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SPEECHES ^ 



OF 



JOHSf C. CAlHOUSf. 



DELIVERED IN THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES FROM 
1811 TO THE PRESENT TIME. 



N E W - y R K : 

HARPER & BROTHERS, 82 CLIFF-STREET. 

18 4 3. 






Entered, according to Act of Congress, m the year 1843, by 

Harper & Brothers, 

In the Clerk's Office of the Southern District of New- York. 



ADVERTISEMENT. 



It may not be inappropriate to set forth, briefly, the considerations which 
have induced the pubUshers to ofFer this volume to the pubHc. ^ The speeches 
which it contains afford the principal— it might almost be said, the only— 
means of knowing the political opinions of a citizen who, for a long suc- 
cession of years, has occupied a conspicuous place before the people j who, 
as a high officer of the government at one time, and as a statesman and 
legislator both before and since that time, has taken a leading part in all the 
great political questions that have agitated the country; who has long pos- 
sessed an almost paramount influence in one part of the Union, and been 
looked upon, in fact, as the chief representative of political opinion in thai 
portion; and who, finally, has now retired from direct participation in the 
councils of the country, only to occupy the station of a candidate for the 
highest office in the gift of the people. The political doctrines of such 2 
man cannot but afford interesting matter for attention and study ; and it ij 
believed that both friends and opponents of the distinguished person referrec 
to will gladly avail themselves of this opportunity to make themselves ac- 
quainted with his views and principles. 

The publishers have only to add, that in collecting the materials for the 
succeeding pages, they have resorted to the most authentic sources. 

^ H. & B. 

New-York, June, 1843. 



CONTENTS. 



Page 

I. Delivered in the House of Representatives, December 19, 1811, in the De- 
bate on the Second Resolution reported by the Committee of Foreign 

Relations 9 

II. Onslow in Reply to Patrick Henry — No. 1 14 

" " " No. 2 22 

III. Mr. Calhoun's Address, stating his Opinion of the RelatLQa_which the, 
"^Slates. and General Government bear to each other . . '. . 27 

IV. MrrCalhoun's Letter to General Hamilton on the Subject of State Inter- 

position 43 

V. Speech against the Force Bill 67 

- VI. Speech on his Resolutions, and Reply to Mr. Webster, February 26, 1833 98 
-^ VII. Speech on the Subject of the Removal of the Deposites from the Bank of 

the United States, January 13, 1834 122 

-^-VIII. Speech on Mr. Webster's Proposition to Recharter the United States 

Bank, March 26, 1834 138 

IX. Speech delivered in the Senate of the United States, April 9, 1834, on the 

Bill to Repeal the Force Act 154 

X. A Report on the Extent of Executive Patronage, February 9, 1835 . . 168 
XI. A Report on that Portion of the President's Message which related to the 
Adoption of efficient Measures to prevent the Circulation of incendiary 
Abolition Petitions through the Mail, February 4, 1836 .189 
XII. Speech on the Abolition Petitions, March 9, 1836 197 

XIII. Speech on the Bill to prohibit Deputy Postmasters from receiving and 

transmitting through the Mail certain Papers therein mentioned, April 
12, 1836 210 

XIV. Speech on the Reception of Abolition Petitions, February, 1837 . 222 
XV. Speech on the Public Deposites, May 28, 1836 226 

XVI. Speech on the Bill for the Admission of Michigan, Januar>' 2, 1837 . . 243 

XVII. On the same Subject, January 5, 1837 249 

--XVIII. Speech on the Bill authorizing an Issue of Treasury Notes, September 19, 

1837 259 

- - XIX. Speech on his Amendment to Separate the Government from the Banks, 

October 3, 1837 275 

XX. Speech on the Sub-treasury Bill, February 15, 1838 .... 290 

XXI. Speech in Reply to Mr. Clay, on the Sub-treasury Bill, March 10, 1838 . 309 
XXII. Speech in Reply to Mr. Webster on4;he Sub-treasury Bill, March 22, 1838 32 

XXIII. Speech on the Bill to Prevent the Interference of certain Federal Officers 

in Elections, February 22, 1839 352 

XXIV. Speech on the Report of Mr. Grundy, of Tennessee, in relation to the As- 

sumption of the Debts of the States by the Federal Government, Febru- 
ary 5, 1840 363 

XXV. Speech on his Resolutions in reference to the Case of the Enterprise, 

March 13, 1840 378 

XXVI. Speech on the Bankrupt Bdl, June 2, 1840 390 

XXVIl. Speech on the Prospective Pre-emption Bill, January 12, 1841 . 403 
XXVIII. Speech on the Bill to Distribute the Proceeds of the Public Lands, Janu- 
ary 23, 1841 417 

XXIX. Speech in Reply to the Speeches of Mr. Webster and Mr. Clay, on Mr. y 

Crittenden's Amendment to the Pre-emption Bill, January 30, 1841 . 429-^ 

XXX. Speech on the Case of M'Leod, June 11, 1841 442 

XXXI. Speech on the Distribution Bill, August 24, 1841 447 

XXXII. Speech on the Treasury Note Bill, January 25, 1842 .... 462 

XXXIII. Speech in Support of the Veto Power, February 28, 1842 .... 477 

XXXIV. Speech on Mr. Clay's Resolutions in Relation to the Revenues and Expen- 

ditures of the Government, March 16, 1842 439 

XXXV. Speech on the Loan Bill, April 12, 1842 509 

-t'-XXXVI. Speech on the Passage of the Tariff Bill, August 5, 1842 . . . .518 

XXXVII. Speech on the Treaty of Washington, August, 1842 532 

XXXVIII. Speech on the Oregon Bill, January 24, 1843 544 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 



I. 

DELIVERED IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, DECEMBER 19, 1811, IN THE 
DEBATE ON THE SECOND RESOLUTION REPORTED BY THE COMMITTEE OF FOR- 
EIGN RELATIONS. 

Mr. Speaker — I understood the opinion of the Committee of Foreign Rela- 
tions differently from what the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Randolph) has 
stated to be his impression. I certainly understood that the committee recom- 
mended the measures now before the house as a preparation for war ; and 
such, in fact, was its express resolve, agreed to, I believe, by every member 
except that gentleman. I do not attribute any wilful misstatement to him, but 
consider it the eflect of inadvertency or mistake. Indeed, the report could mean 
nothing but war or empty menace. I hope no member is in favour of the lat- 
ter. A bullying, menacing system has everything to condemn and nothing to 
recommend it — in expense it almost rivals war. It excites contempt abroad 
and destroys confidence at home. Menaces are serious things, which ought to 
be resorted to with as much caution and seriousness as war itself; and should, 
if not successful, be invariably followed by war. It was not the gentleman 
from Tennessee (Mr. Grundy) that made this a war question. The resolve 
contemplates an additional regular force ; a measure confessedly improper but 
as a preparation for war, but undoubtedly necessary in that event. Sir, I am 
not insensible to the weighty importance of this question, for the first time sub- 
mitted to this house, to r^ompel a redress of our long list of complaints against 
one of the belligerants. According to my mode of thinking, the more serious 
the question, my conviction to support it must be the stronger and more unal- 
terable. War, in. our country, ought never to be resorted to but when it is 
clearly justifiable and necessary ; so much so as not to require the aid of logic 
to convince our understanding, nor the ardour of eloquence to inflame our pas- 
sions. There are many reasons why this country should never resort to it but 
for causes the most urgent and necessary. It is sufiicient that, under a govern- 
ment like ours, none but such will justify it in the eyes of the people ; and were 
I not satisfied that such is the present case, I certainly would be no advocate 
of the proposition now before the house. 

Sir, I might prove the war, should it follow, to be justifiable, by the express 
admission of the gentleman from Virginia ; and necessary, by facts undoubted 
and universally admitted, such as he did not attempt to controvert. The ex- 
tent, duration, and character of the injuries received ; the failure of those peace- 
ful means heretofore resorted to for the redress of our wrongs, are my proofs 
that it is necessary. Why should I mention the impressment of our seamen — 
depredation on every branch of our commerce, including the direct export trade, 
continued for years, and made under laws which professedly undertake to reg- 
ulate our trade with other nations 1 negotiation, resorted to again and again, 
till it became hopeless, and the restrictive system persisted in to avoid war, and 
in the vain expectation of returning justice ? The evil still continued to grow, 
so that each succeeding year exceeded in enormity the preceding. The ques- 
tion, even in the opinion and admission of our opponents, is reduced to this sin- 

B 



10 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

gle point : Which shall we do, abandon or defend our own commercial and mar- 
itime rights, and the personal liberties of our citizens employed in exercising 
them ? These rights are vitally attacked, and war is the only means of re- 
dress. The gentleman from Virginia has suggested none, unless we consider 
the whole of his speech as recommending patient and resigned submission as 
the best remedy. It is for the house to decide which of the alternatives ought 
to be embraced. I hope the decision is made already, by a higher authority 
than the voice of any man. It is not in the power of speech to infuse the sense 
of independence and honour. To resist wrong is the instinct of nature ; a gen- 
erous nature, that disdains tame submission. 

This part of the subject is so imposing as to enforce silence even on the gen- 
tleman from Virginia. He dared not to deny his country's wrongs, or vindi- 
cate the conduct of her enemy. But one part only of his argument had any, 
the most remote relation to this point. He would not say that we had not a 
good cause for war, but insisted that it was our duty to define that cause. If 
he means that this house ought, at this stage of its proceedings, or any other, 
to specify any particular violation of our rights to the exclusion of all others, 
he prescribes a course which neither good sense nor the usage of nations war- 
rants. ^Vhen we contend, let us contend for all our rights — the doubtful and 
the certain, the unimportant and essential. It is as easy to contend, or even 
more so, for the whole as for a part. At the termination of the contest, secure 
all that our wisdom, and valour, and the fortune of war will permit. This is 
the dictate of common sense, and such, also, is the usage of nations. The sin- 
gle instance alluded to, the endeavour of Mr. Fox to compel Mr. Pitt to define 
the object of the war against France, will not support the gentleman from Vir- 
ginia in his position. That was an extraordinary war for an extraordinary pur- 
pose, and was not governed by the usual rules. It was not for conquest or for 
redress of injury, but to impose a government on France which she refused to 
receive — an object so detestable that an avowal dare not be made. 

I might here rest the question. The affirmative of the proposition is estab- 
lished. I cannot but advert, however, to the complaint of the gentleman from 
"V irginia when he was first up on this question. He said he found himself re- 
duced to the necessity of supporting the negative side of the question before the 
affirmative was established. Let me tell that gentleman that there is no hard- 
ship in his case. It is not every affirmative that ought to be proved. Were I 
to affirm that the house is now in session, would it be reasonable to ask for 
proof? He who would deny its truth, on him would be the proof of so extra- 
ordinary a negative. How, then, could the gentleman, after his admissions, and 
■with the facts before him and the nation, complain? The causes are such as 
to warrant, or, rather, to make it indispensable in any nation not absolutely de- 
l)endant to defend its rights by arms. Let him, then, show the reasons why we 
ought not so to defend ourselves. On him, then, is the burden of proof. This 
ho has attempted. He has endeavoured to support his negative. Before I pro- 
ceed to answer him particularly, let me call the attention of the house to one 
circumstance, that almost the whole of his arguments consisted of an enumer- 
ation of evils always incident to war, however just and necessary ; and that, if 
they have any force, it is calculated to produce unqualified submission to every 
species of insult and injury. I do not feel myself bound to answer arguments 
of that description, and if 1 should allude to them, it will be only incidentally, 
and not for the jnirpose of serious refutation. 

The first argument which I shall notice is the unprepared state of the coun- 
try. Whatever weight this argument might have in a question of immediate 
war, it surely has little in that of preparation for it. If our country is unpre- 
pared, let us prepare as soon as possible. Let the gentleman subm'it his plan, 
and if a reasonable one, I doubt not it will be supported by the house. But, 
sir, let us admit the fact with the whole force of the argument ; I ask, whose is 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 11 

the fault 1 Who has been a member for many years past, and has seen the 
defenceless state of his country, even near home, under his own eyes, without 
a sinde endeavour to remedy so serious an evil ? Let him not say " I have 
acted in a minority." It is no less the duty of the minority than a majority to 
endeavour to defend the country. For that purpose principally we are sent 
here, and not for that of opposition. 

We are next told of the expenses of the war, and that the people will not 
pay taxes. Why not? Is it a want of means ? What, with 1,000,000 tons of 
shipping ; a commerce of $100,000,000 annually ; manufactures yielding a 
yearly product of $150,000,000, and agriculture thrice that amount; shall we, 
with such great resources, be told that the country wants ability to raise and 
support 10,000 or 15,000 additional regulars? No : it has the ability, that is 
admitted ; but will it not have the disposition ? Is not our course just and ne- 
cessary ? Shall we, then, utter this libel on the people ? Where will proof be 
found of a fact so disgraceful ? It is said, in the history of the country twelve 
or fifteen years ago. The case is not parallel. The ability of the country is 
greatly increased since. The whiskey tax was unpopular. But, as well as my 
memory serves me, the objection was not so much to the tax or its amount as 
the mode of collectnig it. The people were startled by the host of officers, and 
their love of liberty shocked with the multiplicity of regulations. We, in the 
spirit of imitation, copied from the most oppressive part of the European laws 
on the subject of taxes, and imposed on a young and virtuous people the se- 
vere provisions made necessary by corruption and the long practice of evasion. 
If taxes should become necessary, I do not hesitate to say the people will pay 
cheerfully. It is for their government and their cause, and it would be their 
interest and duty to pay. But it may be, and I believe was said, that the peo- 
ple will not pay taxes, because the rights violated are not worth defending, or 
that the defence will cost more than the gain. Sir, I here enter my solemn 
protest against this low and " calculating avarice" entering this hall of legisla- 
tion. It'is only fit for shops and counting-houses, and ought not to disgrace 
the seat of power by its squalid aspect. Whenever it touches sovereign pow- 
er, the nation is ruined. It is too short-sighted to defend itself. It is a com- 
promising spirit, always ready to yield a part to save the residue. It is too 
timid to have in itself the laws of self-preservation. It is never safe but under 
the shield of honour. There is, sir, one principle necessary to make us a great 
people — to produce, not the form, but real spirit of union, and that is to protect 
every citizen in the lawful pursuit of his business. He will then feel that he 
is backed by the government — that its arm is his arm. He then will rejoice in 
its increased strength and prosperity. Protection and patriotism are reciprocal. 
This is the way which has led nations to greatness. Sir, I am not versed in 
this calculating policy, and will not, therefore, pretend to estimate in dollars 
and cents the value of national independence. I cannot measure in shillings 
and pence the misery, the stripes, and the slavery of our impressed seamen ; 
nor even the value of our shipping, commercial and agricultural losses, under 
the orders in council and the British system of blockade. In thus expressing 
myself, I do not intend to condemn any prudent estimate of the means of a 
country before it enters on a war. That is wisdom, the other folly. The 
gentleman from Virginia has not failed to touch on the calamity of war, that 
fruitful source of declamation, by which humanity is made the advocate of sub- 
mission. If he desires to repress the gallant ardour of our countrymen by such 
topics, let me inform him that true courage regards only the cause ; that it is 
just and necessary, and that it contemns the sufferings and dangers of war. If 
he really wishes well to the cause of humanity, let his eloquence be addressed 
to the British ministry, and not the American Congress. Tell them that, if 
they persist in such daring insult and outrages to a neutral nation, however in- 
clined to peace, it will be bound by honour and safety to resist ; that their pa- 



12 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

tience and endurance, however great, will be exhausted ; that the calamity of 
war will ensue, and that they, and not we, in the opinion of the Avorld, will be 
answerable for all its devastation and raiser}^ Let a regard to the interest of 
humanity stay the hand of injustice, and my life on it, the gentleman Avill not 
find it dillicuit to dissuade iiis coimtrymen from rushing into the bloody scenes 

of war. 

We are next told of the danger of war. We are ready to acknowledge its 
hazard and misfortune, but I cannot think that we have any extraordinary dan- 
ger to apprehend, at least none to warrant an acquiescence in the injuries we 
have received. On the contrary, I believe no war would be less dangerous to 
internal peace or the safety of the country. But we are told of the black pop- 
ulation of the Southern States. As far as the gentleman from Virginia speaks 
of his own personal knowledge, I shall not question the correctness of his 
statement. I only regret that such is the state of apprehension in his part of 
the country. Of the southern section, I too have some personal knowledge, 
and can say that in South Carolina no such fears, in any part, are felt. But, 
sir, admit the gentleman's statement : will a war with Great Britain increase 
the danger ? VV'ill the country be less able to suppress insurrections ? Had we 
anything to fear from that quarter — which. I do not believe — in my opinion, the 
period of the greatest safety is during a war, unless, indeed, the enemy should 
make a lodgment in the country. It is in war .that the countrj' would be most on 
iis guard, our militia the best prepared, and the standing army the greatest. Even 
in our Revolution, no attempts were made at insurrection by that portion of our pop- 
ulation ; and, however the gentleman may alarm himself with the disorganizing 
eilects of French principles, I cannot think our ignorant blacks have felt much 
of their baneful influence. I dare say more than one half of them never heard 
of the French Revolution. 

But as great as he regards the danger from our slaves, the gentleman's fears 
end not there — the standing army is not less terrible to liim. Sir, I think a 
regidar force, raised for a period of actual hostilities, cannot properly be called 
a standing army. There is a just distinction between such a force and one 
raised as a permanent peace establishment. Whatever would be the composi- 
tion of the latter, I hope the former will consist of some of the best materials of 
the country. The ardent patriotism of our young men, and the liberal bounty 
in land proposed to be given, will impel them to join their country's stand- 
ard, and to fight her battles. They will not forget the citizen in the soldier, 
and, in obeying their officers, learn to contemn their government and Con- 
stitution. In our officers and soldiers we will find patriotism no less pure and 
ardent than in the private citizen ; but if they should be as depraved as has 
been represented, what have we to fear from 25,000 or 30,000 regulars ? 
Where will be the boasted militia of the gentleman ? Can 1,000,000 of militia 
be ovorpowfred by 30,000 regulars ? If so, how can we rely on them against 
a foe invading our country? Sir, I have no such contemptuous idea of our 
militia : their untaught bravery is sufficient to crush all foreign and internal at- 
tempts on their country's liberties. 

But we have not yet come to the end of the chapter of dangers. The gen- 
tleman's imagination, so fruitful on this subject, conceives that our Constitution 
is not caiculat«'d for war, and that it cannot stand its rude shock. Can that be 
80 ? If so, we must then depend upon the commiseration or contempt of other 
nations for our existence. The Constitution, then, it seems, has failed in an 
essential object : " to provide for the common defence." -No, says the gentle- 
man, it is competent to a defensive, but not an offensive war. It is not neces- 
sary for me to expose the fallacy of this argument. Why make the distinction 
in this case f Will he pretend to say that this is an oilonsive war— a war of 
conquest ? Yes, the gentleman has ventured to make this assertion, and for 
reasons- no less extraordinary than the assertion itself. He says, our rights are 



SPEECHES OP JOHN C. CALHOUN. 13 

violated on the ocean, and that these violations affect our shipping and commer- 
cial rights, to which the Canadas have no relation. The doctrine of retaUation 
has been much abused of late, by an unreasonable extension of its meaning. 
We have now to witness a new abuse : the gentleman from Virginia has limited 
it down to a point. By his rule, if you receive a blow on the breast, you dare 
not return it on the head ; you are obliged to measure atid return it on the pre- 
cise point on which it was received. If you do not proceed with this mathe- 
matical accuracy, it ceases to be selT-defence — it becomes an improvoked attack. 

In speaking of Canada, the gentleman from Virginia introduced the name of 
Montgomery with much feeling and interest. Sir, there is danger in that name 
to the gentleman's argument. It is sacred to heroism ! it is indignant of sub- 
mission ! It calls our memory back to the time of onr Revolution — to the Con- 
gress of 1774 and 1775. Suppose a member of that day had rose and urged 
all the arguments which we have heard on this occasion — had told that Con- 
gress your contest is about the right of laying a tax — that the attempt on Cana- 
da had nothing to do with it — that the war would be expensive — that danger 
and devastation would overspread our country — and that the power of Great 
Britain was irresistible. With what sentiment, think you, would such doctrines 
have been then received ? Happy for us, they had no force at that period of our 
country's glory. Had such been acted on, this hall would never have witnessed 
a great people convened to deliberate for the general good ; a mighty empire, 
with prouder prospects than any nation the sun ever shone on, would not have 
risen in the West. No ! we would have been base, subjected colonies, gov- 
erned by that imperious rod which Britain holds over her distant provinces. 

The gentleman attributes the preparation for war to everything but its true 
cause. He endeavoured to find it in the probable rise in the price of hemp. 
He represents the people of the Western States as willing to plunge our coun- 
try into war for such interested and base motives. I will not reason this point. 
I see the cause of their ardour, not in such unworthy motives, but in their known 
patriotism and disinterestedness. 

No less mercenary is the reason which he attributes to the Southern States. 
He says that the Non-importation Act has reduced cotton to nothing, Avhich has 
produced a feverish impatience. Sir, I acknowledge the cotton of our planta- 
tions is worth but little, but not for the cause assigned by the gentleman. The 
people of that section do not reason as he does ; they do not attribute it to the 
efforts of their government to maintain the peace and independence of their 
country : they see in the low price of their produce the hand of foreign injustice ; 
they know well, Avithout the market of the Continent, the deep and steady cur- 
rent of our supply will glut that of Great Britain. They are not prepared for 
the colonial state, to which again that power is endeavouring to reduce us.. 
The manly spirit of that section will not submit to be regulated by any foreiga 
power. 

The love of France and the hatred of England have also been assigned as 
the cause of the present measure. France has not done us justice, says the 
gentleman from Virginia, and how can we, without partiality, resist the aggres- 
sions of England ? I know, sir, we have still cause of complaint against 
France, but it is of a different character from that against England. She 
professes now to respect our rights ; and there cannot be a reasonable doubt 
but that the most objectionable parts of her decrees, as far as they respect us, 
are repealed. We have already formally acknowledged this to be a fact. But 
I protest against the principle from which his conclusion is drawn. It is a 
novel doctrine, and nowhere avowed out of this house, that you cannot select 
your antagonist without being guilty of partiality. Sir, when two invade your 
rights, you may resist both, or either, at your pleasure. The selection is regu- 
lated by prudence, and not by right. The stale imputation of partiality for 
France is better calculated for the columns of a newspaper than for the walls 
of this house. 



14 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

The trentleman from Yir-inia is at a loss to account for what he calls our 
hatred to En"land. He asks, how can we hate the country of Locke of New- 
ton HauMMlcn, and Chatham ; a country having the same language and customs 
with our:,.-ive3, and descended from a common ancestry ? Sir, the laws of hu- 
man allections are steadv and uniform. If we have so much to attach us to 
that countn-, powerful indeed must be the cause which has overpowered it. 
Yes there is a causo strong enough; not that occidt, courtly affection, which 
he has -supposed lO be entertained for France, but continued and unprovoked 
insult and injun' : a cause so manifest that he had to exert much ingenuity 
to overlook it. But the gentleman, m his eager admiration of England, has not 
been sulHciently guarded in his argument. Has he reflected on the cause of 
that admiration ? Has he examined the reasons for our high regard for her Chat- 
ham? It is his ardent patriotism — his heroic courage, which could not brook 
the least insult or injury offered to his country, but thought that her interest and 
her honour ought to be vindicated, be the hazard and expense what they might. 
1 hoiH}, when we are called on to admire, we shall also be asked to imitate. I 
hope the gentleman does not wish a monopoly of those great virtues for Englaiid. 

The balance of power has also been introduced as an argument for submis- 
sion. England is said to be a barrier against the military despotism of France. 
There is, sir, one great error in our legislation ; we are ready, it would seem 
from this argument, to watch over the interests of foreign nations, while we 
grossly neglect our own immediate concerns. This argument, drawn from the 
balance of° power, is well calculated for the British Parliament, but is not at 
all suited to the American Congress. Tell the former that they have to coii- 
tend with a mighty power, and if they persist in insult and injmy to the Ameri- 
can people, they will compel them to throw their weight into the scale of their 
enemy. Paint the danger to them, and if they will desist from injiuing us, I 
answer for it, we will not disturb the balance of power. But it is absurd for 
us to talk about it, while they, by their conduct, smile with contempt at what 
they regard as our simple, good-natured vanity. If, however, in the contest, it 
should be found that they imderrate us, which I hope and believe, and that we 
can affect the balance of power, it will not be difficult for us to obtain such terras 
as our rights demand. 

I, sir, will -now conclude, by adverting to an argument of the gentleman used 
in debate on a preceding day. He asked, why not declare war immediately 1 
The answer is obvious — because we are not yet prepared. But, says the gen- 
tleman, such language as is held here will provoke Great Britain to commence 
hostilities. I have no such fears. She knows well that such a course would 
imite all parties here — a thing which, above all others, she most dreads. Be- 
sides, such has been our past conduct, that she will still calculate on our pa- 
tience and submission till war is actually commenced. 



II. 

ONSLOW IN REPLY TO PATRICK HENRY. 
No. 1. 

If rumour may be credited, I may be proud in having you as an antagonist 
[Mr. A., the President of the United States] ; and if I were actuated by a senti- 
ment of vanity, much of my reply would be devoted to tracing the strong, but, 
perhaps, accidental analogy between the style of your numbers and some of 
our public documents. But truth, and not the gratification of vanity, is my ob- 
ject ; and though the pride of victory would be swelled in proportion to the high 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 15 

Standing of an opponent, I shall, without stopping to inquire into the question 
of authorship, proceed directly to the point at issue. 

If you have failed in your argument, you have, at least, succeeded in giving 
the question a new and interesting aspect. You have abandoned the rules and 
usages of the Senate, as the source of the Vice-president's authority as the 
presiding officer of the Senate. You contend that the disputed right is derived 
directly from the Constitution, and that the Vice-president's authority is wholly 
independent of the will of the Senate, which can neither give nor take it away. 
It is not my wish to misstate your arguments in the slightest degree, and, to 
avoid the possibility of misrepresentation, you shall speak for yourself. Spurn- 
ing the authority of the Senate, you scornfully observe, " With the easy assu- 
rance of a man stating a conceded postulate, he (Onslow) says, ' After z\\, the 
power of the Vice-president must depend upon the rules and usages of the Sen- 
ate :' a postulate not only false in its principle, but which, if true, would not 
sustain the cause to whose aid it is invoked. Unless the Constitution of the 
United States was subjected to some military construction, the power of the 
Vice-president, in presiding over the Senate, rests on deeper, holier founda- 
tions than any rules or usages which that body may adopt. What says the 
Constitution ? ' The Vice-president of the United States shall be President of 
the Senate, but shall have no vote unless they be equally divided.' ' The Sen- 
ate shall choose their own officers, and also a president pro tempore, in the 
absence of the Vice-president, or when he shall exercise the office of Presi- 
dent of the United States.' — (Const. U. S., Art. 1, Sec. 3.) It is here made 
the duty of the Vice-president to preside over the Senate, under the sole re- 
striction of having no vote except in a given case ; the right of the Senate to 
choose their president is confined to two contingencies ; his powers, after be- 
ing so chosen, are identical with those of the president set over them by the 
Constitution, and any abridgment of those powers by the Senate would be a pal- 
pable infraction of that Constitution. Now, sir, what is the inVport of the terra 
' to preside,' in relation to a deliberative assembly ? Can any sophistry devise 
a plausible definition of it, which would exclude the power of preserving or- 
der ? In appointing an officer to preside over the Senate, the people surely in- 
tended not to erect an empty pageant, but to accomplish some useful object : 
and when, in another part of the Constitution, they authorize each house ' to 
determine the rules of its proceedings,' they do not authorize it to adopt rules 
depriving any office created by the Constitution of powers belonging, ex vi ter- 
mini, to that office. If the plainest or most profound man in the commimity 
Avere asked what powers he supposed to be inherent in the presiding officer of 
either house of Congress, he would instantly enumerate, first, the power of 
preserving order in its deliberations ; next, that of collecting the sense of its 
members on any question submitted to their decision ; and, thirdly, that of au- 
thenticating, by his signature, their legislative acts. I have before said, and I 
regret that I am obliged to repeat a truism, that ' the right to call to order is a 
necessary consequence of the power of preserving order ;' and that, ' unless a 
deliberative body, acting within the sphere of its competence, expressly restrict 
this power and this right, no restriction on them can then be supposed.' In di- 
vesting the president set over them by the people, of any power which he had 
received, either expressly or impliedly, from the people, the Senate, instead of 
' acting withiri the sphere of their competence,' would act usurpingly and un- 
constitutionally — they would nullify the connexion which the people had es- 
tabUshed between themselves and their president; they would reduce them- 
selves to the monstrous spectacle of a body without a head, and their president 
to the equally monstrous spectacle of a head without a body ; and their violent 
act, while it would be disobeyed as illegal, would be contemned as ridiculous. 
But, in truth, the Senate have never thus forgotten their allegiance to the Con- 
stitution." 



IQ SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

There can be no mistake as to the source or the nature of the power, ac • 
cordiiur to your conception. You tell us plainly that it rests " on a deeper, 
holier Lundation ' than the rules of the Senate— that it is " inherent in the Vice- 
president and that, as presiding officer, he possesses it ex vi termini ; that an 
attempt to divest, and, of course, to modify the power 'by the Senate, would be 
to act' usurpingly and unconstitutionally," and that " such violent act would be 
disobeyed as iflegal, and contemned as ridiculous." _ 

These are, at least, lofty grounds, and if they can be maintained, there is an 
end of the controversy. It would be absurd to go farther. An inquiry into the 
ndes and usages of the Senate, after such grounds are occupied, becomes ri- 
diculous, and much more so an inquiry into those of the houses of Parliament : 
for surely, if it is beyond the power of the Senate to give or withhold the right, 
it must stand on an elevation far above parliamentary rules or usages ; and I 
was therefore not a little surprised to find that, after so bold an assertion, more 
than four fifths of your long and elaborate essay was devoted to a learned and 
critical inquiry into these very rules and usages. There can be but one expla- 
nation of so strange an inconsistency, but that a very satisfactory one. You 
lack confidence in your own position ; and well might you : for, surely, power 
so despotic and dangerous, so inconsistent with the first principles of liberty, 
and every sound view of the Constitution, was never attempted to be establish- 
ed on arguments so imbecile and absurd, to which no intellect, however badly 
organized, could yield assent, unless associated with feelings leaning strongly 
lo°the side of power. That such are your feelings, no one who reads your es- 
say can doubt. None of your sympathies are on the Democratic side of our in- 
stitutions. If a question can be made as to where power is lodged, it requires 
but little sagacity to perceive that you will be found on the side which will 
place it in the fewest and least responsible hands. You perceive perfection 
only in the political arrangement, which, with simplicity and energy, gives pow- 
er to a single will. It is not, then, at all surprising, that you should seize on 
that portion of the Constitution which appoints the Vice-president to be Presi- 
dent of the Senate ; and that you should quote it at large, and dwell on it at 
length, as the source of high and uncontrollable power in that officer ; while you 
have but slightly and casually adverted to another section in the same article, 
which clothes the Senate with the power " of determining the rules of their pro- 
ceedings, punishing its members for disorderly conduct, and, with the concur- 
rence of two thirds, of expelUng a member." — (See Art. 1, Sec. 5.) Had your 
predilections for the unity and irresponsibility of power been less strong, you 
could not have failed to see that the point of view in which you have thought 
proper to place the question made it one of relative power between the Senate 
and its presiding officer. You place the Vice-president on one side and the Sen- 
ate on the other ; and the more you augment the constitutional power of the for- 
mer as the presiding officer, just in the same proportion you diminish the pow- 
er of the latter. What is gained to the one is lost to the other ; and in this com- 
petition of power you were bound to present fully and fairly both sides. This 
you have not done, and, consequently, you have fallen not only into gross, but 
dangerous errors. You set out by asserting that the very object of the appoint- 
ment of the Vice-president as President of the Senate was to preserve order, 
and that he has all the powers, ex vi termini, necessary to the attainment of the 
end for which he was appointed. Having gained this point, you make your 
next step, that the right of enforcing order involves that of calling to order, and 
that again involves the very power in question, which the Vice-president de- 
clined to exercise. You then draw two corollaries : that the power held by 
the Vice-president being derived direct from the Constitution, is held independ- 
ently of the Senate, and is, consequently, beyond their control or participation ; 
and that, as the Vice-president alone possesses it, he, and he alone, is respon- 
sible for order and decorum. Such is your summary logic, which you accom- 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 17 

pany with so much abuse of Mr. Calhoun for not calling the power, which you 
have as you suppose, clearly proven that he possesses by the Constitution, into 
active energy, by correcting and controlling, at his sole will and pleasure, the 
licentious and impertinent debates of the Senators. , ^ , ^ a 

Let us now turn the same mode of reasoning on the side of the Senate, and 
you will perceive that it applies with infinite more force, though you have not 
thought it deserving of notice. . . 

The Constitution has vested the Senate with the right of determining the 
rules of its proceedings, and of punishing members for disorderly conduct, which 
may extend even to expulsion. The great object of givmg the power to estab- 
lish rules is to preserve order. The only effectual means of preserving order 
is to prescribe by rules what shall be a violation of order, and to enforce the 
same by adequate punishment. The Senate alone has these powers by the 
Constitution : consequently, the Senate alone has the right of enforcing order ; 
and, consequently, whatever right the Vice-president possesses over order, 
must be derived from the Senate ; and, therefore, he can exercise no power in 
adopting rules or enforcing them, but what has been delegated to him by the 
Senate,°and only to the extent, both in manner and matter, to which the power 
has been delegated. The particular power in question not havmg been dele- 
aated, cannot be exercised by the Vice-president, and, consequently, he is not 
responsible. Do you not perceive the irresistible force with which your own 
mode of reasoning applies to the substantial constitutional powers of the Senate, 
and how partial and absurd your arguments in favour of the inferred constitu- 
tional power of its presiding officer must appear in contrast with it J As absurd 
as it now appears, it shall be, if possible, intinitely more so before I have closed 
this part of the investigation. -u • j f 

With the same predilection, your assumptions are all on the side ot uncon- 
trolled and unlimited power. Without proof, or even an attempt at it, you as- 
sume that the power in controversy is inherent in the Vice-president, and that 
he possesses it ex vi termini, as presiding officer of the Senate. Now 1, who 
have certainly as much right to assume as yourself, deny that he possesses any 
such power ; and what may, perhaps, startle a mind organized like yours, 1 af- 
firm that, as a presiding officer, he has no inherent power whatever, unless that 
of doin<T what the Senate may prescribe by its rules be such a power. There 
are indeed, inherent powers, but they are in the body, and not in the officer. 
He' is a mere agent to execute the will of the former. He can exercise no 
power which he does not hold by delegation, either express or implied. He 
stands in the same relation to the body, or assembly over which he presides, 
that a magistrate in a republic does to the state, and it would be as absurd to at- 
tribute to'the latter inherent powers as to the former. This, m fact, was once 
a fashionable doctrine. There was a time when minions of power thought it 
monstrous that all of the powers of rulers should be derived from so low and 
filthy a source as the people whom they govern. " A deeper and hoher found- 
ation" of power was sought, and that was proclaimed to be in the " inherent, 
divine "right of rulers;" and, as their powers were thus shown to be inde- 
pendent of the wiU of the people, it followed that any attempt on their part to 
divest rulers of power would be an act of " such violence as would be disobey- 
ed as illeoal and contemned as ridiculous." I might trace the analogy between 
your lano-uaae and principles and those of the advocate of despotic power in all 
ages and° countries much farther, but I deem it not necessary either to weaken 
or refute your arguments. A more direct and decisive reply may be given. _ 

An inherent power is one that belongs essentially to the office, and is, m its 
nature, inseparable from it. To divest the office of it would be to change its 
nature. It would be no longer the same office. It is, then, a power wholly 
independent of the circumstances how the office may be created or filled, orm 
what particular manner its functions may be exercised. If, then, the power be- 
^ C 



18 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOtJN. 

longs to the Vice-president inherently, as presiding officer of the Senate, it is 
because it is essentially attached to the mere function of presiding in a deliber- 
ative assembly, and, consequently, belongs to all presiding officers over such as- 
semblies ; for it would be absurd to assert that it is inherent in him as President 
of the Senate, and then make it depend on the circumstance that he holds his 
appointment to preside in the Senate by the Constitution. The high power, 
then, which you attribute to the Vice-president, must belong, if your argument 
be correct, to the Speaker of the House of Commons, to the lord-chancellor, 
as presidiiig officer of the House of Lords, to the Speaker of the House of Rep- 
resentatives, and those of our State Legislatures. They must not only -possess 
the power, but must hold it independently of the will of the bodies over which 
they preside ; which can neither give nor take it away, nor modify the mode 
of exercising it, nor control its operation. These consequences, absurd as 
they appear to be, are legitimately drawn from your premises. 

Now " out of thine own mouth I will condemn thee ;" by your own authori- 
ties you shall be refuted. To prove that the Vice-president possesses this 
power, you have laboured to establish the fact that the Speaker of the House 
of Commons holds and exercises it, and in proof of which you have cited many 
cases from Jefferson's Manual. 

It is true that he has, at least to a certain extent, but how has he acquired it ? 
This is the important inquiry in the point of view in which we are now con- 
sidering the question. Is it inherent, or is it delegated 1 If the former, 1 ac- 
knowledge that your argument, from analogy, in favour of the inherent power 
of the Vjce-president, would have much force ; but, if the latter, it must utterly 
fail; for, if delegated, it clearly establishes the fact that the power is in the 
body, and not in the presiding officer, and, consequently, not inherent in the Vice- 
president, as you affirm. The instances that you have cited shall decide the 
point. What say the cases? "On the 14th of April, 1604, rule conceived, 
that if any man speak impertinently, or beside the question in hand, it stands 
with the orders of the house for the speaker to interrupt him, and to show the 
pleasure of the house, whether they will farther hear him." " On the 17th of 
April, 1604, agreed for a general rule, if any superfluous motion or tedious 
speech be offered in the house, the party is to be directed and ordered by Mr. 
Speaker." " On the 19th of May, 1604, Sir William Paddy entering into a long 
speech, a rule agreed, that, if any man speak not to the matter in question, the 
speaker is to moderate." So it is said, on the 2d of May, 1610, when a mem- 
ber made what seemed an impertinent speech, and there was much hissing and 
spitting, " that it Avas conceived for a rule, that Mr. Speaker may stay imperti- 
nent speeches." " On the 10th of November, 1640, it was declared that, when 
a business is begun and in debate, if any man rise to speak to a new business, 
any member may, but Mr. Speaker ought to, interrupt him."— See HatseWs 
Precedents, vol. ii., M edition. 

Do you not notice, that in every case the power was delegated by the house j 
that the language is, " rule conceived," " it was agreed to as a general rule," 
" rule atrreed," &c., &c. ; and this, too, in relation to the very power in question, 
according to your own showing? Thus it is established, beyond controversy, 
that in the House of Commons the power is really in the body, and not m the 
presiding officer. i. c. i 

• If, to this decisive proof that the power has been delegated to the Speaker 
of the House of Commons, and is, consequently, not inherent, we add that it is 
conferred on the Speaker of the House of Representatives (see 19th rule) by 
an express rule of the house, and that the lord-chancellor, as presiding officer 
in the House of Lords, possesses it not, either ex-officio or by delegation, as 
shall be shown hereafter, your monstrous and slavish doctrine, that it is an in- 
herent power, will be completely overthrown, and you are left without the pos- 
sibility of escape. 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 19 

Should you attempt to extricate yourself by endeavouring to show that, un- 
der our Constitution, the relative powers of the Vice-president and the Senate 
are different from those of the speaker and the House of Commons ; and that, 
though the latter may hold the power by delegation from the body, that the 
Vice-president may possess it by a different and higher tenure, it would, at least, 
prove that you cede the point that it is not inherent, and, also, that it cannot be 
deduced from analogy between the poicers of the two presiding officers, which 
you have so much relied on in another part of your essay. But this shall not 
avail you. The door is already closed in that direction. It has been, I trust, 
conclusively proved that the Constitution, so far from countenancing the idea 
of the power being inherent in the Vice-president, gives it to the Senate, by the 
strongest implication, in conferring the express right of establishing its own 
rules,, and punishing for disorderly conduct. If you are not yet convinced, ad- 
ditional arguments are not wanting, which, though they may not extort an ac- 
knowledgment of your error, will thoroughly convince you of it. 

You have overlooked the most obvious and best-established rules of construc- 
tion. What are the facts ? The Constitution has designated the Vice-president 
as President of the Senate, and has also clothed that body with the right of de- 
termining the rules of its proceedings. It is obvious that the simple intention of 
the framers of that instrument was to annex to the office of Vice-president that 
of President of the Senate, without intending to define the extent or the limit 
of his power in that character ; and, in like manner, it was the intention to con- 
fer on the Senate simply the power of enacting its own rules of proceeding, 
without reference to the powers, such as they may be, that had been conferred on 
their presiding officer. The extent of power, as between the two, becomes a 
question of construction. Now the first rule of construction, in such cases, is 
the known usage and practice of parliamentary bodies ; and, as those of the 
British Parliament were the best known to the framers of the Constitution, it 
cannot be doubted that, in determining what are the relative powers of the Vice- 
president and the Senate, they ought to prevail. Under this view, as between 
the Vice-president and Senate, the latter possesses the same power in determin- 
ing its rules that is possessed by the houses of Parliament, without being re- 
stricted in the slightest degree by the fact that the Vice-president, under the 
Constitution, is president of the body, saving only the right of adopting such 
rules as apply to the appointment or election of a presiding officer, which the 
Senate would have possessed, if the Constitution had not provided a president 
of the body ; and, as I have proved, from your own cases, that the particular 
power in question incontrovertibly belongs to the house, it follows necessarily, 
according to established rules of construction, that the Senate also possesses it. 

You have overlooked these obvious truths by affixing too high an idea to the 
powers of the presiding officer in preserving order. According to your concep- 
tion, the house is nothing, and the officer everything, on points of order. No- 
thing can be more erroneous. The power you attribute to him has never been 
possessed by the president, or speaker, in any deliberative assembly ; no, not 
even by delegation from the body itself. 

The right of preserving order must depend on the power of enforcing it, or 
of punishing for a breach of order — a right inherent in the house alone, and nev- 
er, in any instance, delegated to the chair. Our Constitution confines this right 
to each house of Congress, by providing " that they may punish for disorderly 
conduct :" a power which they neither have delegated, nor can delegate, to the 
presiding officer. What, then, is the right of preserving order, belonging to the 
Vice-president, which you have so pompously announced, and for not enfor- 
cing which, according to your conception, you and your associates have de- 
nounced Mr. Calhoun almost as a traitor to his country 1 

It is simply the right of calling to order, in the strict, literal meaning ; and, so 
far from being derived from the right of preserving order, as you absurdly sup- 



pose, It IS not even connected with it. 1 lie rigJit ot preserving order depends 
on the richt of enforcing it, or the right of punishment for breaches of order, al- 
ways possessed by the body, but never, either by delegation or otherwise, by 
the chair. It is notorious that the chair cannot enforce its calls to order. The 
bodv alone can, and that only on its decisions, and not on that of the presiding 
officer. It is thus manifest, the high right of preserving order, to Avhich you 
make the riffht of calling to order incidental, belongs especially to the Senate, 
and not to the Vice-president ; and, if your argument be correct, the incident 
must follow the right ; and, consequently, it is the right and duty of a senator 
to call to order for disorderly conduct. So clear is the proposition, that, if the 
member called to order by the chair for disorderly conduct chooses to persist, 
the presiding officer has no other remedy but to repeat his call, or throw himself, 
for the enforcement of it, on the Senate. This feebleness of the chair, in ques- 
tions of order, explains why there has always been such indisposition to call 
to order, even when it is made the express duty by rule, as in the House of 
Representatives, and the House of Commons in England. Thousands of in- 
stances might be cited to establish the truth of this remark, both there and here ; 
instances in which all that has been said and uttered by Mr. Randolph is no- 
thing, but in Avhich the speaker waited for the interference of some of the mem- 
bers, in order to preserve order. Such was the case in the recent occurrence 
in the House of Commons, when i\Ir. Hume made an attack on the Bishop of 
London and the lord-chancellor, both of which, as members of the House of 
Lords, were under the protection of positive rules ; yet no one, even there, had 
the assurance to throw the responsibility on the presiding officer. The parti- 
sans of power in our country have the honour of leading in these new and dan- 
gerous attacks on the freedom of debate. 

Some men, of honest intention, have fallen info the error about the right of 
the Vice-president to preserve order independently of the Senate, because the 
judges, or, as they express it, the presiding officer in the courts of justice pos- 
sess the right. A moment's reflection will show the fallacy. There is not the 
least analogy between the rights and duties of a judge and those of a presiding 
officer in a deliberative assembly. The analogy is altogether the other way. 
It is between the court and the house. In fact, the latter is often called a 
court, and there is a very strict resemblance, in the point under consideration, 
between what may be called a parliamentary court and a court of justice. They 
both have the right of causing their decision to be respected, and order and de- 
corum to he obscn-ed in their presence, by punishing those who offend. But 
■who ever heard of the speaker or Vice-president punishing for disorderly con- 
duct ? The utmost power they can exercise over disorderly conduct, even in 
the lobby or gallery, is to cause it to be suppressed, for the time, by the ser- 
geant-at-arms. 

Enough has been said, though the subject is far from bemg exhausted, to de- 
monstrate that your views of the relative powers and duties of the Vice-pres- 
ident and the Senate, in relation to the point in question, are wholly erroneous. 
It remains to be shown that your opinions (for arguments they cannot be call- 
ed) are dangerous to our liberty, and that they are in conflict with the first prin- 
ciples of our government. I do not attribute to you, or those with whom you 
are associated, any deep-laid design against public liberty. Such an attempt^ 
as flagitious as it may be, requires a sagacity and boldness quite beyond what 
•we have now to apprehend from those in power. But that there exists, at the 
present time, a selfish and greedy appetite to get and to hold office, and that, 
to effect their grovelling objects, doctrines slavish and dangerous are daily prop- 
agated, cannot be doubted by even careless observers. The freedom of de- 
bate is instinctively dreaded by the whole corps, high and low, of those who 
make a speculation of politics ; and well they may : for it is the oreat and 
only effectual means of detecting and holding up to public scorn everj-machi- 



of the press, the trial by jury, the rights of conscience, and the writ ot habeas 
corpus, in the estimation of those who are capable of forming a correct estimate 
of the value of freedom, and the best means of preserving it. Against this pal- 
ladium of liberty your blows are aimed ; and, to do you justice, it must be ac- 
knowledgeJ, if the energy be not great, the direction is not destitute of skill. 
If you could succeed in establishing the points which you labour, that the Vice- 
president holds a power over the freedom of debate, under the right of preserv- 
ing order, beyond the will or control of the Senate ; and that, consequently, he 
alone is responsible for what might be considered an undue exercise of the free- 
dom of speech in debate, a solid foundation w^ould be laid, from which, in time, 
this great barrier against despotic power would be battered down. It is easy 
to see that the scheme takes the power of protecting this, the first of its rights, 
wholly out of the hands of the Senate, and places its custody in the hands of a 
single individual, and he in no degree responsible to the body over which this 
hifh power is to be exercised : thus effectually destroying the keystone of free- 
dom, responsibility, and introducing into a vital part of our system uncontrolled, 
or, what is the same thing, despotic power ; which, being derived, by your 
theory, from the Constitution, and being applicable to all points of order, neces- 
sarily would vest in the Vice-president alone an independent and absolute 
power, that would draw into the vortex of his authority an unlimited control 
over the freedom of debate. "*- 

Mark the consequences ! If the Vice-president should belong to the same 
party or interest which brought the President into power, or if he be dependant 
on him for his political standing or advancement, you will virtually place the 
control over the freedom of debate in the hands of the executive. 

You thus introduce the President, as it were, into the chamber of the Senate, 
and place him virtually over tlie deliberation of the body, with powers to restrain 
discussion, and shield his conduct from investigation. Let us, for instance, sup- 
pose that the present chief magistrate should be re-elected, and that the party 
which supports him should succeed, as, in all probability, they would in that 
event, in electing also their Vice-president, can it be doubted that the rules for 
the restraint of the freedom of debate in the Senate, which have been insisted 
on openly by the party during the last winter, would be reduced to practice, 
through a subservient Vice-president ? And what are those rules ? One of the 
leadino- ones, to advert to no other, is, that the conduct of the executive, as a 
co-ordinate branch of that government, cannot be called in question by a sen- 
ator in debate, at least so far as it relates to impeachable offences ; and, of 
course, an attempt to discuss tJie conduct of the President, in such cases, would be 
disorderly, and render the senator liable to be punished, even to expulsion. What 
would be the consequence ? The Senate would speedily sink into a body to 
register the decrees of the President and sing hosannas in his praise, and be 
as degraded as the Roman Senate under Nero. 

But let us suppose the opposite state of things, in which the Vice-president 
chooses to pursue a course independent of the will of the executive, and, in- 
stead of assuming so dangerous an exercise of power, he should indulge (for 
indulcrence it must be called, if allowed by his courtesy) that freedom of debate 
w^hich exists in other deliberative assemblies. What will then follow ? Pre- 
cisely that which occurred last winter. Alost exaggerated and false accounts 
would everywhere be propagated, by hirelings of power, of the slightest occur- 
rence in the Senate. The public indignation would be roused at the supposed 
disorder and indecorum, and the whole would be artfully directed against the 
Vice-president, in order to prostrate his reputation ; and thus an officer, without 
patronage or power, or even the right of defending himself, would be the target 
against which the whole force and patronage of the Government would be di- 
rected. Few men would have the fiirmness to encounter danger so tremendous ; 



ana me pracncai resuii, in uie luug n 
executive will. 



No. 2. 

Having now established, I may venture to say beyond the possibility of rea- 
sonable controversy, that the idea of an inherent right in the Vice-president, in- 
dependent of, and beyond the will of the Senate, to control the freedom of de- 
bate, is neither sanctioned by the Constitution, nor justified by the relation be- 
tween the body and its presiding officer, and that it is subversive of the right 
of free discussion, and, consequently, dangerous to liberty, I might here fairly 
rest the question. To you, at least, who treat with scorn the rules and usages 
of the Senate, as the source of the power of the Vice-president, all farther in- 
quiry is fairly closed. But as many, who may agree with you in the conclu- 
sion, may treat with contempt your high-strained conception of the origin of the 
power under investigation, it will not be improper to ascertain whether it has 
been conferred on the Vice-president by any act of the Senate, express or im- 
plied, the only source whence the power can be fairly derived. In this view 
of the subject, the simple inquiry is, Has the Senate conferred the power 1 
It has been fully established that they alone possess it, and, consequently, from 
the Senate only can it be derived. We, then, affirm that the Senate has no4 
conferred the power. The assertion of the negative, in such cases, is sufficient 
to throw the burden of proof on those who hold the affirmative. I call on you, 
then, or any of your associates, to point out the rule or the usage of the Senate 
by which the power has been conferred. None such has, or can be designated. 
If a similar question be asked as to the power of the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, how easy would be the reply 1 The 19th rule, which express- 
ly gives the power to him, would be immediately quoted ; and, if that were sufH 
posed to be doulnful, the journals of the house would be held up as containing 
innumerable instances of the actual exercise of the power. No such answer 
can be given when we turn to the power of the Vice-president. The rules are 
mute, and the journals of the Senate silent. What means this striking differ- 
ence, but that, on this point, there is a difference, in fact, between the power of 
the speaker and of the Vice-president? a difference which has been always 
understood and acted on ; and when to this we add, that the rules of the two 
houses in regard to the power are strikingly different ; that, while those of the 
Representatives expressly delegate the power to the speaker, those of the Sen- 
ate, by strong implication, withhold it from the Vice-president, little room can 
be left for doubt. Compare, in this view, the 19th rule of the house and the 
7th of the Senate. The former says, " If any member, by speaking or other- 
wise, transgress the rules of the house, the speaker shall, or any member may, 
call to order : in which case the member so called to order shall immediately 
sit down, unless permitted to explain ; and the house shall, if appealed to, de- 
cide on the case without debate ; if there be no appeal, the decision of the 
chair shall be submitted to. If the decision be in favour of the member called 
to order, he shall be at liberty to proceed ; if otherwise, he will not be permit- 
ted to proceed without leave of the house ; and if tlie case require it, he shall 
be lialilo to the censure of the house." The rule of the Senate, on the contra- 
ry, provides, "If tlio member shall be called to order for wortls spoken, the ex- 
cept ional)le words shall immediately be taken down in writing, that the presi- 
dent may be better enal)led to judge of the matter." These are the corresponding 
rules of the two houses : and can any impartial mind contend that similar pow- 
ers are intended to be conferred by them on the speaker and Vice-president? 
Or will it be insisted on that the difference in the phraseolog)"- is accidental, 
when it is known that they have often been revised on tlie reports of commit- 



mg subjects : unaer sucu circumsiances, u is impossiDle mat it coulQ oe in- 
tended to confer the same power by sucli difference of phraseology, or that the 
withholding of the power in question from the Vice-president was unintentional. 
This rational construction is greatly strengthened, when we advert to the dif- 
ferent relations which the two officers bear to their respective houses. The 
speaker is chosen by the House of Representatives, and is, consequently, di- 
rectly responsible to the body ; and his decision, by the rules, may be appealed 
from to the house. The Vice-president, on the contrary, is placed in the chair 
by the Constitution, is not responsible to the Senate, and his decision is with- 
out appeal. Need we look farther for the reason of so essential a variation in 
the rules conferring power on their respective presiding officers 1 It is a re- 
markable fact, that the same difference exists in the relation between the pre- 
siding officers of the two houses of the British Parliament, and the bodies over 
which they respectively preside. In the Commons, the speaker is chosen as 
in our House of Representatives, and is, consequently, in like manner respon- 
sible ; on the contrary, in the House of Lords the chancellor presides ex-ojicio, 
in like manner as the Vice-president in the Senate, and is, in like manner, ir- 
responsible to the body. Now it is no less remarkable that the speaker pos- 
sesses the power in question, while it is perfectly certahi that the lord-chancel- 
lor does not. Like cause, like effect ; dissimilar cause, dissimilar effect. You, 
sir, have, it is true, made a puny effort to draw a distinction between the mode 
in which the Vice-president and the lord-chancellor are appointed, and have 
also feebly denied that the latter has not the power of calling to order. Both 
of these efforts show the desperation of your cause. What does it signify by 
whom an cz-ojicio officer is appointed, if not by the body ? There can be but 
one material point, and that without reference to the mode of appointment — is 
he, or is he not, responsible to the house ? If the former, there is good cause 
for the delegation of the power ; for power exercised by responsible agents is 
substantially exercised by the principal ; while by irresponsible agents it is the 
power of him by whom it is exercised. Nor is your effort to show that the 
chancellor has the power less unhappy. You have cited but one instance, and 
that really renders you ridiculous. The lord-chancellor, as is well known, 
has the right of speaking ; and you most absurdly cite the commencement of 
a speech of one of the chancellors, in which he states that he would call back 
the attention of the Lords to the question at issue, as an instance of exercisino- 
the power of calling to order as presiding officer, for departure from the ques- 
tion ! Though you have signally failed to prove your position, you have not less 
completely established the fact, that your integrity is not above a resort to trick, 
where argument fails. Nor is this the only instance of subterfuge. You made 
a similar effort to do away the authority of the venerable Jefferson. He has 
left on record, that he considered his power as presiding officer of the Senate 
as the power of umpirage, or, what is the same thing, an appellate power. In 
order to break the force of this authority, you have denied the plain and inva- 
riable meaning of the word, and attempted to affix one to it which it never bears. 
You say that its usual meaning is synonymous wnth " office," " authority," or 
" the act of determining," and that it is only in its technical sense that it con- 
veys the idea of an appellate power ! Can it be unknown to you that no word in 
the language more invariably has attached to it the idea of decision by appeal, 
and that there is not an instance of its being used by any respectable authority 
in the sense which you state to be its usual meaning ? 

It only remains to consider the cases that you have cited from the Manual, 
to prove that the Speaker of the House of Commons possesses the power in 
question ; by which you would infer that it belongs also to the Vice-president. 
A very strange deduction by one who believes that the power originates in the 
Constitution, and that it neither can be given or taken away by the authority of the 



Senate itselt. Alter assorting tnai ii uas uecpci auu uunci iuuiiuaiivjuo tiia« 
tiie rules and usages of the Senate," there is something more than ridiculous, 
that you at last seek for the power in the rules and usages of the House of Com- 
mons ! But let such inconsistency pass. You have, indeed, established the 
fact that the speaker has the power, but you have overlooked the material cir- 
cumstance, as I have shown from your own cases, that he possesses it hy posi- 
tive ruhs of the house. You might as well have shown that the Speaker of 
the House of Representatives possesses it, and then inferred that the Vice- 
president does also : for he, too, holds the power by positive rules of the body, 
which makes the analogy as strong in the one case as the other. 

But you would have it understood that the rules of Parliament have been 
adopted by the Senate. No such thing. I challenge you to cite a single rule 
or act of the Senate that gives countenance to it. Finally, you tell us that Mr. 
Jeflerson has cited these rules as being part of the rules and usages of the Sen- 
ate. Admitting, for a moment, that I\Ir. Jefferson had cited them as such, still 
a very important question would arise, How came they to be the rules of the 
Senate ? The Constitution provides that the Senate shall determine the rules 
of its proceedings ; now, if that body has not, by any rule, adopted the rules of 
the British Parliament, by what process of reason could they be construed to be 
the rules of the Senate ? That the Senate has not adopted the rules of Parlia- 
ment, is certain ; and I confess I am not a little curious to see the process of 
reasoning by which they are made the niles of the Senate, without adoption. 
Is there not a striking analogy between this and the question, whether the com- 
mon law is a part of the laws of the Union ? We know that they have been 
decided by the highest judicial authority not to be ; and, it seems to me, the ar- 
guments which would be applicable to the one would be equally so to the other 
question. That the rules and usages of Parliament may be referred to to illus- 
trate the rules of either house of Congress, is quite a distinct proposition, and 
may be readily admitted. Arguments may be drawn from any source calcida- 
ted to illustrate, but that is wholly different from giving to the rules of another 
body a binding force on the Senate, without ever having been recognised as its 
rules. This is a subject of deep and grave importance ; but as it is not neces- 
sary to my purpose, I decline entering on it. It is sufficient, at present, to de- 
ny that Mr. Jefferson has cited the rules of the Parliament, refined to by you, 
as those of the Senate. On the contrary, they are expressly cited as the rules 
of the British House of Commons, without stating them to be obligatory on the 
Senate. He has notoriously cited many of the rules of that body which are 
wholly dissimilar from the usages of the Senate. But you cite Mr. Jefferson's 
opinion, in which he says, " The Senate have, accordingly, formed some rules 
for its government" (they have been much enlarged since) ; " but these going 
only to a few cases, they have referred to the decision of the president, without 
debate or appeal, all (piestions of order arising under their own rules, or where 
there is none. This places under the discretion of the president a very exten- 
sive field of decision." If your object in quoting the above passage was to !<how 
that, where the Senate has adopted no rules of its OAvn, the rules of Parliament 
are those of the Senate, it completely fails. Not the slightest countenance 
is given to such an idea. Mr. Jeflerson, on the contrary, says that, in cases of 
omission, the sound discretion of the president is the rule ;* and such has been 
the practice, and from which it has followed that usages of the Senate are very 
different from the Parliament, which could not be, if the latter were adopted, 
where there were no positive rules by the Senate. 

If this view of the subject be correct, which is certainly Mr. Jefferson's, the 

* This opinion of Mr. Jeflforsoii's is probably founded on the latter part of the Gtli rule, which 
strongly snp[)cirts it. The rule is as follows : " When a member shall bo called lo order, he shall sit 
down until the president shall have determined whether he is in order or not ; and every question 
of order shall be decided by the president, without debate ; but if tliere be a doubt in his uiindi ha 
may call for the sense of the Senate." 



and the only question tnai coiua arise in mis view is, wneiner ne aas acieu uu 
correct principles in referring the power to the house, instead of exercising it 
by the chair. So long as doubtful and irresponsible power ought not to be as- 
sumed — so long as the freedom of debate is essential to liberty — and so long as 
it is an axiom in politics that no power can be safe but what is in the final con- 
trol and custody of the body over which it is exercised — so long the rule (to 
view it in that light) adopted by the Vice-president will be considered in con- 
formity to sound political principles. But, suppose it to be conceived that the 
rules of Parliament are those of the Senate, when not overruled by its own posi- 
tive acts, still, two questions would remain : first, whether the 7th rule of the 
Senate, by a sound construction, does not restrain the Vice-president from exer- 
cising the power, by limiting it to the members of the Senate ? and, secondly, 
whether the practice of the House of Lords, or that of the Commons, ought, in 
this particular, to prevail ? Both of these points have already been incidental- 
ly considered, and a single remark will now suffice. Whether we regard the 
nature of the power, or the principles of our system of government, there can 
be no doubt that the decision ought to be against the practice of the House of 
Commons, and in favour of that of the House of Lords. 

It may not be improper to notice an opinion which, if I mistake not, has, in 
no small degree, contributed to the error which exists as to the decision of the 
Vice-president. There are many who are far from agreeing with your absurd 
and dangerous positions as to the inherent powers of the Vice-president over 
the freedom of debate, but who have, I think, a vague conception that he has 
the right in dispute, as presiding ofiicer, but a right subordinate to, and depend- 
ant on, the Senate. They concede to the Senate the right of determining their 
rules, and that this right comprehends that of determining what is, or what is 
not, disorderly conduct, and how the same shall be noticed or inhibited ; but 
they have an idea that the ex-officio duty of the Vice-president to regulate the 
proceedings of the Senate according to their own rules, extends to cases of the 
freedom of debate. The amount of the argument, as far as I can understand it, 
is, that, where there is a rule of the Senate, the Vice-president has, ex-ojjicio, 
the power of regulating the proceedings of the Senate by it, without any express 
authority in the rule to that effect. All this may be fairly conceded, but it decides 
nothing. It brings back the question to the inquiry, Is there, or is there not, such 
a rule 1 which has been fully considered, and, I trust, satisfactorily determined 
in the negative. I will not again repeat the arguments on this point : I do not 
deem it necessary. It is sufficient to remark, if there be a rule, let it be shown, 
and the question is at an end. There is none. 

As connected with this part of the subject, I do not think it necessary to 
meet the ridiculous charge of inconsistency which you make against the Vice- 
president in the exercise of his power, and which you endeavour to support by 
reference to the stale and false accounts of his conduct in the case of IMr. Dick- 
erson. It is sufficient that Mr. D. has repelled the charge of injustice, and you 
exhibit but a sorry and factious appearance in defending a senator from oppres- 
sion, who is not conscious of any injustice having been inflicted. 

Having demonstrated that the powers which you claim for the Vice-presi- 
dent do not belong to him as presiding officer of the Senate, and that they are 
not conferred on him by the rules or usage of the Senate, or those of Parlia- 
ment, I may safely affirm that it does not exist, and that, so far from censure, 
Mr. Calhoun deserves praise for decUning to exercise it. He has acted in the 
spirit that ought to actuate every virtuous public functionary — not to assume 
doubtful powers — a spirit, under our systems of delegated authority, essential to 
the preservation of liberty, and for being guided by which, he will receive the 
thanks of the country when the excitement of the day has passed away. 

I have now completed what may be considered the investigation of the sub- 

D 



jet I , UUl nitric aic ami oociai wi y >^"i ix^...".--.K- ^1 

not onlv attacked the decision of Mr. Calhoun, but you have impugned his mo- 
lives \vith licentious severity. The corrupt are the most disposed to attribute 
corruption, and your unprovoked and unjustifiable attack on Mr. C.'s motives 
speak as little in favour of your heart as your arguments do of your head. For- 
tunately for the Vice-president, his general character for virtue and patriotism 
shields'him from the imputation of such gross abuse of power, from such impure 
motives as you attribute to him. He could not decide differently from what he 
did without being at war with the principles which have ever governed him. It 
is well known to all acquainted with him, publically or privately, that the maxim 
which he holds in the highest veneration, and which he regards as the founda- 
tion of our whole system of government, is, that power should be controlled by 
the body over which it is exercised, and that, without such responsibility, all 
delegated power would speedily become corrupt. Whether he is wrong in giv- 
ing too high an estimate to this favourite maxim is immaterial. It is, and long 
hal been, his, and could not fail in having great influence in the decision which 
you have so seriously assaulted. Had his principles been like yours, as illus- 
trated in your essay, it is possible he might have taken a different view of the 
subject ; but, as he has decided in conformity to principles long fixed in his 
mind, there is something malignant in the extreme to attribute his decision to 
motives of personal enmity. You not only attack Mr. C.'s motives for this de- 
cision, but also his motive for the constitution of the Committee of Foreign Re- 
lations. You think it a crime in him that the venerable and patriotic Alacon 
should be placed at the head of the committee. I will neither defend him nor 
the other members of the committee. They need no defence ; but I cannot 
but remark, that the election of Mr. Macon president pro tern, of the Senate is 
a singular comment on your malignant attack on the Vice-president. 

It would have been impossible that you should steer clear of the cant of your 
party, and we accordingly have a profusion of vague charges about Mr. Cal- 
houn's ambition. The lowest and most mercenary hireling can easily coin such 
charges ; and while they deal in the general, without a single specification, it 
is utterly impossible to meet or refute them ; but, fortunately, they go for no- 
thing with the wise and virtuous, saving only that, on the part of those who make 
them, they evince an envious, morbid mind, which, having no real ground of 
attack, indulges in vague, unmeaning abuse. It is highly honourable to Mr. 
C. that, in the midst of so much political enmity, his personal and public char- 
acter stands free from all but one specific charge — which is, that he has incli- 
ned, in his present station, too much against his own poioer, and too muck in favour 
of the inestimable right of the freedom of debate. That he has been indefatiga- 
ble in the discharge of his duty ; that he has been courteous to the members, 
and prompt and intelligent, all acknowledge. Not a moment was he absent 
from his post during a long and laborious session, and often remained in the 
chair, without leaving it, from eight to twelve hours. He has, however, com- 
mitted one unpardonable sin which blots out all. He did not stop Mr. Ran- 
dolph. This is the head and front of his offending. And who is Mr. Randolph ? 
Is he or his manners a stranger in our national councils ? For more than a 
quarter of a century he has been a member of Congress, and during the whole 
time his character has remained unchanged. Highly talented, eloquent, se- 
vere, and eccentric ; not unfrequently wandering from the question, but often 
uttering wisdom worthy of a Bacon, and wit that would not discredit a Sheri- 
dan, every speaker had freely indulged him in his peculiar manner, and that 
•without responsibility or censure ; and none more freely than the present Sec- 
retary of State, while he presided in the House of Representatives. He is 
elected, with a knowledge of all this, by the ancient and renowned common- 
wealth of Virginia, and takes his seat in the Senate. An immediate outcry is 
made against the Vice-president for permitting him, who has been so long per- 



inoiiga m no respecxs were iiis a,uacKs oil ims aamimsiraiioii ireer man wnat 
they had been on those of Mr. Jeflerson, Mr. Madison, and Mr. Monroe. 
Who can doubt, if Mr. Calhoun had yielded to this clamour, that the whole 
current would have turned, and that he would then have been more severely 
denounced for what would have been called his tyranny and usurpation, than 
he has been for refusing to interfere with the freedom of debate ? His author- 
ity would have been denied, and properly denied : the fact that Mr. R. had been 
permitted by all other presiding officers, for so long a time, to speak without re- 
straint, would have been dwelt on ; and the injustice done to the senator, and 
the insult offered to the state that sent him, would have been painted in the 
most lively colours. These considerations, we are satisfied, had no weight 
■with the Vice-president. Those who know him know that no man is more re- 
gardless of consequences in the discharge of his duty ; but that the attack on 
him is personal, in order to shake his political standing, and prostrate his char- 
acter, is clearly evinced by every circumstance ; and with this object, that he 
would have been assaulted, act as he might, is most certain. It is for the 
American people to determine whether this conspiracy against a public servant, 
whose only fault is that he has chosen the side of liberty rather than that of pow- 
er, and whose highest crime consists in a reverential regard for the freedom of 
debate, shall succeed. Onslow. 



/ MR. CALHOUN S ADDRESS, STATING HIS OPINION OF THE RELATION WHICH THE 
STATES AND GENERAL GOVERNMENT BEAR TO EACH OTHER. 

The question of the relation which the States and General Government bear 
to each other is not one of recent origin. From the commencement of our 
system, it has divided public sentiment. Even in the Convention, while the 
Constitution was struggling into existence, there were two parties as to what 
this relation should be, whose different sentiments constituted no small imped- 
iment in forming that instrument. After the General Government went into 
operation, experience soon proved that the question had not terminated with the 
labours of the Convention. The great struggle that preceded the political rev- 
olution of 1801, which brought Mr. Jefferson into power, turned essentially on 
it, and the doctrines and arguments on both sides were imbodied and ably sus- 
tained : on the one, in the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, and the Report 
to the Virginia Legislature ; and on the other, in the replies of the Legislature 
of Massachusetts and some of the other states. These resolutions and this 
report, with the decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania about the 
same time (particularly in the case of Cobbett, delivered by Chief-justice 
M'Kean, and concurred in by the whole bench), contain what I believe to 
be the true doctrine on this important subject. I refer to them in order to avoid 
the necessity of presenting my views, with the reasons in support of them, in 
detail. 

As my object is simply to state my opinions, I might pause with this refer- 
ence to documents that so fully and ably state all the points immediately con- 
nected with this deeply-important subject ; but as there are many who may not 
have the opportunity or leisure to refer to them, and as it is possible, however clear 
they may be, that different persons may place different interpretations on their 
meaning, I will, in order that my sentiments may be fully known, and to avoid 
all ambiguity, proceed to state summarily the doctrines which I conceive they 
embrace. 



from the people of the several states, forming distinct political communities, and 
acting in their separate and sovereign capacity, and not from all of the people 
forming one aggregate political community ; that the Constitution of the United 
States is, in fact, a compact, to which each state is a party, in the character al- 
ready described ; and that the several states, or parties, have a right to judge of 
its infractions ; and in case of a deliberate, palpable, and dangerous exercise of 
power not delegated, they have the right, in the last resort, to use the language 
of the Virginia Resolutions, " to interpose for arresting the progress of the evil, 
and for maintaining, within their respective limits, the authorities, rights, and lib- 
erties appertaining to them." This right of interposition, thus solemnly assert- 
ed by the State of Virginia, be it called what it may — State-right, veto, nullifi- 
cation, or by any other name — I conceive to be the fundamental principle of 
our system, resting on facts historically as certain as our revolution itself, and 
deductions as simple and demonstrative as that of any political or moral truth 
whatever ; and I firmly believe that on its recognition depend the stability 
and safety of our political institutions. 

I am not ignorant that those opposed to the doctrine have always, now and 
formerly, regarded it in a very different light, as anarchical and revolutionarj'. 
Could I believjD such, in fact, to be its tendency, to me it would be no recom- 
mendation. I yield to none, I trust, in a deep and sincere attachment to our 
political institutions and the union of these states. I never breathed an oppo- 
site sentiment ; but, on the contrary, I have ever considered them the great in- 
struments of preserving our liberty, and promoting the happiness of ourselves 
and our posterity ; and next to these I have ever held them most dear. Nearly 
half my life has been passed in the service of the Union, and whatever public 
reputation I have acquired is indissolubly identified with it. To be too national 
has, indeed, been considered by many, even of my friends, to be my greatest 
political fault. With these strong feelings of attachment, I have examined, with 
the utmost care, the bearing of the doctrine in question ; and, so far from anar- 
chical or revolutionary, I solemnly believe it to be the only solid foundation of 
our system, and of the Union itself; and that the opposite doctrine, which denies 
to the states the right of protecting their reserved powers, and which would 
vest in the General Government (it matters not through what department) the 
right of determining, exclusively and finally, the powers delegated to it, is in- 
compatible with the sovereignty of the states, and of the Constitution itself, con- 
sidered as the basis of a Federal Union. As strong as this language is, it is 
not stronger than that used by the illustrious Jefferson, who said to give to the 
General Govermnent the final and exclusive right to judge of its powers, is to 
make " its discretion, and not the Constitution, the measure of its powers ;" and 
that, " in all cases of compact between parties having no common judge, each party 
has an equal right to judge for itself, as well of the infraction as of the mode and 
measure of redress.'^ Language cannot be more explicit, nor can higher author- * 
ity be adduced. / 

That different opinions are entertained on this subject, I consider but as an 
additional evidence of the great diversity of the human intellect. Had not able, 
experienced, and patriotic individuals, for whom I have the highest respect, 
taken dilferent views, I would have thought the right too clear to admit of doubt ; 
but I am taught by this, as well as by many similar instances, to treat with 
deference opinions differing from my own. The error may, possibly, be with 
me ; but if so, I can only say that, after the most mature and conscientious ex- 
amination, I have not been able to detect it. But, with all proper deference, I 
must fliink that theirs is the error who deny what seems to be an essential at- 
tribute of the conceded sovereignty of the states, and who attribute to the Gen- 
eral Govermnent a ri^ht utterly incompatible with what all acknowledo-e to be 
its limited and restricted character : an error originating principally, as I must 



stitutes the only rational object of all political constitutions. 

It has been well' said by one of the most sagacious men of antiquity, that the 
object of a constitution is to restr.ain the government, as that of laws is to restrain 
individuals. The remark is correct; nor is it less true where the government 
is vested in a majority than where it is in a single or a few individuals — in a 
republic, than a monarchy or aristocracy. No one can have a higher respect 
for the maxim that the majority ought to govern than I have, taken in its proper 
sense, subject to the restrictions imposed by the Constitution, and contined to 
subjects in which every portion of the community have similar interests ; but it 
is a great error to suppose, as many do, that the right of a majority to govern is 
a natural and not a conventional right, and therefore absolute and unlimited. 
By nature every individual has the right to govern himself; and governments, 
whether founded on majorities or minorities, must derive their right from the 
assent, expressed or implied, of the governed, and be subject to such limitations 
as they may impose. Where the interests are the same, that is, where the 
laws that may benefit one will benefit all, or the reverse, it is just and proper to 
place them under the control of the majority ; but where they are dissimilar, so 
that the law that may benefit one portion may be ruinous to another, it would 
be, on the contrary, unjust and absurd to subject them to its will ; and such I 
conceive to be the theory on which our Constitution rests. 

That such dissimilarity of interests may exist, it is impossible to doubt. They 
are to be fouud in every community, in a greater or less degree, however small 
or homogeneous, and they constitute everywhere the great difficulty of forming 
and preserving free institutions. To guard against the unequal action of the 
laws, when applied to dissimilar and opposing interests, is, in fact, what mainly 
renders a constitution indispensable ; to overlook which, in reasoning on our 
Constitution, would be to omit the principal element by which to determine its 
character. Were there no contrariety of interests, nothing would be more 
simple and easy than to form and preserve free institutions. The right of suf- 
frage alone would be a sufficient guarantee. It is the conflict of opposing inter- 
ests which renders it the most difficult work of man. 

Where the diversity of interests exists in separate and distinct classes of the 
community, as is the case in England, and was fonnerly the case in Sparta, 
Rome, and most of the free states of antiquity, the rational constitutional pro- 
vision is that each should be represented in the government, as a separate es- 
tate, with a distinct voice, and a negative on the acts of its co-estates, in order 
to check their encroachments. In England the Constitution has assumed ex- 
pressly this form, while in the governments of Sparta and Rome the same 
thing was effected under different, but not much less efficacious forms. The 
perfection of their organization, in this particular, was that which gave to the 
constitutions of these renowned states all their celebrity, which secured their 
liberty for so many centuries, and raised them to so great a height of power 
and prosperity. Indeed, a constitutional provision giving to the great and sep- 
arate interests of the community the right of self-protection, must appear, to 
those who will duly reflect on the subject, not less essential to the preservation 
of liberty than the right of suffi-age itself. They, in fact, have a common object, 
to effect which the one is as necessary as the other to secure responsibility : 
that is, that those xoho make and execute the laws should be accountable to those on 
whom the laivs in reality operate — the only solid and durable foundation of liberty. 
If, without the right of suffi-age, our rulers would oppress us, so, without the 
right of self-protection, the major would equally oppress the minor interests of 
the community. The absence of the former would make the governed the 
slaves of the rulers, and of the latter, the feebler interests, the victim of the 
stronger. 

Happily for us, we have no artificial and separate classes of society. We 



empt from all contrariety of interests, as the present distracted and dangerous 
condition of our country, unfortunately, but too clearly proves. With us they 
are almost exclusively geographical, resulting mainly from difference of climate, 
soil, situation, industry, and production, but are not, therefore, less necessary to 
be protected by an adequate constitutional provision than where the distinct in- 
terests exist in separate classes. The necessity is, in truth, greater, as such 
separate and dissimilar geographical interests are more liable to come into con- 
flict, and more dangerous, when in that state, than those of any other descrip- 
tion : so much so, that ours is the first instance on record where they have not 
formed, in an extensive territory, separate and independent communities, or sub- 
jected the tchole to despotic sway. That such may not be our unhappy fate also, 
must be the sincere prayer of every lover of his country. 

So numerous and diversified are the interests of our country, that they could 
not be fairly represented in a single government, organized so as to give to each 
great and leading interest a separate and distinct voice, as in governments to 
which I have referred. A plan was adopted better suited to our situation, but 
perfectly novel in its character. The powers of the government were divided, 
not, as heretofore, in reference to classes, but geographically. One Gener- 
al Government was formed for the whole, to which was delegated all the 
powers supposed to be necessary to regulate the interests common to all the 
states, leaving others subject to the separate control of the states, being, 
from their local and peculiar character, such that they could not be subject to 
the will of a majority of the whole Union, without the certain hazard of injus- 
tice and oppression. It was thus that the interests of the whole were subject- 
ed, as they ought to be, to the will of the whole, while the peculiar and local 
interests were left under the control of the states separately, to whose custody 
only they could be safely confided. This distribution of power, settled solemnly 
by a constitutional compact, to which all the states are parties, constitutes the 
peculiar character and excellence of our political system. It is truly and emphat- 
ically American, without example or parallel. 

To realize its perfection, we must view the General Government and those 
of the states as a whole, each in its proper sphere independent ; each perfectly 
adapted to its respective objects ; the states acting separately, representing and 
protecting the local and peculiar interests ; acting jointly through one General 
Government, with the weight respectively assigned to each by the Constitu- 
tion, representing and protecting the interest of the whole, and thus perfecting, 
by an admirable but simple arrangement, the great principle of representation 
and responsibility, without which no government can be free or just. To pre- 
serve this sacred distribution as originally settled, by coercing each to move in 
its prescribed orb, is the great and difficult problem, on the solution of which 
the duration of our Constitution, of our Union, and, in all probability, our liberty 
depends. Ilow is this to be effected? 

The question is new when applied to our peculiar political organization, 
where the separate and conflicting interests of society are represented by dis- 
tinct but coimected governments ; but it is, in reality, an old question under a 
new form, long shice perfectly solved. Whenever separate and dissimilar in- 
terests have been separately represented in any government ; whenever the 
sovereign power has been divided in its exercise, the experience and wisdom 
of ages have devised but one mode by which such political organization can be 
preserved — the mode adopted in England, and by all governments, ancient 
and modern, blessed with constitutions deserving to be called free — to give to 
each co-estate the right to judge of its powers, with a negative or veto on the 
acts of the others, in order to protect against encroachments the interests it par- 
ticularly represents : a principle which all of our Constitutions recognise in the 
distribution of power among their respective departments, as essential to main- 



fundamental distribution of powers between the General and State Governments. 
So essential is the principle, that to withhold the right from either, where the 
sovereign power is divided, is, in fact, to annul the division itself, and to con- 
solidate in the one left in the exclusive possession of the right all powers of 
government ; for it is not possible to distinguish, practically, between a govern- 
ment having all power, and one having the right to take what powers it pleases. 
Nor does it in the least vary the principle, whether the distribution of power be 
between co-estates, as in England, or between distinctly organized but con- 
nected governments, as with us. The reason is the same in both cases, while 
the necessity is greater in our case, as the danger of conflict is greater where 
the interests of a society are divided geographically than in any other, as has 
already been shown. 

These truths do seem to me to be incontrovertible ; and I am at a loss to un- 
derstand how any one, who has maturely reflected on the nature of our institu- 
tions, or who has read history or studied the principles of free government to 
any purpose, can call them in question. The explanation must, it appears to 
me, be sought in the fact that in every free state there are those who look more 
to the necessity of maintaining power than guarding against its abuses. I do 
not intend reproach, but simply to state a fact apparently necessary to explain 
the contrariety of opinions among the intelligent, where the abstract considera- 
tion of the subject would seem scarcely to admit of doubt. If such be the true 
cause, I must think the fear of weakening the government too much in this case 
to be in a great measure unfounded, or, at least, that the danger is much less 
from that than the opposite side. I do not deny that a power of so high a na- 
ture may be abused by a state, but when I reflect that the states unanimously 
called the General Government into existence with all its powers, which they 
freely delegated on their part, under the conviction that their common peace, 
safety, and prosperity required it ; that they are bound together by a common 
origin, and the recollection of common suflering and common triumph in the 
great and splendid achievement of their independence ; and that the strongest 
feelings of our nature, and among them the love of national power and distinc- 
tion, are on the side of the Union, it does seem to me that the fear which 
would strip the states of their sovereignty, and degrade them, in fact, to mere 
dependant corporations, lest they should abuse a right indispensable to the peace- 
able protection of those interests which they reserved under their own peculiar 
guardianship when they created the General Government, is unnatural and un- 
reasonable. If those who voluntarily created the system cannot be trusted to 
preserve it, who can 1 

So far from extreme danger, I hold that there never was a free state in which 
this great conservative principle, indispensable to all, was ever so safely lodged. 
In others, when the co-estates representing the dissimilar and conflicting inter- 
ests of the community came into contact, the only alternative was compromise, 
submission, or force. Not so in ours. Should the General Government and 
a state come into conflict, we have a higher remedy : the power which called 
the General Government into existence, which gave it all its authority, and can 
enlarge, contract, or abolish its powers at its pleasure, may be invoked. The 
states themselves may be appealed to, three fourths of which, in fact, form a 
power, whose decrees are the Constitution itself, and whose voice can silence 
all discontent. The utmost extent, then, of the power is, that a state acting in its 
sovereign capacity, as one of the parties to the constitutional compact, may com- 
pel the government, created by that compact, to submit a question touching its 
infraction to the parties who created it ; to avoid the supposed dangers of which, 
it is proposed to resort to the novel, the hazardous, and, I must add, fatal proj- 
ect of giving to the General Government the sole and final right of interpret- 



ment the creature of its will instead of a rule of action impressed on it at its* 
creation, and annihilating, in fact, the authority which imposed it, and from which 
the government itself derives its existence. 

That such would be the result, were the right in question vested in the le- 
gislative or executive branch of the government, is conceded by all. No one 
has been so hardy as to assert that Congress or the President ought to have the 
rio^ht, or deny that, if vested finally and exclusively in either, the consequences 
which I have stated would necessarily follow ; but its advocates have been rec- 
onciled to the doctrine, on the supposition that there is one department of the 
General Government which, from its peculiar organization, affords an independ- 
ent tribunal through which the government may exercise the high authority 
which is the subject of consideration, with perfect safety to all. 

I yield, I trust, to few in my attachment to the judiciary department. I am 
fully sensible of its importance, and would maintain it to the fullest extent in 
its constitutional powers and independence ; but it is impossible for me to be- 
lieve that it was ever intended by the Constitution that it should exercise the 
power in question, or that it is competent to do so ; and, if it were, that it would 
be a safe depositary of the power. 

Its powers are judicial, and not political, and are expressly confined by the 
Constitution " to all cases in law and equity arising under this Constitution, the 
laws of the United States, and the treaties made, or which shall be made, under 
its authority ;" and which I have high authority in asserting excludes political 
questions, and comprehends those only where there are parties amenable to the 
process of the court.* Nor is its incompetency less clear than its want of con- 
stitutional authority. There may be many, and the most dangerous infractions 
on the part of Congress, of which, it is conceded by all, the court, as a judicial 
tribunal, cannot, from its nature, take cognizance. The tariff itself is a strong 
case in point ; and the reason applies equally to all others ichcre Congress per- 
verts a potcer from an object intended to one not intended, the most insidious and 
dangerous of all the infractions ; and which may he extended to all of its powers, 
more esprcialhj to the taxing and appropriating. But, supposing it competent to 
take cognizance of all infractions of every description, the insuperable objec- 
tion still remains, that it would not be a safe tribunal to exercise the power in 
question. 

It is a universal and fundamental political principle, that the power to pro- 
tect can safely be confided only to those interested in protecting, or their re- 
sponsible agents — a maxim not less true in private than in public affairs. The 
danger in our system is, that the General Government, which represents the in- 
terests of the whole, may encroach on the states, which represent the peculiar 
and local interests, or that the latter may encroach on the former. 

In examining this point, we ought not to forget that the government, throno-h 
all its departments, judicial as well as others, is administered by delegated and 
responsible agents ; and that the jiowcr which realhj controls, vltimatehj, all the 
movcmrnts, is not in the agents, but those icho elect or appoint them. To under- 
stand, then, its real character, and what would be the action of the system in 
any supposable case, we must raise our view from the. mere agents to this high 
controlling power, which finally impels every movement of the machine. By 
doing so, we shall find all under the control of the will of a majority, compoimd- 
ed of the majority of the states, taken as corporate bodies, and the majority of 
the people of the states, estimated in federal numbers. These, united, constitute 
the real and final power which impels and directs the movements of the Gen- 
eral Government. The majority of the states elect the majority of the Senate ; 
of the people of the states, that of the House of Representatives ; the two uni- 

♦ I rofer to the authority of Chief-justice Marshall, in the case of Jonathan Robbins. I 
have not been able to refer to the speech, and speak from memory. 



the President, really exercise all the powers of the government, with the excep- 
tion of the cases where the Constitution requires a greater number than a ma- 
jority. The judges are, in fact, as truly the judicial representatives of this uni- 
ted majority, as the majority of Congress itself, or the President, is its legisla- 
tive or executive representative ; and to confide the power to the judiciary to 
determine finally and conclusively what powers are delegated and what reserv- 
ed, would be, in reality, to confide it to the majority, whose agents they are, and 
by whom they can be controlled in various ways ; and, of course, to subject 
(against the fundamental principle of our system and all sound political reason- 
ing) the reserved powers of the states, with all the local and peculiar interests 
they were intended to protect, to the will of the very majority against which the 
protection was intended. Nor will the tenure by which the judges hold their 
office, however valuable the provision in many other respects, materially vary 
the case. Its highest possible effect would be to retard, and not Jinally to re- 
sist, the will of a dominant majority. 

But it is useless to multiply arguments. Were it possible that reason could 
settle a question where the passions and interests of men are concerned, this 
point would have been long since settled forever by the State of Virginia. The 
report of her Legislature, to which I have already referred, has really, in my 
opinion, placed it beyond controversy. Speaking in reference to this subject, 
it says : " It has been objected" (to the right of a state to interpose for the pro- 
tection of her reserved rights) " that the judicial authority is to be regarded as 
the sole expositor of the Constitution. On this objection it might be observed, 
first, that there may be instances of usurped powers which the forms of the 
Constitution could never draw within the control of the judicial department ; 
secondly, that, if the decision of the judiciary be raised above the sovereign 
parties to the Constitution, the decisions of the other departments, not carried 
by the forms of the Constitution before the judiciary, must be equally author- 
itative and final with the decision of that department. But the proper answer 
to the objection is, that the resolution of the General Assembly relates to those 
great and extraordinary cases in which all the forms of the Constitution may 
prove ineffectual against infractions dangerous to the essential rights of the par- 
ties to it. The resolution supposes that dangerous powers, not delegated, may 
not only be usurped and executed by the other departments, but that the judi- 
cial department may also exercise or sanction dangerous powers, beyond the 
grant of the Constitution, and, consequently, that the ultimate right of the par- 
ties to the Constitution to judge whether the compact has been dangerously 
violated, must extend to violations by one delegated authority, as well as by an- 
other — by the judiciarj^, as well as by the executive or legislative." 

Against these conclusive arguments, as they seem to me, it is objected that, 
if one of the party has the right to judge of infractions of the Constitution, so 
has the other ; and that, consequently, in cases of contested powers between a 
state and the General Government, each would have a right to maintain its 
opinion, as is the case when sovereign powers differ in the construction of 
treaties or compacts, and that, of course, it would come to be a mere question 
of force. The error is in the assumption that the General Government is a 
party to the constitutional compact. The states, as has been shown, formed 
the compact, acting as sovereign and independent communities. The General 
Government is but its creature ; and though, in reality, a government, with all 
the rights and authority which belong to any other government, wnthin the orbit 
of its powers, it is, nevertheless, a government emanating from a compact be- 
tween sovereigns, and partaking, in its nature and object, of the character of a 
joint commission, appointed to superintend and administer the interests in which 
all are jointly concerned, but having, beyond its proper sphere, no more power 

E 



facts and the clearest conclusions ; while to acknowledge its truth is to de- 
stroy utterly the objection that the appeal would be to force, in the case sup- 
posed. For, if each party has a right to judge, then, under our system of gov- 
ernment, the final cognizance of a question of contested power »vould be in the 
states, and not in the General Government. It would be the duty of the latter, 
as in all similar cases o[ a contest between one or more of the principals and 
a joint commission or agency, to refer the contest to the principals themselves. 
Such are the plain dictates of both reason and analogy. On no sound principle 
can the agents have a right to final cognizance, as against the principals much 
less to use force against them to maintain their construction of their powers. 
Such a right would be monstrous, and has never, heretofore, been claimed in 
similar cases. 

That the doctrine is applicable to the case of a contested power between the 
states and the General Government, we have the authority not only of reason 
and analogy, but of the distinguished statesman already referred to. Mr. Jef- 
ferson, at a late period of his Ufc, after long experience and mature reflection, 
says, " With respect to our State and Federal Governments, I do not think their 
relations are correctly understood by foreigners. They suppose the former 
are suljordinate to the latter. This is not the case. They are co-ordinate de- 
partments of one simple and integral whole. But you may ask. If the two de- 
partments should claim each the same subject of power, where is the umpire to 
decide between them ? In cases of little urgency or importance, the prudence 
of both parties will keep them aloof from the questionable ground ; but, if it can 
neither be avoided nor compromised, a convention of the states must be called 
to ascribe the doubtfid power to that department which they may think best." 
It is thus that our Constitution, by authorizing amendments, and by prescribing 
the authority and mode of making them, has, by a simple contrivance, with its 
characteristic wisdom, provided a power which, in the last resort, supersedes 
efiectually the necessity, and even the pretext for force : a power to which none 
can fairly object ; with which the interests of all are safe ; which can definitive- 
ly close all controversies in the only effectual mode, by freeing the compact of 
every defect and uncertainty, by an amendment of the instrument itself. It is 
impossible for human wisdom, in a system like ours, to devise another mode 
which shall be safe and efiectual, and, at the same time, consistent with what 
are the relations and acknowledged powers of the two great departments of our 
government. It gives a beauty and security peculiar to our system, which, if 
duly appreciated, will transmit its blessings to the remotest generations ; but, if 
not, our splendid anticipations of the future will prove but an empty dream. 
Stripped of all its covering, the naked question is, whether ours is a federal or 
a consolidated government ; a constitutional or absolute one ; a government 
resting ultimately on the solid basis of the sovereignty of the states or on the 
unrestrained will of a majority ; a form of government, as in all other unlimited 
ones, in which injustice, and violence, and force must finally prevail. Let it 
never Lc fonrottcn that, uhc.rc the majority rules without restriction, the minority 
is tfte subject ; and that, if we should absurdly attribute to the former the exclu- 
sive right of construing the Constitution, there would be, in fact, between the 
sovereign and subject, under such a government, no constitution, or, at least, 
nothing deserving the name, or serving the legitimate object of so sacred an 
instrument. 

How the states are to exercise this high power of interposition, which con- 
stitutes so essential a portion of their reserved rights that it cannot he dele<mted 
without an entire surrender of their sovereignty, and converting our system from 
a federal into a consolidated government, is a question that the states only are 
corapetent to determine. The arguments which prove that they possess the 
power, equally prove that they are, in the language of Jefferson, " the rightful 



well as the nature of the right itseU", forbids a recourse to it, except in cases of 
dangerous infractions of the Constitution ; and then only in the last resort, when 
all reasonable hope of relief from the ordinary action of the government has 
failed ; when, if the right to interpose did not exist, the alternative would be 

I submission and oppression on one side, or resistance by force on the other. 
That our system should afford, in such extreme cases, an intermediate point be- 
tween these dire alternatives, by which the government may be brought to a 
pause, and thereby an interval obtained to compromise differences, or, if im- 
practicable, be compelled to submit the question to a constitutional adjustment, 
through an appeal to the states themselves, is an evidence of its high wisdom : 
an element not, as is supposed by some, of weakness, but of strength ; not of 
anarchy or revolution, but of peace and safety. Its general recognition xvould 
of itself, in a great measure, if not altogether, supersede the necessity of its exer- 
cise, by impressing on the movements of the government that moderation and jus- 
tice so essential to harmony and peace, in a country of such vast extent and diver- 
sity of interests as ours ; and woidd, if controversy should come, turn the resent- 
ment of the aggrieved from the system to those who had abused its powers 
(a point all-important), and cause them to seek redress, 7iot in revolution or over- 
throw, but in reformation. It is, in fact, properly understood, a substitute, ivhere 
the alternative would he force, tending to prevent, and, if that fails, to correct peace- 
ably the aberrations to which all systems are liable, and which, if permitted to ac- 
cumulate without correction, must f nail y end in a general catastrophe. 

I have now said what I intended in reference to the abstract question of the 
relation of the states to the General Government, and would here conclude, did 
I not believe that a mere general statement on an abstract question, without in- 
cluding that which may have caused its agitation, would be considered by many 
imperfect and unsatisfactory. Feeling that such would be justly the case, I am 
compelled, reluctantly, to touch on the tariff, so far, at least, as may be neces- 
sary to illustrate the opinions which I have already advanced. Anxious, how- 
ever, to intrude as little as possible on the public attention, I will be as brief as 
possible ; and with that view will, as far as may be consistent with my object, 
avoid all debateable topics. 

Whatever diversity of opinion may exist in relation to the principle, or the 
effect on the productive industry of the country, of the present, or any other 
tariff of protection, there are certain political consequences flowing from the 
present which none can doubt, and all must deplore. It would be in vain to 
attempt to conceal, that it has divided the country into two great geographical 
divisions, and arrayed them against each other, in opinion at least, if not inter- 
ests also, on some of the most vital of political subjects — on its finance, its com- 
merce, and its industry — subjects calculated, above all others, in time of peace, 
to produce excitement, and in relation to which the tariff has placed the sec- 
tions in question in deep and dangerous conflict. If there be any point on 
which the (I vvas going to say, southern section, but to avoid, as far as possi- 
ble, the painful feelings such discussions are calculated to excite, I shall say) 

I weaker of the two sections is unanimous, it is that its prosperity depends, in a 
great measure, on free trade, light taxes, economical, and, as far as possible, 
equal disbursements of the public revenue, and unshackled industry, leaving 
them to pursue whatever may appear most advantageous to their interests. 
From the Potomac to the Mississippi, there are few, indeed, however divided 
on other points, who would not, if dependant on their volition, and if they re- 
garded the interest of their particular section only, remove from commerce and 
industry every shackle, reduce the revenue to the lowest point that the wants of 
the government fairly required, and restrict the appropriations to the most mod- 
erate scale consistent with the peace, the security, and the engagements of the 
public ; and who do not believe that the opposite system ia calculated to throw 



Kjii tiieiii ail uiit^v. 



enjoyment. 

On all these deeply-important measures, the opposite opinion prevails, if not 
with equal unanimity, with at least a greatly preponderating majority, in the other 
and stroncrer section ; so much so, that no two distinct nations ever entertained 
more opposite views of policy than these two sections do on all the important 
points to which I have referred. Nor is it less certain that this unhappy con- 
flict, llowing directly from the tariff, has extended itself to the halls of legislation, 
and has converted the deliberations of Congress into an annual struggle between 
the two sections ; the stronger to maintain and increase the superiority it has 
already acquired, and the other to throw off or diminish its burdens : a struggle 
in which all the noble and generous feelings of patriotism are gradually subsi- 
ding into sectional and selfish attachments.* Nor has the effect of this danger- 
ous conflict ended here. It has not only divided the two sections on the im- 
portant point already stated, but on the deeper and more dangerous questions, 
the constitutionality of a protective tariff, and the general principles and theory 
of the Constitution itself : the stronger, in order to maintain their superiority, 
giving a construction to the instrument which the other believes would convert 
the General Government into a consolidated, irresponsible government, wdth 
the total destruction of liberty ; and the weaker, seeing no hope of relief with 
such assumption of powers, turning its eye to the reserved sovereignty of the 
states, as the only refuge from oppression. I shall not extend these remarks, 
as I might, by showing that, while the effect of the system of protection was 
rapidly alienating one section, it was not less rapidly, by its necessary opera- 
tion, distracting and corrupting the other ; and, between the two, subjecting the 
administration to violent and sudden changes, totally inconsistent with all sta- 
bility and wisdom in the management of the affairs of the nation, of which we 
already see fearful symptoms. Nor do I deem it necessary to inquire whether 
this unhappy conflict grows out of true or mistaken views of interest on either 
or both sides. Regarded in either light, it ought to admonish us of the extreme 
danger to which our system is exposed, and the great moderation and wisdom 
necessary to preserve it. If it comes from mistaken views — if the interests of 
the two sections, as affected by the tariff, be really the same, and the system, in- 
stead of acting unequally, in reality diffuses equal blessings, and imposes equal 
burdens on every part — it ought to teach us how liable those who are differently 
shuated, and who view their interests under different aspects, are to come to 
different conclusions, even when their interests are strictly the same ; and, con- 
sequently, with what extreme caution any system of policy ought to be adopted, 
and with what a spirit of moderation pursued, in a country of such great extent 
and diversity as ours. But if, on the contrary, the conflict springs really from 
contrariety of interests — if the burden be on one side and the benefit on the 
other — then arc we taught a lesson not less important, how little regard we 
have for the interests of others while in pursuit of our own ; or, at least, how 
apt we are to consider our own interest the interest of all others ; and, of 
course, how great the danger, in a country of such acknowledged diversity of 
interests, of the oppression of the feebler l)y the stronger interest, and, in con- 
sequence of it, of the most fatal sectional conflicts. But whichever may be the 
cause, the real or supposed diversity of interest, it cannot be doubted that the 
political consequences of the prohibitory system, be its effects in other respects 
beneficial or otherwise, are really such as I have stated ; nor can it be doubted 
that a conflict between the great sections, on questions so vitally important, in- 
dicates a condition of the country so distempered and dangerous, as to demand 

♦ The system, if continued, must end, not only in subjecting the industry and property of the 
weaker section to the control of the stronger, but in proscription and political disfranchisement. It 
must finally control elections and appointments to offices, as well as acts of legislation, to the great 
increase of the feelings of animosity, and of the fatal tendency to a complete allenation'between the 
sections. 



me mosi serious ana prompt attention. It is only when we come to consider 
of the remedy, that, under the aspect I am viewing the subject, there can be, 
among the informed and considerate, any diversity of opinion. 

Those who have not duly reflected on its dangerous and inveterate character 
suppose that the disease will cure itself; that events ought to be left to take 
their own course ; and that experience, in a short time, will prove that the in- 
terest of the whole community is the same in reference to the tariff, or, at least, 
whatever diversity there may now be, time will assimilate. Such has been 
their language from the beginning, but, unfortunately, the progress of events has 
been the reverse. The country is now more divided than in 1824, and then 
more than in 1816. The majority may have increased, but the opposite sides 
are, beyond dispute, more determined and excited than at any preceding period 
t ormerly, the system was resisted mainly as inexpedient ; but now, as uncon- 
stitutional, unequal, unjust, and oppressive. Then, relief was sought exclusive- 
ly from the General Government ; but now, many, driven to despair, are raisin<r 
their eyes to the reserved sovereignty of the states as the only refuoe If 
we turn from the past and present to the future, we shall find nothing to^lessen 
but much to aggravate the danger. The increasing embarrassment and distress 
ot the staple states, the growing conviction, from experience, that they are 
caused by the prohibitory system principally, and that, under its continued oper- 
ation, their present pursuits must become profitless, and with a conviction that 
their great and peculiar agricultural capital cannot be diverted from its ancient 
and hereditary channels without ruinous losses, all concur to increase, instead 
ot dispelling, the gloom that hangs over the future. In fact, to those who will 
duly relied on the subject, the hope that the disease will cure itself must ap- 
pear perfectly illusory. The question is, in reality, one between the exporting 
and non-exporting interests of the country. Were there no exports, there imuld 
be no tarijf. It would be perfectly useless. On the contrary, so lono- as there 
are stales which raise the great agricultural staples with the view of'obtainino- 
their supplies, and which must depend on the general market of the world fo? 
tlieir sales, the conflict must remain if the system should continue, and the dis- 
ease become more and more inveterate. Their interest, and that of those who 
by high duties, would confine the purchase of their supplies to the home mar- 
^^u T^^' ^"^^'^ ^^^ "^""^^ °^ i\\mgs, in reference to the tariff, be in conflict 
1 111, then, we cease to raise the great staples cotton, rice, and tobacco, for the 
general market, and till we can find some other profitable investment for the 
immense amount of capital and labour now employed in their production, the 
present unhappy and dangerous conflict cannot terminate, unless with the 'nro- 
rtibitory system itseif. ^ 

In the mean time, while idly waiting for its termination through its own ac- 
tion, the progress of events in another quarter is rapidly bringing' the contest to 
an immediate and decisive issue. We are fast approaching a period very novel 
m the history of nations, and bearing directly and powerfully on the point un- 
der consideration— the final payment of a long-standing funded debt— a period 
that cannot be greatly retarded, or its natural consequences eluded, without pro- 
ving disastrous to those who attempt either, if not to the country itself When 
'ifl'Z''^n]^^ government will find itself in possession of a surplus revenue of 
$10,000,000 or $12,000,000, if not previously disposed of— which presents the 
important question, What previous disposition ought to be made ? a question 
wliicli must press urgently for decision at the very next session of Congress, 
it cannot be delayed longer without the most distracting and dangerous conse- 

The honest and obvious course is, to prevent the accumulation of the surplus 
in the treasury by a timely and judicious reduction of the imposts ; and there- 
by to leave the money in the pockets of those who made it, and from whom it 
camot be honestly nor constitutionally taken, unless required by the fair and 



legitimate wants ol ttie government, it, neglecting a Disposition so ODvions 
and just, the government should attempt to keep- up the present high duties, 
when the money is no longer wanted, or to dispose of this immense surplus by 
enlarging the old, or devising new schemes of appropriations ; or, finding that 
to be impossible, it should adopt the most dangerous, unconstitutional, and ab- 
surd project ever devised by any government, of dividing the surplus among the 
states — a project which, if carried into execution, would not fail to create an an- 
tagonist interest between the states and General Government on all questions of 
appropriations, which would certainly end in reducing the latter to a mere office 
of collection and distribution — either of these modes would be considered by the 
section suffering under the present high duties as a fixed determination to per- 
petuate forever what it considers the present unequal, unconstitutional, and op-; 
pressive burden ; and from that moment it would cease to look to the General 
Government for relief. This deeply-intpesting period, which must prove so 
disastrous should a wrong direction be given, but so fortunate and glorious, 
should a right one, is just at hand. The work must commence at the next ses- 
sion, as I have stated, or be left undone, or, at least, be badly done. The suc- 
ceeding session would be too short, and too much agitated by the presidential 
contest, to afford the requisite leisure and calmness ; and the one succeeding 
•would find the country in the midst of the crisis, when it would be too late to 
prevent an accumulation of the surplus : which I hazard nothing in saying, 
judging from the nature of men and government, if once permitted to accumu- 
late, would create an interest strong enough to perpetuate itself, supported, as 
it would be, by others so numerous and powerful ; and thus would pass away a 
moment, never to be quietly recalled, so precious, if properly used, to lighten 
the public burden ; to equalize the action of the government ; to restore har- 
mony and peace ; and to present to the world the illustrious example, which 
could not fail to prove most favourable to the great cause of liberty everywhere^ 
of a nation the freest, and, at the same time, the best and most cheaply govern- 
ed ; of the highest earthly blessing at the least possible sacrifice. 

As the disease will not, then, heal itself, we are brought to the question, Can 
a remedy be applied ? and if so, what ought it to be ? 

To answer in the negative would be to assert that our Union has utterly fail- 
ed ; and that the opinion, so common before the adoption of our Constitution, 
that a free government could not be practically extended over a large country, 
■was correct ; and that ours had been destroyed by giving it limits so great as to 
comprehend, not only dissimilar, but irreconcilable interests. I am not prepared 
to admit a conclusion that would cast so deep a shade on the future, and that 
■would falsify all the glorious anticipations of our ancestors, while it would so 
greatly lessen their high reputation for wisdom. Nothing but the clearest dem- 
onstration, founded on actual experience, will ever force me to a conclusion 
so abhorrent to all my feelings. As strongly as I am impressed with the great 
dissimilarity, and, as I must add, as truth compels me to do, contrariety of inter- 
ests in our country, resulting from the causes already indicated, and which are 
so great that they caimot be subjected to the unchecked will of a majoritj- of 
the whole without defeating the great end of government, and without which it 
is a curse — ^justice — yet I see in the Ifnion, as ordained by the Constitution, the 
means, if wisely used, not only of reconciling all diversities, but also the means, 
and the only effectual one, of securing to us justice, peace, and security, at home 
and abroad, and with them that national power and renown, the love of which 
Providence has implanted, for wise purposes, so deeply in the human heart : in 
all of which great objects, every portion of our country, widely extended and di- 
versified as it is, has a common and identical interest. If we have the wisdom 
to place a proper relative estimate on these more elevated and durable blessings, 
the present and every other conflict of like character may be readily terminated ; 
but if, reversing the scale, each section should put a higher estimate on its im- 



ures of mere policy, without some regard to peace, harmony, or justice, our 
sectional conflicts would then, indeed, without some constitutional check, become 
interminable, except by the dissolution of the Union i-tself. That we have, in 
fact, so reversed the estimate, is too certain to be doubted, and the residt is our 
present distempered and dangerous condition. The cure must commence in 
the correction of the error ; and not to admit that we have erred would be the 
worst possible symptom. It would prove the disease to be incurable, through 
the regular and ordinary process of legislation ; and would compel, finally, a re- 
sort to extraordinary, but I still trust, not only constitutional, but safe remedies. 

No one would more sincerely rejoice than myself to see the remedy applied 
from the quarter where it could be most easily and regularly done. It is the 
only way by which those who think that it is the only quarter from which it 
can constitutionally come, can possibly sustain their opinion. To omit the ap- 
plication by the General Government would compel even them to admit the 
truth of the opposite opinion, or force them to abandon our political system in 
despair ; while, on the other hand, all their enlightened and patriotic opponents 
would rejoice at such evidence of moder'ation and wisdom, on the part of the 
General Government, as would supersede a resort to what they believe to be 
the higher powers of our political system, as indicating a sounder state of pub- 
lic sentiment than has ever heretofore existed in any country, and thus afford- 
ing the highest possible assurance of the perpetuation of our glorious institu- 
tions to the latest generation. For, as a people advance in knowledge, in the 
same degree they may dispense with mere artificial restrictions in their gov- 
ernment ; and we may imagine (but dare not expect to see it) a state of intelli- 
gence so universal and high, that all the guards of liberty may be dispensed with 
except an enlightened public opinion, acting through the right of suflrage ; but 
it presupposes a state where every class and every section of the commimity 
are capable of estimating the effects of every measure, not only as it may af- 
fect itself, but every other class and section ; and of fully realizing the sub- 
lime truth that the highest and wisest policy consists in maintaining justice, and 
promoting peace and harmony ; and that, compared to these, schemes of mere 
gain are but trash and dross. I fear experience has already proved that we 
are far removed from such a state, and that we must, consequently, rely on the 
old and clumsy, but approved mode of checking power, in order to prevent or 
correct abuses ; but I do trust that, though far from perfect, we are, at least, so 
much so as to be capable of remedying the present disorder in the ordinary 
way ; and thus to prove that with us public opinion is so enlightened, and our 
political machine so perfect, as rarely to require for its preservation the inter- 
vention of the power that created it. How is that to be effected ? 

The application may be painful, but the remedy, I conceive, is certain and 
simple. There is but one eflectual cure — an honest reduction of the duties to 
a fair system of revenue, adapted to the just and constitutional wants of the 
government. Nothing short of this will restore the country to peace, harmony, 
and mutual aflection. There is already a deep and growing conviction, in a 
large section of the country, that the impost, even as a revenue system, is ex- 
tremely unequal, and that it is mainly paid by those who furnish the means of 
paying the foreign exchanges of the country on which it is laid ; and that the 
case would not be varied, taking into the estimate the entire action of the sys- 
tem, whether the producer or consumer pays in the first instance. 

I do not propose to enter formally into the discussion of a point so complex 
and contested ; but, as it has necessarily a strong practical bearing on the sub- 
ject under consideration in all its relations, I cannot pass it without a tew gen- 
eral and brief remarks : 

If the producer in reality pays, none will doubt but the burden would mainly 
fall on the section it is supposed to do. The theory that the consumer pays in 



the first instance renders the proposition more complex, aim win require, in 
order to understand wliere the burden, in reality, uhimately falls, on that gup- 
position, to consider the protective, or, as its friends call it, the American Sys- 
tem, under its threefold aspect of taxation, of protection, and of distribution, or 
as performinsr, at the same time, the several functions of giving a revenue to the 
government, of affording protection to certain branches of domestic industry, and 
furnishing means to Congress of distributing large sums through its appropria- 
tions : all of which are so blended in their effects, that it is impossible to un- 
derstand its tnie operation without taking the whole into the estimate. 

Admitting, then, as supposed, that he who consumes the article pays the tax 
in the increased price, and that the burden falls wholly on the consumers, with- 
out affecting the producers as a class (which, by-the-by, is far from being 
true, except in the single case, if there be such a one, where the producers have 
a monopoly of an article so indispensable to life that the quantity consumed 
cannot be affected by any increase of price), and that, considered in the light 
of a tax merely, the impost duties fall equally on every section in proportion 
to its population, still, when combined with its other effects, the burden it im- 
poses as a tax may be so transferred from one section to the other as to take 
it from one and place it wholly on the other. Let us apply the remark first to 
its operation as a system of protection : 

The tendency of the tax or duty on the imported article is not only to 
raise its price, but also, in the same proportion, that of the domestic article of 
the same kind, for which purpose, when intended for protection, it is, in fact, 
laid ; and, of course, in determining where the system ultimately places the 
burden in reality, this effect, also, must be taken into the estimate. If one of 
the sections exclusively produces such domestic articles, and the other pur- 
chases them from it, then it is clear that, to the amount of such increased pri- 
ces, the tax or duty on the consumption of foreign articles would be transferred 
from the section producing the domestic articles to the one that purchased and 
consumed them, unless the latter, in turn, be indemnified by the increased price 
of the objects of its industry, which none will venture to assert to be the case 
"with the great staples of the country, which form the basis of our exports, the 
price of which is regulated by the foreign, and not the domestic market. To 
those who grow them, the increased price of the foreign and domestic articles 
both, in consequence of the duty on the former, is in reality, and in the strictest 
sense, a tax, while it is clear that the increased price of the latter acts as a 
bounty to the section producing them ; and that, as the amount of such increased 
prices on what it sells to the other section is greater or less than the duty it 
pays on the imported articles, the system will, in fact, operate as a bounty or 
tax : if greater, the difference Avould be a bounty ; if less, a tax. 

AgTvin, the operation may be equal in every other respect, and vet the pres- 
sure of the system, relatively, on the two sections, be rendered very unequal by 
the appropriations or distribution. If each section receives back what it paid 
into the treasury, the equality, if it previously existed, will continue ; but if one 
receives back less, and the other proportionably more than is paid, then the dif- 
ference in relation to the sections will be to the former a loss, and to the latter 
a gain ; and the system, in this aspect, would operate to the amount of the difl^'er- 
ence, as a contribution from the one receiving less than it paid to the other that 
receives more. Such would be incontestably its general effects, taken in all its 
different aspects, even on the theory supposed to be most favourable to prove 
the eiiual action of the system, that tlio consumer pays in the first instance the 
whole amount of the tax. 

To show how, on this supposition, the burden and advimtages of the system 
would actually distribute themselves between the sections, would carry me too 
far into details ; but I feel assured, after full and careful examination, that they 
are such as to explain what otherwise would seem inexplicable, that one sec- 



tiUli OllUUl 



such opposite views should be taken by them as to place them in a state of de- 
termined conflict in relation to the great fiscal and commercial interests of the 
country. Indeed, were there no satisfactory explanation, the opposite views 
that prevail in the two sections, as to the effects of the system, ought to satis- 
fy all of its unequal action. There can be no safer, or more certain rule, than 
to suppose each portion of the country equally capable of understanding their 
respective interests, and that each is a much better judge of the effects of any 
system or measures on its peculiar interest than the other can possibly be. 

But, whether the opinion of its unequal action be correct or erroneous, no- 
thing can be more certain than that the impression is widely extending itself, 
that the system, under all its modifications, is essentially unequal ; and if to 
that be added a conviction still deeper and more universal, that every duty im- 
posed/or the purpose of protection is not only unequal, hut also unconstitutional, 
it would be a fatal error to suppose that any remedy, short of that which I have 
stated, can heal our political disorders. 

In order to understand more fully the difficulty of adjusting this unhappy con- 
test on any other ground, it may not be improper to present a general view of 
the constitutional objection, that it may be clearly seen how hopeless it is to 
expect that it can be yielded by those who have embraced it. 

They believe that all the powers vested by the Constitution in Congress are 
not only restricted by the limitations expressly imposed, but also by the nature 
and object of the powers themselves. Thus, though the power to impose du- 
ties on imports be granted in general terms, without any other express limita- 
tions but that they shall be equal, and no preference shall be given to the ports 
of one state over those of another, yet, as being a portion of the taxing power 
given with the view of raising revenue, it is, from its nature, restricted to that 
object, as much so as if the Convention had expressly so limited it ; and that to 
use it to effect any other purpose not specified in the Constitution, is an infrac- 
tion of the instrument in its most dangerous form — an infraction by perversion, 
more easily made, and more difficult to resist, than any other. The same view 
is believed to be applicable to the power of regulating commerce, as well as all 
the other powers. To surrender this important principle, it is conceived, would 
be to surrender all power, and to render the government unlimited and despotic ; 
and to yield it up, in relation to the particular power in question, would be, in 
fact, to surrender the control of the whole industry and capital of the country to 
the General Government, and would end in placing the weaker section in a 
colonial relation with the stronger. For nothing are more dissimilar in their 
nature, or may be more unequally affected by the same laws, than different de- 
scriptions of labour and property ; and if taxes, by increasing the amount and 
changing the intent only, may be perverted, in fact, into a system of penalties 
and rewards, it would give all the power that could be desired to subject the 
labour and property of the minority to the will of the majority, to be regulated 
without regarding the interest of the former in subserviency to the will of the 
latter. Thus thinking, it would seem unreasonable to expect that any adjust- 
ment, based on the recognition of the correctness of a construction of the Con- 
stitution which would admit the exercise of such a power, would satisfy the 
weaker of two sections, particularly with its peculiar industry and property, 
which experience has shown may be so injuriously affected by its exercise. 
Thus much for one side. 

The just claim of the other ought to be equally respected. Whatever excite- 
ment the system has justly caused in certain portions of our country, I hope 
and believe all will conceive that the change should be made with the least pos- 
sible detriment to the interests of those who may be liable to be affected by it, 
consistently with what is justly due to others, and the principles of the Consti- 
tution. To effect this will require the kindest spirit of conciliation and the ut- 

F 



most skill; but, even witti these, it wiu ne iiiipossiuie lu mat^v uic uausmuu 
without a shock, greater or less, though I trust, if judiciously effected, it will 
not be without many compensating advantages. That there will be some such 
cannot be doubted. It will, at least, be followed by greater stability, and will 
tend to harmonize the manufacturing with all of the other great interests of the 
country, and bind the whole in mutual affection. But these are not all. Another 
advanta'cre of essential importance to the ultimate prosperity of our manufactu- 
ring industry will follow. It will cheapen production; and, in that view, the loss 
of any one branch will be nothing like in proportion to the reduction of duty on 
that particular branch. Every reduction will, in fact, operate as a bounty to 
every other branch except the one reduced ; and thus the effect of a general re- 
duction will be to cheapen, universally, the price of production, by cheapening 
living, wages, and materials, so as to give, if not equal profits after the reduc- 
tion-^profits by no means reduced proportionally to the duties — an effect which, 
as it regards the foreign markets, is of the utmost importance. It must be ap- 
parent, on reflection, that the means adopted to secure the home market for our 
manufactures are precisely the opposite of those necessary to obtain the for- 
eign. In the former, the increased expense of production, in consequence of a 
system of protection, may be more than compensated by the increased price at 
home of the article protected ; but in the latter, this advantage is lost ; and, as 
there is no other corresponding compensation, the increased cost of production 
must be a dead loss in the foreign market. But whether these advantages, and 
many others that might be mentioned, will ultimately compensate to the full ex- 
tent or not the loss to the manufacturers, on the reduction of the duties, certain 
it is, that we have approached a point at which a great change cannot be nmch 
longer delayed; and that the more promptly it may be -met, the less excitement 
there will be, and the greater leisure and calmness for a cautious and skilful 
operation in making the transition ; and which it becomes those more immedi- 
ately interested duly to consider. Nor ought they to overlook, in considering 
the question, the different character of the claims of the two sides. The one 
asks from govermnent no advantage, but simply to be let alone in the undis- 
turbed possession of their natural advantages, and to secure which, as far as w-as 
consistent with the other objects of the Constitution, was one of their leading 
motives in entering into the Union ; while the other side claims, for the advance- 
ment of their prosperity, the positive interference of the government. In such 
cases, on every principle of fairness and justice, such interference ought to be 
restrained within limits strictly compatible with the natural advantages of the 
other. He who looks to all of the causes in operation, the near approach of 
the final payment of the public debt, the growing disaffection and resistance to 
the system in so large a section of the country, the deeper principles on which 
opposition to it is gradually turning, must be, indeed, infatuated not to see a 
great change is unavoidable ; and that the attempt to elude or much longer delay 
it must finally but increase the shock and disastrous consequences which may 
follow. 

In forming the opinions I have expressed, I have not been actuated by an un- 
kind feeling towards our manufacturing interest. I now am, and ever have been, 
decidedly friendly to them, though I cannot concur in all of the measures which 
have been adopted to advance them. I believe considerations higher than any 
question of mere pecuniary interest forbade their use. But subordinate to these 
higher views of policy, I regard the advancement of mechanical and chemical 
improvements in the arts with feelings little short of enthusiasm ; not only as 
the prolific source of national and individual wealth, but as the great means of 
enlarging the domain of man over the material world, and thereby of laying the 
solid foundation of a highly-improved condition of society, morally and politi- 
cally. I fear not that we shall extend our power too far over the great agents 
of nature ; but, on the contrary, I consider such enlargement of our power as 



any one oi the many powertul causes nowoperaUng to that result. vVith these 
impressions, I not only rejoice at the general progress of the arts in the world, 
but in their advancement in our own country ; and as far as protection may be 
incidentally afforded, in the fair and honest exercise of our constitutional 
powers, I think now, as I have always thought, that sound policy, connected 
Avith the security, independence, and peace of the countr}% requires it should be 
done, but that we cannot go a single step beyond without jeopardizing our peace, 
our harmony, and our liberty — considerations of infinitely more importance to us 
than any measure of mere policy can possibly be. 

In thus placing my opinions before the public, I have not been actuated by 
the expectation of changing the public sentiment. Such a motive, on a ques- 
tion so long agitated, and so beset with feelings of prejudice and interest, would 
argue, on my part, an insufferable vanity, and a profound ignorance of the 
human heart. To avoid as far as possible the imputation of either, I have con- 
fined my statement, on the many and important points on which I have been 
compelled to touch, to a simple declaration of my opinion, without advancing 
any other reasons to sustain them than what appeared to me to be indispensa- 
ble to the full understanding of my views ; and if they should, on any point, be 
thought to be not clearly and explicitly developed, it will, I trust, be attributed 
to my solicitude to avoid the imputations to which I have alluded, and not from 
any desire to disguise my sentiments, nor the want of arguments and illustra- 
tions to maintain positions, which so abound in both, that it would require a 
volume to do them anything like justice. I can only hope that truths which, I 
feel assured, are essentially connected with all that we ought to hold most dear, 
may not be weakened in the public estimation by the imperfect manner in 
which I have been, by the object in view, compelled to present them. 

With every caution on my part, I dare not hope, in taking the step I have, to 
escape the imputation of improper motives ; though I have, without reserve, 
freely expressed my opinions, not regarding whether they might or might not 
be popular. I have no reason to believe that they are such as will conciliate 
public favour, but the opposite, which I greatly regret, as I have ever placed a 
high estimate on the good opinion of my fellow-citizens. But, be that as it 
may, I shall, at least, be sustained by feelings of conscious rectitude. I have 
formed my opinions after the most careful and deliberate examination, with all 
the aids which my reason and experience could furnish ; I have expressed 
them honestly and fearlessly, regardless of their effects personally, which, 
however interesting to me individually, are of too little importance to be taken 
into the estimate, where the liberty and happiness of our country are so vitally 
involved. John C. Calhoun. 

Fort HiU, Jidy 26a, 1831. 



IV. 



MR. Calhoun's letter to general Hamilton on the subject of state 

INTERPOSITION. 

Fort Hill, August 28th, 1832. 

My dear Sir — -I have received your note of the 31st July, requesting me 
to give you a fuller development of my views than that contained in my ad- 
dress last summer, on the right of a state to defend her reserved powers against 
the encroachments of the General Government. ' 

As fully occupied as my time is, were it doubly so, the quarter from which 
the request comes, with my deep conviction of the vital importance of the sub- 
ject, would exact a compliance. 



No one can be more sensible than 1 am that the address ot last summer fell 
far short of exhausting the subject. It was, in fact, intended as a simple state- 
ment of my views. I felt that the independence and candour which ought to 
distinf'uish one occupying a high public station, imposed a duty on me to meet 
the call for my opinion by a frank and full avowal of my sentiments, regardless 
of consequences. To fultil this duty, and not to discuss the subject, was the 
object of the address. But, in making these preliminary remarks, I do not in- 
tend to prepare you to expect a full discussion on the present occasion. What 
I propose is, to touch some of the more prominent points that have received less 
of the public attention than their importance seems to me to demand. 

Strange as the assertion may appear, it is, nevertheless, true, that the great 
difBculty in determining whether a state has the right to defend her reserved 
powers against the General Government, or, in fact, any right at all beyond 
those of a mere corporation, is to bring the public mind to realize plain histor- 
ical facts connected with the origin and formation of the government. Till 
they are fully understood, it is impossible that a correct and just view can be 
taken of the subject. In this connexion, the first and most important point is 
to ascertain distinctly who are the real authors of the Constitution of tire Uni- 
ted States — whose powers created it — whose voice clothed it with authority; 
and whose agent the government it formed in reality is. At this point, I com- 
mence the execution of the task which your request has imposed. 

The formation and adoption of the Constitution are events so recent, and all 
the connected facts so fully attested, that it would seem impossible that there 
should be the least uncertainty in relation to them ; and yet, judging by what is 
constantly heard and seen, there are few subjects on which the public opinion 
is more confused. The most indefinite expressions are habitually used in speak- 
ing of them. Sometimes it is said that the Constitution was made by the 
states, and at others, as if in contradistinction, by the people, without distin- 
guishing between the two very different meanings which may be attached to 
those general expressions ; and this, not in ordinary conversation, but in grave 
discussions before deliberate bodies, and in judicial investigations, where the 
greatest accuracy on so important a point might be expected ; particularly as 
one or the other meaning is intended, conclusions the most opposite must fol- 
low, not only in reference to the subject of this communication, but as to the 
nature and character of our political system. By a state may be meant either 
the government of a state or the people, as forming a separate and independent 
community ; and by the people, either the American people taken collectively, 
as forming one great connnunity, or as the people of the several states, forming, 
as above stated, separate and independent communities. These distinctions 
are essential in the inquiry. If by the people be meant the people collective- 
ly, and not the people of the several states taken separately ; and if it be true, 
indeed, that the Constitution is the work of the American people collectively ; 
if it originated with them, and derives its authority from their will, then there 
is an end of tlie argument. The right claimed for a state of defending her re- 
served powers against the General Government would be an absurdity. View- 
ing the American people collectively as the source of political power, the rights 
of the states would be mere concessions — concessions from the common major- 
ity, and to be revoked by them with the same facility that they were granted. 
The states would, on this supposition, bear to the Union the same relation that 
counties do to the states ; and it would, in that case, be just as preposterous to 
discuss the right of interposition, on the part of a state, against the General 
Government, as that of the counties against the states themselves. That a 
large portion of the people of the United States thus regard the relation between 
the state and the General Government, including many who call themselves 
the friends of State-rights and opponents of consolidation, can scarcely be doubt- 
ed, as it is only on that supposition it can be explained that so many of that 



from the Constitution being the work of the American people collectively, no 
such political body either now, or ever did. exist. In that character the people 
of this country never performed a single political act, nor, indeed, can, without 
an entire revolution in all our political relations. 

I challenge an instance. From the beginning, and in all the changes of po- 
litical existence through which we have passed, the people of the United 
States have been united as forming political communities, and not as individ- 
uals. Even in the first stage of existence, they formed distinct colonies, inde- 
pendent of each other, and politically united only through the British crown. 
In their first imperfect union, for the purpose of resisting the encroachments of 
the mother-country, they united as distinct political communities ; and, passing 
from their colonial condition, in the act announcing their independence to the 
world, they declared themselves, by name and enumeration, free and inde- 
pendent states. In that character, they formed the old confederation ; and, when 
it was proposed to supersede the articles of the confederation by the present 
Constitution, they met in convention as states, acted and voted as states ; and 
the Constitution, when formed, was submitted for ratification to the people of 
the several states : it was ratified by them as states, each state for itself ; each 
by its ratification binding its own citizens ; the parts thus separately binding 
themselves, and not the whole the parts ; to wTiich, if it be added, that it is de- 
clared in the preamble of the Constitution to be ordained by the people of the 
United States, and in the article of ratification, when ratified, it is declared " to 
be binding between the states so xatifyingr The conclusion is inevitable, that 
the Constitution is the work of the people of the states, considered as separate 
and independent political communities ; that they are its authors — their power 
created it, their voice clothed it with authority — that the government formed is, 
in reality, their agent ; and that the Union, of which the Constitution is the 
bond, is a union of states, and not of individuals. No one, Avho regards his 
character for intelligence and truth, has ever ventured directly to deny facts so 
certain ; but while they are too certain for denial, they are also too conclusive 
in favour of the rights of the states for admission. The usual course has been 
adopted — to elude what can neither be denied nor admitted ; and never has the 
device been more successfully practised. By confounding states with state 
governments, and the people of the states with the American people collective- 
ly — things, as it regards the subject of this communication, totally dissimilar, 
as much so as a triangle and a square — facts of themselves perfectly certain and 
plain, and which, when well understood, must lead to a correct conception of 
the subject, have been involved in obscurity and mystery. 

I will next proceed to state some of the results which necessarily follow 
from the facts which have been established. 

The first, and, in reference to the subject of this communication, the most im- 
portant, is, that there is no direct and immediate connexion between the indi- 
vidual citizens of a state and the General Government. The relation between 
them is through the state. The Union is a union of states as communities, 
and not a union of individuals. As members of a state, her citizens were 
originally subject to no control but that of the state, and could be subject to 
no other, except by the act of the state itself The Constitution was, accord- 
ingly, submitted to the states for their separate ratification ; and it was only by 
the ratification of the state that its citizens became subject to the control of the 
General Government. The ratification of any other, or all the other states, 
without its own, could create no connexion between them and the General 
Government, nor impose on them the slightest obligation. Without the ratifi- 
cation of their own state, they would stand in the same relation to the General 
Government as do the citizens or subjects of any foreign state ; and we find the 



ClllZeUS Ul i>UUIl v^ciiuima ciinj. i.iil^^^ ^^^^..^ j — ^ 

the government for some time after it went into operation ; these states having, 
in the first instance, declined to ratify. Nor had the act of any individual the 
least influence in subjecting him to the control of the General Government, ex- 
cept as it mif^ht influence the ratification of the Constitution by his own state. 
Whether subject to its control or not, depended wholly on the act of the state. 
His dissent had not the least weight against the assent of his state, nor his as- 
sent against its dissent. It follows, as a necessary consequence, that the act 
of ratification bound the state as a community, as is expressly declared in the 
! article of the Constitution above quoted, and not the citizens of the state as in- 
dividuals : the latter being bound through their state, and in consequence of the 
ratification of the former. Another, and a highly important consequence, as it 
regards the subject under investigation, follows with equal certainty : that, on a 
question whether a particular power exercised by the General Government be 
granted by the Constitution, it belongs to the state as a member of the Union, 
in her sovereign capacity in convention, to determine definitively, as far as her 
citizens are concerned, the extent of the obligation which she contracted ; and 
if, in her opinion, the act exercising the power be unconstitutional, to declare it 
null and void, which declaration ivould be obligatory on her citizens. In coming 
to this conclusion, it may be proper to remark, to prevent misrepresentation, 
that I do not claim for a state the right to abrogate an act of the General Gov- 
ernment. It is the Constitution that annuls an unconstitutional act. Such an 
act is of itself void and of no effect. What I claim is, the right of the state, 
as far as its citizens are concerned, to declare the extent of the obligation, and 
that such declaration is binding on thc?n — a right, when limited to its citizens, 
flowing directly from the relation of the state to the General Government on the 
one side, and its citizens on the other, as already explained, and resting on 
the most plain and solid reasons. 

Passing over, what of itself might be considered conclusive, the obvious prin- 
ciple, that it belongs to the authority which imposed the obligation to declare 
its extent, as far as those are concerned on whom the obligation is placed, I 
shall present a single argmnent, which of itself is decisive. I have already 
shown that there is no immediate connexion between the citizens of a state 
and the General Government, and that the relation between them is through the 
state. I have also shown that, whatever obligations were imposed on the cit- 
izens, were imposed by the act of the state ratifying the Constitution. A sim- 
ilar act by the same authority, made with equal solemnity, declaring the extent 
of the obligation, must, as far as they are concerned, be of equal authority. I 
speak, of course, on the supposition that the right has not been transferred, as 
it will hereafter be shown that it has not. A citizen would have no more right 
to question the one than he would have the other declaration. They rest on 
the same authority ; and as he was bound by the declaration of his state as- 
senting to the Constitution, whether he assented or dissented, so would he be 
equally bound by a declaration declaring the extent of that assent, whether op- 
posed to, or in favour of, such declaration. In this conclusion I am supported 
by analog)--. The case of a treaty between sovereigns is strictly analogous. 
There, as in this case, the state contracts for the citizen or subject ; there, as 
in this, the obligation is imposed by the state, and is independent of his will ; 
and there, as in this, the declaration of the state, determining the extent of 
the obligation contracted, is obligatory on him, as much so as the treaty itself. 

Having now, I trust, established the very important point, that the declara- 
tion of a state, as to the extent of the power granted, is obligatory on its citi- 
zens, I shall next proceed to consider the effects of such declarations in refer- 
ence to the General Government : a question which necessarily involves the 
consideration of the relation between it and the states. It has been shown that 
the people of the states, acting as disthict and independent communities, are the 



of its departments, is, in fact, the agent of the states, constituted to execute their 
joint will, as expressed in the Constitution. 

In usinff the term agent, I do not intend to derogate in any degree from its 
character as a government. It is as truly and properly a government as are 
the state governments themselves. I have applied it simply because it strictly 
belongs to the relation between the General Government and the states, as, in 
fact, it does also to that between a state and its own government. Indeed, ac- 
cording to our theory, governments are in their nature but trusts, and thosfe ap- 
pointed to administer them trustees or agents to execute the trust powers. 
The sovereignty resides elsewhere — in the people, not in the government ; and 
with us, the people mean the people of the several states originally formed into 
thirteen distinct and independent communities, and now into twenty-four. Po- 
litically speaking, in reference to our own system, there are no other people. 
The General Government, as well as those of the states, is but the organ of 
their power: the latter, that of their respective states, through which are exer- 
cised separately that portion of power not delegated by the Constitution, and in 
the exercise of which each state has a local and peculiar interest ; the former, 
the joint organ of all the states confederated into one general comm.unity, arid 
through which they jointly and concurringly exercise the delegated powers, in 
which all have a common interest. Thus viewed, the Constitution of the Uni- 
ted States, with the government it created, is truly and strictly the Constitution 
of each state, as much so as its own particular Constitution and government, 
ratified by the same authority, in the same mode, and having, as far as its citi- 
zens are concerned, its powers and obligations from the same source, differing 
only in the aspect, under which I am considering the subject, in the plighted 
faith of the state to its co-states, and of which, as far as its citizens are con- 
sidered, the state, in the last resort, is the exclusive judge. 

Such, then, is the relation between the state and General Government, in 
whatever light we may consider the Constitution, whether as a compact be- 
tween the states, or of the nature of the legislative enactment by the joint and 
concurring authority of the states in their high sovereignty. In whatever light 
it may be viewed, I hold it as necessarily resulting, that, in the case of a power 
disputed between them, the government, as the agent, has no right to enforce 
its construction against the construction of the state as one of the sovereign 
parties to the Constitution, any more than the state government would have 
against the people of the state in their sovereign capacity, the relation being 
the same between them. That such would be the case between agent and 
principal in the ordinary transactions of life, no one will doubt, nor will it be 
possible to assign a. reason why it is not as applicable to the case of gov- 
ernment as to that of individuals. The principle, in fact, springs from the re- 
latio7i itself, and is applicable to it in all its forms and characters. It may, how- 
ever, be proper to notice a distinction between the case of a single principal 
and his agent, and that of several principals and their joint agent, which might 
otherwise cause some confusion. In both cases, as between the agent and a 
principal, the construction of the principal, whether he be a single principal or 
one of several, is equally conclusive ; but, in the latter case, both the principal 
and the agent bear relation to the other principals, which must be taken into 
the estimate, in order to understand fully all the results which may grow out of 
the contest for power between them. Though the construction of the principal 
is conclusive against the joint agent, as between them, such is not the case be- 
tween him and his associates. They both have an equal right of construction, 
and it would be the duty of the agent to bring the subject before the principal 
to be adjusted, according to the terms of the instrument of association, and of 
the principal to submit to such adjustment. In such cases the contract itself 



to it The General Uovernmeni is a cuae ui juuu agoii.._y — .^ic jwx... agoi.i, kji 
the twentv-four sovereign states. It would be its duty, according to the prin- 
ciples established in such cases, instead of attempting to enforce Us construc- 
tion of its powers against that of the states, to bring the subject before the states 
themselves, in the only form which, according to the provision of the Constitu- 
tion it can' be— by a proposition to amend, in the manner prescribed in the in- 
strument, to be acted on by them in the only mode they can, by expressly grant- 
ing or withholding the contested power. Against this conclusion there can be 
rafsed but one objection, that the states have surrendered or transferred the 
right in question. If such be the fact, there ought to be no difficulty in estab- 
lishintT it. The grant of the powers delegated is contained in a written instru- 
ment.'drawn up with great care, and adopted with the utmost deliberation. It 
provides that the powers not granted are reserved to the states and the people. 
If it be surrendered, let the grant be shown, and the controversy will be ter- 
minated ; and, surely, it ought to be shown, plainly and clearly shown, before 
the states are asked to admit what, if true, would not only divest them of a right 
tvhich, under all its forms, belongs to the principal over his agent, unless surren- 
dered, but which cannot be surrendered without in effect, and for all practical 
purposes, reversing the relation between them ; putting the agent in the place 
of the principal, and the principal in that of the agent ; and which would de- 
grade the states from the high and sovereign condition which they have ever 
held, under every form of their existence, to be mere subordinate and dependant 
corporations of the government of its own creation. But, instead of showing 
any such grant, not a provision can be found in the Constitution authorizing the 
General Government to exercise any control ivhatever over a state by force, by 
veto, by judicial process, or in any other form— a most iinportant omission, de- 
signed, and not accidental, and, as will be shown in the course of these remarks, 
omitted by the dictates of the profoundest wisdom. 

The journal and proceedings of the Convention which formed the Constitu- 
tion afford abundant proof that there was in the body a powerful party, distin- 
guished for talents and influence, intent on obtaining for the General Govern- 
ment a grant of the very power in question, and that they attempted to eflect 
this object in all possible ways, but, fortunately, without success. The first 
project of a Constitution submitted to the Convention (Governor Randolph's) 
embraced a proposition to grant power " to negative all laws contrary, in the opin- 
ion of the National Legislature, to the articles of the Union, or any treaty sub- 
sisting under the authority of the Union ; and to call forth the force of the Union 
against any member of the Union failing to fulfil his duty under the articles 
thereof." The next project submitted (Charles Pinckney's) contained a simi- 
lar provision. It proposed, "that the Legislature of the United States should 
have the power to revise the laws of the several states that may be supposed 
to infringe the powers exclusively delegated by this Constitution to Congress, 
and to negative and annil! such as do." The next was submitted by Mr. Pat- 
erson, of New-Jersey, which provided, "if any state, or body of men in any 
state, shall oppose or prevent the carrying into execution such acts or treaties" 
(of the Union), " the federal executive shall be authorized to call forth the pow- 
ers of the confederated states, or so much thereof as shall be necessary to en- 
force, or compel the obedience to such acts, or observance of such treaties." 
General Hamilton's next succeeded, which declared " all laws of the particu- 
lar states contrary to the Constitution or laws of the United States, to be ut- 
terly void ; and, the better to prevent such laws being passed, the governor or 
president of each state shall be appointed by the General Government, and 
shall have a negative on the laws about to be passed in the state of which he 
is governor or president." 

At a subsequent period, a proposition was moved and referred to a committee 



trOVersKis Ut/iwecii iiio uiiii-t;u kjiaics anu. any iiiuiviuuai otaoc , aiiu, ai, a suil 

later period, it was moved to grant power " to negative all laws passed by the 
several states interfering, in the opinion of the Legislature, with the general 
harmony and interest of the Union, provided that two thirds of the members of 
each house assent to the same," which, after an ineffectual attempt to commit, 
was withdrawn. 

I do not deem it necessary to trace through the journals of the Convention 
the fate of these various propositions. It is sufficient that they were moved 
and failed, to prove conclusively, in a manner never to be reversed, that the 
Convention which framed the Constitution was opposed to granting the power 
to the General Government in any form, through any of its departments, legis- 
lative, executive, or judicial, to coerce or control a state, though proposed in all 
conceivable modes, and sustained by the most talented and influential members 
of the body. This, one would suppose, ought to settle forever the question of 
the surrender or transfer of the power under consideration ; and such, in fact, 
would be the case, were the opinion of a large portion of the community not bi- 
ased, as, in fact, it is, by interest. A majority have almost always a direct in- 
terest in enlarging the power of the government, and the interested adhere to 
power with a pertinacity which bids defiance to truth, though sustained by evi- 
dence as conclusive as mathematical demonstration ; and, accordingly, the ad- 
vocates of the powers of the General Government, notwithstanding the impreg- 
nable strength of the proof to the contrary, have boldly claimed, on construc- 
tion, a power, the grant of which was so perseveringly sought and so sternly 
resisted by the Convention. They rest the claim on the provisions in the 
Constitution which declare " that this Constitution, and the laws made in pur- 
suance thereof, shall be the supreme law of the land," and that " the judicial 
power shall extend to all cases in law and equity arising under this Constitu- 
tion, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, 
under their authority." 

I do not propose to go into a minute examination of these provisions. They 
have been so frequently and so ably investigated, and it has been so clearly 
shown that they do not warrant the assumption of the power claimed for the 
government, that I do not deem it necessary. I shall, therefore, confine myself 
to a few detached remarks. 

I have already stated that a distinct proposition was made to confer the very 
power in controversy on the Supreme Court, which failed ; which of itself 
ought to overrule the assumption of the power by construction, unless sustained 
by the most conclusive argimients ; but when it is added that this proposition 
was moved (20th August) subsequent to the period of adopting the provisions, 
above cited, vesting the court with its present powers (18th July), and that an 
effort was made, at a still later period (23d August), to invest Congress with a 
negative on all state laws which, in its opinion, might interfere with the gen- 
eral interest and harmony of the Union, the argimient would seem too conclu- 
sive against the powers of the court to be overruled by construction, however 
strong. 

Passing by, however, this, and also the objection that the terms cases in law 
and equity are technical, embracing only questions between parties amenable to 
the process of the court, and, of course, excluding questions between the states 
and the General Government — an argument which has never been answered — 
there remains another objection perfectly conclusive. 

The construction which would confer on the Supreme Court the power in 
question, rests on the ground that the Constitution has conferred on that tribu- 
nal the high and important right of deciding on the constitutionality aflaws. 
That it possesses this power I do not deny, but I do utterly that it is conferred 
by the Constitution, either by the provisions above cited, or any other. It is a 

G 



by the Supreme Court exclusively or peculiarly, it not only belongs to every 
court of the country, high or low, civil or criminal, but to all foreign courts, be- 
fore which a case may be brought involving the construction of a law which may 
conflict with the provisions of the Constitution. The reason is plain. Where 
there are two sets of rules prescribed in reference to the same subject, one by 
a higher and the other by an inferior authority, the judicial tribunal called in 
to decide on the case must unavoidably determine, should they convict, which is 
the law ; and that necessity compels it to decide that the rule prescribed by the 
inferior power, if in its opinion inconsistent with that of the higher, is void, be it a 
conflict between the Constitution and a law, or between a charter and the by-laws 
of a corporation, or any other higher and inferior authority. The principle and 
source of authority are the same in all such cases. Being derived from neces- 
sity, it is restricted within its limits, and cannot pass an inch beyond the nar- 
row confines of deciding in a case before the court, and, of course, between par- 
ties amenable to its process, excluding thereby political questions, which of the 
two is, in reality, the law, the act of Congress or the Constitution, when on 
their face they are inconsistent ; and yet, from this resulting limited power, de- 
rived from necessity, and held in common with every court in the world which, 
by possibility, may take cognizance of a case involving the interpretation of our 
Constitution and laws, it is attempted to confer on the Supreme Court a power 
Avhich would work a thorough and radical change in our system, and which, 
moreover, was positively refused by the Convention. 

The opinion that the General Government has the right to enforce its con- 
struction of its powers against a state, in any mode whatever, is, in truth, found- 
ed on a fundamental misconception of our system. At the bottom of this, and, 
in fact, almost every other misconception as to the relation between the states 
and the General Government, lurks the radical error, that the latter is a national, 
and not, as in reality it is, a confederated government ; and that it derives its 
powers from a higher source than the states. There are thousands influenced 
by these impressions without being conscious of it, and who, while they believe 
themselves to be opposed to consolidation, have infused into their conception 
of our Constitution almost all the ingredients which enter into that form of 
government. The striking difTerence between the present government and that 
imder the old confederation (I speak of governments as distinct from constitu- 
tions) has mainly contributed to this dangerous impression. But, however dis- 
similar their governments, the present Constitution is as far removed from coh' 
solidalion, and is as strictly and as imrely a confederation, as the one which it su- 
perseded. 

Like the old confederation, it was formed and ratified by state authority. The 
only diflerence in this particular is, that one was ratified by the people of the 
states, and the other by the state governments ; one forming strictly a union of 
the state governments, the other of the states themselves ; one, of the agents ex- 
ercising the powers of sovereignty, and the other, of the sovereigns themselves ; 
but both were unions of })olitical bodies, as distinct from a union of the people 
individually. They are, indeed, both confederations, but the present in a higher 
and purer sense than that which it succeeded, just as the act of a sovereign 
is higher and more perfect than that of his agent ; and it was, doubtless, in ref- 
erence to this diUcrencc that the preamble of the Constitution, and the address 
of the Convention laying the Constitution before Congress, speak of consolida- 
ting and perfecting the Union ; yet this diflerence, which, while it elevated the 
General Government in relation to the state governments, placed it more imme- 
diately in the relation of the creature and agent of the states themselves, by a 
natural misconception, has been the principal cause of the impression so preva- 
lent of the inferiority of the states to the General Government, and of the con- 
sequent right of the latter to coerce the former. Raised from below to the same 



themselves. 

I have now, I trust, conclusively shown that a state has a right, in her sov- 
ereign capacity, in convention, to declare an unconstitutional act of Congress to 
be null and void, and that such declarations would be obligatory on her citizens, 
as highly so as the Constitution itself, and conclusive against the General Gov- 
ernment, which would have no right to enforce its construction of its powers 
' against that of the state. 

! I next propose to consider the practical effect of the exercise of this high and 
important right— -which, as the great conservative principle of our system, is 
known under the various names of nullification, interposition, and state veto — in 
reference to its operation viewed under different aspects : nullification, as de- 
claring null an unconstitutional act of the General Government, as far as the 
state is concerned ; interposition, as throwing the shield of protection between 
the citizens of a state and the encroachments of the Government ; and veto, as 
arresting or inhibiting its unauthorized acts within the limits of the state. 

The practical effect, if the right was fully recognised, would be plain and 
simple, and has already, in a great measure, been anticipated. If the state has 
a right, there must, of necessity, be a corresponding obligation on the part of 
the General Government to acquiesce in its exercise ; and, of course, it would 
be its duty to abandon the power, at least as far as the state is concerned, to 
compromise the difSculty, or apply to the states themselves, according to the 
form prescribed in the Constitution, to obtain the power by a grant. If granted, 
acquiescence, then, would be a duty on the part of the state ; and, in that event, 
the contest would terminate in converting a doubtful constructive power into one 
positively granted ; but, should it not be granted, no alternative would remain for 
the General Government but a compromise or its permanent abandonment. In 
either event, the controversy would be closed and the Constitution fixed : a re- 
suh of the utmost importance to the steady operation of the government and the 
stability of the system., and which can never be attained, under its present opera- 
tion, without the recognition of the right, as experience has shown. 

From the adoption of the Constitution, we have had but one continued agita- 
tion of constitutional questions embracing some of the most important powers 
exercised by the government ; and yet, in spite of all the ability and force of 
argument displayed in the various discussions, backed by the high authority 
claimed for the Supreme Court to adjust such controversies, not a single con- 
stitutional question, of a political character, which has ever been agitated during 
this long period, has been settled in the public opinion, except that of the un- 
constitutionality of the Alien and Sedition Law ; and, what is remarkable, that 
was settled against the decision of the Supreme Court. ^ The tendency is to in- 
crease, and not diminish, this conflict for power. New questions are yearly 
added without diminishing the old ; while the contest becomes more obstinate 
as the list increases, and, what is highly ominous, more sectional. It is im- 
possible that the government can last under this increasing diversity of opinion, 
find growing uncertainty as to its power in relation to the most important sub- 
jects of legislation ; and equally so, that this dangerous state can terminate 
without a power somewhere to compel, in effect, the government to abandon 
doubtful constructive powers, or to convert them into positive grants by an 
amendment of the Constitution ; in a word, to substitute the positive grants of 
the parties themselves for the constructive powers interpolated by the agents. 
Nothing short of this, in a system constructed as ours is, with a double set of 
agents, one for local and the other for general purposes, can ever terminate the 
conflict for power, or give uniformity and stability to its action. 

Such would be the practical and happy operation were the ri^ht recognised ; 
but the case is far otherwise ; and as the right is not only denied, but violently 
opposed, the General Government, so far from acquiescing in its exercise, and 



abandoning the power, as it ought, may endeaA-our, by all the means within its 
command to enforce its construction against that of the state. It is under this 
aspect of the question that I now propose to consider the practical effect of the 
exercise of the ri^ht, with the view to determine which of the two, the state or 
the General Government, must prevail in the conflict ; which compels nae to 
revert to some of the grounds already established. 

I have already shown that the declaration of nullification would be obligatory 
on the citizens of the state, as much so, in fact, as its declaration ratifying the 
Constitution, resting, as it does, on the same Ijasis. It would to them be the 
hio^hest possible evidence that the power contested was not granted, and, of 
course, that the act of the General Government was unconstitutional. They 
Avould be bound, in all the relation.s. of life, private and political, to respect and 
obey it ; and, when called upon as jurymen, to render their verdict according- 
ly, or, as judges, to pronounce judgment in conformity to it. The right of jury 
trial is secured by the Constitution (thanks to the jealous spirit of liberty, 
doubly secured and fortified) ; and, with this inestimable right — inestimable, not 
only as an essential portion of the judicial tribunals of the country, but infinitely 
more so, considered as a popular, and still more, a local representation, in that 
department of the government which, without it, would be the farthest removed 
from the control of the people, and a fit instrument to sap the foundation of the 
system — with, I repeat, this inestimable right, it would be impossible for the Gen- 
eral Government, within the limits of the state, to execute, legally, the act nulli- 
fied, or any other passed with a view to enforce it ; while, on the other hand, the 
state would be able to enforce, legally and peaceably, its declaration of nullification. 
Sustained by its court and juries, it would calmly and quietly, but successfully, 
meet every effort of the General Government to enforce its claim of power. 
The result would be inevitable. Before the judicial tribunal of the country, the 
state must prevail, miless, indeed, jury trial could be eluded by the refinement 
of the court, or by some other device ; which, however, guarded as it is by the 
ramparts of the Constitution, would, I hold, be impossible. The attempt to 
elude, should it be made, would its.elf be iraconstitutional ; and, in turn, would 
be annulled by the sovereign voice of the state. Nor would the right of appeal 
to the Supreme Court, under the judiciary act, avail the General Government.. 
If taken, it would but end in a new trial, and that in another verdict against the 
government ; but whether it may be taken, would be optional with the state. 
The court itself has decided that a copy of the record is requisite to review a 
judgment of a state court, and, if necessary, the state would take the precaution 
to prevent, by proper enactments, any means of obtaining a copy. But if ob- 
tained, what would it avail against the execution of the penal enactments of the 
state, intended to enforce the declaration of nullification ? The judgment of 
the state court would be pronounced and executed before the possibility of a 
reversal, and executed, too, without responsibility incurred by any one. 

Beaten before the courts, the General Government Avould be compelled to 
abandon its unconstitutional pretensions, or resort to force : a resort, the diffi- 
culty (I was about to say, the impossibility) of which would very soon fully 
manifest itself, should folly or madness ever make the attempt. 

In considering this aspect of the controversy, I pass over the fact that the 
General Government has no right to resort to force against a state — to coerce a 
sovereign member of the Union — which, I trust, I have established beyond all 
possible doubt. Let it, however, be determined to use force, and the difficulty 
Avould be insurmountable, unless, indeed, it be also determined to set aside the 
Constitution, and to subvert the system to its foundations. 

Against whom would it be applied ? Congress has, it is true, the right to 
call forth the militia " to execute the laws and suppress insurrection ;" but 
there would be no law resisted, unless, indeed, it be called resistance for the 
juries to refuse to find, and the courts to render judgment, in conformity to the 



force to reduce ; not a sword unsheathed ; not anbayonet raised ; none, absolute- 
ly none, on whom force could be used, except it be on the unarmed citizens en- 
gaged peaceably and quietly in their daily occupations. 

No one would be guilty of treason (" levying war against the United States, 
adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort"), or any other crime 
made penal by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. 

To suppose that force could be called in, implies, indeed, a great mistake, 
both as to the nature of our government and that of the controversy. It would 
be a legal and constitutional contest — a conflict of moral, and not physical force — 
a trial of constitutional, not military power, to be decided before the judicial 
tribunals of the country, and not on the field of battle. In such contest, there 
would be no object for force, but those peaceful tribunals — nothing on which it 
could be employed, but in putting down courts and juries, and preventing *the 
execution of judicial process. Leave these untouched, and all the militia that 
could be called forth, backed by a regular force of ten times the number of our 
small, but gallant and patriotic army, could have not the slightest effect on the 
result of the controversy ; but subvert these by an armed body, and you subvert 
the very foundation of this our free, constitutional, and legal system of govern- 
ment, and rear in its place a military despotism. 

Feeling the force of these difficulties, it is proposed, with the view, I suppose, 
of disembarrassing the operation, as much as possible, of the troublesome inter- 
ference of courts and juries, to change the scene of coercion from land to water ; 
as if the government could have one particle more right to coerce a state by 
water than by laud ; but, unless I am greatly deceived, the difficulty on that 
element will not be much less than on the other. The jury trial, at least the 
local jury trial (the trial by the vicinage), may, indeed, be evaded there, but 
in its place other, and not much less formidable, obstacles must be encoun- 
tered. 

There can be but two modes of coercion resorted to by water — blockade and 
abolition of the ports of entry of the state, accompanied by penal enactments, 
authorizing seizures for entering the waters of the state. If the former be at- 
tempted, there will be other parties besides the General Government and the 
state. Blockade is a belligerent right ; it presupposes a state of war, and, 
unless there be war (war in due form, as prescribed by the Constitution), the 
order for blockade would not be respected by other nations or their subjects. 
Their vessels would proceed directly for the blockaded port, with certain pros- 
pects of gain ; if seized under the order of blockade, through the claim of in- 
demnity against the General Government; and, if not, by a profitable market, 
without the exaction of duties. 

The other mode, the abolition of the ports of entry of the state, would also 
have its difficulties. The Constitution provides that " no preference shall be 
given by any regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports of one state over 
those of another ; nor shall vessels bound to or from one state be obliged to 
enter, clear, or pay duties in another :" provisions too clear to be eluded even 
by the force of construction. There wall be another difficulty. If seizures be 
made in port, or within the distance assigned by the laws of nations as the limits 
of a state, the trial must be in the state, with all the embarrassments of its courts 
and juries ; while beyond the ports and the distance to which I have referred, 
it would be difficult to point out any principle by which a foreign vessel, at 
least, could be seized, except as an incident to the right of blockade, and, of 
course, with all the difficulties belonging to that mode of coercion. 

But there yet remains another, and, I doubt not, insuperable barrier, to be 
found in the judicial tribunals of the Union, against all the schemes of introdu- 
cing force, whether by land or water. Though I cannot concur in the opinion 
of those who regard the Supreme Court as the mediator appointed by the Con- 



SlltUUOn DeUVeen me Siaies aim mv vjcuciai viruvcjuiiiem , aim luuugii 1 isatUiOi. 

doubt there is a natural bias on its part towards the powers of the latter, yet I 
must greatly lower my -opinion of that high and important tribunal for intelli- 
gence, justice, and attachment to the Constitution, and particularly of that pure 
and upright magistrate who has so long, and with such distinguished honour to 
himself and the Union, presided over its deliberations, with all the weight that' 
belongs to an intellect of the first order, united with the most spotless integrity. 
to believe, for a moment, that an attempt so plainly and manifestly unconstitu-i 
tional as a resort to force woidd be in such a contest, could be sustained by the 
sanction of its authority. In whatever form force may be used, it must present 
questions for legal adjudication. If in the shape of blockade, the vessels seized | 
under it must be condemned, and thus woidd be presented the question of prize! 
or no prize, and, with it, the legality of the blockade ; if in that of a repeal of 
the acts establishing ports of entries in the state, the legality of the seizure 
must be determined, and that would bring up the question of the constitutional- 
ity of giving a preference to the ports of one state over those of another ; and 
so, if we pass from water to land, we wall find every attempt there to substitute 
force for lav/ must, in like manner, come under the review of the courts of the 
Union ; and the unconstitutionality v/ould be so glaring, that the executive and 
legislative departments, in their attempt to coerce, should either make an attempt 
so lawless and desperate, would be without the support of the judicial depart- 
ment. I will not pursue the question farther, as I hold it perfectly clear that, 
so long as a state retains its federal relations ; so long, in a word, as it continues 
a member of the Union, the contest between it and the General Go'VernmenJ; 
must be before the courts and juries ; and every attempt, in whatever form^ 
■whether by land or water, to substitute force as the arbiter in their place, must 
fail. The unconstitutionality of the attempt would be so open, and palpable, 
that it would be impossible to sustain it. 

There is, indeed, one view, and one only, of the contest in which fi:)rce could 
be employed ; but that view, as between the parties, would supersede the Con- 
stitution itself: that nullification is secession, and would, consequently, place 
the state, as to the others, in the relation of a foreign state. Such, clearly, 
would be the effect of secession : but it is equally clear that it would place the 
state beyond the pale of all her federal relations, and, thereby, all control on the 
part of the other states over her. She would stand to them simply in the rela- 
tion of a foreign state, divested of all federal connexion, and having none other 
between them but those belonging to the laws of nations. Standing thus to- 
wards one another, force might, indeed, be employed against a state, but it 
must be a belligerent force, preceded by a declaration of war, and earned on 
with all its formalities. Such would be the certain eflect of secession ; and if 
nullification be secession — if it be but a difl!erent name for the same thing — such, 
too, must be its effect ; which presents the highly important question. Are they, 
in fact, the same ? on the decision of which depends the question whether it 
be a peaceable and constitutional remedy, that may be exercised without termi- 
nating the federal relations of the state or not. 

I am aware that there is a considerable and respectable portion of our state, 
with a very large portion of the Union, constituting, in fact, a great majority, 
who are of the opinion that they are the same thing, differing only in name, 
and who, under that impression, denounce it as the most dangerous of all doc- 
trines ; and yet, so far from being the same, they are, unless, indeed, I am 
greatly deceived, not only perfectly distinguishable, but totally dissimilar in 
their nature, their object, and effect ; and that, so far from deserving the de- 
nunciation, so properly belonging to the act with which it is confounded, it is, 
in truth, the highest and most precious of all the rights of the states, and es- 
sential to preserve that very Union, for the supposed effect of destroying which 
it is so bitterly anathematized. 



First, they are wholly dissimilar in their nature. One has reference to the 
parties themselves, and the other to their agents. Secession is a withdrawal from 
the Union : a separation from partners, and, as far as depends on the member 
withdrawing, a dissolution of the partnership. It presupposes an association : 
a union of several states or individuals for a common object. Wherever these 
exist, secession may ; and where they do not, it cannot. Nullification, on the 
contrary, presupposes the relation of principal and agent : the one granting a 
power to be executed, the other, appointed by him with authority to execute it ; 
and is simply a declaration on the part of the principal, made in due form, that 
un act of the agent transcending his power is null and void. It is a right belong- 
ing exclusively to the relation between principal and agent, to be found ivher- 
ever it exists, and in all its forms, between several, or an association of princi- 
pals, and their joint agents, as well as between a single principal and his agent. 
The difference in their object is no less striking than in their nature. The 
object of secession is to free the withdrawing member from the obligation of 
the association or union, and is applicable to cases where the object of the 
association or union has failed, either by an abuse of power on the part of its 
members, or other causes. Its direct and iminediate object, as it concerns the with, 
drawino- member, is the dissolution of the association or union, as far as it is con- 
cerned. On the contrary, the object of nullification is to confine the agent with- 
in the limits of his powers, by arresting his acts transcending them, iiot with the 
view of destroying the delegated or trust power, but to preserve it, by compelling 
the agent to fulfil the object for v:hich the agency or trust was created ; and is ap. 
plicable only to cases where the trust or delegated powers are transcended on the 
])art of the agent. Without the power of secession, an association or union, 
formed for the common good of all the members, might prove ruinous to some, 
by the abuse of power on the part of the others ; and without nullification the 
agent might, under colour of construction, assume a power never intended to 
be delegated, or to convert those delegated to objects never intended to be com- 
prehended in the trust, to the ruin of the principal, or, in case of a joint agency, 
to the ruin of some of the principals. Each has, thus, its appropriate object, 
but objects in their nature very dissimilar ; so much so, that, in case of an asso- 
ciation or union, where the povvers are delegated to be executed by an agent, 
the abuse of power, on the part of the agent, to the injury of one or more of the 
members, would not justify secession on their part. The rightful remedy in 
that case would be nullification. There w^ould be neither right nor pretext to 
secede : not right, because secession is applicable only to the acts of the mem- 
bers of the association or union, and not to the act of the agent ; nor pretext, 
because there is another, and equally efiicient remedy, short of the dissolution 
of the association or union, which can only be justified by necessity. Nullifi- 
cation may, indeed, be succeeded by secession. In the case stated, should the 
other members undertake to grant the power nullified, and should the nature of 
the power be such as to defeat the object of the association or union, at least as 
far as the member nullifying is concerned, it would then become an abuse of 
power on the part of the principals, and thus present a case where secession 
would apply ; but in no other could it be justified, except it be for a failure of 
the association or union to effect the object for which it was created, independ- 
ent of any abuse of power. 

It now remains to show that their effect is as dissimilar as their nature or 
object. 

Nullification leaves the members of the association or union in the condi- 
tion it found them — subject to all its burdens, and entitled to all its advantages, 
comprehending the member, nullifying as well as the others — its object being, 
not to destroy, but to preserve, as has been stated. It simply arrests the act 
of the agent, as far as the principal is concerned, leaving in every other respect 



the operation of the joint concern as before ; secession, on the contrary, destroys, 
as far as the withdrawing member is concerned, the association or union, and 
restores him to the relation he occupied towards the other members before the 
existence of the association or union. He loses the benefit, but is released 
from the burden and control, and can no longer be dealt with, by his former as- 
sociates, as one of its members. 

Such are clearly the differences between them — differences so marked, that, 
instead of being identical, as supposed, they form a contrast in all the aspects 
in which they can be regarded. The application of these remarks to the polit- 
ical association or Union of these twenty-four states and the General Govern- 
ment, their joint agent, is too obvious, after what has been already said, to re- 
quire any additional illustration, and I will dismiss this part of the subject with 
a single additional remark. 

There are many who acknowledge the right of a state to secede, but deny 
its right to nullify ; and yet, it seems impossible to admit the one without ad- 
mitting the other. They both presuppose the same structure of the govern- 
ment, that it is a Union of the states, as forming political communities, the 
same right on the part of the states, as members of the Union, to determine for 
their citizens the extent of the powers delegated and those reserved, and, of 
course, to decide whether the Constitution has or has not been violated. The 
simple difference, then, between those who admit secession and deny nullifica- 
tion, and those who admit both, is, that one acknowledges that the declara- 
tion of a state pronouncing that the Constitution has been violated, and is, there- 
fore, null and void, would be obligatory on her citizens, and would arrest all 
the acts of the government within the limits of the state ; while they deny that 
a similar declaration, made by the same authority, and in the same manner, that 
an act of the government has transcended its powers, and that it is, therefore, 
null and void, would have any obligation ; while the other acknowledges the 
obligation in both cases. The one admits that the declaration of a state assent- 
ing to the Constitution bound her citizens, and that her declaration can unbind 
them ; but denies that a similar declaration, as to the extent she has, in fact, 
bound them, has any obligatory force on them ; Avhile the other gives equal 
force to the declaration in the several cases. The one denies the obligation, 
where the object is to jrreserve the Union in the only way it can he, by confining^ 
the government, formed to execute the trust powers, strictly within their 
limits, and to the objects for which they were delegated, though they give full 
force where the object is to destroy the Union itself; while the other, in giving^ 
equal weight to both, prefers the one because it preserves, and rejects the other be- 
cause it destroys ; and yet the former is the Union, and the latter the disunion 
■party ! And all this strange distinction originates, as far as I can judge, in 
attributing to nullification what belongs exclusively to secession. The" diffi- 
culty as to the former, it seems, is, that a state cannot be in and out of the 
Union at the same time. 

This is, indeed, true, if applied to secession— the throwing off the authority 
of the Union itself To nullify the Constitution, if I may be pardoned the sole- 
cism, would, indeed, be tantamount to disunion ; and, as applied to such an 
act, it would be true that a state could not be in and out of the Union at the 
same time ; but the act would be secession. 

But to apply it to nullification, properly understood, the object of which, in- 
stead of resisting or diminishing the powers of the Union, is to preserve them 
as they are, neither increased nor diminished, and thereby the Union itself 
(for the Union may be as effectually destroyed by increasing as by diminish- 
ing its powers— by consolidation, as by disunion itself), would be, I would say, 
had I not great respect for many who do thus apply it, egregious trifling with a 
grave and deeply-important constitutional subject. 

I might here finish the task which your request imposed, having, I trust, de* 



her reserved powers against the encroachments of the General Government ; 
and 1 may add that the right is, in its nature, peaceable, consistent with the 
federal relations of the state, and perfectly efficient, whether contested before 
the courts, or attempted to be resisted by force. But there is another aspect of 
the subject not yet touched, without adverting to which, it is impossible to un- 
derstand the full eflects of nullification, or the real character of our political in- 
stitutions : I allude to the power which the states, as a confederated body, have 
acquired directly over each other, and on which I will now proceed to make 
some remarks, though, I fear, at the hazard of fatiguing you. 

Previous to the adoption of the present Constitution, no power could be ex- 
ercised over any state by any other, or all of the states, without its own con- 
sent ; and we, accordingly, find that the old confederation and the present Con- 
stitution were both submitted for ratification to each of the states, and that 
each ratified for itself, and was bound only in consequence of its own partic- 
ular ratification, as has been already stated. The present Constitution has made, 
in this particular, a most important modification in their condition. I allude to 
the provision which gives validity to amendments of the Constitution when 
ratified by three fourths of the states — a provision which has not attracted as 
much attention as its importance deserves. Without it, no change could have 
been made in the Constitution, unless with the unanimous consent of all the 
states, in like manner as it was adopted. This provision, then, contains a high- 
ly-important concession by each to all of the states, of a portion of the original 
and inherent right of self-government, possessed previously by each separately, 
in favour of their general confederated powers, giving thereby increased energy 
to the states in their united capacity, and weakening them in the same degree 
in their separate. Its object was to facilitate and strengthen the action of the 
amending, or (to speak a little more appropriately, as it regards the point under 
consideration) the repairing power. It was foreseen that experience would, 
probably, disclose errors in the Constitution itself ; that time would make great 
changes in the condition of the country, which would require corresponding 
changes in the Constitution ; that the irregular and conflicting movements of the 
bodies composing so complex a system might cause derangements requiring 
correction ; and that, to require the unanimous consent of all the states to meet 
these various contingencies, would be placing the whole too much under the 
control of the parts : to remedy which, this great additional power was given to 
the amending or repairing power — this vis medicatrix of the system. 

To understand correctly the nature of this concession, we must not confound 
it with the delegated powers conferred on the General Government, and to be 
exercised by it as the joint agent of the states. They are essentially different. 
The former is, in fact, but a modification of the original sovereign power re- 
siding in the people of the several states — of the creating or Constitution-making 
power itself, intended, as stated, to facilitate and strengthen its action, and not 
change its character. Though modified, it is not delegated. It still resides in the 
states, and is still to be exercised by them, and not by the government. 

I propose next to consider this important modification of the sovereign pow- 
ers of the states, in connexion with the right of nullification. 

It is acknowledged on all sides that the duration and stability of our system 
depend on maintaining the equilihriiun between the states and the General 
Government — the reserved and delegated powers. We know that the Conven- 
tion which formed the Constitution, and the various state conventions which 
adopted it, as far as we are informed of their proceedmgs, felt the deepest soli- 
citude on this point. They saw and felt there would be an incessant conflict 
between them, which would menace the existence of the system itself, unless 
properly guarded. The contest between the states and General Government 
—the reserved and delegated rights — will, in truth, be a conflict between ths 

H 



great predominant interests of the Union on one side, controlling and directing 
the movements of the government, and seeking to enlarge the delegated pow- 
ers, and thereby advance their power and prosperity ; and, on the other, the 
minor interests rallying on the reserved powers, as the only means of protect- 
ing themselves against the encroachment and oppression of the other. In such 
a contest, wdthoiU the most effectual check, the stronger will absorb the weak- 
er interests ; while, on the other hand, without an adequate provision of some 
description or other, the efforts of the Aveaker to guard against the encroach- 
ments and oppression of the stronger might permanently derange the system. 

On the side of the reserved powers, no check more effectual can be found or 
desired than nullification, or the right of arresting, within the limits of a state, 
the exercise, by the General Government, of any powers but the delegated— a 
ritdit which, if the states be true to themselves and faithful to the Constitution, 
Avfll ever prove, on the side of the reserved powers, an effectual protection to 
both. 

Nor is the check on the side of the delegated less perfect. Though less 
strong, it is ample to guard against encroachments ; and is as strong as the na- 
ture of the system would bear, as will appear in the sequal. It is to be found 
in the amending power. Without the modification which it contains of the 
rights of self-government on the part of the states, as already explained, the 
consent of each state would have been requisite to any additional grant of power, 
or other amendment of the Constitution. While, then, nullification would ena- 
ble a state to arrest the exercise of a power not delegated, the right of self-gov- 
ernment, if unmodified, would enable her to prevent the grant of a power not 
delegated ; and thus her conception of what power ought to be granted would 
be as conclusive against the co-states, as her construction of the powers grant- 
ed is against the General Government. In that case, the danger would be on 
the side of the states or reserved powers. The amending power, in effect, 
prevents this danger. In virtue of the provisions which it contains, the re- 
sistance of a state to a power cannot finally prevail, unless she be sustain- 
ed by one fourth of the co-states ; and in the same degree that her resistance 
is weakened, the power of the General Government, or the side of the delega- 
ted powers, is strengthened. It is true that the right of a state to arrest an un- 
constitutional act is of itself complete against the government ; but it is equally 
so that the controversy may, in effect, be terminated against her by a grant of 
the contested powers by three fourths of the states. It is thus by this simple, 
and, apparently, incidental contrivance, that the right of a state to nullify an uncon- 
stitutional act, so essential to the protection of the reserved rights, but which, 
unchecked, might too much debilitate the government, is counterpoised : not 
by weakening the energy of a state in her direct resistance to the encroach- 
ment of the government, or by giving to the latter a direct control over the 
states, as proposed in the Convention, but in a manner infinitely more safe, and, 
if I may be permuted so to express myself, scientific, by strengthening the 
amending or repairing power — the power of correcting all abuses or derange- 
ments, by whatever cause, or from whatever quarter. 

To sum all in a few words. The General Government has the right, in the 
first instance, of construing its own powers, which, if final and conclusive, as 
is supposed by many, would have placed the reserved powers at the mercy of 
the delegated, and thus destroy the equilibrium of the system. Against that, a 
state has the right of nullification. This right, on the part of the stale, if not 
counterpoised, might tend too strongly to weaken the General Government and 
derange the system. To correct this, the amending or repairing power is 
strengthened. The former cannot be made too strong if the latter be propor- 
tionably so. The increase of the latter is, in effect, the decrease of the former. 
Give to a majority of the states the right of amendment, and the arresting power, 
on the part of the state, would, in fact, be annulled. The amending power and 



hands. The same majority that controlled the one would the other, and the power 
arrested, as not granted, would be immediately restored in the shape of a grant. 
This modification of the right of self-government, on the part of the states, is, in 
fact, the pivot of the system. By shifting its position as the preponderance is 
on the one side or the other, or, to drop the simile, by increasing or diminish- 
ing the energy of the repairing power, effected by diminishing or increasing 
the number of states necessary to amend the Constitution, the equilibrium be- 
tween the reserved and the delegated rights may be preserved or destroyed at 
pleasure. 

I am aware it is objected that, according to this view, one fourth of the 
states may, in reality, change the Constitution, and thus take away powers 
which have been imanimously granted by all the states. The objection is more 
specious than solid. The right of a state is not to resume delegated powers, 
but to prevent the reserved from being assumed by the government. It is, how- 
ever, certain the right may be abused, and, thereby, powers be resumed which 
were, in fact, delegated ; and it is also true, if sustained by one fourth of the co- 
states, such resumption may be successfully and permanently made by the 
state. This is the danger, and the utmost extent of the danger from the side of 
the reserved powers. It would, I acknowledge, be desirable to avoid or 
lessen it ; but neither can be effected without increasing a greater and opposing 
danger. 

If the right be denied to the state to defend her reserved powers, for fear she 
might resume the delegated, that denial would, in effect, yield to the General 
Government the power, under the colour of construction, to assume at pleasure 
all the reserved powers. It is, in fact, a question between the danger of the 
states resuming the delegated powers on one side, and the General Government 
assuming the reserved on the other. Passing over the far greater probability 
of the latter than the former, which I endeavoured to illustrate in the address 
of last summer, I shall confine my remarks to the striking difference between 
them, viewed in connexion with the genius and theory of our government. 

The right of a state originally to complete self-government is a fundamental 
principle in our system, in virtue of which the grant of power required the con- 
sent of all the stales, while to withhold power the dissent of a single state toas suf- 
ficient. It is true, that this original and absolute power of self-government has 
been modified by the Constitution, as already stated, so that three fourths of the 
states may now grant power ; and, consequently, it requires more than one fourth 
to withhold. The boundary between the reserved and the delegated powers 
marks the limits of the Union. The states are united to the extent of the latter, 
and separated beyond that limit. It is, then, clear that it was not intended that 
the states should be more united than the will of one fourth of them, or, rather, 
one more than a fourth, would permit. It is worthy of remark, that it was pro- 
posed in the Convention to increase the confederative power, as it may be call- 
ed, by vesting two thirds of the states with the right of amendment, so as to 
require more than a third, instead of a fourth, to withhold power. The propo- 
sition was rejected, and three fourths unanimously adopted. It is, then, more i 
hostile to the nature and genius of our system to assume powers not delegated, 
than to resume those that are ; and less hostile that a state, sustained hy one fourth 
of her co-states, should j^f event the exercise of power really intended to be granted, 
than that the General Government should assume the exercise of powers not in- 
tended to he delegated. In the latter case, the usurpation of power would be 
against the fundamental principle of our system, the original right of the states ' 
to self-government ; while in the former, if it be usurpation at all, it would be, 
if so bold an expression may be used, a usurpation in the spirit of the Consti- 
tution itself — the spirit ordaining that the utmost extent of our Union should be 
limited by the will of any number of states exceeding a fourth, and that most 



interest, with so vast a territory, to be filled, in a short time, with almost count- 
less millions — a country of which the parts will equal empires, a union more 
intimate than that ordained in the Constitution, and so intimate, of course, that it 
might be permanently hostile to the feelings of more than a fourth of the states, 
instead of strengthening, would have exposed the system to certain destruction. 
There is a deep and profound philosophy, which he who best knows our nature 
will the most highly appreciate, that would make the intensity of the Union, if 
I mav so express myself, inversely to the extent of territory and the population 
of a countrv, and the diversity of its interests, geographical and political ; and 
which would hold in deeper dread the assumption of reserved rights by the 
agent appointed to execute the delegated, than the resumption of the delegated 
by the authority which granted the powers and ordained the agent to adminis- 
ter them. There appears, indeed, to be a great and prevailing principle that 
tends to place the delegated power in opposition to the delegating — the created 
to the creating power — reaching far beyond man and his works, up to the uni- 
versal source of all power. The earliest pages of Sacred History record the re- 
bellion of the archangels against the high authority of Heaven itself, and ancient 
mythology, the Avar of the Titans against Jupiter, which, according to its nar- 
rative, menaced the universe with destruction. This all-pervading principle is 
at work in our system — the created warring against the creating power; and 
unless the government be bolted and chained down with links of adamant by the 
hand of the states which created it, the creature will usurp the place of the 
creator, and universal political idolatry overspread the land. 

If the views presented be correct, it follows that, on the interposition of a 
state in favour of the reserved rights, it would be the duty of the General Gov- 
ernment to abandon the contested power, or to apply to the states themselves, 
the source of all political authority, for the power, in one of the two modes pre- 
scribed in the Constitution. If the case be a simple one, embracing a single 
power, and that in its nature easily adjusted, the more ready and appropriate 
mode would be an amendment in the ordinary form, on a proposition of two 
thirds of both houses of Congress, to be ratified by three fourths of the states ; 
but, on the contrary, should the derangement of the system be great, embracing 
many points difficult to adjust, the states ought to be convened in a general Con- 
vention, the most august of all assemblies, representing the united sovereignty 
of the confederated states, and having power and authority to correct every er- 
ror, and to repair every dilapidation or injury, whether caused by time or acci- 
dent, or the conflicting movements of the bodies which compose the system. 
With institutions every way so fortunate, possessed of means so well calculated 
to prevent disorders, and so admirable to correct them when they cannot be pre- 
vented, he who would prescribe for our political disease disunion on the one 
side, or coercion of a state in the assertion of its rights on the other, loould de- 
serve, and will receive, the execrations of this and all future generations. 

I have now finished what I had to say on the subject of this communication, 
in its immediate connexion with the Constitution. In the discussion, I have 
advanced nothing but on the authority of the Constitution itself, or that of re- 
corded and unqucstionalile facts connected with the history of its origin and 
formation ; and have made no deduction but such as rested on principles which 
I believe to be unquestionable ; but it would be idle to expect, in the present state 
of the pul)lic mind, a favourable reception of the conclusions to which I have 
been carried. There are too many misconceptions to encounter, too many prej- 
udices to combat, and, above all, too great a weight of interest to resist. I do 
not propose to investigate these great impediments to the reception of the truth, 
though it would l)e an interesting subject of inquiry to trace them to their cause, 
and to measure the force of their impeding power; but there is one among 
them of so marked a character, and wiiich operates so extensively, that I can- 



will be calculated to throw much light on what has already been said. 

Of all the impediments opposed to a just conception of the nature of our po- 
litical system, the impression that the right of a state to arrest an unconstitu- 
tional act of the General Government is inconsistent with the great and funda- 
mental principle of all free states — that a majority has the right to govern — is the 
greatest. Thus regarded, nullification is, without farther reflection, denounced 
as the most dangerous and monstrous of all political heresies, as, in truth, it 
would be, were the objection as well-founded as, in fact, it is destitute of all 
foundation, as I shall now proceed to show. 

Those who make the objection seem to suppose that the right of a majority 
to govern is a principle too simple to admit of any distinction ; and yet, if I do not 
mistake, it is susceptible of the most important distinction — entering deeply into 
the construction of our system, and, I may add, into that of all free states in 
proportion to the perfection of their institutions, and is essential to the very ex- 
istence of liberty. 

When, then, it is said that a majority has the right to govern, there are two 
modes of estimating the majority, to either of which the expression is applica- 
ble. The one, in which the whole community is regarded in the aggregate, 
and the majority is estimated in reference to the entire mass. This may be 
called the majority of the whole, or the absolute majority. The other, in which 
it is regarded in reference to its different political interests, whether composed 
of different classes, of different communities, formed into one general confeder- 
ated community, and in which the majority is estimated, not in reference to the 
•whole, but to each class or community of which it is composed, the assent of 
each taken separately, and the concurrence of all constituting the majority. 
A majority thus estimated may be called the concurring majority. 

When it is objected to nullification, that it is opposed to the principle that a 
majority ought to govern, he who makes the objection must mean the absolute, 
as distinguished from the concurring. It is only in the sense of the former the 
objection can be applied. In that of the concurring, it would be absurd, as the 
concurring assent of all the parts (with us, all the states) is of the very essence 
of such majority. Again, it is manifest, that in the sense it would be good 
against nullification, it would be equally so against the Constitution itself; for, 
in whatever light that instrument may be regarded, it is clearly not the work 
of the absolute, but of the concurring majority. It was formed and ratified by 
the concurring assent of all the states, and not by the majority of the whole ta- 
ken in the aggregate, as has been already stated. Thus, the acknowledged 
right of each state in reference to the Constitution, is unquestionably the same 
right which nvdlification attributes to each in reference to the unconslitiitional 
acts of the government ; and, if the latter be opposed to the right of a majority 
to govern, the former is equally so. I go farther. The objection might, with 
equal truth, be applied to all free states that have ever existed : I mean states 
deserving the name, and excluding, of course, those which, after a factious and 
anarchical existence of a few years, have sunk under the yoke of tyranny or f 
the dominion of some foreign power. There is not, with this exception, a sin- ' 
gle free state whose institutions were not based on the principle of the con- 
curring majority : not one in which the community was not regarded in refer- 
ence to its different political interests, and which did not, in some form or other, 
take the assent of each in the operation of the government. 

In support of this assertion, I might begin with our own government and go 
back to that of Sparta, and show conclusively that there is not one on the list 
Avhose institutions were not organized on the principle of the concurring ma- 
jority, and in the operation of which the sense of each great interest was not 
separately consulted. The various devices which have been contrived for this 
purpose, with the peculiar operation of each, would be a curious and highly im- 



nent. 

The principle of the concurring majority has sometimes been incorporated 
in the reguhir and ordinary operation of the government, each interest having a 
distinct organization, and a combination of the whole forming the government ; 
but still requiring the consent of each, within its proper sphere, to give validity 
to the measures of government. Of this modification the British and Spartan 
govenunents are by far the most memorable and perfect examples. In others, 
the right of acting — of making and executing the laws — was vested in one in- 
terest, and the right of arresting or nullifying in another. Of this description, 
the Roman government is much the most striking instance. In others, the 
right o( originating or introducing projects of laws was in one, and of enacting 
them in another : as at Athens before its government degenerated, where the 
Senate proposed, and the General Assembly of the people enacted, laws. 

These devices were all resorted to with the intention of consulting the separ- 
ate interests of which the several communities were composed, and against 
all of which the objection to nullification, that it is opposed to the will of a ma- 
jority, could be raised with equal force — as strongly, and I may say much more 
so, against the unlimited, unqualified, and uncontrollable veto of a single tribune 
out of ten at Rome on all laws and the execution of laws, as against the same 
right of a sovereign state (one of the twenty-four tribunes of this Union), limit- 
ed, as the right is, to the unconstitutional acts of the General Government, and 
liable, as in effect it is, to be controlled by three fourths of the co-states ; and 
yet the Roman Republic, and the other states to which I have referred, are the 
renowned among free states, whose examples have difl'used the spirit of liberty 
over the world, and which, if struck from the list, would leave behind but little 
to be admired or imitated. There, indeed, would remain one class deserving 
from us particular notice, as ours belongs to it — I mean confederacies ; but, as 
a class, heretofore far less distinguished for power and prosperity than those 
already alluded to ; though I trust, with the improvements we have made, des- 
tined to be placed at the very head of the illustrious list of states which have 
blessed the world with examples of well-regulated liberty ; and which stand 
as so many oases in the midst of the desert of oppression and despotism, which 
occupies so vast a space in the chart of governments. That such will be the 
great and glorious destiny of our system, I feel assured, provided we do not 
permit our government to degenerate into the worst of all possible forms, a con- 
solidated government, swayed by the will of an absolute majority. But to pro- 
ceed. 

Viewing a confederated community as composed of as many distinct politi- 
cal interests as there are states, and as requiring the consent of each to its meas- 
ures, no government can be conceived in which the sense of the whole com- 
munity can be more perfectly taken, and all its interests be more fully represent- 
ed and protected. But, with this great advantage, united with the means of 
the most just and perfect local administration through the agency of the states, 
and combined with the capacity of embracing within its limits the greatest ex- 
tent of territory and variety of interests, it is liable to one almost fatal objection, 
the tardiness and feebleness of its movements — a defect difficult to be reme- 
died, and when not, so great as to render a form of government, in olher re- 
spects so admirable, almost worthless. To overcome this difficulty was the 
great desideratum in political science, and the most difficult problem'within its 
circle. To us belongs the glory of its solution, if, indeed, our experiment (for 
such it must yet be called) shall prove that we have overcome it, as I sincerely 
believe and hope it will, on account of our own, as well as the liberty and happi- 
ness of our race. 

Our first experiment in government was on the old form of a simple confed- 
eracy, unmodified, and extending the principle of the concmring majority alike 



for the first time in a confederation, the absolute with the concurring majority ; 
and thus uniting the justice of the one with the energy of the other. 

The new government was reared on the foundation of the old, strengthened, 
but not changed. It stands on the same solid basis of the concurring majority, 
perfected by the sanction of the people of the states directly given, and not in- 
directly through the state governments, as their representatives, as in the old 
confederation. With that difference, the authority which made the two Consti- 
tutions — which granted their powers, and ordained and organized their respect- 
ive governments to execute them — is the same. But, in passing from the Con- 
stitution to the government (the law-making and the law-administering powers), 
the difference between the two becomes radical and essential. There, in the 
present, the concurring majority is dropped, and the absolute substituted. In 
determining, then, what powers ought to be granted, and how the government 
appointed for their execution ought to be organized, the separate and concur- 
ring voice of the states was required — the union being regarded, for this pur- 
pose, in reference to its various and distinct interests ; but in the execution of 
these powers (delegated only because all the states had a common interest in 
their exercise), the union is no longer regarded in reference to its parts, but as 
forming, to the extent of its delegated powers, one great community, to be gov- 
erned by a common will, just as the states are in reference to their separate in- 
terests, and by a government organized on principles similar to theirs. By this 
simple but fortunate arrangement, we have ingrafted the absolute on the con- 
curring majority, thereby giving to the administration of the powers of the gov- 
ernment, where they were required, all the energy and promptness belonging 
to the former, while we have retained in the power granting and organizing 
authority (if I may so express myself) the principle of the concurring majori- 
ty, and with it that justice, moderation, and full and perfect representation of 
all the interests of the community which belong exclusively to it. 

Such is the solidity and beauty of our admirable system, but which, it is per- 
fectly obvious, can only be preserved by maintaining the ascendency of the 

CONSTITUTION-MAKING AUTHORITY OVER THE LAW-MAKING THE CONCURRING 

OVER THE ABSOLUTE MAJORITY. Nor is it Icss clear that this can only be ef- 
fected by the right of a state to annul the unconstitutional acts of the govern- 
jnent — a right confounded with the idea of a minority governing a majority, but 
which, so far from being the case, is indispensable to prevent the more ener- 
getic but imperfect majority which controls the movements of the government, 
from usurping the place of that more perfect and just majority which formed 
the Consthution and ordained government to execute its powers. 

Nor need we apprehend that this check, as powerful as it is, will prove ex- 
cessive. The distinction between the Constitution and the law making pow- 
ers, so strongly marked in our institutions, may yet be considered as a new and 
untried experiment. It can scarcely be said to have existed at all before our 
system oi government. We have yet much to learn as to its practical opera- 
tion ; and, among other things, if I do not mistake, we are far from realizing 
the many and great difficulties of holding the latter subordinate to the former, 
and without which, it is obvious, the entire scheme of constitutional govern- 
ment, at least in our sense, must prove abortive. Short as has been our expe- 
rience, some of these, of a very formidable character, have begun to disclose 
themselves, particularly between the Constitution and the government of the 
Union. The two powers there represent very different interests : the one, 
that of all the states taken separately ; and the other, that of a majority of the 
states as forming a confederated community. Each acting under the impulse 
of these respective and very different interests, must necessarily strongly tend 
to come into collision, and, in the conflict, the advantage will be found almost 



marks will be sufficient to illustrate these positions. 

The Constitution, while it grants powers to the government, at the same time im- 
poses restrictions on its action, with the intention of confining it within a limited 
ranofe of powers, and of the means of executing them. The object.of the powers is 
to protect the rights and promote the interests of all ; and of the restrictions, to pre- 
vent the majority, or the dominant interests of the government, from perverting 
powers intended for the common good into the means of oppressing the minor inter- 
ests of the community. Thus circumstanced, the dominant interest in possession 
of the powers of the government, and the minor interest on whom they are exer- 
cised, must regard these restrictions in a very different light : the latter, as a 
protection, and the former, as a restraint, and, of course, accompanied with all 
the impatient feelings with which restrictions on cupidity and ambition are 
ever regarded by those unruly passions. Under their influence, the Constitu- 
tion will be viewed by the majority, not as the source of their authority, as it 
should be, but as shackles on their power. To them it will have no value as 
the means of protection. As a majority they require none. Their number and 
strength, and not the Constitution, are their protection ; and, of course, if I may 
so speak, their instinct will be to weaken and destroy the restrictions, in order 
to enlarge the powers. He must have a very imperfect knowledge of the hu- 
man heart who does not see, in this state of things, an incessant conflict between 
the government or the law-making power and the Constitution-making power. 
Nor is it less certain that, in the contest, the advantage will be exclusively with 
the former. 

The law-making poAver is organized and in constant action, having the con- 
trol of the honours and emoluments of the country, and armed with the power 
to punish and reward ; the other, on the contrary, is unorganized, lying dormant 
in the great inert mass of the community, till called into action on extraordinary 
occasions and at distant intervals ; and then bestowing no honours, exercising 
no patronage, having neither the faculty to reward nor to punish, but endowed 
simply with the attribute to grant powers and ordain the authority to execute 
them. The result is inevitable. With so strong an instinct on the part of the 
government to throw off the restrictions of the Constitution and to enlarge its 
powers, and with such powerful faculties to gratify this instinctive impidse, the 
law-making must necessarily encroach on the Constitution-making power, un- 
less restrained by the most efficient check — at least as strong as that for which 
we contend. It is worthy of remark, that, all other circumstances being equal, 
the more dissimUar the interests represented by the two, the more powerful will 
be this tendency to encroach ; and it is from this, among other causes, that it is 
so much stronger between the government and the Constitution-making powers 
of the Union, where the interests are so very dissimilar, than between the two 
in the several states. 

That the framers of the Constitution were aware of the danger which I have 
described, we have conclusive proof in the provision to which I have so fre- 
quently alluded — I mean that which provides for amendments to the Constitu- 
tion. 

I have already remarked on that portion of this provision which, with the 
view of strengthening the confederated power, conceded to three fourths of the 
states a right to amend, which otherwise could only have been exercised by 
the unanimous consent of all. It is remarkable, that, while this provision thus 
strengthened the amending power as it regards the states, it imposed imped- 
iments on it as far as the government was concerned. The power of acting, 
as a general rule, is invested in the majority of Congress ; but, instead of per- 
mitting a majority to propose amendments, the provision requires for that pur- 
pose two thirds of both houses, clearly with a view of interposing a barrier 
against this strong instinctive appetite of the government for the acquisition of 



the passage to the direct acquisition, had the wide door of construction been 
left open to its indirect ; and hence, in the same spirit in which two thirds of 
both houses were required to propose amendments, the Convention that framed 
the Constitution rejected the many propositions which were moved in the body 
with the intention of divesting the states of the right of interposing, and, there- 
by, of the only effectual means of preventing the enlargement of the powers of 
the government by construction. 

It is thus that the Constitution-making power has fortified itself against the 
law-making ; and that so effectually, that, however strong the disposition and 
capacit}^ of the latter to encroach, the means of resistance on the part of the 
former are not less powerful. If, indeed, encroachments have been made, the 
fault is not in the system, but in the inattention and neglect of those whose in- 
terest and duty it was to interpose the ample means of protection afforded by 
the Constitution. 

To sum up in few words,- in conclusion, what appears to me to be the entire 
philosophy of government, in reference to the subject of this communication. 

Two powers are necessary to the existence and preservation of free states : 
a power on the part of the ruled to prevent rulers from abusing their authority, 
by compelling them to be faithful to their constituents, and which is efiected 
through the right of suffrage ; and a power to compel the parts of society 

TO BE just to one ANOTHER, BY COMPELLING THEM TO CONSULT THE INTER- 
EST OF EACH OTHER, which cau only be effected, whatever may be the device 
for the purpose, by requiring the concurring assent of all the great and distinct 
interests of the community to the measures of the government. This result is 
the sum-total of all the contrivances adopted by free states to preserve their 
liberty, by preventing the conflicts between the several classes or parts of 
the community. Both powers are indispensable. The one as much so as the 
other. The rulers are not more disposed to encroach on the ruled than the dif- 
ferent interests of the community on one another ; nor would they more cer- 
tainly convert their power from the just and legitimate objects for which gov. 
ernments are instituted into an instrument of aggrandizement, at the expense 
of the ruled, unless made responsible to their constituents, than would the 
stronger interests theirs, at the expense of the weaker, unless compelled to con- 
sult them in the measures of the government, by taking their separate and con- 
curring assent. The same cause operates in both cases. The constitution of 
our nature, which would impel the rulers to oppress the ruled, unless prevented, 
would in like manner, and with equal force, impel the stronger to oppress the 
weaker interest. To vest the right of government in the absolute majority, 
would be, in fact, but to imbody the will op the stronger interest in 

THE operations OF THE GOVERNMENT, AND NOT THE WILL OF THE WHOLE 
community, and TO LEAVE THE OTHERS UNPROTECTED, A PREY TO ITS AMBI- 
TION AND CUPIDITY, just as would be the case between rulers and ruled, if the 
right to govern was vested exclusively in the hands of the former. They 
would both be, in reality, absolute and despotic governments : the one as much 
so as the other. 

They would both become mere instruments of cupidity and ambition in the 
hands of those who wielded them. No one doubts that such would be the case 
were the government placed under the control of irresponsible lulers ; but, un- 
fortunately for the cause of liberty, it is not seen with equal clearness that it 
must as necessarily be so when controlled by an absolute majority ; and yet, 
the former is not more certain than the latter. To this we may attribute the 
mistake so often and so fatally repeated, that to expel a despot is to estab- 
lish LIBERTY — a mistake to which we may trace the failure of many noble 
and generous efforts in favour of liberty. The error consists in considering 
communities as formed of interests strictly identical throughout, instead of be- 

I 



ing composeu, as mvy m i^a.i,.^j "*-, "- — j , i • 

individuals. The interests of no two persons are the same, regardea m refer- 
ence to each other, though they may be, viewed in relation to the rest of the 
conuimnity. It is this diversity which the several portions of the community 
bear to each other, in reference to the whole, that renders the principle of the 
concurring majority necessary to preserve liberty. Place the power in the 
hands of the absolute majority, and the strongest of these would certainly per- 
vert the o-overnment from the object for which it was instituted, the equal pro- 
tection of the rights of all, into an instrument of advancing itself at the expense 
of the rest of the community. Against this abuse of power no remedy can be 
devised but that of the concurring majority. Neither the right of suffrage nor 
public opinion can possibly check it. They, in fact, but tend to aggravate the 
disease. It seems really surprising that truths so obvious should be so imper- 
fectly understood. There would appear, indeed, a feebleness in our intellect- 
ual powers on political subjects when directed to large masses. We readily 
see why a single individual, as a ruler, would, if not prevented, oppress the 
rest of the community ; but are at a loss to understand why seven millions 
would, if not also prevented, oppress six millions, as if the relative numbers on 
either 'side could in the least degree vary the principle. 

In stating what I have, I have but repeated the experience of ages, compre- 
hending alffree governments preceding ours, and ours as far as it has progress- 
ed. tIic practical operation of ours has been substantially on the principle 
of the absolute majority. We have acted, with some exceptions, as if the Gen- 
eral Government had the right to interpret its own powers, without limitation or 
check. : and though many circumstances have favoured us, and greatly impeded 
the natural progress of events, under such an operation of the system, yet we 
already see, in whatever direction we turn our eyes, the growing symptoms of 
disorder and decay — the growth of faction, cupidity, and corruption ; and the 
decay of patriotism, integrity, and disinterestedness. In the midst of youth, we 
see the flushed cheek, and the short and feverish breath, that mark the approach 
of the fatal hour ; and come it will, unless there be a speedy and radical change 
— a return to the great conservative principle which brought the Republican 
party into authority, but which, with the possession of power and prosperity, it 
has long ceased to remember. 

I have now finished the task which your request imposed. If I have been 
so fortunate as to add to your fund a single new illustration of this great con- 
servative principle of our government, or to furnish an additional argument cal- 
culated to sustain the state in her noble and patriotic struggle to revive and 
maintain it, and in which you have acted a part long to be remembered by the 
friends of freedom, I shall feel amply compensated for the time occupied in so 
long a commimication. I believe the cause to be the cause of truth and justice, 
of imion, liberty, and the Constitution, before which the ordinary party strug- 
gles of the day sink into perfect insignificance ; and that it will be so regarded 
by the most distant posterity, I have not the slightest doubt. 

With great and sincere regard, 
^ I am yours, &c., &c., 

John C. Calhoun. 
His Excellency James Hamilton, Jun., 
Governor of South Carolina. 



V. 

SPEECH AGAINST THE FORCE BILL. 

Mr. President — I know not which is most objectionable, the provision of 
I the bill, or the temper in which its adoption has been urged. If the extraordi- 
' nary powers with which the bill proposes to clothe the executive, to the utter 
I prostration of the Constitution and the rights of the states, be calculated to im- 
press our minds with alarm at the rapid progress of despotism in our country ; 
the zeal with which every circumstance calculated to misrepresent or exago-er- 
ate the conduct of Carolina in the controversy, is seized on with a view to°ex- 
' cite hostility against her, but too plainly indicates the deep decay of that broth- 
erly feeling which once existed between these states, and to which we are 
indebted for our beautiful federal system, and by the continuance of which 
alone it can be preserved. It is not my intention to advert to all these mis- 
representations, but there are some so well calculated to mislead the mind as 
to the real character of the controversy, and hold up the state in a light so 
odious, that I do not feel myself justified in permitting them to pass unnoticed. 

Among them, one of the most prominent is the false statement that the ob- 
ject of South Carolina is to exempt herself from her share of the public burdens, 
while she participates in the advantages of the government. If the charge were 
true — if the state were capable of being actuated by such low and unworthy 
motives, mother as I consider her, I would not stand up on this floor to vindi- 
cate her conduct. Among her faults, and faults I will not deny she has, no one 
has ever yet charged her with that low and most sordid of vices — avarice. Her 
conduct, on all occasions, has been marked with the very opposite quality. 
From the commencement of the Revolution — from its first breaking out at Bos- 
ton till this hour, no state has been more profuse of its blood in the cause of 
the country, nor has any contributed so largely to the common treasury in 
proportion to wealth and population. She has in that proportion contributed 
more to the exports of the Union, on the exchange of which with the rest of 
the world the greater portion of the public burden has been levied, than any 
other state. No ; the controversy is not such as has been stated ; the state does 
not seek to participate in the advantages of the government without contributing 
her full share to the public treasury. Her object is far different. A deep con- 
stitutional question lies at the bottom of the controversy. The real question at 
issue is. Has the government a right to impose burdens on the capital and indus- 
try of one portion of the country, not with a view to revenue, but to benefit 
another 1 and I must be permitted to say that, after the long and deep agitation 
of this controversy, it is with surprise that I perceive so strong a disposition to 
misrepresent its real character. To correct the impression which those misrep- 
resentations are calculated to make, I will dwell on the point under consider- 
ation for a (ew moments longer. 

The Federal Government has, by an express provision of the Constitution, 
the right to lay duties on imports. The state has never denied or resisted this 
right, nor even thought of so doing. The government has, however, not been 
contented with exercising this power as she had a right to do, but has gone a 
step beyond it, by laying imposts, not for revenue, but for protection. This the 
state considers as an unconstitutional exercise of power — highly injurious and 
oppressive to her and the other staple states, and has, accordingly, met it with 
the most determined resistance. I do not intend to enter, at this time, into the 
argument as to the unconstitutionality of the protective system. It is not ne- 
cessary. It is sufficient that the power is nowhere granted ; and that, from the 
journals of the Convention which formed the Constitution, it would seem that 
it was refused. In support of the journals, I might cite the statement of Luther 



Martin, which has already been relerred to, to sno\y tnat tne i^onvention, so 
far from conferring the power on the Federal Government, left to the state the 
right to impose duties on imports, with the express view of enabling the sev- 
eral states to protect their own manufactures. Notwithstanding this, Congress 
has assumed, without any warrant from the Constitution, the right of exercising 
this most important power, and has so exercised it as to impose a ruinous bur- 
den on the labour and capital of the state, by which her resources arc exhaust- ' 

ed the enjoyments of her citizens curtailed — the means of education contracted 

— and all her interests essentially and injuriously affected. We have been 
sneeringly told that she is a small state ; that her population does not much ex- 
ceed half a million of souls ; and that more than one half are not of the Euro- 
pean race. The facts are so. I know she never can be a great state^ and 
that the only distinction to which she can aspire must be based on the mora! 
and intellectual acquirements of her sons. To the development of these much 
of her attention has been directed ; but this restrictive system, which has so un- 
justly exacted the proceeds of her labour, to be bestowed on other sections, has 
so impaired the resources of the state, that, if not speedily arrested, it will dry 
Dp the means of education, and with it deprive her of the only source through 
which she can aspire to distinction. 

There is another misstatement, as to the nature of the controversy, so fre- 
quently made in debate, and so well calculated to mislead, that I feel bound to 
notice it. It has been said that South Carolina claims the right to annul the 
Constitution and laws of the United States ; and to rebut this supposed claim, 
the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Rives) has gravely quoted the Constitution, 
to prove that the Constitution, and the laws made in pursuance thereof, are the 
supreme laws of the land — as if the state claimed the right to act contrary to 
this provision of the Constitution. Nothing can be more erroneous : her object 
is not to resist laws made in pursuance of the Constitxition, but those made 
■without its authority, and which encroach on her reserved powers. She claims 
not even the right of judging of the delegatea powers ; but of those that are re- 
served, and to resist the former, when they encroach upon the latter. I will 
pause to illustrate this important point. 

All must admit that there are delegated and reserved powers, and that the 
powers reserved are reserved to the states respectively. The powers, then, of 
the system are divided between the general and the state government ; and 
the point immediately under consideration is, whether a state has any right 
to judge as to the extent of its reserved powers, and to defend them against the 
encroachments of the General Government. Without going deeply into this 
point at this stage of the argument, or looking into the nature and origin of the 
government, there is a simple view of the subject which I consider as conclu- 
sive. The very idea of a divided power implies the right on the part of the 
state for which I contend. The expression is metaphorical Avhen applied to 
power. Every one readily understands that the division of matter consists in 
the separation of the parts. But in this sense it is not applicable to power. 
What, then, is meant by a division of power ? I cannot conceive of a division, 
without giWng an equal right to each to judge of the extent of the power allotted 
to each. Such right I hold to be essential to the existence of a division ; 
and that, to give to either party the conclusive right of jndging, not only of the 
share allotted to it, but of that allotted to the other, is to annul the division, and 
would confer the whole power on the party vested with such right. 

But it is contended that the Constitution has conferred on the Supreme Court 
the right of judging between the states and the General Government. Those 
who make this objection overlook, I conceive, an important provision of the 
Constitution. By turning to the 10th amended article, it will be seen that the 
reservation of power to the states is not only against the powers delegated to 
Congress, but against the United States themselves ; and extends, of course, as 



tide provides, that all powers not delegated to the United States, or prohibited 
by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people. 
This presents the inquiry, What powers are delegated to the United States ? 
They may be classed under four divisions : first, those that are delegated by the 
states to each other, by virtue of which the Constitution may be altered or 
amended by three fourths of the states, when, without which, it would have re- 
quired the unanimous vote of all ; next, the powers conferred on Congress ; 
then those on the President ; and, finally, those on the judicial department — all 
of which are particularly enumerated in the parts of the Constitution which or- 
ganize the respective departments. The reservation of powers to the states is, 
as I have said, against the whole, and is as full against the judicial as it is 
against the executive and legislative departments of the government. It cannot 
be claimed for the one without claiming it for the whole, and without, in fact, 
annulling this important provision of the Constitution. 

Against this, as it appears to me, conclusive view of the subject, it has beea 
urged that this power is expressly conferred on the Supreme Court by that 
portion of the Constitution which provides that the judicial power shall extend 
to all cases in law and equity arising under the Constitution, the laws of the 
United States, and treaties made under their authority. I believe the assertion 
to be utterly destitute of any foundation. It obviously is the intention of the 
Constitution simply to make the judicial power commensurate with the law- 
making and treaty-making powers ; and to vest it with the right of applying the 
Constitution, the laws, and the treaties, to the cases which might arise under 
them ; and not to make it the judge of the Constitution, the laws, and the trea- 
ties themselves. In fact, the power of applying the laws to the facts of the 
case, and deciding upon such application, constitutes, in truth, the judicial pow- 
er. The distinction between such power, and that of judging of the laws, will 
be perfectly apparent when we advert to what is the acknowledged power of 
the court in reference to treaties or compacts between sovereigns. It is per- 
fectly established, that the courts have no right to judge of the violation of 
treaties ; and that, in reference to them, their power is limited to the right of 
judging simply of the violation of rights under them ; and that the right of 
judging of infractions belongs exclusively to the parties themselves, and not to 
the courts : of which we have an example in the French treaty, which was de- 
clared by Congress null and void, in consequence of its violation by the gov- 
ernment of France. Without such declaration, had a French citizen sued a 
citizen of this country under the treaty, the court could have taken no cogni- 
zance of its infraction ; nor, after such a declaration, would it have heard any 
argument or proof going to show that the treaty had not been violated. 

The declaration of itself is conclusive on the court. But it will be asked 
how the court obtained the powers to pronounce a law or treaty unconstitution- 
al, when they come in conflict with that instrument. I do not deny that it 
possesses the right, but I can by no means concede that it was derived from 
the Constitution. It had its origin in the necessity of the case. Where there 
are two or more rules established, one from a higher, the other from a lower 
authority, which may come into conflict in applying them to a particular case, the 
judge cannot avoid pronouncing in favour of the superior against the inferior. 
It is from this necessity, and this alone, that the power which is now set up to 
overrule the rights of the slates against an express provision of the Constitutiori 
was derived. It had no other origin. That I have traced it to its true source, 
will be manifest from the fact that it is a power which, so far from being con- 
I ferred exclusively on the Supreme Court, as is insisted, belongs to every 
court — inferior and superior — state and general — and even to foreign courts. 

But the senator from Delaware (Mr. Clayton) relies on the journals of the 
Convention to prove that it was the intention of that body to confer on the Su- 



preme i^ouri iiie ngui "i uc(,i 
General Government. I will not follow him through the journals, as I do not 
deem that to be necessary to refute his argument. It is sufficient for this pur- 
pose to state, that Mr. Rutledge reported a resolution, providing expressly that 
the United States and the states might be parties before the Supreme Court. 
If this proposition had been adopted, I would ask the senator whether this very 
controversy between the United States and South Carolina might not have been 
brou<^ht before the court ? I would also ask him whether it can be brought be- I 
fore the court as the Constitution now stands ? If he answers the former in the 
affirmative, and the latter in the negative, as he must, then it is clear, his elabo- 
rate art^ument to the contrary notwithstanding, that the report of Mr. Rutledge 
Avas not, in substance, adopted as he contended ; and that the journals, so far 
from supporting, are in direct opposition to the position which he attempts to 
maintain. I might push the argument much farther against the power of the 
court, but I do not deem it necessary, at least in this stage of the discussion. 
If the views which have already been presented be correct, and I do not see 
how they can be resisted, the conclusion is inevitable, that the reserved powers 
were reserved equally against every department of the government, and as 
strongly against the judicial as against the other departments, and, of course, 
were left under the exclusive will of the states. 

There still remains another misrepresentation of the conduct of the state 
which has been made with the view of exciting odium. I allude to the charge, 
that South Carolina supported the tariff of 1816, and is, therefore, responsible 
for the protective system. To determine the truth of this charge, it becomes 
necessary to ascertain the real character of that law — whether it was a tariff 
for revenue or for protection — which presents the inquiry, What was the corvdi- 
tion of the country at that period ? The late war with Great Britain had just 
terminated, which, with the restrictive system that preceded it, had diverted a 
large amount of capital and industry from commerce to manufactures, particu- 
larly to the cotton and woollen branches. There was a debt, at the same time, 
of one hundred and thirty millions of dollars hanging over the country, and the 
heavy war duties were still in existence. Under these circumstances, the ques- 
tion was presented, to what point the duties ought to be reduced. That ques- 
tion involved another — at what time the debt ought to be paid ; which was a 
question of policy involving in its consideration all the circumstances connected 
with the then condition of the country. Among the most prominent arguments 
in favour of an early discharge of the debt was, that the high duties which it 
would require to effect it would have, at the same time, the effect of sustaining 
the infant manufactures, which had been forced up under the circumstances to 
which I have adverted. This view of the subject had a decided influence in 
determining in favour of an early payment of the debt. The sinking fund was, 
accordingly, raised from seven to ten millions of dollars, with the provision to 
apply the surplus which might remain in the treasury as a contingent appro- 
priation to that fund ; and the duties were graduated to meet this increased 
expenditure. It was thus that, the policy and justice of protecting the large 
amount of capital and industry which had heen diverted by the measures of the 
government into new channels, as I have stated, was combined with the fiscal 
action of the government, and which, while it secured a prompt payment of the 
debt, prevented the immense losses to the manufacturers which would have fol- 
lowed a sudden and great reduction. Still, revenue was the main object, and 
protection but the incidental. The bill to reduce the duties was reported by 
the Committee of Ways and Means, and not of Manufactures, and it proposed 
a heavy reduction on the then existing rate of duties. But what of itself, with- 
out other evidence, was decisive as to the character of the bill, is the fact that 
it fixed a much higher rate of duties on the unprotected than on the protected 
articles. I will enumerate a few leading articles only : woollen and cotton 



objects of protection, were subject to a permanent duty of only 20 per cent. 
Iron, another leading article among the protected, had a protection of not more 
than 9 per cent, as fixed by the act, and of but fifteen as reported in the bill. 
These rates were all below the average duties as fixed in the act, including 
the protected, the unprotected, and even the free articles. I have entered into 
some calculation, in order to ascertain the average rate of duties under the act. 
There is some uncertainty in the data, but I feel assured that it is not less than 
thirty per cent, ad valorem : showing an excess of the average duties above that 
imposed on the protected articles enumerated of more than 10 per cent., and 
thus clearly establishing the character of the measure — that it was for revenue, 
and not protection. 

Looking back, even at this distant period, with all our experience, I perceive 
but two errors in the act : the one in reference to iron, and the other the mini- 
mum duty on coarse cottons. As to the former, I conceive that the bill, as re- 
ported, proposed a duty relatively too low, which was still farther reduced in 
its passage through Congress. The duty, at first, was fixed at seventy-five 
cents thehundred weight ; but, in the last stage of its passage, it was reduced, 
by a sort of caprice, occasioned by an unfortunate motion, to forty-five cents. 
This injustice was severely felt in Pennsylvania, the state, above all others, 
most productive of iron ; and was the principal cause of that great reaction 
which has since thrown her so decidedly on the side of the protective policy. 
The other error was that as to coarse cottons, on which the duty was as much 
too hio^h as that on iron was too low. It introduced, besides, the obnoxious 
minimum principle, which has since been so mischievously extended ; and to 
that extent, I am constrained, in candour, to acknowledge, as I wish to disguise 
nothing, the protective principle was recognised by the act of 1816. How this 
was overlooked at the time, it is not in my power to say. It escaped my ob- 
servation, which I can account for only on the ground that the principle was 
then new, and that my attention was engaged by another important subject 
— the question of the currency, then so urgent, and with which, as chairman 
of the committee, I was particularly charged. With these exceptions, I again 
repeat, I see nothing in the bill to condemn ; yet it is on the ground that the 
members from the state voted for the bill, that the attempt is now made to hold 
up Carolina as responsible for the whole system of protection which has since 
followed, though she has resisted its progress in every stage. Was there ever 
greater injustice 1 And how is it to be accounted for, but as forming a part of 
that systematic misrepresentation and calumny which has been directed for so 
many years, without interruption, against that gallant and generous state ? And 
why has she thus been assailed ] Merely because she abstained from taking 
any part in the Presidential canvass — believing that it had degenerated into a 
mere system of imposition on the people — controlled, almost exclusively, by 
those whose object it is to obtain the patronage of the government, and that 
without regard to principle or policy. Standing apart from what she considered 
a contest in which the public had no interest, she has been assailed by both 
parties with a fury altogether unparalleled; but which, pursuing the course 
which she believed liberty and duty required, she has met with a firmness equal 
to the fierceness of the assault. In the midst of this attack, I have not escaped. 
With a view of inflicting a wound on the state through me, I have been held 
up as the author of the protective system, and one of its most strenuous advo- 
cates. It is with pain that I allude to myself on so deep and grave a subject 
as that now under discussion, and which, I sincerely believe, involves the lib- 
erty of the country. I now regret that, under the sense of injustice which the 
remarks of a senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. Wilkins) excited for the moment^ 
I hastily gave my pledge to defend myself against the charge which has^ been 
made in reference to my course in 1816 : not that there will be any difliculty 



1 ClUV^i 



in repelling tne cnarge, dui oecuu&t; i icci a ucc^ 
cussion, in any degree, from a subject of so much magnitude to one of so little 
importance as the consistency or inconsistency of myself, or any other indi- 
vidual, particularly in connexion with an event so long since passed. But for 
this hasty pledge, I would have remained silent, as to my own course, on this 
occasion, and would have borne with patience and calmness this, with the 
many other misrepresentations with which I have been so incessantly assailed 
for so many years. 

The charge that I was the author of the protective system has no other 
foundation but that I, in common with the almost entire South, gave my support 
to the tarifi'of 1816. It is true that I advocated that measure, for which I may 
rest my defence, without taking any other, on the ground that it was a tariff for 
revenue, and not for protection, which I have established beyond the power of 
controversy. But my speech on the occasion has been brought in judgment 
against me by the senator from Pennsylvania. I have since cast my eyes over 
the speech ; and I will surprise, I have no doubt, the senator, by telling him 
that, with the exception of some hasty and unguarded expressions, I retract 
nothing I uttered on that occasion. I only ask that I may be judged, in refer- 
ence to it, in that spirit of fairness and justice which is due to the occasion : 
taking into consideration the circumstances under which it was delivered, and 
bearing in mind that the subject was a tariff for revenue, and not for protection ; 
for reducing, and not raising the revenue. But, before I explain the then con- 
dition of the country, from which my main arguments in favour of the measure 
•were drawn, it is nothing but an act of justice to myself that I should state a 
fact in connexion with my speech, that is necessary to explain what I have call- 
ed hasty and unguarded expressions. My speech was an imprompiu ; and, as 
such, I apologized to the house, as appears from the speech as printed, for of- 
fering my sentiments on the question without having duly reflected on the sub- 
ject. It was delivered at the request of a friend, when I had not previously 
the least intention of addressing the house. I allude to Samuel D. Ingham, 
then and now, as I am proud to say, a personal and political friend — a man of 
talents and integrity — with a clear head, and firm and patriotic heart : then 
among the leading members of the house : in the palmy state of his political 
glory, though now for a moment depressed — depressed, did I say ? no ! it is 
his state which is depressed — Pennsylvania, and not Samuel D. Ingham ! 
Pennsylvania, which has deserted him under circumstances which, instead of 
depressing, ought to have elevated him in her estimation. He came to me, 
when sitting at my desk writing, and said that the house was falling into some 
confusion, accompanying it with a remark, that I knew how difficult it was to 
rally so large a body when once broken on a tax bill, as had been experienced 
during the late war. Having a higher opinion of my influence than it desers-ed, 
he requested me to say something to prevent the confusion. I replied that I 
was at a loss what to say ; that I had been busily engaged on the currency, 
which was then in great confusion, and which, as I have stated, had been pla- 
ced particularly under my charge, as the chairman of the committee on that 
subject. He repeated his request, and the speech which the senator fram Penn- 
sylvania has complimented so highly was the result. 

I will ask whether the facts stated ought not, in justice, to be borne in mind 
by those who would hold me accountable, not only for the general scope of the 
speech, but for every word and sentence which it contains ? But, in asking this 
question, it is not my intention to repudiate the speech. All I ask is, that I 
may be judged by the rules which, in justice, belong to the case. Let it be 
recollected that the bill was a revenue bill, and, of course, that it was constitu- 
tional. I need not remind the Senate that, when the measure is constitutional, 
all arguments calculated to show its beneficial operation may be legitimately 
pressed into service, without taking into consideration whether the subject to 



for instance, a question were beiore tnis body to lay a duty on iiibies, and a 
motion were made to reduce the duty, or admit Bibles duty free, who could doubt 
that the argument in favour of the motion, that the increased circulation of the 
Bible would be in favour of the morality and religion of the country, would be 
strictly proper 1 Or who would suppose that he who adduced it had committed 
himself on the constitutionality of taking the religion or morals of the country 
under the charge of the Federal Government? Again: suppose the question 
to be to raise the duty on silk, or any other article of luxury, and that it should 
be supported on the ground that it was an article mainly consumed by the rich 
and extravagant, could it be fairly inferred that, in the opinion of the speaker. 
Congress had a right to pass sumptuary laws ? I only ask that these plain 
rules may be applied to my argument on the tariff of 1816. They turn almost 
entirely on the benefits which manufactures conferred on the country in time 
war, and which no one could doubt. The country had recently passed through 
such a state. The world was at that time deeply agitated by the effects of the 
great conflict which had so long raged in Europe, and which no one could tell 
how soon again might return. Bonaparte had but recently been overthrown ; 
the whole southern part of this Continent was in a state of revolution, and was 
threatened with the interference of the Holy Alliance, which, had it occurred, 
must almost necessarily have involved this country in a most dangerous conflict. 
It was under these circumstances that I delivered the speech, in which I urged 
the house that, in the adjustment of the tariff, reference ought to be had to a 
state of war as well as peace, and that its provisions ought to be fixed on the 
compound views of the two periods — making some sacrifice in peace, in order 
that less might be made in war. Was this principle false ? and, in urging it, did I 
commit myself to that system of oppression since grown up, and which has for 
its object the enriching of one portion of the country at the expense of the other ? 

The plain rule in all such cases is, that when a measure is proposed, the first 
thing is to ascertain its constitutionality ; and, that being ascertained, the next is 
its expediency ; wliich last opens the whole field of argument for and against. 
Every topic may be urged calculated to prove it wise or unwise : so in a bill 
to raise imposts. It must first be ascertained that the bill is based on the prin- 
ciples of revenue, and that the money raised is necessary for the wants of 
the country. These being ascertained, every argument, direct and indirect, may 
be fairly offered, which may go to show that, under all the circumstances, the 
provisions of the bill are proper or improper. Had this plain and simple rule 
been adhered to, we should never have heard of the complaint of Carolina. 
Her objection is not against the improper modification of a bill acknowledged to 
be for revenue, but that, under the name of imposts, a power essentially differ- 
ent from the taxing power is exercised — partaking much more of the character 
of a penalty than a tax. Nothing is more common than that things closely re- 
sembling in appearance should widely and essentially differ in their character. 
Arsenic, for instance, resembles flour, yet one is a deadly poison, and the other 
that which constitutes the staff of life. So duties imposed, whether for reve- 
nue or protection, may be called imposts ; though nominally and apparently the 
same, yet they differ essentially in their real character. 

I shall now return to my speech on the tarifl'of 1816. To determine what 
my opinions really were on the subject of protection at that time, it will be 
proper to advert to my sentiments before and after that period. My sentiments 
preceding 1816, on this subject, are matter of record. I came into Congress, 
in 1812, a devoted friend and supporter of the then administration ; yet one of 
my first efforts was to brave the administration, by opposing its favourite meas- 
ure, the restrictive system — embargo, non-intercourse, and all — and that upoa 
the priaciple of free trade. The system remained in fashion for a time ; but, 
after the overthrow of Bonaparte, I reported a bill i'rom the Committee on For- 

K 



cign rielaiions,to repeal me wnuie s^sieui ui le&uii-uvc muaouics. w ime me 
bill was iiiider consideration, a worthy man, then a member of the house (Mr. 
M'Kim, of Baltimore), moved to except the non-importation act, which he sup- 
ported on the (ground of encouragement to manufactures. I resisted the motion 
on the verv (grounds on which Mr. M'Kim supported it. I maintained that the 
manufacturers were then receiving too much protection, and warned its friends 
that the witlidrawal of the protection which the war and the high duties then 
afforded would cause great embarrassment ; and that the true policy, in the 
mean time, was to admit foreign goods as freely as possible, in order to dimin- 
ish the anticipated embarrassment on the return of peace ; intimating, at the 
same time, my desire to see the tariff revised, with a view of affording a moder- 
ate and permanent protection.* 

Such was my conduct before 1816. Shortly after that period I left Congress, 
and had no opportunity of making known my sentiments in reference to the pro- 
tective system, which shortly after began to be agitated. But I have the most 
conclusive evidence that I considered the arrangement of the revenue, in 1816, 
as growing out of the necessity of the case, and due to the consideration of jus- 
tice ; but that, even at that early period, I was not without my fears that even 
that arrangement would lead to abuse and future difficulties. I regret that I 
have been compelled to dwell so long on myself; but trust that, whatever cen- 
sure may be incurred, will not be directed against me, but against those who 
have drawn my conduct into the controversy ; and who may hope, by assailing 
my motives, to wound the cause with which I am proud to be identified. 

I may add, that all the Southern States voted with South Carolina in support of 
the bill : not that they had any interest in manufactures, but on the ground that 
they had supported the war, and, of course, felt a corresponding obligation to 
sustain those establishments which had grown up under the encouragement it 
had incidentally afforded ; while most of the New-England members were op- 
posed to the measure principally, as I believe, on opposite principles. 

I have now, I trust, satisfactorily repelled the charge against the state, and 
myself personally, in reference to the tariff of 1816. Whatever support the 
state has given the bill, originated in the most disinterested motives. 

There was not within the limits of the state, so far as my memory serves me, 
a single cotton or woUen establishment. Her whole dependance was on agri- 
culture, and the cultivation of two great staples, rice and cotton. Her obvious 
policy was to keep open the market of the world unchecked and unrestricted : 
to buy cheap, and to sell high ; but from a feeling of kindness, combined with a 
sense of justice, she added her support to the bill. We had been told by the 
agents of the manufacturers that the protection which the measure afforded 
would be sufficient ; to which we the more readily conceded, as it was consid- 
ered a final adjustment of the question. 

Let us now turn our eyes forward, and see what has been the conduct of the 
parties to this arrangement. Have Carolina and the South disturbed this ad- 
justment ? No : they have never raised their voice in a single instance against 
it, even though this measure, moderate, comparatively, as it is, was felt with 
no inconsiderable pressure on their interests. Was this example imitated on 
the opposite side ? Far otherwise. Scarcely had the president signed his 
name, before application was made for an increase of duties, which was repeat- 
ed, with demands continually growing, till the passage of the act of 1828. What 
course now, I would ask, did it become Carolina to pursue in reference to these 
demands ? Instead of acquiescing in them, because she had acted generously 
in adjusting the tariff of 1816, she saw, in her generosity on that occasion, ad- 
ditional motives for that firm and decided resistance which she has since made 
against the system of protection. She accordingly commenced a systematic 
opposition to all farther encroachments, which continued from 1818 till 1828 : 
* See Mr. C.'s Speech in the National Intelligencer, April, 1814. 



her Legislature. Ihese all proved insumcient to stem the current oi encroach- 
ment ; but, notwithstanding the heavy pressure on her industry, she never de- 
spaired of relief till the passage of the act of 1828 — that bill of abominations — 
engendered by avarice and political intrigue. Its adoption opened the eyes 
of the state, and gave a new character to the controversy. Till then, the ques- 
tion had been, whether the protective system was constitutional and expedient ; 
but, after that, she no longer considered the question whether the right of regu- 
lating the industry of the states was a reserved or delegated power, but what 
right a state possesses to defend her reserved powers against the encroach- 
ments of the Federal Government : a question on the decision of which the 
value of all the reserved powers depends. The passage of the act of 1828, with 
all its objectionable features, and under the odious circumstances under which 
it was adopted, almost, if not entirely, closed the door of hope through the Gen- 
eral Government. It afforded conclusive evidence that no reasonable prospect 
of relief from Congress could be entertained ; yet, the near approach of the pe- 
riod of the payment of the public debt, and the elevation of General Jackson to 
the presidency, still afforded a ray of hope — not so strong, however, as to pre- 
vent the state from turning her eyes for final relief to her reserved powers. 

Under these circumstances commenced that inquiry into the nature and extent 
of the reserved powers of a state, and the means which they afford of resist- 
ance against the encroachments of the General Government, which has been 
pursued with so much zeal and energy, and, I may add, intelligence. Never 
was there a political discussion carried on with greater activity, and which 
appealed more directly to the intelligence of a community. Throughout the 
whole, no address has been made to the low and vulgar passions ; but, on the 
contrary, the discussion has turned upon the higher principles of political econ- 
omy, connected with the operations of the tariff system, calculated to show its 
real bearing on the interests of the state, and on the structure of our political 
system ; and to show the true character of the relations between the state and 
the General Government, and the means which the states possess of defending 
those powers which they reserved in forming the Federal Government. 

In this great canvass, men of the most commanding talents and acquirements 
have engaged with the greatest ardour ; and the people have been addressed 
through every channel — by essays in the public press, and by speeches in their 
public assemblies — until they have become thoroughly instructed on the nature 
of the oppression, and on the rights which they possess, under the Constitution, 
to throw it off. 

If gentlemen suppose that the stand taken by the people of Carolina rests on 
passion and delusion, they are wholly mistaken. The case is far otherwise. 
No community, from the legislator to the ploughman, were ever better instruct- 
ed in their rights ; and the resistance on which the state has resolved is the 
result of mature reflection, accompanied with a deep conviction that their rights 
have been violated, and that the means of redress which they have adopted are 
consistent with the principles of the Constitution. 

But while this active canvass was carried on, which looked to the reserved 
powers as the final means of redress if all others failed, the state at the same 
time cherished a hope, as I have already stated, that the election of General 
Jackson to the presidency would prevent the necessity of a resort to extrem- 
ities. He was identified with the interests of the staple states ; and, having the 
same interest, it was believed that his great popularity — a popularity of the 
strongest character, as it rested on military services — would enable him, as they 
hoped, gradually to bring down the system of protection, without shock or inju- 
ry to any interest. Under these views, the canvass in favour of General Jack- 
son's election to the presidency was carried on with great zeal, in conjunction 
with that active inquiry into the reserved powers of the states on which final 



whom ihey were thus striving to elevate to the highest seat of power would 
prove so utterly false to all their hopes. Man is, indeed, ignorant of the future ; 
nor was there ever a stronger illustration of the observation than is afforded 
by the result of that election ! The very event on which they had buiU their 
Lopes has been turned against them, and the very individual to whom they 
looked as a deliverer, and whom, under that impression, they strove for so 
many years to elevate to power, is now the most powerful instrument in the 
hands of his and their bitterest opponents to put down them and their cause ! 

Scarcely had he been elected, when it became apparent, from the organiza- 
tion of his cabinet, and other indications, that all their hopes of relief through 
him were blasted. The admission of a single hidividual into the cabinet, under 
the circumstances which accompanied that admission, threw all into confusion. 
The mischievous influence over the President, through which this individual 
was admitted into the cabinet, soon became apparent. Instead of turning his 
eyes forward to the period of the payment of the public debt, which was then 
near at hand, and to the present dangerous political crisis, which was inevita- 
ble unless averted by a timely and wise system of measures, the attention of 
the President was absorbed by mere party arrangements, and circumstances too 
disreputable to be mentioned here, except by the most distant allusion. 

Here I must pause for a moment to repel a charge which has been so often 
made, and which even the President has reiterated in his proclamation— the 
charge that I have been actuated, in the part which I have taken, by feelings of 
disappointed ambition. I again repeat, that I deeply regret the necessity of 
noticing myself in so important a discussion ; and that nothing can induce me 
to advert to my own course but the conviction that it is due to the cause, at 
whick a blow is aimed through me. It is only in this view that I notice it. 

It illy became the chief magistrate to make this charge. The course which 
the state took, and which led to the present controversy between her and the 
General Government, was taken as far back as 1828— in the very midst of that 
severe canvass which placed him in power— and in that very canvass Carolina 
openly avowed and zealously maintained those very principles which he, the 
chief magistrate, now officially pronounces to be treason and rebellion. That was 
the period at which he ought to have spoken. Having remained silent then, and 
having, under his approval, impUed by that silence, received the support and the 
vote of the state, I, if a sense of decorum did not prevent it, might recriminate 
with the double charge of deception and ingratitude. My object, however, is not 
to assail the President, but to defend myself against a most unfounded charge. 
The time alone at which the course upon which this charge of disappointed am- 
bition is founded, will of itself repel it, in the eye of every unprejudiced and 
honest man. The doctrine which I now sustain, under the present difficulties, 
I openly avowed and maintained immediately after the act of 1828, that " bill 
of abominations," as it has been so often and properly termed. Was I at that 
period disappointed in any views of ambition which I might be supposed to en- 
tertain ? I was Vice-president of the United States, elected by an overwhelm- 
ing majority. I was a candidate for re-election on the ticket with General 
Jackson himself, with a certain prospect of a triumphant success of that tick- 
et, and with a fair j)rospect of the highest office to which an American citizen 
can aspire. What was my course under these prospects ? Did I look to my 
own advancement, or to an honest and faithful discharge of my duty ? Let facts 
speak for themselves. When the bill to which I have referred came from the 
other house to the Senate, the almost universal impression was, that its fate 
would depend upon my casting vote. It was known that, as the bill then stood, 
the Senate was nearly equally divided ; and as it was a combined measure, ori- 
ginating with the politicijans and manufacturers, and intended as much to bear 
upon the Presidential election as to protect manufactures, it was believed that, 



order to defeat General Jackson's election, as well as my own. The friends 
of General Jackson were alarmed, and I was earnestly entreated to leave the 
chair in order to avoid the responsibility, under the plausible argument that, if 
the Senate should be equally divided, the bill would be lost without the aid of 
my casting vote. The reply to this entreaty was, that no consideration person- 
al to myself could induce me to take such a course ; that I considered the 
measure as of the most dangerous character, and calculated to produce the most 
fearful crisis ; that the payment of the public debt was just at hand ; and that the 
great increase of revenue which it would pour into the treasury would acceler- 
ate the approach of that period, and that the country would be placed in the 
most trying of situations — with an immense revenue without the means of ab- 
sorption upon any legitimate or constitutional object of appropriation, and would 
be compelled to submit to all the corrupting consequences of a large surplus, or 
to make a sudden reduction of the rates of duties, which would prove ruinous to 
the very interests which were then forcing the passage of the bill. Under these 
views I determined to remain in the chair, and if the bill came to me, to give 
my casting vote against it, and in doing so, to give my reasons at large ; but at 
the same time I informed my friends that 1 would retire from the ticket, so that 
the election of General Jackson might not be embarrassed by any act of mine. 
Sir, I was amazed at the folly and mfatuation of that period. So completely 
absorbed was Congress in the game of ambition and avarice, from the double 
impulse of the manufacturers and politicians, that none but a few appeared to 
anticipate the present crisis, at which now all are alarmed, but which is the in- 
evitable result of what was then done. As to myself, I clearly foresaw what 
tas since followed. The road of ambition lay open before me — I had but to 
follow the corrupt tendency of the times — but I chose to tread the rugged path 
of duty. 

It was thus that the reasonable hope of relief through the election of Gen- 
eral Jackson was blasted ; but still one other hope remained, that the final dis- 
charge of the public debt — an event near at hand — would remove our burden. 
That event would leave in the treasury a large surplus : a surplus that could 
not be expended under the most extravagant schemes of appropriation, having 
the least colour of decency or constitutionality. That event at last arrived. 
At the last session of Congress, it was avowed on all sides that the public debt, 
for all practical purposes, was in fact paid, the small surplus remaining being 
nearly covered by the money in the treasury and the bonds for duties, which 
had already accrued ; but with the arrival of this event our last hope was doom- 
ed to be disappointed. After a long session of many months, and the most ear- 
nest effort on the part of South Carolina and the other Southern States to obtain 
relief, all that could be effected was a small reduction in the amount of the du- 
ties ; but a reduction of such a character, that, while it diminished the amount 
of burden, distributed that burden more unequally than even the obnoxious act 
of 1828 : reversing the principle adopted by the bill of 1816, of laying higher 
duties on the unprotected than the protected articles, by repealing almost en- 
tirely the duties laid upon the former, and imposing the burden almost entirely i 
on the latter. It was thus that, instead of relief — instead of an equal distribu- 
tion of the burdens and benefits of the government, on the payment of the debt, 
as had been fondly anticipated — the duties were so arranged as to be, in fact, 
bounties on one side and taxation on the other : thus placing the two great sec- 
tions of the country in direct conflict in reference to its fiscal action, and there- , 
by letting in that flood of political corruption which threatens to sweep away '• 
our Constitution and our liberty. 

This unequal and unjust arrangement was pronounced, both by the adminis- 
tration, through its proper organ, the secretary of the treasury, and by the op- 
position, to be a permanent adjustment; and it was thus that all hope of relief 



through the action of the General Government terminated, and the crisis so long 
apprehended at length arrived, at which the state was compelled to choose be- 
tween absolute acquiescence in a ruinous system of oppression, or a resort to 
her reserved powers — powers of which she alone was the rightful judge, and 
•which only, in this momentous juncture, can save her. She determined on the 
latter. 

The consent of two thirds of her Legislature was necessary for the call of a 
convention, which was considered the only legitimate organ through which the 
people, in their sovereignty, could speak. After an arduous struggle, the State 
Rights party succeeded : more than two thirds of both branches of the Legisla- 
ture favourable to a convention were elected ; a convention was called — the 
ordinance adopted. The convention was succeeded by a meeting of the Legis- 
lature, when the laws to carry the ordinance into execution were enacted : all 
of which have been communicated by the President, have been referred to the 
Committee on the Judiciary, and this bill is the result of their labour. 

Having now corrected some of the prominent misrepresentations as to the na- 
ture of this controversy, and given a rapid sketch of the movement of the state 
in reference to it, I will next proceed to notice some objections connected with 
the ordinance and the proceedings under it. 

The first and most prominent of these is directed against what is called the 
test oath, which an effort has been made to render odious. So far from de- 
serving the denunciation which has been levelled against it, I view this provis- 
ion of the ordinance as but the natural result of the doctrines entertained by 
the state, and the position which she occupies. The people of that state be- 
lieve that the Union is a union of states, and not of individuals ; that it was 
formed by the states, and that the citizens of the several states were bound to it 
through the acts of their several states ; that each state ratified the Constitution 
for itself, and that it was only by such ratification of a state that any obligation 
was imposed upon the citizens : thus believing, it is the opinion of the people 
of Carolina that it belongs to the state which has imposed the obligation to de- 
clare, in the last resort, the extent of this obligation, as far as her citizens are 
concerned ; and this upon the plain principles which exist in all analogous 
cases of compact between sovereign bodies. On this principle, the people of 
the state, acting in their sovereign capacity in convention, precisely as they 
adopted their own and the federal Constitution, haved eclared by the ordi- 
nance, that the acts of Congress which imposed duties under the authority to 
lay imposts, are acts, not for revenue, as intended by the Constitution, but for 
protection, and therefore null and void. The ordinance thus enacted by the 
people of the state themselves, acting as a sovereign community, is as obliga- 
tory on the citizens of the state as any portion of the Constitution. In pre- 
scribing, then, the oath to obey the ordinance, no more was done than to pre- 
scribe an oath to obey the Constitution. It is, in fact, but a particular oath of 
allegiance, and in every respect similar to that which is prescribed under the 
Constitution of the United States, to be administered to all the officers of the 
State and Federal Governments ; and is no more deserving the harsh and bit- 
ter epithets which have been heaped upon it than that, or any similar oath. It 
ought to be borne in mind, that, according to the opinion which prevails in Caro- 
lina, the right of resistance to the unconstitutional laws of Congress belongs to 
the state, and not to her individual citizens ; and that, though the latter may, in 
a mere question of meum and tuum, resist, through the courts, an unconstitu- 
tional encroachment upon their rights, yet the final stand against usurpation 
rests not with them, but with the state of which they are members ; and such 
act of resistance by a state binds the conscience and allegiance of the citizen. 
But there appears to be a general misapprehension as to the extent to which 
the state has acted under this part of the ordinance. Instead of sweeping every 
officer by a general proscription of the minority, as has been represented in de- 



VeQ. 1 lie Siaie Iias, m lai^i, a,ui,t;u Willi iiits yieciteai, uciiuciiitroo, aii i;ni;uiiisia.ii- 

ces considered, towards citizens who differed from the majority ; and, in that 
spirit, has directed the oath to be administered only in cases of some official 
act directed to be performed in which obedience to the ordinance is involved. 

It has been farther objected that the state has acted precipitately. What ! 
precipitately ! after making a strenuous resistance for twelve years — by discus- 
sion here and in the other house of Congress — by essays in all forms — by res- 
olutions, remonstrances, and protests on the part of her Legislature — and, final- 
ly, by attempting an appeal to the judicial power of the United States ? I say 
attempting, for they have been prevented from bringing the question fairly be- 
fore the court, and that by an act of that very majority in Congress who now 
upbraid them for not making that appeal ; of that majority who, on a motion of 
one of the members in the other house from South Carolina, refused to give to 
the act of 1828 its true title — that it was a protective, and not a revenue act. 
The state has never, it is true, relied upon that tribunal, the Supreme Court, to 
vindicate its reserved rights ; yet they have always considered it as an auxili- 
ary means of defence, of which they would gladly have availed themselves to 
test the constitutionality of protection, had they not been deprived of the means 
of doing so by the act of the majority. 

Notwithstanding this long delay of more than ten years, under this continued 
encroachment of the government, we now hear it on all sides, by friends and foes, 
gravely pronounced that the state has acted precipitately — that her conduct has 
been rash ! That such should be the language of an interested majority, who, 
by means of this unconstitutional and oppressive system, are annually extorting 
millions from the South to be bestowed upon other sections, is not at all sur- 
prising. Whatever impedes the course of avarice and ambition will ever be de- 
nounced as rash and precipitate ; and had South Carolina delayed her resist- 
ance fifty instead of twelve years, she would have heard from the same quarter 
the same language ; but it is really surprising that those who are suffering in 
common with herself, and who have complained equally loud of their grievan- 
ces, who have pronounced the very acts which she has asserted within her 
limits to be oppressive, unconstitutional, and ruinous, after so long a struggle — a 
struggle longer than that which preceded the separation of these states from the 
mother-country — longer than the period of the Trojan war — should now com- 
plain of precipitancy ! No, it is not Carolina which has acted precipitately ; but 
her sister states, who have suffered in common with her, have acted tardily. 
Had they acted as she has done, had they performed their duty with equal en- 
ergy and promptness, our situation this day would be very different from what 
we now find it. Delays are said to be dangerous ; and never was the maxim 
more true than in the present case, a case of monopoly. It is the very nature 
of monopolies to grow. If we take from one side a large portion of the pro- 
ceeds of its labour and give it to the other, the side from which we take must 
constantly decay, and that to which we give must prosper and increase. Such 
is the action of the protective system. It exacts from the South a large portion 
of the proceeds of its industry, which it bestows upon the other sections, in the 
shape of bounties to manufactures, and appropriations in a thousand forms ; 
pensions, improvement of rivers and harbours, roads and canals, and in every 
shape that wit or ingenuity can devise. Can we, then, be surprised that the 
principle of monopoly grows, when it is so amply remunerated at the expense . 
of those who support it ? And this is the real reason of the fact which we wit- 
ness, that all acts for protection pass with small minorities, but soon come to be 
sustained by great and overwhelming majorities. Those who seek the monop- 
oly endeavour to obtain it in the most exclusive shape ; and they take care, 
accordingly, to associate only a sufficient number of interests barely to pass it 
through the two houses of Congress, on the plain principle that the greater the 



greater is the advantage to the monopolists. Acting in this spirit, we have 
often seen with what exact precision they count : adding wool to woollens, as- 
sociating lead and iron, feeling their way, until a bare majority is obtained, 
when the bill passes, connecting just as many interests as are sufficient to ensure 
its success, and no more. In a short time, however, we have invariably found 
that this h(i?i becomes a decided majority, under the certain operation which 
compels individuals to desert the pursuits which the monopoly has rendered 
unprofitable, that they may participate in those pursuits which it has rendered 
profitable. It is against this dangerous and growing disease which South Car- 
olina has acted : a disease whose cancerous action would soon have spread to 
every part of the system, if not arrested. 

There is another powerful reason why the action of the state could not have 
been safely delayed. The public debt, as I have already stated, for all practi- 
cal purposes, has already been paid ; and, under the existing duties, a large 
annual surplus of many millions must come into the treasury. It is impossi- 
ble to look at this state of things without seeing the most mischievous conse- 
quences ; and, among others, if not speedily corrected, it would interpose pow- 
erful and almost insuperable obstacles to throwing off the burden under which 
the South has been so long labouring. The disposition of the surplus would 
become a subject of violent and corrupt struggle, and could not fail to rear up 
new and powerful interests in support of the existing system, not only in those 
sections which have been heretofore benefited by it, but even in the South itself. 
I cannot but trace to the anticipation of this state of the treasury the sudden 
and extraordinary movements which took place at the last session in the Vir- 
ginia Legislature, in which the whole South is vitally interested.* It is im- 
possible for any rational man to believe that that state could seriously have 
thought of effecting the scheme to which I allude by her own resources, with- 
out powerful aid from the General Government. 

It is next objected, that the enforcing acts have legislated the United States 
out of South Carolina. I have already replied to this objection on another oc- 
casion, and will now but repeat what I then said : that they have been legisla- 
ted out only to the extent that they had no right to enter. The Constitution 
has admitted the jurisdiction of theUnited States within the limits of the sev- 
eral states only so far as the delegated powers authorize ; beyond that they are 
intruders, and may rightfully be expelled ; and that they have been efficiently 
expelled by the legislation of the state through her civil process, as has been 
acknowledged on all sides in the debate, is only a confirmation of the truth of 
the doctrine for which the majority in Carolina have contended. 

The very point at issue between the two parties there is, whether nullifica- 
tion is a peaceable and an efficient remedy against an imconstitutional act of the 
General Government, and which may be asserted as such through the state tri- 
bunals. Both parties agree that the acts against which it is directed are un- 
constitutional and oppressive. The controversy is only as to the means by 
which our citizens may be protected against the acknowledged encroachments 
on their rights. This being the point at issue between the parties, and the 
very object of the majority being an efficient protection of the citizens through 
the state tribunals, the measures adopted to enforce the ordinance of course 
received the most decisive character. AVe were not children, to act by halves. 
Yet for acting thus efficiently the state is denounced, and this bill reported, to 
overrule, by military force, the civil tribunals and civil process of the state ! 
Sir, I consider this bill, and the arguments which have been urged on this floor 
in its support, as the most triumphant acknowledgment that nullification is 
peaceful and efficient, and so deeply intrenched in the principles of our system, 

* Having for their object the emancipation and colonization of slaves. 



the su})remacy of military lorce in lieu of the supremacy oi the laws. In fact, 
the advocates of this bill refute their own argument. They tell us that the or- 
dinance is unconstitutional ; that they infract the Constitution of South Carolina, 
although, to me, the objection appears absurd, as it was adopted by the very 
authority which adopted the Constitution itself. They also tell us that the Su- 
preme Court is the appointed arbiter of all controversies between a state and 
the General Government. Why, then, do they not leave this controversy to 
that tribunal 1 Why do they not confide to them the abrogation of the ordi- 
nance, and the laws made in pursuance of it, and the assertion of that suprema- 
cy which they claim for the laws of Congress ? The state stands pledged to 
resist no process of the court. Why, then, confer on the President the exten- 
sive and unlimited powers provided in this bill ? Why authorize him to use 
military force to arrest the civil process of the state ? But one answer can be 
given : That, in a contest between the state and the General Government, if 
the resistance be limited on both sides to the civil process, the state, by its in- 
herent sovereignty, standing upon its reserved powers, will prove too powerful 
in such a controversy, and must triumph over the Federal Government, sustain- 
ed by its delegated and limited authority ; and in this answer we have an ac- 
knowledgment of the truth of those great principles for which the state has so 
firmly and nobly contended. 

Having made these remarks, the great question is now presented. Has Con- 
gress the right to pass this bill 1 which I will next proceed to consider. The 
decision of this question involves the inquiry into the provisions of the bill. 
What are they ? It puts at the disposal of the President the army and navy, 
and the entire militia of the country ; it enables him, at his pleasure, to subject 
every man in the United States, not exempt from militia duty, to martial law ; 
to call him from his ordinary occupation to the field, and under the penalty of 
fine and imprisonment, inflicted by a court martial, to imbrue his hand in his 
brothers' blood. There is no limitation on the power of the sword, and that 
over the purse is equally without restraint ; for, among the extraordinary fea- 
tures of the bill, it contains no appropriation, which, under existing circumstan- 
ces, is tantamount to an unlimited appropriation. The President may, under its 
authority, incur any expenditure, and pledge the national faith to meet it. He 
may create a new national debt, at the very moment of the termination of the 
former — a debt of millions, to be paid out of the proceeds of the labour of that 
section of the country whose dearest constitutional rights this bill prostrates ! 
Thus exhibiting the extraordinary spectacle, that the very section of the coun- 
try which is urging tliis measure, and carrying the sword of devastation against 
us, are, at the same time, incurring a new debt, to be paid by those whose rights 
are violated ; while those who violate them are to receive the benefits, in the 
shape of bounties and expenditures. 

And for what purpose is the unlimited control of the purse and of the sword 
thus placed at the disposition of the executive 1 To make war against one of 
the free and sovereign members of this confederation, which the bill proposes 
to deal with, not as a state, but as a collection of banditti or outlaws. Thus ex- 
hibiting the impious spectacle of this government, the creature of the states, 
making war against the power to which it owes its existence. 

The bill violates the Constitution, plainly and palpably, in many of its pro- 
visions, by authorizing the President, at his pleasure, to place the different 
ports of this Union on an unequal footing, contrary to that provision of the Con- 
stitution which declares that no preference shall be given to one port over 
another. It also violates the Constitution by authorizing him, at his discretion, 
to impose cash duties on one port, while credit is allowed in others ; by enabling 
the President to regulate commerce, a power vested in Congress alone ;. and by 
drawing within the jurisdiction of the United States courts powers aever in- 

L 



tended to be conferred on them. As great as these objections are, they become 
insignificant in the provisions of a bill which, by a single blow— by treating the 
states as a mere lawless mass of individuals — prostrates all the barriers of the 
Constitution. I will pass over the minor considerations, and proceed directly 
to the trreat point. This bill proceeds on the ground that the entire sovereignty 
of this'country belongs to the American people, as forming one great community, 
and re<^ards the states as mere fractions or counties, and not as an integral part 
of the Union : having no more right to resist the encroachments of the govern- 
ment than a county has to resist the authority of a state ; and treating such re- 
sistance as the lawless acts of so many individuals, without possessing sover- 
eif^ntv or political rights. It has been said that the bill declares v/ar against 
South Carolina. No. It decrees a massacre of her citizens ! War has some- 
thing ennobling about it, and, with all its horrors, brings into action the highest 
qualities, intellectual and moral. It was, perhaps, in the order of Providence 
that it should be permitted for that very purpose. But this bill declares no war, 
except, indeed, it be that which savages wage— a war, not against the commu- 
nity, but the citizens of whom that community is composed. But I regard it as 
worse than savage warfare — as an attempt to take away life under the colour of 
law, wdthout the trial by jury, or any other safeguard which the Constitution has 
thrown around the life of the citizen ! It authorizes the President, or even his 
deputies, when they may suppose the law to be violated, without the interven- 
tion of a court or jury, to kill without mercy or discrimination ! 

It has been said by the senator from Tennessee (Mr. Grundy) to be a meas- 
ure of peace ! Yes, such peace as the wolf gives to the lamb — the kite to the 
dove ! Such peace as Russia gives to Poland, or death to its victim ! A peace, 
by extinguishing the political existence of the state, by awing her into an aban- 
donment of the exercise of every power which constitutes her a sovereign com- 
munity. It is to South Carolina a question of self-preservation ; and I proclaim 
it, that, should this bill pass, and an attempt be made to enforce it, it will be 
resisted, at every hazard — even that of death itself. Death is not the greatest 
calamity : there are others still more terrible to the free and brave, and among 
them may be placed the loss of liberty and honour. There are thousands of 
her brave sons who, if need be, are prepared cheerfully to lay down their lives in 
defence of the state, and the great principles of constitutional liberty for which 
she is contending. God forbid that this should become necessary ! It never 
can be, unless this government is resolved to bring the question to extremity, when 
her gallant sons will stand prepared to perform the last duty — to die nobly. 

I go on the ground that this Constitution was made by the states ; that it is a 
federal union of the states, in which the several states still retain their sover- 
eignty. If these views be correct, I have not characterized the bill too strongly, 
which presents the question whether they be or be not. I will not enter into 
the discussion of that question now. I will rest it, for the present, on what I 
have said on the introduction of the resolutions now on the table, under a hope 
that another opportunity will be afforded for more ample discussion. I will, for 
the present, confine my remarks to the objections which have been raised to 
the views which I presented when I introduced them. The authority of Luther 
Martin has been adduced by the senator from Delaware, to prove that the citi- 
zens of a state, acting under the authority of a state, are liable to be punished 
as traitors by this government. As eminent as Mr. Martin was as a lawyer, 
and as high as his authority may be considered on a legal point, I cannot ac- 
cept it in determining the point at issue. The attitude which he occupied, if 
taken into view, would lessen, if not destroy, the weight of his authority. He 
had been violently opposed in Convention to the Constitution, and the very let- 
ter from which the senator has quoted was intended to dissuade Maryland from 
its adoption. With this view, it was to be expected that every consideration 
calculated to effect that object should be urged ; that real objections should be 



exaggerated ; and that those having no loundation, except mere plausible deduc- 
tions, should be presented. It is to this spirit that I attribute the opinion of 
Mr. Martin in reference to the point under consideration. But if his authority 
be good on one point, it must be admitted to be equally so on another. If his 
opinion be sufficient to prove that a citizen of the state may be punished as a 
traitor when acting under allegiance to the state, it is also sufficient to show 
I that no authority was intended to be given in the Constitution for the protection 
i of manufactures by the General Government, and that the provision in the Con- 
' stitution permitting a state to lay an impost duty, with the consent of Congress, 
was intended to reserve the right of protection to the states themselves, and 
that each state should protect its own industry. Assuming his opinion to be 
of equal authority on both points, how embarrassing would be the attitude ia 
I which it would place the senator from Delaware, and those with whom he is 
acting — that of using the sword and the bayonet to enforce the execution of an. 
unconstitutional act of Congress. I must express my surprise that the slightest 
authority in favour oi power should be received as the most conclusive evidence, 
while that M-hich is, at least, equally strong in favour of right and liberty, is 
wholly overlooked or rejected. 

Notwithstanding all that has been said, I must say that neither the senator 
from Delaware (Mr. Clayton), nor any other who has spoken on therisame side, 
has directly and fairly met the great questions at issue : Is this a federal union ? 
a union of states, as distinct from that of individuals ? Is the sovereignty in the 
several states, or in the American people in the aggregate ? The very language 
which we are compelled to use, when speaking of our political institutions, af- 
fords proof conclusive as to its real character. The terras union, federal, uni- 
ted, all imply a combination oi sovereignties, a confederation of states. They 
are never applied to an association of individuals. Who ever heard of the Uni- 
ted State of New- York, of Massachusetts, or of Virginia ? Who ever heard 
the term federal or union applied to the aggregation of individuals into one 
community 1 Nor is the other point less clear — that the sovereignty is in the 
several states, and that our system is a union of twenty-four sovereign powers, 
under a constitutional compact, and not of a divided sovereignty between the 
states severally and the United States. In spite of all that has been said, I 
maintain that sovereignty is in its nature indivisible. It is the supreme power 
in a state, and we might just as well speak of half a square, or half of a trian- 
gle, as of half a sovereignty. It is a gross error to confound the exercise of 
sovereign powers with sovereingty itself, or the delegation of such powers with 
a surrender of them. A sovereign may delegate his powers to be exercised by 
as many agents as he may think proper, under such conditions and with such 
limitations as he may impose ; but to surrender any portion of his sovereignty 
to another is to annihilate the whole. The senator from Delaware (Mr. Clay- 
ton) calls this metaphysical reasoning, which, he says, he cannot comprehend. 
If by metaphysics he means that scholastic refinement which makes distinc- 
tions without difference, no one can hold it in more utter contempt than I do ; 
but if, on the contrary, he means the power of analysis and combination — that 
power which reduces the most complex idea into its elements, which traces 
causes to their first principle, and, by the power oi generalization and combi- 
nation, unites the whole in one harmonious system — then, so far from deserv- 
ing contempt, it is the highest attribute of the human mind. It is the power 
which raises man above the brute — which distinguishes his faculties from mere 
sagacity, which he holds in common with inferior animals. It is this power 
which has raised the astronomer from being a mere gazer at the stars to the 
liigh intellectual eminence of a Newton or Laplace, and astronomy itself from 
a mere observation of insulated facts into that noble science which displays to 
our admiration the system of the universe. And shall this high power of the 
mind, which has effected such wonders when directed to the laws which con- 



trol the material world, be forever prohibited, under a senseless cry of metaphyg. 
ics, from beinn- applied to the high purpose of political science and legislation ? 
I hold them to be subject to laws as fixed as matter itself, and to be as fit a 
subject for the application of the highest intellectual power. Denunciation may, 
indeed, fall upon the philosophical inquirer into these first principles, as it did 
upon Galileo and Bacon when they first unfolded the great discoveries which . 
have immortalized their names ; but the time will come when truth will pre- 
vail in spite of prejudice and denunciation, and when politics and legislation 
will be considered as much a science as astronomy and chemistry. 

In connexion with this part of the subject, I understood the senator from Vir- 
ginia (Mr. Rives) to say that sovereignty was divided, and that a portion re- 
mained with the states severally, and that the residue was vested in the Union, 
By Union, I suppose the senator meant the United States. If such be his 
meaning — if he intended to affirm that the sovereignty Avas in the twenty-four 
states, in whatever light he may view them, our opinions will not disagree ; but, 
according to my conception, the whole sovereignty is in the several states, \vhile 
the exercise of sovereign powers is divided — a part being exercised under com- 
pact, through this General Government, and the residue through the separate 
state governments. But if the senator from Virginia (Mr. Rives) means to as- 
sert thatihe twenty-four states form but one community, with a single sovereign 
power as to the objects of the Union, it will be but the revival of the old ques- 
tion, of whether the Union is a union between states, as distinct communities, 
or a mere aggregate of the American peaple, as a mass of individuals ; and in 
this light his opinions would lead directly to consolidation. 

But to return to the bill. It is said that the bill ought to pass, because the 
law must be enforced. The law must be enforced. The imperial edict must 
be executed. It is under such sophistry, couched in general terms, without 
looking to the limitations which must ever exist in the practical exercise of 
power, that the most cruel and despotic acts ever have been covered. It was 
such sophistry as this that cast Daniel into the lion's den, and the three Inno- 
cents into the fiery furnace. Under the same sophistry the bloody edicts of 
Nero and Caligula were executed. The law must be enforced. Yes, the act 
imposing the " tea-tax must be executed." This was the very argument which 
impelled Lord North and his administration in that mad career which forever 
separated us from the British crown. Under a similar sophistry, " that religion 
must be protected," how many massacres have been perpetrated T and how many 
martyrs have been tied to the stake 1 What ! acting on this vague abstraction, 
are you prepared to enforce a law without considering whether it be just or un- 
just, constitutional or unconstitutional ? Will you collect money when it is ac- 
knowledged that it is not wanted ? He who cams the money, who digs it from 
ihe earth with the sweat of his brow, has a just title to it against the universe. 
No one has a right to touch it without his consent except his government, and 
it only to the extent of its legitimate wants ; to take more is robbery, and you 
propose by this bill to enforce robbery by murder. Yes : to this result you 
must come, by this miserable sophistry, this vague abstraction of enforcing the 
law, without a regard to the fact whether the law be just or unjust, constitution- 
al or unconstitutional. 

In the same spirit, we arc told that the Union must be preserved, without re- 
gard to the means. And how is it proposed to preserve the Union ? By 
force ! Does any man in his senses believe that this beautiful structure — this 
harmonious aggregate of states, produced by the joint consent of all — can be 
preserved by force ? Its very introduction will be certain destruction of this 
Federal Union. No, no. You cannot keep the states united in their consti- 
tutional and federal bonds by force. Force may, indeed, hold the parts togeth- 
er, but such union would be the bond between master and slave : a union of 
exaction on one side, and of unqualified obedience on the other. That obedience 



Lmon! les, exaction on tlie side oi tne master; tor this very bill is intend- 
ed to collect what can be no longer called taxes — the voluntary contribution of 
a free people — but tribute — tribute to be collected under the mouths of the can- 
non ! Your custom-house is already transferred to a garrison, and that garri- 
son with its batteries turned, not against the enemy of your country, but on sub- 
jects (I will not say citizens), on whom you propose to levy contributions. Has 
reason fled from our borders ? Have we ceased to reflect ? It is madness 
to suppose that the Union can be preserved by force. I tell you plainly, that 
the bill, should it pass, cannot be enforced. It will prove only a blot upon your 
statute-book, a reproach to the year, and a disgrace to the American Senate. 
I repeat that it will not be executed : it will rouse the dormant spirit of the 
people, and open their eyes to the approach of despotism. The country has 
sunk into avarice and political corruption, from which nothing can arouse it but 
some measure, on the part of the government, of folly and madness, such as 
that now under consideration. 

Disguise it as you may, the controversy is one between power and liberty ; 
and I will tell the gentlemen who are opposed to me, that, as strong as may be 
the love of power on their side, the love of liberty is still stronger on ours. 
History furnishes many instances of similar struggles where the love of liberty 
has prevailed against power under every disadvantage, and among them few 
more striking than that of our own Revolution ; where, as strong as was the pa- 
rent country, and feeble as were the colonies, yet, under the impulse of liberty, 
and the blessing of God, they gloriously triumphed in the contest. There are, 
indeed, many and striking analogies between that and the present controversy : 
they both originated substantially in the same cause, with this difference, that, 
in the present case, the power of taxation is converted into that of regulating 
industry ; in that, the power of regulating industry, by the regulation of com- 
merce, was attempted to be converted into the power of taxation. Were I to 
trace the analogy farther, we should find that the perversion of the taxing pow- 
er, in one case, has given precisely the same control to the Northern section 
over the industry of the Southern section of the Union, which the power to reg- 
ulate commerce gave to Great Britain over the industry of the colonies ; and 
that the very articles in which the colonies were permitted to have a free trade, 
and those in Avhich the mother-country had a monopoly, are almost identically 
the same as those in which the Southern States are permitted to have a free 
trade by the act of 1832, and in which the Northern States have, by the same 
act, secured a monopoly : the only difference is in the means. In the former, 
the colonies were permitted to have a free trade with all countries south of 
Cape Finisterre, a cape in the northern part of Spain ; while north of that 
the trade of the colonies was prohibited, except through the mother-country, by 
means of her commercial regulations. If we compare the products of the coun- 
try north and south of Cape Finisterre, we shall find them almost identical with 
the list of the protected and unprotected articles contained in the act of last 
year. Nor does the analogy terminate here. The very arguments resorted 
to at the commencement of the American Revolution, and the measures adopt- 
ed, and the motives assigned to bring on that contest (to enforce the law), are 
almost identically the same. 

But to return from this digression to the consideration of the bill. Whatever 
diflference of opinion may exist upon other points, there is one on which I should 
suppose there can be none : that this bill rests on principles which, if carried 
out, will ride over state sovereignties, and that it will be idle for any of its ad- 
vocates hereafter to talk of state rights. The senator from Virginia (Mr. Rives) 
says that he is the advocate of state rights ; but he must permit me to tell him 
that, although he may differ in premises from the other gentlemen with whom 
he acts on this occasion, yet in supporting this bill he obliterates every vestige 



Ul UlOUlHyHUIl UC-l 



of '98, his example will be more pernicious than that of the most open and bit- 
ter opponents of the rights of the states. I will also add, what I am compelled 
to say, that 1 must consider him (Mr. Rives) as less consistent than our old 
oppoiients, whose conclusions were fairly drawn from their premises, while 
his premises ought to have led him to opposite conclusions. The gentleman , 
has told us that the new-fangled doctrines, as he chooses to call them, have ' 
brought state rights into disrepute. I must tell him, in reply, that what he calls 
new-fangled are but the doctrines of '98 ; and that it is he (Mr. Rives), and 
others with him, who, professing these doctrines, have degraded them by ex- 
plaining away their meaning and efficacy. He (Mr. R.)has disclaimed, in be- 
half of Virginia, the authorship of nullification. I will not dispute that point, j 
If Virginia chooses to throw away one of her brightest ornaments, she must 
not hereafter complain that it has become the property of another. But while 
I have, as a representative of Carolina, no right to complain of the disavowal 
of the senator from Virginia, I must believe that he (Mr. R.) has done his na- 
tive state great injustice by declaring on this floor that, when she gravely re- 
solved, in '98, that, " in cases of deliberate and dangerous infractions of the Con- 
stitution, the states, as parties to the compact, have the right, and are in duty 
bound, to interpose to arrest the progress of the evil, and to maintain within their 
respective limits the authorities, rights, and liberties appertaining to them," she 
meant no more than to ordain the right to protest and to remonstrate. To sup- 
pose that, in putting forth so solemn a declaration, which she afterward sustain- 
ed by so able and elaborate an argument, she meant no more than to assert what 
no one had ever denied, would be to suppose that the state had been guilty of 
the most egregious trifling that ever was exhibited on so solemn an occasion. 

In reviewing the ground over which I have passed, it will be apparent that 
the question in controversy involves that most deeply important of all political 
questions, whether ours is a federal or a consolidated government : a question, 
on the decision of which depend, as I solemnly believe, the liberty of the peo- 
ple, their happiness, and the place which we are destined to hold in the moral 
and intellectual scale of nations. Never was there a controversy in which 
more important consequences were involved : not excepting that between Per- 
sia and Greece, decided by the battles of Marathon, Platea, and Salamis ; 
which gave ascendency to the genius of Europe over that of Asia ; and which, 
in its consequences, has continued to affect the destiny of so large a portion of 
the world even to this day. There is often close analogies between events ap- 
parently very remote, which are strikingly illustrated in this case. In the great 
contest between Greece and Persia, between European and Asiatic polity and 
civilization, the very question between the federal and consolidated form of gov- 
ernment was involved. The Asiatic governments, from the remotest time, with 
some exceptions on the eastern shore of the Mediterranean, have been based 
on the principle of consolidation, which considers the whole community as but 
a unit, and consolidates its powers in a central point. The opposite principle 
has prevailed in Europe — Greece, throughout all her states, was based on a 
federal system. All were united in one common, but loose bond, and the gov- 
ernments of the several states partook, for the most part, of a complex organi- 
zation, whiclt distributed political power among diflerent members of the com- 
munity. The same principles prevailed in ancient Italy ; and, if we turn to the 
Teutonic race, our great ancestors — the race which occupies the first place in 
power, civilization, and science, and which possesses the largest and the fairest 
part of Europe — we shall find that their governments were based on the federal 
organization, as has been clearly illustrated by a recent and able writer on the 
British Constitution (Mr. Palgrave), from whose writings I introduce the follow- 
ing extract : 

" In this manner the first establishment of the Teutonic States was effected. 



nosts ana armies, lea on oy pruices, magistrates, ana cnieitains ; each ot whom 
was originally independent, and each of whom lost a portion of his pristine in- 
dependence in proportion as he and his compeers became united urtder the su- 
premacy of a sovereign, who was superinduced upon the state, first as a milita- 
ry commander, and afterward as a king. Yet, notwithstanding this political con- 
nexion, each member of the state continued to retain a considerable portion of 
the rights of sovereignty. Every ancient Teutonic monarchy must be consid- 
ered as a federation : it is not a unit, of which the smaller bodies politic there- 
in contained are the fractions, but they are the integers, and the state is the 
multiple which results from them. Dukedoms and counties, burghs and baron- 
ies, towns and townships, and shires, form the kingdom ; all, in a certain de- 
gree, strangers to each other, and separate in jurisdiction, though all obedient 
to the supreme executive authority. This general description, though not al- 
ways strictly applicable in terms, is always so substantially and in effect ; and 
he^ce it becomes necessary to discard the language which has been very <Ten- 
erally employed in treating on the English Constitution. It has been supposed 
that the kingdom was reduced into a regular and gradual subordination of gov- 
ernment, and that the various legal districts of which it is composed arose from 
the divisions and subdivisions of the country. But this hypothesis, which tends 
greatly to perplex our history, cannot be supported by fact ; and instead of view- 
ing the Constitution as a whole, and then proceeding to its parts, we must ex- 
amine it synthetically, and assume that the supreme authorities of the state 
were created by the concentration of the powers originally belonging to the 
members and corporations of which it is composed." [Here Mr. C. gave way 
for a motion to adjourn.] 

On the next day Mr. Calhoun said, I have omitted at the proper place, in the 
course of my observations yesterday, two or three points, to which I will now 
advert, before I resume the discussion where I left off. I have stated that the 
ordinance and acts of South Carolina were directed, not against the revenue, 
but against the system of protection. But it may be asked, If such was her 
object, how happens it that she has declared the whole system void — revenue 
as well as protection, without discrimination 1 It is this question which I pro- 
pose to answer- Her justification will be found in the necessity of the case ; 
and if there be any blame, it cannot attach to her. The two are so blended, 
throughout the whole, as to make the entire revenue system subordinate to the 
protective, so as to constitute a complete system of protection, in which it is 
impossible to discriminate the two elements of which it is composed. South 
Carolina, at least, could not make the discrimination, and she was reduced to the 
alternative of acquiescing in a system which she believed to be unconstitution- 
al, and which she felt to be oppressive and ruinous, or to consider the whole 
as one, equally contaminated through all its parts, by the unconstitutionality of 
the protective portion, and, as such, to be resisted by the act of the state. I 
maintain that the state has a right to regard it in the latter character, and that, 
if a loss of revenue follow, the fault is not hers, but of this government, which 
has improperly blended together, in a manner not to be separated by the state, 
two systems wholly dissimilar. If the sincerity of the state be doubted ; if it 
be supposed that her action is against revenue as well as protection, let the two 
be separated : let so much of the duties as are intended for revenue be put in 
one bill, and the residue intended for protection be put in another, and I pledge 
myself that the ordinance and the acts of the state will cease as to the former, 
and be directed exclusively against the latter. 

I also stated, in the course of my remarks yesterday, and I trust I have con- 
clusively shown, that the act of 1816, with the exception of a single item, to 
which I have alluded, was, in reality, a revenue measure, and that Carolina and 
the other states, in supporting it, have not incurred the slighted responsibility 



in relation to the system ot protection wnicn nas since grown up, ana wmcii 
now so deeply distracts the country. Sir, I am willing, as one of the repre- 
sentatives of Carolina, and I believe I speak the sentiment of the state, to take 
that act as the basis of a permanent adjustment of the tariff, simply reducing the 
duties, in an average proportion, on all the items to the revenue point. I make 
that offer now to the advocates of the protective system ; but I must, in candour, 
inform them that such an adjustment would distribute the revenue between the 
protected and unprotected articles more favourably to the state, and to the South, 
and less so to the manufacturing interest, than an average uniform ad valorem, 
and, accordingly, more so than that now proposed by Carolina through her con- 
vention. After such an offer, no man Avho values his candour will dare accuse 
the state, or those who have represented her here, with inconsistency in refer- 
ence to the point under consideration. 

I omitted, also, on yesterday, to notice a remark of the senator from Virginia 
(Mr. Rives), that the only difficulty in adjusting the tariff grew out of the ordi- 
nance and the acts of South Carolina. I must attribute an assertion so incon- 
sistent wath the facts to an ignorance of the occurrences of the last few years 
in reference to this subject, occasioned by the absence of the gentleman from 
the United States, to which he himself has alluded in his remarks. If the sen- 
ator will take pains to inform himself, he will find that this protective system 
advanced with a continued and rapid step, in spite of petitions, remonstrances, 
and protests, of not only Carolina, but also of Virginia and of all the Southern 
States, until 1828, when Carolina, for the first time, changed the character of 
her resistance, by holding up her reserved rights as the shield of her defence 
against farther encroachment. This attitude alone, unaided by a single state, 
arrested the farther progress of the system, so that the question from that pe- 
riod to this, on the part of the manufacturers, has been, not how to acquire 
more, but to retain that which they have acquired. I will inform the gentle- 
man that, if this attitude had not been taken on the part of the state, the ques- 
tion Avould not now be how duties ought to be repealed, but a question, as to 
the protected articles, between prohibition on one side and the duties establish- 
ed by the act of 1828 on the other. But a single remark will be sufficient in 
reply to what I must consider the invidious remark of the senator from Virgin- 
ia (xMr. Rives). The act of 1832, which has not yet gone into operation, and 
which was passed but a few months since, was declared by the supporters of 
the system to be a permanent adjustment, and the bill proposed by the Treasury 
Department, not essentially different from the act itself, was in like manner de- 
clared to be intended by the administration as a permanent arrangement. 
What has occurred since, except this ordinance, and these abused acts of the 
calumniated state, to produce this mighty revolution in reference to this odious 
system ? Unless the senator from Virginia can assign some other cause, he is 
bound, upon every principle of fairness, to retract this unjust aspersion upon the 
acts of South Carolina. 

The senator from Delaware (Mr. Clayton), as well as others, has relied with 
great emphasis on the fact that we are citizens of the United States. I do not 
object to the expression, nor shall I detract from the proud and elevated feel- 
ings with which it is associated ; but I trust that I may be permitted to raise the 
inquiry. In what manner are we citizens of the United States 1 without weak- 
ening the patriotic feeling with which, I trust, it will ever be uttered. If by cit- 
izen of the United States he means a citizen at large, one whose citizenship 
extends to the entire geographical limits of the country, without having a local 
citizenship in some state or territory, a sort of citizen of the world, all I have 
to say is, that such a citizen would be a perfect nondescript ; that not a single 
individual of this description can be found in the entire mass of our population. 
Notwithstanding all the pomp and display of eloquence on the occasion, every 
citizen is a citizen of some state or territory, and, as such, vmder an express pro- 



in the several states : and it is in this,*and in no other sense, that we are citizens 
of the United States. The senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. Dallas), indeed, re- 
lies upon that provision in the Constitution which gives Congress the power 
to establish a uniform rule of naturalization, and the operation of the rule actu- 
ally established under this authority, to prove that naturalized citizens are citi- 
zens at large, without being citizens of any of the states. I do not deem it ne- 
cessary to examine the law of Congress upon this subject, or to reply to the ar- 
gument of the senator, though I cannot doubt that he (Mr. D.) has taken an en- 
tirely erroneous view of the subject. It is sufficient that the power of Congress 
extends simply to the establishment of a uniform rule by which foreigners may 
be naturalized in the several states or territories, without infringing in any other 
respect, in reference to naturalization, the rights of the states as they existed 
before the adoption of the Constitution. 

Having supplied the omissions of yesterday, I now resume the subject at the 
point where my remarks then terminated. The Senate will remember that 
I stated, at their close, that the great question at issue is, whether ours is a 
federal or a consolidated system of government ; a system in which the parts, 
to use the emphatic language of Mr. Palgrave, are the integers, and the whole 
the multiple, or in which the whole is a unit and the parts the fractions ; that I 
stated, that on the decision of this question, I believe, depend not only the lib- 
erty and prosperity of this country, but the place which we are destined to hold 
in the intellectual and moral scale of nations. I stated, also, in my remarks on 
this point, that there is a striking analogy between this and the great struggle 
between Persia and Greece, which was decided by the battles of Marathon, 
Platea, and Salamis, and which immortalized the names of Miltiades and The- 
mistocles. I illustrated this analogy by showing that centralism or consolida- 
tion, with the exception of a few nations along the eastern border of the Medi- 
terranean, has been the pervading principle in the Asiatic governments, while 
the federal system, or, what is the same in principle, that system which organ- 
izes a community in reference to its parts, has prevailed in Europe. 

Among the few exceptions in the Asiatic nations, the government of the 
twelve tribes of Israel, in its early period, is the most striking. Their govern- 
ment, at first, was a mere confederation without any central power, till a mil- 
itary chieftain, with the title of king, was placed at its head, without, however, 
merging the original organization of the twelve distinct tribes. This was the 
commencement of that central action among that peculiar people which, in 
three generations, terminated in a permanent division of their tribes. It is im- 
possible even for a careless reader to peruse the history of that event without 
being forcibly struck with the analogy in the causes which led to their separa- 
tion, and those which now threaten us with a similar calamity. With the es- 
tablishment of the central power in the king commenced a system of taxation, 
which, under King Solomon, was greatly increased to defray the expense of 
rearing the temple, of enlarging and embellishing Jerusalem, the seat of the 
central government, and the other profuse expenditures of his magnificent reign. 
Increased taxation was followed by its natural consequences — discontent and 
complaint ; which before his death began to excite resistance. On the succes- 
sion of his son, Rehoboam, the ten tribes, headed by Jeroboam, demanded a re- 
duction of the taxes ; the temple being finished, and the embellishment of Jeru- 
salem completed, and the money which had been raised for that purpose being 
no longer required, or, in other words, the debt being paid, they demanded a 
reduction of the duties — a repeal of the tariff. The demand was taken under 
consideration, and after consulting the old men, the counsellors of '98, Avho ad- 
vised a reduction, he then took the opinion of the younger politicians, who had 
since grown up, and knew not the doctrines of their fathers ; he hearkened unto 
their counsel, and refused to make the reduction, and the secession of the ten 

M 



iriDes iiiiacr jcruDUciiii luiiuwcu. ^^-^^ ^^^^^^ ^^ ^1.^^**1 ^^..^ x^v.,.ju,.x,x.., T.^i.^x. 
had received the disbursements, alone rerhained to the house of David. 

But to return to the point immediately under consideration. I know that it 
is not only the opinion of a large majority of our country, but it may be said to 
be the opinion of the age, that the very beau ideal of a perfect government is 
the o-overnment of a majority, acting through a representative body, without, 
check or limitation in its power ; yet, if we may test this theory by experience 
and reason, we shall find that, so far from being perfect, the necessary tenden- 
cy of all governments, based upon the will of an absolute majority, without con- 
stitutional check or limitation of power, is to faction, corruption, anarchy, and 
despotism ; and this, whether the will of the majority be expressed directly 
through an assembly of the people themselves, or by their representatives. I 
know that, in venturing this assertion, I utter that which is unpopular both 
■within and without these walls ; but where truth and liberty are concerned, 
such considerations should not be regarded. I will place the decision of this 
point on the fact that no government of the kind, among the many attempts 
which have been made, has ever endured for a single generation, but, on the 
contrary, has invariably experienced the fate which I have assigned to it. Let 
a single instance be pointed out, and I will surrender my opinion. But, if we 
had not the aid of experience to direct our judgment, reason itself would be a 
certain guide. The view which considers the community as a unit, and all its 
parts as having a similar interest, is radically erroneous. However small the 
community may be, and however homogeneous its interests, the moment that 
government is put into operation, as soon as it begins to collect taxes and to 
make appropriations, the different portions of the community must, of necessity, 
bear different and opposing relations in reference to the action of the govern- 
ment. There must inevitably spring up two interests — a direction and a stock- 
holder interest — an interest profiting by the action of the government, and in- 
terested in increasing its powers and action ; and another, at whose expense 
the political machine is kept in motion. I know how difficult it is to commu- 
nicate distinct ideas on such a subject, through the medium of general proposi- 
tions, without particular illustration ; and in order that I may be distinctly un- 
derstood, though at the hazard of being tedious, I will illustrate the important 
principle which I have ventured to advance by examples. 

Let us, then, suppose a small community of five persons, separated from the 
rest of the world ; and, to make the example strong, let us suppose them all to be 
engaged in the same pursuit, and to be of equal wealth. Let us farther sup- 
pose that they determine to govern the community by the will of a majority ; 
and, to make the case as strong as possible, let us suppose that the majority, in 
order to meet the expenses of the government, lay an equal tax, say of $100, on 
each individual of this little community. Their treasury would contain five 
hundred dollars. Three are a majority; and they, by supposition, have con- 
tributed three hvmdred as their portion, and the other two (the minority), 
two hundred. The three have the right to make the appropriations as they 
may think proper. The question is. How would the principle of the abso- 
hite and unchecked majority operate, under these circumstances, in this Ihtle 
community? If the three be governed by a sense of justice — if they should 
appropriate the money to the objects for which it was raised, the common and 
equal benefit of the five, then the object of the association would l)e fairly and 
honestly effected, and each Avould have a common interest in the government. 
But, should the majority pursue an opposite course — should they appropriate the 
money in a manner to benefit their own particular interest, without regard to 
the interest of the two (and that they will so act, unless there be some effi- 
cient check, he who best knows human nature will least doubt), who does not 
see that the three and the two would have directly opposite interests in refer- 
ence to the action of the government ? The three who contribute to the com- 



iiunarea lu men uwii uoc, (^unvcn, mc auiiuu ui iiie guvt:iiiiiit;iu imo iiie means 
of making money, and, of consequence, would have a direct interest in increas- 
ing the taxes. They put in three hundred and take out five : that is, they take 
back to themselves all that they had put in, and, in addition, that which was 
put in by their associates ; or, in other words, taking taxation and appropriation 
together, they have gained, and their associates have lost, two hundred dollars 
by the fiscal action of the government. Opposite interests, in reference to the 
action of the government, are thus created between them : the one having an 
interest in favour, and the other against the taxes ; the one to increase, and the 
other to decrease the taxes ; the one to retain the taxes when the money is no 
longer wanted, and the other to repeal them ^hen the objects for which they 
were levied have been executed. 

Let us now suppose this community of five to be raised to twenty-four indi- 
viduals, to be governed, in like manner, by the will of a majority : it is obvious 
that the same principle would divide them into two interests — into a majority 
and a minority, thirteen against eleven, or in some other proportion ; and that 
all the consequences which I have shown to be applicable to the small com- 
munity of five would be equally applicable to the greater, the cause not de- 
pending upon the number, but resulting necessarily from the action of the gov- 
ernment itself. Let us now suppose that, instead of governing themselves di- 
rectly in an assembly of the whole, without the intervention of agents, they 
should adopt the representative principle, and that, instead of being governed 
by a majority of themselves, they should be governed by a majority of their 
representatives. It is obvious that the operation of the system would not be 
affected by the change : the representatives being responsible to those who 
choose them, would conform to the will of their constituents, and would act as 
they would do were they present and acting for themselves ; and the same con- 
flict of interest, which we have shown would exist in one case, would equally 
exist in the other. In either case, the inevitable result would be a system of 
hostile legislation on the part of the majority, or the stronger interest, against the 
minority, or the weaker interest : the object of which, on the part of the former, 
would be to exact as much as possible from the latter, which would necessarily 
be resisted by all the means in their power. Warfare, by legislation, would 
thus be commenced between the parties, with the same object, and not less 
hostile than that which is carried on between distinct and rival nations — the 
only distinction would be in the instruments and the mode. Enactments, in the 
one case, would supply what could only be effected by arms in the other ; and 
the inevitable operation would be to engender the most hostile feelings between 
the parties, which would merge every feeling of patriotism — that feeling which 
embraces the whole, and substitute in its place the most violent party attach- 
ment ; and, instead of having one common centre of attachment, around which 
the affections of the community might rally, there would, in fact, be two — the 
interests of the majority, to which those who constitute that majority would be 
more attached than they would be to the whole, and that of the minority, to 
which they, in like manner, would also be more attached than to the interests of 
the whole. Faction would thus take the place of patriotism ; and, with the loss 
of patriotism, corruption must necessarily follow, and in its train, anarchy, and, 
finally, despotism, or the establishment of absolute power in a single individual, 
as a means of arresting the conflict of hostile interests : on the principle that 
it is better to submit to the will of a single individual, who, by being made lord 
and master of the whole community, would have an equal interest in the pro- 
tection of all the parts. 

Let us next suppose that, in order to avert the calamitous train of consequen- 
ces, this little community should adopt a written constitution, with limitations 
restricting the will of the majority, in order to protect the minority against the 



tions. It is obvious that the case would not be in the slightest degree varied, 
if the majority be left in possession of the right of judging exclusively of the 
extent of its powers, without any right on the part of the minority to enforce 
the restrictions imposed by the Constitution on the will of the majority. The 
point is almost too clear for illustration. Nothing can be more certain than 
that when a constitution grants power, and imposes limitations on the exercise 
of that power, whatever interests may obtain possession of the government, Avill 
be in favour of extending the power at the expense of the limitation ; and that, 
unless those in whose behalf the limitations were imposed have, in some form 
or mode, the right of enforcing them, the power will ultimately supersede the 
limitation, and the government must operate precisely in the same manner as 
if the will of the majority governed without constitution or limitation of power. 

I have thus presented all possible modes in which a government founded 
upon the will of an absolute majority will be modified, and have demonstrated 
that, in all its forms, whether in a majority of the people, as in a mere Democ- 
racy, or in a majority of their representatives, without a constitution or with a 
constitution, to be interpreted as the will of the majority, the result will be the 
same : two hostile interests will inevitably be created by the action of the gov- 
ernment, to be followed by hostile legislation, and that by faction, corruption, 
anarchy, and despotism. 

The great and solemn question here presents itself. Is there any remedy for 
these evils ? on the decision of which depends the question, whether the people 
can govern themselves, which has been so often asked with so much skepticism 
and doubt. There is a remedy, and but one, the effects of which, whatever 
may be the form, is to organize society in reference to this conflict of interests, 
which springs out of the action of government ; and which can only be done by 
giving to each part the right of self-protection ; which, in a word, instead of con- 
sidering the community of twenty-four a single community, having a common 
interest, and to be governed by the single will of an entire majority, shall, upon 
all questions tending to bring the parts into conflict, the thirteen against the 
eleven, take the will, not of the twenty-four as a unit, but that of the thirteen 
and that of the eleven separately, the majority of each governing the parts, and 
where they concur, governing the whole, and where they disagree, arresting 
the action of the government. This I will call the concurring, as distinct from 
the absolute majority. It would not be, as was generally supposed, a minority 
governing a majority. In either way the number would be the same, whether 
taken as the absolute or as the concurring majority. Thus, the majority of the 
thirteen is seven, and of the eleven six ; and the two together make thirteen, which 
is the majority of twenty-four. But, though the number is the same, the mode of 
counting is essentially diflerent : the one representing the strongest interest, 
and the other, the entire interests of the community. The first mistake is, in 
supposing that the government of the absolute majority is the government of this 
people — that beau ideal of a perfect government which has been so enthusias- 
tically entertained in every age by the generous and patriotic, where civiliza- 
tion and lil)erty have made the smallest progress. There can be no greater er- 
ror : the government of the people is the government of the whole community 
— of the twenty-four — the self-government of all the parts — too perfect to be re- 
duced to practice in the present, or any past stage of human society. The gov- 
ernment of the absolute majority, instead of the government of the people, is 
but the government of the strongest interests, and, when not efficiently checked, 
is the most tyrannical and oppressive that can be devised. Between this ideal 
perfection on one side and despotism on the other, none other can be devised 
but that which considers society in reference to its parts, as'diff'erently affected 
by the action of the government, and which takes the sense of each part sepa- 
rately, and thereby the sense of the whole, in the manner already illustrated. 



of which the community may be composed, and are just as applicable to one 
of thirteen millions, the number which composes ours, as of the small commu- 
nity of twenty-four, which I have supposed for the purpose of illustration ; and 
are not less applicable to the twenty-four states united in one community, than 
to the case of the twenty-four individuals. There is, indeed, a distinction be- 
tween a large and a small community, not affecting the principle, but the vio- 
lence of the action. In the former, the similarity of the interests of all the 
parts will limit the oppression from the hostile action of the parts, in a great 
degree, to the fiscal action of the government merely ; but in the large commu- 
nity, spreading over a country of great extent, and having a great diversity of 
interests, with different kinds of labour, capital, and production, the conflict and 
oppression will extend, not only to a monopoly of the appropriations on the 
part of the stronger interests, but will end in unequal taxes, and a general con- 
flict between the entire interests of conflicting sections, which, if not arrested 
by the most powerful checks, will terminate in the most oppressive tjnranny 
that can be conceived, or in the destruction of the community itself. 

If we turn our attention from these supposed cases, and direct it to our gov- 
ernment and its actual operation, we shall find a practical confirmation of the 
truth of what has been stated, not only of the oppressive operation of the sys- 
tem of an absolute majority, but also a striking and beautiful illustration, in the 
formation of our system, of the principle of the concurring majority, as distinct 
from the absolute, which I have asserted to be the only means of efficiently 
checking the abuse of power, and, of course, the only solid foundation of con- 
stitutional liberty. That our government, for many years, has been gradually 
verging to consolidation ; that the Constitution has grsidually become a dead let- 
ter ; and that all restrictions upon the power of government have been virtually 
removed, so as practically to convert the General Government into a govern- 
ment of an absolute majority, without check or limitation, cannot be denied by 
any one who has impartially observed its operation. 

It is not necessary to trace the commencement and gradual progress of the 
causes which have produced this change in our system : it is sufficient to state 
that the change has taken place within the last few years. What has been the 
result ? Precisely that which might have been anticipated : the growth of fac- 
tion, corruption, anarchy, and, if not despotism itself, its near approach, as wit- 
nessed in the provisions of this bill. And from what have these consequences 
sprung 1 We have been involved in no war ! We have been at peace with 
all the world. We have been visited with no national calamity. Our people 
have been advancing in general intelligence, and, I will add, as great and 
alarming as has been the advance of political corruption among the mercenary 
corps who look to government for support, the morals and virtue of the commu- 
nity at large have been advancing in improvement. What, I will again repeat, 
is the cause ? No other can be assigned but a departure from the fundamental 
principles of the Constitution, which has converted the government into the will 
of an absolute and irresponsible majority, and which, by the laws that must in- 
evitably govern in all such majorities, has placed in conflict the great inter- 
ests of the country : by a system of hostile legislation, by an oppressive and 
unequal imposition of taxes, by unequal and profuse appropriations, and by ren- 
dering the entire labour and capital of the weaker interest subordinate to the 
stronger. 

This is the cause, and these the fruits, which have converted the government 
into a mere instrument of taking money from one portion of the community to 
be given to another, and which has rallied around it a great, a powerful, and 
mercenary corps of office-holders, office-seekers, and expectants, destitute of 
principle and patriotism, and who have no standard of morals or politics but the 
will of the executive — the will of him who has the distribution of the loaves 






and the fishes. I hold it impossible lor any one to look at the theoretical illus- 
tration of the principle of the absolute majority in the cases which I have sup- 
posed, and not be struck with the practical illustration in the actual operation 
of our o-overnment. Under every circumstance, the absolute majority will ever 
have its American system (I mean nothing offensive to any senator) ; but the 
real meaning of the American system is, that system of plunder which the 
strongest interest has ever waged, and will ever wage, against the weaker, 
where the latter is not armed with some efficient and constitutional check to 
arrest its action. Nothing but such check on the part of the weaker interest 
can arrest it : mere constitutional limitations are wholly insufficient. Whatever 
interest obtains possession of the government will, from the nature of things, be 
in favour of the powers, and against the limitations imposed by the Constitution, 
and will resort to every device that can be imagined to remove those restraints. 
On the contrary, the opposite interest, that which I have designated as the 
stockholding interest, the tax-payers, those on whom the system operates, will 
resist the abuse of powers, and contend for the limitations. And it is on this 
point, then, that the contest between the delegated and the reserved powers will 
be waged ; but in this contest,, as the interests in possession of the govern- 
ment are organized and armed by all its powers and patronage, the opposite in- 
terest, if not in like manner organized and possessed of a power to protect them- 
selves under the provisions of the Constitution, will be as inevitably crushed as 
would be a band of unorganized militia when opposed by a veteran and train- 
ed corps of regulars. Let it never be forgotten that power can only be oppo- 
sed by power, organization by organization ; and on this theory stands our beau- 
tiful federal system of government. No free system was ever farther removed 
from the principle that the absolute majority, without check or limitation, ought 
to govern. To understand what our government is, we must look to the Con- 
stitution, which is the basis of the system. I do not intend to enter into any 
minute examination of the origin and the source of its powers : it is sufficient 
for my purpose to state, what I do fearlessly, that it derived its power from the 
people of the separate states, each ratifying by itself, each binding itself by its 
own separate majority, through its separate convention, the concurrence of the 
majorities of the several states forming the Constitution, thus taking the sense 
of the whole by that of the several parts, representing the various interests of 
the entire community. It was this concurring and perfect majority which form- 
ed the Constitution, and not that majority which would consider the American 
people as a single community, and which, instead of representing fairly and 
fully the interests of the whole, w^ould but represent, as has been stated, the in- 
terest of the stronger section. No candid man can dispute that I have given a 
correct description of the constitution-making power : that power which created 
and organized the government, which delegated to it, as a common agent, cer- 
tain powers, in trust for the common good of all the states, and which imposed 
strict limitation and checks against abuses and usurpations. In administer- 
ing the delegated powers, the Constitution provides, very properly, in order to 
give promptitude and efficiency, that the government shall be organized upon 
the principle of the absolute majority, or, rather, of two absolute majorities com- 
bined : a majority of the states considered as bodies politic, which prevails in 
this body ; and a majority of the people of the states, estimated in federal num- 
bers, in the other house of Congress. A combination of the two prevails in 
the choice of the President, and, of course, in the appointment of judges, they be- 
ing nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. It is thus that the 
concurring and the absolute majorities are combined in one complex system : 
the one in forming the Constitution, and the other in making and executing the 
laws ; thus beautifully blending the moderation, justice, and equity of the former, 
and more perfect majority, with the promptness and energy of the latter, but 
less perfect. 



ty is the great and essential point, on which the success of the system must 
depend : unless that ascendency can be preserved, the necessary consequence 
must be, that the laws will supersede the Constitution, and, finally, the will of 
the executive, by the influence of his patronage, will supersede the laws, indi- 
cations of which are already perceptible. This ascendency can only be pre- 
served through the action of the states as organized bodies, having their own 
separate governments, and possessed of the right, under the structure of our 
system, of judging of the extent of their separate powers, and of interposing 
their authority to arrest the enactments of the General Government within their 
respective limits. I will not enter at this time into the discussion of this im- 
portant point, as it has been ably and fully presented by the senator from Ken- 
tucky (Mr. Bibb), and others who preceded him in this debate on the same 
side, whose arguments not only remain unanswered, but are unanswerable. It 
is only by this power of interposition that the reserved rights of the states can 
be peacefully and efficiently protected against the encroachments of the Gener- 
al Government, that the limitations imposed upon its authority will be enforced, 
and its movements confined to the orbit allotted to it by the Constitution. 

It has, indeed, been said in debate, that this can be efiected by the or- 
ganization of the General Government itself, particularly by the action of this 
body, which represents the states, and that the states themselves must look to 
the General Government for the preservation of many of the most important of 
their reserved rights. I do not underrate the value to be attached to the organ- 
ic arrangement of the General Government, and the wise distribution of its pow- 
ers between the several departments, and, in particular, the structure and the 
important functions of this body ; but to suppose that the Senate, or any depart- 
ment of this government, was intended to be the only guardian of the reserved 
rights, is a great and fundamental mistake. The government, through all its 
departments, represents the delegated, and not the reserved powers ; and it is a 
violation of the fundamental principle of free institutions to suppose that any 
but the responsible representative of any interest can be its guardian. The 
distribution of the powers of the General Government, and its organization, 
were arranged to prevent the abuse of power in fulfilling the important trusts 
confided to it, and not, as preposterously supposed, to protect the reserved pow- 
ers, which are confided wholly to the guardianship of the several states. 

Against the view of our system which I have presented, and the right of the 
state to interpose, it is objected that it would lead to anarchy and dissolution. 
I consider the objection as without the slightest foundation, and that, so far from 
tending to weakness or disunion, it is the source of the highest power and of 
the strongest cement. Nor is its tendency in this respect difficult of explana- 
tion. The government of an absolute majority, unchecked by efficient consti- 
tutional restraint, though apparently strong, is, in reality, an exceedingly feeble 
government. That tendency to conflict between the parts, which I have shown 
to be inevitable in such governments, wastes the powers of the state in the 
hostile action of contending factions, which leaves very little more power than 
the excess of the strength of the majority over the minority. But a government 
based upon the principle of the concurring majority, where each great interest 
possesses within itself the means of self-protection, which ultimately requires 
the mutual consent of all the parts, necessarily causes that unanimity in coun- 
cil, and ardent attachment of all the parts to the whole, which give an irresist- 
ible energy to a government so constituted. I might appeal to history for the 
truth of these remarks, of which the Roman furnishes the most familiar and 
striking. It is a well-known fact, that, from the expulsion of the Tarquins to 
the time of the establishment of the tribunitian power, the government fell into 
a state of the greatest disorder and distraction, and, I may add, corruption. 
How did this happen ? The explanation will throw important light on the sub- 



iect under consideration, ine comiiiuniLy vvas uiviueu iiiiu iwu paus — lue 
Patricians and the Plebeians : «ith the power of the state principally in the 
hands of the former without adequate check to protect the rights of the latter. 
The result was as ini""ht be expected. The patricians converted the powers of 
the government into the means of making money, to enrich themselves and their 
dependants. They, in a word, had their American system, growing out of the 
peculiar character of the government and condition of the country. This re- 
quires explanation. At that period, according to the laws of nations, when one 
nation conquered another, the lands of the vanquished belonged to the victors ; 
and. according to the Roman law, the lands thus acquired were divided into two 
parts, one allotted to the poorer class of the people, and the other assigned to 
the use of the treasury, of which the patricians had the distribution and admin- 
istration. The patricians abused their power by withholding from the plebeians 
that which ought to have been allotted to them, and by converting to their own 
use that which ought to have gone to the treasury. In a word, they took to 
themselves the entire spoils of victory, and they had thus the most powerful 
motive to keep the state perpetually involved in war, to the utter impoverish- 
ment and oppression of the plebeians. After resisting the abuse of power by 
all peaceable means, and the oppression becoming intolerable, the plebeians, at 
last, withdrew from the city — they, in a word, seceded ; and, to induce them to 
reunite, the patricians conceded to the plebeians, as the means of protecting 
their separate interests, the very power which I contend is necessary to protect 
the rights of the states, but which is now represented as necessarily leading to 
disunion. They granted to them the right of choosing three tribunes from 
among themselves, whose persons should be sacred, and who should have the 
right of interposing their veto, not only against the passage of laws, but even 
against their execution : a power which those who take a shallow insight into 
human nature would pronounce inconsistent with the strength and unity of the 
state, if not utterly impracticable ; yet, so far from that being the effect, from 
that day the genius of Rome became ascendant, and victory followed her steps 
till she had established an almost universal dominion. How can a result so 
contrary to all anticipation be explained ? The explanation appears to me to 
be simple. No measure or movement could be adopted without the concurring 
assent of both the patricians and plebeians, and each thus became dependant 
on the other ; and, of consequence, the desire and objects of neither could be 
effected without the concurrence of the other. To obtain this concurrence, 
each Avas compelled to consult the good-will of the other, and to elevate to 
office, not simply those who might have the confidence of the order to which 
he belonged, but also that of the other. The result was, that men possessing 
those qualities which would naturally command confidence — moderation, wis- 
dom, justice, and patriotism — were elevated to office ; and these, by the weight 
of their authority and the prudence of their counsel, together with that spirit of 
unanimity necessarily resulting from the concurring assent of the two orders, 
furnishes the real explanation of the power of the Roman State, and of that ex- 
traordinary wisdom, moderation, and firmness which in so remarkable a degree 
characterized her public men. I might illustrate the truth of the position which 
I have laid down by a reference to the history of all free states, ancient and 
modern, distinguished for their power and patriotism, and conclusively show, 
not only that there was not one which had not some contrivance, under so.me 
form, by Avhich the concurring assent of the different portions of the community 
■was made necessary in the action of government, but also that the virtue, 
patriotism, and strength of the state were in direct proportion to the perfection 
of the means of securing such assent. In estimating the operation of this prin- 
ciple in our system, which depends, as I have stated, on the right of interposi- 
tion on the part of the state, we must not omit to take into consideration the 
amending power, by which new powers may be granted, or any derangement 



states, and thus, m the same degree, strengthening the power of repairing any 
derangement occasioned by the eccentric action of a state. In fact, the power 
of interposition, fairly understood, may be considered in the light of an appeal 
against the usurpations of the General Government, the joint agent of all the 
states, to the states themselves, to be decided under the amending power, 
affirmatively in favour of the government, by the voice of three fourths of the 
states, as the highest power known under the system. I know the difficulty, 
in our country, of establishing the truth of the principle for which I contend, 
though resting upon the clearest reason, and tested by the universal experience 
of free nations. I know that the governments of the several states will be cited 
as an argument against the conclusion to which I have arrived, and which, for 
the most part, are constructed on the principle of the absolute majority ; but, in 
my opinion, a satisfactory answer can be given : that the objects of expenditure 
•which fall within the sphere of a state government are few and inconsiderable, 
so that, be their action ever so irregular, it can occasion but little derangement. 
If, instead of being members of this great confederacy, they formed distinct 
communities, and were compelled to raise armies, and incur other expenses 
necessary to their defence, the laws which I have laid down as necessarily 
controlling the action of a state where the will of an absolute and unchecked 
majority prevailed, would speedily disclose themselves in faction, anarchy, and 
corruption. Even as the case is, the operation of the causes to which I have 
referred are perceptible in some of the larger and more populous members of 
the Union, whose governments have a powerful central action, and which al- 
ready show a strong tendency to that moneyed action which is the invariable 
forerunner of corruption and convulsions. 

But, to return to the General Government, we have now sufficient experi- 
ence to ascertain that the tendency to conflict in its action is between southern 
and other sections. The latter having a decided majority, must habitually be 
possessed of the powers of the government, both in this and in the other house ; 
and, being governed by that instinctive love of power so natural to the human 
breast, they must become the advocates of the power of government, and in the 
same degree opposed tc^fhe limitations ; while the other and weaker section is 
as necessarily throwTi on the side of the limitations. One section is the natural 
guardian of the delegated powers, and the other of the reserved ; and the strug- 
gle on the side of the former will be to enlarge the powers, while that on the 
opposite side ,>vill be to restrain them within their constitutional limits. The 
contest will, in fact, be a contest between power and liberty, and such I con- 
sider the present — ^a contest in which the weaker section, with its peculiar 
labour, productions, and institutions, has at stake all that can be dear to free- 
men. Should we be able to maintain in their full vigour our reserved rights, 
liberty and prosperity will be our portion ; but if we yield, and permit the 
stronger interest to concentrate within itself all the powers of the government, 
then will our fate be more wretched than that of the aborigines whom we have 
expelled. In this great struggle between the delegated and reserved powers, 
so far from repining that my lot, and that of those whom I represent, is cast on 
the side of the latter, I rejoice that such is the fact; for, though we participate 
in but few of the advantages of the government, we are compensated, and more 
than compensated, in not being so much exposed to its corruption. Nor do I 
repine that the diity, so difficult to be discharged, as the defence of the reserved 
powers, against apparently such fearful odds, has been assigned to us. To dis- 
charge successfully this high duty requires the highest qualities, moral and in- 
tellectual ; and should we perform it with a zeal and ability in proportion to 
its magnitude, instead of being mere planters, our section will become dis- 
tinguished for its patriots and statesmen. But, on the other hand, if we prove 
unworthy of this high destiny — if we yield to the steady encroachment of 

N 



f al.mitv ind most debasing corruption wiu uvcrbpit-^^a .x.c 
power, the severest calannt> and mo ^ . ^. ^^ ^^^ faithful to 

Ld. Every Somheru man, true^ h ^n -s^^ ^^;^^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^ 

the duties -»-^P-:;t"of thfs g v^^«^ -^^ ^^ ^'^^^^^^'^ '^^ ^'"'^ 

X°"r tvT^SthemSv'es, by political prostitution, for admission into 

the Magdalen Asylum. 



VI. 



... CALHOUN'S SPEECH ON HIS -SOLUTIONS AND KEPLY TO MK. WEB- 
''*' STER, FEBRUARY 26, lUSd. 

The following resolutions, submitted by Mr. Calho.n, came up for consider- 

^"-'Th"'^! \rl That the people of the several states composing these United 
''Resolved, inai tiie peupic i^ ,-, .• „^i „nmnart to which the people ot 

''Resolved, 1 hat tne peopie ui creatine a General Govern- 

.ional compact, in !-i;-^i^^ll;:::Z:ti^i^Zt^^i. delegated to that 

ment to carry into efiect the objects loijn ^^^ers to be exercised jointly, 
government, for that purpose, ^f^^^^^f"^^^P,"jSiduary mass of powers, lo 
reserving, at the same time, each sja^ ^^^^f ' td hat" ^^enever the General 
be exercised by its own ^^P^^^^.^g^J™" , 'i^oTdele^a^ by the compact, its 
Government assumes the exercise «f P« ^^^^;*^^/^ the said government is 
acts are unauthorized, void and of ^^ ei^eci jndihn^ tti^e ^^^^^^^ ^^^^ 

the mode aad measure of redress. ^-^.^^^ States, taken 

« Resolved, That the assertions that the peop e oi principle 

collectively as mdividuals are now, --e^hav^ - - ^^^^^^^^ V ^^^ P^^ 

of the social compact, and, as such, are "O"^^"^ ^ ^ j political exist- 

or that they have ever been so united, ^/^ ^ny one s age o t p ^^ 

ence; that the people of the several ^f^^f^^^.^JP^'^^ egiance of their citi- 
niembers thereof, retained their ^^'^'^'^fl^JZrml^^^^^^ they have parted 
zens has been transferred to the ^^^neral Govern^^^^^^^^^^^^ 

with the right of punishing treason through ^^ ^^^P^^^^^^^^^^ ,U, extent of 
and that they have not the "§1^* of judging m the ast resort ^^^ ^,^^^^^ 

powers reserA^ed, and, of consequence « ^^^ ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ,,,d plain historical 
foundation in truth, but are contrary to the ^«f ^^^'^^^^.^cise of power on 
facts, and the clearest deductions ot ^^'^^^^ ^ J^f Jl^' " ^en^^^^ deriving author^ 
the liart of the General ^^vernment, or any of its dep^^^ 
ity from such erroneous assumptions, "^^^^^ f^^^'^;^^^^ of the states-to 
Just tend directly and inevitably '^^^^fjll^^^ro^Aihrnns a consolida- 
destroy the federal character of the U^^o"' an^H^o ^^^^ ^^_ 

ted aovernment, without constitutional check or Umimion, 
cessarily terminate in the loss of liberty itself. 

S'clut^rstti.. When the Wnwith^h^^^^^^^^^ 



iciiuum^cu. 



the bill in strong language, but not stronger than the rules .which govern parlia- 
mentary proceedings permit ; nor stronger than the dfcafacter of the bill, and its 
bearing on the state which it is my honour to represent, justified. I am at a 
loss to understand what motive governed the senator in giving a personal char- 
acter to his remarks. IF he intended anything unkind — (here Mr. Webster. 
said, audibly, Certainly not ; and Mr. C. replied, I will not, then, say what I in- 
I tended, if such had been his motives) — but still I must be permitted to ask. If he 
I intended nothing unkind, what was the object of the senator ? Was his motive 
to strengthen a cause which he feels to be weak, by giving the discussion a per- 
sonal direction ? If such was his motive, his experience as a debater ought to 
have taught him that it was one of those weak devices which seldom fail to 
react on those who resort to them. If his motive was to acquire popularity 
by attacking one who had A'oluntarily, and from a sense of duty — from a deep 
conviction that liberty and the Constitution were at stake-T-7liaji4^gQ,tihed him- 
self with an unpopular question, I would say to him that a true sense of dignity 
would have impelled him in an opposite direction. Among the possible motives 
which might have influenced him, there is another to the imputation of which 
he is exposed, but which, certainly, I will not attribute to him — that his motive 
was to propitiate in a certain high quarter — a quarter in which he must know 
that no oflering could be more acceptable than the immolation of the character 
of him who now addresses you. But whatever may have been the motive of 
the senator, I can assure him that I will not follow his example. I never had 
any inclination to gladiatorial exhibitions in the halls of legislation, and if I now 
had, T certainly would not indulge them on so solemn a question :. a question 
which, in the opinion of the senator from MassachHsett&>. 9|^x pressed in debate, 
involves the union'of, these states, and in mine, the liberty and the CTonstTtiifion 
of the country. Before, however, I conclude the prefatory observations, I must 
allude to the remark which the senator made at the termination of the argmnent 
of my friend from Mississippi (Mr. P^indexter). I understood the senator 
to say that, if I chose to put at issue his character for consistency, he stood pre- 
pared to vindicate his course. I assure the senator that I have no idea of call- 
ing in question his consistency, or that of any other member of this body. It 
is a subject in which I feel no concern ; but if I am to understand the remark 
of the senator as intended indirectly as a challenge to put in issue the consist- 
ency of my course as compared to his own, I have to say that, though I do not 
accept of his challenge, yet, if he should think proper to make a trial of charac- 
ter on that or any other point connected with our public conduct, and will select 
a suitable occasion, I stand prepared to vindicate my course, as compared with 
his, or that of any other member of this body, for consistency of conduct, purity 
of motive, and devoted attachment to the country and its institutions. 

Having made these remarks, which have been forced -upon me, I shall now 
proceed directly to the subject before the Senate ; and in order that it may, with 
all its bearings, be fully understood, I must go back to the period at which I in- 
troduced the resolutions. They were introduced in connexion with the bill 
which has passed this house, and is now pending before the other. That bill 
was couched in general terras, without naming South Carolina or any other 
state, though it was understood, and avowed by the committee, as intended to 
act directly on her. 

Believing that the government had no right to use force in the controversy, 
and that the attempt to introduce it rested upon principles utterly subversive of the 
Constitution and the sovereignty of the states, I drew up the resolutions, and intro- 
duced theni expressly with the view to test those principles, with a desire that 
they should be discussed and voted on before the bill came up for consideration. 
The majority ordered otherwise. The resolutions were laid on the table, and 
the bill taken up for discussion. Under this arrangement, which it was under- 



stood orio-inated with the committee that reported the bill, I, of course, ccmcln- 
ded that Its members would proceed in the discussion, and explain the princi- 
ples and the necessity for the bill, before the other senators would enter into 
the discussion, and particularly those from South Carolina ; understanding, how- 
erer that by the arrangement of the committee, it was allotted to the senator 
from Tennessee to close the discussion on the bill, I waited to the last moment^ 
in expectation of hearing from the senator from Massachusetts. He is a mem- 
ber of the committee. But not hearing from him, I rose to speak to the bill, and 
as soon as I had concluded, the senator from Massachusetts arose — I will nol 
say to reply to me, and certainly not to discuss the bill, but the resolutions 
■which had been laid on the table, as I have stated. I do not state these facts 
in the way of complaint, but in order to explain my own course. The senator 
having directed his argument against my resolutions, I felt myself compelled to 
seize the first opportunity to call them up from the table, and to assign a day for 
their discussion, in the hope not only that the Senate would hear me in their 
vindication, but would also afford me an opportunity of taking the sense of this 
body on the great principles on which they are based. 

The senator from Massachusetts, in his argument against the resolutions, 
directed his attack almost exclusively against the first, on the ground, I suppose, 
that it was the basis of the other two, and that, unless the first could be demol- 
ished, the others would follow of course. In this he was right. As plain and 
as simple as the facts contained in the first are, they cannot be admitted to be 
true without admitting the doctrines for which I, and the state I represent, con- 
tend. He (Mr. W.) commenced his attack with a verbal criticism on the res- 
olution, in the course of which he objected strongly to two words, " constitu- 
tional," and " accede." To the former on the ground that the word^ as used 
(constitutional compact), was obscure — that it conveyed no definite meaning — 
and that the Constitution was a noun-substantive, and not an adjective. I re- 
gret that I have exposed myself to the criticism of the senator. I certainly 
did not intend to use any expression of a doubtful sense, and if I have done so, 
the senator must attribute it to the poverty of my language, and not to design. 
I trust, however, that the senator will excuse me, when he comes to hear my 
apology. In matters of criticism, authority is of the highest importance, and I 
have an authority of so high a character, in this case, for using the expression 
which he considers so obscure and so unconstitutional, as will justify me even 
in his eyes. • It is no less than the authority of the senator himself— given on 
a solemn occasion (the discussion on Mr. Foote's resolution), and doubtless 
with great deliberation, after having duly weighed the force of the expression. 
(Here Mr. C. read from Mr. Webster's speech in reply to Mr. Hayne, in the 
Senate of the United States, delivered January 26, 1830, as follows :) 

" The domestic slavery of the South I leave where I find it — in the hands of 
their own governments. It is their affair, not mine. Nor do I complain of 
the peculiar eflfect which the magnitude of that population has had in the dis- 
tribution of power imder the Federal Government. We know, sir, that the 
xeprcsentation of the states in the other house is not equal. We know that 
great advantage, in that respect, is enjoyed by the slaveholding states ; and we 
know, too, that the intended equivalent for that advantage, that is to_ say^ the 
imposition of direct taxes in the same ratio, has become merely nominal : the 
habit of the government being almost invariably to collect its revenues from 
other sources, and in other modes. Nevertheless, I do not complain^ nor 
would I countenance any movement to alter this arrangement of representation. 
It is the original bargain — the compact— let it stand ; let the advantage of it be 
fully enjoyed. The Union itself is too full of benefits to be hazarded in propo- 
sitions for changing its original basis. I go for the Constitution as it is, and 
for the Union as it is. But I am resolved not to submit in silence to accusa- 
tions, either against myself individually, or against the North, wholly unfound- 



STiTUTioNAL COMPACT, and to extend the power of the government over the 
internal laws and domestic condition of the states." 

It will be seen, by this extract, that the senator not only uses the phrase 
*' constitutional compact," v/hich he now so much condemns, but, what is still 
more important, he calls the Constitution itself a compact — a bargain ; which 
contains important admissions, having a direct and powerful bearing on the 
main issue involved in the discussion, as will appear in the course of his re- 
marks. But, as strong as his objection is to the word " constitutional," it is 
still stronger to the word " accede," which, he thinks, has been introduced into 
the resolution with some deep design, as I suppose, to entrap the Senate into 
an admission of the doctrine of state rights. Here, again, I must shelter 
myself under authority. But I suspect that the senator, by a sort of instinct 
(for our instincts often strangely run before our knowledge), had a prescience, 
which would account for his aversion for the word, that this authority was no less 
fhan Thomas Jefferson himself, the great apostle of the doctrines of state rights. 
The word was borrowed from him. It was taken from the Kentucky Resolu- 
tion, as well as the substance of the resolution itself. But I trust that I may 
neutralize whatever aversion the authorship of this word may have excited ia 
the mind of the senator, by the introduction of another authority — that of Wash- 
ington himself, who, in his speech, to Congress, speaking of the admission of 
North Carolina into the Union, uses this very term, which was repeated by the 
Senate in their reply. Yet, in order to narrow the ground between the sena- 
tor and myself as much as possible, I will accommodate myself to his strange 
antipathy against the two unfortunate words, by striking them out of the reso- 
lution, and substituting in their place those very words which the senator him- 
self has designated as constitutional phrases. In the place of that abhorred ad- 
jective " constitutional," I will insert the very noun-substantive " constitution ;" 
and in the place of the word *' accede," I will insert the word " ratify," which 
lie designates as the proper term to be used. 

Let us now see how the resolution stands, and how it will read after these 
amendments. Here Mr. C. said the resolution, as introduced, reads : 

Resolved, That the people of the several states composing these United States 
are united as parties to a constitutional compact, to which the people of each 
state acceded as a separate and sovereign community, each binding itself by its 
own particular ratification ; and that the Union, of which the said compact is 
a bond, is a union heluoeen the stales ratifying the same. 
As proposed to be amended : 

Resolved, That the people of the several states composing these United States 
are united as parties to a compact, under the title of the Constitution of the Uni- 
ted States, which the people of each state ratified as a separate and sovereign 
community, each binding itself by its own particular ratification ; and that the 
Union, of which the said compact is the bond, is a Union hetween the states 
ratifying the same. 

Where, sir, I ask, is that plain case of revolution ? Where that hiatus, as 
wide as the globe, between the premises and conclusion, which the senator pro- 
claimed would be apparent if the resolution was reduced into constitutional lan- 
guage ? For my part, with my poor powers of conception, I cannot perceive 
the slightest difference between the resolution as first introduced, and as it is 
proposed to be amended in conformity to the views of the senator. And, in- 
stead of that hiatus between premises and conclusion, which seems to startle 
the imagination of the senator, I can perceive nothing but a continuous and sol- 
id surface, sufficient to sustain the magnificent superstructure of state rights. 
Indeed, it seems to rae that the senator's vision is distorted by the medium 
through which he views everything connected with the subject ; and that the 
same distortion wliich has presented to his imagination this hiatus, as wide as 



the globe, where not even a hssiire exists, also presented that beaiitnul and clas- 
sical image of a strong man struggling in a bog without the power of extricating 
himself, and incapable of being aided by any friendly hand, Avhile, instead of 
struggling in a bog, he stands on the everlasting rock of truth. 

Having now noticed the criticism of the senator, I shall proceed to meet and 
repel the main assault on the resolution. He directed his attack against the 
strong point, the very horn of the citadel of state rights. The senator clearly [ 
perceived that, if the Constitution be a compact, it was impossible to deny the 
assertions contained in the resolutions, or to resist the consequences which I ! 
had drawn from them, and, accordingly, directed his whole fire against that point ; 
but, after so vast an expenditme of ammunition, not the slightest impression, so 
far as I can perceive, has been made. But, to drop the simile, after a careful i 
examination of the notes which I took of what the senator said, I am now at a ' 
loss to know whether, in the opinion of the senator, our Constitution is a com- 
pact or not, though the almost entire argument of the senator was directed to 
that point. At one time he would seem to deny directly and positively that it 
was a compact, while at another he would appear, in language not less strong, 
to admit that it was. 

1 have collated all that the senator has said upon this point ; and, that what 
I have stated may not appear exaggerated, I will read his remarks in juxtapo- 
sition. He said that 

" The Constitution means a government, not a compact. Not a constitution- 
al compact, but a government. If compact, it rests on plighted faith, and the 
mode of redress would be to declare the whole void. States may secede if a 
league or compact." 

1 thank the senator for these admissions, which I intend to use hereafter. 
(Here Mr. C. proceeded to read from his notes.) 

" The states agreed that each should participate in the sovereignty of the 
other." 

Certainly, a very correct conception of the Constitution ; but when did they 
make that agreement but by the Constitution, and how could they agree but by 
compact ? 

" The system, not a compact between states in their sovereig-n capacity, but 
a government proper, founded on the adoption of the people, and creating indi- 
Tidual relations between itself and the citizens." 

This the senator lays down as a leading fundamental principle to sustain his 
doctrine, and, I must say, by a strange confusion and uncertainty of language ; 
not, certainly, to be explained by any want of command of the most appropriate 
words on his part. 

" It does not call itself a compact, but a constitution. The Constitution rests 
on compact, but it is no longer a compact." 

I would ask, To what compact does the senator refer, as that on which the 
Constitution rests ? Before the adoption of the present Constitution, the states 
had formed but one compact, and that was the old confederation ; and, certain- 
ly, the gentleman does not intend to assert that the present Constitution rests 
upon that. What, then, is his mc-ining ? What can it be, but that the Con- ] 
stitution itself is a compact ? and how will his language read, when fairly in- 
terpreted, but that the Constitution was a compact, but is no longer a compact ? 
It had, by some means or another, changed its nature, or become defunct. 

He next states that 

" A man is almost untrue to his country who calls the Constitution a com- 
pact." 

I fear the senator, in calling it a compact, a bargain, has called down this 
heavy denunciation on his own head. He finally states that 

" It is founded on compact, but not a compact results from it." 

To what are we to attribute the strange confusion of words 1 The senator 



guage. No man knows better the precise import of the words he uses. The 
difficulty is not in him, but in his subject. He who undertakes to prove that this 
Constitution is not a compact, undertakes a task which, be his strength ever 
so oreat, must oppress him by its weight. Taking the whole of the argument 
of the senator together, I would say that it is his impression that the Constitu- 
tion is not a compact, and will now proceed to consider the reason which he 
has assigned for this opinion. 

He thinks there is an incompatibility between constitution and compact. To 
prove this, he adduces the words " ordain and establish," contained in the pre- 
amble of the Constitution. I confess I am not capable of perceiving in what 
manner these words are incompatible with the idea that the Constitution is a 
compact. The senator will admit that a single state may ordain a constitution ; 
and where is the difficulty, where the incompatibility of two states concurring 
in ordaining and establishing a constitution 1 As between the states themselves, 
the instrument would be a compact ; but in reference to the government, and 
those on whom it operates, it would be ordained and established — ordained and 
established by the joint authority of two, instead of the single authority of one. 
The next argument which the senator advances to show that the language 
of the Constitution is irreconcilable with the idea of its being a compact, is ta- 
ken from that portion of the instrument which imposes prohibitions on the au- 
thority of the states. He said that the language used in imposing the prohibi- 
tions is the language of a superior to an inferior ; and that, therefore, it was not 
the language of a compact, which implies the equality of the parties. As a 
proof, the senator cited the several provisions of the Constitution which provide 
that no state shall enter into treaties of alliance and confederation, lay imposts, 
&c., without the assent of Congress. If he had turned to the articles of the 
old confederation, which he acknowledges to have been a compact, he would 
have found that those very prohibitory articles of the Constitution were borrow- 
ed from that instrument ; that the language which he now considers as imply- 
ing superiority was taken verbatim from it. If he had extended his researches 
still farther, he would have found that itas the habitual language used in treat- 
ies, whenever a stipulation is made against the performance of any act. Among 
many instances which I could cite if it were necessary, I refer the senator to 
the celebrated treaty negotiated by Mr. Jay with Great Britain in 1793, and in 
which the very language used in the Constitution is employed. 

To prove that the Constitution is not a compact, the senator next observes 
that it stipulates nothing, and asks, with an air of triumph, Where are the evi- 
dences of the stipulations between the states ? I must express my surprise at 
this interrogatory, coming from so intelligent a source. Has the senator never 
seen the ratification of the Constitution by the several states ? Did he not cite 
them on this very occasion ? Do they contain no evidence of this stipulation 
on the part of the states ? Nor is the assertion less strange that the Constitu- 
tion contains no stipulation. So far from regarding it in the light in which the 
senator regards it, I consider the whole instrument but a mass of stipulation : 
what is that but a stipulation to which the senator refers when he states, in the 
course of his argument, that each state had agreed to participate in the sover- 
eignty of the others 1 

But the principal argument on which the senator relied to show that the 
Constitution is not a compact, rests on the provision in that instrument which 
declares that " this Constitution, and the laws made in pursuance thereof, and 
treaties made under their authority, are the supreme laws of the land." He 
asked, with marked emphasis. Can a compact be the supreme law of the land ? 
I ask, in return, whether treaties are not compacts, and Avhether treaties, as well 
as the Constitution, are not declared to be the supreme law of the land ? His 
argument, in fact, as conclusively proves that treaties are not compacts as it 



does that this Constitution is not a compact. 1 might rest this point on this 
decisive answer ; but, as I desire to leave not a shadow of doubt on this impor- 
tant point, I shall folloW the gentleman in the course of his reasoning. 

He defines a constitution to be a fundamental law, which organizes the gov- 
ernment, and points out the mode of its action. I will not object to the defini- 
tion, though, in my opinion, a more appropriate one, or, at least, one better 
adapted to American ideas, could be given. My objection is not to the defini- 
tion, but to the attempt to prove that the fundamental laws of a state cannot be 
a compact, as the senator seems to suppose. I hold the very reveyse to be the 
case ; and that, according to the most approved writers on the subject of gov- 
ernment, these very fundamental laws which are now stated not only not to be 
compacts, but inconsistent with the very idea of compacts, are held invariably 
to be compacts ; and, in that character, as distinguished from the ordinary laws 
of the country. I will cite a single authority, which is full and explicit on this 
point, from a writer of the highest repute. 

Burlamaqui says, vol. ii., part 1, chap, i., sec. 35, 36, 37, 38 : " It entirely de- 
pends upon a free people to invest the sovereigns whom they place over their 
heads with an authority either absolute, or limited by certain laws. These 
regulations, by which the supreme authority is kept within bounds, are called the 
fundamental laws of the state." 

" The fundamental laws of a state, taken in their full extent, are not only the 
decrees by which the entire body of the nation detemiine the form of govern- 
ment, and the manner of succeeding to the crown, but are likewise covenants 
between the people and the person on whom they confer the sovereignty, which 
regulate the manner of governing, and by which the supreme authority is lim- 
ited." 

" These regulations are called fundamental laws, because they are the basis, 
as it were, and foundation of the state on which the structure of the government 
is raised, and because the people look upon these regulations as their principal 
strength and support." 

" The name of laws, however, has been given to these regalatioms in an im- 
proper and figurative sense, for, properly speaking, they are real covenants. 
But as those covenants are obligatory between the contracting parties, they have 
the force of laws themselves." 

The same, vol. ii., part 2, ch. i., sec. 19 and 23, in part. " The whole body 
of the nation, in whom the supreme power originally resides, may regulate the 
government by a fundamental law in such manner as to commit the exercise 
of the difl'erent parts of the supreme power to different persons or bodies, who 
may act independently of each other in regard to the rights committed to them, 
but still subordinate to the laws from which those rights are derived." 

" And these fundamental laws are real covenants, or what the civilians call 
pacta conventa, between the diflferent orders of the Republic, by which they 
stipulate that each shall have a particular part of the sovereignty, and that this 
shall establish the form of government. It is evident that, by these means, each 
of the contracting parties acquires a right not only of exercising the power 
granted to it, but also of jyeserving that original right." 

A reference to the Constitution of Great Britain, with which wc are- better 
acquainted than with that of any other European government, will show that 
it is a compact. Magna Cliarta may certainly be reckoned among the funda- 
mental laws of that kingdom. Now, although it did not assume, originally, the 
form of a compact, yet, before the breaking up of the meeting of the barons 
which imposed it on King John, it was reduced into the form of a covenant, 
and duly signed by Robert Fitzwalter and others, on the one part, and the king 
on the other. 

But we have a more decisive proof that the Constitution of England is a com- 
pact in the resolution of the Lords and Commons in 1688, which declared that 



kingdom, by breaking the original contract between the king and people, and 
having, by the advice of Jesuits and other wicked persons, violated the fun- 
damental law, and withdrawn himself out of the kingdom, hath abdicated the 
government, and that the throne is thereby become vacant." 

But why should I refer to writers upon the subject of government, or inquire 
into the constitution of foreign states, when there are such decisive proofs that 
our Constitution is a compact ? On this point the senator is estopped. I bor- 
row from the gentleman, and thank him for the word. His adopted state, 
which he so ably represents on this floor, and his native state, the states of 
Massachusetts and New-Hampshire, both declared, in their ratification of the 
Constitution, that it was a compact. The ratification of Massachusetts is in the 
following words (here Mr. C. read) : 

" In Convention of the Delegates of the People of the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts, Feb. 6, 1788. 

" The Convention having impartially discussed and fully considered the Con- 
stitution of the United States of America, reported to Congress by the Conven- 
tion of Delegates from the United States of America, and submitted to us by 
a resolution of the General Court of said Commonwealth, passed the 25th day 
of October last past, and acknowledgnig, with grateful hearts, the goodness of 
the Supreme Ruler of the universe, in affording the people of the United States, 
in the course of his providence, an opportunity deliberately and peaceably, 
without fraud or surprise, of entering into an explicit and solemn compact with 
each other, by assenting to and ratifying a new Constitution, in order to form a 
more perfect union, establish justice, ensure domestic tranquillity, provide for the 
common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of lib- 
erty to themselves and of Massachusetts, assent to and ratify the said Constitu- 
tion for the United States of America." 

The ratification of New-Hampshire is taken from that of Massachusetts, and 
almost in the same words. But proof, if possible, still more decisive, may be 
found in the celebrated resolutions of Virginia on the alien and sedition law, 
in 1798, and the responses of Massachusetts and the other states. Those 
resolutions expressly assert that the Constitution is a compact between the 
states, in the following language (here Mr. C. read from the resolutions of 
Virginia as follows) : 
■ " That this Assembly doth explicitly and peremptorily declare that it views 

THE POWERS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, AS RESULTING FROM THE COMPACT, 
TO WHICH THE STATES ARE PARTIES, AS LIMITED BY THE PLAIN SENSE AND IN- 
TENTION OF THE INSTRUMENT CONSTITUTING THAT COMPACT AS NO FARTHER 
VALID THAN THEY ARE AUTHORIZED BY THE GRANTS ENUMERATED IN THAT COM- 
PACT ; AND THAT, IN CASE OF A DELIBERATE, PALPABLE, AND DANGEROUS EX- 
ERCISE OF OTHER POWERS NOT GRANTED BY THE SAID COMPACT, THE STATES 
WHO ARE PARTIES THERETO HAVE THE RIGHT, AND ARE IN DUTY BOUND, TO 
INTERPOSE FOR ARRESTING THE PROGRESS OF THE EVIL, AND FOR MAINTAINING 
WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE LIMITS THE AUTHORITIES, RIGHTS, AND LIBERTIES 
APPERTAINING TO THEM. 

" That the General Assembly doth also express its deep regret that a spirit 
has, in sundry instances, been manifested by the Federal Government to en- 
large its powers by forced constructions of the constitutional charter, which de- 
fines them ; and that indications have appeared of a design to expound certain 
general phrases (which, having been copied from the very limited grant of powers 
in the former articles of confederation, were the less liable to be misconstrued), 
so as to destroy the meaning and effect of the particular enumeration which 
necessity explains, and limits the general phrases, and so as to consolidate 

THE STATES, BY DEGREES, INTO ONE SOVEREIGNTY, THE OBVIOUS TENDENCY 

o 



AND INEVITABLE RESULT OF WHICH WOULD BE TO TRANSFORM THE PRESENT 
REPUBLICAN SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES INTO AN ABSOLUTE, OR, AT BEST, 
A MIXED MONARCHY." 

They were sent to the several states. We have the reply of Delaware, 
New-York, Connecticut, New-Hampshire, Vermont, and Massachusetts, not 
one of which contradicts this important assertion on the part of Virginia ; and, 
by their silence, they all acquiesce in its truth. The case is still stronger 
against Massachusetts, which expressly recognises the fact that the Constitu- 
tion is a compact. 

In her answer she says (here Mr. C. read from the answer of INIassachusetts 
as follows) : " But they deem it their duty solemnly to declare that, while they 
hold sacred the principle, that consent of the people is the only pure source of 
just and legitimate power, they cannot admit the right of the state Legislatures 
to denounce the administration of that government, to which the people them- 
selves, by a solemn compact, have exclusively committed their national concerns. 
That, although a liberal and enlightened vigilance among the people is always 
to be cherished, yet an unreasonable jealousy of the men of their choice, and a 
recurrence to measures of extremity upon groundless or trivial pretexts, have a 
strong tendency to destroy all rational liberty at home, and to deprive the Uni- 
ted States of the most essential advantages in their relations abroad. That this 
Legislature are persuaded that the decision of all cases in law or equity, arising 
under the Constitution of the United States, and the construction of all laws 
made in pursuance thereof, are exclusively vested by the people in the judicial 
courts of the United States." 

" That the people, in that solemn compact, which is declared to be the supreme 
law of the land, have not constituted the state Legislatures the judges of the acts 
or measures of the Federal Government, but have confided to them the power of 
proposing such amendments of the Constitution as shall appear to them neces- 
sary to the interests, or conformable to the wishes, of the people whom they 
represent." 

Now, I ask the senator himself— I put it to his candour to say, if South Car- 
olina be estopped on the subject of the protective system because Mr. Burke 
and Mr. Smith proposed a moderate duty on hemp, or some other article, I 
know not what, nor do I care, with a view of encouraging its production, of 
which motion, I venture to say, not one individual in a hundred in the state 
ever heard, whether he and Massachusetts, after this clear, full, and solemn 
recognition that the Constitution is a compact, both on his part and that of his 
state, be not forever estopped on this important point ? 

There remains one more of the senator's arguments to prove that the Con- 
stitution is not a compact, to be considered. He says it is not a compact, be- 
cause it is a government ; which he defines to be an organized body, possessed 
of the will and power to execute its purposes by its own proper authority ; and 
which, he says, bears not the slightest resemblance to a compact. But I would 
ask the senator, Who ever considered a government, when spoken of as the 
agent to execute the powers of the Constitution, as distinct from the Constitu- 
tion itself, as a compact ? 

In that light it would be a perfect absurdity. It is true that, in general and 
loose language, it is often said that the government is a compact, meaning the 
Constitution which created it, and vested it with authority to execute the powers 
contained in the instrument ; but when the distinction is drawn between the 
Constitution and the government, as the senator has done, it would be as ridic- 
ulous to call the government a compact as to call an individual, appointed to 
execute provisions of the contract, a contract ; and not less so to suppose that 
there could be the slightest resemblance between them. In connexion with 
this point the senator, to prove that the Constitution is not a compact, asserts 
that it is wholly independent of the state, and pointedly declares that the states 



Constitution that three fourths of the states have a right to alter, change, or 
amend, or even to abolish it, staring him in the face. 

I have examined all of the arguments of the senator intended to prove that 
the Constitution is not a compact ; and I trust I have shown, by the clearest 
demonstration, that his arguments are perfectly inconclusive, and that his as- 
sertion is against the clearest and most solemn evidence — evidence of record, 
and of such a character that it ought to close his lips forever. 

I turn now to consider the other, and, apparently, contradictory aspect in 
which the senator presented this part of the subject : I mean that one in which 
he states that the government is founded in compact, but is no longer a com- 
pact. I have already remarked, that no other interpretation could be given to 
this assertion, except that the Constitution was once a compact, but is no long- 
er so. There is a vagueness and indistinctness in this part of the senator's 
argument, which left me altogether uncertain as to its real meaning. If he 
meant, as I presume he did, that the compact is an executed, and not an execu- 
tory one — that its object was to create a government, and to invest it with 
proper authority — and that, having executed this office, it had performed its 
functions, and, with it, had ceased to exist, then we have the extraordinary 
avowal that the Constitution is a dead letter — that it has ceased to have any 
binding etlect, or any practical influence or operation. 

It had, indeed, often been charged that the Constitution had become a dead 
letter ; that it was continually violated, and had lost all its control over the 
government ; but no one had ever before been bold enough to advance a theory 
on the avowed basis that it was an executed, and, therefore, an extinct instru- 
ment. I will not seriously attempt to refute an argument which to me appears 
so extravagant. I had thought that the Constitution was to endiure forever; 
and that, so far from its being an executed contract, it contained great trust 
powers for the benefit of those who created it, and all future generations, which 
never could be finally executed during the existence of the world, if our gov- 
ernment should so long endure. 

I will now return to the first resolution, to see how the issue stands between 
the senator from Massachusetts and myself. It contains three propositions. 
First, that the Constitution is a compact ; second, that it was formed by the 
states, constituting distinct communities ; and, lastly, that it is a subsisting and 
binding compact between the states. How do these three propositions now 
stand ? The first, I trust, has been satisfactorily established ; the second, the 
senator- has admitted, faintly, indeed, but still he has admitted it to be true. 
This admission is something. It is so much gained by discussion. Three 
years ago even this was a contested point. But I cannot say that I thank hira 
for the admission : we owe it to the force of truth. The fact that these states 
were declared to be free and independent states at the time of their independ- 
ence ; that they were acknowledged to be so by Great Britain in the treaty 
which terminated the war of the Revolution, and secured their independence ; 
that they were recognised in the same character in the old articles of the con- 
federation ; and, finally, that the present Constitution was formed by a conven- [ 
tion of the several states, afterward submitted to them for their ratification, and 
was ratified by them separately, each for itself, and each, by its own act, bind- I 
ing its citizens, formed a body of facts too clear to be denied and too strong to 
be resisted. , 

It now remains to consider the third and last proposition contauied in the 
resolution — that it is a binding and a subsisting compact between the states. 
The senator was not explicit on this point. I understood him, however, as as- 
serting that, though formed by the states, the Constitution was not binding be- 
tween the states as distinct communities, but between the American people in 
the aggregate, who, in consequence of the adoption of the Constitution, accord- 



inw to tlie opinion ot tlie senator, oecaiue one peupiu, at leasi, lu lue baluiii ui 
the delei/ated powers. This would, indeed, be a great change. All ackuowl- 
edo-e that previous to the adoption of the Constitution, the states consthuted 
distinct and independent communities, in full possession of their sovereignty ; 
and surely, if the adoption of the Constitution was intended to effect the great 
and important change in their condition which the theory of the senator sup- 
poses, some evidence of it ought to be found in the instrument itself. It pro- 
fesses to be a careful and full enumeration of all the powers wliich the states 
delegated, and of every modification of their political condition. The senator 
said ttiat he looked to the Constitution in order to ascertain its real character; 
and, surely, he ought to look to the same instrument in order to ascertain what 
chan^^es were, in fact, made in the political condition of the states and the coun- 
try. But with the exception of " we, the people of the United States," in the 
preamble, he has not pointed out a single indication in the Constitution of the 
great change which he conceives has been effected in this respect. 

Now, sir, I intend to prove that the only argument on which the gentleman 
relies on this point must utterly fail him. I do not intend to go into a critical 
examination of the expression of the preamble to which I have referred. I do 
not deem it necessary ; but were it, it might be easily shown that it is at least 
as applicable to my view of the Constitution as to that of the senator ; and that 
the whole of his argument on this point rests on the ambiguity of the terra thir- 
teen United States ; which may mean certain territorial limits, comprehending 
within them the whole of the states and territories of the Union. In this sense 
the people of the United States may mean all the people living within these 
limits, without reference to the states or territories in which they may reside, 
or oi which they may be citizens, and it is in this sense only that the expres- 
sion gives the least countenance to the argument of the senator. 

But it may also mean the states united, which inversion alone, without farther 
explanation, removes the ambiguity to which I have referred. The expression, 
in this sense, obviously means no more than to speak of the people of the sev- 
eral states in their united and confederated capacity ; and, if it were requisite, 
it might be shown that it is only in this sense that the expression is used in the 
Constitution. But it is not necessary. A single argument will forever settle 
this point. Whatever may be the true meaning of this expression, it is not ap- 
plicable to the condition of the states as they exist under the Constitution, but 
as it was under the old confederation, before its adoption. The Constitution 
had not yet been adopted, and the states, in ordaining it, could only speak of 
themselves in the condition in which they then existed, and not in that in which 
they would exist under the Constitution. So that, if the argument of the sena- 
tor proves anything, it proves, not, as he supposes, that the Constitution forms 
the American people into an aggregate mass of individuals, but that such was 
their political condition before its adoption, under the old confederation, direct- 
ly contrary to his argument in the previous part of this discussion. 

But 1 intend not to leave this important point, the last refuge of those who 
advocate consolidation, even on this conclusive argument. I have shown that 
the Constitution affords not the least evidence of the mighty change of the po-r 
litical condition of the states and the country, which the senator supposed it 
effected ; and 1 intend now, by the most decisive proof, drawn from the consti- 
tutional instrument itself, to show that no such change was intended, and that 
the people of the states are united under it as states and not as individuals. On 
this point there is a very important part of the Constitution entirely and strange- 
ly overlooked by the senator in this debate, as it is expressed in the first reso» 
lution, which furnishes the conclusive evidence, not only that the Constitution 
is a compact, but a subsisting compact, binding between the states. I allude to 
the seventh article, which provides that " the ratification of the convention of 
nine states shall be sufficient for the establishment of this Constitution between 



mean a volume — compacts, not laws, bind between the states ; and it here binds, 
not between individuals, but between the states : the states ratifying, implyino-, 
as strong as language can make it, that the Constitution is what I have assert- 
ed it to be — a compact, ratified by the states, and a subsisting compact, binding 
the states ratifying it. 

But, sir, I will not leave this point, all-important in establishing the true the- ' 
ory of our government, on this argument alone, as demonstrative and conclusive 
as I hold it to be. Another, not much less powerful, but of a different charac- 
ter, may be drawn from the tenth amended article, which provides that " the 
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited 
to it by the states, are reserved to the states respectively or to the people." 
The article of ratification which I have just cited informs us that the Constitu- ' 
tion, which delegates powers, was ratified by the states, and is binding between 
them. This informs us to whom the powers are delegated, a most important 
fact in determining the point immediately at issue between the senator and my- 
self. According to his views, the Constitution created a union between indi- 
viduals, if the solecism may be allowed, and that it formed, at least to the ex- 
tent of the powers delegated, one people, and not a Federal Union of the states, 
as I contend ; or, to express the same idea differently, that the delegation of 
powers was to the American people in the aggregate (for it is only by such 
delegation that they could be made into one people), and not to the United 
States, directly contrary to the article just cited, which declares that the pow- 
ers are delegated to the United States. And here it is worthy of notice that 
the senator cannot shelter himself under the ambiguous phrase " to the people 
of the United States," under which he would certainly have taken refuge, had 
the Constitution so expressed it ; but, fortunately for the cause of truth and for 
the great principles of constitutional liberty for which I am contending, " peo- 
ple" is omitted : thus making the delegation of power clear and unequivocal to 
the United States, as distinct political communities, and conclusively proving 
that all the powers delegated are reciprocally delegated by the states to each 
other, as distinct political communities. 

So much for the delegated powers. Now, as all admit, and as it is express- 
ly provided for in the Constitution, the reserved powers are reserved to the 
states respectively, or to the people : none will pretend that, as far as they are 
concerned, we are one people, though the argument to prove it, however ab- 
surd, would be far more plausible than that which goes to show that we are 
one people to the extent of the delegated powers. This reservation " to the 
people" might, in the hands of subtle and trained logicians, be a peg to hang a 
doubt upon ; and had the expression " to the people" been connected, as fortu- 
nately it is not, with the delegated instead of the reserved powers, we should 
not have heard of this in the present discussion, 

I have now established, I hope, beyond the power of controversy, every alle- 
gation contained in the first resolution — that the Constitution is a compact 
formed by the people of the several states, as distinct political communities, 
subsisting and binding between the states in the same character ; which brings 
me to the consideration of the consequences which may be fairly deduced in 
reference to the character of our political system from these established facts. 

The first, and most important, is, that they conclusively establish that ours is 
a federal system : a system of states arranged in a Federal Union, and each re- 
taining its distinct existence and sovereignty. Ours has every attribute which 
belongs to a federative system. It is founded on compact ; it is formed by 
sovereign communities ; and is binding between them in their sovereign capaci- 
ty. I might appeal, in confirmation of this assertion, to all elementary writers 
on the subject of government, but will content myself with citing one only: 
Burlamaqui, quoted with approbation by Judge Tucker, in his Commentary on 



er's Ulackslone as follows) : 

Extracts from Blackstone's Commentaries. 

" Political bodies, whether great or small, if they are constituted by a people 
formerly independent, and under no civil subjection, or by those who justly 
claim independence from any civil power they were formerly subject to, have 
the civil supremacy in themselves, and are in a state of equal right and liberty 
with respect to all other states, whether great or small. No regard is to be had 
in this matter to names, whether the body politic be called a kingdom, an em- 
pire, a principality, a dukedom, a country, a republic, or free town. If it can 
exercise justly all the essential parts of civil power within itself, independently 
of any other person or body politic, and no other hath any right to rescind or 
annul its acts, it has the civil supremacy, how small soever its territory may be, 
or the number of its people, and has all the rights of an independent state. 

" This independence of states, and there being distinct political bodies from 
each other, is not obstructed by any alliance or confederacies whatsoever, about 
exercising jointly any parts of the supreme powers, such as those of peace and 
war, in league offensive and defensive. Two states, notwithstanding such 
treaties, are separate bodies, and independent. 

" These are, then, only deemed politically united when some one person or 
council is constituted with a right to exercise some essential powers for both, 
and to hinder either from exercising them separately. If any person or coun- 
cil is empowered to exercise all these essential powers for both, they are then 
one state : such is the State of England and Scotland, since the act of union 
made at the beginning of the eighteenth century, whereby the two kingdoms 
were incorporated into one, all parts of the supreme power of both kingdoms 
being thenceforward united, and vested in the three estates of the realm of Great 
Britain ; by which entire coalition, though both kingdoms retain their ancient 
laws and usages in many respects, they are as effectually united and incorpo- 
rated as the several petty kingdoms which composed the heptarchy were before 
that period. 

" But when only a portion of the supreme civil power is vested in one person 
or council for both, such as that of peace and war, or of deciding controversies 
between different states, or their subjects, while each within itself exercises 
other parts of the supreme power, independently of all the others — in this case 
they are called systems of states, which Burlamaqui defines to be an assemblage 
of perfect governments, strictly united by some common bond, so that they seem 
to make but a single body with respect to those affairs which interest them in 
common, though each preserves its sovereignty, full and entire, independently 
of all others. And in this case, he adds, the confederate states engage to each 
other only to exercise with common consent certain parts of the sovereignty, 
especially that which relates to their mutual defence against foreign enemies. 
But each of the confederates retains an entire liberty of exercising as it thinks 
proper those parts of the sovereignty which are not mentioned in the treaty of 
union, as parts that ought to be exercised in common. And of this nature is the 
American confederacy, in which each state has resigned the exercise of certain 
parts of the supreme civil power which they possessed before (except in com- 
mon with the other states included in the confederacy), reserving to themselves 
all their former powers, which are not delegated to the United States by the 
common bond of union. 

" A visible distinction, and not less important than obvious, occurs to our ob- 
servation in comparing these different kinds of union. The kingdoms of Eng- 
land and Scotland are united into one kingdom ; and the two contracting states, 
by such an incorporate unioa, are, in the opinion of Judge Blackstone, totally 
annihilated, without any power of revival ; and a third arises from their con- 



tion, are vested, from vvnence ne expresses a aouot wneiaer any inirmge- 
ments of the fundamental and essential conditions of the union would of itself 
dissolve the union of those kingdoms ; though he readily admits that, in the 
case of a federate alliance, such an infringement would certainly rescind the 
compact between the confederated states. In the United States of America, on 
the contrary, each state retains its own antecedent form of government ; its own 
laws, subject to the alteration and control of its own Legislature only ; its own 
executive officers and council of state ; its own courts of judicature, its own 
judges, its own magistrates, civil ofhcers, and officers of the militia ; and, in 
short, its own civil state, or body politic, in every respect whatsoever. And 
by the express declaration of the 12th article of the amendments to the Consti- 
tution, the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the 
people. In Great Britain, a new civil state is created by the annihilation of two 
antecedent civil states; in the American States, a general /ec^eraZ council and 
administration is provided for the joint exercise of such of their several powers 
as can be more conveniently exercised in that mode than any other, leaving their 
civil stale unaltered ; and all the other powers, which the states antecedently 
possessed, to be exercised by them respectively, as if no union or connexion 
were established between them. 

" The ancient Achaia seems to have been a confederacy founded upon a 
similar plan : each of those little states had its distinct possessions, territories, 
and boundaries ; each had its Serrate or Assembly, its magistrates and judges ; 
and every state sent deputies to the general convention, and had equal weight 
in all determinations. And most of the neighbouring states which, moved by 
fear of danger, acceded to this confederacy, had reason to felicitate themselves. 
" These confederacies, by which several states are united together by a per- 
petual league of alliance, are chiefly founded upon this circumstance, that each 
particular people choose to remain their own masters, and yet are not strong 
enough to make head against a common enemy. The purport of such an 
agreement usually is, that they shall not exercise some part of the sovereignty 
there specified without the general consent of each other. For the leagues to 
which these systems of states owe their rise seem distinguished from others 
(so frequent among different states) chiefly by this consideration, that, in the 
latter, each confederate people determine themselves, by their own judgment, 
to certain mutual performances, yet so that in all other respects they design not 
in the least to make the exercise of that part of the sovereignty, whence these 
performances proceed, dependant on the consent of their allies, or to retrench 
anything from their full and unlimited power of governing their own states. 
Thus we see that ordinary treaties propose, for the most part, as their aim, only 
some particular advantage of the states thus transacting — their interests happen- 
ing at present to fall in with each other — but do not produce any lasting union 
as to the chief management of affairs. Such was the treaty of alliance between 
America and France in the year 1778, by which, among other articles, it was 
agreed that neither of the two parties should conclude either truce or peace 
with Great Britain without the formal consent of the other first obtained, and 
whereby they mutually engaged not to lay down their arms until the independ- 
ence of the United States should be formally or tacitly assured by the treaty 
or treaties which should terminate the war. Whereas, in these confederacies, 
of which we are now speaking, the contrary is observable, they being estab- 
lished with this design, that the several states shall forever liidi their safety one 
with another, and, in order to their mutual defence, shall engage themselves not 
to exercise certain parts of their sovereign power, otherwise than by a common 
agreement and approbation. Such were the stipulations, among others, con- 
tained in the articles of confederation and perpetual union between the Ameri- 



can oiai«:>, uy wmwu. ii. »> a.o i^gi-^v.^^ — -- — ^-.^, ~^^ ^w„«,.- 

of the United States in Congress assembled, send any embassy to, or receive 
any embassy from, or enter into any conference, agreement, alliance, or treaty 
with, any king, prince, or state ; nor keep up any vessels of war, or body of 
forces, in time of peace ; nor engage in any war, without the consent of the 
United States in Congress assembled, unless actually invaded ; nor grant com- 
missions to any ships of war, or letters of marque and reprisal, except after a 
declaration of war by the United States in Congress assembled, with several 
others ; yet each state respectively retains its sovereignty, freedom, and inde- 
pendence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right which is not expressly dele- 
gated to the United States in Congress assembled. The promises made in 
these two cases here compared run very differently ; in the former, thus : ' I 
will join you in this particular war as a confederate, and the manner of our 
attacking the enemy shall be concerted by our common advice ; nor will we 
desist from war till the particular end thereof, the establishment of the inde- 
pendence of the United States, be obtained.' In the latter, thus : ' None of us 
who have entered into this alliance will make use of our right as to the affairs 
of war and peace, except by the general consent of the whole confederacy.' 
We observed before that these unions submit only some certain parts of the 
sovereignty to mutual direction ; for it seems hardly possible that the affairs of 
different states should have so close a connexion, as that all and each of them 
should look on it as their interest to have no part of the chief government ex- 
ercised without the general concurrence. The most convenient method, there- 
fore, seems to be, that the particular stated reserve to themselves all those 
branches of the supreme authority, the management of which can have little or 
no influence in the affairs of the rest." 
Mr. Calhoun proceeded : 

If we compare our present system with the old confederation, which all 
acknowledge to have heen federal in its character, we shall find that it possesses 
all the attributes which belong to that form of government as fully and com- 
pletely as that did. In fact, in this particular, there is but a single difference, 
and that not essential, as regards the point immediately under consideration, 
though very important in other respects. The confederation was the act of the 
state governments, and formed a union of governments. The present Consti- 
tution is the act of the states themselves, or, which is the same thing, of the 
people of the several states, and forms a union of them as sovereign communi- 
ties. The states, previous to the adoption of the Constitution, were as separate 
and distinct political bodies as the governments which represent them, and there 
is nothing in the nature of things to prevent them from uniting under a compact, 
in a federal union, without being blended in one mass, any more than uniting 
the governments themselves, in like manner, without merging them in a single 
government. To illustrate what I have stated by reference to ordinary trans- 
actions, the confederation was a contract between agents — the present Consti- 
tution between the principals themselves ; or, to take a more analogous case, 
one is a league made by ambassadors ; the other, a league made by sovereigns 
— the latter no more tending to unite the parties into a single sovereignty than 
the former. The only difference is in the solemnity of the act and the force of 
the obligation. 

There, indeed, results a most important t' fference, under our theory of govern- 
ment, as to the nature and character of the act itself, whether executed by the 
states themselves, or by their governments ; but a result, as I have already 
stated, not at all affecting the question under consideration, but which will 
throw much light on a subject in relation to which I must think the senator 
from Massachusetts has formed very confused conceptions. 

The senator dwelt much on the point that the present system is a constitu- 
tion and a government, in contradistinction to the old confederation, with a view 



senator that our present system is a constitution and a government ; and that 
the former, the old confederation, was not a constitution or government ; not, 
however, for the reason which he assigned, that the former was a compact, and 
the latter not, but from the difference of the origin from which the two com- 
pacts are derived. According to our American conception, the people alone 
can form constitutions or governments, and not their agents. It is this differ- 
ence, and this alone, which makes the distinction. Had the old confederation 
been the act of the people of the several states, and not of their governments, 
that instrument, imperfect as it is, would have been a constitution, and the 
agency which it created to execute its powers, a government. This is the 
true cause of the difference between the two acts, and not that in wliich the 
senator seems to be bewildered. 

There is another point on which this difference throws important light, and 
which has been frequently referred to in debate on this and former occasions. 
I refer to the expression in the preamble of the Constitution, which speaks of 
<' forming a more perfect union," and in the letter of General Washington, lay- 
ing the draught of the Convention before the old Congress, in which he speaks 
of " consolidating the Union ;" both of which I conceive to refer simply to the 
fact that the present Union, as already stated, is a union between the states 
themselves, and not a union like that which had existed between the govern- 
ments of the states. 

We will now proceed to consider some of the conclusions which necessarily 
follow from the facts and positions already established. They enable us to de- 
cide a question of vital importance under our system : Where does sovereignty 
reside ? If I have succeeded in establishing the fact that ours is a federal sys- 
tem, as I conceive I conclusively have, that fact of itself determines the ques- 
tion which I have proposed. It is of the very essence of such a system, that 
the sovereignty is in the parts, and not in the whole ; or, to use the language of 
Mr. Palgrave, the parts are the units in such a system, and the whole the mul- 
tiple ; and not the whole the units and the parts the fractions. Ours, then, is 
a government of twenty-four sovereignties, united by a constitutional compact, 
for the purpose of exercising certain powers through a common government as 
their joint agent, and not a union of the twenty-four sovereignties into one, 
which, according to the language of the Virginia Resolutions, already cited, would 
form a consolidation. And here I must express my surprise that the senator 
from Virginia should avow himself the advocate of these very resolutions, when 
he distinctly maintains the idea of a union of the states in one sovereignty, 
which is expressly condemned by those resolutions as the essence of a consol- 
idated government. 

Another consequence is equally clear, that, whatever modification was made 
in the condition of the states under the present Constitution, were modifications 
extending only to the exercise of their powers by compact, and not to the sover- 
eignty itself, and are such as sovereigns are competent to make : it being a con- 
ceded point, that it is competent to them to stipulate to exercise their powers 
in a particular manner, or to abstain altogether from their exercise, or to dele- 
gate them to agents, witb'sut in any degree impairing sovereignty itself. The 
plain state of the facts, ^s regards our government, is, that these states have 
agreed by compact to exercise their sovereign powers jointly, as already stated ; 
and that, for this purpose, they have ratified the compact in their sovereign ca- 
pacity, thereby making" it the constitution of each state, in nowise distinguish- 
ed from their own separate constitution, but in the superadded obligation of com- 
pact — of faith mutually pledged to each other. In this compact, they have stip- 
ulated, among other things, that it may be amended by three fourths of the states : 
that is, they have conceded to each other by compact the right to add new pow- 
ers or to subtract old, by the consent of that proportion of the states, without re- 

P 



quirinff, as otherwise would be the case, the consent of all ; a modincation no 
more inconsistent, as has been supposed, with their sovereignty, than any other 
contained in the compact. In fact, the provision to which I allude furnishes 
strong evidence that the sovereignty is, as I contend, in the states severally : 
as the amendments are eftected, not by any one three fourths, but by any three 
fourths of the states, indicating that the sovereignty is in each of the states. 

If these views be correct, it follows, as a matter of course, that the allegiance 
of the people is to their several states, and that treason consists in resistance 
to the joint authority of the states united, not, as has been absurdly contended, 
in resistance to the government of the United States, which, by the provision of 
the Constitution, has only the right of punishing. 

These conclusions have all a most important bearing on that monstrous and 
despotic bill which, to the disgrace of the Senate and the age, has passed this 
body. I have still a right thus to speak without violating the rules of order, 
as it is not yet a law. These conclusions show that the states can violate no 
law ; that they neither are, nor in the nature of things can be, under the domin- 
ion of the law ; that the worst that can be imputed to them is a violation of 
compact, for which they, and not their citizens, are responsible ; and that, t_p 
undertake to punish a state by law, or to hold the citizens responsible for the 
acts of the state, which they are on their allegiance bound to obey, and liable 
to be punished as traitors for disobeying, is a cruelty unheard of among civilized 
nations, and destructive of every principle upon which our government is found- 
ed. It is, in short, a ruthless and complete revolution of our entire system. 

I was desirous to present these views fully before the passage of this long- 
to-be-laniented bill, but as I was prevented -by the majority, as I have stated at 
the commencement of my remarks, I trust that it is not yet too late. 

Having now said what I intended in relation to my first resolution, both in 
reply to the senator from Massachusetts, and in vindication of its correctness, I 
will now proceed to consider the conclusions drawn from it in the second res- 
olution — that the General Government is not the exclusive and final judge of 
the extent of the powers delegated to it, but that the states, as parties to the 
compact, have a right to judge, in the last resort, of the infractions of the com- 
pact, and of the mode and measure of redress. 

It can scarcely be necessary, before so enlightened a body, to premise that 
our system comprehends two distinct governments — the General and State Gov- 
ernments, which, properly considered, form but one. The former representing 
the joint authority of the states in their confederate capacity, and the latter that 
of each state separately. I have premised this fact simply with a view of pre- 
senting distinctly the answer to the argument offered by the senator from Mas- 
sachusetts to prove that the General Government has a final and exclusive right 
to judge, not only of its delegated powers, but also of those reserved to the 
states. That gentleman relies for his main argument on the assertion that a 
government, which he defines to be an organized body, endowed with both will, 
and power, and authority in propria v/gore to execute its purpose, has a right 
inherently to judge of its powers. It is not my intention to comment upon the 
definition of the senator, though it would not be difiicult to show that his ideas 
of government are not very American. My object is to deal with the conclu- 
sion, and not the definition. Admit, then, that the government has the right of 
judging of its powers, for which he contends. How, then, will he withhold, 
upon his own principle, the right of judging from the state governments, which 
he has attributed to the General Government ? If it belongs to one, on his prin- 
ciple it belongs to both ; and if to both, when they differ, the veto, so abhorred 
by the senator, is the necessary result : as neither, if the right be possessed by 
both, can control the other. 

The senator felt the force of this argument, and, in order to sustain his main 
position, he fell back on that clause of the ConstUution which provides that 



i-iiio »^uiioi,ii,uiiuii, aiiu tiit^ lavvo mauvj ill |»uisua,m;e iiitjieui, siiaii ue me Su- 
preme law of the land." 

This is admitted : no one has ever denied that the Constitution, and the laws 
made in pursuance of it, are of paramount authority. But it is equally undenia- 
ble that laws not made in pursuance are not only not of paramount authority, 
but are of no authority whatever, being of themselves null and void ; which pre- 
. sents the question, Who are to judge whether the laws be or be not pursuant 
I to the Constitution ? and thus the difficulty, instead of being taken away, is re- 
moved but one step farther back. This the senator also felt, and has attempted 
to overcome the difficulity by setting up, on the part of Congress and the judi- 
ciary, the final and exclusive right of judging, both for the Federal Government 
( and the fetates, as to the extent of their powers. That I may do full justice to 
the gentleman, I will give his doctrine in his own words. He states : 

" That there is a supreme law, composed of the Constitution, the laws pass- 
ed in pursuance of it, and the treaties ; but in cases coming before Congress, 
not assuming the shape of cases in law and equity, so as to be subjects of ju- 
dicial discussion, Congress must interpret the Constitution so often as it has oc- 
casion to pass laws ; and in cases capable of assuming a judicial shape, the Su- 
preme Court must be the final interpreter." 

Now, passing over this vague and loose phraseology, I would ask the sena- 
tor upon what principle can he concede this extensive power to the legislative 
and judicial departments, and v/ithhold it entirely from the executive 1 If one 
has the right, it cannot be withheld from the other. I would also ask him on 
what principle, if the departments of the General Government are to possess 
the right of judging, finally and conclusively, of their respective powers, on what 
principle can the same right be withheld from the State Governments, which, 
as well as the General Government, properly considered, are but departments 
of the same general system, and form together, properly speaking, but one gov- 
ernment. This was a favourite idea of Mr. Macon, for whose wisdom I have 
a respect, increasing with my experience, and whom I have frequently heard 
say that most of the misconceptions and errors in relation to our system origi- 
nated in forgetting that they were but parts of the same system. I would far- 
ther tell the senator, that, if this right be withheld from the State Governments ; 
if this restraining influence, by which the General Government is coerced to its 
proper sphere, be withdrawn, then that department of the government from which 
he has withheld the right of judging of its own powers (the executive) will, so 
far from being excluded, become the sok interpreter of the powers of the o-ov- 
ernment. It is the armed interpreter, with powers to execute its own construc- 
tion, and without the aid of which the construction of the other departments 
will be impotent. 

But I contend that the states have a far clearer right to the sole construction 
of their powers than any of the departments of the Federal Government can 
have ; this power is expressly reserved, as I have stated on another occasion, 
not only against the several departments of the General Government, but against 
the United States themselves. I will not repeat the arguments which I then 
offered on this point, and which remain unanswered, but I must be permitted to 
offer strong additional proof of the views then taken, and wliich, if I am not 
mistaken, are conclusive on this point. It is drawn from the ratification of the 
Constitution by Virginia, and is in the following words (Mr. C. then read as 
follows) : 

" We, the delegates of the people of Virginia, duly elected in pursuance of a 
recommendation from the General Assembly, and now met in Convention, hav- 
ing fully and freely investigated and discussed the proceedings of the Federal 
Convention, and being prepared, as well as the most mature dehberation hath 
enabled us, to decide thereon, do, in the name and in behalf of the people of 
Virginia, declare and make known that the powers granted under the Coustitu- 



tion, being derived from the people of the United States, may be resumed hy 
them whensoever the same shall be perverted to their injury or oppression, and 
that every power not granted thereby remains with them, and at their will ; that, 
therefore no rifht of any denomination can be cancelled, abridged, restrained, 
or modified bv the Congress, by the Sena-te or House of Representatives, act- 
ing in any capacity, by the President or any departmen»t or officer of the United 
States except in those instances in which power is given by the Constitution 
for those purposes ; and that, among other essential rights, the liberty of con- 
science and of the press cannot be cancelled, abridged, restrained, or modified 
by any authority of the United States. With these impressions, with a solemn 
appeal to the Searcher of all hearts for the purity of our intentions, and under 
the conviction that whatsoever imperfections may exist in the Constitution ought 
rather to be examined in the mode prescribed therein, than to bring the Union 
in danuer bv a delay, with the hope of obtaining amendments previous to the 
ratification— we, the said delegates, in the name and in the behalf of the people 
of Vir<rinia, do, by these presents, assent to and ratify the Constitution recom- 
mended on the 17th day of September, 1787, by the Federal Convention, for 
the government of the United States, hereby announcing to all those whom it 
may concern, that the said Constitution is bhiding upon the said people, accord- 
ino- to an authentic copy hereto annexed, in the words following," &c. 

It thus appears that that sagacious state (I fear, however, that her sagacity 
is not as sharpsighted now as formerly) ratified the Constitution, with an ex- 
planation as to her reserved powers ; that they were powers subject to her own 
will, and reserved against every department of the General Government — le- 
gislative, executive, and judicial — as if she had a prophetic knowledge of the at- 
tempts now made to impair and destroy them : Avhich explanation can be con- 
sidered in no other light than as containing a condition on which she ratified, 
and, in fact, making part of the Constitution of the United States — extending as 
well to the other states as herself. I am no lawyer, and it may appear to be 
presumption in me to lay down the rule of law which governs in such cases, in a 
controversy with so distingiiished an advocate as the senator from Massachusetts. 
But I shall venture to lay it down as a rule in such cases, which I have no fear 
that the gentleman will contradict, that, in case of a contract between several 
partners, if the entrance of one on condition be admitted, the condition enures to 
the benefit of all the partners. But I do not rest the argument simply upon this 
view : Virginia proposed the tenth amended article, the one in question, and her 
ratification must be at least received as the highest evidence of its true mean- 
ing and interpretation. 

If these views be correct — and I do not see how they can be resisted — the 
rights of the states to judge of the extent of their reserved powers stands on the 
most solid foundation, and is good against eveiy department of the General Gov- 
ernment ; and the judiciary is as much excluded from an interference with the 
reserved powers as the legislative or executive departments. To establish the 
opposite, the senator relies \ipon the authority of Mr. INIadison, in the Federal- 
ist, to prove that it was intended to invest the court with the power in question. 
In reply, I will meet Mr. Madison with his own opinion, given on a most solemn 
occasion, and backed by the sagacious Commonwealth of Virginia. The opinion 
to which I allude will be found in the celebrated report of 1799, of which Mr. 
Madison was the author. It says : 

" But it is objected, that the judicial authority is to be regarded as the sole 
expositor of the Constitution in the last resort ; and it may be asked for what 
reason, the declaration by the General Assembly, supposing it to be theoretical- 
ly true, could be required at the present day, and in so solemn a manner. 

" On this objection it might be observed, first, that there may be instances 
of usurped power, which the forms pf the Constitution would never draw with- 
in the control of the judicial department : secondly, that, if the decision of the ju- 



diciary be raisea above the authority of the sovereign parties to the Constitu- 
tion, the decisions of the other departments, not carried by the forms of the 
Constitution before the judiciary, must be equally authoritative and final with 
decisions of the department. But the proper answer to this objection is, that 
the resolution of the General Assembly relates to those great and extraordinary 
cases in which all the forms of the Constitution may prove ineffectual against 
j infractions dangerous to the essential rights of the parties to it. The resolution 
supposes that dangerous powers, not delegated, may not only be usurped and 
executed by the other departments, but that the judicial department, also, may 
exercise or sanction dangerous powers beyond the grant of the Constitution ; 
and, consequently, that the ultimate right of the parties to the Constitution to 
judge whether the compact was dangerously violated, must extend to violations 
by one delegated authority as well as by another ; by the judiciary as well as 
by the executive or the legislative." 

The senator also relies upon the authorhy of Luther Martin to the same 
point, to Avhich I have already replied so fully on another occasion (in answer 
to the senator from Delaware, Mr. Clayton), that I do not deem it necessary 
to add any farther remarks on the present occasion. 

But why should I \vaste w-ords in reply to these or any other authorities, 
when it has been so clearly established that the rights of the states are reserved 
against all and every department of the government, that no authority in oppo- 
sition can possibly shake a position so well established ? Nor do I think it ne- 
cessary to repeat the argument which I offered when the bill was under dis- 
cussion, to show that the clause in the Constitution which provides that the ju- 
dicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity arising under this Con- 
stitution, and to the laws and treaties made under its authority, has no bearing 
on the point in controversy ; and that even the boasted power of the Supreme 
Court to decide a law to be unconstitutional, so far from being derived from this 
or any other portion of the Constitution, results from the necessity of the case — 
vv^here two rules of unequal authority come in conflict — and is a power belong- 
ing to all courts, superior and inferior, state and general, domestic and foreign. 

I have now, I trust, shown satisfactorily that there is no provision in the 
Constitution to authorize the General Government, through any of its depart- 
ments, to control the action of the state within the sphere of its reserved pow- 
ers ; and that, of course, according to the principle laid down by the senator from 
Slassachusetts himself, the government of the states, as well as the General 
Government, has the right to determine the extent of their respective powers, 
without the right on the part of either to control the other. The necessary re- 
sult is the veto, to which he so much objects ; and to get clear of which, he in- 
forms us, was the object for which the present Constitution was formed. I know 
not whence he has derived his information, but my impression is very different 
as to the immediate motives w^hich led to the formation of that instrument. I 
have always understood that the principal was, to give to Congress the power 
to regulate commerce, to lay impost duties, and to raise a revenue for the pay- 
ment of the public debt and the expenses of the government ; and to subject the 
action of the citizens individually to the operation of the laws, as a substitute 
for force. If the object had been to get clear of the veto of the states, as the 
senator states, the Convention certainly performed their work in a most bungling 
manner. There was unquestionably a large party in that body, headed by men 
of distinguished talents and influence, who commenced early and worked ear- 
nestly to the last, to deprive the states — not directly, for that would have been 
too bold an attempt, but indirectly — of the veto. The good sense of the Con- 
vention, however, put down every eflbrt, however disguised and perseveringly 
made. I do not deem it necessary to give from the journals the history of these 
various and unsuccessful attempts, though it would afford a very instructive les- 
son. It is sufficient to say that it was attempted by proposing to give Congress 



power to annul the acts of the states which they might deem inconsistent witli 
the Constitution ; to give to the President the power of appointing the governors 
of the states, with a view of vetoing state laws through his authority ; and^ 
finally, to give to the judiciary the power to decide controversies between the 
states and the General Government : all of which failed — fortunately for the 
liberty of the country — utterly and entirely failed ; and in their failure we have . 
the strongest evidence that it was not the intention of the Convention to deprive ' 
the states of the veto power. Had the attempt to deprive them of this power 
been directly made, and failed, e\'ery one would have seen and felt thai it would 
furnish conclusive evidence in favour of its existence. Now, I would ask, 
What possible difference can it make in what form this attempt was made ? 
whether by attempting to confer on the General Government a power incom- | 
patible with the exercise of the veto on the part of the states, or by attempting 
directly to deprive them of the right of exercising it. We have thus direct and 
strong proof that, in the opinion of the Convention, the states, unless deprived 
of it, possess the veto power, or, what is another name for the same thing, the 
right of nullification. I knov/ that there is a diversity of opinion among the 
friends of state rights in regard to this power, which I regret, as I cannot but 
consider it as a power essential to the protection of the minor and local inter- 
ests of the community, and the liberty and the union of the country. It is the 
ver}' shield of state rights, and the only power by which that system of injus- 
tice against which we have contended for more than thirteen years can be 
arrested : a system of hostile legislation, of plundering by law, which must ne- 
cessarily lead to a conflict of arms if not prevented. 

But I rest the right of a state to judge of the extent of its reserved powers-, 
in the last resort, on higher grounds — that the Constitution is a compact, to 
which the states are parties in their sovereign capacity ; and that, as in ali 
other cases of compact between parties having no common umpire, each has a 
right to judge for itself. To the truth of this proposition the senator from Mas- 
sachusetts has himself assented, if the Constitution itself be a compact — and 
that it is, I have shown, I trust, beyond the possibility of a doubt. Having es- 
tablished that point, I now claim, as I stated I would do in the course of the dis- 
cussion, the admissions of the senator, and, among them, the right of secession 
and nullification, which he conceded would necessarily follow if the Constitu- 
tion be indeed a compact. 

I have now replied to the arguments of the senator from Massachusetts so 
far as they directly apply to the resolutions, and will, in conclusion, notice some 
of his general and detached remarks. To prove that ours is a consolidated gov- 
ernment, and that there is an immediate connexion between the government and 
the citizen, he relies on the fact that the laws act directly on individuals. That 
such is the case I will not deny ; but I am very far from conceding the point 
that it affords the decisive proof, or even any proof at all, of the position which 
the senator wishes to maintain. I hold it to be perfectly within the competen- 
cy of two or more states to subject their citizens, in certain cases, to the direct 
action of each other, without surrendering or impairing their sovereignty. I rec- 
ollect, while I was a member of Mr. Monroe's cabinet, a proposition was sub- . 
mitted by the British Government to permit a mutual right of search and seizure , 
on the part of each government of the citizens of the other, on board of vessels 
engaged in the slave-trade, and to establish a joint tribunal for their trial and pun- ' 
ishment. The proposition was declined, not because it would impair the sover- 
eignty of either, but on the ground of general expediency, and because it would 
be incompatible with the provisions of the Constitution which establish the ju- 
dicial power, and which provisions require the judges to be appointed by the 
President and Senate. If I am not mistaken, propositions of the same kind 
were made and acceded to by some of the Continental powers. 

With the same view, the senator cited the suability of the states as evidence 



oi ineir warn oi sovereignly ; at wmcii i musi express my surprise, coming irom 
the quarter it does. No one knows better than the senator that it is perfectly 
within the competency of a sovereign state to permit itself to be sued. We have 
on the statute-book a standing law, under which the United States may be sued 
in certain land cases. If the provision in the Constitution on this point proves 
anything, it proves, by the extreme jealousy with which the right of suing a state 
is permitted, the very reverse of that for which the senator contends. 

Among other objections to the views of the Constitution for which I contend, 
it is sa.id that they are novel. I hold this to be a great mistake. The novelty 
is not on my side, but on that of the senator from Massachusetts. The doctrine 
of consolidation which he maintains is of recent growth. It is not the doctrine 
of Hamilton, Ames, or any of the distinguished federalists of that period, all of 
whom strenuously maintained the federative character of the Constitution, 
though they were accused of supporting a system of policy which would neces- 
sarily lead to consolidation. The first disclosure of that doctrine was in the 
case of M'Culloch,in which the Supreme Court held the doctrine, though wrapped 
up in language somewhat indistinct and ambiguous. The next, and more open 
avowal, was by the senator of Massachusetts himself, about three years ago, in 
the debate on Foot's resolution. The first official annunciation of the doctrine 
was in the recent proclamation of the President, of which the bill that has re- 
cently passed this body is the bitter fruit 

It is farther objected by the senator from Massachusetts, and others, against 
this doctrine of state rights, as maintained in this debate, that, if they should 
prevail, the peace of the country would be destroyed. But what if they should 
not prevail ? W(5uld there be peace ? Yes, the peace of despotism ; that peace 
which is enforced by the bayonet and the sword ; the peace of death, where 
all the vital functions of liberty have ceased. It is this peace which the doc- 
trine of state sovereignty may disturb b)^ that conflict, which in every free state, 
if properly organized, necessarily exists between liberty and power ; but which, 
if restrained within proper limits, is a salutary exercise to our moral and intel- 
lectual faculties. In the case of Carolina, which has caused all this discus- 
sion, who does not see, if the effusion of blood be prevented, that the excite- 
ment, the agitation, and the inquiry which it has caused, will be followed by 
the most beneficial consequences ? The country had sunk into avarice, in- 
trigue, and electioneering, from which nothing but some such event could rouse 
it, or restore those honest and patriotic feelings which had almost disappeared 
under their baneful influence. What government has ever attained power and 
distinction without such conflicts ? Look at the degraded state of all those na- 
tions where they have been put down by the iron arm of the government. 

I, for my part, have no fear of any dangerous conflict, under the fullest ac- 
knowledgment of state sovereignty : the very fact that the states may interpose 
will produce moderation and justice. The General Government will abstain 
from the exercise of any power in which they may suppose three fourths of the 
states will not sustain them ; while, on the other hand, the states will not in- 
terpose but on the conviction that they will be supported by one fourth of their 
co-states. IModeration and justice will produce confidence, attachment, and patri- 
otism ; and these, in turn, will offer most powerful barriers against the excess 
of conflicts between the states and the General Government. 

But we are told that, should the doctrine prevail, the present system would 
be as bad, if not worse, than the old confederation. I regard the assertion only 
as evidence of that extravagance of declaration in which, from excitement of 
feeling, we so often indulge. Admit the power, and still the present system 
would be as far removed from the weakness of the old confederation as it would 
be from the lawless and despotic violence of consolidation. So far from being 
the same, the difference between the confederation and the present Constitution 
would still be most strongly marked. If there were no other distinction, the 



IMaHBK 



fact that the former required the concurrence of the states to execute its acts, 
and the latter the act of a state to arrest its acts, would make a distinction as 
broad as the ocean : in the former, the vis inertice of our nature is in opposhion to 
the action of the system. Not to act was to defeat. In the latter, the same 
principle is on the opposite side — action is required to defeat. He who under- 
stands human nature will see in this diflerence the difference between a feeble 
and illy-contrived confederation, and the restrained energy of a federal system. 
Of the same character is the objection that the doctrine will be the source of 
weakness. If vve look to mere org-anization and physical power as the only 
source of strength, without taking into the estimate the operation of moral 
causes, such would appear to be the fact ; but if we take into the estimate the 
latter, we shall find that those governments have the greatest strength in which 
power has been most efficiently checked. The government of Rome furnishes 
a memorable example. There, two independent and distinct powers existed — 
the people acting by tribes, in which the plebeians prevailed, and by centuries, 
in which the patricians ruled. The tribunes were the appointed representa- 
tives of the one power, and the Senate of the other : each possessed of the au- 
thority of checking and overruling one another, not as departments of the gov- 
ernment, as supposed by the senator from Massachusetts, but as independent 
powers — as much so as the State and General Governments. A shallow ob- 
server would perceive, in such an organization, nothing but the perpetual source 
of anarchy, discord, and weakness ^ and yet, experience has proved that it was 
the most powerful government that ever existed ; and reason teaches that this 
power was derived from the very circumstance which hasty .reflection would 
consider the cause- of weakness. I will venture an assertion; which may be 
considered extravagant, hut in which history will fully bear me out, that we have 
no knowledge of any people in which a power of arresting the improper acts of the 
government, or what may be called the negative power of government, was too 
strong, except Poland, where every freeman possessed a veto ; but even there, 
although it existed in so extravagant a form, it was the source of the highest 
and most lofty attachment to liberty, and the most heroic courage : qualities that 
more than once saved Europe from the domination of the crescent and cime- 
ter. It is worthy of remark, that the fate of Poland is not to be attributed so 
much to the excess of this negative power of itself, as to the facility which it 
afforded to foreign influence in controlling its political movements. 

I am not surprised that, with the idea of a perfect government which the 
senator from Massachusetts has formed — a government of an absolute majority, 
unchecked and unrestrained, operating through a representative body— that he 
should be so much shocked with what he is pleased to call the absurdity of the 
state veto. But let me tell him that his scheme of a perfect government, as 
beautiful as he conceives it to be, though often tried, has invariably failed, and 
has always run, whenever tried, through the same uniform process of faction, 
corruption, anarchy, and despotism. He considers the representative principle 
as the great modern improvement in legislation, and of itself sufficient to secure 
liberty. I cannot regard it in the light in which he does. Instead of modern, 
it is of remote origin, and has existed, in greater or less perfection, in every 
free state, from the remotest antiquity. Nor dol consider it as of itself sufScient 
to secure liberty, though I regard it as one of the indispensable means — the 
means of securing the people against the tjTanny and oppression of i\ie\x riders. 
To secure liberty, another means is still necessary — the means of securing the 
different portions of society against the injustice and oppression of each other, 
which can only be effected by veto, interposition, or nullification, or by what- 
£vcr name the restraining or negative power of government may be called. 

The senator appears to be enamoured with his conception of a consolidated 
government, and avows himself to be prepared, seeking no lead, to rush, in its 
defence, to the front rank, where the blows fall heaviest and thickest. I ad- 



mire his gallantry ana courage, out i wm tell nun mat ne win nna in me op- 
posite ranks, under the flag of liberty, spirits as gallant as his own ; and that 
experience will teach him that it is intinitely easier to carry on the war of 
legislative exaction by bills and enactments, than to extort by sword and bayo- 
net from the brave and the free. 

The bill which has passed this body is intended to decide this great contro- 
versy between that view of our government entertained by the senator and those 
who act with him, and that supported on our side. It has merged the tariif, 
and all other questions connected with it, in the higher and direct issue which 
it presents between the federal and national system of governments. I con- 
sider the bill as far worse, and more dangerous to liberty, than the tarifT. It has 
been most wantonly passed, when its avowed object no longer justified it. I 
consider it as chains forged and fitted to the limbs of the states, and hung up to 
be used when occasion may require. We are told, in order to justify the pas- 
sage of this fatal measure, that it was necessary to present the olive-branch 
with one hand and the sword with the other. We scorn the alternative. You 
have no right to present the sword. The Constitution never put the instru- 
ment in your hands to be employed against a state ; and as to the olive-branch, 
whether we receive it or not will not depend on your menace, but on our own 
estimate of what is due to ourselves and the rest of the community in reference 
to the difficult subject on which we have taken issue. 

The senator from Massachusetts has struggled hard to sustain his cause, but 
the load was too heavy for him to bear. I am not surprised at the ardour and 
zeal with which he has entered into the controversy. It is a great struggle 
between povvefcand liberty — power on the side of the North, and liberty on the 
side of the ^outh. But, while I am not surprised at the part w^hich the sena- 
tor from Massachusetts has taken, I must express my amazement at the prin- 
ciples advanced by the senator from Georgia, nearest me (Mr. Forsyth). I had 
supposed it was impossible that one of his experience and sagacity should not 
perceive the new and dangerous direction which this controversy is about to take. 
For the first time, we have heard an ominous reference to a provision in the Con- 
stitution which I have never known to be before alluded to in discussion, or in 
connexion with any of our measures. I refer to that provision in the Constitu- 
tion in which the General Government guaranties a republican form of gov- 
ernment to the states — a power which hereafter, if not rigidly restricted to the 
objects intended by the Constitution, is destined to be a pretext to interfere 
with our political affairs and domestic institutions in a manner infinitely more 
dangerous than any other power which has ever been exercised on the part of 
the General Government. I had supposed that every Southern senator, at least, 
would have been awake to the danger which menaces us from this new quar- 
ter ; and that no sentiment would be uttered, on their part, calculated to coun- 
tenance the exercise of this dangerous power. With these impressions, I heard 
the senator, with amazement, alluding to Carolina as furnishing a case which 
called for the enforcement of this guarantee. Does he not see the hazard of 
the indefinite extension of this dangerous power ? There exists in every 
Southern State a domestic institution, which would require a far less bold con- 
struction to consider the government of every state, in that quarter, not to be 
Republican, and, of course, to demand, on the part of this government, a sup- 
pression of the institution to which I allude, in fulfilment of the guarantee. I 
believe there is now no hostile feelings combined with political considerations, 
in any section, connected with this delicate subject. But it requires no stretch 
of the imagination to see the danger which must one day come, if not vigilant- 
ly watched. With the rapid strides with which this government is advancing 
to power, a time will come, and that not far distant, when petitions will be re- 
ceived from the quarter to which I allude for protection : when the faith of the 
guarantee will be, at least, as applicable to that case as the senator from Geor- 

Q 



■■ 



gia now thinks it is to Carolina. Unless his doctrine be opposed by united and 
firm resistance, its ultimate effect will be to drive the white population from the 
Southern Atlantic States. 



VII. 



SPEECH ON THE SUBJECT OF THE REMOVAL OF THE DEPOSITES FROM THE BANK OF 
THE UNITED STATES, JANUARY 13, 1834. 

The Special Order now came up, the question being on Mr. Clay's resolu- 
tions in regard to the removal of the Public Deposites. 

Mr. Calhoun then rose, and said, that the statement of this case might be 
given in a very few words. The 16th section of the act incorporating the Bank 
provides that, wherever there is a bank or branch of the United States Bank, 
the public moneys should be deposited therein, unless otherwise ordered by the 
Secretary of the Treasury, and that, in that case, he should report to Congress, 
if in session, immediately ; and, if not, at the commencement of the next ses- 
sion. The secretary, acting under the provision of this section, has ordered 
the deposites to be withheld from the Bank, and has reported his reasons, in 
conformity with the provisions of the section. The Senate is now called upon 
to consider his reasons, in order to determine whether the secretary is justified 
or not. I have examined them with care and deliberation, withg^ut the slightest 
bias, as far as I am conscious, personal or political. I have tut a slight ac- 
quaintance with the secretary, and that little is not unfavourable to him. I 
stand wholly disconnected with the two great parlies now contending for as- 
cendency. My political connexions are with that small and denounced party 
which has voluntarily wholly retired from the party strifes of the day, with a 
view of saving, if possible, the liberty and the Constitution of the country, in 
this great crisis of our affairs. 

Having maturely considered, with these impartial feelings, the reasons of the 
secretary-, I am constrained to say that he has entirely failed to make out his 
justification. At the very commencement, he has placed his right to remove 
the deposites on an assumption resting on a misconception of the case. In the 
progress of his argxmient he has entirely abandoned the first, and assumed a new 
and greatly enlarged ground, utterly inconsistent with the first, and equally un- 
tenable ; and yet, as broad as his assumptions are, there is an important part of 
the transaction which he does not attempt to vindicate, and to which he has not 
even alluded. I shall, said INIr. Calhoix, now proceed, without farther remark, 
to make good these assertions. 

The secretary, at the commencement of his argument, assumes the position 
that, in the absence of all legal provision, he, as the head of the financial depart- 
ment, had the right, in virtue of his office, to designate the agent and place for 
the safe-keeping of the public deposites. lie then contends that the 16th sec- 
tion does not restrict his power, which stands, he says, on the same ground that 
it had before the passing of the act incorporating the Bank. It is unnecessary 
to inquire into the correctness of the position assumed by the secretary ; but, if 
it were, it would not be difficult to show that when an agent, with general pow- 
ers, assumes, in the execution of his agency, a power not delegated, the assump- 
tion rests on the necessity of the case ; and that no power, in such case, can be 
lawfully exercised, which was not necessary to effect the object intended. Nor 
■would it be difficult to show that, in this case, the power assumed by the secre- 
tary would belong, not to him, but to the treasurer, who, under the act organ- 
izing the Treasury Department, is expressly charged with the safe-keeping of 
the public funds, for which he is responsible under bond, in heavy penalties. 



Dui, as siroiigiy aim uireuii^ as iiiese consiaeranons Dear on tne question ol the 
power of the secretary, I do not think it necessary to pursue them, for the plain 
reason that the secretary has entirely mistaken the case. It is not a case, as 
he supposes, where there is no legal provision in relation to the safe-keeping 
of the public funds, but one of precisely the opposite character. The 16th sec- 
tion expressly provides that the deposites shall be made in the Bank and its 
branches, and, of course, it is perfectly clear that all powers which the secre- 
tary has derived from the general and inherent powers of his office, in the ab- 
sence of such provision, are wholly inapplicable to this case. Nor is it less 
clear that, if the section had terminated with the provision directing the deposites 
to be made in the Bank, the secretary would have had no more control over the 
subject than myself, or any other senator ; and it follows, of course, that he must 
derive his power, not from any general reasons connected with the nature of 
his office, but from some express provision contained in the section, or some 
other part of the act. It has not been attempted to be shown that there is any- 
such provision in any other section or part of the act. The only control, then, 
which the secretary can rightfully claim over the^^deposites is contained in the 
provision which directs that the deposites shall^^e made in the Bank, unless 
otherwise ordered by the Secretary of the Treasury ; which brings the whole 
question in reference to the deposites to the extent of the power which Con- 
gress intended to confer upon the secretary, in these few words, " unless other- 
wise ordered." 

In ascertaining the intention of Congress, I lay it down as a rule, which I 
suppose will not^be controverted, that all pohtical powers under our free insti- 
tutions are trus|r!^wers, and not rights, liberties, or immunities, belonging per- 
sonally to the ^ffiger. I also lay it down as a rule not less incontrovertible, 
that trust po\^^s are necessarily limited (unless there be some express pro- 
vision to the contrary) to the subject-matter and object of the tnist. This brings 
us to the question. What is the subject and object of the trust in this case ? The 
whole section relates to deposites — to the safe and faithful keeping of the pub- 
lic funds. With this view they are directed to be made in the Bank. With 
the same view, and in order to increase the security, power was conferred on 
the secretary to withhold the deposites ; and, with the same view, he is direct- 
ed to report his reasons for the removal, to Congress. All have one common 
object, the security of the public funds. To this point the whole section con- 
verges. The language of Congress, fairly understood, is. We have selected 
the Bank because we confide in it as a safe and faithful agent to keep the pub- 
lic money ; but, to prevent the abuse of so important a trust, we invest the sec- 
retary with power to remove the deposites, with a view to their increased se- 
curity. And lest the secretary, on his part, should abuse so important a trust, 
and in order still farther to increase that security, we direct, in case of removal, 
that he shall report his reasons. It is obvious, under this view of the subject, 
that the secretary has no right to act in relation to the deposites but with a view 
to their increased security ; that he has no right to order them to be withheld 
from the Bank so long as the funds are safe, and the Bank has faithfully per- 
formed the duties imposed in relation to them ; and not even then, unless the 
deposites can be placed in safer and more faithful hands. That such was the 
opinion of the executive in the first instance, we have demonstrative proof in 
the message of the President to Congress at the close of the last session, which 
placed the subject of the removal of the deposites exclusively on the question 
of their safety ; and that such was also the opinion of the House of Representa- i 
tives then, we have equally conclusive proof from the vote of that body that the , 
public funds in the Bank were safe, which was understood, at that time, on all 
sides, by friends and foes, as deciding the question of the removal of the de- 
posites. 

The extent of the power intended to be conferred being established, the ques- 



■i 



tion now arises, Has the secretary transcended its limit ? It can scarcely be 
necessary to argue this point. It is not even pretended that the public deposites 
were in danger, or that the Bank had not faithfully performed all the duties im- 
posed on it in relation to them, nor that the secretary had pdaced the money in 
a safer or in more faithful hands. So far otherwise, there is not a man who 
hears me who will not admit that the public moneys are now less safe than 
they were in the Bank of the United States. And I will venture to assert that 
not a capitalist can be found who would not ask a considerably higher per cent- 
age to ensure them in their present, than in the place of deposite designated by 
law. If these views are correct, and I hold them to be unquestionable, the ques- 
tion is decided. The secretary has no right to withhold the deposites from the 
Bank. There has been, and can be but one argument advanced in favour of his 
right, which has even the appearance of being tenable — that the power to with- 
hold is given in general terms, and without qualification, " unless the secretary 
otherwise direct.'''' Those who resort to this argument must assume the posi- 
tion, that the letter ought to prevail over the clear and manifest intention of the 
act. They must regard the power of the secretary, not as a trust power, limit- 
ed by the subject and the object of the trust, but as a chartered right, to be used 
according to his discretion and^pleasure. There is a radical defect in our mode 
of construing political powers, of which this and many other instances aflbrd 
striking examples, but I will give the secretary his choice : either the intention 
or the letter must prevail : he may select either, but cannot be permitted to take 
one or the other as may suit his purpose. If he chooses the former, he has 
transcended his powers, as I have clearly demonstrated. If he selects the lat- 
ter, he is equally condemned, as he has clearly exercised pewer not compre- 
hended in the letter of his authority. He has not confined himself simply to 
withholding the public moneys from the Bank of the United Sta|es, but he has 
ordered them to be deposited in other banks, though there is not a word in the 
section to justify it. I do not intend to argue the question whether he had a 
right to order the funds withheld from the United States Bank to be placed in 
the state banks, which he has selected ; but I ask. How has he acquired that 
right ? It rests wholly on construction — on the supposed intention of the Legis- 
lature, which, when it gives a power, intends to give all the means necessary to 
render it available. But, as clear as this principle of construction is, it is not 
more clear than that which would limit the right of the secretary to the question 
of the safe and faithful keeping of the public funds ; and 5 cannot admit that the 
secretary shall be permitted to resort to the letter or to construction, as may 
best be calculated to enlarge his power, when the right construction is denied 
to those who would limit his power by the clear and obvious intention of Con- 
gress. 

I might here, said Mr. Calhoun, rest the question of the power of the secre- 
tary over the deposites, without adding another word. I have placed it on 
grounds from which no ingenuity, however great, or subtlety, however refined, 
can remove it ; but such is the magnitude of the case, and such my desire to 
give the reasons of the secretary the fullest consideration, that I shall follow 
him through the remainder of his reasons. 

That the secretary was conscious that the first position which he assumed, 
and which I have considered, was untenable, we have ample proof in the pre- 
cipitancy with which he retreated from it. He had scarcely laid it down, when, 
without illustration or argument, he passed with a rapid transition, and, I must 
say, a transition as obscure as rapid, to another position wholly inconsistent 
with the first, and in assuming which, he expressly repudiates the idea that the 
safe and faithful keeping of the public funds had any necessary connexion with 
his removal of the deposites ; his power to do which, he places on the broad 
and unlimited ground that he had a right to make such disposition of them as 
the public interest or the convenience of the people might require. I have 



Bdiu mat mc liaiioiiAuii yji uin^ oc>^icicii^ vvcia do uusuuic as ii was lixuiu , uui, OO- 

scure as it is, he has said enough to enable us to perceive the process by which 
he has reached so extraordinary a position ; and we may safely affirm, that his 
arguments are not less extraordinary than the conclusion at which he arrives. 
His first proposition, which, however, he has not ventured to lay down express- 
ly, is, that Congress has an unlimited control over the deposites, and that it 
may dispose of them in whatever manner it may please, in order to promote 
the general welfare and convenience of the people. He next asserts that Con- 
gress has parted with this power under the sixteenth section, which directs the 
deposites to be made in the Bank of the United States, and then concludes 
with affirming that it has invested the Secretary of the Treasury with it, for 
reasons which I am unable to understand. 

It cannot be necessary, before so enlightened a body, that I should undertake 
to refute an argument so utterly untrue in premises and conclusion — to show 
that Congress never possessed the power which the secretary claim_s for it — - 
that it is a power, from its very nature, incapable of such enlargement, being 
limited solely to the safe keeping of the publi'e funds ; that if it existed, it 
would be susceptible of the most dangerous abuses ; that Congress might make 
the wildest and most dangerous association the ^depository of the public funds ; 
might place them in the hands of the fanatics and the madmen of the North, 
who are waging war against the domestic institutions of the South, under the 
plea of promoting the general welfare. But admitting that Congress possessed 
the power which the secretary attributes to it, by what process of reasoning caii 
he show that it has parted with this unlimited power, simply by directing the 
public money^^oVbe deposited in the Bank of the United States ? or, if it has 
-j'^arted with the power, by what extraordinary process has it been transferred 
to the Secretary of the Treasury by those few and simple words, "unless he 
shall other\V%; direct ?" In support of this extraordinary argument, the secre- 
tary has otfered not a single illustration, nor a single remark bearing the sem- 
blance of reason, bv^^one, which I shall now proceed to notice. 

He asserts, and asserts truly, that the Bank charter is a contract between the 
government, or, rather, the people of the United States and the Bank, and then 
assumes that it constitutes him a common agent or trustee, to superintend the 
execution of the stipulations contained in that portion of the contract compre- 
hended in the sixteenth section. Let us now, taking these assumptions to be 
true, ascertain what those stipulations are, the superintendence of the execution 
of which, as he affirms, are jointly confided by the parties to the secretary. 
The government stipulated, on its part, that the public money should be deposi- 
ted in the Bank of the United States — a great and valuable privilege, on which 
the successful operation of the institution mainly depends. The Bank, on its 
part, stipulated that the funds should be safely kept, that the duties imposed in 
relation to them should be faithfully discharged, and that for this, with other 
privileges, it would pay to the government the sum of one million five hundred 
thousand dollars. These are the stipulations, the execution of which, accord- 
ing to the secretary's assumption, he has been appointed, as joint agent or trus- 
tee, to superintend, and from which he would assume the extraordinary power 
which he claims over the deposites, to dispose of them in such manner as he 
may think the public interest or the convenience of the people may require. 

Is it not obvious that the whole extent of power conferred upon him, admitting 
his assumption to be true, is to withhold the deposites in case that the Bank 
should violate its stipulations in relation to them, on one side, and on the other, 
to prevent the government from withholding the deposites, so long as the Bank 
faithfully performed its part of the contract ? This is the full extent of his pow- 
er. According to his own showing, not a particle more can be added. But 
there is another aspect in which the position in which the secretary has pla- 
ced himself may be viewed. It offers for consideration not only a question of 



the extent of his power, but a question as to the nature and extent of duty 
which has been imposed upon him. If the position be such as he has descri- 
bed there has been confided to him a trust of the most sacred character, ac- 
companied by duties of the most solemn obligation. He stands, by the mutual 
confidence of the parties, vested with the high judicial power to determine on 
the infraction or observance of a contract in which government and a large and 
respectable portion of the citizens are deeply interested ; and, in the execution 
of this hiffh power, he is bound, by honour and conscience, so to act as to pro- 
tect each of the parties in the full enjoyment of their respective portion of ben- 
efit in the contract, so long as they faithfully observe it. How has the secre- 
tary performed these solemn duties, which, according to his representation, 
have been imposed upon him ? Has he protected the Bank against the aggres- 
sion of the government, or the government against the unfaithful conduct of the 
Bank in relation to the deposites ? Or has he, forgetting his sacred obligations, 
disregarded the interests of both : on one side, divesting the Bank of the de- 
posites, and on the other, defeating the government in the intended security of 
the public funds, by seizing an them as the property of the executive, to be dis- 
posed at pleasure to favourite and partisan banks ? 

But I shall relieve the secretary from this awkward and disreputable posi- 
tion in which his own arguments have placed him. He is not the mutual trus- 
tee, as he has represented, of the government and the Bank, but simply the 
agent of the former, vested, under the contract, with power to withhold the de- 
posites, with a view, as has been stated, to their additional security — to their 
safe keeping ; and if he had but for a moment reflected on th^fact that he was 
directed to report his reasons to Congress only, and not alsfiJ tq the Bank, for 
withholding the deposites, he could scarcely have failed tC|<^ceive that he 
was simply the agent of one of the parties, and not, as he supposes, a joint 
agent of both. 

The secretary having established, as he supposes, his right to dispose of 
the deposites as, in his opinion, the general interest and convenience of the 
people might require, proceeds to claim and exercise power with a boldness 
commensurate with the extravagance of the right which he has assumed. He 
commences with a claim to determine, in his official character, that the Bank 
of the United States is unconstitutional: a monopoly, baneful to the welfare of 
the community. Having determined this point, he comes to the conclusion 
that the charter of the Bank ought not to be renewed, and then assumes that it 
will not be renewed. Having reached this point, he then determines that it is 
his duty to remove the deposites. No one can object that Mr. Taney, as a 
citizen, in his individual character, should entertain an opinion as to the uncon- 
stitutionality of the Bank ; but that he, acting in his official character, and per- 
forming official acts under the charter of the Bank, should undertake to deter- 
mine that the institution was unconstitutional, and that those who granted the 
charter, and bestowed upon him his power to act imder it, had violated the 
Constitution, is an assumption of power of a nature which I will not undertake 
to characterize, as I wish not to be personal. 

But he is not content with the power simply to determine on the unconstitu- 
tionality of the Bank. He goes far beyond : he claims to be the organ of the 
voice of the people. In this high character, he pronounces that the question 
of the renewal of the Bank charter was put at issue at the last presidential ejec- 
tion, and that the people had determined that it should not be renewed. I do 
not, said Mr. Calhoun, intend to enter into the argument whether, in point of 
fact, the renewal of the charter was put at issue at the last election. That 
point was ably and fully discussed by the honourable senators from Kentucky 
(xMr. Clay) and New-Jersey (Mr. Southard), who conclusively proved that no 
such question was involved in the issue ; and if it were, the issue comprehend- 
ed so many others, that it was impossible to conjecture on which the election 



Secretary of the Treasury constitutes himself the organ of the people of the Uni- 
ted States. He has the reputation of being an able lawyer, and can he be ig- 
norant that, so long as the Constitution of the United States exists, the only or- 
gans of the people of these states, as far as the action of the General Govern- 
ment is concerned, are the several departments, legislative, executive, and judi- 
cial, which, acting within the respective limits assigned by the Constitution, 
have a right to pronounce authoritatively the voice of the people ? A claim on 
the part of the executive to interpret, as the secretary has done, the voice of 
the people through any other channel, is to shake the foundation of our system. 
Has the secretary forgotten that the last step to absolute power is this very as- 
sumption which he has claimed for that department ? I am thus brought, said 
Mr. C.jto allude to the extraordinary manifesto read by the President to the 
cabinet, ajid which is so intimately connected with the point immediately under 
consideration. That document, though apparently addressed to the cabinet, 
was clearly and manifestly intended as an appeal to the people of the United 
States, and opens a new and direct organ of couimimication between the Presi- 
dent and them unknown to the Constitution ar\d the laws. There are but two 
channels known to either through which the president can communicate with 
the people — by messages to the two houses of Congress, as expressly provided 
|F for in the Constitution, or by proclamation, setting forth the interpretations 
""'^which he places upon a law it has become his official duty to execute. Going 
beyond, is one among the alarming signs of the times which portend the over- 
throw of the Constitution and the approach of despotic power. 
:/ The secretary, having determined that the Bank was unconstitutional, and 
f that the people had pronounced against the recharter, concludes that Congress 
■^' had nothing, to do.>with the subject. With a provident foresight, he perceives 
the didlculty aa4y^barrassment into which the currency of the country would 
be thrown ori-"Afe termination of the Bank charter ; to prevent which, he pro- 
ceeds deliberately, with a parental care, to supply a new currency, " equal to or 
better" than that which Congress had supplied. With this view, he determines 
on an immediate removal of the deposites ; he puts them in certain state insti- 
tutions, intending to organize them, after the fashion of the empire state, into a 
great safety-fund system, but which, unfortunately, undoubtedly for the project- 
ors, if not for the country, the limited power of the state banks did not permit 
him to effect. But a substitute was found by associating them in certain arti- 
cles of agreement, and appointing an inspector-general of all this league of 
banks ! and all this without law or appropriation ! Is it not amazing that it never 
occurred to the secretary that the subject of currency belonged exclusively to 
Congress, and that to assume to regulate it was a plain usurpation of the pow- 
ers of that department of the government 1 

Having thus assumed the power officially to determine on the constitutional- 
ity of the Bank ; having erected himself into an organ of the people's voice, and 
settled the question of the regulation of the currency, he next proceeds to as- 
sume the judicial powers over the Bank. He declares that the Bank has trans- 
cended its powers, and has, therefore, forfeited its charter, for which he indicts 
on the institution the severe and exemplary punishment of withholding the de- 
posites ; and all this in the face of an express provision investing the court 
with power touching the infraction of the charter, directing in what manner the 
trial should be commenced and conducted, and securing expressly to the Bank 
the sacred right of trial by jury in finding the facts. All this passed for nothing 
in the eyes of the secretary, who was too deeply engrossed in providing for the 
common welfare to regard either Congress, the Court, or the Constitution. The 
secretary next proceeds to supervise the general operations of the Bank, pro- 
nouncing, with authority, that at one time it has discounted too freely, and at an- 
other too sparingly, without reflecting that all the control which the government 



can rightfully exercise over the operations of the institution is througti the tive 
directors who represent the government in this respect. Directors ! Mr. Cal- 
houn exclaimed, did I say ? (alluding to the present). No, spies is their prop- 

er designation. , . , t • i i i_ 

I cannot said Mr. C, proceed with the remarks which 1 intended on the re- 
mainder of the secretary's reasons : I have not patience to dwell on assump- 
tions of power so bold, so lawless, and so unconsthutional ; they deserve not 
the name of argument, and I cannot waste time in treating them as such. 
There are, hov/ever, two which I cannot pass over, not because they are more 
extraordinary or audacious than the others, but for another quality, Avhich 1 
choose not to designate. 

The secretary alleges that the Bank has interfered with the politics of the 
countrj-. If this be true, it certainly is a most heinous offence. The-Bank is 
a great public trust, possessing, for the purpose of discharging the trust, great 
power and influence, which it could not pervert from the object intended to that 
of influencing the politics of the country without being guilty of a great politi- 
cal crime. In making thesfhretQarks, I do not intend to give any countenance 
to the truth of the charge 'alleged by the secretary, nor to deny to the officers 
of the Bank the right which bel«Migs to them, in common with every chizen, free- 
ly to form political principles, and act on them in their private capacity, with- 
out permitting them to influence their official condu<;t. But it is straaage it did^ 
not occur to the secretary, while he was accusing and punishing the Ba^k on 
the charge of interfering in the politics of the country, that the government also 
was a great trust, vested with powers still more extensive, auil innnei 
measurably greater than that of the Bank, given to enable it to dischar-i , i 
jeet for which h was created ; and that it has no more right to pervert .- uov.-- 
er and influence into the means of controlling the politics of the coram \ than 
the Bank itself. Can it be unknown to him that the fourth :uiditor of tli. tr.asu- 
ry (an officer in his own department), the man who has nKutevso proiinncnt a 
figure in this transaction, was daily and hourly meddlin^.iu ']p6litics. and that 
he is one of the principal political managers of the adminTstration 1 ( ".in he be 
ignorant that the whole power of the government has been-'p^rrfetfed into a great 
political machine, with a view of corrupting and controlling the country ? Can 
he be ignorant that the avowed and open policy of the government is to reward 
politicaf friends and punish political enemies ? and that, acting on this princi- 
ple, it has driven from office hundreds of honest and competent officers for opin- 
ion's sake only, and filled their places with devoted partisans ? Can he be ig- 
norant that the real offence of the Bank is not that it has intermeddled in poli- 
tics, but because it toouhl not intermeddle on the side of power ? There is no- 
thing more dignified than reproof from the lips of innocence, or punishment from, 
the hands of justice ; but change the picture — let the guilty reprove and the 
criminal punish, and what more odious, more hateful, can be presented to the 
imagination ? 

The secretary next tells us, in the same spirit, that the Bank had been waste- 
ful of the public funds. That it has spent some thirty, forty, or fifty thousand 
dollars — I do not remember the exact amount (trifles have no weight in the 
determination of so great a question) — in circulating essays and speeches in de- 
fence of the institution, of which sum, one fifth part — some seven thousand dol- 
lars — belonged to the government. AVell, sir, if the Bank has really irasted this 
amount of the public money, it is a grave charge. It has not a right to waste a 
single cent ; but I must say, in defence of the Bank, that, assailed as it was by 
the executive, it would have been unfaithful to its trust, both to 'he stockholders 
and to the public, had it not resorted to ever}' proper means in its power to de- 
fend its conduct, and, among others, the free circulation of able and judicious 
publications. 

But admit that the Bank has been guilty of wasting the pu.iic funds to the 



lull CAlClit \^IICH.^^\JL UJ Kixv^ v:»v^\_.ivyv(j,i^ , i *\VU1U. aoiv Al 11^, l/llt> xn^ a,\_l VJl Llic llliail- 

cial department of the government, is not under as high and solemn obligation 
to take care of the moneyed interest of the public as the Bank itself. I would 
ask him to answer me a few simple questions : IIow has he performed this duty 
in relation to the interest which the public holds in the Bank ? Has he been 
less wasteful than he has charged the Bank to have been I Has he not wast- 
ed thousands where the Bank, even according to his own statement, has hun- 
dreds ? Has he not, by withdrawing the deposites and placing them in the 
state banks, where the public receives not a cent of interest, greatly affected 
the dividends of the Bank of the United States, in which the government, as a 
stockholder, is a loser to the amount of one fifth of the diminution ? a sum which 
I will venture to predict will many fold exceed the entire amount which the 
Bank has expended in its defence. But this is a small, a very small proportion 
of the public loss, in consequence of the course which the executive has pur- 
sued in relation to the Bank, and which has reduced the value of the shares 
from 130 to 108 (a senator near me says much more. It may be; I am not 
particular in such things), and on which the public sustains a corresponding 
loss on its share of the stock, amounting to seven millions of dollars — a sum 
more than two hundred fold greater than the waste which he has charged upon 
the Bank. Other administrations may exceed this in talents, patriotism, and 
honesty, but, certainly, in audacity, in effrontery, it stands without a parallel ! 

The secretary has brought forward many and grievous charges against the 
Bank. I willnot condescend to notice them — it is the conduct of the secreta- 
ry, and not that of the Bank, which is immediately under examination, and he 
has no right to drag the conduct of the Bank into the issue, beyond its opera- 
tions in regard to the deposites. To that extent I am prepared to examine his 
allegations again^la^t, but beyond that he has no right — no, not the least — to ar- 
raign the conductfof the Bank ; and I, for one, will not, by noticing his charges 
beyond that point, sanction his authority to call its conduct in question. But 
let the point in issue be determined, and I, as far as my voice extends, will give 
to those who desirent the means of the freest and most unlimited inquiry into 
its conduct. I am no partisan of the Bank — I am connected with it in no way, 
by moneyed or political ties. I might say, with truth, that the Bank owes as 
much to me as to any other individual iu the country ; and I might even add 
that, had it not been for my efforts, it woxi)4'iiot have been chartered. Standing 
in this relation to the institution, a high"^nse of delicacy, a regard to independ- 
ence and character, has restrained me from any connexion with the institution 
whatever, except some trifling accommodations in the way of ordinary business, 
which were not of the slightest importance either to the Bank or myself. 

But while I shall not condescend to notice the charges of the secretary 
against the Bank beyond the extent which I have stated, a sense of duty to the 
institution, and regard to the part which I took in its creation, compels me to 
notice two allegations against it which have fallen from another quarter. It is 
said that the Bank had no agency, or at least efficient agency, in the restoration 
of specie payment in 1817, and that it had failed to furnish the country with a 
uniform and sound currency, as had been promised at its creation. Both of 
these allegations I pronounce to be Avithout just foundation. To enter into a 
minute examination of them would carry me too far from the subject, and I must 
content myself with saying that, having been on the political stage, without in- 
terruption, from that day to this — having been an attentive observer of the ques- 
tion of the currency throughout the whole period — that the Bank has been an 
indispensable agent in the restoration of specie payments ; that without it the 
restoration could not have been effected short of the utter prostration of all the 
moneyed institutions of the country, and an entire depreciation of bank paper ; 
and that it has not only restored specie payment, but has given a currency far 
more uniform between the extremes of the country than was anticipated, or even 
.,1. R 



dreamed of, at the time of its creation. I will say for myself, that I did not be- 
lieve, at that time, that the exchange between the Atlantic and the West would 
be brouo-ht lower than two and a half per cent. — the estimated expense then, 
including insurance and loss of time, of transporting specie between the two 
points. How much it was below the anticipated point I need not state : the 
whole commercial world knows that it was not a fourth part at the time of the 
removal of the deposites. 

But to return from this digression. Though I will not notice the charges of 
the secretary for the reasons already stated, I will take the liberty of propound- 
ino- to those who support them on this floor a few plain questions. If there 
be in banking institutions an inherent tendency so strong to abuse and corrup- 
tion as they contend — if, in consequence of this tendency, the Bank of the Uni- 
ted States be guilty of the enormous charges and corruptions alleged, notwith- 
standing its responsibility to the government and our control over it, v/hat is to 
be expected from an irresponsible league of banks, as called by the senator from 
Kentucky (M. Clay), over which we have no legal control? If our power of 
renewing the charter of the Bank of the United States — if our right to vacate 
the charter by scire facias, in case of misconduct— if the influence vi^iich the 
appointment of five government directors gives us — and, finally, if the power 
which we have of appointing committees to examine into its condition, are not 
sufficient to hold the institution in check ; if, in spite of all these, it has, from the 
innate corruption of such institutions, been guilty of the enormous abuses and 
crimes charged against it, what may we not expect from the asso<;iated banks, 
the favourites of the treasury, over the renewal of whose charter the government 
has no power, against which it can issue no scire facias, in whose direction it 
has not a single individual, and into whose conduct Congress can appoint no 
committee to look ? With these checks all withdrawn, wh^ will be the con- 
dition of the public funds ? ^ 

I, said Mr. Calhoun, stated in the outset of my remarks, that, as broad as 
was the power which the secretary had assumed in relation to the deposites, 
there was a portion of the transaction of a highly important^ character, to which 
he has not alluded, and in relation to which he has not even attempted a justifi- 
cation. I will now proceed to make good this assertion to the letter. 

There is a material diflerence between withholding money from going into the 
Bank, and ivithdrawing it after it ha§ been placed there. The former is authorized 
in the manner which 1 have stated, uMer the sixteenth section, which directs, as 
has been frequently stated, that the public money shall be deposited in the Bank, 
unless otherwise ordered by the Secretary of the Treasury. But neither that sec- 
tion, nor any portion of the act incorporating the Bank, nor, in truth, any other 
act, gives the secretary any authority of himself to withdraw public money de- 
posited in the Bank. There is, I repeat, a material difl"erence between with- 
holding public money from deposite and withdrawing it. When paid into the 
place designated by law as the deposite of the public money, it passes to the 
credit of the treasurer, and then is in the treasury of the United States, where 
it is placed under the protection of the Constitution itself, and from which, by 
an express provision of the Constitution, it can only be withdrawn by an appro- 
priation made by law. So careful were the framers of the act of 1816 to leave 
nothing to implication, that express authority is given to the Secretary of the 
Treasury, in the fifteenth section, to transfer the deposites from one place to an- 
other, for the convenience of disbursements ; but which, by a strange perversion, 
is now attempted to be so construed as to confer on the secretary the power to 
withdraw the money from the deposite, and loan it to favourite state banks — I 
express myself too favourably, I should say give (they pay no interest) — with 
a view to sustain their credits or enlarge their profits — a power not only far be- 
yond the secretary, but which Congress itself could not exercise without a fla- 
grant breach of the Constitution. But it is said, in answer to these views. 



that money paid m deposite into the Bank, as directed by law, is not in the 
treasury. I will not stop, said Mr. C, to reply to such an objection. If it be 
not in the treasury, where is the treasury ? If it be not money in the treasury, 
where is the money annually reported to be in the treasury ? where the eight or 
nine millions which, by the annual report of the secretary, are said to be now in 
the treasury ? Are we to understand that none of this money is, in truth in the 
, treasury ? that it is floating about at large, subject to be disposed of, to be given 
I away, at the will of the executive, to favourites and partisans ? So it would 
seem ; for it appears, by a correspondence between the treasurer and the cash- 
ier of the Bank, derived through the Bank (the secretary not deemino- it worth 
while to give the slightest information of the transaction, as if a matter of 
course), that he has drawn out two millions and a quarter of the public money 
/ without c^ppropriation, and distributed it at pleasure among his favourites ! 

But it jis attempted to vindicate the conduct of the secretary on the ground of 
precederii I will not stop to notice whether the cases cited are in point, nor 
will I avail myself of the great and striking advantage that I might have on the 
question of precedent : this case stands alone and distinct from all others. There 
is none similar to it in magnitude and importance. I waive all that : I place 
myself on higher grounds— I stand on the immovable principle that, on a ques- 
tion of law and constitution, in a deliberative assembly, there is no room no 

place for precedents. To admit them would be to make the violation of to-day 
the law and Constitution of to-morrow ; and to substitute in the place of the writ- 
ten and sacred will of the people and the Legislature, the infraction of those char, 
ged with the execution of the laio. Such, in my opinion, is the relative force of 
law and constitution on one side, as compared with precedents on the other. 
Viewed in a different light, not in reference to the law or Constitution, but to 
the conduct of the officer, I am disposed to give rather more weight to prece- 
dents, when the question relates to an excuse or apology for the officer, in case 
of infraction. If the infraction be a trivial one, in a case not calculated to ex- 
cite attention, an offi„cer might fairly excuse himself on the ground of precedent ; 
but in one like this, of the utmost magnitude, involving the highest interests and 
most important principles, where the attention of the officer must be aroused to 
a most carefiil examination, he cannot avail himself of the plea of precedent to 
excuse his conduct. It is a case where false precedents are to be corrected, and 
not followed. An officer ought to be ashamed, in such a case, to attempt to vin- 
dicate his conduct on a charge of violating law or Constitution by pleading pre- 
cedent. The principle in such case is obvious. If the secretary's right to 
withdraw public money from the treasury be clear, he has no need of precedent 
to vindicate him. If not, he ought not, in a case of so much magnitude, to 
have acted. 

I have not (said Mr. Calhoun) touched a question, which has had so promi- 
nent a part in the debate, whether the withholding of the deposites was the act 
of the secretary or the President. Under my view of the subject, the question 
is not of the slightest importance. It is equally unauthorized and illegal, 
whether done by President or secretary ; but^ as the question has been agitated, 
and as my views do not entirely correspond on this point with those advocating 
the side which I do, I deem it due to frankness to express my sentiments. 

I have no doubt that the President removed the former secretary, and placed 
the present in his place, expressly with a view to the removal of the deposites. 
I am equally clear, under all the circumstances of the case, that the President's 
conduct is wholly indefensible ; and, among other objections, I fear he had in 
view, in the removal, an object eminently dangerous and unconstitutional — to 
give an advantage to his veto never intended by the Constitution — a power in- 
tended as a shield to protect the executive against the encroachment of the 
legislative department — to maintain the present state of things against dangerous 
or hasty innovation, but which, I fear, is, in this case, intends*^ ■ « a sword to 



defend the usurpation of the executive. I say I fear ; for, ahhough the circmn- 
stance of this case leads to a just apprehension that such is the intention, I will 
not permit myself to assert that such is the fact — that so lawless and unconsti- 
tutional an object is contemplated by the President, till his act shall compel me 
to believe to the contrary. But while I thus severely condemn the conduct of 
the President in removing the former secretary and appointing the present, I 
must say that, in my opinion, it is a case of the abuse, and not of the usurpation 
of power. The President has the right of removal from office^ The power of 
xemoval. wherever it exists, does, from necessity, involve the power of general 
supervision ; nor can I doubt that it might be constitutionally exercised in ref- 
erence to the deposites. Reverse the present case : suppose the late secreta- 
ly, instead of being against, had been in favour of the removal, and that the 
President, instead of for, had been against it, deeming the removal not only in- 
expedient, but, under the circumstances, illegal ; would any man doubt thaty 
imder such circumstances, he had a right to remove his secretary, if it were the 
only means of preventing the removal of the deposites ? Nay, would it not be 
his indispensable duty to have removed him ? and had he not, would not he 
have been universally, and justly, held responsible ? 

1 have now (said Mr. C.) ofl'ered all the remarks I intended in reference to 
the deposite question ; and, on reviewing the whole ground, I must say, that 
the secretary, in removing the deposites, has clearly transcended his power ; that 
he has violated the contract between the Bank and the United States ; that, iri 
so doing, he has deeply injured that large and respectable portion of our citi- 
zens who have been invited, on the faith of the government, to invest their 
property in the institution ; while, at the same time, he has deeply injured the 
public in its character of stockholder ; and, finally, that he has ir.flicted a deep 
-wound on the public faith. To this last I attribute the present embarrassment 
in the currency, which has so injuriously affected all the great interests of the 
country. The credit of the country is an important ponion of the currency of 
the country — credit in every shape, public and private — ©redit,- not only in the 
shape of paper, but that of faith and confidence between man and man — through 
the agency of which, in all its fonns, the great and mighty exchanges of this 
commercial countr}', at home and abroad, are, in a great measure, effected. To 
inflict a wound anywhere, particularly on the public faith, is to embarrass all 
the channels of currency and exchange ; and it is to this, and not to the with- 
drawing the few millions of dollars from circulation, that I attribute the present 
moneyed embarrassment. Did I believe the contrary — if I thought that any great 
and permanent distress would of itself resxilt from winding up, in a regular and 
legal manner, the present or any other Bank of the United States, I would deem 
it an evidence of the dangerous power of the institution, and, to that extent, an 
argument against its existence ; but, as it is, I regard the present embarrass- 
ment, not as an argument against the Bank, but an argument against the law- 
less and wanton exercise of power on the part of the executive — an embarrass- 
ment which is likely to continue if the deposites be not restored. The banks 
■which have received them, at the expense of the public faith, and in violation 
of law, will never be permitted to enjoy their spoils in quiet. No one who re- 
gards the subject in the light in which I do, can ever give his sanction to any 
law intended to protect or carry through the present illegal arrangement ; on 
the contrary, all such must feel bound to wage perpetual war against a usurpa- 
tion of power so fiagrant as that which controls the present deposites of the 
public money. If I stand alone (said Mr. Calhoun), I, at least, will continue 
to maintain the contest so long as I remain in public life. 

As important (said Mr. Calhoun) as I consider the question of the deposites, 
in all its bearings, public and private, it is one on the surface, a mere pretext 
to another, and one greatly more important, which lies beneath, and which 
must be taken into consideration, to understand correctly all the circumstances 



auenuing this extraorainary transaction. It is lelt and acknowjeugeu on all 
sides that there is another and a deeper question, which has excited the pro- 
found sensation and alarm which pervade the country. 

If we are to believe what we hear from the advocates of the administration, 
we would suppose at one time that the real question was Bank or no Bank ; at 
another, that the question was between the United States Bank and the state 
banks ; and, finally, that it was a struggle on the part of the administration to 
guard and defend the rights of the states against the encroachments of the Gen- 
eral Government. The administration the guardians and defenders of the 
rights of the states ! What shall I call it ? audacity or hypocrisy ? The au- 
thors of the proclamation the guardians and defenders of the rights of the states ! 
The authors of the war message against a member of this confederacy — the au- 
thors of the " bloody bill" the guardians and defenders of the rights of the 
states ! This a struggle for state rights ? No, sir : state rights are no more. 
The .struggle is over for the present. The bill of the last session, which vested 
in the government the right of judging of the extent of its powers, finally and 
conclusively, and gave it the right of enforcing its judgments by the sword, de- 
stroyed all distinction between delegated and reserved rights, concentrated in 
the government the entire power of the system, and prostrated the states, as poor 
and helpless corporations, at the foot of this sovereignty. 

Nor is it more true that the real question is Bank or no Bank. Taking the 
deposite question in the broadest sense ; suppose, as it is contended by the 
friends of the administration, that it involves the question of the renewal of the 
charter, and, consequently, the existence of the Bank itself, still the banking sys- 
tem would stand almost untouched and unimpaired. Four hundred banks 
would still remain scattered over this wide Republic, and on the ruins of the 
United States Bank many would rise to be added to the present list. Under 
this aspect of the subject, the only possible question that could be presented 
for consideration would be, whether the banking system was more safe, more 
beneficial, or more constitutional, with or without the United States Bank. 

If, said Mr. Calhoun, this was a question of Bank or no Bank — if it involved 
the existence of the banking system, it would indeed be a great question — one 
of the first magnitude, and, with my present impression, long entertained and 
daily increasing, I would hesitate — long hesitate — before I would be found un- 
der the banner of the system. I have great doubts, if doubts they may be call- 
ed, as to the soundness and tendency of the whole system, in all its modifica- 
tions : I have great fears that it will be found hostile to liberty and the advance 
of civilization — fatally hostile to liberty in our country', where the system ex- 
ists in its worst and most dangerous form. Of all institutions affecting the 
great question of the distribution of wealth — a question least explored and the 
most important of any in the whole range of political economy — the banking in- 
stitution has, if not the greatest, one of the greatest, and, I fear, most pernicious 
influence on the mode of distribution. Were the question really before us, I 
would not shun the responsibility, as great as it might be, of freely and fully of- 
fering my sentiments on these deeply-important points ; but, as it is, I must 
content myself with the few remarks which I have thrown out. 

What, then, is the real question which now agitates the country ? I answer, 
it is a struggle between the executive and legislative departments of the gov- 
ernment: a struggle, not in relation to the existence of the Bank, but which, 
Congress or the President, should have the power to create a Bank, and the 
consequent control over the currency of the country. This is the real question. 
Let us not deceive ourselves : this league, this association of banks, created by 
the executiv'e, bound together by its influence, united in common articles of as- 
sociation, vivified and sustained by receiving the deposites of the public money, 
and having their notes converted, by being received everywhere by the treasu- 
ry, into the common currency of the country', is, to all intents and purposes, a 



Bank of the United States — the executive Bank of the United States, as distin- 
guished from that of Congress. However it might fail to perforin satisfactorily 
the useful functions of the Bank of the United States as incorporated by law, it 
would outstrip it — far outstrip it — in all its dangerous qualities, in extending the 
power, the influence, and the corruption of the government. It is impossible 
to conceive any institution more admirably calculated to advance these objects. 
Not only the selected banks, but the whole banking institutions of the country, 
and with them the entire money power, for the purpose of speculation, peculation, 
and corruption, would be placed under the control of the executive. A system 
of menaces and promises will be established : of menace to the banks in pos- 
session of the deposites, but which might not be entirely subservient to execu- 
tive views ; and of promise of future favours to those who may not as yet enjoy 
its favours. Between the two, the banks would be left without influence, hon- 
our, or honesty, and a system of speculation and stock-jobbing would com- 
mence, unequalled in the annals of our country. I fear they have already com- 
menced ; I fear the means which have been put in the hands of the minions of 
power by the removal of the deposites, and placing them in the vaults of de- 
pendant banks, have extended their cupidity to the public lands, particularly in 
the Southwest, and that to this we must attribute the recent phenomena in that 
quarter — immense and valuable tracts of land sold at short notice ; sales fraudu- 
lently postponed to aid the speculators, with which, if I am not misinformed, a 
name not unknown to this body has performed a prominent part. But I leave 
this to my vigilant and able friend from Mississippi (Mr. Poindexter), at the 
head of the Committee on Public Lands, who, I doubt not, will see justice done 
to the public. As to stock-jobbing, this new arrangement will open a field 
which Rothschild himself may envy. It has been found hard work — very 
hard, no doubt — by the jobbers in stock, who have been engaged in attempts to 
raise or depress the price of United States Bank stock ; but no work will be 
more easy than to raise or depress the price of the stock of the selected banks,, 
at the pleasure of the executive. Nothing more will be required than to give 
or withhold deposites ; to draw, or abstain from drawing warrants ; to pamper 
them at one time, and starve them at another. Those who would be in the se- 
cret, and who would know when to buy and when to sell, would have the means 
of realizing, by dealing in the stocks, whatever fortune they might please. 

So long as the question is one between a Bank of the United States incorpo- 
rated by Congress, and that system of banks which has been created by the 
will of the executive, it is an insult to the understanding to discourse on the 
pernicious tendency and unconstitutionality of the Bank of the United States. 
To bring up that question fairly and legitimately, you must go one step farther : 
you must divorce the government and the banking system. You must refuse 
all connexion with banks. You must neither receive nor pay away bank-notes ; 
you must go back to the old system of the strong box, and of gold and silver. 
If you have a right to receive bank-notes at all — to treat them as money by re- 
ceiving them in your dues, or paying them away to creditors — you have a right 
to create a bank. Whatever the government receives and treats as money, is 
money in efliect ; and if it be money, then they have the right, under the Consti- 
tution, to regulate it. Nay, they are bound by a high obligation to adopt the 
most efficient means, according to the nature of that which they have recogni- 
sed as money, to give it the utmost stability and uniformity of value. And if 
it be in the shape of bank-notes, the most efficient means of giving those quali- 
ties is a Bank of the United States, incorporated by Congress. Unless you 
give the highest practical uniformity to the value of bank-notes, so long as you 
receive them in your dues, and treat them as money, you violate that provision 
of the Constitution which provides that taxation shall be uniform throughout the 
United States. There is no other alternative : I repeat, you must divorce the 
government entirely from the banking system, or, if not, you are boimd to incor- 



poraie a oanK as luts uuiy saie aim erncient means oi giving stability ^nd uni- 
formity to the currency. And should the deposites not be restored, and the 
present illegal and unconstitutional connexion between the executive and the 
league of banks continue, I shall feel it my duty, if no one else moves, to in- 
troduce a measure to prohibit government from receiving or touching bank-notes 
in any shape whatever, as the only means left of giving safety and stability to 
the ourrency, and saving the country from corruption and ruin. 

Viewing the question, in its true light, as a struggle on the part of the execu- 
tive to seize on the power of Congress, and to unite in the President the power 
of the sword and the purse, the senator from Kentucky (Mr. Clay) said, truly, 
and, let me add, philosophically, that we are in the midst of a revolution. Yes, 
the very existence of free governments rests on the proper distribution and or- 
ganization of power ; and to destroy this distribution, and thereby concentrate 
power in any one of the departments, is to effect a revolution ; but, while I 
agree with the senator that we are in the midst of a revolution, I cannot atrree 
with him as to the time at which it commenced, or the point to which it has 
progressed. Looking to the distribution of the powers of the General Govern- 
ment — into the legislative, executive, and judicial departments — and confinino- 
his views to the encroachment of the executive upon t-he legislative, he dates 
the commencement of the revolution but sixty days previous to the meeting of 
the present Congress. I, said Mr. Calhoun, take a wider range, and date it 
from an earlier period. Besides the distribution among the departments of the 
General Government, there belongs to our system another, and a far more im- 
portant division or distribution of power — that between the states and the Gen- 
eral Government, the reserved and delegated rights, the maintenance of which 
is still more essential to the preservation of our institutions. Taking this wide 
review of our political system, the revolution in the midst of which we are, be- 
gan, not, as supposed by the senator from Kentucky, shortly before the com- 
mencement of the present session, but many years ago, with the commence- 
ment of the restrictive system, and terminated its first stage with the passage 
of the force bill of the last session, which absorbed all the rights and sovereign- 
ty of the states, and consolidated them in this government. While this pro- 
cess was going on, of absorbing the reserved powers of the states on the part 
of the General Government, another commenced, of concentrating in the execu- 
tive the powers of the other two, the legislative and judicial departments of the 
government, which constitutes the second stage of the revolution, in which we 
have advanced almost to the termination. 

The senator from Kentucky, in connexion with this part of his argument, read a 
striking passage from one of the most pleasing and instructive writers in any lan- 
guage (Plutarch), giving the description of Caesar forcing himself, sword in hand, 
into the treasury of the Roman Commonwealth. We are at the same stao-e of 
our political revolution, and the analogy between the two cases is complete, va- 
ried only by the character of the actors and the circumstances of the times. 
That was a case of an intrepid and bold warrior, as an open plunderer, seiz- 
ing forcibly the treasury of the country, which, in that Republic, as well as 
ours, was confided to the custody of the legislative department of the govern- 
ment. The actors in our case are of a different character : artful and cunning 
politicians, and not fearless warriors. They have entered the treasury, not 
sword in hand, as public plunderers, but with the false keys of sophistry, under 
the silence of midnight. The motive and object are the same, varied only by 
character and circumstances. " With money I will get men, and with men 
money," was the maxim of the Roman plunderer. With money we will get 
partisans, with partisans votes, and with votes money, is the maxim of our pub- 
lic pilferers. With men and money, Caesar struck down Roman liberty at the 
fatal battle of Pharsalia, never to rise again ; from which disastrous hour, all the 
powers of the Roman Republic were consolidated in the person of Cajsar, and 



■i 



perpetuated in his line. "With money and corrupt partisans, a great efTort is 
now making to choke and stifle the voice of American liberty, through all its con- 
stitutional and legal organs ; by pensioning the press ; by overawing the other 
departments ; and, finally, by setting up a new organ, composed of office-holders 
and partisans, under the name of a national convention, which, counterfeiting the 
voice of the people, will, if not resisted, in their name dictate the succession ; 
when the deed shall have been done — -the revolution completed — and all the 
powers of our Republic, in like manner, consolidated in the executive in time, 
and perpetuated by his dictation. 

The senator from Kentucky (Mr. C.) anticipates with confidence that the 
small party who were denounced at the last session as traitors and disuuionists 
will be found, on this trying occasion, standing in the front rank, and manfully 
resisting the advance of despotic power. I, said Mr. Calhoun, heard the an- 
ticipation with pleasure, not on account of the compliment which it implied, bul 
the evidence which it affords that the cloud which has been so industriously 
thrown over the character and motive of that small, but patriotic party, begins 
to be dissipated. The senator hazarded nothing in the prediction. That party 
is the determined, the fixed, and sworn enemy to usurpation, come from \vha& 
quarter and under what form it may — whether from the executive upon the other 
departments of this government, or from this government on the sovereignty and 
rights of the states. The resolution and fortitude with which it maintained its 
position at the last session, under so many difliculties and dangers, in defence 
of the states against the encroachments of the General Government, furnished 
evidence not to be mistaken, that that party, in the present momentous struggle, 
would be found arrayed in defence of the rights of Congress against the en- 
croachments of the President. And let me tell the senator from Kentucky, said 
Mr. C, that, if the present struggle against executive usurpation be successful, 
it will be owing to the success with which we, the nullifiers — I am not afraid 
of the word — maintained the rights of the states against the encroachment of 
the General Govemment at the last session. 

A very few words will place this point beyond controversy. To the inter- 
position of the State of South Carolina we are indebted for the adjustment of 
the tariff question ; without it, all the influence of the senator from Kentucky 
over the manufacturing interest, great as it deservedly is, would have been 
wholly incompetent, if he had even thought proper to exert it, to adjust the 
question. The attempt would have prostrated him, and those who acted with 
him, and not the system. It was the separate action of the state that gave him 
the place to stand ujxin, created the necessity for the adjustment, and disposed 
the minds of all to compromise. Now, I put the solemn question to all who 
hear me. If the tariff had not then been adjusted — if it was now an open ques- 
tion — what hope of successful resistance against the usurpations of the executive, 
on the part of this or any other branch of the government, could be entertained ? 
Let it not be said that this is the result of accident — of an unforeseen contin- 
gency. It was clearly perceived, and openly stated, that no successful resist- 
ance could be made to the corruption and encroachments of the executive while 
the tariff question remained open — while it separated the North from the South, 
and wasted the energy of the honest and patriotic portions of the community 
against each other, the joint effort of which is indispensably necessary to expei 
those from authority who are converting the entire powers of government into 
a corrupt electioneering machine ; and that, without separate state interposition, 
the adjustment was impossible. The truth of this position rests not upon the 
accidental state of thing's, but on a profound principle growing out of the nature 
of government and party struggles in a free state. History and reflection teach 
us that, when great interests come into conflict, and the passions and the preju- 
dices of men are roused, such struggles can never be composed by the influ- 
ence of any individuals, however great ; and if there be not somewhere in the 



system some high constitutional power to arrest their progress, ana compel the 
parties to adjust the difference, they go on till the state falls by corruption or 
violence. 

I will, said Mr. C, venture to add to these remarks another, in connexion 
with the point under consideration, not less true. We are not only indebted to the 
cause which I have stated for our present strength in this body against the pres- 
ent usurpation of the executive, but if the adjustment of the tariff had stood alone, 
as it outrht to have done, without the odious bill which accompanied it — if those 
who led in the compromise had joined the State Rights party in their resistance 
to that unconstitutional measure, and thrown the responsibility on its real authors, 
the administration, their party would have been so prostrated throughout the en- 
tire South, and their power, in consequence, so reduced, that they would not 
have dared to attempt the present measure ; or, if they had, they would have 
been broke and defeated. 

Were I, said Mr. C, to select the case best calculated to illustrate the ne- 
cessity of resisting usurpation at the very commencement, and to prove how 
difficult it is to resist it in any subsequent stage if not met at first, I would se- 
lect this very case. What, he asked, is the cause of the present usurpation of 
power on the part of the executive 1 What the motive, the temptation, which 
has induced them to seize on the deposites ? What but the large surplus 
revenue ? the eight or ten millions in the public treasury beyond the wants of 
the government ? And what has put so large an amount of money in the treas- 
ury, when not needed ? I answer, the protective system — that system which 
graduated duties, not in reference to the wants of the government, but in refer- 
ence to the importunities and demands of the manufacturers, and which poured 
millions of dollars into the treasury beyond the most profuse demands, and even 
the extravagance of the government — taken — unlawfully taken, from the pockets 
of those who honestly made it. I hold that those who make are entitled to 
what they make against all the world, except the government ; and against it, 
except to the extent of its legitimate and constitutional wants ; and that for the 
government to take one cent more is robbery. In violation of this sacred prin- 
ciple. Congress frst removed the deposites into the public treasury from the 
pockets of those who made it, where they were rightfully placed by all laws, 
human and divine. The executive, in his turn, following the example, has 
taken them from that deposite, and distributed them among favourite and partisan 
banks. The means used have been the same in both cases. The Constitution 
gives to Congress the power to lay duties with a view to revenue. This power, 
without regarding the object for which it was intended, forgetting that it was a 
great trust power, necessarily limited, by the very nature of such powers, to the 
subject and the object of the trust, was perverted to a use never intended, that 
of protecting the industry of one portion of the country at the expense of another ; 
and, under this false interpretation, the money was transferred from its natural 
and just deposite, the pockets of those who made it, into the public treasury, as 
I have stated. In this, too, the executive followed the example of Congress. 

By the magic construction of a few simple words — " unless otherwise order- 
ed" — intended to confer on the Secretary of the Treasury a limited power — to 
give additional security to the public deposites, he has, in like manner, pervert- 
ed this power, and made it the instrument, by similar sophistry, of drawing the 
money from the treasury, and bestowing it, as I have stated, on favourite and 
partisan banks. Would to God, said Mr. C, would to God I could reverse the 
whole of this nefarious operation, and terminate the coritroversy by returning 
the money to the pockets of the honest and industrious citizens, by the sweat 
of whose brows it was made, and to whom only it rightfully belongs. But, as 
this cannot be done, I must content myself by giving a vote to return it to the 
public treasury, where it was ordered to be deposited by an act of the Legis- 
lature. 

S 



There is another aspect, said Mr. C, in which this subject may be viewed. 
We all remember how early the question of the surplus revenue began to agi- 
tate the country. At a very early period, a senator from New-Jersey (Mr. 
Dickerson) presented his scheme for disposing of it by distributing it among 
the states. The first message of the President recommended a similar project, 
which was followed up by a movement on the part of the Legislature of New- 
York, and, I believe, some of the other states. The public attention was aroused 
— the scheme scrutinized — its gross unconstitutionality and injustice, and its 
dangerous tendency — its tendency to absorb the power and existence of the 
states, were clearly perceived and denounced. The denunciation was too deep 
to be resisted, and the scheme was abandoned. What have we now in lieu 
of it ? What is the present scheme but a distribution of the surplus revenue ? 
A distribution at the sole will and pleasure of the executive — a distribution to 
favourite banks, and through them, in the shape of discounts and loans, to corrupt 
partisans, as the means of increasing political influence ? 

We have, said Mr. C, arrived at a fearful crisis. Things cannot long re- 
main as they are. It behooves all who love their country — who have afl'ection 
for their ofl'spring, or who have any stake in our institutions, to pause and re- 
flect. Confidence is daily withdrawing from the General Government. Alien- 
ation is hourly going on. These will necessarily create a state of things 
inimical to the existence of our institutions, and, if not arrested, convulsions 
must follow ; and then comes dissolution or despotism, when a thick cloud will 
be thrown over the cause of liberty and the future prospects of our country. 



VIII. 



SPEECH ON MR. WEBSTER S PROPOSITION TO RECHARTER THE UNITED ST.-VTES 
BANK, MARCH 26, 1834. 

The question being upon granting leave to Mr. Webster to introduce into tne 
Senate a bill to recharter, for the term of six years, the Bank of the United 
States, with modifications : 

I rise, said Mr. Calhoun, in order to avail myself of an early opportunity to 
express my opinion on the measure proposed by the senator from iMassachu- 
setts, and the questions immediately connected with it, under the impression 
that, on a subject so intimately connected with the interests of every class in 
the community, there should be an early declaration of their sentiments by the 
members of tlus body, so that all might know what to expect, and on what to 
calculate. 

I shall vote for the motion of the senator, not because I approve of the meas- 
ure he proposes, but because I consider it due in courtesy to grant leave, un- 
less there be strong reasons to the contrary, which is not the case in this in- 
stance ; but while I am prepared to vote for his motion, and, let me add, to do 
ample justice to his motives for introducing the bill, I cannot approve of the 
measure he proposes. In every view which 1 have been able to take, it is ob- 
jectionable. Among the objections, I place the uncertainty as to its object. It 
is left perfectly open to conjecture whether a renewal of the charter is intend- 
ed, or a mere continuance, with the view of affording the Bank time to wind up 
its afi'airs ; and what increases the uncertainty is, if we compare the provisions 
of the proposed bill with the one or the other of these objects, it is equally un- 
suited to either. If a renewal of the charter be intended, six years is too short ; 
if a continuance, too long. I, however, state this as a minor objection. There 
is another of far more decisive character : it settles nothing ; it leaves every- 
thing unfixed ; it perpetuates the present struggle, which so injuriously agitates 



the country — a struggle of bank against bank — of one set of opinions against 
another ; and prolongs the whole, without even an intervening armistice, to the 
year 1842 : a period that covers two presidential terms, and, by inevitable con- 
sequence, running, for two successive presidential elections, the politics of the 
country into the Bank question, and the Bank question into politics, with the 
mutual corruption which must be engendered ; keeping, during the whole peri- 
od, the currency of the country, which the public interest requires should have 
the utmost stability, in a state of uncertainty and fluctuation. 

But why should I pursue the objections to the plan proposed by the senator ? 
He himself acknowledged the measure to be defective, and that he would pre- 
fer one of a more permanent character. He has not proposed this as the best 
measure, but has brought it forward under a supposed necessity — under the im- 
pression that something must be done — something prompt and immediate, to re- 
lieve the existing distress which overspreads the land. I concur with him in 
relation to the distress, that it is deep and extensive ; that it fell upon us sudden- 
ly, and in the midst of prosperity almost unexampled ; that it is daily consign- 
ing hundreds to poverty and misery ; blasting the hopes of the enterprising ; 
taking employment and bread from the labourer ; and working a fearful change in 
the relative condition of the money dealers on one side, and the man of busi- 
ness on the other — raising the former rapidly to the top of the wheel, while it 
is whirling the latter, with equal rapidity, to the bottom. While I thus agree 
with the senator as to the distress, I am also sensible that there are great pub- 
lic emergencies in which no permanent relief can be afforded, and when the 
wisest are obliged to resort to expedients : to palliate and to temporize, in order 
to gain time with a view to apply a more effectual remedy. But there are also 
emergencies of precisely the opposite character : when the best and most per- 
manent is the only practicable measure, and when mere expedients tend but to 
distract, to divide, and confound, and thereby to delay or defeat all relief ; and 
such, viewed in all its relations and bearing, I consider the present ; and that 
the senator from Massachusetts has not also so considered it, I attribute to the 
fact that, of the two questions blended in the subject under consideration, he 
has given an undue prominence to that which has by far the least relative im- 
portance — I mean those of the Bank and of the currency. As a mere bank 
question, as viewed by the senator, it would be a matter of but little importance 
whether the renewal should be for six years or for a longer period ; and a pref- 
erence might very properly be given to one or the other, as it might be suppo- 
sed most likely to succeed ; but I must say, that, in my opinion, in selecting the 
period of six years, he has taken that which will be much less likely to succeed 
than one of a reasonable and proper duration. But had he turned his view to the 
other and more prominent question involved ; had he regarded the question as 
a question of currency, and that the great point was to give it uniformity, per- 
manency, and safety ; that, in effecting these essential objects, the Bank is a 
mere subordinate agent, to be vised or not to be used, and to be modified, as to 
its duration and other provisions, wholly in reference to the higher question of 
the currency, I cannot think that he would ever have proposed the measure 
which he has brought forward, which leaves, as I have already said, everything 
connected with the subject in a state of uncertainty and fluctuation. 

All feel that the currency is a delicate subject, requiring to be touched with 
the utmost caution ; but in order that it may be seen as well as felt why it is 
so delicate, why slight touches, either in depressing or elevating it, agitate and 
convulse the whole community, I will pause to explain the cause. If we take | 
the aggregate property of a community, that which forms the currency consti- i 
tutes, in value, a very small proportion of the whole. What this proportion is 
in our country and other commercial and trading communities, is somewhat un- 
certain. I speak conjecturally in fixing it as one to twenty-five or thirty, though 
I presume that is not far from the truth ; and yet this small proportion of the 



property of the community regulates the value of all the rest, and forms the me- 
dium of circulation by which all its exchanges are effected ; bearing, in this re- 
spect a striking similarity, considering the diversity of the subjects, to the blood 
in the human or animal system. 

If we turn our attention to the laws which govern the circulation, we shall 
find one of the most important to be, that, as the circulation is decreased or in- 
creased the rest of the property will, all other circumstances remaining the 
same be decreased or increased in value exactly in the same proportion. To 
illustrate : If a community should have an aggregate amount of property of thir- 
ty-one millions of dollars, of which one million constitutes its currency ; and 
that one million should be reduced one tegth part, that is to say, one hundred 
thousand dollars, the value of the rest will be reduced in like manner one tenth 
part, that is, three millions of dollars. And here a very important fact dis- 
closes itself, which explains why the currency should be touched with such 
delicacy, and why stability and uniformity are such essential qualities ; I mean 
that a small absolute reduction of the currency makes a great absolute reduction 
of the value of the entire property of the community, as we see in the case pro- 
posed ; where a reduction of one hundred thousand dollars in the currency re- 
duces the aggregate value of property three millions of dollars — a sum thirty 
times greater than the reduction of the currency. From this results an impor- 
tant consideration. If we suppose the entire currency to be in the hands of one 
portion of the community, and the property in the hands of the other portion, 
the former, by having the currency under their exclusive control, might control 
the value of all the property in the community, and possess themselves of it at 
their pleasure. Take the case already selected, and suppose that those who 
hold the currency diminish it one half by abstracting that amount from circula- 
tion : the effect of which would be to reduce the circulation to five hundred 
thousand dollars ; the value of property would also be reduced one half, that is, 
fifteen millions of dollars. Let the process be reversed, and the money abstract- 
ed gradually restored to circulation, and the value of the property would again 
be increased to thirty millions. It must be obvious that, by alternating these 
processes, and purchasing at the point of the greatest depression, when the cir- 
culation is the least, and selling at the point of the greatest elevation, when it is 
the fullest, the supposed moneyed class, who could at pleasure increase or di- 
minish the circulation, by abstracting or restoring it, might also at pleasure con- 
trol the entire property of the country. Let it be ever borne in mind, that the 
exchangeable value of the circulating medium, compared with the property and 
the business of the community, remains fixed, and can never be diminished or 
increased by increasing or dilninishing its quantity ; while, on the contrary, the 
exchangeable value of the property, compared to the cj^rency, must increase 
or decrease with every addition or diminution of the latter^ It results, from this, 
that there is a dangerous antagonist relation between those who hold or com- 
mand the currency and the rest of the community ; "tut, fortunately for the coun- 
try, the holders of property and of the currency are so blended as not to consti- 
tute separate classes. Yet it is worthy of remark — it deserves strongly to at- 
tract the attention of those who have charge of the public affairs — that under 
the operation of the banking system, and that peculiar description of property ex- 
isting in the shape of credit or stock, public and private, which so strikingly dis- 
tinguishes modern society from all that preceded it, there is a strong tendency 
to create a separate moneyed interest, accompanied with all the dangers which 
must necessarily result from such interest, and which deserves to be most care- 
fully watched and restricted. 

I do not stand here the partisan of any particular class in society — the rich 
or the poor, the property holder or the money holder ; and, in making these re- 
marks, I am not actuated by the slightest feeling of opposition to the latter. 
My object is simply to point out important relations that exist between them, re- 



suiting irom me laws wnicn govern tne currency, in order that the necessity 
for a uniform, stable, and safe currency, to guard against dangerous control of 
one class over another, may be clearly seen. I stand in my place simply as a 
senator from South Carolina, to represent her on this floor, and to advance the 
common interest of these states as far as we have the constitutional power, and 
as far as it can be done consistently with equity and justice to the parts. I am 
the partisan, as I have said, of no class, nor, let me add, of any political party. 
I am neither of the opposition nor of the administration. If I act with the former 
in any instance, it is because I approve of the course on the particular occasion ; 
and I shall always be happy to act with them when I do approve. If I oppose 
the administration — if I desire to see power change hands— it is because I dis- 
approve of the general course of those in authority — because they have depart- 
ed from the principles on which they came into 'office — because, instead of usint? 
the immense power and patronage put in their hands to secure the liberty of the 
country and advance the public good, they have perverted them into party in- 
struments for personal objects. But mine has not been, nor will it be, a syste- 
matic opposition. Whatever measure of theirs I may deem right, I shall cheer- 
fully support ; and I only desire that they shall aflbrd me more frequent occa- 
sions for support, and fewer for opposition, than they have heretofore done. 

With these impressions, and entertaining a deep conviction that an unfixed, 
unstable, and fluctuating currency is to be ranked among the most fruitful sour- 
ces of evil, whether viewed politically, or in reference to the business transac- 
tions of the country, I cannot give my consent to any measure that does not 
place the currency on a solid foundation. If I thought this determination would 
delay the relief so necessary to mitigate the present calamity, it would be to me 
a subject of the deepest regret. I feel that sympathy which I trust I ought, for 
the suflering of so many of my fellow-citizens, who see their hopes daily with- 
ered. I, however, console myself with the reflection that delay will not be 
the result, but, on the contrary, relief will be hastened by the view which I 
take of the subject. I hold it impossible that anything can be effected, regard- 
ing the subject as a mere bank question. Viewed in that light, the opinion of 
this house, and of the other branch of Congress, is probably definitively made 
up. In the Senate, it is known that we have three parties,' whose views, con- 
sidering it as a bank question, appear to be irreconcilable. All hope, then, of 
relief, must centre in taking a more elevated view, and in considering it, in its 
true light, as a subject of currency. Thus regarded, I shall be surprised if, on 
full investigation, there will not appear a remarkable coincidence of opinion, 
even between those whose views, on a slight inspection, would seem to be con- 
tradictory. Let us, then, proceed to the investigation of the subject under the 
aspect which I have proposed. 

What, then, is the currency of the United States? What its present state 
and condition ? These are the questions which I propose now to consider, with 
a view of ascertaining what is the disease, what the remedy, and what the 
means of applying it, that may be necessary to restore our currency to a sound 
condition. 

The legal currency of this country — that in which alone debts can be dis- 
charged according to law — are certain gold, silver, and copper coins authorized 
by Congress under an express provision of the Constitution. Such is the law. 
What, now, are the facts ? That the currency consists almost exclusively of 
bank-notes, gold having entirely disappeared, and silver, in a great measure, 
expelled by banks instituted by twenty-five distinct and independent powers, 
and iiotes issued under the authority of the direction of those institutions. They 
are, in point of fact, the mint of the United States, They coin the actual 
money (for such we must call bank-notes), and regulate its issue, and, conse- 
quently, its value. If we inquire as to their number, the amount of their issue, 
and other circumstances calculated to show their actual condition, we shall find 



■■ 



that, so rapid has been their increase, and so various their changes, that no ac- 
curate information can be had. According to the latest and best that I have 
been able to obtain, they number at least four hundred and fifty, with a capital 
of not less than one hundred and forty-five millions of dollars, with an issue ex- 
ceedino' seventy millions ; and the whole of this immense fabric standing on a 
metallic currency of less than fifteen millions of dollars, of which the greater 
part is held by the Bank of the United States. If we compare the notes in 
circulation with the metallic currency in their vaults, we shall find the propor- 
tion about six to one ; and if we compare the latter with the demands that may 
be made upon the banks, we shall find that the proportion is about one to elev- 
en. If we examine the tendency of the system at this moment, we shall find 
that it is on the increase — rapidly on the increase. There is now pending a 
project of a ten million bank before the Legislature of New- York ; but recently 
one of five millions was established in Kentucky ; within a short period one of 
a large capital was established in Tennessee, besides others in agitation in 
several of the other states (here Mr. Porter, of Louisiana, said that one of 
eleven millions had just been established in that state). 

This increase is not accidental. It may be laid down as a law, that, where 
two currencies are permitted to circulate in any country, one of a cheap and 
the other of a dear material, the former necessarily tends to grow upon the lat- 
ter, and will ultimately expel it from circulation, unless its tendency to increase 
be restrained by a powerful and efficient check. Experience tests the truth of 
this remark, as the history of the banking system clearly illustrates. The sen- 
ator from Massachusetts truly said that the Bank of England was derived from 
that of Amsterdam, as ours, in turn, are from that of England. Throughout its 
progress, the truth of what I have stated to be a law of the system is strongly 
evinced. The Bank of Amsterdam was merely a bank of deposite — a storehouse 
for the safe-keeping of the bullion and precious metals brought into that com- 
mercial metropolis, through all the channels of its widely-extended trade. It 
was placed under the custody of the city authorities ; and on the deposite, a cer- 
tificate was issued as evidence of the fact, which was transferable, so as to en- 
title the holder to demand the return. An important fact was soon disclosed — 
that a large portion of the deposites might be withdrawn, and that the residue 
would be sulficient to meet the returning certificates ; or, what is the same in 
eflfect, that certificates might be issued without making a deposite. This sug- 
gested the idea of a bank of discount as well as deposite. The fact thus dis- 
closed fell too much in with the genius of the system to be lost, and, accord- 
ingly, when transplanted to England, it suggested the idea of a bank of discount 
and of deposite ; the very essence of which form of banking, that on which their 
profit depends, consists in issuing a greater amount of notes than it has specie 
in its vaults. But the system is regularly progressing, under the impulse of the 
laws that govern it, from its present form to a mere paper machine — a machine 
for fabricating and issuing notes, not convertible into specie. Already has it 
once reached this condition, both in England and the United States, and from 
which it has been forced back, in both, to a redemption of its notes with great 
difficulty. 

The natural tendency of the system is accelerated in our country by pecu- 
liar causes, which have greatly increased its progress. There are two power- 
ful causes in operation. The one resulting from that rivalry which must ever 
take place in states situated, as ours are, under one General Government, and 
having a free and open commercial intercourse. The introduction of the bank- 
ing system in one state necessarily, on this principle, introduces it into all the 
others, of which we have seen a striking illustration on the part of Virginia 
and some of the other Southern States, which entertained, on principle, strong 
aversion to the system ; yet they were compelled, after a long and stubborn re- 
sistance, to yield their objections, or permit their circulation to be furnished by 



The same cause which thus compels one state to imitate the example of an- 
other in introducing the system from self-defence, will compel the other states, in 
like manner, and from the same cause, to enlarge and give increased activity 
to the banking operation, whenever any one of the states sets the example of 
so doino- on its part ; and thus, by mutual action and reaction, the whole sys- 
tem is rapidly accelerated to the final destiny which I have assigned. 

This is strikingly exemplified in the rapid progress of the system since its 
first introduction into our country. At the adoption of our Constitution, forty- 
five years ago, there were but three banks in the United States, the amount of 
whose capital I do not now recollect, but it was very small. In this short 
space, they have increased to four hundred and fifty, with a capital of one hun- 
dred and forty-five millions, as has already been stated : an increase exceeding 
nearly a hundred fold the increase of our wealth aiid population, as great as 
they have been. 

But it is not in numbers only that they have increased : there has, in the 
same time, been a rapid advance in the proportion which their notes in circu- 
lation bear to the specie in their vaults. Some twenty or thirty years ago, it 
was not considered safe for the issues to exceed the specie by more than two 
and a half or three for one ; but now, taking the whole, and including the Bank 
of the United States with the state banks, the proportion is about six to one ; 
and excluding that Bank, it would very greatly exceed that proportion. This 
increase of paper in proportion to metal results from a cause which deserves 
much more notice than it has heretofore attracted. It originates mainly in the 
number of the banks. I will proceed to illustrate it. 

The senator from New-York (Mr. Wright), in assigning his reasons for be- 
lieving the Bank of the United States to be more dangerous than those of the 
states, said that one bank was more dangerous than many. That in some re- 
spects may be true ; but in one, and that a most important one, it is strikingly 
the opposite — I mean in the tendency of the system to increase. Where there 
is but one bank, the tendency to increase is not near so strong as where there 
are many, as illustrated in England, where the system has advanced much less 
rapidly, in proportion to the wealth and population of the kingdom, than in the 
United States. But where there is no limitation as to their number, the in- 
crease will be inevitable, so long as banking continues to be among the most 
certain, eligible, and profitable employments of capital, as now is the case. 
With these inducements, there must be constant application for new banks, 
whenever there is the least prospect of profitable employment — banks to be 
founded mainly on nominal and fictitious capital, and adding but little additional 
capital to that already in existence — and with our just and natural aversion to 
monopoly, it is difficult, on principles of equality and justice, to resist such ap- 
plication. The admission of a new bank tends to diminish the profits of the 
old, and, between the aversion of the old to reduce their income and the desire 
of the new to acquire profits, the result is an enlargement of discounts, effected 
by a mutual spirit of forbearance ; an indisposition on the part of each to oppress 
the other ; and, finally, the creation of a common feeling to stigmatize and oppose 
those, whether banks or individuals, who demand specie in payment of their 
notes. This community of feeling, which ultimately identifies the whole as a 
peculiar and distinct interest in the community, increases, and becomes more and 
more intense, just in proportion as banks multiply ; as they become, if I may 
use the expression, too populous, when, from the pressure of increasing num- 
bers, there results a corresponding increase of issues, in proportion to their 
means, which explains the present extraordinary disproportion between specie 
and notes in those states where banks have been most multiplied ; equal, in 
some, to sixteen to one. There results from this state of things some pohtical 
considerations, which demand the profound attention of all who value the liberty 
and peace of the country. 



While the banking system rests on a solid foundation, there will be, on their 
part, but little depcndance on the government, and but little means by which the 
government can influence them, and as little disposition on the part of the 
banks to be connected with the government ; but in the progress of the system, 
when their number is greatly multiplied, and their issues, in proportion to their 
means, are correspondingly increased, the condition of the banks becomes more 
and more critical. Every adverse event in the commercial world, or political 
movement that disturbs the existing state of things, agitates and endangers them. 
They become timid and anxious for their safety, and necessarily court those in 
power, in order to secure their protection. Property is, in its nature, timid, and 
seeks protection, and nothing is more gratifying to government than to become 
a protector. A union is the result ; and when that union takes place — when the 
government, in fact, becomes the bank direction, regulating its favours and ac- 
commodation — the downfall of liberty is at hand. Are there no indications that 
we are not far removed from this state of things ? Do we not behold in those 
events which have so deeply agitated us within the last few months, and which 
have interrupted all the business transactions of this community, a strong ten- 
dency to this union on the part of a department of this government, and a por- 
tion of the banking system ? Has not this union been, in fact, consummated in 
the largest and most commercial of the states ? What is the safety-fund system 
of New-York but a union between the banks and the state, and a consummation 
by law of that community of feeling in the banking system which I have at- 
tempted to illustrate, the object of which is to extend their discounts, and to ob 
tain which, the interior banks of that state have actually put themselves under 
the immediate protection of the government ? The effects have been striking. 
Already have they become substantially mere paper machines, several having 
not more than from one to two cents in specie to the dollar, when compared 
with their circulation ; and, taking the aggregate, their average condition will 
be foimd to be but little better. I care not, said Mr. C, whether the present 
commissioners are partisans of the present state administration or not, or 
w^hether the assertion of the senator from New- York (Mr. Wright), that the 
government of the state has not interfered in the control of these institutions, be 
correct. Whether it has taken place or not, interference is inevitable. In such 
state of weakness, a feeling of dependance is unavoidable, and the control of 
the government over the action of the banks, whenever that control shall be- 
come necessary to subserve the ambition or the avarice of those in power, is 
certain. 

Such is the strong tendency of our banks to terminate their career in the pa- 
per system — in an open suspension of specie payment. Whenever that event 
occurs, the progress of convulsion and revolution will be rapid. The currency 
will become local, and each state will have a powerful interest to depreciate 
its currency more rapidly than its neighbour, as moans, at the same time, of ex- 
empting itself from the taxes of the government, and drawing the commerce of 
the country to its ports. This was strongly exemplified after the suspension 
of specie payment during the late war, when the depreciation made the most 
rapid progress, till checked by the establishment of the present Bank of the Uni- 
ted States, and when the foreign trade of the country was as rapidly conver- 
ging to the point of the greatest depreciation, with a view of exemption from du- 
ties, by paying in the debased currency of the place. 

What, then, is the disease which afflicts the system ? what the remedy ? and 
what the means of applying it ? These are the questions which I shall next 
proceed to consider. What I have already stated points out the disease. It 
consists in a great and growing disproportion between the metallic and paper 
circulation of the country, effected through the instrumentality of the banks : a 
disproportion daily and hourly increasing, under the impulse of most powerful 
causes, which are rapidly accelerating the country to that state of convulsion 



ana revoimion wiucii i nave inaicaiea. i ne remedy is to arrest its tuture proo-- 
ress, and to diminish the existing disproportion — to increase the metals and to 
diminish the paper — advancing till the currency shall be restored to a sound, 
safe, and settled condition. On these two points all must be agreed. There 
is no man of any party, capable of reflecting, and who will take the pains to in- 
form himself, but must agree that our currency is in a dangerous condition, and 
that the danger is increasing ; nor is there any one who can doubt that the only 
safe and effectual remedy is to diminish this disproportion to which I have re- 
ferred. Here the extremes unite : the senator from Missouri (Mr. Benton), 
and the senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Webster), who stands here as the able 
and strenuous advocate of the banking system, are on this point united, and must 
move from it in the same direction : though it may be the design of the one to 
go through, and of the other to halt after a moderate advance. 

There is another point on which all must be agreed — that the remedy must 
be gradual — the change from the present to another and sounder condition, slow 
and cautious. The necessity for this results from that highly delicate nature 
of currency which I have already illustrated. Any sudden and great chant^e 
from our present to even a sounder condition would agitate and convulse socie- 
ty to the centre. On another point there can be but little disagreement. What- 
ever may be the different theoretical opinions of the members of the Senate as 
to the extent to which the reformation of the currency should be carried, even 
those who think it may be carried practically and safely to the restoration of a 
metallic currency, to the entire exclusion of paper, must agree that the restora- 
tion ought not to be carried farther than a cautious and slow experience shall 
prove that it can be done, consistently with the prosperity of the country, in the 
existing fiscal and commercial condition of the world. To go beyond the point 
to which experience shall show it is proper to go, would be to sacrifice the pub- 
lic interest merely to a favourite conception. There may be ultimately a disa- 
greement of opinion where that point is, but, since all must be agreed to move 
forward in the same direction and at the same pace, let us set out in the spirit 
of harmony and peace, though we intend to stop at different points. It may be 
that, enlightened by experience, those who intended to stop at the nearest point 
may be disposed to advance farther, and that those who intended the farthest, 
may halt on this side, so that finally all may agree to terminate the journey to- 
gether. 

Th^ brings us to the question of how shall so salutary a change be effected ? 
What the means, and the mode of application ? A great and difficult question, 
on which some diversity of opinion may be expected. 

No one can be more sensible than I am of the responsibility that must be in- 
curred in proposing measures on questions of so much magnitude, and which, 
in so distracted a state, must affect seriously great and influential interests. 
But this is no time to shun responsibihty. The danger is great and menacing, 
and delay hazardous, if not ruinous. While, however, I would not shun, I have 
not sought the responsibility. I have waited for others ; and, had any one pro- 
posed an adequate remedy, I would have remained silent. And here, said Mr. 
Calhoun, let me express the deep regret which I feel that the administration, 
with all that weight of authority which belongs to its power and immense pat- 
ronage, had not, instead of the deposite question, which has caused such agita- 
tion and distress, taken up the great subject of the currency ; examined it grave- 
ly and deliberately in all its bearings ; pointed out its diseased condition ;' des- 
ignated the remedy, and proposed some safe, gradual, and effectual means of 
applying it. Had that course been pursued, my zealous and hearty co-opera- 
tion would not have been wanting. Permit me, also, to express a similar re- 
gret that the administration, having failed in this great point of duty, the oppo- 
sition, with all its weight and talents, headed on this question by the distinguish- 
ed and able senator from Massachusetts, who is so capable of comprehending 

T 



or iIjCjK/hi:'-^ 



this subject in all its bearings, had not brought forward, under its auspices, some 
permanent system of measures, based upon a deliberate and mature investiga- 
tion into the cause of the existing disease, and calculated to remedy the disor- 
dered state of the currency. What might have been brought forward by them 
■with such fair prospects of success, has been thrown on more incompetent hands, 
unaided by patronage or influence, save only that power which truth clearly 
developed, and honestly and zealously advanced, may be supposed to possess, 
and on which I must wholly rely. 

But to return to the subject. Whatever diversity of sentiment there may be 
as to the means, on one point all must be agreed : nothing effectual can be done, 
no check interposed to restore or arrest the progress of the system, by the ac- 
tion of the states. The reasons already assigned to prove that banking by one 
state compels all others to bank, and that the excess of banking in one in like 
manner compels all others to like excess, equally demonstrate that it is impossi- 
ble for the states, acting separately, to interpose any means to prevent the catas- 
trophe which certainly awaits the system, and perhaps the government itself, un- 
less the great and growing danger to which I refer be timely and effectually 
arrested. There is no power anywhere but in this government — the joint agent 
of all the states, and through which a concert of action can be effected adequate 
to this great task. The responsibility is upon us, and upon us alone. The 
means, if means there be, must be applied by our hands, or not applied at all — 
a consideration, in so great an emergency, and in the presence of such imminent 
danger, calculated, I should suppose, to arouse even the least patriotic. 

What means do we possess, and how can they be applied ? 

If the entire banking system was under the immediate control of the Gener- 
al Government, there would be no difficulty in devising a safe and effectual 
remedy to restore the equilibrium, so desirable, between the specie and the pa- 
per which compose our currency. But the fact is otherwise. With the ex- 
ception of the Bank of the United States, all the other banks owe their origin 
to the authority of the several states, and are under their immediate control, 
which presents the great difficulty experienced in devising the proper means 
of effecting the remedy Avhich all feel to be so desirable. 

Among the means which have been suggested, a senator from Virginia, not 
now a member of this body (Mr. Rives), proposed to apply the taxing power to 
suppress the circulation of small notes, with a view of diminishing the- paper 
and increasing the specie circulation. The remedy would be simple and effect- 
ive, but is liable to great objection. The taxing power is odious under any 
circumstances ; it would be doubly so when called into exercise with an over- 
flowing treasury ; and still more so, with the necessity of organizing an expen- 
sive body of officers to collect a single tax, and that of an inconsiderable 
amount. But there is another, and of itself a decisive objection. It would be 
unconstitutional — palpably and dangerously so. All political powers, as I sta- 
led on another occasion, are trust powers, and limited in their exercise by the 
subject and object of the grant. The tax power was granted to raise revenue 
for the sole purpose of supplying the necessary means of carrj'ing on the oper- 
ations of the government. To pervert this power from the object thus intend- 
ed by the Constitution, to that of suppressing the circulation of bank-notes, 
would be to convert it from a revenue into a penal power — a power in its nature 
and object essentially different from that intended to be granted in the Consti- 
tution ; and a power which in its full extension, if once admitted, would be suf- 
ficient of itself to give an entire control to this government over the property 
and the pursuits of the community, and thus concentrate and consolidate in it 
the entire power of the system. 

Rejecting, then, the taxing power, there remains two obvious and direct 
means in possession of the government, which may be brought into action to 
effect the object intended, but neither of which, either separately or jointly, is 



m sumcieni emcacy, aowever inaispensaoie mey may oe as a pan ot an etti- 
cient system of measures, to correct the present, or repress the growing disor- 
ders of the currency ; I mean that provision in the Constitution which empow- 
ers Congress to coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin, and 
the power of prohibiting anything but the legal currency to be received, either 
in whole or in part, in the dues of the government. The mere power of coining 
, and regulating the value of coins, of itself, and unsustained by any other meas- 
1 ure, can exercise but a limited control over the actual currency of the country, 
and is inadequate to check excess or correct disorder, as is demonstrated by the 
present diseased state of the currency. Congress has had, from the beginninor, 
iaws upon the statute-books to regulate the value of coins ; and at an early pe- 
riod of the government the mint was erected, and has been in active operation 
ever since ; and yet, of the immense amount which has been coined, a small res- 
idue only remains in the country, the great body having been expelled under 
the banking system. To give efficiency to this power, then, some other must 
be combined with it. The most immediate and obvious is that which has been 
suggested — of excluding all but specie in the receipts of the government. This 
measure would be eflectual to a certain extent ; but with a declining income, 
which must take place under the operation of the act of the last session, to ad- 
just the tariff, and which must greatly reduce the revenue (a point of the ut- 
most importance to the reformation and regeneration of our institutions), the effi- 
cacy of the measure must be correspondingly diminished. From the nature 
of things, it cannot greatly exceed the average of the government deposites, 
which I hope will, before many years, be reduced to the smallest possible 
amount, so as to prevent the possibility of the recurrence of the shameful and 
dangerous state of things which now exists, and which has been caused by the 
vast amount of the surplus revenue. But there is, in 7mj opinion, a strong ob- 
jection against resorting to this measure, resulting from the fact that an exclu- 
sive receipt of specie in the treasury would, to give it efficacy, and to prevent 
extensive speculation and fraud, require an entire disconnexion on the part of 
the government with the banking system in all its forms, and a resort to the 
strong box as the means of preserving and guarding its funds — a means, if prac- 
ticable, in the present state of things liable to the objection of being far less 
safe, economical, and efficient than the present. 

What, then, Mr. Calhoun inquired, what other means do we possess, of suffi- 
cient efficacy, in combination with those to which I have referred, to arrest its 
progress, and correct the disordered state of the currency ? This is the deeply- 
important question, and here some division of opinion must be expected, how- 
ever united we may be, as I trust we are thus far, on all other points. I intend 
to meet this question explicitly and directly, without reservation or concealment. 
After a full survey of the whole subject, I see none : I can conjecture no 
means of extricating the country from the present danger, and to arrest its far- 
ther increase, but a Bank — the agency of which, in some form, or under some 
authority, is indispensable. The country has been brought into the present dis- 
tressed state of currency by banks, and must be extricated by their agency. 
We must, in a word, use a bank to unbank the banks, to the extent that may be 
necessary to restore a safe and stable currency — just as we apply snow to a 
frozen limb in order to restore vitality and circulation, or hold up a burn to the 
flame to extract the inflammation. All must see that it is impossible to sup- 
press the banking system at once. It must continue for a time. Its greatest 
enemies, and the advocates of an exclusive specie circulation, must make it a 
part of their system to tolerate the banks for a longer or a shorter period. To 
suppress them at once would, if it were possible, work a greater revolution — a 
greater change in the relative condition of the various classes of the communi- 
ty, than would the conquest of the country by a savage enemy. What, then, 
must be done ? I answer, a new and safe system must gradually grow up un- 



nBum 



der, and replace the old ; imitating, in this respect, the beantifiil process which 
we ' sometimes see of a wounded or diseased part in a living organic body 
gradually superseded by the healing process of nature. 

How is this to be effected 1 How is a bank to be used as the means of cor- 
rectintr the excess of the banking system ? and Avhat bank is to be selected as 
the af^ent to eifect this salutary change ? I know, said ]Mr. C, that a diversity 
of opmion will be found to exist, as to the agent to be selected, among those 
who ao-ree on every other point, and who, in particular, agree on the necessity 
of usin""- some bank as the means of effecting the object intended : one prefer- 
ring a simple recharter of the existing Bank, another the charter of a new Bank 
of the United States ; a third, a new Bank ingrafted upon the old ; and a fourth, 
the use of the state banks as the agent. I wish, said Mr. C, to leave all these 
as open questions, to be carefully surveyed and compared with each other, 
calmly and dispassionately, without prejudice or party feeling ; and that to be 
selected which, on the Avhole, shall appear to be best, the most safe, the most 
efficient, the most prompt in application, and the least liable to consthutional 
objections. It would, however, be wanting in candour on my part not to de- 
clare that my impression is, that a new Bank of the United States, ingrafted 
upon the old, will be found, under all the circumstances of the case, to combine 
the greatest advantages, and to be liable to the fewest objections ; but this im- 
pression is not so firmly fixed as to be inconsistent Avith a calm review of the 
whole ground, or to prevent my yielding to the convictron of reason, should the 
result of such review prove that any other is preferable. Among its pecrdiar 
recommendations may be ranked the consideration that, while it would afford the 
means of a prompt and effectual application for mitigating and finally removing 
the existing distress, it would, at the same time, open to the whole community a 
fair opportunity of participation in the advantages of the institution, be they what 
they may. 

Let us, then, suppose (in order to illustrate, and not to indicate a preference) 
that the present Bank be selected as the agfent to effect the intended object. 
What provisions will be necessary ? I will suggest those that have occurred to 
me, mainly, however, with a view of exciting the reflections of those much 
more familiar with banking operations than myself, and who, of course, are more 
competent to form a correct judgment of their practical effect. 

Let, then, the Bank charter be renewed for twelve years after the expiration 
of the present term, with such modifications and limitations as may be judged 
proper ; and that after that period it shall issue no notes imder ten dollars — that 
government shall not receive in its dues any sum less tban ten dollars, except 
in the legal coins of the United States ; that it shall not receive in its dues the 
notes of any bank that issues notes of a denomination less than five dollars ; 
and that the United States Bank shall not receive in payment, or on deposite, 
the notes of any bank whose notes are not receivable in the dues of the govern- 
ment, nor the notes of any bank which may receive the notes of any bank whose 
notes are not receivable by the government. At the expiration of s-ix years from 
the commencement of the renewed charter, let the Bank be prohibited from is- 
suing any note under twenty dollars, and let no sum imder that amount be re- 
ceived in dues of the government, except in specie ; and let the value of gold be 
raised at least equal to that of silver, to take effect immediately ,- so that the 
country may be replenished with the coin, the lightest and the most portable 
in proportion to its value, to take the place of the receding bank-notes. It is 
unnecessary for me to state, that at present the standard value of gold is less 
than that of silver ; the necessary effect of which has been to expel gold entire- 
ly from circulation, and to deprive us of a coin so well calcvdated for the 
circulation of a country so great in extent, and having so vast an intercourse, 
commercial, social, and political, between all its parts, as ours. As an addition- 
al recommendation to raise its relative value, gold has, of late, become an impor- 



lina, and Georgia — to the industry of which the measure proposed would give 
a strong impulse, and which, in turn, would greatly increase the quantity pro- 
duced. 

Such are the means which have occurred to me. There are members of this 
body far more competent to judge of their practical operation than myself; and 
I as my object is simply to suggest them for their reflection, and for that of others 
' who are more familiar with this part of the subject, I will not at present enter 
into an inquiry as to their efficiency, with a view of determining whether they 
are fully adequate to effect the object in view or not. There are, doubtless, others 
of a similar description, and perhaps more efficacious, that may occur to the ex- 
perienced, which I would freely embrace, as my object is to adopt the best and 
most efficient. And it may be hoped, that if, on experience, it should be found 
that neither these provisions, nor any other in the power of Congress, are fully 
adequate to effect the important reform which I have proposed, the co-operation 
of the states may be afforded, at least to the extent of suppressing the circula- 
tion of notes under five dollars, where such are permitted to be issued under 
their authority. 

I omitted, in the proper place, to state my reason for suggesting twelve years 
as the term for the renewal of the charter of the Bank. It appears to me that 
it is long enough to permit the agitation and distraction which now disturbs the 
country to subside, while it is sufficiently short to enable us to avail ourselves 
of the full benefit of the light of experience, which may be expected to be de- 
rived from the operation of the system under its new provisions. But there is 
another reason which appears to me to be entitled to great weight. The char- 
ter of the Bank of England has recently been renewed for the term of ten 
years, with very important changes, calculated to furnish much experience upon 
the nature of banking operations and currency. It is highly desirable, if 
the Bank charter should be renewed, or a new bank created, that we should 
have the full benefit of that experience before the expiration of the term, which 
would be effected by fixing the period I have designated. But as my object in 
selecting the recharter of the Bank of the United States was simply to enable 
me to present the suggestions I have made in the clearest form, and not advocate 
the recharter, I shall omit to indicate many limitations and provisions, which 
seem to me to be important to be considered, when the question of its perma- 
nent renewal is presented, should it ever be. Among others, I entirely concur 
in the suggestion of the senator from Georgia, of fixing the rate of interest at 
five per cent. — a suggestion of importance, and to which but one objection can, 
in my opinion, be presented — I mean the opposing interest of existing state in- 
stitutions, all of which discount at higher rates, and which may defeat any 
measure of which it constitutes a part. In addition, I will simply say that I, 
for one, shall feel disposed to adopt such provisions as are best calculated to 
secure the government from any supposed influence on the part of the Bank, or 
the Bank from any improper interference on the part of the government, or 
which may be necessary to protect the rights or interests of the states. 

Having now stated the measure necessary to apply the remedy, I am thus 
brought to the question, Can the measure succeed ? which brings up the inqui- 
ry of how far it may be expected to receive the support of the several parties 
which now compose the Senate, and on which I shall next proceed to make a 
few remarks. 

First, then, can the State Rights party give it their support ? that party of 
which I am proud of being a member, and for which I entertain so strong an 
attachment — the stronger because we are few among many. In proposing this 
question, I am not ignorant of their long-standing constitutional objection to the 
Bank, on the ground that this was intended to be, as it is usually expressed, a 
hard-money government, whose circulating medium was intended to consist of 



mmaam^^^m^^mmmmmmimmmm 



the precious metals, and for which object the power of coining money, and 
regulating the value thereof, was expressly conferred by the Constitution. I 
know how long and how sincerely this opinion has been entertained, and under 
how many difficulties it has been maintained. It is not my intention to attempt 
to change an opinion so firmly fixed ; but I may be permitted to make a few 
observations, in order to present Avhat appears to me to be the true question in 
reference to this constitutional point, in order that we may fully comprehend the 
circumstances under which we are placed in reference to it. 1 

With this view, I do not deem it necessary to inquire whether, in conferring 
the power to coin money, and to regulate the value thereof, the Constitution in- 1 
tended to limit the power strictly to coining money and regulating its value, or 
whether it intended to confer a more general power over the currency ; nor do I in- j 
tend to inquire whether the word coin is limited simply to the metals, or may be 
extended to other substances, if, through a gradual change, they may become the 
medium of the general circulation of the world. I pass these points. Whatever 
opinion there may be entertained in reference to them, we must all agree, as a 
fixed principle in our system of thinking on constitutional questions, that the 
power under consideration, like other powers, is a trust power ; and that, like 
all such powers, it must be so exercised as to effect the object of the trust as 
far as it may be practicable. Nor can we disagree that the object of the power 
was to secure to these states a safe, uniform, and stable currency. The nature 
of the power, the terms used to convey it, the history of the times, the necessi- 
ty, with the creation of a common government, of having a common and uniform 
circulating medium, and the power conferred to punnish those vyho, by coun- 
terfeiting, may attempt to debase and degrade the coins of the country, all pro- 
claim this to be the object. 

It is not my purpose to inquire whether, admitting this to be the object, Con- 
gress is not bound to use all the means in its power to give this safety, this sta- 
bility, this unifonnity to the currency, for which the power was conferred ; nor 
to inquire whether the states are not bound to abstain from acts, on their part, in- 
consistent with them ; nor to inquire whether the right of banking, on the part 
of a state, does not directly, and by immediate consequence, injuriously afiect 
the currency — whether the effect of banking is not to expel the specie currency, 
which, according to the assumption that this is a hard-money government, it 
was the object of the Constitution to furnish, in conferring the power to coin 
money ; or whether the effect of banking does not necessarily tend to diminish 
the value of a specie currency as certainly as clipping or reducing its weight 
would ; and whether it has not, in fact, since its introduction, reduced the val- 
ue of the coins one half. Nor do I intend to inquire whether Congress is not 
bound to abstain from all acts, on its part, calculated to affect injuriously the 
specie circulation, and whether the receiving anything but specie, in its dues. 
must not necessarily so affect it by diminishing the quantity in circulation, and 
depreciating the value of what remains. All these questions I leave open. I 
decide none of them. There is one, however, that I will decide. If Congress 
has a right to receive anything else than specie in its dues, they have the right 
to regulate its value ; and have a right, of course, to adopt all necessary and ' 
proper means, in the language of the Constitution, to effect the object. It mat- 
ters not what they receive, tobacco, or anything else, this right must attach to 
it. I do not assert the right of receiving, but I do hold it to be incontroverti- 
ble, that, if Congress were to order the dues of the government to be paid, for in- 
stance, in tobacco, they would have the right, nay, more, they would be bound 
to use all necessary and proper means to give it a uniform and stable value — ' 
inspections, appraisement, designation of qualities, and whatever else would be 
necessary to that object. So, on the same principle, if they receive bank-notes, 
they are equally bound to use all means necessary and proper, according to the 
peculiar nature of the subject, to give them unifornuty, stability, and safety. 



would, it is conceded, make them money, as far as the government may be 
concerned, and, by a necessary consequence, would make them, to a great ex- 
tent, the currency of the country. I say nothing of the positive provisions in 
the Constitution which declare that " all duties, imposts, and excises shall be 
uniform throughout the United States," which cannot be, unless that in which 
they are paid should also have, as nearly as practicable, a uniform value 
throughout the country. To effect this, if bank-notes are received, the bank- 
ing power is necessary and proper within the meaning of the Constitution ; and, 
consequently, if the government has the right to receive bank-notes in its dues, 
the power becomes constitutional. Here lies, said Mr. Calhoun, the real con- 
stitutional question : Has the government a right to receive bank-notes, or not ? 
The question is not upon the mere power of incorporating a bank, as it has 
been commonly argued ; though even in that view there would be as great a 
constitutional objection to any act on the part of the executive, or any other 
branch of the government, which should unite any association of state banks 
into one system, as the means of giving the uniformity and stability to the cur- 
rency which the Constitution intends to confer. The very act of so associa- 
ting or uniting them into one, by whatever name called, or by whatever depart- 
ment performed, would be, in fact, an act of incorporation. 

But, said Mr. Calhoun, my object, as I have stated, is not to discuss the con- 
stitutional questions, nor to determine whether the Bank be constitutional or 
not. It is, I repeat, to show where the difficulty lies : a difficulty which I have 
felt from the time I first came into the public service. I found then, as now, 
the currency of the country consisting almost entirely of bank-notes- I found 
the government intimately connected with the system : receiving bank-notes in 
its dues, and paying them away, under its appropriations, as cash. The fact was 
beyond my control ; it existed long before my time, and without my agency ; 
and I was compelled to act on the fact as it existed, without deciding on the 
many questions which I have suggested as connected with this subject, and on 
many of which I have never yet formed a definite opinion. No one can pay 
less regard to the precedent than I do, acting here, in my representative and de- 
liberative character, on legal or constitutional questions ; but I have felt from 
the beginning the full force of the distinction so sensibly taken by the senator 
from Virginia (Mr. Leigh) between doing and undoing an act, and which he 
so strongly illustrated in the case of the purchase of Louisiana. The constitu- 
tionality of that act was doubted by many at the time, and, among others, by its 
author himself; yet he would be considered a madman who, coming into polit- 
ical life at this late period, would now seriously take up the question of the 
constitutionality of the purchase, and, coming to the conclusion that it was un- 
constitutional, should propose to rescind the act, and eject from the Union two 
flourishing states and a growing territory : nor would it be an act of much less 
madness thus to treat the question of the currency, and undertake to suppress 
at once the system of bank circulation which has been growing up from the 
beginning of the government, which has penetrated into and connected itself 
with every department of our political system, on the ground that the Constitu- 
tion intended a specie circulation ; or who would treat the constitutional ques- 
tion as one to be taken up de novo, and decided upon elementary principles, 
without reference to the imperious state of facts. 

But in raising the question whether my friends of the State Rights party can 
consistently vote for the measure which I have suggested, I rest not its decision 
on the ground that their constitutional opinion in reference to the Bank is errone- 
ous. I assume their opinion to be correct — I place the argument, not on the 
constitutionality or unconstitutionality, but on wholly different ground. I lay it 
down, as an incontrovertible principle, that, admitting an act to be unconstitu- 
tional, but of such a nature that it cannot be reversed at once, or at least without 



involving gross injustice to the community, we may, under such circumstances^ 
vote for its temporary continuance, for undoing gradually, as the only practica- 
ble mode of terminating it, consistently with the strictest constitutional objects. 
The act of the last session, adjusting the tariff, furnishes an apt illustration. 
All of us believed that measure to be unconstitutional and oppressive, yet we 
voted for it without supposing that we violated the Constitution in so doing, 
although it allowed upward of eight years for the termination of the system, 
on the ground that to reverse it at once would spread desolation and ruin over 
a large portion of the country. I ask the principle in that case to be applied 
to this. It is equally as impossible to terminate suddenly the present system 
of paper currency, without spreading a desolation still wider and deeper over 
the face of the country. If it can be reversed at all — if we can ever return to 
a metallic currency, it must be by gradually undoing what we hare done, and 
to tolerate the system while the process is going on. Thus, the measure 
which I have suggested proposes, for the period of twelve years, to be follow- 
ed up by a similar process, as far as a slow and cautious experience shall prove 
we may go consistently with the public interest, even to its entire reversal, if 
experience shall prove we may go so far, which, however, I, for one, do not 
anticipate ; but the effort, if it should be honestly commenced and pursued, would 
present a case every way parallel to the instance of the tariff to which I have 
already referred. I go farther, and ask the question, Can you, consistently with 
your obligation to the Constitution, refuse to vote for a measure, if intended, in 
good faith, to effect the object already stated ? Would not a refusal to vote for 
the only means of terminating it consistently with justice, and without involving 
the horror of revolution, amount in fact, and in all its practical consequences, to 
a vote to perpetuate a state of things which all must acknowledge to be emi- 
nently unconstitutional, and highly dangerous to the liberty of the country ? 

But I know that it will be objected that the Constitution ought to be amended, 
and the power conferred in express terms. I feel the full force of the objection. 
I hold the position to be sound, that, when a constitutional question has been 
agitated involving the powers of the government, which experience shall prove 
cannot be settled by reason, as is the case of the Bank question, those who 
claim the power ought to abandon it, or obtain an express grant by an amend- 
ment of the Constitution ; and yet, even with this impression, I would, at the 
present time, feel much, if not insuperable objection, to vote for an amendment, 
till an effort shall be fairly made, in order to ascertain to what extent the power 
might be dispensed with, as I have proposed. 

I hold it a sound principle, that no more power should be conferred upon the 
General Government than is indispensable ; and if experience should prove that 
the power of banking is indispensable, in the actual condition of the currency 
of this country and of the world generally, I should even then think that, what- 
ever power ought to be given, should be given with such restrictions and limita- 
tions as would limit it to the smallest amount necessary, and guard it with the 
utmost care against abuse. As it is, without farther experience, we are at a 
loss to determine how little or how much would be required to correct a dis- 
ease which must, if not corrected, end in convulsions and revolution. I con- 
sider the whole subject of banking and credit as undergoing at this time, 
throughout the civilized world, a progressive change, of which I think I per- 
ceive many indications. Among the changes in progression, it appears to me 
there is a strong tendency in the banking system to resolve itself into two 
parts — one becoming a bank of circulation and exchange, for the purpose of 
regulating and equalizing the circulating medium, and the other assuming 
more the character of private banking ; of which separation there are indica- 
tions in the tendency of the English system, particularly perceptible in the late 
modification of the charter of the Bank of England. In the mean time, it would 
be wise in us to avail ourselves of the experience of the next few years befora 



seems to me, it would be advisable to pm'sue, would be the same, whether the 
power be expressly conferred or not. 

I next address myself to the members of the opposition, who principally r^ep- 
resent the commercial and manufacturing portions of the country, where the 
banking system has been the farthest extended, and where a larger portion of 
the property exists in the shape of credit than in any. other section, and to 
whom a sound and stable currency is most necessary, and the opposite most 
dangerous. You have no constitutional objection : to you it is a mere question 
of expediency. Viewed in this light, can you vote for the measure suggested ? 
A measure designed to arrest the approach of events which, I have demonstra- 
ted, must, if not arrested, create convulsions and revolutions ; and to correct a 
disease which must, if not corrected, subject the currency to continued ao-ita- 
tions and fluctuations ; and, in order to give that permanence, stability, and uni- 
formity, which is so essential to your safety and prosperity. To efiect this 
may require some diminution of the profits of banking, some temporary sacri- 
fice of interest ; but if such should be the fact, it will be compensated more 
than a hundred fold by increased security and durable prosperity. If the sys- 
tem must advance in the present course without a check, and if explosion must 
follow, remember that where you stand will be the crater — should the system 
quake, under your feet the chasm will open that will ingulf your institutions and 
your prosperity. 

Can the friends of the administration vote for this measure ? If I understand 
their views, as expressed by the senator from Missouri, behind me (Mr. Ben- 
ton), and the senator from New- York (Mr. Wright), and other distinguished 
members of the party, and the views of the President as expressed in reported 
conversations, I see not how they can reject it. They profess to be the advo- 
cates of a metallic currency. 

I propose to restore it by the most effectual measures that can be devised ; 
gradually and slowly, and to the extent that experience may show that it can 
be done consistently with a due regard to the public interest. Farther no one 
can desire to go. If the means I propose are not the best and most effectual, 
let better and more effectual be devised. If the process which I propose be too 
slow or too fast, let it be accelerated or retarded. Permit me to add to these 
views what, it appears to me, those whom I address ought to feel with deep 
and solemn obligation of duty. They are the advocates and the supporters of 
the administration. It is now conceded, almost universally, that a rash and 
precipitate act of the executive, to speak in the mildest terms, has plunged this 
country into deep and almost universal distress. You are the supporters of that 
measure — you personally incur the responsibility by that support. How are 
its consequences to terminate ? Do you see the end ? Can things remain 
as they are, with the currency and the treasury of the country under the ex- 
clusive control of the executive ? And by what scheme, what device, do you 
propose to extricate the country and the Constitution from their pres'ent dan- 
gers ? 

I have now said what I intended. I have pointed out, without reserve, what 
I beheve in my conscience to be for the public interest. May what I have said 
be received as favourably as is the sincerity with which it has been uttered. In 
conclusion, I have but to add, that, if what I have said shall in any degree con- 
tribute to the adjustment of this question, which I believe cannot be left open 
without imminent danger, I shall rejoice ; but if not, I shall at least have the 
consolation of having discharged my duty. 

U 



mmams^m 



IX. 

SPEECH DELIVERED IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES APRIL 9, 1834, ON 
• THE BILL TO REPEAL THE FORCE ACT. 

I HAVE, said Mr. Calhoun, introduced this bill from a deep conviction 
that the act which it proposes to repeal is, in its tendency, subversive of our 
political institutions, and fatal to the liberty and happiness of the country j 
which I trust to be able to establish to the satisfaction of the Senate, 
should I be so fortunate as to obtain a dispassionate and favourable hear- 
ing. 

In resting the repeal on this ground, it is not my intention to avail my- 
self of the objections to the details of the act, as repugnant as many of 
them are to the principles of our government. In illustration of the truth 
of this assertion, I might select that provision which vests in the Pres- 
ident, in certain cases, of which he is made the judge, the entire force of 
the country, civil, military, and naval, with the implied power of pledging 
the public faith for whatever expenditure he may choose to incur in its 
application. And, to prove how dangerous it is to vest such extraordi- 
nary powers in the executive, I might avail myself of the experience which 
we have had in the last few months of the aspiring character of that de- 
partment of the government, and which has furnished conclusive evidence 
of the danger of vesting in it even a very limited discretion. It is not for 
me to judge of the propriety of the course which the members of this 
body may think proper to pursue in reference to the question under con- 
sideration ; but I must say that I am at a loss to understand how any one, 
who regards as I do the acts to which I have referred, as palpable usur- 
pations of power, and as indicating on the part of the executive a danger- 
ous spirit of aggrandizement, can vote against the bill under considera- 
tion, and thereby virtually vote to continue in the President the extraor- 
dinary and dangerous power in question. 

But it may be said that the provision of the act which confers this pow- 
er will expire, by its own limitation, at the termination of the present 
session. It is true it will then cease to be law ; but it is no less true 
that the precedent, unless the act be expunged from the statute-book, will 
live forever, ready, on any pretext of future danger, to be quoted as an au- 
thority to confer on the chief magistrate similar, or even more dangerous 
powers, if more dangerous can be devised. We live in an eventful period> 
and, among other things, we have had, recently, some impressive lessons 
on the danger of precedents. To thein immediately we owe the act which 
has caused the present calamitous and dangerous condition of the coun- 
try ; which has been defended almost solely on the ground of precedents 
— precedents almost unnoticed at the time ; but had they not existed, or 
had they been reversed at the time by Congress, the condition of the 
country would this day be far different from what it is. With this knowl- 
edge of the facts, we must see that a bad precedent is as dangerous as 
the bad measure itself; and in some respects more so, as it may give rise 
to acts far worse than itself, as in the case to which I have alluded. In 
this view of the subject, to refuse to vote against the repeal of the act, 
and thereby constitute a precedent to confer similar, or more dangerous 
powers hereafter, would be as dangerous as to vote for an act to vest per- 
manently in the President the power in question. 

But I pass over this and other objections to the details not much less 
formidable. I take a higher stand against the act : I object to the princi- 
ple in which it originated, putting the details aside, on the ground, as I 



in their tendency, to the liberty and happiness of the country. Fortunate- 
ly, we are not left to conjecture or inference as to what these principles 
are. It was openly proclaimed, both here and elsewhere, in the debates 
of this body and the proclamation and message of the President, in which 
the act originated, that the very basis on which it rests — the assumption 
on which only it could be supported — was, that this government had the 
final and conclusive right, in the last resort, to judge of the extent of its 
powers ; and that, to execute its decision, it had the right to use all the 
means of the country, civil, military, and fiscal, not only against individ- 
uals, but against the states themselves, and all acting under their author- 
ity, whether in a legislative, executive, or judicial capacity. 

If farther evidence be required as to the nature and character of the 
act, it will be found in the history of the events in which it took its ori- 
gin. It originated, as we all know, in a controversy between this govern- 
ment and the State of South Carolina, in reference to a power which in- 
volved the question of the constitutionality of a protective tariff. I do not 
intend to give the history of this controversy ; it is sufficient for my pur- 
pose to say that the state, in maintenance of what she believed to be her 
unquestionable power, assumed the highest ground : she placed herself on 
her sovereign authority as a constituent member of this confederacy, and 
made her opposition to the encroachment on her rights through a conven- 
tion of the people, the only organ by which, according to our conception, 
the sovereign will of a state can be immediately and directly pronounced. 
This government, on its part, in resistance to the action of the state, as- 
sumed the right to trample upon the authority of the convention, and to 
look beyond the state to the individuals who compose it : not as form- 
ing a political community, but as a mere mass of insolated individuals, 
without political character or authority ; and thus asserted in the strongest 
manner, not only the right of judging of its own powers, but that of over- 
looking, in a contest for power, the very existence of the state itself, and 
of recognising, in the assertion of what it might claim to be its power, no 
other authority whatever in the system but its own. 

Such being the principle in which this bill originated, we are brought 
to the consideration of a question of the deepest import. Is an act, which 
assumes such powers for this government, consistent with the nature and 
character of our political institutions'? 

It is not my intention, in the discussion of this question, to renew the 
debate of the last session. But, in declining to renew that discussion, I 
wish to be directly understood that I do so exclusively on the ground 
that I do not feel myself justified in repeating arguments so recently ad- 
vanced ; and not on the ground that there is the least abatement of con- 
fidence in the positions then assumed, or in the decisive bearing which 
they ought to have against the act. So far otherwise, time and reflection 
have but served to confirm me in the impression which I then entertain- 
ed ; and, without repeating the arguments, I now avail myself, in this dis- 
cussion, of the positions then established, and stand prepared to vindicate 
tkem against whatever assaults maybe made upon them, come from what 
quarter they may. Without, then, reopening the discussion of the last 
session on the elementary principles of our government, which were 
then brought into controversy, I shall now proceed to take the plainest 
and most common-sense view of our political institutions, regarding them 
merely in a matter-of-fact way, in order to ascertain the parts of which 
they are composed, and the relations which they bear to each other. 

Thus regarding our institutions, we are struck, on the first view, with 
the number and complexity of the parts — with the division, classification, 



^^^■■IHHHiHiHiB^^lHHHMHai 



ar.Q organizaiion wiucu peivuuc cvci^ pan ui mc o^oicm. ±t i.>, m luti, 
a system of governments ; and these, in turn, are a system of departments — 
a system in which government bears the same relation to government, in 
reference to the whole, as departments do to departments, in reference to 
each particular government. As each government is made up of the le- 
gislative, executive, and judicial departments organized into one, so the 
system is made up of this government, and the state governments, in like 
manner, organized into one system. So, too, as the powers which consti- 
tute the respective governments are divided and organized into depart- 
ments, in like manner in the formation of the governments, their powers 
are classed into two distinct divisions : the one containing powers local 
and peculiar in their character, which the interests of the states require 
to be exercised by each state through a separate government ; the other 
containing those which are more general and comprehensive, and which 
can be best exercised in some uniform mode through a common govern- 
ment. The former of these divisions constitutes what, in our system, are 
known as the reserved powers, and are exercised by each state through 
its own separate government. The latter are known as the delegated 
powers, and are exercised through this, the common government of the 
several states. This division of power into two parts, with distinct and 
independent governments, regularly organized into departments, legisla- 
tive, executive, and judicial, to carry their respective parts into effect, 
constitutes the great striking and peculiar character of our system, and is 
without example in ancient or modern times ; and may be regarded as the 
fundamental distribution of power under the system, and as constituting 
its great conservative principle. 

If we extend our eyes beyond, we shall find another striking division 
between the power of the people and that of the government — between 
that inherent, primitive, creative power which resides exclusively in the 
people, and from which all authority is derived, and the delegated power 
or trust conferred upon the government to effect the object of their cre- 
ation. If we look still beyond, we shall find another and most important 
dicision. The people, instead of being united in one general community, 
are divided into twenty-four states, each forming a distinct sovereign com- 
munity, and in which, separately, the whole power of the system ulti- 
mately resides. 

If we examine how this ultimate power is called into action, we shall 
find that its only organ is a primary assemblage of the people, known un- 
der the name of a convention, through which their sovereign will is an- 
nounced, and by which governments are formed and organized. If we 
trace historically the exertion of this power in the formation of the gov- 
ernments constituting our system, we shall find that, originally, on the 
separation of the thirteen colonies from the crown of Great Britain, each 
state for itself, through its own convention, formed separate constitu- 
tions and governments, and that these governments, in turn, formed a 
league or confederacy for the purpose of exercising those powers, in the 
regulation of which the states had a common interest. But this confed- 
eracy, proving incompetent for its object, was superseded by the present 
Constitution, which essentially changed the character of the system. If 
we compare the mode of the adoption of this Constitution with that of 
the adoption of original constitutions of the several states, we shall find 
them precisely the same. In both, each state adopted the Constitution 
through its own convention, by its separate act, each for itself, and is 
only bound in consequence of its own adoption, without reference to the 
adoption of any other state. The only point in which they can be dis- 
tinguished is the mutual compact, in which each state stipulated with the 



stitution is, in fact, the Constitution of each state. In Virginia, for in 
stance, it is the Constitution of Virginia ; and so, too, this government, 
and the laws which it enacts, are, within the limits of the state, the gov- 
ernment and the laws of the state. It is, in fact, the Constitution and o-ov- 
ernment of the whole, because it is the Constitution and government of 
each part ; and not the Constitution and government of the parts because ' 
it is of the whole. The system commences with the parts, and ends with ' 
the whole. The parts are the units, and the whole the multiple, instead 
of the Avhole being a unit and the parts the fractions. Thus viewed, each 
state has two distinct Constitutions and governments — a separate Consti- 
tution and government, instituted, as I have stated, to regulate the object in 
which each has a peculiar interest j and a general one to regulate the inter- ' 
ests common to all, and binding by a common compact the whole into one 
community, in which the separate and independent existence of each 
state as a sovereign community is preserved, instead of being fused into 
a common mass. ' 

Such is our system : such are its parts, and such their relation to each 
other. I have stated no fact that can be questioned, nor have I omitted 
any that is essential which I am capable of perceiving. In reviewing the 
whole, we must be no less struck with the simplicity of the means by 
which all are blended into one, than we are by the number and complex, 
ity of the parts. I know of no system, in either respect, ancient or mod- 
ern, to be compared with it ; and can compare it to nothing but that sub- 
lime and beautiful system of which our globe constitutes a part, and to 
which it bears in many particulars so striking a resemblance. In this sys- 
tem, this government, as we have seen, constitutes a part — a prominent, 
but a subordinate part, with defined, limited, and restricted powers. 

I now repeat the question. Is the act which assumes for this government 
the right to interpret, in the last resort, the extent of its powers, and to 
enforce its interpretation against all other authority, consistent with our 
institutions % To state the question is to answer it. We mio-ht with 
equal propriety ask whether a government of unlimited poAver is consist- 
ent with one of enumerated and restricted powers. I say unlimited, for I 
would hold his understanding in low estimation who can make, practical- 
ly, any distinction between a government of unlimited powers, and one 
which has an unlimited right to construe and enforce its powers as it 
pleases ; who does not see that, to divide power, and to give one of the 
parties the exclusive right to determine what share belongs to him, is to 
annihilate the division, and to vest the whole in him who possesses the 
right "? It would be no less absurd, than for one in private life to divide 
his property with another, and vest in that other the absolute and uncon- 
ditional right to determine the extent of his share ; which would be, in 
fact, to give him the whole. Nor could I think much more highly of the 
understanding of him who does not perceive that this exclusive right, on 
the part of this government, of determining the extent of its powers, ne- 
cessarily destroys all distinction between reserved and delegated powers ; 
and that it thus strikes a fatal blow at that fundamental distribution of 
power which lies at the bottom of our system. It also, by inevitable con- 
sequence, destroys all distinction between constitutional and unconstitu- 
tional laws, making the latter to the full as obligatory as the former ; of 
Avhich we had a remarkable example when the act proposed to be repeal- 
ed was before the Senate. It is well known that the power in controver- 
sy between this government and the State of South Carolina had been 
pronounced to be unconstitutional by the legislatures of most of the . 
Southern States, and also by many of the members of this body ; and yet 



IbS SPEECHES VF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

there were instances, however extraordinary it may appear, of members 
of the body voting to enforce an act which they believed to be unconsti- 
tutional, and that, too, at the hazard of civil war. As strange as such a 
course must appear, it was the natural and legitimate consequence of the 
power which the act assumed for this government, and illustrates, in the 
strongest manner imaginable, the truth of what I have advanced. But to 
proceed. This unlimited right of judging as to its powers, not only de- 
stroys, as I have stated, all distinction between constitutional and uncon- 
stitutional acts, but merges in this government the very existence of the 
separate governments of the states, by reducing them from that independ- 
ent and distinct existence, as co-governments, assigned to them in the 
system, to mere subordinate and dependant bodies, holding their power 
and existence at the mercy of this government. It stops not here — it an- 
nihilates the states themselves. The right which it assumes of trampling 
upon the authority of a Convention of the people of the states, the only 
organ through which the sovereignty of the states can exert itself, and to 
look beyond the states to the individuals who compose them, and to treat 
them as entirely destitute of all political character or power, is, in fact, 
to annihilate the states, and to transfer their sovereignty, and all their 
powers, to this government. 

If we now raise our eyes, and direct them towards that once beautiful 
system, with all its various, separate, and independent parts blended into 
one harmonious whole, we must be struck with the mighty change ! All 
have disappeared — gone — absorbed — concentrated and consolidated in this 
government, which is left alone in the midst of the desolation of the sys- 
tem, the sole and unrestricted representative of an absolute and despotic 
majority. 

Will it be tolerated, that I should ask whether an act which has caused 
so complete a revolution — which has entirely subverted our political sys- 
tem, as it emanated from the hands of its creators, and reared in its place 
one in every respect so different — must not, in its consequences, prove fa- 
tal to the liberty and the happiness of these states ] Can it be necessary 
for me to prove that no other system that human ingenuity can devise, 
or imagination conceive, but that which this fatal act has subverted, can 
preserve the liberty or secure the happiness of the country 1 Need I show 
that the most difficult problem which ever was presented to the mind of 
a legislator to solve, was to devise a system of government for a country 
of such vast extent, that should at once possess sufficient power to hold 
the whole together, without, at the same time, proving fatal to liberty 1 
There never existed an example before of a free community spreading 
over such an extent of territory ; and the ablest and profoundest thinkers, 
at the time, believed it to be utterly impracticable that there should be. 
Yet this difficult problem was solved — successfully solved, by the wise 
and sagacious men who framed our Constitution. No : it was above un- 
aided human wisdom — above the sagacity of the most enlightened. It 
was the result of a fortunate combination of circumstances, co-operating 
and leading the way to its formation ; directed by that kind Providence 
which has so often and so signally disposed events in our favour. 

To solve this difficult problem, and to overcome the apparently insu- 
perable obstacle which it presents, required that peculiar division, distribu- 
tion, and organization of power which, as I have stated, so remarkably 
distinguish our system, and which serve as so many breakwaters to ar- 
rest the angry waves of power, impelled by avarice and ambition, and 
which, driven furiously over a broad and unbroken expanse, would be re- 
sistless. Of this partition and breaking up of power into separate parts, 
the most remarkable division is that between the reserved and delegated 



of the states are organized, as the great and primary departments of the 
system. It is this important division which mainly gives that expansive 
character to our institutions, by means of which they have the capacity of 
beino- spread over the vast extent of our country without exposing us on 
the one side to the danger of disunion, or on the other to the loss of lib- 
erty. Without this happy device, the people of these states, after having 
achieved their independence, would have been compelled to resolve them- 
selves into small and hostile communities, in despite of a common origin, 
a common language, and the common renown and glory acquired by their 
united wisdom and valour in the war of the Revolution, or have submitted 
quietly to the yoke of despotic power as the only alternative. 

In the place of this hdmirably-coritrived system, the act proposed to be 
repealed has erected one gl-eat consolidated government. Can it be ne- 
cessary for me to show what must be the inevitable consequences '? Need 
I prove that all consolidated governments— governments in which a sin- 
gle power predominates (for such is their essence) — are necessarily despot- 
ic, whether that po-wer be wielded by the will of one man, or that of an 
absolute and unchecked majority ] Need I demonstrate that it is, on the 
contrary, the very essence of liberty that the power should be so divided, 
distributed, and. organized, that one interest may check the other, so as 
to prevent the excessive action of the separate interests of the communi- 
ty against each other ; on the principle that organized power can only be 
checked by orgattized power V 

The truth of these doctrines was fully understood at the ti'm-e of the 
formation of this Constitution. It was then clearly foreseen and foretold 
what must be the inevitable consequences of concentrating all the powers 
of. the system in this government. Yes, we are in a state predicted, fore- 
told, prophesied from the beginning. All the calamities we have expe- 
rienced, and those which are yet to come, are the result of the consolida- 
tinor tendency of the government ; and unless that tendency be arrested 
.■ — unless we reverse our steps, all that has been foretold will certainly 
befall us^^even to the pouring out of the last vial of wrath — military des- 
potism. To this fruitful source of woes may be traced that remarkable 
-decay of public virtue ; that rapid growth of corruption and subserviendy ; 
that decline of patriotism ; that increase of faction ; that tendency to an- 
archy ; and, finally, that visible approach of the absolute power of one man 
which so lamentably characterizes the times. Should there be anyone 
seeing and acknowledging all these morbid and dangerous symptoms, but 
should doubt whether the disease is to be traced to the cause which I 
have assigned, I would ask him, To what other can it be attributed/? There 
is no event — no, not in the political or moral world, more than in the physi- 
cal — without an adequate cause. I would ask him, Does he attribute it to 
the people 1 to their want of sufficient intelligence and virtue for self-gov- 
ernment % If the true cause may be traced to them, very inelancholy 
would be our situation ; gloomy would be the prospect before us. If such 
be the fact, that out people are, indeed, incapable of self-government, I 
know of no people upon earth with whom we rhight not desire to change 
condition. When the day comes when this people shall be compelled to 
surrender self-government, a people so spirited and so long accustomed 
to liberty, it will be indeed a day of revolution, of convulsion and blood, 
such as has rarely, if ever, been witnessed in any age or countfy ; and, 
until compelled by irresistible evidence, so- fearful a cause cannot be ad- 
mitted. 

Can it be attributed to the nature of out system of government 1 Shall 
"We pronounce it radically defective^ and incapable of effecting the ol^ects 



be, in fact, not much less calamitous than if attributable to the people. To 
what other system could we resort 1 To a confederation 1 That has already- 
been tried, and has proved utterly inadequate. To consolidation 1 Rea- 
son and experience (as far as we have had experience) proclaim it to be 
the worst passible form. But if the cause be not in the people or the 
system, to what can it be attributed but to some misapprehension of the 
nature and character of our inst " "ions, and consequent misdirection of 
their powers or functions 1 And u , to what other misapprehension or 
misdirection, but that which directed our system towards consolidation, 
and consummated its movement in that direction in the act proposed to 
be repealed 1 That such is the fact — that this is the true explanation of 
all the symptoms of decay and corruption which I have enumerated — is, 
in reality, our only consolation ; furnishes the only hope that can be ra- 
tionally entertained of extricating- ourselves from our present calamity, 
and of averting the still greater that are impending. 

I know that there are those who take a different, but, in my opinion, a 
very superficial view of the cause of our difficulties. They attribute it 
exclusively to those who are in power, and see in the misconduct of Gen- 
eral Jackson the cause of all that has befallen us. That he has done much 
to aggravate the evil, I acknowledge with pain. I had my full share of 
responsibility in elevating him to power, and there once existed between 
us friendly relations, personal and political, and I would rejoice had he so 
continued to conduct himself as to advance the interests of the country, 
and his own reputation and fame. He certainly might have effected 
much good. He came into office under circumstances, and had a weight 
of popularity which placed much in his power, for good or for evil ; but 
either from a want of a just comprehension of the duties attached to the 
situation in which he is placed, or an indisposition to discharge them, or 
the improper influence and control of those who, unfortunately for the 
country and for himself, have acquired, through flattery and subserviency, 
an ascendency over him, he has disappointed the hopes of his friends, and 
realized the predictions of his enemies. But the question recurs. How 
happened it that he who has proved himself so illy qualified to fill the 
high station that he occupies, was elected by the people 1 If it be attrib- 
uted to a misapprehension of his qualifications, or to an undue gratitude 
for distinguished military services, which at times leads astray the most 
intelligent and virtuous people in the selection of rulers — how shall we 
explain his re-election, after he had actually proved himself so incompe- 
tent ; after he had violated every pledge which he had made previous to 
election ; after he had disregarded the principles on which he had permit- 
ted his friends and partisans to place his elevation, and had outraged the 
feelings of the community by attempting to regulate the domestic inter- 
course and relations of society 1 Shall we say that the feelings of grat- 
itude for military services outweighed all this 1 or that the people, with 
all this experience, were incapable of forming a correct opinion of his con- 
duct or character, or of understanding the tendency of the measures of 
his administration 1 To assert this would be neither more nor less than 
to assert that they have neither the intelligence nor the virtue for self- 
government ; as the very criterion by which their capacity in that respect 
is tested, is their ability duly to appreciate the character and conduct of 
public rulers, and the true tendency of their public measures ; and to ad- 
mit their incapacity in that respect would, in fact, bring- us back to the 
people as the cause. 

To understand truly how the distinguished individual now at the head 
of the nation was elevated to this exalted station, in despite of his ac- 



gk.liUWlCU" cu. ucicoia III otv^iai n;ouc\^io, aiiu liu»v lie iiao iciaiiit^u ills 

power among an intelligent and patriotic people, notwithstanding all the 
objections to his administration that have been stated, we must elevate 
our views from the individual, and his qualifications and conduct, to the 
working of the system itself, by which only we can come to a knowledge 
of the true cause of our present condition ; how we have arrived at it, 
and by what means we can extricate ourselves from its dangers and diffi- 
culties. I do not deem it r ':essary, in taking this view, to go back and 
trace the operation of our ^ jvernment from the commencement, or to 
point out the departure from its true principles from the beginning, with 
the evils thence resulting, however interesting and instructive the inves- 
tigation might be. I might show that from the first, beginning with the 
formation of the Constitution, there were two parties in the Convention : 
one in favour of a national, or, what is the same thing, a consolidated 
government, and the other in favour of the confederative principle ; how 
the latter, from being in the minority at first, gradually, and after a long 
struggle, gained the ascendency ; and how the fortunate result of that as- 
cendency terminated in the establishment of that beautiful, complex, fed- 
erative system of government which I have attempted to explain. 

I might show that the struggle between the two parties did not termi- 
nate with the adoption of the Constitution ; that after it went into opera- 
tion the national party gained the ascendency in the counsels of the na- 
tion ; and that the result of that ascendency was to give an impulse to the 
government in the direction which their principles led, and from which 
it never afterward recovered. I am far from attributing this to any sin- 
ister design. The party were not less distinguished for patriotism than 
for ability, and no doubt honestly intended to give the system a fair trial ; 
but they would have been more than men, if their attachment to a favour- 
ite plan had not biased their feelings and judgment. I (said Mr. C.) 
avail myself of the occasion to avow my high respect for both of the 
great parties which divided the country in its early history. They were 
both eminently honest and patriotic, and the preference which each gave 
to its respective views resulted from a zealous attachment to the public 
interest. At that early period, before there was any experience as to the 
operation of the system, it is not surprising that one should believe that 
the danger was a tendency to anarchy, while the other believed it to be 
towards despotism, and that these different theoretical views should hon- 
estly have a decided influence on their public conduct. 

I pass over the intermediate events : the reaction against the national, 
or, as it was then called, federal party — the elevation of Mr. Jefferson in 
consequence of that reaction in 1801 — and the gradual departure (from 
the influence of power) of the Republican party from the principles which 
brought them into office. I come down at once to the year eighteen hun- 
dred and twenty-four, when a protective tariff was for the first time adopt- 
ed ; when the power to impose duties, granted for the purpose of raising 
revenue, was converted into an instrument of regulating, controlling, and 
organizing the entire capital and industry of the country, and placing them 
under the influence of this government ; and when the principles of con- 
solidation gained an entire ascendency in both houses of Congress. Its 
first fruit was to give a sectional action to the government, and, of course, 
a sectional character to political parties — arraying the non-exporting states 
against the exporting, and the Northern against the Southern section. 

It is my wish to speak of the events to which I feel myself compelled 
to refer, in illustration of the practical operation of that consolidating 
tendency of the government, which was consummated by the act pro- 
posed to be repealed, and which I believe to be the cause of all our evils, 

X 



with the greatest possible moderation. I know how delicate a task it is 
to speak of recent political events, and of the actors concerned in them ; 
and I would, on this occasion, gladly avoid so painful a duty, if I did not 
believe that truth and public interest ret[uire it. Without a full under- 
standing of the events of this period, from '24 down to the present time, 
it is impossible that we can have a just knowledge of the cause of our 
present condition, or a clear perception of the means of remedying it. 
To avoid all personal feeling, I shall endeavour to recede, in imagination, 
a century from the present time, and from that distant position regard the 
events to which I allude, in that spirit of philosophical inquiry by which an 
earnest seeker after truth, at so remote a day, may be supposed to be ac- 
tuated. I feel I may be justified in speaking with the less reserve of these 
events, as the great question which, during the greater part of the period, 
so deeply agitated the country (the protective tariff), may now be consid- 
ered as terminated in the adjustment of the last winter, never to be re- 
agitated, as I trust ; and, of course, may be spoken of with the freedom of 
a past event. 

But to proceed with the narrative : the presidential contest, which was 
terminated the next year, placed the executive department under the con- 
trol of the same interest that controlled the legislative, so that all depart- 
ments of this government were united in favour of that great interest. 
The successful termination of the election in favour of the individual then 
elevated to the chief magistracy, and for whom 1 then and now entertain 
kind feelings, may be attributed in part, no doubt, to the predominance 
of the tariff interest, and may be considered as the first instance of the 
nredominance of that interest in a presidential contest. 

Let us pause at this point (it is an important one), in order to survey 
the state of public affairs at that juncture. In casting our eyes over the 
scene, we find the country divided into two great hostile and sectional 
parties — placed in conflict on a question, believed to be on both sides of 
vital importance, in reference to their respective interests ; and, on the 
side of the weaker party, believed, in addition, to involve a constitutional 
question of the greatest magnitude, and having a direct and important 
bearing on the duration of the liberty and Constitution of the country. In 
this conflict, we find both houses of Congress, with the chief magistrate, 
and, of course, the government itself, on the side of the dominant interest, 
and identified with it in principles and feelings. In this state of things, a 
great and solemn question. What ought to be done 1 was forced on the 
decision of the minority. Shall we acquiesce, or shall we oppose 1 and if 
oppose, howl To acquiesce quietly would be to subject the property 
and industry of an entire section of the country to an unlimited and indef- 
inite exaction ; as it was openly avowed that the protective system could 
only be perfected by being carried to the point of prohibition on all ar- 
ticles of which a sufficient supply could be made or manufactured in the 
country. To submit under such circumstances would have been, accord- 
ing to our view of the subject, a gross dereliction both of interest and 
duty. It was impossible. But how could the majority be successfully 
opposed, possessed, as they were, of every department of the government ? 
How, in this state of things, could the minority effect a change in their 
favour through the ordinary operations of the government ? They could 
effect no favourable change in this or the other house — the majority in 
both but too faithfully represented what their constituents believed to be 
the interest of their section, to whom only, and not to us, they were re- 
sponsible. The only branch of the government, then, on which the mi- 
nority could act, and through which they could hope to effect a favourable 
change, was the executive. The President is elected by a majority of 



election, in proportion to their number and the unity of their voice. Here 
was all our hope, and to this point all our efforts to effect a change were 
necessarily directed 5 but even here our power of acting with effect was 
limited to a narrow circle. It would have been hopeless to present a can- 
didate openly and fully identified with our own interest. Defeat would have 
been the certain result, had his acknowledged qualifications for intelli- 
' gence, experience, and patriotism been ever so great. We were thus 
I forced by inevitable consequence — neither to be avoided nor resisted — to 
abandon the contest, or to select a candidate who, at best, was but a 
choice of evils ; one whose opinions were intermediate or doubtful on 
the subject which divided the two sections. However great the hazard, 
or the objections to such a selection for such an office, it must be char- 
ged, not to us, but to that action of the system which compelled us to 
make the choice— compelling us by that consolidating tendency which, 
had drawn under the control of this government the local and reserved 
powers belonging to the states separately ; the exercise of which had ne- 
cessarily given that direction to its action, that created and placed in con- 
flict the two great sectional, political parties. 

But it was not sufficient that the opinion of our candidate should not 
be fully in coincidence with our own. That alone could not be sufficient 
to ensure his success. It was necessary that he should have great per- 
sonal popularity, distinct from political 5 to be, in a word, a successful 
military chieftain, which gives a popularity the most extensive, and the 
least affected by political considerations ; and this was another fruit — a 
necessary fruit of consolidation. To these recommendations others must 
be added, in order to conciliate the feelings of the minority — that he should 
be identified, for instance, with them in interest, possess the same prop- 
erty, and pursue the same industry. These qualifications, all of which 
were made indispensable by the juncture, pointed clearly to one man, and 
but one, General Jackson. There was, however, another circumstance 
which gave him great prominence and strength, and which greatly con- 
tributed to recommend him as the opposing candidate. He had been de- 
feated in the presidential contest before the House of Representatives 
(though returned with the highest vote) under circumstances which were 
supposed to involve a disregard of the public voice. I do not deem it 
necessary to enter into an inquiry as to the principles which controlled 
the election, or as to the view of the actors in that scene. Many con- 
siderations doubtless governed, and, among others, the feelings of prom- 
inent individuals in reference to the candidates, and their opinion of their 
respective qualifications, besides the one to which I have alluded — that of 
giving to the dominant interest that control over the executive which 
they had over the legislative department. 

These combined motives, as I have stated, pointed distinctly to Gen- 
eral Jackson. He was selected as the candidate of the minority, and the 
canvass entered into with all that zeal which belonged to the mao-nitude 
of the stake, united with the consciousness of honest and patriotic pur- 
pose. The leading objects were to effect a great political reform, and to 
arrest, if possible, what we believed to be a dangerous, and felt to be an 
oppressive action of the government. It is true that the qualifications of 
the individual, thus necessarily selected, were believed to be, in many im- 
portant particulars, defective ; that he lacked experience, extensive polit- 
ical information, and a command of temper ; but it was believed that his 
firmness of purpose, and his natural sagacity, by calling to his aid the ex- 
perience, the talents, and patriotism of those who supported his claims, 
would compensate for these defects. 



I do not deem it necessary to enter into a history of this interesting 
and animated canvass ; but there is one circumstance attending it so 
strikino- so full of instruction, and so illustrative of the point under con- 
siderat'ion that I cannot pass it in silence. The canvass soon ran into 
the great and absorbing question of the day, as all ordinary diseases run 
into the prevailing one. Those in power sought to avail themselves of 
the popularity of the system with which they were identified. I speak 
it not in censure. It was natural, perhaps unavoidable, as connected with 
the morbid action of the government. That portion of our allies iden- 
tified with the same interest were in like manner, and from the same 
motive and cause, forced into a rivalry of zeal for the same interest. The 
result of these causes, combined with a monopolizing spirit of the protect- 
ive system, was the tariff of eighteen hundred and twenty-eight : that 
disastrous measure, which has brought so many calamities upon us, and 
put in peril the Union and liberty of the country. It poured millions into 
the treasury, beyond even the most extravagant wants of the government ; 
and which, on the payment of the public debt, caused that hazardous junc- 
ture, resuhing from a large undisposable surplus revenue, which has 
spread such deep corruption in every direction. 

This disastrous event opened our eyes (I mean myself, and those imme- 
diately connected with me) as to the full extent of the danger and op- 
pression of the protective system, and the hazard of failing to effect the 
reform intended through the election of General Jackson. With these 
disclosures, it became necessary to seek some other ultimate, but more 
certain measure of protection. We turned to the Constitution to find this 
remedy. We directed a more diligent and careful scrutiny into its pro- 
visions, in order to ascertain fully'the nature and character of our polit- 
ical system. We found a certain and effectual remedy in that great fun- 
damental division of the powers of the system between this government 
and its independent co-departments : the separate government of the 
states to be called into action to arrest the unconstitutional acts of this 
government, by the interposition of the state — the paramount source 
from which both governments derive their power. But in relying on this 
as our ultimate remedy, we did not abate our zeal in the presidential 
canvass J we still hoped that General Jackson, if elected, would effect the 
necessary reform, and thereby supersede the necessity for calling into 
action the sovereign authority of the state, which we were anxious to 
avoid. With these views, the two were pushed with equal zeal at the 
same time ; which double operation commenced in the fall of eighteen 
hundred and twenty-eight, but a few months after the passage of the Tar- 
iff Act of that year 5 and at the meeting of the Legislature of the State, 
at the same period, a paper, known as the South Carolina Exposition, was 
reported to that body, containing a full development, as well on the con- 
stitutional point, as the operation of the protective system, preparatory 
to a state of things which might eventually render the action of the state 
necessary in order to protecther rights and interests, and to stay a course 
of policy which we believed would, if not arrested, prove destructive of 
liberty and the Constitution. This movement on the part of the state 
places beyond all controversy the true character of the motives which 
<Toverned us in the presidential canvass. We were not the mere partisans 
of the candidate we supported. We aimed at a far more exalted object 
than his election— the defence of the rights of the state, and the security 
of liberty and of the Constitution. To this we held his election entirely 
subordinate. This we pursued, unwarped by selfish or ambitions views. 
The contest terminated in the elevation of him who now presides 5 but 
it soon became apparent that our apprehensions that we might be dis- 



appointed in the expected reform, was not without foundation. That oc- 
curred, which we ought, perhaps, to have expected, and which, under 
siniilar circumstances, has rarely failed to follow. He who was elevated 
to power proved to be more solicitous to retain what he had acquired 
than to fulfil the expectation of those who had honestly contributed to his 
elevation, with a view to political reform. The tale may be readily told: 
not a promise fulfilled — not a measure adopted to correct the abuses of 
the system — not a step taken to arrest the progress of consolidation, and 
to restore the confederative principles of our government — not a look cast 
to the near approach of the payment of the public debt — nor an effort 
made to reduce gradually the duties, in order to prevent a surplus revenue, 
and to save the manufactures which had grown up under the protective 
system, from the hazard of a shock caused by a sudden reduction of the 
duties. All were forgotten ; and, instead of attempting to control events, 
the executive was only solicitous to occupy a position the most propitious 
to retain and increase his power. It required but little penetration to see 
that the position sought was a middle one between the contending parties: 
to be identified v/ith no principle or policy, and rely on the personal pop- 
ularity of the incumbent, and the power and patronage of the government, 
as the means of support. Hence a third party was formed, a personal 
and government party, made up of those who were attached to the person 
and the fortunes of a successful political chief. In a word, we had ex- 
hibited to our view, for the first time under our system, that most danarer- 
ous spectacle, m a country like ours, a prerogative party, who take their 
creed wholly from the mandate of their chief. The times were eminently 
propitious for the formation of such a party. Millions were poured into 
the treasury by the high protective duties of eighteen hundred and 
twenty-eight, furnishing an overflowing fund to secure the services of ex- 
pectants and partisans. Against these superabundant means of power 
there was not, nor could there be, as things were situated, any effective 
resistance, all being necessarily withdrawn in consequence of the fierce 
contest between the two sections which continued to rage with increasing 
violence, and which wasted the strength of the parties on each other, in- 
stead of opposing the rapidly-increasing power of the executive. This, 
and not the personal or the military popularity of General Jackson, is the 
true explanation of the fact, which has struck so many with wonder, that 
no misconduct, that no neglect of duty nor perversions of the power of 
government, however gross, has been able to shake his power and pop- 
ularity ; and that the people have looked idly on, apparently bereaved of 
every patriotic sentiment, or joined to swell the tide of power with shouts 
of approbation at every act, however outrageous. I do not doubt that his 
personal popularity, arising from his military achievements, contributed 
much to his elevation (in fact, it was one of the elements, as stated, which 
governed his selection as a candidate), and to sustain him while in power; 
but I feel a perfect conviction that, whatever advantage he has gained 
from this source, has been more than counterbalanced by the mismanage- 
ment and blunders of his administration, and that it would be equally dif- 
ficult to expel from power any individual of sagacity and firmness, in 
possession of that department, under the circumstances which he has held 
it. Let us learn, from the instructive history of this interesting period, 
that despotic power, under our system, commences with usurpation of 
this government on the reserved powers of the states, and terminates in 
the concentration of all the powers of this government in the person of a 
chief magistrate ; and that, unless the first be resisted, the latter follows 
by a necessary, resistless, and inevitable law, as much so as that which 
governs the movements of the solar system. 



As soon as it was perceived that he whom Ave had elevated to office 
was, as I have stated, more intent to retain and augment his power than 
to meet the just expectations on which he was supported, we totally de- 
spaired of relief and reform through the ordinary action of this govern- 
ment, and separated, from that moment, from the administration ; with- 
drew from the political contest here, and concentrated all our energies on 
that ultimate remedy which we had taken the precaution to prepare, in I 
order to be called into action in the event of things taking the direction [ 
which they have. j 

An active discussion followed in the state, in which the principles and ; 
character of our political institutions were fully investigated, and a clear i 
perception of the danger to which the country was exposed was impress- 
ed upon the public mind. Still the determination was fixed not to act 
while there was a ray of hope of redress from the government ; and we 
accordingly waited the approach of the final payment of the public debt, 
when all pretexts for keeping up the extravagant duties of eighteen hun 
dred and twenty-eight would cease. The near approach of that event 
caused the passage of the act of eighteen hundred and thirty-two, which 
was proclaimed on both sides, by the opposition and the administration, 
to be a final and permanent adjustment of the protective system. We 
felt every disposition to acquiesce in any reasonable adjustment, but 
it was impossible, consistently with our views of the nature of our rights, 
and the consequences involved in the contest, to submit to the act. The 
protective principle was fully maintained; the reduction was small, and 
the distribution of the burden between the two sections more unequal than 
under the act of eighteen hundred and twenty-eight. Every effort was 
made to magnify the amount of reduction. With that view false and de- 
ceptions calculations were made, and that, too, in official documents, in 
order to make the impression that the revenue would be reduced to the 
legitimate wants of the government, or, at least, nearly so. We were not 
to°be imposed upon by such calculations. We clearly perceived that the 
income would be at least from twenty-two to twenty-five millions of dol- 
lars, nearly double what the government ought to expend ; and we as 
clearly saw how much so large a permanent surplus must contribute to 
corrupt the country and undermine our political institutions. Seeing 
this, with a prospect of an indefinite continuance of the heavy and useless 
tax levied in the shape of duties, the state interposed, and by that inter- 
position prepared to arrest within its limits the operation of the protective 
system — interposed, not to dissolve the Union, as was calumniously 
charged, but to compel an adjustment here or through a convention of the 
state's, or, if an adjustment could not be had through either, to compel 
the government to abandon the protective system. 

, The moment was portentous. Our political system rocked to the 
centre. Whatever diseases existed within, engendered by long corrup- 
tion and abuse, were struck to the surface. The proclamation and the 
message of the President appeared, containing doctrines never before 
officiafly avowed — going far beyond the extreme tenets of the Federal 
party, and in direct conflict with all that had ever been entertained by the 
Kepublican party ; and yet, such was the corruption, such the subserviency 
to power, that both parties, forgetting the past, abandoning every political 
principle, however sacred or long entertained, rushed to the embrace of 
the new creed— suddenly, instantly, without the slightest hesitation. 
Never did a free people exhibit so degraded a spectacle ; give such evi- 
dence of the loose attachment to principle, or greater subserviency to 
power. At this moment the current of events tended towards despotic 
authority in the person of the chief magistrate on one side, and to dis- 



■HHUHiiHi 



umuiL UH me oiiier. uu uiie siue lu uiuiiie uie rresiuem wmi puwer more 
than dictatorial, in order to maintain the ascendency of the protective 
system ; and, on the other, to resist the loss of liberty at every hazard. 
Fortunately for the country, there was at the time in the councils of the 
nation an individual who had the highest weight of authority with the 
supporters of that system — one who had done more to advance it than 
any other — who was the most intimately identified with it, and to whom, 
of course, the task of adjustment most appropriately belonged. For- 
tunately, also, he had the disposition and the fortitude to undertake it. 
An adjustment followed; the crisis of our disease was passed ; the body 
politic from that moment became convalescent ; the tendency to despotic 
power in the executive was weakened — doubly weakened — by enabling 
those who had been so long wasting their strength in mutual conflict, to 
unite in resisting the usurpation of that department, as we this day behold 
on the question of the deposites ; and by diminishing the revenue — the 
food on which it had grown to such enormous dimensions. In a short 
time the decreasing scale of duties will cause the effect of this diminution 
to be felt : a period that will be hastened by that profuse and profligate 
disbursement which has nearly doubled the public expenditure, and which 
is so rapidly absorbing the surplus revenue. 

I have said that the crisis is passed ; yet there remains some trouble- 
some and even dangerous symptoms, growing out of the former cause of 
the disease, which, however, may be overcome by skill and decision ; un- 
less, indeed, they should run into the lurking cause of another, and most 
dangerous disease, with which it is intimately connected, and excite it 
into action ; I mean the rotten state of the currency. There are indica- 
tions of a very dangerous and alarming character of this tendency, at the 
point where the currency is the most disordered. I refer to the measure 
now pending before the Legislature of New- York, to pledge the capital 
and the industry of the state, to the amount of six millions of dollars, in 
support of the banks — a measure of a kind that a British minister (Lord 
Althorp), with all the power of Parliament to support him, refused to adopt, 
because of its dangerous and corrupting tendency. 

Let us now turn, and inquire, What would have been the course of 
events if the state had not interposed, and things had been permitted to 
take their natural course 1 The act of eighteen hundred and thirty-two 
was proclaimed, as I have stated, on both sides, to be a final settlement 
of the tariff question, and, of course, was intended to be a permanent law 
of the land. The revenue, as I have already stated, under that act, 
and the sales of public lands, would, in all probability, be not less than 
twenty-five millions of dollars per annum : a sum exceeding the legiti- 
mate wants of the government, estimated on a liberal scale, by ten or 
eleven millions of dollars. Now, I ask, What would have been our situa- 
tion, with so large an annual surplus, and a fierce sectional conflict raging 
between the Northern and Southern portions of the Union ] If we find it 
so difficult to resist the usurpation of the executive department with a 
temporary surplus revenue, to continue at most but for one or two years, 
how much more diflicult would it have been to resist with a permanent 
surplus such as I have stated ^ If we find it so difficult to resist that de- 
partment when those who have been separated by the tariff are united, 
how utterly hopeless would have been the prospect of resistance were 
that question now open, and those who are now united against executive 
encroachments were exhausting their strength against each other \ Is 
it not obvious that the executive power, under such circumstances, would 
have been irresistible, and that we should have been impelled rapidly to 
despotism or disunion ] One or the other would certainly have been our 



fate if events had been permitted to move in the channel in which they 
were then flowing, and despotism much more probably than disunion. 
It is almost without example that free states should be disunited in con- 
sequence of the violence of internal conflicts ; but very numerous are the 
cases in which such conflicts have terminated in the establishment of de- 
spotic power. The danger of disunion is small ; that of despotism great. 
We have, however, I trust, escaped, for the present, the danger of both, 
for which we are indebted to that great conservative principle of our sys- 
tem which considers this government and that of the states as co-depart- 
ments ; and which proved successful, although rejected by every state but 
one, and although called into action on the most trying occasion that can 
be imagined, and under the most adverse circumstances. 

I said that the danger has passed for the present. The seeds of the 
disease still remain in the system. The act which I propose to repeal 
accompanied the adjustment of the tariff'. It was passed solely on the 
ground of recognising the principles in which it originated, and to estab- 
lish them, as far as an act of Congress could do so, as the permanent law 
of the land. While these seeds remain, it will be in vain to expect a 
healthy state of the body politic: alienation, the loss of confidence, sus- 
picion, jealousy, on the part of the weaker section at least, who have ex- 
perienced the bitter fruits that spring from those principles, must accom- 
pany the movements of this government. But these seeds will not remain 
in the system without germinating. Unless removed, the genius of con- 
solidation will again exhibit itself ; but in what form, whether in revival 
of the question from whose dangers we have not yet wholly escaped ; 
whether between North and South, East and West ; whether between the 
slaveholding and the non-slaveholding states ; the rich and poor, or the 
capitalists and the operatives, it is not for me to say ; but that it will 
again revive (unless, by your votes, you expunge the act from your statute- 
book), to divide, distract, and- corrupt the community, is certain. Nor is 
it much less so that, when it again revives, it will pass through all those 
stages which we have witnessed, and, in all human probability, consum- 
mate itself, and terminate, finally, in a military despotism. Reverse the 
scene— let the act be obliterated forever from among our laws ; let the 
principle of consolidation be forever suppressed, and that admirable and 
beautiful federative system, which I have so imperfectly portrayed, be 
firmly established, and renovated health and vigour will be restored to the 
body politic, and our country may yet realize that permanent state of 
liberty, prosperity, and greatness, which we all once so fondly hoped was 
our allotted destiny. 



X. 

t 
A REPORT ON THE EXTENT OF EXECUTIVE PATRONAGE, FEBRUARY 9, 1835 ; 

The Select Committee appointed to inquire into the extent of the executive patron' 
age ; the circumstances which have contributed to its great increase of late ; the 
expediency and practicaUUty of reducing the same, and the means of such re- 
duction, have bestowed on the subjects into lohich ihey were directed to inquire 
that deliberate attention which their importance deinands, and submit, as the re- 
sult of their investigation, the following report, in part : 

To ascertain the extent of executive patronage, the first subject to which the 
resolution directs the attention of the committee, it becomes necessary to as- 



^^maaMaMmmmaaaa^tt^auaa 



certain previously the amount of the revenue and the expenditure, and the number 
of officers, agents, and persons in the employment of the government, or who 
receive money from the pubUc treasury, all of which, taken collectively, consti- 
tute the elements of which patronage is mainly composed. 

As the returns of the revenue and expenditure for the year 1834 are not yet 
completed, your committee have selected the year 1833 as being the last of 
which complete and certain returns can be obtained. 

The result of their investigation on all these points will be found in a table an- 
nexed to the report, which contains a statemeht of the gross amount of the rev- 
enue under the various heads of customs, lands, postoffice, and miscellaneous, 
for the year 1833 ; the expenditures for the same period, arranged under the va- 
rious heads of appropriations, the number of officers, agents, contractors, and 
persons in the employment of the government, or who receive money from the 
public treasury. From this table it appears that the aggregate amount of the 
revenue for the year was $35,298,426, and of the disbursements $22,713,755; 
that the number of officers, agents, and persons in the employment of the gov- 
ernment is 60,294 : of which there belong to the civil list, including persons 
in civil employ, attached to the army and navy, 12,144 ; to the military and In- 
dian department, 9643 ; to the navy, including marine corps, 6499 ; to the post- 
office, 31,917 ; all of whom hold their places directly or indirectly from the ex- 
ecutive, and, with the exception of the judicial officers, are liable to be dismiss- 
ed at his pleasure. If to the above there be added 39,549 pensioners, we shall 
have a grand total of 100,079 persons who are in the employ of the govern- 
ment, or dependant directly on the public treasury. 

But, as great as is this number, it gives a very imperfect conception of the 
sum-total of those who, as furnishing supplies or otherwise, are connected with, 
and more or less dependant on, the government, and, of course, liable to be in- 
fluenced by its patronage, the number of whom, with their dependants, cannot 
even be conjectured. If to these be added the almost countless host of expect- 
ants who are seeking to displace those in office, or to occupy their places as 
they become vacant, all of whom must look to the executive for the gratification 
of their wishes, some conception may be formed of the immense number sub- 
ject to the influence of executive patronage. 

But to ascertain the full extent of this influence, and the prodigious control 
which it exerts over public opinion and the movements of the government, we 
must, in addition to the amount of the revenue and expenditure, and the num- 
ber of persons dependant upon the government, or in its employ, take into 
the estimate a variety of circumstances which contribute to add to the force and 
extent of patronage. These, in the regular course of the investigation, would 
next claim the attention of your committee ; but as all, or, at least, a far greater 
part of them, are of recent origin, they will properly fall under the next head to 
which the resolution directs the attention of your committee, and which they 
will now proceed to investigate. 

Among the circumstances which have contributed to the great increase of 
executive patronage of late, the most prominent, doubtless, are the great increase 
of the expenditure of the government, which, within the last eight years (from 
1825 to 1833), has risen from $11,490,460 to $22,713,755, not including pay- 
ments on account of the public debt : a corresponding increase of officers, agents, 
contractors, and others, dependant on the government ; the vast quantity ol land 
to which the Indian title has, in the same period, been extinguished, and which 
has been suddenly thrown into the market, accompanied wiih the patronage in- 
cident to holding Indian treaties, and removing the Indians to the west of the 
INIississippi, and also a great increase of the number and influence of survey- 
ors, receivers, registers, and others employed in the branch of the administra- 
tion connected with the public lands ; all of which have greatly increased the 
influence of executive patronage over an extensive region, and that the most 

y 



growing and flourishing portion of the Union. In this connexion, the recent 
practice of the government must be taken into estimate, of reserving to individ- 
ual Indians a large portion of the best land of the country, to which the title of 
the nation is extinguished, to be disposed of under the sanction of the execu- 
tive, on the recommendation of agents appointed solely by him, and which has 
prevailed to so great an extent of late, especially in the Southwestern section 
of the Union. 

It is difficult to imagine a device better calculated to augment the patronage 
of the executive, and, with it, to give rise to speculations calculated to deprave 
and corrupt the community, without benefit to the Indians. But as greatly as 
these causes have added to the force of patronage of late, there are others of a 
diflerent nature, which have contributed to give it a far greater and more dan- 
gerous influence. At the head of these should be placed the practice so great- 
ly extended, if not for the first time introduced, of removing from office persons 
Avell qualified, and who had faithfully performed their duty, in order to lill their 
places with those who are recommended on the groimd that they belong to the 
party in power. 

Your committee feel that they are touching ground which may be considered 
of a party character, and which, were it possible consistently with the discharge 
of their duty, they would wholly avoid, as their object is to inquire into facts 
only, as contributing to increase the patronage of the executive, without looking 
to intention, or desiring to cast censure on those in power ; but while they 
would cautiously avoid any remark of a party character, as inconsistent with the 
gravity of the subject, and incompatible with the intention of the Senate in di- 
recting the inquiry, they trust that they are incapable of shrinking from the per- 
formance of the important and solemn duty confided to them, of thoroughly in- 
vestigating to the bottom a subject involving, as they believe, the fate of our po- 
litical institutions and the liberty of the country, by declining to investigate, fully 
and freely, as regards its character and consequence, every measure or practice 
of the government connected with the inquiry, w^hether ft has or has not been 
a subject of party controversy. 

In speaking of the practice of removing from office on party ground as of re- 
cent date, and, of course, comprehended under the causes which have, of late, 
contributed to the increase of executive patronage, your committee are aware 
that cases of such removals may be found in the early stages of the govern- 
ment ; but they are so few, and exercised so little influence, that they may be 
said to constitute instances rather than as forming a practice. It is only within 
the last few years that removals from office have been introduced as a system ; 
and for the first time, an opportunity has been alTorded of testing the tendency 
of the practice, and witnessing the mighty increase which it has given to the 
force of executive patronage ; and the entire and fearful change, in conjunction 
with other causes, it is effecting in the character of our political system. Nor 
will it require much reflection to perceive in what manner it contributes to in- 
crease so vastly the extent of executive patronage. 

So long as offices were considered as public trusts, to be conferred on the 
honest, the faithful, and capable, for the common good, and not for the benefit 
or gain of the incumbent or his party, and so long as it was the practice of the 
government to continue in office those who faithfully performed their duties, its 
patronage, in point of fact, was limited to the mere power of nominating to ac- 
cidental vacancies or to newly-created offices, and could, of course, exercise but a 
moderate influence, either over the body of the community, or of the office-hold- 
ers themselves ; but when this practice was reversed — when offices, instead of 
being considered as public trusts, to be conferred on the deserving, w ere regard- 
ed as the spoils of victory, to be bestowed as rewards for partisan services, 
without respect to merit ; when it came to be understood that all who hold of- 
fice hold by the tenure of partisan zeal and party service, it is easy to see that 



the certain, direct, and inevitable tendency of such a state of things is to convert 
the entire body of those in office into corrupt and supple instruments of power, 
and to raise up a host of hungry, greedy, and subservient partisans, ready for 
every service, however base and corrupt. Were a premium olTered for the'best 
means of extending to the utmost the power of patronage ; to destroy the lore 
of country, and to substitute a spirit of subserviency and man-worship ; to en- 
courage vice and discourage virtue ; and, in a word, to prepare for the subver- 
sion of liberty and the establishment of despotism, no scheme more perfect could 
be devised ; and such must be the tendency of the practice, with whatever in- 
tention adopted, or to whatever extent pursued. 

As connected with this portion of the inquiry, your committee cannot avoid 
adverting to the practice, similar in its character and tendency, growing out of 
the act of the 15th of May, 1820, which provides, among other things, that, 
from and after its passage, all district attorneys, collectors, and other disbur- 
sing officers therein mentioned, to be appointed under the Jaws of the United 
States, shall be appointed for the term of four years. The object of Congress 
in passing this act was, doubtless, to enforce a more faithful performance of 
duty on the part of the disbursing officers, by withholding reappointments 
from those who had not faithfully discharged their duty, without intending 
to reject those who had. At first the practice conformed to the intention of 
the law, and thereby the good intended was accomplished, without material- 
ly increasing the patronage of the executive ; but a very great change has fol- 
lowed, which has, in the opinion of your committee, defeated the object of 
the act, and, at the same time, added greatly to the influence of patronage. 
Faithful performance of duty no longer ensures a renewal of appointment. The 
consequence is inevitable : a feeling of dependance on the executive, on the 
part of the incimibent, increasing as his term approaches its end, with a great 
increase of the number of those who desire his place, followed by an active com- 
petition between the occupant and those who seek his place, accompanied by 
all those acts of compliance and subserviency by which power is conciliated ; 
and, of course, with a corresponding increase of the number of those influenced 
by the executive Avill. 

In enumerating the causes which have, of late, increased executive patronao-e, 
your committee cannot, without a dereliction of duty, pass over one of very re- 
cent origin, although they are aware that it is almost impossible to allude to it, 
in the most delicate manner, without exciting feelings of a party character, which 
they are sincerely anxious to avoid : they refer to the increased power which 
late events have given to the executive over the public funds, and, with it, the 
currency of the country. 

In considering this part of the subject of their inquiry, it is the intention of 
the committee to confine themselves exclusively to the tendency of the events 
to which they refer as increasing executive patronage, avoiding all allusion to 
motives, or to the legality of the acts in question. 

Whatever diversity of opinion may exist as to the expediency or the legality 
of removing the deposites, there can, it is supposed, be none as to the fact that 
the removal has, as things now stand, increased the power and patronage of 
the executive in reference to the public funds. They are now, in point of fact, 
under his sole and unlimited control ; and may, at his pleasure, be withdrawn 
from the banks where he has ordered them to be deposited, be placed in other 
banks, or in the custody of whomsoever he may choose to select, without limit- 
ation or restriction ; and must continue subject to his sole will, till placed, by 
an act of Congress, under the custody of the laws. Whether any provision can 
be devised which would place them as much beyond the control of the execu- 
tive in their present as they were in their former place of deposite, and which, 
at the same time, would not endanger their safety, are points on which your com- 
mittee do not deem it necessary to venture an opinion. What addition this un- 



limited control over the public funds, from the time of their collection till that 
of their expenditure, makes to the patronage of the executive, is difficult to es- 
timate. According to the report of the Secretary of the Treasury, the amount 
of the public funds in deposite on the 1st of January, 1834, was $11,702,905; 
and their estimated amount, on the 31st of December last, was $8,695,981 ; 
making an average amount for the year of $10,199,443, the use of which, con- 
siderino- the permanency of the deposites, may be estimated as not of less value 
to the banks in which they were deposited than four per cent. ; making, at that 
rate, on the average amount in deposite, the sum of $407,977 per annum. This 
immense gain to these powerful and influential monopolies depends upon the 
will and pleasure of the executive, and must give him a corresponding control 
over them ; but this, of itself, affords a very imperfect view of the extent of his 
patronage, dependant on his control over the public deposites. To ascertain its 
full extent, the advantages which these banks have, in consequence of the de- 
posites, in circulating their notes and in dealing in exchanges, and the compe- 
tition which it must excite among the banks generally to supplant each other in 
these advantages, and, of course, in executive favour, on which they depend, 
and which must tend to create, on their part, a universal spirit of dependance 
and subserviency ; the means which the deposites necessarily afford to raise or 
depress at pleasure the value of the stock of this or that bank ; and the wide 
field which is consequently opened to the initiated partisans of power for the 
accumulation of fortunes by speculations in bank stock ; the facility which all 
these causes combined must give to political favourites in obtaining bank accom- 
modations ; and, finally, the control which the accompanying power of desig- 
nating the notes of what banks may, and what may not, be received in the pub- 
lic dues, gives to the executive over these institutions, must be taken into the 
estimate, to form a correct opinion of the full force of this tremendous engine of 
power and influence, wielded, as things now stand, by the will of a single in- 
dividual. 

Your committee have now enumerated the principal causes which have of 
late contributed to increase so greatly the patronage of the executive. There 
are others still remaining to be noticed, which have greatly contributed to this 
increase, and which claim the most serious consideration ; but, as they are of 
an incidental character, it is proposed to consider them in their proper connex- 
ion, in a subsequent part of this report. Having completed, under its proper 
head, the inquiry as to the extent of executive patronage, and the cause of its 
recent increase, your committee will next proceed to investigate the deeply-in- 
teresting questions of the expediency and practicability of its reduction. 

In considering the question of the expediency of its reduction, your commit- 
tee do not deem it necessary to enter into an elaborate argument to prove that 
patronage, at best, is but a necessary evil ; that its tendency, where it is not 
effectually checked and regulated, is to debase and corrupt the community ; 
and that it is, of course, a fundamental maxim in all states having free and pop- 
ular institutions, that no more should be tolerated than is necessary to maintain 
the proper efficacy of government. How little this principle, so essential to 
the preservation of liberty in popular governments, has been respected under 
ours, the view which has already been presented of the vast extent to which 
patronage has already attained under this government, and its rapid growth, but 
too clearly demonstrate. But as great and as rapid as has been its growth, it 
may be thought by some who have not duly reflected upon the subject, that it 
is not more than sufficient to maintain the government in its proper efficiency, 
■ and that it cannot be diminished without exposing our institutions to the danger 
I of weakness and anarchy. To demonstrate the utter fallacy of such a suppo- 
sition, it is only necessary to compare the present to the past, in reference to 
the point under consideration. 

No one capable of judging will venture to assert that the patronage of the 



IHHIiliiililiHHHHIIBilHHBiBmHi 



executive branch of this government, in any stage of its existence, from the 
time it went fairly into operation, has ever proved deficient in proper influence 
and control ; yet, if the present be compared with any past period of our histo- 
ry, excluding, of course, that of the late war, the patronage now under the con- 
trol of the executive will be found greatly to exceed that of any former period. 
To illustrate the truth of this remark, your committee will select, for compari- 
son, the years 1825 and 1833 : the former, because it was thought, even then, 
by many of the most experienced and reflecting of our citizens, that executive 
patronage had attained a dangerous extent ; and the latter, because it is the 
latest period of which we have the requisite materials with which to make the 
comparison. What, then, is the comparative extent of executive patronage, 
respectively, with the short interval of but eight years between them 1 What, 
at these respective periods, was the amount of the revenue and expenditure 1 
What the number of persons in the employ of the government, or dependant on 
its bounty ? and what the extent to which, according to the practice of the re- 
spective periods, the patronage of the government was brought to exert over 
those subject to its control ? A short comparative statement will show. 

The income of the government, in all its branches, including the postofhce, 
was, in 1825, $28,147,383 ; and 1833, $36,667,274. The gross expenditures, 
including the pubUc debt, in 1825, was $24,814,847; in 1833, $27,229,389, 
Excluding the public debt, it was, in 1825, $12,719,503 ; in 1833, $25,685,846. 
The number of persons employed, and living on the bounty of the government, 
in 1825,55,777; in 1833, 100,079. 

Measuring the extent of the patronage, at these respective periods, by these 
elements combined, without taking into consideration the circumstances which, 
as already shown, have in this short period given such increased force to ex- 
ecutive patronage, the result of the whole, in 1825, compared to 1833, is as 65 
to 89, making an increase of upward of 36 per cent. If the comparative ra- 
pidity of this great increase be examined, it will be found that it has had a pro- 
gressive acceleration throughout the period. If we divide the period into equal 
parts of four years each, the increase in the first four years will be found much 
less than in the last four. The increase, for instance, of the revenue during 
the first four years, was 4,616,594 dollars ; and during the last four, 4,906,026 
dollars ; of the expenditures during the first four, 1,873,675 dollars ; and during 
the last four, 9,313,340 dollars. 

It may be said that this increase of patronage, great as it is, does not mate- 
rially exceed the growth and population of the country, with which it is as- 
sumed that it ought to keep pace. This view overlooks entirely the increase 
of patronage from those circumstances which have so much increased it during 
the period in question, as has already been shown. If these be taken into con- 
sideration ; if to the increase of revenue and expenditure, and the number de- 
pendant on government, we add the vast increase of executive patronage from the 
immense public domain recently thrown into market, the great extent of Indian 
reservations, the control which the practice of removal has established over those 
in office, and the great addition to executive power over the public funds, and, 
through this, over the banking institutions of the country, it cannot be doubted 
that, instead of increasing only 36 per cent., it has more than doubled in the 
period in question, while the growth and population of the country have prob- 
ably not exceeded 24 per cent. 

But your committee cannot agree that there is any substantial reason why 
executive patronage should increase in the same proportion with the growth and 
population of the country. With the exception of the postofBce establishment, 
there is no necessary connexion between the increasing growth and population 
of the country and the increasing patronage of the government. On the con- 
trary, many of the public establishments are, or ought to be, stationary ; others 
on the decrease ; others, though necessarily increasing, increase at a rate far 



less than our population ; and yet we find that, for the last eight years, there 
has been a progressive increase of patronage far greater than the growth and 
population of the country. 

But the assumption that executive patronage and influence should increase in 
the same ratio with the growth and population of the country, is not less dan- 
o-erous than it is erroneous. If this assumption be carried out in practice, it 
must finally prove fatal to our institutions and liberty. The same amount of 
patronage and influence, in proportion to the extent and population of a country, 
which, tn a small state, moderately populous, would be perfectly safe, might 
prove fatal in an extensive and populous community, just as a much smaller 
military force, in proportion, would hold under subjection the latter than the 
former. The principle is the same in both cases : the great advantage which 
an organized body, such as a government or an army, has over an unorganized 
jnass — an advantage increasing with the increased difficulty of concert and co- 
operation ; and this, again, increasing with the number and dispersion of those 
on whose concert andco-operation resistance depends ; and hence, from their 
combined action, both as applied to the civil and military, the great advan- 
tage which power has over liberty in large and populous countries— an advan- 
tage so great that it is utterly impossible in such countries to defend the latter 
against the former, unless aided by a highly artificial political organization such 
as ours, based on local and geographical interests. If to this difficulty, result- 
ing from numbers and extent only, there be added others of a most formidable 
character, the greater capacity, in proportion, on the part of the government, in 
large communities, to seize on and corrupt all the organs of public opinion, and 
thus to delude and impose on the people ; the greater tendency in such com- 
munities to the formation of parties on local and separate interests, resting on 
opposing and conflicting principles, with separate and rival leaders at the head 
of each,°and the great difficulty of combining such parties in any system of re- 
sistance against the common danger from the government, some conception may 
be formed of the vast superiority which that organized and central party, con- 
sisting of office-holders and office-seekers, with their dependants, forming one 
compact, disciplined corps, wielded by a single individual, without conflict of 
opinion within either as to policy or principle, and aiming at the single object 
of retaining and perpetuating power in their own ranks, must have, in such a 
country as ours, over the people a superiority so decisive, that it may be safe- 
ly asserted that, whenever the patronage and influence of the government are 
suflftciently strong to form such a party, liberty, without a speedy reform, must 
inevitably be lost. When we add that this great advantage of the government 
over the people, of power over liberty, must increase proportionately with the 
growth and population of our country, it must be apparent how fatal would be 
the assumption, if acted on, that patronage and influence should increase in the 
same proportion ; and how infinitely dangerous has been the tendency of our 
aff"airs of late, when, as has been shown, instead of increasing simply in the 
same proportion, they have advanced with a rapidity more than double. So far 
is the assumption from being true, if we regard the duration of our institutions 
and the preservation of our liberty, we must hold it as a fundamental maxim, 
that the action of the government should, with our growth, gradually be- 
come more moderate instead of more intense : a maxim resting on principles 
deep and irreversible, and which cannot be violated without inevitable destruc- 
tion. Moderation in the action of this government, the great central power of 
our system, is, in fact, the condition on which our political existence depends ; 
and, in acting in conformity, it but conforms to the principle which Divine wis- 
; dom has impressed upon the beautiful and sublime system of which our globe 
is a part, and in which the great mass that gives life, and harmony, and action 
to the whole, reposes almost motionless in the centre. 

Your committee are aware that, since 1833, there has been a very consid- 



- .^— .~.»^ »>.—«-« »»»«»»«H«U.IW»tHJIlWWtlH 



erable decrease of revenue, under the act of March 2d, ItiSS, known as the 
Compromise Law, with other preceding acts, in consequence of the payment 
of the public debt, which would very considerably affect the comparison, if 
the year 1834, instead of 1833, had been selected ; and they have to express 
their regret that the want of full and accurate materials for the former year 
prevents them from furnishing a statement which, while it would show the de- 
crease, would also show how little the final discharge of the public debt has 
contributed to diminish either the public expenditure or the patronage of the 
executive : facts of no small moment, as connected with the subject of inquiry. 
The deep interest which the enlightened and patriotic took in that great event 
was not to indulge in the idle boast that the country was free from debt, but 
that it would, as they believed, be necessarily followed by the substantial bless- 
ing of reducing the public burdens, and, with it, the patronage of the govern- 
ment ; and thus, while it relieved industry, it would, at the same time, strength- 
en liberty against power. Thus far, these anticipations have been but very im- 
perfectly, if at all, realized. As great as has been the reduction of the revenue, it 
is still as great as it was when the debt exceeded more than $100,000,000; 
and, what is more to the point, what conclusively shows how much easier it is 
to discharge a public debt than to obtain the corresponding benefits, a proportion- 
ate diminution of the public expenditure, is the fact, that now, when we are free 
from all debt, the pubhc expenditure is as great as it was when the debt was 
most burdensome to the country. The only difference is, that then the money 
went to the public creditors, but now goes into the pockets of those who live 
on the government, with great addition to the patronage and influence of the ex- 
ecutive, but without diminution of burden to the people. 

Your committee will next proceed to inquire what has been the effects of 
this great, growing, and excessive patronage on our political condition and 
prospects : a question of the utmost importance in deciding on the expediency 
of its reduction. Has it tended to strengthen our political institutions, and to 
give a stronger assurance of perpetuating them, and, with them, the blessings 
of liberty to our posterity 1 Has it purified the public and political morals of 
our country, and strengthened the feeUng of patriotism ? Or, on the other hand, 
has it tended to sap the foundation of our institutions ; to throw a cloud of un- 
certainty over the future ; to degrade and corrupt the public morals ; and to 
substitute devotion and subserviency to power, in the place of that disinterested 
and noble attachment to principles and country, which are essential to the pres- 
ervation of free institutions 1 These are the questions to be decided ; and it 
is with profound regret that yoUr committee are constrained, however painful, to 
say that the decision admits of little doubt. They are compelled to admit the 
fact, that there never has been a period, from the foundation of the government, 
when there were such general apprehensions and doubts as to the permanency 
and success of our political institutions ; when the prospect of perpetuating 
them, and, with them, our liberty, appeared so uncertain ; when pubhc and po- 
litical morals were more depressed ; when attachment to country and principles 
were more feeble, and devotion to party and power stronger : for the truth of 
all which they appeal to the observation and reflections of the experienced and 
enlightened of all parties. If we turn our eyes to the government, we shall find 
that, with this increase of patronage, the entire character and structure of the 
government itself is undergoing a great and fearful change, which, if not arrest- 
ed, must, at no distant period, concentrate all its power in a single department. 

Your committee are aware that, in a country of such vast extent and diversity 
of interests as ours, a strong executive is necessary ; and, among other reasons, 
in order to sustain the government, by its influence, against the local feelings 
and interests which it must, in the execution of its duties, necessarily encoun- 
ter ; and it was doubtless with this view mainly that the framers of the Consti- 
tution vested the executive powers in a single individual, and clothed him with 



■SI'EiXljt^XlCiO 



ihe almost entire patronage of the government. As long as the patronage of 
the executive is so moderate as to compel him to identify his administration 
with the public interest, and to hold his patronage subordinate to the principles 
and measures necessary to promote the common good, the executive power may 
be said to act within the sphere assigned to it by the Constitution, and may be 
considered as essential to the steady and equal operation of the government ; 
but when it becomes so strong as. to be capable of sustaining itself by its influ- 
ence alone, unconnected with any system of measures or policy, it is the cer- 
tain indication of the near approach of irresponsible and despotic power. When 
it attains that point, it will be difficult to find anywhere in our system a power 
sufficient to restrain its progress to despotism. The very causes which render 
a strong executive necessary, the great extent of country and diversity of inter- 
ests, will form great and almost insuperable impediments to any effectual re- 
sistance. Each section, as has been shown, will have its own party and its 
own favourites, entertaining views of principles and policy so different as to 
render a united effort against executive power almost impossible, while their 
separate and disjointed efforts must prove impotent against a power far stronger 
than either, taken separately ; nor can the aid of the states be successfully in- 
voked to arrest the progress to despotism. So far from weakening, they will 
add strength to executive patronage. A majority of the states, instead of oppo- 
sing, will be usually found acting in concert with the Federal Government, and, 
of course, will increase the influence of the executive : so that, to ascertain his 
patronage, the sum-total of the patronage of all the states, acting in conjunction 
with the federal executive, must be added to his. The two, as things now 
stand, constitute a joint force, difficult to be resisted. 

Against a danger so formidable, which threatens, if not arrested, and that 
speedily, to subvert the Constitution, there can be but one effectual remedy : a 
prompt and decided reduction of executive patronage ; the practicability and 
means of effecting which, your committee will next proceed to consider. 

The first, most simple, and usually the most certain mode of reducing patron, 
age, is to reduce the public income, the prolific source from which it almost ex- 
clusively flows. Experience has shown that it is next to impossible to reduce 
the public expenditure with an overflowing treasury ; and not much less difficult 
to reduce patronage without a reduction of expenditure ; or, in other words, that 
the most simple and eff'ectual mode of retrenching the superfluous expenditure 
of the government, of introducing a spirit of frugality and economy in the admin- 
istration of public afi'airs, of correcting the corruption and abuses of the government, 
and, finally, of arresting the progress of power, is to leave tht;"ioney in the pock- 
ets of those who made it, where all laws, human and divine, place it, and from 
which it cannot be removed by government itself, except for its necessary and 
indispensable wants, without violation of its highest trust and the most sacred 
principles of justice. Yet, as manifest as is this truth, such is our peculiar 
(it may be said extraordinary) situation, that this simple and obvious remedy to 
excessive patronage, the reduction of the revenue, can be applied only to a very 
limited extent. 

But before they proceed to the question of reducing the revenue, your com- 
mittee propose to show what will be its probable amount in future, as the laws 
now stand, to what limits the public expendituia may be reduced consistently 
with the just wants of government, and, finally, what, with such reduction, will 
be the probable annual surplus to the year 1842, when the highest duties will 
be reduced to 20 per cent, under the act of March 2, 1833 ; and when, as the 
act provides, the revenue is to be reduced to a sum necessary to an economical 
administration of the government. 

According to the statement from the Treasury Department, the receipts of the 
year 1834, from all sources, amounted to $22,584,365 ; of which, customs yield- 
ed $16,105,372; land, $5,020,940; the residue being made uo of bank divi- 



dends and incidental items ; and the question now for consideration is, What 
will be the probable annual receipts from all sources during the next seven 
years, if the income, as has just been stated, is to be reduced to the economical 
wants of the government ? a question which, from its nature, can only be an- 
swered by probable estimates and conjectures, and which, in this case, is the 
more difficult to be answered from a defect of data in reference to the customs, 
the principal source of revenue. The changes in the rates of duties have been 
so great latterly, and the period so recent since the laws, as they now stand, 
commenced operation, that it is impracticable to resort to those average results 
deduced from long periods, by which only the temporary changes and fluctu- 
ations of commerce can be detected, and its habitual current ascertained and 
subjected to calculation. The act of the 2d of March, 1833, which made the 
last change, and on the provisions of which the estimates of the income from 
the customs for the period in question must be based, commenced its operation 
on the first of January, 1834, and we, of course, have the result of but a single 
year. From a statement furnished by the treasury department, it seems that 
the domestic exports of that year amounted, in round numbers, to eighty mill- 
ions of dollars, and the imports, given in round numbers (as all the subsequent 
statements are), to $125,500,000; of which $23,000,000 were reshipped, 
leaving $102,500,000 for the consumption and use of the country, of which 
$55,000,000 were of articles free of duty, and $47,000,000 of those liable to du- 
ties; that the gross receipts amounted to $ 15,572,448, and the nett to $14,222,448, 
leaving $1,350,000 as the expense of collection ; that the reduction of one tenth 
of the duties above 20 per cent, ad valorem every two years, according to the 
pro\^sions of the act of 2d of March, 1833, amounted to $850,000. 

As scanty as are these data, it is believed that it may be safely anticipated 
that the average annual income of the period in question will be equal, at least, 
to the income of the last year. Instead of entering into all the details through 
which your committee have come to this conclusion, which would swell this re- 
port to an unwieldy size, they will content themselves with simply giving the 
results of the causes which, as far as can be foreseen, may either increase or 
diminish the receipts of the customs for the next seven years as compared 
with the past year, accompanied by a statement of their probable effects in the 
aggregate. 

It will, however, be previously necessary to inquire whether the receipts 
from the customs during the last year in fact equalled the amount which the 
commercial transactions of the year, under ordinary circumstances, ought to 
have produced, ^i is not possible, in such an inquiry, to overlook the very un- 
usual importation of the precious metals during the year, which, accordino- to 
the statements from the treasury department, amounted to $16,572,582, consti- 
tuting, to that amount, a part of the articles imported in the year free of duty. 
The reshipment for the same period amounted to $1,676,208, leaving in the 
country, of the amount imported, $14,896,374 : a sum greatly exceeding our an- 
nual consumption, which, in addition to the supplies from our own rain's, prob- 
ably falls short of $2,000,000. The excess was doubtless caused by the pecu- 
liar condition of the country, in reference to its currency, during the year ; and 
would, under ordinary circumstances, have been imported in goods of various 
descriptions for the usual supply of the country instead of gold and silver. Sub- 
tracting, then, the two millions from this sum, and the balance from the amount 
of the articles free of duty, which, as stated, is $55,000,000, it would reduce 
the annual consumption of goods free of duty, including the precious metals, to 
$42,103,626 ; and assuming that the proportion between goods free of duty, 
and those liable to duty, to be as that sum is to $47,000,000 ; and, also, that 
the excess of the supply c,' gold and silver imported during the year would, un- 
der ordinary circumstances, have returned in that proportion between the dutied 
and the free articles, it would add to the former $7,133,313, and, of course, in- 

Z 



ori!<r<'^n-E<3 Kii 



crease the receipts from the customs in the same proportion ; that is, it wonM 
make an addition to them of $2,150,000, and would have raised the receipts 
from customs during the year from $14,220,000 to $16,370,000; which last, 
it is believed, may be assumed, at the present rate of the duties, as the proba- 
ble receipts, under ordinary circumstances, of an export and import trade equal 
to that of the last year. 

Let us now inquire into the causes which may tend to diminish or increase 
this estimated receipt during the next seven years, and their probable effects, 
in the aggregate, on the income from the customs. 

The only cause, as is believed, that will tend to diminish the amount, as far 
as can now be foreseen, is the gradual reduction of one tenth every two years, 
under the act of the 2d of March, 1833, till the year 1841, as has been stated. It 
■will be seen, by reference to the statement from the treasury already given, that 
this reduction last year, on an importation of $47,000,000 of dutiable articles, 
amounted to $850,000. If, however, instead of that amount, the importation 
of such articles had been $54,133,000, as it is assumed they would have been 
had not the derangement of the currency prevented, the reduction on account 
of the one tenth would have increased in the same proportion, and would have, 
of course, amounted to $975,000. 

Against this increased reduction there must be set off a probable gradual in- 
crease of the domestic exports of the country ; and with them, as a necessary 
consequence, a corresponding increase of the imports, and with them the re- 
ceipts from the customs. If we take the last six years, from 1828 to 1834, the 
last included, the average annual increase of domestic exports in the period is 
nearly $5,000,000, of which the increase in 1833 was $7,200,000, and in 1834, 
$9,600,000, making in the last two years an average increase of $8,800,000 : 
thus showing a much more rapid increase at the end than at the beginning of 
the series. If to this fact we add the effect which the decrease of duties under 
the act of the 2d of March, 1833, must have on the exports, the growing de- 
mand for the great staples of the country, and the vast amount of fertile and 
fresh lands brought into market within the last five years in the region most 
congenial to the growth of cotton, it is believed that it may be safely assumed 
that .the average annual increase of our domestic exports for the next seven 
years will, at least, equal $6,000,000. This increase must be followed by a 
corresponding increase of imports, and with them, as stated, of the receipts 
from the customs. Assuming that the proportion between the free and dutied 
articles, in consequence of this increase of imports, will be as has been estimated, 
it will add to the receipts from the customs an annual increase of $1,000,000, 
from which, however, must be deducted $59,000 on account of the biennial 
reduction of one tenth, which would reduce the increase to $941,000. If this 
be deducted from the average reduction of one tenth, as above ascertained, 
we shall have, taking the two causes together, the increase of the customs 
from increased imports, and the decrease from the biennial reduction of one 
tenth, a decrease of revenue equal to $34,000 annually : making, in seven years, 
$238,000. 

But it must be taken into the estimate, that the increase of revenue from the 
increase of exports is annually added, while the reduction on account of the 
one tenth is biennially. Taking this into the estimate, the increase of revenue 
on account of the increase of the exports over the decrease, on account of the 
biennial reduction of one tenth, will in the seven years equal $3,298,500 ; from 
which take $238,000, and it will leave an aggregate increase over the decrease 
of $3,060,500. 

This conclusion, however, rests on the assumption that the proportion be- 
tween the free and dutied articles will remain during the period the same as is 
estimated for last year ; but it is probable that the reduction of the price of the 
free articles, in conseouence of the repeal of the duties, will greatly increase 



^^^»^«— H i mi nmiiiiii— III ■■■■■■w ni i mnm ii nn — M — 



iheir consumption, and, of course, have a corresponding effect in reducing the 
amount of the dutiable articles, and, with them, the receipts into the treasury. 
It is, however, believed to be a safe estimate, that the reduction of the receipts 
from this cause will be more than counterbalanced by the excess of the increase 
of income from the increase of exports over the reduction of one tenth biennial- 
ly, as has been shown ; and that it may, therefore, be assumed with reasonable 
confidence, if no untoward event should intervene, that the average annual re- 
ceipts from the customs will be equal to the sum of $16,370,000, the sura 
which the commerce of last year ought to have yielded, as has been shown, 
under ordinary circumstances. 

Your committee will next inquire what will be the probable amount of re- 
ceipts from the public lands during the period in question. The receipts from 
that source during the last year, according to a statement from the treasury, 
equalled $5,020,940. This, however, probably greatly exceeds the permanent 
receipts from that source, as it was caused, probably, by the great quantity of 
rich and valuable land thrown into the market during the year. The receipts 
of 1833 equalled $3,967,682, and that of the last four years averaged $3,705,405. 
If we take into consideration, with these facts, the rapid increase of our popu- 
lation, the steady rise in landed property generally, the vast quantity of lands 
held by the government, it is believed to be a safe estimate, that the average an- 
nual income from this source, during the period in question, will be at least equal 
to $3,500,000. 

Of the remaining sources of revenue, the bank dividends is the only one that 
requires notice. They amounted in 1833 to $450,000;* and it is probable that 
they will give an equal annual income till the expiration of its charter, 1836, 
after which time there will be a reduction from the income of the government 
equal to the annual dividends ; but it is believed, by those who are most familiar 
with the subject, that a retrenchment in the collection of the customs, by a reform- 
ation of that branch of the administration, may be effected, at least equal to this re- 
duction. It cost the government the last year $1,350,000 to collect $14,222,448, 
which is more than equal to nine per cent. ; a rate, considering the facility of 
collecting this branch of the revenue, and the decreased inducement to elude 
the duties in consequence of the great reduction in the rate of duties, altogether 
extravagant. 

If these calculations should prove correct, the average income of the gov- 
ernment for the next seven years, not including incidental items, will equal 
$20,320,000, making in the whole period the aggregate sum of $142,240,000 ; to 
which, if we add the residue of the government stock in the United States Bank, 
amounting to $6,343,400, and which must be paid into the treasury at the ex- 
piration of its charter, and the surplus in the treasury on the 31st of December 
last, which, after deducting $2,000,000, will amount to $6,695,981, it will 
give an aggregate sum of $148,679,381 ; which, divided by seven, will make 
the average annual sum, subject to the disposition of the government for the 
next seven years, amount to $21,239,911. 

Such being the probable average annual income and means of the govern- 
ment for the seven ensuing years, the next question which presents itself for 
consideration is. What ought to be the average expenditure for the same period? 

The expenditure for the year 1834, as taken from the annual report of the 
Secretary of the Treasury, equals $19,430,373, and for the preceding year 
$22,713,753 ; deducting in both cases the payments on accoimt of the public 
debt. Your committee are, however, of the opinion, that these amounts far 
exceed what ought to be the expenditure on a just and economical scale, and 
that it may be very greatly reduced without injury to the public service. They 
are also of opinion, that to this great and extravagant expenditure may be at- 

* The amount of dividends for 1834 could not be obtained from the treasury. 



or LAlLx^tirj^ \Jr iii^nii v>» o2iijn\j c i^« 



tributed, in no small degree, the disease which now threatens so seriously the 
body politic. That a just conception may be formed of this extraordinary' in- 
crease, they have annexed a table of expenditures from the year 1823 to 1833, 
deducting the payment on account of the public debt, by which it appears that, 
in this short period of ten years, the expenditure has risen from 89,784,000 
to 822,713,000, being an increase in the latter over the former of almost 
$3,000,000 beyond the whole expenditure of the government in 1823, exclu- 
ding, as stated, the public debt ; and this, too, during a period of profound peace, 
when not an event had occurred calculated to warrant any unusual expenditure. 
Of this enormous increase the greater part occurred in the last three years, in 
which time the expenditure has risen nearly $9,000,000, which may well ac- 
count for the present dangerous symptoms. 

Your committee have not time to give that minute attention to the expendi- 
tures necessary to determine what particular items can or ought to be retrenched ; 
nor do they deem it important, at present, to enter into so laborious an inquiry, 
even if time did not prevent. It is sufficient for their purpose to as«ume that 
the expenditures of 1823 were, at the time, considered ample to meet all the just 
wants of the government ; and that, so far from being a period distinguished by 
parsimony, the then administration were thought by many to be iinreasonably 
profuse, and were, accordingly, the object of systematic attacks on account of 
their supposed extravagance. Assuming, then, the expenditure of $9,784,000 
to have been ample at that period, the question which presents itself is. What 
ought it to be at present, taking into consideration the necessity of increased 
expenditures in consequence of increased population ? 

They have already shown that the government cannot bear a permanent in- 
crease of expenditure in proportion to the growth of the population, which may 
be estimated at about three per cent., without an increase of patronage which 
must, in its progress, inevitably prove fatal to the institutions and liberty of the 
country. On this principle, the expenditure, instead of increasing nearly thir- 
teen millions in ten years, as it has, ought to have increased much less than 
three, a.id ought not, in the opinion of your committee, to have exceeded two 
millions at the farthest. Assuming that sum as a liberal allowance, and adding 
it to the expenditure of 1823, we shall have the sum of $11,784,000, beyond 
which the present expenditure ought not to have passed, including the pensions ; 
and, excluding them, $10,012,412, instead of $22,713,000, the sum actually 
expended. 

But it is believed that this sum will very considerably exceed, on the basis 
assumed, what ought to be the average annual expenditure for the next seven 
years. Of the items which compose the present expenditure, that for pensions 
constituted, last year, the sum of $3,341,877. Considering the advanced age 
of the pensioners, there ought to be, according to the anrAiity tables, a decrease 
by deaths of fourteen per cent, annually, which, in seven years, would diminish 
the expenditure on pensions from the sum above mentioned to $1,040,802 annu- 
ally, giving an annual average deduction of $328,725, and would reduce the 
expenditure on pensions for the ensuing seven years to an average sum of 
$2,048,000. Add this sum to $10,012,412, the sum beyond which the present 
expenditure ought not to extend, excluding the pensions, and we shall have 
$12,060,412, as what the annual average expenditure for the next seven years 
ought to be. 

Take this from the sum of $21,239,911, Avhich, as has been shown, will be 
the probable average aimual means of the government for the same period, and 
it would leave $9,170,499 ; or, in round numbers, for the facility of calculation, 
nine millions, as the average surplus means during the period at the disposition 
of the government, on the supposition that the expenditures will be reduced to 
the economical wants of the government. 

Having shown what will be the probable surplus revenue should the expen- 



.,.t^.^.>rfTr»CTrnTrnM^UMmMMW.M 



cr£jj:.v^neiO \jr jxjtin \j, K^ALttiuviMn 



diture be reduced to its proper limits, the committee propose next to consider 
whether, under existing circumstances, the revenue can be reduced. 

The two great sources of revenue are lands and customs. The others (not 
including the postoffice, which is a particular fund) are of small amount. Af- 
ter a careful investigation, your committee are of opinion that the act of 3d of 
ilarch, 183.3, has reduced the duties on imports, with some exceptions, as far 
as is practicable, under existing circumstances, consistently with the intent and 
spirit of the act. 

The act provides, among other things, that after the 31st day of December, 
1 833, in all cases where the duties shall exceed twenty per cent, ad valorem, 
one tenth part of such excess shall be reduced, and, in like manner, one tenth, 
part every two years, till the 3Ist of December, 1839 ; and that, on the 31st of 
December, 1841, one half of the residue of such excess shall be deducted ; 
and on the 30th of June, 1842, the residue. It also provides that, till the 30th 
of June, 1842, the duties imposed by the then existing law shall remain un- 
changed, except as provided in the sixth section. 

Your comnuttee do not deem it necessary to inquire whether the circumstan- 
ces under which it passed inv^olves anything in the nature of a pledge or con- 
tract, which would forbid any alterations of its provissions. It is sufficient for 
their purpose to state the fact, that the act is the result of a compromise between 
great sectional interests, brought into conflict under circumstances which threat- 
ened the peace and safety of the country ; and that it continues to be the only 
ground on which the adjustment of the controversy can stand. Under these 
circumstances, to disregard the provisions of the act would be to open a contro- 
versy which your committee hope is closed forever : a controversy which, if 
renewed, would do more to increase the power and influence of the executive 
than any other event that could occur. With the impression, then, that the 
provisions of the act cannot be disturbed without endangering the peace of the 
country, and adding greatly, by its consequences, to executive patronage, your 
committee have limited their inquiries to the reduction of the duties on such ar- 
ticles as, by the provisions of the act, are subject to be reduced ; and, after a 
careful investigation, they are of the opinion that all the reductions which caa 
be effected, consistently with the spirit of the compromise, are inconsiderable ; 
and that, to make those that might be made, would require too much time and 
investigation to permit it to be done at this session, as will appear by a reference 
to the letter of the Secretary of the Treasury, herewith annexed; but, in order 
that the subject may be taken up with full information at the next session, they 
have instructed their chairman to submit a resolution for the consideration of 
the Senate, directing the Secretary of the Treasury to report, at the commence- 
ment of the next session, what duties under twenty per cent, ad valorem may, 
with a due regard to the manufacturing interests of the country, be repealed or 
reduced, with an estimate of the probable amount of the reduction. 

In turning from the customs to the public lands, your committee find that the 
difficulty of reducing the revenue from that source is not less considerable than 
that from the customs. They fully agree in that liberal policy in relation to the 
public lands that regards them as the means of settlement, as well as a source 
of revenue ; and that they should be disposed of, accordingly, in the manner best 
calculated to diff"use a flourishing and happy population over the vast regions 
placed under our dominion ; a policy, the wisdo'n of which is best illustrated 
by the wonderful success with which it has been accomplished. It is an es- 
sential maxim of this noble and generous policy, that the price of the public 
lands should be fixed so low as to be accessible to the great mass of the citi- 
zens, and, at the same time, so high as not to subject them to the monopoly of 
the great capitalists of the country. Your committee are of opinion that this 
happy medium is attained by the present price ; and, judging from many indica- 
tions of late, that no considerable reduction can be made in the price without 



192 SPEECHES OF JOHN C CALHOUN. 

making them the prey of hungry and voracious speculators and monopolists, to 
the great injury of the honest and industrious portion of the community, as 
well as to the portion of the country where the lands may be situated. Be this, 
however, as it may, it is at least certain that the immediate effect of reduction 
would be to increase rather than diminish the revenue from lands, and, of course, 
to augment instead of reducing the public income. 

To this may be added another, and, under ordinary circumstances, conclusive 
objection against the reduction. 

The reduction of the price of public lands, while it would act, in effect, as a 
bounty to the purchasers from the government, by enabling them to acquire more 
land for the same sum of money, would act, at the same time, as a tax upon the 
entire body of landholders, who constitute the great mass of our population — a 
tax on them immeasurably greater than the bounty to the purchasers. 

The government of the United States is, in fact, the great land-dealer of the 
country, and, as such, has the power, by raising or reducing the price of its lands, 
to reduce or raise, in a greater or less degree, the value of lands everywhere, 
and, of course, to affect in the same degree the property of the landholders 
throughout the Union. To what extent any given reduction of the price of pub- 
lic lands would affect the price of lands generally, would be difficult, if not im- 
possible, to ascertain. It would be greater or less, according to the circumstan- 
ces. The price of land in the adjacent portion of the country, or that from 
which emigration principally flowed, would be reduced nearly in the same pro- 
portion with that of the public lands ; that is, if the price of public lands be re- 
duced one half, lands adjacent, or lying in the emigrating portion of the countrj-, 
would generally fall one half, while the more remote would be less affected, in 
proportion to distance and the absence of emigration. But it may be safely as- 
sumed, taking the whole country, that the actual fall in the value of lands gen- 
erally, in the hands of the holders, would greatly exceed the actual reduction of 
the price of public lands. To illustrate : if the price of the latter be reduced 
one half, which at present would be sixty-two and one half cents per acre, lands 
generally throughout the country would be reduced in value per acre much 
more than that sum ; and if the far greater quantity held by the whole body of 
land proprietors, compared to the quantity sold by the government, be taken into 
the estimate, some idea may be formed how great the aggregate loss of the pro- 
prietors generally would be, on any reduction of price, compared with the ag- 
gregate gain of the purchasers. As great, however, as it must be, none who 
know the public spirit and enlightened patriotism of that great and respectable 
portion of our citizens can doubt their cheerful acquiescence in the sacrifice, 
should the public interest, or the fundamental maxim which ought to govern in 
the disposition of the public lands, require it ; but, otherwise, it would be a plain 
and palpable sacrifice of one, and that the largest portion of the community, to 
the other, without a corresponding benefit. In presenting this view, it is not 
the intention of your committee to offer any opinion on the propriety of a grad- 
uated reduction, as a measure of general policy, in the price of such public lands 
as have remained long in the market unsold, and of which there is no imme- 
diate prospect of making sale at the present price, because of their inferior qual- 
ity. Their case is very distinguishable from that of the great body of the pub- 
lic lands ; but the immediate effects of such reduction would obviously be to 
raise instead of reduce the revenue, and would, of course, increase instead of 
diminish the difficulty under consideration. 

Having now shown that no other reduction of the revenue can be effected, 
uifider existing circumstances, than the progressive reduction already provided 
for by the act of March 2d, 1833, in either of the great sources of our public 
income, with the exception already stated, your committee will next proceed to 
inquire whether executive patronage can be reduced by reducing the expendi- 
tures of the government. 



The result of their investigation on this point is, that, for reasons which will 
hereafter be offered, a reduction of expenditure, under existing circumstances, 
would tend to increase instead of reducing executive patronage. But if it were 
otherwise, it would be found utterly impracticable, for reasons already assigned, 
to reduce the expenditure much below the income. Experience has abundant- 
ly proved that, so long as there is a large surplus in the treasury, the interests 
in favour of its expenditure will ever be stronger than that opposed to it ; and 
that no prudential consideration, arising from the necessity of accumulating 
funds to meet future wants, or the hazard of enlarging executive patronage, or 
the danger of corrupting the political and public morals of the country by use- 
less and profuse expenditure, or any other whatever, is sufficient to resist the 
temptation to expend. If one unworthy object of appropriation is defeated, an- 
other, with no greater claims on the public bounty or justice, will ever stand 
ready to urge its claims, till the frugal and patriotic are wearied out with inces- 
sant and useless efforts to guard the treasury. But were it practicable, with 
an overflowing treasury, to bring the expenditures within proper limits, such is 
the present condition of things, that to reduce expenditure would, as has been 
stated, increase the patronage of the executive, and that to an extent so great 
that no object of expenditure can be suggested, having a plausible claim on the 
justice or boiuity of the public, which would tend half so much to increase his 
patronage as leaving the public money unexpended, to accumulate as surplus 
revenue in the deposite banks. 

To realize the truth of this remark, it must be borne in mind that the depos- 
ites are under the exclusive control of the executive ; that they are deposited 
in banks selected by him ; that they have the free use of them without com- 
pensation to the public, and they may be continued or dismissed as depositories 
of the public funds, at the pleasure of the executive. 

With these facts before us, the result must be obvious. To accumulate a per- 
manent surplus revenue in the banks is, in fact, but to add so much additional 
bank capital — capital, in this case, exclusively under executive control, without 
check or limitation ; and, with its increasing amount, daily giving to him a 
greater control over the deposite banks, and, through them, over the banking 
institutions of the country generally : thus adding the deep and wide-spread 
influence of the banks to the already almost overwhelming patronage of the 
executive. 

As the expenditure cannot be reduced, the next inquiry is, whether some ob- 
ject of general utility, in which every portion of the country has an interest, may 
not be selected as a fixed and permanent object on which to expend the sur- 
plus revenue. 

Your committee admit that, if such an object of expenditure could be selected, 
under a well-regulated system of disbursements established by law, much of the 
patronage incident to the present loose and unregulated disbursements might be 
curtailed ; but they are at a loss to find such an object. Internal improvement 
approaches the nearest; but there is opposed to it, with the object in view, in- 
superable objections. To pass by the formidable difficulty, the long-establish- 
ed diversity of opinion as to its constitutionality, which divides the two great 
sections of the country, experience has shown that there is no expenditure so 
little susceptible of being regulated by law ; none calculated to excite deeper 
competition, or to enlist a greater number in its favour, in proportion to the 
amount expended ; and, of course, calculated to add more to executive patron- 
age. To these an additional objection of a recent origin may be added. Your 
committee allude, to the executive veto, as applied to internal improvements, the 
effect of which has been to increase very considerably his power and patronage 
in reference to this branch of expendituie. The executive, in his veto mes- 
sage, assumes the ground that internal improvements may or may not be con- 
stitutional, according to the nature of each particular object ; the distinction to 



184 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN 

be determined by him in the exercise of his constitutional function of giving or 
withholding his approval to acts of Congress ; the practical effect of which is 
to draw within his control the power and influence which appertain, not only 
to the administration, but also to the enactment of the law ; and, of course, to in- 
crease in the same degree his influence and patronage in reference to internal 
improvements. 

In making these remarks, the object of your committee is not to call in ques- 
tion the motive of the executive, or his right to draw what distinction he may 
think just and right in the exercise of his veto power, or the correctness of the 
distinctions in reference to the particular subject under consideration ; but sim- 
ply to exhibit the full extent of the objections to selecting it as the subject on 
which to expend the surplus revenue — objections, in their nature, incapable of 
being wholly removed even by an amendment of the Constitution, were an 
amendment practicable. 

But if no subject of expenditure can be selected on which the surplus can be 
safely expended, and if neither the revenue nor expenditure can, under existing 
circumstances, be reduced, the next inquiry is. What is to be done with the sur- 
plus 1 which, as has been shown, will probably equal, on an average, for the next 
eight years, the sum of $9,000,000 beyond the just wants of the government : 
a surplus of which, unless some safe disposition can be made, all other means 
of reducing the patronage of the executive must prove ineffectual. 

Your committee are deeply sensible of the great difficulty of finding any sat- 
isfactory solution of this question ; but, believing that the very existen«;e of our 
institutions, and, with them, the liberty of the country, may depend on the suc- 
cess of their investigation, they have carefully explored the whole gTound, and 
the result of their inquiry is, that but one means has occurred to them holding 
out any reasonable prospect of success. A few preliminary remarks will be 
necessary to explain their views. 

Amid all the difiiculties of our situation, there is one consolation — that the 
danger from executive patronage, as far as it depends on excess of revenue, 
must be temporary. Assuming that the act of 2d of March, 1833, will be left 
undisturbed by its provisions, the income, after the year 1842, is to be reduced 
to the economical wants of the government. The government, then, is in a 
state of passage from one where the revenue is excessive, to another in which, 
at a fixed and no distant period, it will be reduced to its proper limits. The 
difiiculty, in the intermediate time, is, that the revenue cannot be brought down 
to the expenditure, nor the expenditure, without great danger, raised to the rev- 
enue, for reasons already explained. How is this difficulty to be overcome ? 
It might seem that the simple and natural means would be to vest the surplus 
in some safe and profitable stock, to accumulate for future use ; but the difficul- 
ty in such a course will, on examination, be found insuperable. 

At the very commencement, in selecting the stock, there would be great, if 
not insurmountable difiiculties. No one would think of investing the surplus in 
bank stock, against which there are so many, and such decisive reasons, that it 
is not deemed necessary to state them ; nor would the objections be less deci- 
sive against vesting in the stock of the states, which would create the danger- 
ous relation of debtor and creditor between the government and the members of 
the Union. But suppose this difficulty surmounted, and that some stock, per- 
fectly safe, was selected, there would still remain another that could not be sur- 
mounted. There cannot be found a stock with an interest in its favour suffi- 
ciently strong to compete with the interests which, with a large surplus reve- 
nue, will ever be found in favour of expenditures. It must be perfectly obvious 
to all who have the least experience, or who will duly reflect on the subject, 
that, were a fund selected in which to vest the surplus revenue for future use, 
there would be found in practice a constant conflict between the interest in fa- 
vour of some local or favourite scheme of expenditure, and that in favour of the 



ariiii^jyjacja \jr jutin o. V/Ajjnuuii. 



stock. Nor can it be less obrious that, in point of fact, the former would prove 
far stronger than the latter. The result is obvious. The surplus, be it ever 
so great, would be absorbed by appropriations instead of being vested in the 
stock, and the scheme, of course, would, in practice, prove an abortion ; which 
brings us back to the original inquiry, How is the surplus to be disposed of un- 
til the excess shall be reduced to the just and economical wants of the govern- 
ment ? 

After bestowing on this question, on the successful solution of which so much 
depends, the most deliberate attention, your committee, as they have already 
stated, can advise but one means by which it can be effected ; and that is an 
amendment of the Constitution, authorizing the temporary distribution of the 
surplus revenue among the states till the year 1843, when, as has been shown, 
the income and expenditure will be equalized. 

Your committee are fully aware of the many and fatal objections to the dis- 
tribution of the surplus revenue among the states, considered as a part of the 
ordinary and regular system of this government. They admit them to be as 
great as can be well imagined. The proposition itself, that the government 
should collect money for the purpose of such distribution, or should distribute a 
surplus for the purpose o( perpetuating taxes, is too absurd to require refutation ; 
and yet what would be, when applied, as supposed, so absurd and pernicious, is, 
in the opinion of your committee, in the present extraordinary and deeply-dis- 
ordered state of our affairs, not only useful and salutary, but indispensable to 
the restoration of the body politic to a sound condition : just as some potent 
medicine, which it would be dangerous and absurd to prescribe to the healthy, 
may, to the diseased, be the only means of arresting the hand of death. Dis- 
tribution, as proposed, is not for the preposterous and dangerous purpose of 
raising a revenue for distribution, or of distributing the surplus as a means of 
perpetuating a system of duties or taxes, but a temporary measure to dispose of 
an unavoidable surplus while the revenue is in the course of reduction, and 
which cannot be otherwise disposed of without greatly aggravating a disease 
that threatens the most dangerous consequences ; and which holds out hope, 
not only of arresting its farther progress, but also of restoring the body politic 
to a state of health and vigour. The truth of this assertion a few observations 
will suffice to illustrate. 

It must be obvious, on a little reflection, that the effects of distribution of the 
surplus would be to place the interests of the states, on all questions of expen- 
diture, in opposition to expenditure, as every reduction of expense would ne- 
cessarily increase the sum to 'be distributed among the states. The effect of 
this would be to convert them, through their interests, into faithful and vigilant 
sentinels on the side of economy and accountability in the expenditures of this 
government ; and would thus powerfully tend to restore the government, in its 
fiscal action, to the honest simplicity of former days. 

It may, perhaps, be thought by some that the power which the distribution 
among the states would bring to bear against the expenditure, and its conse- 
quent tendency to retrench the disbursements of the government, would be so 
strong as not only to curtail useless or improper expenditure, but also the use- 
ful and necessary. Such, undoubtedly, would be the consequence if the pro- 
cess were too long continued ; but in the present irregular and excessive ac- 
tion of the system, when its centripetal force threatens to concentrate all its 
powers in a single department, the fear that the action of this government will 
be too much reduced by the measure under consideration, in the short period to 
which it is proposed to limit its operation, is without just foundation. On the 
contrary, if the proposed measure should be applied in the present diseased 
state of the government, its effect would be like that of some powerful altera- 
tive medicine, operating just long enough to change the present morbid action, 
but not sufficiently long to superinduce another of an opposite character. 

Aa 



186 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

But it may be objected, that, though the distribution might reduce all useless 
expenditure, it would, at the same time, give additional power to the interest in 
favour of taxation. It is not denied that such would be its tendency ; and, if 
the dano-er from increased duties or taxes was at this time as great as that from 
a surplus revenue, the objection would be fatal; but it is confidently believed 
that such is not the case. On the contrary, in proposing the measure, it is as- 
sumed that the act of March 2, 1833, will remain undisturbed. It is on the 
streno-th of this assumption that the measure is proposed, and, as it is believed, 
safely proposed. 

It may, however, be said that the distribution may create, on the part of the 
states, an appetite in its favour which may ultimately lead to its adoption as a 
permanent measure. It may, indeed, tend to excite such an appetite, short as 
is the period proposed for its operation ; but it is obvious that this danger is far 
more than countervailed by the fact, that the proposed amendment to the Con- 
stitution to authorize the distribution would place the power beyond the reach 
of legislative construction, and thus effectually prevent the possibility of its 
adoption as a permanent measure, as it cannot be conceived that three fourths 
of the states will ever assent to an amendment of the Constitution to authorize 
a distribution, except as an extraordinary measure, applicable to some extraor- 
dinary condition of the country like the present. 

Giving, however, to these, and other objections which may be urged, all the 
force that can be claimed for them, it must be remembered, the question is not 
whether the measure proposed is or is not liable to this or that objection, but 
whether any other less objectionable can be devised ; or, rather, whether there 
is any other which promises the least prospect of relief that can be applied. 
Let not the delusion prevail that the disease, after running through its natural 
course, will terminate of itself, without fatal consequences. Experience is op- 
posed to such anticipations. Many and striking are the examples of free states 
perishing under that excess of patronage which now afflicts ours. It may, in 
fact, be said with truth, that all, or nearly all, diseases which afflict free govern- 
ments, may be traced directly or indirectly to excess of revenue and expendi- 
ture ; the effect of which is to rally around the government a powerful, corrupt, 
and subservient corps — a corps ever obedient to its will, and ready to sustain 
it in every measure, whether right or wrong, and which, if the cause of the dis- 
ease be not eradicated, must ultimately render the government stronger than 
the people. 

What progress this dangerous disease has already made in our country it is 
not for your committee to say ; but when they reflect on the present symptoms, 
on the almost unboimded extent of executive patronage, wielded by a single 
will ; the surplus revenue, which cannot be reduced within proper limits in less 
than seven years — a period which covers two presidential elections, on both of 
which all this mighty power and influence will be brought to bear — and when 
they consider that, with the vast patronage and influence of this government, 
that of all the states acting in concert with it will be combined, there are just 
grounds to fear that the fate which has befallen so many other free governments 
must also befall ours, unless, indeed, some effectual remedy be forthwith ap- 
plied. It is under this impression that your committee have suggested the one 
proposed, not as free from all objections, but as the only one of sufficient power 
to arrest the disease, and to restore the body politic to a sound condition ; and 
they have, accordingly, reported a resolution so to amend the Constitution that 
the money remaining in the treasury at the end of each year, till the 1st of 
January, 1843, deducting therefrom the sum of $2,000,000 to meet current 
and contingent expenses, shall annually be distributed among the states and 
territories, including the District of Columbia ; and, for that purpose, the sum 
to be distributed to be divided into as many shares as there are senators and 
representatives in Congress, adding two for each territory, and two for the Dis- 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 187 

trict of Columbia ; and that there shall be allotted to each state a number of 
shares equal to its representation in both houses, and to the territories, inclu- 
ding the District of Columbia, two shares each. Supposing the surplus to be 
distributed should average $9,000,000 annually, as estimated, it would give to 
each share $30,405 ; which, multiplied by the number of senators and repre- 
sentatives of any state, would show the sum to which it would be entitled. 

The reason for selecting the ratio of distribution proposed in the amendment 
is too obvious to require much illustration. It is that which indicates the rela- 
tive political weight assigned by the Constitution to the members of the confed- 
eracy respectively, and, it is believed, approaches as nearly to equality as any 
other that can be selected. It may be objected that some states, under the 
distribution, may receive more, and others less than their actual contribution to 
the treasury, under the existing system of revenue. The truth of the objec- 
tion may be acknowledged, but it must also be acknowledged that the inequali- 
ty is at least as great under the present system of disbursement, and would be 
as great under any other disposition of the surphis that can be adopted. 

But as effectual as the distribution must be, if adopted, to retrench improper 
expenditure, and reduce correspondingly the patronage of the government, yet 
other means must be added to bring it within safe limits, and to prevent the re- 
currence hereafter of the danger which now threatens the institutions and the 
liberty of the country ; and, with this view, your committee have reported a bill 
to repeal the first and second sections of the act to limit the term of certain 
officers therein named, passed 13th May, 1820; to make it the duty of the 
President to lay before Congress, on the first of January next, and on the first 
of January every four years thereafter, the names of all defaulting officers and 
agents charged with the collection and disbursement of the public money, 
whose commissions shall be vacated from and after the date of such message ; 
and also to make it his duty, in all cases of nomination to fill vacancies occa- 
sioned by removal from office, to assign the reason for which said officer may 
have been removed. 

The provisions of this bill are the same as those contained in bill No. 2, re- 
ported to the Senate on the 4th of May, 1826, by a select committee appointed to 
" inquire into the expediency of reducing the patronage of the government of 
the United States," and which was accompanied by an explanatory report, to 
which your committee would refer the Senate ; and, in order to facilitate the 
reference, they have instructed their chairman to move to reprint the report for 
their use. 

But the great and alarming strides which patronage has made in the short 
period that has intervened since the date of the report, has demonstrated the 
necessity of imposing other limitations on the discretionary powers of the ex- 
ecutive, particularly in reference to the General Postoffice and the public funds, 
on which important subject the executive has an almost unlimited discretion as 
things now are. 

In a government like ours, liable to dangers so imminent from the excess 
and abuse of patronage, it would seem extraordinary that a department of such 
vast powers, with an annual income and expenditure so great, and with a host 
of persons in its service, extending and ramifying itself to the remotest point, 
and into every neighbourhood of the Union, and having a control over the cor- 
respondence and intercourse of the whole community, should be permitted to 
remain so long, without efficient checks or responsibility, under the almost un- 
limited control of the executive. Such a power, wielded by a single will, is 
sufficient of itself, when made an instrument of ambition, to contaminate the 
community, and to control to a great extent public opinion. To guard against 
this danger, and to impose effectual restrictions on executive patronage, acting 
through this important department, your committee are of the opinion that an 
entire reorganization of the department is required ; but their labour, in refer- 



188- SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

ence to this subject, has been superseded by the Comrnittee on the Postoffice, 
which has bestowed so much attention on it, and which is so much more mi- 
nutely acquainted with the diseased state of the department than your committee 
can be, that it would be presumption on their part to attempt to add to their 
recommendation. 

But, as expensive and dangerous as is the patronage of the executive through 
the postoffice department, it is not much less so in reference to the public 
funds, over which, as has been stated, it now has unlimited control, and, through 
them, over the entire banking system of the country. With a banking system 
spread from Maine to Louisiana, from the Atlantic to the utmost West, consist- 
ing of not less than five or six hundred banks, struggling among themselves for 
existence and gain, with an immense public fund under the control of the ex- 
ecutive, to be deposited in whatever banks he may favour, or to be withdrawn at 
his pleasure, it is impossible for ingenuity to devise any scheme better calcu- 
lated to convert the surplus revenue into a most potent engine of power and in- 
fluence ; and, it may be added, of peculation, speculation, corruption, and fraud. 
The first and most decisive step against this danger is that already proposed, 
of distributing the surplus revenue among the states, which will prevent its 
growing accumulation in the banks, and, with it, the corresponding increase of 
executive power and influence over the banking system. In addition, your 
committee have reported a bill to charge the deposite banks at the rate of 
per cent, per annum for the use of the public funds, to be calculated on the 
average monthly deposites ; to prohibit transfers, except for the purpose of dis- 
bursements ; and to prevent a removal of the public funds from the banks in 
which they are now, or may hereafter be deposited, without the consent of 
Congress, except as is provided in the bill. The object of the bill is to secure 
to the government an equivalent for the use of the public funds, to prevent the 
abuses and influence incident to transfer-warrants, and to place the deposite 
banks, as far as it may be practicable, beyond the control of the executive. 

In addition to these measures, there are, doubtless, many others connected 
with the customs — Indian affairs, public lands, army, navy, and other branches 
of the administration — into which, it is feared, there have crept many abuses, 
which have unnecessarily increased the expenditures and the number of per- 
sons employed, and, with them, the executive patronage ; but to reform which 
would require a more minute investigation into the general state of the adminis- 
tration than your committee can at present bestow. Should the measures which 
they have recommended receive the sanction of Congress, they feel a strong 
conviction that they \vill greatly facilitate the work of carrying accountability, 
retrenchment, and economy through every branch of the administration, and 
thereby reduce the patronage of the executive to those safe and economical 
limits which are necessary to a complete restoration of the equilibrium of the 
system, now so dangerously disturbed. Your committee are deeply impressed 
with the necessity of commencing early, and of carrying through to its full and 
final completion, this great work of reform. 

The disease is daily becoming more aggravated and dangerous, and, if it be 
permitted to advance for a few years longer with the rapidity with which it 
has of late, it will soon pass beyond the reach of remedy. This is no party 
question. Every lover of his country and of its institutions, be his party what 
it may, must see and deplore the rapid growth of patronage, with all its attend- 
ant evils, and the certain catastrophe which awaits its farther progress, if not 
timely arrested. The question now is not how, or where, or with whom the 
danger originated, but how it is to be arrested ; not the cause, but the remedy ; 
not how our institutions and liberty have been endangered, but how they are to 
be rescued. 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 189 



XI. 

A REPORT ON THAT PORTION OF THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE WHICH RE- 
LATED TO THE ADOPTION OF EFFICIENT MEASURES TO PREVENT THE 
CIRCULATION OF INCENDIARY ABOLITION PETITIONS THROUGH THE 
MAIL, FEBRUARY 4, 1836. 

The Select Committee to vjhom was referred that portion of the President's Mes- 
sage tohich relates to the attempts to circulate, through the mail, inflammatory 
appeals, to excite the slaves to insurrection, submit the following report : 

The committee fully concur with the President as to the character and ten- 
dency of the papers which have been attempted to be circulated in the South 
through the mail, and participate with him in the indignant regret which he ex- 
presses at conduct so destructive of the peace and harmony of the country, and 
SO repugnant to the Constitution and the dictates of humanity and religion. They 
also concur in the hope that, if the strong tone of disapprobation which these 
unconstitutional and wicked attempts have called forth does not arrest them, 
the non-slaveholding states will be prompt to exercise their power to suppress 
them, as far as their authority extends. But, while they agree with the Presi- 
dent as to the evil and its highly dangerous tendency, and the necessity of ar- 
resting it, they have not been able to assent to the measure of redress which he 
recommends — that Congress should pass a law prohibiting, under severe pen- 
alty, the transmission of incendiary publications through the mail, intended to 
instigate the slaves to insurrection. 

After the most careful and deliberate investigation, they have been constrain- 
ed to adopt the conclusion that Congress has not the power to pass such a law ; 
that it Avould be a violation of one of the most sacred provisions of the Consti- 
tution, and subversive of reserved powers essential to the preservation of the 
domestic institutions of the slaveholding states, and, with them, their peace and 
security. Concurring, as they do, with the President in the magnitude of the 
evil and the necessity of its suppression, it would hare been the cause of deep 
regret to the committee, if they thought the difference of opinion, as to the right 
of Congress, Avould deprive the slaveholding states of any portion of the protec- 
tion which the measure recommended by the President was intended to afford 
them. On the contrary, they believe all the protection intended may be afford- 
ed, according to the views they take of the power of Congress, without infrin- 
ging on any provision of the Constitution on one side, or the reserved rights of 
the states on the other. 

The committee, with these preliminary reniarks, will now proceed to estab- 
lish the positions Avhich they have assumed, beginning with the first — that the 
passage of a law would be a violation of an express provision of the Constitution. 

In the discussion of this point, the committee do not deem it necessary to in- 
quire whether the right to pass such a law can be derived from the power to 
establish postoflices and postroads, or from the trust of " preserving the relation 
created by the Constitution between the states," as supposed by the President. 
However ingenious or plausible the arguments may be by which it may be at- 
tempted to derive the right from these or any other sources, they must fall short 
of their object. The jealous spirit of liberty which characterized our ancestors 
at the period when the Constitution was adopted, forever closed the door by 
which the right might be implied from any of the granted powers, or any other 
source, if there be any other. The committee refer to the amended article of 
the Constitution, which, among other things, provides that Congress shall pass 
no law which shall abridge the liberty of the press — a provision which inter- 
poses, as will be hereafter shown, an insuperable objection to the measure rec- 



190 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

ommended by the President. That the true meaning of this provision may be 
fully comprehended, as bearing on the point under consideration, it will be ne- 
cessary to recur briefly to the history of the adoption of the Constitution. 

It is well known that great opposition was made to the adoption of the Con- 
stitution. It was acknowledged on all sides, at the time, that the old confeder- 
ation, from its weakness, had failed, and that something must be done to save 
the country from anarchy and convulsion ; yet, so high was the spirit of liberty 
— so jealous were our ancestors of that day of power, that the utmost efforts 
were necessary, under all the then existing pressure, to obtain the assent of the 
states to the ratification of the Constitution. Among the many objections to its 
adoption, none were more successfully urged than the absence in the instrument 
of those general provisions which experience had shown to be necessary to 
guard the outworks of liberty : such as the freedom of the press and of speech, 
the rights of conscience, of trial by jury, and others of like character. It was 
the belief of those jealous and watchful guardians of liberty, who viewed the 
adoption of the Constitution with so much apprehension, that all these sacred 
barriers, without some positive provision to protect them, would, by the power 
of construction, be undermined and prostrated. So strong was this apprehen- 
sion, that it was impossible to obtain a ratification of the instmment in many of 
the states without accompanying it with the recommendation to incorporate in 
the Constitution various articles, as amendments, intended to remove this defect, 
and guard against the danger apprehended, by placing these important rights 
beyond the possible encroachment of Congress. One of the most important of 
these is that which stands at the head of the list of amended articles, and which, 
among other things, as has been stated, prohibits the passage of any law abridg- 
ing the freedom of the press, and which left that important barrier against pow- 
er under the exclusive authority and control of the states. 

That it was the object of this provision to place the freedom of the press be- 
yond the possible interference of Congress, is a doctrine not now advanced for 
the first time. It is the ground taken, and so ably sustained by Mr. Madison, 
in his celebrated report to the Virginia Legislature, in 1799, against the alien 
and sedition law, and which conclusively settled the principle that Congress 
has no right, in any form or in any manner, to interfere with the freedom of 
the press.* The establishment of this principle not only overthrew the se- 
dition act, but was the leading cause of the great political revolution which, 
in 1801, brought the Republican party, with Mr. Jefterson at its head, into 
power. 

With these remarks, the committee will turn to the sedition act, in order to 
show the identity in principle between it and the act which the message recom- 
mends to be passed, as far as it relates to the freedom of the press. Among its 
other provisions, it inflicted punishment on all persons who should publish any 
false, scandalous, or malicious writing against the government, with intent to 
defame the same, or bring it into contempt or disrepute. Assuming this pro- 
vision to be unconstitutional, as abridging the freedom of the press, which no 
one now doubts, it will not be difficult to show that if, instead of inflicting pun- 
ishment for publishing, the act had inflicted punishment for circulating through 
the mail for the same offence, it would have been equally unconstitutional. The 
one would have abridged the freedom of the press as effectually as the other. The 
object of publishing is circulation ; and to prohibit circulation is, in efl'ect, to 
prohibit publication. They both have a common object — the communication 
of sentiments and opinions to the public ; and the prohibition of one may as 
effectually suppress such communication as the prohibition of the other ; and, of 

* The article is in the following words : 

" Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exer- i 
cise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press ; or the right of the people peaceably * 
to assemble, and petition the government for a redress of grievances." 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 191 

course, would as effectually interfere with the freedom of the press, and be 
equally unconstitutional. 

But, to understand more fully the extent of the control which the right of 
prohibiting circulation through the mail would give to the government over the 
press, it must be borne in mind that the power of Congress over the post- 
office and the mail is an exclusive power. It must also be remembered that 
Congress, in the exercise of this power, may declare any road or navigable 
water to be a post-road; and that, by the act of 1825, it is provided "that no 
stage, or other vehicle which regularly performs trips on a post-road, or on a 
road parallel to it, shall carry letters." The same provision extends to packets, 
boats, or other vessels, on navigable waters. Like provision may be extended 
to newspapers and pamphlets ; which, if it be admitted that Congress has the right 
to discriminate in reference to their character, what papers shall or what shall 
not be transmitted by the mail, would subject the freedom of the press on all 
subjects, political, moral, and religious, completely to its will and pleasure. It 
would, in fact, in some respects, more effectually control the freedom of the 
press than any sedition law, however severe its penalties. The mandate of the 
government alone would be sufficient to close the door against circulation through 
the mail ; and thus, at its sole will and pleasure, might intercept all communica- 
tion between the press and the people, while it would require the intervention 
of courts and juries to enforce the provisions of a sedition law, which experi- 
ence has shown are not always passive and willing instruments in the hands of 
government, where the freedom of the press is concerned. 

From these remarks, it must be apparent that, to prohibit publication on one 
side, and circulation through the mail on the other, of any paper, on account of 
its religious, moral, or political character, rests on the same principle ; and that 
each is equally an abridgment of the freedom of the press, and a violation of 
the Constitution. It would, indeed, have been but a poor triumph for the cause 
of liberty, in the great contest of 1799, had the sedition law been put down on 
principles that would have left Congress free to suppress the circulation through 
the mail of the very publications which that odious act was intended to pro- 
hibit. The authors of that memorable achievement would have had but slen- 
der claims on the gratitude of posterity, if their victory over the encroachment 
of power had been left so imperfect. 

It will, after what has been said, require but few remarks to show that the 
same principle which applied to the sedition law woidd apply equally to a law 
punishing, by Congress, such incendiary publications as are referred to in the 
message, and, of course, to the passage of a law prohibiting their transmission 
through the mail. The principle on which the sedition act was condemned as 
unconstitutional was a general one, and not limited in its application to that act. 
It withdraws from Congress all right of interference with the press, in any form 
or shape whatever ; and the sedition law was put down as unconstitutional, not 
because it prohibited publications against the government, but because it inter- 
fered at all with the press. The prohibition of any publication on the ground 
of its being immoral, irreligious, or intended to excite rebellion or insurrection, 
would have been equally unconstitutional ; and, from parity of reason, the sup- 
pression of their circulation through the mail would be no less so. 

But, as conclusive as these reasons are against the right, there are others not 
less so, derived from the powers reserved to the states, which the committee 
will next proceed to consider. 

The message, as has been stated, recommends that Congress should pass a 
law to punish the transmission through the mail of incendiary publications in- 
tended to instigate the slaves to insurrection. It of course assumes for Congress 
a right to determine what papers are incendiary and intended to excite insur- 
rection. The question, then, is. Has Congress such a right 1 A question of 
vital importance to the slaveholding states, as will appear in the course of the 
discussion. 



]92 SPEECHES OF JOHN C CALHOUN. 

After examining this question with due deliberation, in all its bearings, the 
committee are of opinion, not only that Congress has not the right, but to admit 
it would be fatal to the states. Nothing is more clear than that the admission 
of the ri"-ht, on the part of Congress, to determine what papers are incendiary, 
and, as such, to prohibit their circulation through the mail, necessarily involves 
the ri"-ht to determine what are not incendiary, and to enforce their circulation. 
Nor is it less certain that, to admit such a right, would be virtually to clothe 
Congress with the power to abolish slavery, by giving it the means of breaking 
down all the barriers which the slaveholding states have erected for the pro- 
tection of their lives and property. It would give Congress, without regard to 
the prohibition laws of the states, the authority to open the gates to the flood 
of incendiary publications which are ready to break into those states, and to 
punish all who dare resist as criminals. Fortunately, Congress has no such 
right. The internal peace and security of the states are under the protection 
of the states themselves, to the entire exclusion of all authority and control on 
the part of Congress. It belongs to them, and not to Congress, to determine 
what is, or is not, calculated to disturb their peace and security ; and, of course, 
in the case under consideration, it belongs to the slaveholding states to deter- 
mine what is incendiary and intended to incite to insurrection, and to adopt 
such defensive measures as may be necessary for their security, with unUmited 
means of carrying them into effect, except such as may be expressly inhibited 
to the states by the Constitution. To establish the truth of this position, so es- 
sential to the safety of those states, it would seem sufficient to appeal to their 
constant exercise of this right at all times, without restriction or question, both 
before and since the adoption of the Constitution. But, on a point of so much 
importance, which may involve the safetj', if not the existence itself, of an en- 
tire section of the Union, it will be proper to trace it to its origin, in order to 
place it on a more immovable foundation. 

That the states which form our Federal Union are sovereign and independent 
communities, bound together by a constitutional compact, and are possessed of 
all the powers belonging to distinct and separate states, excepting such as are 
delegated to be exercised by the General Government, is assumed as unques- 
tionable. The compact itself expressly provides that all powers not delegated 
are reserved to the states and the people. To ascertain, then, whether the 
power in question is delegated or reserved, it is only necessary to ascertain 
■whether it is to be found among the enumerated powers or not. If it be not 
among them, it belongs, of course, to the reseri'ed powers. On turning to the 
Constitution, it will be seen that, while the power of defending the country 
against external danger is found among the enumerated, the instrument is whol- 
ly silent as to the power of defending the internal peace and security of the 
states, and, of course, reserves to the states this important power, as it stood 
before the adoption of the Constitution, with no other limitation, as has been 
stated, except such as are expressly prescribed by the instrument itself. From 
what has been stated, it may be inferred that the right of a state to defend it- 
self against internal dangers is a part of the great, primary, and inherent right 
of self-defence, which, by the laws of nature, belongs to all communities ; and 
so jealous were the states of this essential right, without which their independ- 
ence could not be preserved, that it is expressly provided by the Constitution,* 
that the General Government shall not assist a state, even in case of domestic 
violence, except on the application of the authorities of the state itself: thus ex- 
cluding, by a necessary consequence, its interference in all other cases. 

Having now shown that it belongs to the slaveholding states, whose institu- 
tions are in danger, and not to Congress, as is supposed by the message, to de- 
termine what papers are incendiary and intended to excite insurrection among 

* See 4th article, 4th eection, of the Constitution. 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C CALHOUN. 193 

the slaves, it remains to inquire, in the next place, what are the corresponding 
duties of the General Government, and the other states, from within whose lim- 
its and jurisdiction their institutions are attacked : a subject intimately connect- 
ed with that with which the committee are immediately charged, and which, 
at the present juncture, ought to be fully understood by all the parties. The 
committee will begin with the first. 

It mav not be entirely useless to premise that rights and duties are recipro- 
cal — the existence of a right always implying a corresponding duty. If, con- 
sequently, the right to protect her internal peace and security belongs to a state, 
the General Government is bound to respect the measures adopted by her for 
that purpose, and to co-operate in their execution, as far as its delegated pow- 
ers may admit, or the measure may require. Thus, in the present case, the 
slaveholding states having the unquestionable right to pass all such laws as may 
be necessary to maintain the existing relation between master and slave in those 
states, their right, of course, to prohibit the circulation of any publication or any 
intercourse calculated to disturb or destroy that relation, is incontrovertible. In 
the execution of the measures which may be adopted by the states for this pur- 
pose, the powers of Congress over the mail, and of regulating commerce with 
foreign nations and between the states, may require co-operation on the part of 
the General Government ; and it is bound, in conformity to the principle estab- 
lished, to respect the laws of the state in their exercise, and so to modify its 
acts as not only not to violate those of the states, but, as far as practicable, to 
co-operate in their execution. The practice of the government has been in 
conformity to these views. 

By the act of the 28th of February, 1803, entitled "An act to prevent the 
importation of certain persons into certain states," where, by the laws of those 
states, their importation is prohibited, masters or captains of ships or vessels are 
forbidden, under severe penalty, " to import or bring, or cause to be imported or 
brought, any negro or mulatto, or person of colour, not being a native or citizen, 
or registered seaman of the United States, or seamen, natives of countries be- 
yond the Cape of Good Hope, into any port or place which shall be situated in 
any state which, by law, has prohibited, or shall prohibit, the admission or im- 
portation of such negro, mulatto, or other person of colour." This provision 
speaks for itself, and requires no illustration. It is a case in point, and fully 
embraces the principle laid down. To the same effect is the act of the 25th of 
February, 1799, respecting quarantine and health laws, which, as belonging to 
the internal police of the states, stand on the same ground. The act, among 
other things, " directs the collectors and all other revenue officers, the masters 
and crews of the revenue cutters, and the military officers in command on the 
station, to co-operate faithfully in the execution of the quarantine and other re- 
strictions which the health laws of the state may establish." 

The principles embraced by these acts, in relation to the commercial inter- 
course of the country, are equally applicable to the intercourse by mail. There 
may, indeed, be more difficulty in co-operating with the states in the latter than 
in the former, but that cannot possibly affect the principle. Regarding it, then, 
as established both by reason and precedents, the committee, in conformity 
with it, have prepared a bill, and directed their chairman to report the same to 
the Senate, prohibiting, under the penalty of fine and dismission from office, any 
deputy postmaster in any state, territory, or district, from knowingly receiving 
and putting into the mail any letter, packet, pamphlet, paper, or pictorial repre- 
sentation, directed to any postoffice or person in a state, territory, or district, by 
the laws of which the circulation of the same is forbidden ; and also prohibit- 
ing, under a like penalty, any deputy postmaster in said state, territory, or dis- 
trict, from knowingly delivering the same, except to such persons as may be 
authorized to receive them by the civil authority of said state, territory, or dis- 
trict, 

Bb 



194 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOtJN. 

It remains next to inquire into the duty of the states, from within whose lim- 
its and jurisdiction the internal peace and security of the slaveholding states 
are endangered. . ■ ■ % 

In order to comprehend more fully the nature and extent of their duty, it will 
be necessary to make a few remarks on the relations which exist between the 
states of our Federal Union, with the rights and obligations reciprocally result- 
ing from such relations. 

It has already been stated that the states which compose our Federal Union 
are sovereio'n and independent communities, united by a constitutional compact. 
Amono- its members the laws of nations are in full force and obligation, except 
as altered or modified by the compact ; and, of course, the states possess, with 
that exception, all the rights, and are subject to all the duties which separate 
and distinct communities possess, or to which they are subject. Among these 
are comprehended the obligation which all states are under to prevent their citi- 
zens from disturbing the peace or endangering the security of other states ; and, 
in case of being disturbed or endangered, the right of the latter to demand of 
the former to adopt such measures as will prevent their recurrence ; and, if re- 
fused or neglected, to resort to such measures as its protection may require. 
This right remains, of course, in force among the states of this Union, with 
such limitations as are imposed expressly by the Constitution. Within their 
limits, the rights of the slaveholding states are as full to demand of the states 
within whose limits and jurisdiction their peace is assailed, to adopt the meas- 
ures necessary to prevent the same, and, if refused or neglected, to resort to 
means to protect themselves, as if they were separate and independent commu- 
nities. 

Those states, on the other hand, are not only under all the obligations which 
independent communities would be to adopt such measures, but also under the 
obligation which the Constitution superadds, rendered more sacred, if possible, 
by the fact that, while the Union imposes restrictions on the right of the slave- 
holding states to defend themselves, it afibrds the medium through which their 
peace and security are assailed. It is not the intention of the committee to in- 
quire what those restrictions are, and what are the means which, under the 
Constitution, are left to the slaveholding states to protect themselves. The pe- 
riod has not yet come, and they trust never will, when it may be necessary to 
decide those questions ; but come it must, unless the states whose duty it is to 
suppress the danger shall see in time its magnitude, and the obligations which 
they are under to adopt speedy and effectual measures to arrest its farther prog- 
ress. That the full force of this obligation may be understood by all parties, 
the committee propose, in conclusion, to touch briefly on the movements of the 
Abolitionists, with the view of showing the dangerous consequences to which 
they must lead if not arrested. 

Their professed object is the emancipation of slaves in the Southern States, 
which they propose to accomplish through the agency of organized societies, 
spread throughout the non-slavcholding states, and a powerful press, directed 
mainly to excite in the other states hatred and abhorrence against the institu- 
tions and citizens of the slaveholding states, by addresses, lectures, and picto- 
rial representations, abounding in false and exaggerated statements. 

If the magnitude of the mischief affords, in any degree, the measure by which 
to judge of the criminality of a project, few have ever been devised to be com- 
pared with the present, whether the end be regarded, or the means by which 
it is proposed to be accomplished. The blindness of fanaticism is proverbial. 
With more zeal than understanding, it constantly misconceives the nature of 
the object at which it aims, and towards which it rushes with headlong violence, 
regardless of the means by which it is to be effected. Never was its charac- 
ter more fully exemplified than in the present instance. Setting out with the 
abstract principle that slavery is an evil, the fanatical zealots come at once to 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 195 

the conclusion that it is their duty to abolish it, regardless of all the disasters 
which must follow. Never was conclusion more false or dangerous. Admit- 
ting their assumption, there are innumerable things which, regarded in the ab- 
stract, are evils, but which it would be madness to attempt to abolish. Thus 
regarded, government itself is an evil, with most of its institutions intended to 
protect life and property, comprehending the civil as well as the criminal and 
military code, which are tolerated only because to abolish them would be to 
increase instead of diminishing the evil. The reason is equally applicable to 
the case under consideration : to illustrate which, a few remarks on slavery, as 
it actually exists in the Southern States, will be necessary. 

He who regards slavery in those states simply under the relation of master 
and slave, as important as that relation is, viewed merely as a question of prop- 
erty to the slaveholding section of the Union, has a very imperfect conception 
of the institution, and the impossibility of abolishing it without disasters unex- 
ampled in the history of the world. To understand its nature and importance 
fully, it must be borne in m.ind that slavery, as it exists in the Southern States 
(including under the Southern all the slaveholding States), involves not only 
the relation of master and slave, but also the social and political relations of 
two races, of nearly equal numbers, from different quarters of the globe, and the 
most opposite of all others in every particular that distinguishes one race of 
men from another. Emancipation would destroy these relations — would divest 
the masters of their property, and subvert the relation, social and political, that 
has existed between the races from almost the first settlement of the Southern 
States. 

It is not the intention of the committee to dwell on the pecuniary aspect 
of this vital subject : the vast amount of property involved, equal, at least, to 
$950,000,000, the ruin of families and individuals', the impoverishment and 
prostration of an entire section of the Union, and the fatal blow that would be 
given to the productions of the great agricultural staples, on which the com- 
merce, the navigation, the manufactures, and the revenue of the country almost 
entirely depend. As great as these disasters woidd be, they are nothing com- 
pared to what must follow the subversion of the existing relation between the 
two races, to which the committee will confine their remarks. 

Under this relation the two races have long lived in peace and prosperity, 
and, if not disturbed, would long continue so to live. While the European race 
has rapidly increased in wealth and numbers, and, at the same time, has main- 
tained an equality, at least morally and intellectually, with their brethren of the 
non-slaveholding states, the African race has multiplied with not less rapidity, 
accompanied by great improvement, physically and intellectually, and a degree 
of comfort w'hich the labouring class in few other countries enjoy, and con- 
fessedly greatly superior to what the free people of the same race possess in 
the non-slaveholding states. It may, indeed, be safely asserted, that there is 
no example in history in which a savage people, such as their ancestors were 
when brought into the country, have ever advanced in the same period so rap- 
idly in numbers and improvement. 

To destroy the existing relations, would be to destroy this prosperity, and to 
place the two races in a state of conflict, which must end in the expulsion or 
extirpation of one or the other. No other can be substituted compatible with 
their peace or security. The difficulty is in the diversity of the races. So 
strongly drawn is the line between the two in consequence, and so strengthen- 
ed by the force of habit and education, that it is impossible for them to exist to- 
gether in the same community, where their numbers are so nearly equal as in 
the slaveholding states, under any other relation than that which now exists. 
Social and political equality between them is impossible. No power on earth 
can overcome the difficulty. The causes lie too deep in the principles of our 
nature to be siu:mounted. But, without such equality, to change the present 



196 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOrPf. 

condition of the African race, were it possible, would be but to change the form 
of slavery. It would make them the slaves of the community instead of the 
slaves of individuals, with less responsibility and interest in their welfare on the 
part of the connnunity than is felt by their present masters ; while it would destroy 
the security and independence of the European race, if the African should be per- 
mitted to continue in their changed condition within the limits of those states. 
They would look to the other states for support and protection, and woidd be- 
come, virtually, their allies and dependants ; and would thus place in the hands 
of those states the most effectual instrument to destroy the influence and con- 
trol the destiny of the rest of the Union. 

It is against this relation between the two races that the blind and criminal 
zeal of the Abolitionists is directed — a relation that now preserves in quiet and 
security more than 6,500,000 of human beings, and which cannot be destroyed 
■without destroying the peace and prosperity of nearly half the states of the 
Union, and involving their entire population in a deadly conflict, that must ter- 
minate either in the expulsion or extirpation of those who are the object of the 
misguided and false humanity of those who claim to be their friends. 

He must be blind indeed who does not perceive that the subversion of a re- 
lation which must be followed with such disastrous consequences, can only be 
effected by convulsions that would devastate the country, burst asunder the 
bonds of the Union, and ingulf in a sea of blood the institutions of the country. 
It is madness to suppose that the slaveholding states would quietly submit to be 
sacrificed. Every consideration — interest, duty, and humanity ; the love of 
country, the sense of wrong, hatred of oppressors, and treacherous and faithless 
confederates, and, finally, despair — would impel them to the most daring and 
desperate resistance in defence of property, family, country, liberty, and exist- 
ence. 

But wicked and cruel as is the end aimed at, it is fully equalled by the 
criminality of the means by which it is proposed to be accomplished. These, 
as has been stated, consist in organized societies and a powerful press, directed 
mainly with a view to excite the bitterest animosity and hatred of the people of 
the non-slaveholding states against the citizens and institutions of the slave- 
holding states. It is easy to see to what disastrous results such means must 
tend. Passing over the more obvious effects, their tendency to excite to insur- 
rection and servile war, with all its horrors, and the necessity which such ten- 
dency must impose on the slaveholding states to resort to the most rigid disci- 
pline and severe police, to the great injury of the present condition of the slaves, 
there remains another threatening, incalculable mischief to the country. 

The inevitable tendency of the means to which the Abolitionists have resort- 
ed to efiect their object must, if persisted' in, end in comjiletely alienating the 
two great sections of the Union. The incessant action of hundreds of societies, 
and a vast printing establishment, throwing out daily thousands of artful and in- 
flammatory publications, must make, in time, a deep impression on the section 
of the Union where they freely circulate, and are mainly designed to hare ef- 
fect. The well-informed and thoughtful may hold them in contempt, but the 
young, the inexperienced, the ignorant, and thoughtless will receive the poison. 
In process of time, when the number of proselytes is sufficiently multiplied, the 
artful and profligate, who are ever on the watch to seize on any means, how- 
ever wicked and dangerous, will unite with the fanatics, and make their move- 
ments the basis of a powerful political party, that will seek advancement by 
difl'using, as widely as possible, hatred against the slaveholding states. But, 
as hatred begets hatred, and animosity animosity, these feelings would become 
reciprocal, till every vestige of attachment woifld cease to exist between the 
two sections ; when the Union and the Constitution, the oflspring of mutual af- 
fection and confidence, would forever perish. 

Such is the danger to which the movements of the Abolitionists expose the 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 197 

country. If the force of the obligation is in proportion to the magnitude of tire 
dano-er, stronger cannot be imposed than is at present on the states within 
whose limits the danger originates, to arrest its farther progress — a duty they 
owe, not only to the states whose institutions are assailed, but to the Union and 
Constitution, as has been shown, and, it may be added, to themselves. The 
sober and considerate portions of citizens of the non-slaveholding states, who 
have a deep stake in the existing institutions of the country, would have little 
forecast not to see that the assaults which are now directed against the institu- 
tions of the Southern States may be very easily directed against those which 
uphold their own property and security. A very slight modification of the ar- 
guments used against the institutions which sustain the property and security 
of the South would make them equally effectual against the institutions of the 
North, including banking, in which so vast an amount of its property and capi- 
tal is invested. It would be well for those interested to reflect whether there 
now exists, or ever has existed, a wealthy and civilized community in which 
one portion did not live on the labour of another ; and whether the form in 
which slavery exists in the South is not but one modification of this universal 
condition ; and, finally, whether any other, under all the circumstances of the 
case, is more defensible, or stands on stronger ground of necessity. It is time 
to look these questions in the face. Let those who are interested remember 
that labour is the only source of wealth, and how small a portion of it, in all 
old and civilized countries, even the best governed, is left to those by whose 
labour wealth is created. Let them also reflect how little volition or agency 
the operatives in any country have in the question of its distribution — as little, 
with a few exceptions, as the African of the slaveholding states has in the distri- 
biition of the proceeds of his labour. Nor is it the less oppressive, that in the 
one case it is eff*ected by the stern and powerful will of the government, and iu 
the other by the more feeble and flexible will of a master. If one be an evil, 
so is the other. The only difference is the amount and mode of the exaction 
and distribution, and the agency by which they are effected. 



XII. 

SPEECH ON THE ABOLITION PETITIONS, MARCH 9, 1836. 

The question of receiving the petitions from Pennsylvania for the abo- 
lition of slavery in the District of Columbia being under consideration, 

Mr. Calhouu rose and said: If we may judge from what has been said, 
the mind of the Senate is fully made up on the subject of these petitions. 
With the exception of the two senators from V^ermont, all who have 
spoken have avowed their conviction, not only that they contain nothing 
requiring the action of the Senate, but that the petitions are highly mis- 
chievous, as tending to agitate and distract the country, and to endanger 
the Union itself. With these concessions, I may fairly ask, Why should 
these petitions be received 1 Why receive when we have made up our 
mind not to act ] Why idly waste our time and lower our dignity in the 
useless ceremony of receiving to reject, as is proposed, should the peti- 
tions be received] Why, finally, receive what all acknowledge to be 
highly dangerous and mischievous 1 But one reason has, or can be as- 
signed — that not to receive would be a violation of the right of petition, 
and, of course, that we are bound to receive, however objectionable and 
dangerous the petitions may be. If such be the fact, there is an end to 
the question. As great as would be the advantage to the Abolitionists if 
we are bound to receive, if it would be a violation of the right of petition 



193 SPEECHES OF JOH\ C. CALHOl'N'. 

not to receive, we must acquiesce. On the other hand, if it shall be 
sliown, not only that we are not bound to receive, but that to receive, on 
the ground on which it has been placed, would sacrifice the constitutional 
rights of this body, would yield to the Abolitionists all they could hope 
at this time, and would surrender all the outworks by which the slave- 
holding states can defend their rights and property hers, then a unani- 
mous rejection of these petitions ought of right to follow. 

The decision, then, of the question now before the Senate is reduced 
to the single point. Are we bound to receive these petitions'? Or, to vary 
the form of the question, Would it be a violation of the right of petition 
not to receive them 1 

When the ground was first taken that it would be a violation, I could 
scarcely persuade myself that those who took it were in earnest, so con- 
trary was it to all my conceptions of the rights of this body and the 
provisions of the Constitution ; but finding it so earnestly maintained, I 
have since carefully investigated the subject, and the result has been a 
confirmation of my first impression, and a conviction that the claim of 
right is without shadow of foundation. The question, I must say, has 
not been fairly met. Those opposed to the side which we support have 
discussed the question as if we denied the right of petition, when they 
could not but know that the true issue is not as to the existence of the 
. right, which is acknowledged by all, but its extent and limits, which not 
one of our opponents has so much as attempted to ascertain. What they 
have declined doing I undertake to perform. 

There must be some point, all will agree, where the right of petition 
ends, and that of this body begins. Where is that point 1 I have exam- 
ined this question carefu]lj\ and I assert boldly, without the least fear of 
refutation, that, stretched to the utmost, the right cannot be extended be- 
yond the presentation of a petition, at which point the rights of this body 
commence. When a petition is presented, it is before the Senate. It 
must then be acted on. Some disposition must be made of it before the 
Senate can proceed to the consideration of any other subject. This no one 
will deny. With the action of the Senate its rights commence : rights 
secured by an express provision of the Constitution, which vests each 
house with the right of regulating its own proceedings, that is, to deter- 
mine by fixed rules the order and form of its action. To extend the ri^ht 
of petition beyond presentation, is clearly to extend it beyond that point 
Avhere the action of the Senate commences, and, as such, is a manifest 
violation of its constitutional rights. Here, then, we have the limits be- 
tween the right of petition and the right of the Senate to regulate its 
proceedings clearly fixed, and so perfectly defined as not to admit of mis- 
take, and, I would add, of controversy, had it not been questioned in this 
discussion. 

If what I have asserted required confirmation, ample might be found in 
our rules, which imbody the deliberate sense of the Senate on this point, 
from the commencement of the government to this day. Among them, 
the Senate has prescribed that of its proceedings on the presentation of 
petitions. It is contained in the 24.th Rule, which I ask the secretary to 
read, with Mr. JefTerson's remarks in reference to it. 

" Before any petition or memorial addressed to the Senate shall be re- 
ceived and read at the table, whether the same shall be introduced by the 
President or a member, a brief statement of the contents of the petition 
or memorial shall verbally be made by the introducer." — Rule 24. 

Mr. Jefferson's remarks : " Regularly a motion for receiving it must be 
made and seconded, and a question put whether it shall he received ; but a cry 
from the house of ' Receive,' or even a silence, dispenses with the for- 
mality of the question." 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 199 

Here we have a confirmation of all I have asserted. It clearly proves 
that, when a petition is presented, the action of the Senate commences. 
The first act is to receive the petition. Received by whom ] Not the 
secretary, but the Senate. And how can it be received by the Senate 
but on a motion to receive, and a vote of a m.ajority of the body 1 And 
Mr. Jeiierson, accordingly, tells us that, regularly, such a motion must be 
made and seconded. On this question, then, the right of the Senate 
begins, and its right is as perfect and full to receive or reject, as it is to 
adopt or reject any other question, in any subsequent stage of its pro- 
ceedings. When I add that this rule was adopted as far back as the 19th 
of April, 1789, at the first session of the Senate, and that it has been re- 
tained, without alteration, in all the subsequent changes and modifications 
of the rules, we have the strongest evidence of the deliberate sense of this 
body in reference to the point under consideration. 

I feel that I might here terminate the discussion. I have shown con- 
clusively that the right of petition cannot possibly be extended beyond 
presentation. At that point it is met by the rights of the Senate ; and it 
follows, as a necessary consequence, that, so far from being bound to re- 
ceive these petitions, so far would a rejection be from violating the right 
of petition, we are left perfectly free to reject or to receive at pleasure, 
and that we cannot be deprived of it without violating the rights of this 
body, secured by the Constitution. 

But, on a question of such magnitude, I feel it to be a duty to remove 
every difficulty ; and, that not a shadow of doubt may remain, I shall 
next proceed to reply to the objections our opponents have made to the 
grounds I have taken. At the head of these it has been urged, again and 
again, that petitioners have a right to be heard, and that not to receive 
petitions is to refuse a hearing. It is to be regretted that, throughout 
this discussion, those opposed to us have dealt in such vague generalities, 
and ventured assertions with so little attention to facts. Why have they 
not informed us, in the present instance, what is meant by the right to 
be heard, and how that right is violated by a refusal to receive 1 Had 
they thought proper to give us this information, it would, at least, have 
greatly facilitated my reply ; but as it is, I am constrained to inquire into 
the different senses in which the assertion may be taken, and then to 
show that in not one o( them is the right of petition in the slightest de- 
gree infringed by a refusal to receive. 

What, then, is meant by the assertion that these petitioners have a right 
to be heard? Is it meant that they have a right to appear in the Senate 
chamber in person to present their petition and to be heard in its defence I 
If this be the meaning, the dullest apprehension must see that the ques- 
tion on receiving has not the slightest bearing on such right. If they 
have the right to be heard personally at our bar, it is not the 24'th rule of 
our proceedings, but the 19th which violates that right. That rule ex- 
pressly provides that a motion to admit any person whatever within the 
doors of the Senate to present a petition shall be out of order, and, of 
course, excludes the petitioners from being heard in person. But it may 
be meant that petitioners have a right to have their petitions presented 
to the Senate and read in their hearing. If this be the meaning, the right 
has been enjoyed in the present instance to the fullest extent. The peti- 
tion was presented by the senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. Buchanan) in 
the usual mode, by giving a statement of its contents, and on my call was 
read by the secretary at his table. 

But one more sense can be attached to the assertion. It may be ineant 
that the petitioners have a right to have their petitions discussed by the 
Senate. If this be intended, I will venture to say that there never was an 



200 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

assertion more directly in the teeth of facts than that which has been so 
frequently made in the course of this discussion, that, to refuse to receive 
the petition, is to refuse a hearing to the petitioners. Has not this ques- 
tion been before us for months'? Has not the petition been discussed 
day after day, fully and freely, in all its bearings 1 And how, with these 
facts before us, with the debates still ringing in our ears, any senator caa 
rise in his place, and gravely pronounce that to refuse to receive this pe- 
tition is to refuse a hearing to the petitioners, to refuse discussion in the 
broadest sense, is past my comprehension. Our opponents, as if in their 
eagerness to circumscribe the rights of the Senate, and to enlarge those 
of the Abolitionists (for such must be the effect of their course), have 
closed their senses against facts passing before their eyes ; and have en- 
tirely overlooked the nature of the question now before the Senate, and 
which they have been so long discussing. 

The question on receiving the petition not only admits discussion, but 
admits it in the most ample manner ; more so, in fact, than any other, 
except the final question on the rejection of the prayer of the petition, or 
some tantamount question. Whatever may go to show that the petition 
is or is not deserving the action of this body, may be freely urged for 
or against it, as has been done on the present occasion. In this respect 
there is a striking difierence between it and many of the subsequent ques- 
tions which may be raised after reception, and particularly the one made 
by the senator from Tennessee (Mr, Grundy), who now is so strenuous 
an advocate in favour of the right of the petitioners to be heard. He 
spoke with apparent complacency of his course as it respects another of 
these petitions. And what was that course ] He who is now so eager 
for discussion to give a hearing, moved to lay the petition on the table, 
a motion which cuts off all discussion. 

But it may be asked, If the question on receiving petitions admits of 
so wide a scope for discussion, why not receive this petition, and discuss 
it at some subsequent stage 1 Why not receive, in order to reject its 
prayer, as proposed by the senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. Buchanan), 
instead of rejecting the petition itself on the question of receiving, as we 
propose 1 What is the difference between the two 1 

I do not intend at this stage to compare, or, rather, to contrast the two 
courses, for they admit of no comparison. My object at present is to 
establish, beyond the possibility of a doubt, that we are not bouiid to re- 
ceive these petitions ; and when that is accomplished, I will then show 
the disastrous consequences which must follow the reception of the peti- 
tion, be the after disposition what it may. In the mean time, it is suffi- 
cient to remark, that it is only on the question of receiving that oppo- 
sition can be made to the peiition itself. On all others the opposition is 
to its prayer. On the decision, then, of the question of receiving depends 
the important question of jurisdiction. To receive is to take jurisdic- 
tion ; to give an implied pledge to investigate and decide on the prayer, 
and to give the petition a place in our archives, and become responsible 
for its safe keeping ; and who votes for receiving this petition on the 
ground on which its reception is placed, votes that Congress is bound to 
take jurisdiction of the question of abolishing slavery both here and in 
the states ; gives an implied pledge to take the subject under considera- 
tion, and orders the petition to be placed among the public records for 
safe keeping. 

But to proceed in reply to the objections of our opponents. It is next 
urged that precedents are against the side we support. I meet this ob- 
jection with a direct denial. From the beginning of the government to 
the commencement of this session, there is not a single precedent that 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 201 

justifies the receiving of these petitions on the ground on which their re- 
ception is urged. The real state of the case is, that we are not following, 
but making precedents. For the first time has the principle been assumed 
that we are bound to receive petitions ; that we have no discretion, but 
must take jurisdiction over them, however absurd, frivolous, mischievous, 
or foreign from the purpose for which the government was created. Re- 
ceive these petitions, and you will create a precedent which will hereaf- 
ter establish this monstrous principle. As yet there are none. The case 
relied on by the senator from Tennessee (Mr. Grundy) is in no respect 
analoo-ous. No question, in that case, was made on the reception of the 
petition. The petition slipped in without taking a vote, as is daily done 
where the attention of the Senate is not particularly called to the subject. 
The question on which the discussion took place was on the reference, 
and not on the reception, as in this case ; but what is decisive against the 
precedent, and which I regret the senator (Mr. Grundy) did not state, so 
that it might accompany his remarks, is the fact that the petition was not 
for abolishing slavery. The subject was the African slave-trade ; and the 
petition simply prayed that Congress would inquire whether they might 
not adopt some measure of interdiction prior to 1808, when, by the Con- 
stitution, they would be authorized to suppress that trade. I ask the sec- 
retary to read the prayer of the petition: 

"But we find it indispensably incumbent on us, as a religious body, as- 
suredly believing that both the true temporal interests of nations and 
eternal well-being of individuals depend on doing justly, loving mercy, 
and walking humbly before God, the creator, preserver, and benefactor of 
men, thus to attempt to excite your attention to the affecting subject 
(slave-trade), earnestly desiring that the infinite Father of Spirits may so 
enrich our minds with his love and truth, and so influence your under- 
standing by that pure wisdom which is full of mercy and good fruits, as 
th-at a sincere and an impartial inquiry may take place, whether it be not 
an essential part of the duty of your exalted station to exert upright en- 
deavours, to the full extent of your power, to remove every obstruction 
to public righteousness, which the influence of artifice of particular per- 
sons, governed by the narrow, mistaken views of self-interest, has occa- 
sioned ; and whether, notwithstanding such seeming impediments, it be 
not really within your power to exercise justice and mercy, which, if ad- 
hered to, we cannot doubt abolition must produce the abolition of the 
slave-trade." 

Now, I ask the senator, Where is the analogy between this and the pres- 
ent petition, the reception of which he so strenuously urges \ He is a 
lawyer of long experience and of distinguished reputation, and I put the 
question to him. On what possible principle can a case so perfectly dis- 
similar justify the vote he intends to give on the present occasion! On 
what possible ground can the vote of Mr. Madison, to refer that petition, 
on which he has so much relied, justify him in receiving this X Does he 
not perceive, in his own example, the danger of forming precedents 1 If 
he may call to his aid the authority of Mr. Madison, in a case so dissim- 
ilar, to justify the reception of this petition, and thereby extend the juris- 
diction of Congress over the question of emancipation, to what purpose, 
hereafter, may not the example of his course on the present occasion be 
perverted % 

It is not my design to censure Mr. Madison's course, but I cannot re- 
frain from expressing my regret that his name is not found associated, on 
that occasion, with the sagacious and firm representatives from the South 
— Smith, Tucker, and Burke of South Carolina, James Jackson of Geor- 
gia, and many others, who, at that early period, foresaw the danger, 

Cc 



and met it as it ought ever to be met by those who regard the peace and 
security of the slaveholding states. Had he added the weight of his tal- 
ents and authority to theirs, a more healthy tone of sentiment than that 
which now, unfortunately, exists, would this day have been the conse- 
quence. 

Another case has been cited to justify the vote for reception. I refer 
to the petition from the Quakers in 1805, which the senator from Pennsyl- 
vania (Mr. Buchanan) relies on to sustain him in receiving the present pe- 
tition. What I have said in reply to the precedent cited by the senator 
from Tennessee applies equally to this. Like that, the petition prayed 
legislation, not on abolition of slavery, but the African slave-trade, oyer 
which subject Congress then in a few years would have full jurisdiction 
by the Constitution, and might well have their attention called to it in ad- 
vance. But, though their objects were the same, the manner in which 
the petitions were met was very dissimilar. Instead of being permitted 
to be received silently, like the former, this petition was met at the 
threshold. The question of receiving Avas made, as on the present oc- 
casion, and its rejection sustained by a strong Southern vote, as the jour-- 
iial will show. The secretary will read the journal : 

" Mr. Logan presented a petition, signed Thomas Morris, clerk, on be- 
half of the meeting of the representatives of the people called Quakers, 
in Pennsylvania, New-Jersey, &c., stating that the petitioners, from a 
sense of religious duty, had again come forward to plead the cause of 
their oppressed and degraded fellow-men of the African race. On the 
question, ' Shall this petition be received V it passed in the affirmative — 
yeas 19, nays 9." 

Among those to receive the petition there were but four from the 
slaveholding states, and this on a single petition praying for legislation on 
a subject over which Congress in so short a time would have full author- 
ity. What an example to us on the present occasion ! Can any man 
doubt, from the vote, if the Southern s^iators on that occasion had been 
placed in our present situation— that, had it been their lot, as it is ours, 
to meet that torrent of petitions which is now poured in on Congress, not 
from peaceable Quakers, but ferocious incendiaries — not to suppress the 
African slave-trade, but to abolish slavery, they would with united voice 
have rejected the petition with scorn and indignation! Can any one who 
knew him doubt that one of the senators from the South (the gallant Sum- 
ter), who, on that occasion, voted for receiving the petition, would have 
been among the first to vindicate the interests of those whom he rep- 
resented, had the question at that day been what it is on the present oc- 
casion ? 

W^e are next told that, instead of looking to the Constitution in order 
to ascertain what are the limits to the right of petition, we must push that 
instrument aside, and go back to Magna Charta and the Declaration of 
Rights for its origin and limitation. We live in strange times. It seems 
there are Christians now more orthodox than the Bible, and politicians 
whose standard is higher than the Constitution ; but I object not to tracing 
the right to these ancient and venerated sources; I hold in high estima- 
tion the institutions of our English ancestors. They grew up gradually, 
through many generations, by the incessant and untiring efforts of an in- 
telligent and brave people struggling for centuries against the power of 
the crown. To them we are indebted for nearly all that has been gained 
for liberty in modern times, excepting what we have added. But may I 
not ask how it has happened that our opponents, in going back to these 
sacred instruments, have not thought proper to cite their provisions, or 
to show in what manner our refusal to receive these petitions can violate 



^mmm 



the right of petition as secured by them 1 I feel under no obligation to 
supply the omission — to cite what they have omitted to cite, or to prove, 
from the instruments themselves, that to be no violation of them which 
they have not proved to be a violation. It is unnecessary. The practice 
of Parliament is sufficient for my purpose. It proves conclusively that 
it is no violation of the right, as secured by those instruments, to refuse 
to receive petitions. To establish what this practice is, I ask the secretary 
to read from Hatsel, a Avork of the highest authority, the several para- 
graphs which are marked with a pencil, commencing at page 760, under 
the head of Petitions on Matter of Supply : 

" On the 9th of April, 1694, a petition was tendered to the house re- 
lating to the bill for granting to their majesties several duties upon the 
tonnage of ships ; and the question being put that the petition be re- 
ceived, it passed in the negative." 

" On the 28th of April, 1698, a petition was offered to the house against 
the bill for laying a duty upon inland pit coal ; and the question being 
put that the petition be received, it passed in the negative. See, also, the 
29th and 30th of June, 1698, petitions relating to the duties upon Scotch 
linens, and upon whale fins imported. — Vid. 20th of April, 1698." 

" On the 5th of January, 1703, a petition of the maltsters of Nottingham 
being offered against the bill for continuing the duties on malt, and the 
question being put that the petition be brotight up, it passed in the nega- 
tive." 

" On the 21st of December, 1706, Resolved, That this house will receive 
no petition for any sum of money relating to public service but Avhat is 
recommended from the crown. Upon the 11th of June, 1713, this is de- 
clared to be a standing order of the house." 

" On the 29th of March, 1707, Resolved, That the house will not pro- 
ceed on any petition, motion, or bill for granting^ any money, or for re- 
leasing or compounding any money owing to tlie crown, but in a com- 
mittee of the whole house ; and this is declared to be a standing order. 
See, also, the 29th of November, 1710." 

" On the 23d of April, 1713, Resolved, That the house wall receive no 
petition for compounding debts to the crown, upon any branch of the rev- 
enue, without a certificate from the proper officer annexed, stating the 
debt, what prosecutions have been made for the recovery thereof, and 
what the petitioner and his security are able to pay." 

"On the 25th of March, 1715, this is declared to be a standing order. 
See the 2d of March, 1735, and the 9th of January, 1752, the proceedings 
upon petitions of this sort." 

" On the 8th of March, 1732, a petition being offered against a bill de- 
pending for securing the trade of the sugar colonies, it was refused to be 
brought up. A motion was then made that a committee be appointed to 
search precedents in relation to the receiving or not receiving petitions 
against the imposing of duties ; and the question being put, it passed in 
the negative." 

Nothing can be more conclusive. Not only are petitions rejected, but 
resolutions are passed refusing to receive entire classes of petitions, and 
that, too, on the subject of imposing taxes — a subject, above all others, in 
relation to which we would suppose the right ought to be held most sa- 
cred, and this within a few years after the Declaration of Rights. With 
these facts before us, what are we to think of the assertion of the senator 
from Tennessee (Mr. Grundy), who pronounced in his place, in the bold- 
est and most unqualified manner, that there was no deliberative body 
which did not act on the principle that it was bound to receive petitions 1 
That a member of his long experience and caution should venture to 



make an assertion so unfounded, is one among the many proofs of tiie 
carelessness, both as to facts and argument, with which this important 
subject has been examined and discussed on that side. 

But it is not necessary to cross the Atlantic, or to go back to remote 
periods, to find precedents for the rejection of petitions. This body, on a 
memorable occasion, and after full deliberation, a short time since reject- 
ed a petition; and among those who voted for the rejection will be found 
the names (of course I exclude my own) of the most able and experienced 
members of the Senate. I refer to the case of resolutions in the nature 
of a remonstrance from the citizens of York, Pennsylvania, approving the 
act of the President in removing the deposites. I ask the secretary to 
read the journals on the occasion : 

" The Vice-president communicated a preamble and a series of resolu- 
tions adopted at a meeting of the citizens of York county, Pennsylvania, 
approving the act of the executive removing the public money from the 
Bank of the United States, and opposed to the renewal of the charter of 
said bank ; which having been read, Mr. Clay objected to the reception. 
And on the question, ' Shall they be received V it was determined in the 
negative — yeas 20, nays 24-. 

" On motion of Mr. Preston, the yeas and nays being desired by one 
fifth of the senators present, those who voted in the affirmative are, 

" Messrs. Benton, Brown, Forsyth, Grundy, Hendricks, Hill, Kane, 
King of Alabama, King of Georgia, Linn, M'Kean, Mangum, Morris, 
Robinson, Shepley, Tallmadge, Tipton, White, Wilkins, Wright. 

" Those who voted in the negative, are, 

" Messrs. Bibb, Black, Calhoun, Clay, Clayton, Ewing, Frelinghuysen, 
Kent, Leigh, Moore, Naudain, Poindexter, Porter, Prentiss, Preston, Rob- 
bins, Silsbee, Smith, Southard, Sprague, Swift, Tomlinson, Waggaman, 
Webster." 

In citing this case il^is not my intention to call in question the con- 
sistency of any member on this floor : it would be unworthy of the occa- 
sion. I doubt not the vote then given was given from a full conviction 
of its correctness, as it will doubtless be in the present case, on whatever 
side it may be found. My object is to show that the principle for which 
I contend, so far from being opposed, is sustained by precedents, here and 
elsewhere, ancient and modern. 

In following as I have those opposed to me, to Magna Charta and the 
Declaration of Rights for the origin and the limits of the right of petition, 
I am not disposed, with them, to set aside the Constitution. I assent to 
the position they assume, that the right of petition existed before the 
Constitution, and that it is not derived from it ; but while I look beyond 
that instrument for the right, I hold the Constitution, on a question as to 
its extent and limits, to be the highest authority. The first amended ar- 
ticle of the Constitution, which provides that Congress shall pass no law 
to prevent the people from peaceably assembling and petitioning for a re- 
dress of grievances, was clearly intended to prescribe the limits within 
which the right might be exercised. It is not pretended that to refuse 
to receive petitions touches in the slightest degree on thgse limits. To 
suppose that the framers of the Constitution — no, not the framers, but 
those jealous patriots who were not satisfied with that instrument as it 
came from the hands of the framers, and who proposed this very provision 
to guard what they considered a sacred right, performed their task so 
bunglingly as to omit any essential guard, would be to do great injustice 
to the memory of those stern and sagacious men ; and yet this is what 
the senator from Tennessee (Mr. Grundy) has ventured to assert. He 
said that no provision was added to guard against the rejection of petitions, 



HIilliillfliiliilHHIBlHIUHHiHi 



because the obligation to receive was considered so clear that it was 
deemed unnecessary ; when he ought to have known that, according to 
the standing practice at that time, Parliament was in the constant habit, 
as has been shown, of refusing to receive petitions — a practice which 
could not have been unknown to the authors of the amendment ; and from 
which it may be fairly inferred that, in omitting to provide that petitions 
should be received, it was not intended to comprehend their reception in 
the right of petition. 

I have now, I trust, established, beyond all controversy, that we are not 
bound to receive these petitions, and that if we should reject them we 
would not in the slightest degree infringe the right of petition. It is now 
time to look to the rights of this body, and to see whether, if we should 
receive them, when it is acknowledged that the only reason for receiving 
is that we are bound to do so, we would not establish a principle which 
would trench deeply on the rights of the Senate. I have already shown 
that, where the action of the Senate commences, there also its rights to 
determine how and when it shall act also commences. I have also shown 
that the action of the Senate necessarily begins on the presentation of a 
petition ; that the petition is then before the body ; that the Senate can- 
not proceed to other business without making some disposition of it ; and 
that, by the 24jth rule, the first action after presentation is on a question 
to receive the petition. To extend the right of petition to the question 
bn receiving is to expunge this rule — to abolish this unquestionable right 
of the Senate, and that for the benefit, in this case, of the Abolitionists. 
Their gain would be at the loss of this body. I have not expressed my- 
self too strongly. Give the right of petition the extent contended for, 
decide that we are bound under the Constitution to receive these in- 
cendiary petitions, and the very motion before the Senate would be out 
of order. If the Constitution makes it our duty to receive, we would 
have no discretion left to reject, as the motion presupposes. Our rules 
of proceeding must accord with the Constitution. Thus, in the case of 
Revenue bills, which, by the Constitution, must originate in the other house, 
it would be out of order to introduce them here, and it has, accordingly, 
been so decided. For like reason, if we are bound to receive petitions, 
the present motion would be out of order ; and, if such be your opinion, 
it is your duty, as the presiding officer, to call me to order, and to arrest 
all farther discussion on the question of reception. Let us now turn our 
eyes for a moment to the nature of the right which, I fear, we are about 
to abandon, with the view to ascertain what must be the consequence if 
we should surrender it. 

Of all the rights belonging to a deliberative body, I know of none more 
universal, or indispensable to a proper performance of its functions, than 
the right to determine at its discretion what it shall receive, over what it 
shall extend its jurisdiction, and to what it shall direct its deliberation and 
action. It is the first and universal law of all such bodies, and extends 
not only to petitions, but to reports, to bills, and resolutions, varied only 
in the two latter in the form of the question. It may be compared to the 
function in the animal economy, with which all living creatures are en- 
dowed, of selecting through the instinct of taste what to receive or reject, 
and on which the preservation of their existence depends. Deprive them 
of this function, and the poisonous as well as the wholesome would be 
indifl^erently received into their system. So with deliberative bodies : 
deprive them of the essential and primary right to determine at their 
pleasure what to receive or reject, and they would become the passive 
receptacle, indifferently, of all that is frivolous, absurd, unconstitutional, 
immoral, and impious, as well as what may properly demand their de- 



liberation and action. Establish this monstrous, this impious principle 
(as it would prove to be in practice), and what must be the consequence 1 
To what would we commit ourselves 1 If a petition should be presented 
praying the abolition of the Constitution (which we are bound by our 
oaths to protect), according to this abominable doctrine it must be re- 
ceived. So if it prayed the abolition of the Decalogue, or of the Bible 
itself. I go farther. If the abolition societies should be converted into 
a body of Atheists, and should ask the passage of a law denj'ing the ex- 
istence o( the Almighty Being above us, the Creator of all, accordino- to 
this blasphemous doctrine we would be bound to receive the petition ; to 
take jurisdiction of it. I ask the senators from Tennessee and Pennsyl- 
vania (Mr. Grundy and Mr. Buchanan), Would they vote to receive such 
a petition 1 I wait not an answer. They would instantly reject it with 
loathing. What, then, becomes of the unlimited, unqualified, and universal 
obligation to receive petitions, which they so strenuously maintain, and 
to which they are prepared to sacrifice the constitutional rights of this 
body 1 

I shall now descend from these hypothetical cases to the particular 
question before the Senate. What, then, must be the consequences of 
receiving this petition, on the principle that we are bound to receive it, 
and all similar petitions whenever presented'? I have considered this 
question calmly in all its bearings, and do not hesitate to pronounce that 
to receive would be to yield to the Abolitionists all that the most sanguine 
could for the present hope, and to abandon all the outworks upon which 
we of the South rely for our defence against their attacks here. 

No one can believe that the fanatics, who have flooded this and the 
other house with their petitions, entertain the slightest hope that Con- 
gress would pass a law at this time to abolish slavery in this District. In- 
fatuated as they are, they must see that public opinion at the North is 
not yet prepared for so decisive a step, and that seriously to attempt it 
now would be fatal to their cause. What, then, do they hopel What but 
that Congress should take jurisdiction of the subject of abolishing slavery 
— should throw open to the Abolitionists the halls of legislation, and en- 
able them to establish a permanent position within their walls, from v/hich 
hereafter to carry on their operations against the institutions of the slave- 
holding states % If we receive this petition, all these advantages will be 
realized to them to the fullest extent. Permanent jurisdiction would be 
assumed over the subject of slavery not only in this District, but in the 
states themselves, whenever the Abolitionists might choose to ask Con- 
gress, by sending their petitions here, for the abolition of slavery in the 
states. We would be bound to receive such petitions, and, by receiving, 
Avould be fairly pledged to deliberate and decide on them. Having suc- 
ceeded in this point, a most favourable position would be gained. The 
centre of operations would be transferred from Nassau Hall to the Halls 
of Congress. To this common centre the incendiary publications of the 
Abolitionists would flow, in the form of petitions, to be received and pre- 
served among the public records. Here the subject of abolition would be 
agitated session after session, and from hence the assaults on the prop- 
erty and institutions of the people of the slaveholding states would be dis- 
seminated, in the guise of speeches, over the whole Union. 

Snch would be the advantages yielded to the Abolitionists. In propor- 
tion to their gain would be our loss. What would be yielded to them 
would be taken from us. Our true position — that which is indispensable 
to our defence here — is, that Congress has no legitimate jurisdiction over 
the subject of slavery either here or elsewhere. The reception of this 
petition surrenders this commanding position ; yields the question of ju- 



!■■ 



risaiction, so important to tne cause ot abolition, and so injurious to us j 
compels us to sit in silence to witness the assaults on our character and 
institutions, or to engage in an endless contest in their defence. Such a 
contest is beyond mortal endurance. We must, in the end, be humbled, 
degraded, broken down, and worn out. 

The senators from the slaveholding states, who, most unfortunatelj^, 
have committed themselves to vote for receiving these incendiary peti- 
tions, tell us, that whenever the attempt shall be made to abolish slavery, 
they will join with us to repel it. I doubt not the sincerity of their dec- 
laration. We all have a common interest, and they cannot betray ours 
without betraying, at the same time, their own. But I announce to them 
that they are now called on to redeem their pledge. The attempt is now 
making. The work is going on daily and hourly. The war is wao-ed, not 
only in the most dangerous manner, but in the only manner it'can be 
Avaged. Do they expect that the Abolitionists will resort to arms, and 
commence a crusade to liberate our slaves by force \ Is this what they 
mean when they speak of the attempt to abolish slavery % If so, let me 
tell our friends of the South who differ from me, that the war which the 
Abolitionists wage against us is of a very different character, and far more 
effective. It is a war of religious and political fanaticism, mingled, on 
the part of the leaders, with ambition and the love of notoriety, and waged, 
not against our lives, but our character. The object is to humble °and 
debase us in our own estimation, and that of the world in general ; to blast 
our reputation, while they overthrow our domestic institutions. This is 
the mode in which they are attempting abolition with such ample means 
and untiring industry ; and now is the time for all who are opposed to them 
to meet the attack. How can it be successfully met % This is the im- 
portant question. There is but one way: we must meet the enemy on 
the frontier — on the question of receiving ; we must secure that important 
pass — it is our Thermopylae. The power of resistance, by a universal 
law of nature, is on the exterior. Break through the shell— penetrate 
the crust, and there is no resistance within. In the present contest, the 
question on receiving constitutes our frontier. It is the first, the exterior 
question, that covers and protects all the others. Let it be penetrated 
by receiving this petitioH, and not a point of resistance can be found 
within, as far as this government is concerned. If we cannot maintain 
ourselves there, we cannot on any interior position. Of all the questions 
that can be raised, there is not one on which we can rally on ground more 
tenable for ourselves, or more untenable for our opponents, not excepting 
the ultimate question of abolition in the states. For our right to reject 
this petition is as clear and unquestionable as that Congress has no right 
to abolish slavery in the states. 

Such is the importance of taking our stand immovably on the question 
now before us. Such are the advantages that we of the South would 
sacrifice, and the Abolitionists would gain, were we to surrender that im- 
portant position by receiving this petition. What motives have we for 
making so great a sacrifice % What advantages can we hope to gain that 
would justify us 1 

We are told of the great advantages of a strong majority. I acknowl- 
edge it in a good cause, and on sound principles. I feel, in the present 
instance, how much our cause would be strengthened by a strong and de- 
cided majority for the rejection of these incendiary petitions. If anything 
we could do here could arrest the progress of the Abolitionists, it would 
be such a rejection. But, as advantageous as would be a strong majority 
on sound principles, it is in the same degree dangerous when on tlie op- 
posite — when it rests on improper concessions and the surrender of prin- 



ciples, whicn would be the case at present. Such a majority must, in this 
instance, be purchased by concessions to the Abolitionists, and a surrender, 
on our part, that would demolish all our outworks, give up all our strong 
positions, and open all the passes to the free admission of our enemies. 
It is only on this condition that we can hope to obtain such a majority — 
a majoritj- which must be gathered together from all sides, and entertain- 
ing every variety of opinion. To rally such a majority, the senator from 
Pennsylvania has fallen on the device to receive this petition, and imme- 
diately reject it, without consideration or reflection. To my mind, the 
movement looks like a trick — a mere piece of artifice to juggle and de- 
ceive. I intend no disrespect to the senator. I doubt not his intention 
is good, and believe his feelings are with us ; but I must say that the 
course he has intimated is, in my opinion, the worst possible for the slave- 
holding states. It surrenders all to Abolitionists, and gives nothing in 
turn that would be of the least advantage to us. Let the majority for the 
course he indicates be ever so strong, can the senator hope that it will 
make any impression on the Abolitionists 1 Can he even hope to maintain 
his position of rejecting their petitions Avithout consideration or deliber- 
ation on their merits 1 Does he not see that, in assuming jurisdiction by 
receiving their petitions, he gives an implied pledge to inquire, to delib- 
erate, and decide on them 1 Experience will teach him that we must 
either refuse to receive, or go through. I entirely concur with the sen- 
ator from Vermont (Mr. Prentiss) on that point. There is no middle 
ground that is tenable, and, least cf ill, that proposed to be occupied by 
the senator from Per" ylvania, and those who act with him. In the mean 
time, the courr^j ::i: proposes is calculated to lull the people of the slave- 
holding states into a false security, under the delusive impression which 
it is calculated to make, that there is more strength here against the Abo- 
litionists than really does exist. 

But we are told that the right of petition is popular in the North, and 
that to make an issue, however true, which might bring it in question, 
tvould weaken our friends here, and strengthen the Abolitionists. I have 
no doubt of the kind feelings of our brethren from the North on this 
floor; but I clearly see that, while we have their feelings in our favour, 
their constituents, right or wrong, will have their votes, however we may 
be affected. But I assure our friends that we would not do anything 
willingly which would weaken them at home; and if we could be assured 
that, by yielding to their wishes the right of receiving petitions, they 
would be able to arrest permanently the progress of the Abolitionists, 
we then might be induced to yield ; but nothing short of the certainty of 
permanent security can induce us to yield an inch. If to maintain our 
rights must increase the Abolitionists, be it so. I would at no period make 
the least sacrifice of principle for any temporary advantage, and much 
less at the present. If there must be an issue, now is our time. We 
never can be more united or better prepared for the struggle ; and I, for 
one, would much rather meet the danger now than to turn it over to those 
who are to come after us. 

But, putting these views aside, it does seem to me, taking a general 
view of the subject, that the course intimated by the senator from Penn- 
sylvania is radically wrong, and must end in disappointment. The at- 
tempt to unite all must, as it usually does, terminate in division and dis- 
traction. It will divide the South on the question of receiving, and the 
North on that of rejecting, with a mutual weakening of both. I already 
see indications of division among Northern gentlemen on this floor, even 
in this stage of the question. A division among them would give a great 
impulse to the cause of abolition. Whatever position the parties may 



JMiiiiiiiMMiliiiiBnnmTMininTimiii \\\m ■■m 



take, in the event of such division, one or the other would be considered 
more or less favourable to the abolition cause, which could not fail to run 
it into the political struggles of the two great parties of the North. With 
these views, I hold that the only possible hope of arresting the progress 
of the Abolitionists in that quarter is to keep the two great parties there 
united against them, which would be impossible if they divide here. The 
course intimated by the senator from Pennsylvania will effect a division 
here, and, instead of uniting the North, and thereby arresting the progress 
of the Abolitionists, as he anticipates, will end in division and distraction, 
and in giving thereby a more powerful impulse to their cause. I must 
say, before I close my remarks in this connexion, that the members from 
the North, it seems to me, are not duly sensible of the deep interest 
which ihey have in this question, not only as affecting the Union, but as 
it relates immediately and directly to their particular section. As great 
as may be our interests, theirs are not less. If the tidecontinues to roll 
on its turbid waves of folly and fanaticism, it must, in the end, prostrate 
in the North all the institutions that uphold their peace and prosperity, 
and ultimately overwhelm all that is eminent, morally and intellectually. 

I have now concluded what I intended to say on the question immedi- 
ately before the Senate. If I have spoken earnestly, it is because I feel 
the subject to be one of the deepest interest. We are about to take the 
first step ; that must control all our subsequent movements. If it should 
be such as I fear it will, if we receive this petition, and thereby establish 
the principle that we are obliged to receive all such petitions ; if we shall 
determine to take permanent jurisdiction over the subject of abolition, 
whenever and in whatever ^ "nner the Abolitionists may ask, either here 
or in the states, I fear that the consequen-ctyn will be ultimately disastrous. 
Such a course would destroy the confidence -. - the people of the slave- 
holding states in this government. We love and cherish the Union : we 
remember with the kindest feelings our common origin, with pride our 
common achievements, and fondly anticipate the common greatness and 
glory that seem to await us; but origin, achievements, and anticipation 
of coming greatness are to us as nothing compared to this question. It 
is to us a vital question. It involves not only our liberty, but, what is 
greater (if to freemen anything can be), existence itself. The relation 
which now exists between the two races in the slaveholding states has 
existed for two centuries. It has grown with our growth, and strength- 
ened with our strength. It has entered into and modified all our institu- 
tions, civil and political. None other can be substituted. We will not, 
cannot permit it to be destroyed. If we were base enough to do so, we 
would be traitors to our section, to ourselves, our families, and to poster- 
ity. It is our anxious desire to protect and preserve this relation by the 
joint action of this government and the confederated states of the Union ; 
but if, instead of closing the door — if, instead of denying all jurisdiction 
and all interference in this question, the doors of Congress are to be 
thrown open ; and if we are to be exposed here, in the heart of the Union, 
to an endless attack on our rights, our character, and our institutions; if 
the other states are to stand and look on without attempting to suppress 
these attacks, originating Avithin their borders ; and, finally, if this is to 
be our fixed and permanent condition as members of this confederacy, 
we will then be compelled to turn our eyes on ourselves. Come what 
will, should it cost every drop of blood and every cent of property, we 
must defend ourselves ; and if compelled, we would stand justified by all 
laws, human and divine. 

If I feel alarm, it is not for ourselves, but the Union and the institu- 
tions of the country, to which I have ever been devotedly attached, how- 

D D 



ever calumniated and slandered. Few have made greater sacrifices to 
maintain them, and none is more anxious to perpetuate them to the latest 
generation ; but they can and ought to be perpetuated only on the con- 
dition that they fulfil the great objects for which they were created — the 
liberty and protection of these states. 

As for ourselves, I feel no apprehension. I know to the fullest extent 
the niairnitude of the danger that surrounds us, I am not disposed to under- 
estimat^e it. My colleague has painted it truly. But, as great as is the 
danger, we have nothing to fear if true to ourselves. We have many and 
great resources ', a numerous, intelligent, and brave population ; great and 
valuable staples ; ample fiscal means ; unity of feeling and interest, and 
an entire exemption from those dangers originating in a conflict between 
labour and capital, which at this time threatens so much danger to con- 
stitutional governments. To these may be added, that we would act un- 
der an imperious necessity. There would be to us but one alternative — 
to triumph or perish as a people. We would stand alone, compelled to 
defend life, character, and institutions. A necessity so stern and impe- 
rious would develop to the full all the great qualities of our nature, men- 
tal and moral, requisite for defence — intelligence, fortitude, courage, and 
patriotism ; and these, with our ample means, and our admirable mate- 
rials for the construction of durable free states, would ensure security, 
liberty, and renown. 

With these impressions, I ask neither sympathy nor compassion for 
the slaveholding states. We can take care of ourselves. It is not we, 
but the Union which is in danger. It is that which demands our care — 
demands that the agitation of this question shall cease here — that you 
shall refuse to receive these petitions, and decline all jurisdiction over 
the subject of abolition in every form and shape. It is only on these 
terms that the Union can be safe. We cannot remain here in an endless 
struggle in defence of our character, our property, and institutions. 

I shall now, in conclusion, make a single remark as to the course I shall 
feel myself compelled to pursue, should the Senate, by receiving this pe- 
tition, determine to entertain jurisdiction over the question of abolition. 
Thinking as I do, I can perform no act that would countenance so dan- 
gerous an assumption ; and, as a participation in the subsequent proceed- 
ings on this petition, should it unfortunately be received, might be so 
construed, in that event I shall feel myself constrained to decline such 
participation, and to leave the responsibility wholly on those who may 
assume it. 



XIII. 



SPEECH ON THE BILL TO PROHIBIT DEPUTY POSTMASTERS FROM RECEIV- 
ING AND TRANSMITTING THROUGH THE MAIL CERTAIN PAPERS THERE- 
IN MENTIONED, APRIL 12, 1836. 

I AM aware, said Mr. Calhoun, how offensive it is to speak of one's self; but 
as the senator from Georgia on my right (Mr. King) has thought proper to im- 
pute to me improper motives, I feel myself compelled, in self-defence, to state 
the reasons which have governed my course in reference to the subject now 
under consideration. The senator is greatly mistaken in supposing that I was 
governed by hostility to General Jackson. So far is that from being the fact, 
that I came here at the commencement of the session with fixed and settled 
principles on the subject under discussion, and which, in pursuing the course 
that the senator condemns, I have but attempted to carry into effect. 



m....w,.«»„«u,uuu,.,_ 



As soon as the subject of abolition began to agitate the South last summer, 
in consequence of the transmission of incendiary publications through the mail, 
I saw at once that it would force itself on the notice of Congress at the present 
session, and that it involved questions of great delicacy and difficulty. I im- 
mediately turned my attention, in consequence, to the subject, and, after due re- 
flection, arrived at the conclusion that Congress could exercise no direct power 
over it ; and that, if it acted at all, the only mode in which it could act, consist- 
ently with the Constitution and the rights and safety of the slaveholding states, 
would be in the manner proposed by this bill. I also saw that there was no 
inconsiderable danger in the excited state of the feelings of the South ; that 
the power, however dangerous and unconstitutional, might be thoughtlessly 
yielded to Congress, knowing full well how apt the weak and timid are, in a 
state of excitement and alarm, to seek temporary protection in any quarter, re- 
gardless of after-consequences, and how ready the artful and designing ever are 
to seize on such occasions to extend and perpetuate their power. 

With these impressions I arrived here at the beginning of the session. The 
President's message was not calculated to remove my apprehensions. He as- 
sumed for Congress direct power over the subject, and that on the broadest, 
most unqualified, and dangerous principles. Knowing the influence of his name, 
by reason of his great patronage and the rigid discipline of party, with a large 
portion of the country, who have scarcely any other standard of Constitution, 
politics, and morals, I saw the full extent of the danger of having these danger- 
ous principles reduced to practice, and I determined at once to use CA'ery effort 
to prevent it. The senator from Georgia will, of course, understand that I do 
not include him in this subservient portion of his party. So far from it, I have 
always considered him as one of the most independent. It has been our for- 
tune to concur in opinion in relation to most of the important measures which 
have been agitated since he became a member of this body, two years ago, at 
the commencement of the session during which the deposite question was agi- 
tated. On that important question, if I mistake not, the senator and myself con- 
curred in opinion, at least as to its inexpediency, and the dangerous consequen- 
ces to which it would probably lead. If my memory serves me, we also agreed 
in opinion on the connected subject of the currency, which Avas then incident- 
ally discussed. We agreed, too, on the question of raising the value of gold 
to its present standard, and in opposition to the bill for the distribution of the 
proceeds of public land, introduced by the senator from Kentucky (Mr. Clay). 
In recurring to the events of that interesting session, I can remember but one 
important subject on which we disagreed, and that was the President's protest. 
Passing to the next, I find the same concurrence of opinion on most of the im- 
portant subjects of the session. We agreed on the question of executive pat- 
ronage, on the propriety of amending the Constitution for a temporary distribu- 
tion of the surplus revenue, on the subject of regulating the deposites, and in 
support of the bill for restricting the power of the executive in making removals 
from office. We also agreed in the propriety of establishing branch mints in 
the South and West — a subject not a little contested at the time. 

Even at the present session we have not been so unfortunate as to disagree 
entirely. We have, it is true, on the question of receiving abolition petitions, 
which I regret, as I must consider their reception, on the principle on which they 
were received, as a surrender of the whole ground to the Abolitionists, as far as 
this government is concerned. It is also true that we disagreed, in part, in ref- 
erence to the present subject. The senator has divided, in relation to it, be- 
tween myself and General Jackson. He has given his speech in support of 
his message, and announced his intention of giving his vote in favour of my bill. 
I certainly have no right to complain of this division. I had rather have his 
vote than his speech. The one will stand forever on the records of the Senate 



(unless expunged) in favour of the bill, and the important principles on which 
it rests, while the other is destined, at no distant day, to oblivion. 

I now put to the senator from Georgia two short questions. In the numerous 
and important instances in which we have agreed, I must haA-e been either righi 
or wrono-. If rif^ht, how could he be so uncharitable as to attribute my course 
to the low and unworthy motive of inveterate hostility to General Jackson ? 
But if wrong, in what condition does his charge against me place himself, who 
has concurred with me in all these measures ? (Here Mr. King disclaimed 
the imputation of improper motives to Mr. C.) I am glad to hear the gentle- 
man's disclaimer, said Mr. C., but I certainly understood him as asserting that, 
such was my hostility to General Jackson, that his support of a measure was 
sufficient to ensure my opposition ; and this he imdertook to illustrate by an 
anecdote borrowed from O'Connell and the pig, which, I must tell the senator, 
was much better suited to the character of the Irish mob to which it was ori- 
ginally addressed, than to the dignity of the Senate, where he has repeated it. 
But to return from this long digression. I saw, as I have remarked, that 
there was reason to apprehend that the principles embraced in the message 
might be reduced to practice— principles which I believe to be dangerous to 
the^ South, and subversive of the liberty of the press. The report fully states 
what those principles are, but it may not be useless to refer to them briefly on 
the present occasion. 

The message assumed for Congress the right of determining what publica- 
tions are incendiary and calculated to excite the slaves to insurrection, and to 
prohibit the transmission of such publications through the mail ; and, of course, 
it also assumes the right of deciding what are not incendiary, and of enforcing 
the transmission of such through the mail. But the senator from Georgia de- 
nies this inference, and treats it as a monstrous absurdity. I had (said Mr. C.) 
considered it so nearly intuitive, that I had not supposed it necessary in the re- 
port to add anything in illustration of its truth ; but as it has been contested by 
the senator, I will add, in illustration, a single remark. 

The senator will not deny that the right of determining what papers are in- 
cendiaiy, and of preventing their circulation, implies that Congress has jurisdic- 
tion over the subject ; that is, of discriminating as to what papers ought or ought 
not to be transmitted by the mail. Nor will he deny that Congress has a right, 
when acting within its acknowledged jurisdiction, to enforce the execution of 
its acts ; and yet the admission of these unquestionable truths admits the con- 
sequence asserted by the report, and so sneered at by the senator. But, lest he 
should controvert so plain a deduction, to cut the matter short, I shall propound 
a plain question to him. He believes that Congress has the right to say what 
papers are incendiary, and to prohibit their circulation. Now, I ask him, if he 
does not also believe that it has the right to enforce the circulation of such as 
it may determine not to be incendiary, even against a law of Georgia that might 
prohibit their circulation? If the senator should answer in the affirmative, I 
then would prove by his admission the truth of the inference for which I con- 
tend, and which he has pronounced to be so absurd : but if he should answer in 
the negative, and deny that Congress can enforce the circulation againt the law 
of the "state, I must tell him he would place himself in the neighbourhood of 
nullification. He would, in fact, go beyond. The denial would assume the 
xieht of nullifying what the senator himself must, with his views, consider a 
constitutional act, when nullification only assumes the right of a state to nullify 
an unconstitutional act. 

But the principle of the message goes still farther. It assumes for Congress 
jurisdiction over the liberty of the press. The framers of the Constitution 
(or, rather, those jealous patriots who refused to consent to its adoption without 
amendments to guard against the abuse of power) have, by the first amended 
article, provided that Congress shall pass no law abridging the liberty of the 



mmammmmmmt^^ 



press, with the view of placing the press beyond the control of congressional 
legislation. But this cautious foresight would prove in vain, if we should con- 
cede to Congress the power which the President assumes of discriminating, in 
reference to character, what publications shall not be transmitted by the mail. 
It would place in the hands of the General Government an instrument more 
potent to control the freedom of the press than the sedition law itself, as is fully 
established in the report. 

Thus regarding the message, the question which presented itself on its first 
perusal was, How to prevent powers so dangerous and unconstitutional from 
being carried into practice 1 To permit the portion of the message relating to 
the subject under consideration to take its regular course, and be referred to the 
Committee on Postoffices and Post-roads, would, I saw, be the most certain 
way to defeat what I had in view. I could not doubt, from the composition of 
the committee, that the report would coincide with the message, and that it 
would be drawn up with all that tact, ingenuity, and address, for which the 
chairman of the committee and the head of the postoffice department are not a 
little distinguished. With this impression, I could not but apprehend that the 
authority of the President, backed by such a report, would go far to rivet in the 
public mind the dangerous principles which it was my design to defeat, and 
which could only be effected by referring the portion of the message in question 
to a select committee, by which the subject might be thoroughly investigated, 
and the result presented in a report. With this view I moved the committee, 
and the bill and report which the senator has attacked so violently are the 
result. 

These are the reasons which governed me in the course I took, and not the 
base and unworthy motive of hostility to General Jackson. I appeal with con- 
fidence to my life to prove that neither hostility nor attachment to any man or 
any party can influence me in the discharge of my public duties ; but were I 
capable of being influenced by such motives, I must tell the senator from Geor- 
gia, that I have not such regard for the opinion of General Jackson as to permit 
his course to influence me in the slightest degree, either for or against any 
measure. 

Having now assigned the motives which governed me, it is with satisfaction 
I add that I have a fair prospect of success. So entirely are the principles of 
the message abandoned, that not a friend of the President has ventured, and I 
hazard nothing in saying, will venture, to assert them practically, whatever they 
may venture to do in argument. They well know now that, since the subject 
has been investigated, a bill to carry into effect the recommendation of the mes- 
sage would receive no support even from the ranks of the administration, de- 
voted as they are to their chieftain. 

The senator from Georgia made other objections to the report besides those 
which I have thus incidentally noticed, to which I do not deem it necessary to 
reply. I am content with his vote, and cheerfully leave the report and his 
speech to abide their fate, with a brief notice of a single objection. 

The senator charges me with what he considers a strange and unaccountable 
contradiction. He says that the freedom of the press and the right of petition 
are both secured by the same article of the Constitution, and both stand on the 
same principle ; yet I, who decidedly opposed the receiving of abolition peti- 
tions, now as decidedly support the liberty of the press. To make out the con- 
tradiction, he assumes that the Constitution places the right of petitioners to 
have their petitions received and the liberty of the press on the same ground. 
I do not deem it necessary to show that in this he is entirely mistaken, and 
that my course on both occasions is perfectly consistent. I take the senator at 
his word, and put to him a question for his decision. If, in opposing the receiv- 
ing of the abolition petitions, and advocating the freedom of the press, I have 
involved myself in a palpable contradiction, how can he escape a similar charge, 



when his course was the reverse of mine on both occasions ? Does he not see 
that, if mine be contradictory, as he supposes, his loo must necessarily be so ? 
But the senator forgets his own argument, of which I must remind him, in order 
to reUeve him from the awkward dilemma in which he has placed himself in 
his eatxerness to fix on me the charge of contradiction. He seems not to recol- 
lect that, in his speech on receiving the abolition petitions, he was compelled 
to abandon the Constitution, and to place the right, not on that instrument, as he 
would now have us believe, but expressly on the ground that the right existed 
anterior to the Constitution, and that we must look for its limits, not to the Con- 
stitution, but to the Magna Charta and the Declaration of Rights. 

Having now concluded what I intended to say in reply to the senator from 
Georgia, I now turn to the objections of the senator from Massachusetts (Mr. 
Davis), which were directed, not against the report, but the bill itself. The 
senator confined his objections to the principles of the bill, which he pronoun- 
ces dangerous and unconstitutional. It is my wish to meet his objections fully, 
fairly, and directly. For this purpose, it will be necessary to have an accurate 
and clear conception of the principles of the bill, as it is impossible, without it, 
to estimate correctly the force either of the objections or the reply. I am thus 
constrained to restate what the principles are, at the hazard of being considered 
somewhat tedious. 

The first and leading principle is, that the subject of slavery is under the 
sole and exclusive control of the states where the institution exists. It belongs 
to them to determine what may endanger its existence, and when and how it 
may be defended. In the exercise of this right, they may prohibit the intro- 
duction or circulation of any paper or publication which may, in their opinion, 
disturb or endanger the institution. Thus far all are agreed. To this extent 
no one has questioned the right of the states ; not even the senator from Mas- 
sachusetts, in his numerous objections to the bill. 

The next and remaining principle of the bill is intimately connected with the 
preceding, and, in fact, springs directly from it. It assumes that it is the duty 
of the General Government, in the exercise of its delegated rights, to respect 
the laws which the slaveholding states may pass in protection of its institutions ; 
or, to express it differently, it is its duty to pass such laws as may be necessa- 
ry to make it obligatory on its officers and agents to abstain from violating the 
laws of the states, and to co-operate, as far as it may consistently be done, irj 
their execution. It is against this principle that the objections of the senator 
from Massachusetts have been directed, and to which I now proceed to reply. 

His first objection is, that the principle is new ; by which I understand him 
to mean, that it never has, heretofore, been acted on by the government. The 
objection presents two questions : Is it true in point of fact ? and if so, what 
weight or force properly belongs to it ? If I am not greatly mistaken, it will 
be found wanting in both particulars ; and that, so far from being new, it has 
been frequently acted on ; and that if it were new, the fact would have little or 
no force. 

If our government had been in operation for centuries, and had been exposed 
to the various changes and trials to which political institutions, in a long-pro- 
tracted existence, are exposed in the vecissitudes of events, the objection, under 
such circumstances, that a principle has never been acted upon, if not decisive, 
would be exceedingly strong ; but when made in reference to our government, 
which has been in operation for less than half a century, and which is so com- 
plex and novel in its structure, it is very feeble. We all know that new prin- 
ciples are daily developing themselves under our system, with the changing 
condition of the country, and, doubtless, will long continue so to do in the new 
and trying scenes through which we are destined to pass. It may, I admit, be 
good reason even with us for caution — for thorough and careful investigation, 
if a principle proposed to be acted upon be new ; for I have long since been 



BiHiiliiiiiiiaHHIiiiiHilliHHHyH^ 



n-augiu uy eAptjiiKiiue, uiu.i wxiaievbr is umneu IS 10 oe receiveu witu caution m 
politics, however plausible. But to go farther in this early stage of our politi- 
C9l existence, would be to deprive ourselves of means that might be indispensa- 
ble to meet future dangers and ditficulties. 

But I take higher grounds in reply to the objection. I deny its truth in point 
of fact, and assert that the principle is not new. The report refers to two in- 
stances in which it has been acted on, and to which, for the present, I shall con- 
jfine myself: one in reference to the quarantine laws of the states, and the oth- 
er more directly connected with the subject of this bill. I propose to make a 
few remarks in reference to both : beginning with the former, with the view of 
showing that the principle in both cases is strictly analogous, or, rather, identi- 
cal with the present. 

The health of the state, like that of the subject of slavery, belongs exclusively 
to the states. It is reserved, and not delegated ; and, of course, each state has 
a right to judge for itself what may endanger the health of its citizens, what 
measures are necessary to prevent it, and when and how such measures are to 
be carried into effect. Among the causes which may endanger the health of a 
state, is the introduction of infectious or contagious diseases through the medi- 
um of commerce. The vessel returning with a rich cargo, in exchan"-e for the 
products of a state, may also come freighted with the seeds of disease and death. 
To guard against this danger, the states at a very early period adopted quaran- 
tine or health laws. These laws, it is obvious, must necessarily interfere with 
the power of Congress to regulate commerce — a power as expressly given as 
that to regulate the mail, and, as far as the present question is concerned, every 
way analogous ; and acting, accordingly, on the principles of this bill. Congress, 
as far back as the year '96, passed an act making it the duty of its civil and mil- 
itary officers to abstain from the violation of the health laws of the states, and 
to co-operate in their execution. This act was modified and repealed by that 
of '99, which has since remained unchanged on the statute-book. 

But the other precedent referred to in the report is still more direct and im- 
portant. That case, like the present, involved the right of the slaveholding 
states to adopt such measures as they may think proper to prevent their domes- 
tic institutions from being disturbed or endangered. They may be endangered, 
not only by introducing and circulating inflammatory publications calculated to 
excite insurrection, but also by the introduction of free people of colour from 
abroad, who may come as emissaries, or with opinions and sentiments hostile 
to the peace and security of those states. The right of a state to pass laws to 
prevent danger from publications is not more clear than the right to pass those 
which may be necessary to guard against this danger. The act of 1803, to 
which the report refers as a precedent, recognises this right to the fullest ex- 
tent. It was intended to sustain the laws of the states against the introduction 
of free people of colour from the West India Islands. The senator from Mas- 
sachusetts, in his remarks upon this precedent, supposes the law to have been 
passed under the power given to Congress by the Constitution to suppress the 
slave-trade. I have turned to the journals in order to ascertain the facts, and 
find that the senator is entirely mistaken. The law was passed on a memorial 
of the citizens of Wilmington, North Carolina, and originated in the following 
facts : '^ 

After the successful rebellion of the slaves of St. Domingo, and the expul- 
sion of the French power, the government of the other French West India 
Islands, in order to guard against the danger from the example of St. Domingo,, 
adopted rigid measures to expel and send out their free blacks. In 1803, a brig, 
having on board five persons of that description who were driven from Guada- 
loupe, arrived at Wilmington. The alarm which this caused gave birth to the 
memorial, and the memorial to the act. 

1 learn from the journals, that the subject was fully investigated and discuss- 



cd in both houses, and that it passed by a very large majority. The first sec- 
tion of the bill prevents the introduction of any negro, mulatto, or mustee, into 
any state, by the laws of which they are prevented from being introduced, ex- 
cept persons of the description from beyond the Cape of Good Hope, or register- 
ed seamen, or natives of the United States. The second section prohibits the 
entry of vessels having such persons on board, and subjects the vessels to sei- 
zure and forfeiture for landing, or attempting to land them contrary to the laws 
of the states ; and the third and last section makes it the duty of the officers of 
the General Government to co-operate with the states in the execution of their 
laws against their introduction. 1 consider this precedent to be one of vast im- 
portance to the slaveholding states. It not only recognises the right of those 
states to pass such laws as they may deem necessary to protect themselves 
against the slave population, and the duty of the General Government to respect 
those laws, but also the very important right, that the states have the authority 
to exclude the introduction of such persons as may be dangerous to their insti- 
tutions : a principle of great extent and importance, and applicable, to other 
states as well as slaveholding, and to other persons as well as blacks, and 
which may hereafter occupy a prominent place in the history of our legislation. 
Having now, I trust, fully and successfully replied to the first objection of the 
senator from Massachusetts, by showing that it is not true in fact, and if it 
were, that it would have had little or no force, I shall now proceed to reply to 
the second objection, which assumes that the principles for which I contend 
would, if admitted, transfer the power over the mail from the General Govern- 
ment to the states. 

If the objection be well founded, it must prove fatal to the bill. The power 
over the mail is, beyond all doubt, a delegated power ; and whatever would di- 
vest the government of this power, and transfer it to the states, would certainly 
be a violation of the Constitution. But would the principle, if acted on, transfer 
the power ? If admitted to its full extent, its only effect would be to make it 
the duty of Congress, in the exercise of its power over the mail, to abstain 
from violating the laws of the state in protection of their slave property, and to 
co-operate, where it could with propriety, in their execution. Its utmost effect 
"would then be a modification, and not a transfer or destruction of the power ; 
and surely the senator will not contend that to modify a right amounts either to 
its transfer or annihilation. He cannot forget that all rights are subject to 
modifications, and all, from the highest to the lowest, are held under one uni- 
versal condition — that their possessors should so use them as not to injure oth- 
ers. Nor can he contend that the power of the General Government over the 
mail is without modification or limitation. He himself admits that it is subject 
to a very important modification, when he concedes that the government cannot 
discriminate in reference to the character of the publications to be transmitted 
by the mail, without violating the first amended article of the Constitution, 
which prohibits Congress from passing laws abridging the liberty of the press. 
Other modifications of the right might be shown to exist, not less clear, nor of 
much less importance. It might be easily shown, for instance, that the power over 
the mail is limited to the transmission of intelligence, and that Congress cannot, 
consistently with the nature and the object of the power, extend it to the ordinary 
objects of transportation without a manifest violation of the Constitution, and the 
assumption of a principle which would give the government control over the 
general transportation of the country, both by land and water. But if it be 
subject to these modifications, without either annihilating or transferring the 
power, why should the modification for which I contend, and which I shall 
show hereafter to rest upon unquestionable principles, have such effect ? That 
it would not, in fact, might be shown, if other proof were necessary, by a refer- 
ence to the practical operation of the principle in the two instances already re- 
ferred to. In both, the principle which I contend for in relation to the mail 



has long been in operation in reference to commerce, witnout the transfer ot 
the power of Congress to regulate commerce to the states, which the senator 
contends would be its effect if applied to the mail. So far otherwise, so little 
has it affected the power of Congress to regulate the commerce of the countr}', 
that few persons, comparatively, are aware that the principle has been recog- 
nised and acted on by the General Government. 

I come next (said .Mr. Calhoun) to what the senator seemed to rely upon as 
his main objection. He stated that the principles asserted in the report were 
contradicted by the bUl, and that the latter undertakes to do indirectly what the 
former asserts that the General Government cannot do at all. 

Admit (said Mr. C.) the objection to be true in fact, and what does it prove, 
but that the author of the report is a bad logician, and that there is error some- 
where, but without proving that it is in the bill, and that it ought, therefore, to 
be rejected, as the senator contends. If there be error, it may be in the report 
instead of the bill, and till the senator can fix it on the latter, he cannot avail 
himself of the objection. But does the contradiction which he alleges exist ! 
Let us turti to the principles asserted in the report, and compare them with 
those of the bill, in order to determine this point. 

What, then, are the principles which the report maintains ? It asserts that 
Congress has no right to determine what papers are incendiar}-, and calculated 
to excite insurrection, and, as such, to prohibit their circulation, but, on the con- 
trary, that it belongs to the states to determine on the character and tendency 
of such publications, and to adopt such measures as they may think proper to 
prevent their introduction or circulation. Does the bill deny any of these prin- 
ciples ? Does it not assume them all ? Is it not drawn up on the supposition 
that the General Government have none of the powers denied by the report, and 
that the states possess all for which it contends ? How, then, can it be said 
that the bill contradicts the report ! But the difficulty, it seems, is, that the 
General Government would do through the states, under the pro^"isions of the 
bill, what the report denies that it can do directly ; and this, according to the 
senator from Georgia, is so manifest and palpable a contradiction, that he can 
find no explanation for my conduct but an inveterate hostility to General Jack- 
son, which he is pleased to attribute to me. 

I have, I trust, successfully repelled already the imputation, and it now re- 
mains to show that the gross and palpable errors which the senator perceives 
exist only in his own imagination, and that, instead of the cause he supposes, it 
orit^inates, on his part, in a dangerous and fundamental misconception of the na- 
ture of our political system — particularly of the relation between the states and 
the General Government. "Were the states the agents of the General Govern- 
ment, as the objection clearly presupposes, then what he says would be true, 
and the government, in recognising the law of the states, would adopt the acts 
of its agents. But the fact is far otherwise. The General Governjneut and 
the governments of the states are distinct and independent departments in our 
complex political system. The states, in passing laws in protection of their 
domestic institutions, act in a sphere as independent as the General Govern- 
ment passing laws in regulation of the mail ; and the latter, in abstaining from 
%-iolatinor the laws of the states, as pro\'ided for in the bill, so far from making 
the states its agents, but recognises the right of the states, and performs on its 
part a conesponding duty. Rights and duties are in their nature reciprocal. 
The existence of one presupposes that of the other, and the performance of the 
duty, so far from denying the right, distinctly recognises its existence. The 
senator, for example, next to me (Judge White) has the unquestionable right 
to the occupation of his chair, and I am, of course, in duty bound to abstain 
from violating that right ; but would it not be absurd to say, that in performing 
that duty by abstaining from violating his right, I assume the right of occupa- 
tion ? Again : suppose the verv quiet and peaceable senator from Maine (Six. 

Ee 



Shepley), who is his next neighbour on the other side, should undertake to oust 
the senator from Tennessee, would it not be a strange doctrine to contend that, 
if I were to co-operate with the senator from Tennessee in maintaining pos- 
session of his chair, it would be an assumption on my part of a right to the 
chair ? And yet this is the identical principle which the senator from Georgia 
assumed, in charging a manifest and palpable contradiction between the bill and 
the report. 

But to proceed with the objections of the senator from Massachusetts. He 
asserts, and asserts truly, that rights and duties are reciprocal ; and that, if it 
be the duty of the General Government to respect the laws of the state, it is in 
like manner the duty of the states to respect those of the General Government. 
The practice of both have been in conformity to the principle. I have already 
cited instances of the General Government respecting the laws of the states, 
and many might be shown of the states respecting those of the General Govern- 
ment. 

But the senator from Massachusetts affirms that the laws of the General Gov- 
ernment regulating the mail, and those of the government of the states, prohibit- 
ing the introduction and circulation of incendiary publications, may come into 
conflict, and that, in such event, the latter must yield to the former ; and he rests 
this assertion on the ground that the power of the General Government is ex- 
pressly delegated by the Constitution. I regard the argument as wholly incon- 
clusive. Why should the mere fact that a power is expressly delegated give 
it paramount control over the reserved powers ? What possible superiority can 
the mere fact of delegation give, uidess, indeed, it be supposed to render the 
right more clear, and, of course, less questionable ? Now I deny that it has, in 
this instance, any such superiority. Though the power of the General Govern- 
ment over the mail is delegated, it is not more clear and unquestionable than 
the rights of the states over the subject of slavery — a right which neither has, 
nor can be denied. In fact, I might take higher grounds, if higher grounds 
were possible, by showing that the rights of the states are as expressly reserved 
as those of the General Government are delegated ; for, in order to place the 
reserved rights beyond controversy, the tenth amended article of the Constitu- 
tion expressly provides, that all powers not delegated to the United States, nor 
prohibited to the states, are reserved to the states or the people ; and, as the 
subject of slavery is acknowledged by all not to be delegated, it may be fairly 
considered as expressly reserved under this provision of the Constitution. 

But, while I deny his conclusion, I agree with the senator that the laws of 
the states and General Government may come into conflict, and that, if they do, 
one or the other must yield ; the question is. Which ought to yield ? The ques- 
tion is one of great importance. It involves the whole merit of the controversy, 
and I must entreat the Senate to give me an attentive hearing while I state my 
views in relation to it. 

In order to determine satisfactorily which ought to yield, it becomes neces- 
sary to have a clear and full understanding of the point of difliculty ; and for 
this purpose it is necessary to make a few preliminary remarks. 

Properly considered, the reserved and delegated powers can never come into 
conflict. The fact that a power is delegated is conclusive that it is not re- 
served ; and that it is not delegated, that it is reserved, unless, indeed, it be pro- 
hibited to the states. There is but a single exception : the case of powers of 
such nature that they be exercised concurringly by the state and General Gov- 
ernment — such as the power of laying taxes, which, though delegated, may also 
be exercised by the states. In illustration of the truth of the position I have 
laid down, I might refer to the case now under consideration. Regarded in 
the abstract, there is not the slightest conflict between the power delegated by 
the Constitution to the General Government to establish postofiices and post- 
roads, and that reserved to the states over the subject of slavery. How, then, 



g_|||_|_»»|»«||||»^^ 



can there be conflict ? It occurs, not between the powers themselves, but the 
laws respectively passed to carry them into eflect. The laws of the state, pro- 
hibiting the introduction or circulation of incendiary publications, may come in 
conflict with the laws of the General Government in relation to the mail ; and 
the question to be determined is. Which, in the event, ought to give way ? 

I will not pretend to enter into a full and systematic investigation of this high- 
ly important question, which involves, as I have said, the merits of the whole 
controversy. I do not deem it necessary. I propose to lay down a single 
principle, which I hold to be not only unquestionable, but decisive of the ques- 
tion as far as the present controversy is concerned. My position is, that, in de- 
ciding which ought to yield, regard must be had to the nature and magnitude 
of the powers to which the laws respectively relate. The low must yield to 
the high ; the convenient to the necessary ; mere accommodation to safety and 
security. This is the universal principle which governs in all analogous cases, 
both in our social and political relations. Wherever the means of enjoying or 
securing rights come into conflict (rights themselves never can), this universal 
and fundamental principle is the one which, by the consent of mankind, gov- 
erns in all such cases. Apply it to the case under consideration, and need I 
ask which ought to yield ? Will any rational being say that the laws of eleven 
states of this Union, which are necessary to their peace, security, and very ex- 
istence, ought to yield to the laws of the General Government regulating the 
postoffice, which, at best, is a mere accommodation and convenience, and this, 
when this government was formed by the states mainly with a view to secure 
more perfectly their peace and safety ? But one answer can be given. All 
must feel that it would be improper for the laws of the states, in such case, to 
yield to those of the General Government, and, of course, that the latter ought 
to yield to the former. When I say ought, I do not mean on the principle of 
concession. I take higher grounds. I mean under the obligation of the Consti- 
tution itself. That instrument does not leave this important question to be de- 
cided by mere inference. It contains an express provision which is decisive 
of the question. I refer to the provision which invests Congress with the pow- 
er of passing laws to carry into effect the granted powers, and which express- 
ly restricts its power to laws necessary and proper to carry into ellect the dele- 
gated powers. We here have the limitation on the power of passing laws. 
They must be necessary and proper. I pass the term necessary with the sin- 
gle remark, that, whatever may be its true and accurate meaning, it clearly in- 
dicates that this important power was granted with the intention of being spa- 
ringly used by the framers of the Constitution. I come to the term proper ; 
and I boldly assert, if it has any meaning at all — if it can be said of any law 
whatever that it is not proper, and that, as such. Congress has no constitution- 
al right to pass it, surely it may be said of that which would abrogate, in fact, 
the laws of nearly half of the states of the Union, and which are conceded to 
be necessary for their peace and safety. If it be proper for Congress to pass 
such a law, what law could possibly be improper ? We have heard much, of 
late, of state rights. All parties profess to respect them, as essential to the 
preservation of our liberty. I do not except the members of the old Federal 
party — that honest, high-minded, patriotic party, though mistaken as to the 
principles and tendency of the government. But what, let me ask, would be 
the value of state rights, if the laws of Congress, in such cases, ought not to 
yield to the states ? If they must be considered paramount, whenever they 
come into conflict with those of the states, without regard to their safety, what 
possible value can be attached to the rights of the states, and how perfectly un- 
meaning their reserved powers ? Surrender the principle, and there is not one 
of the reserved powers which may not be annulled by Congress under the pre- 
text of passing laws to carry into effect the delegated powers. 

The senator from Massachusetts next objects, that, if the principles of the biU 



be admitted, they may be extended to morals and religion. I do not feel bound 
to admit or deny the truth of this assertion ; but if the senator will show me a 
case in which a state has passed laws under its unquestionable reserved powers, 
in protection of its morality or religion, I would hold it to be the duty of the 
General Government to respect the laws of the states, in conformity to the prin- 
ciples which I maintain. 

His next objection is, that the bill is a manifest violation of the liberty of the 
press. He has not thought proper to specify w^herein the violation consists. 
Does he mean to say that the laws of the states prohibiting the introduction and 
circulation of papers calculated to excite insurrection, are in violation of the 
liberty of the press ? Does he mean that the slaveholding states have no right 
to pass such laws ? I cannot suppose such to be his meaning ; for I understood 
him, throughout his remarks, to admit the right of the states — a right which 
they have always exercised, without restriction or limitation, before and since 
the adoption of the Constitution, without ever having been questioned. But 
if this be not his meaning, he must mean that this bill, in making it the duty 
of the officers and agents of the government to respect the laws of the states, 
violates the liberty of the press, and thus involves the old misconception that the 
states are the agents of this government, which pervades the whole argument 
of the senator, and to which I have already replied. 

The senator next objects that the bill makes it penal on deputy postmasters 
to receive the papers and publications which it embraces. I must say, that my 
friend from IMassachusetts (for such I consider him, though we differ in politics) 
has not expressed himself with his usual accuracy on the present occasion. If 
he will turn to the provisions of the bill, he will find that the penahy attaches 
only in cases of knowingly receiving and delivering out the papers and publi- 
cations in question. All the consequences which the senator drew from the 
view which he took of the bill of course fall, and relieves me from the necessity 
of showingthat the deputy postmasters will not be compelled to resort to the 
espionage into letters and packages, in order to exonerate themselves from the 
penalty of the bill, which he supposed. 

The last objection of the senator is, that, under the provision of the bill, every- 
thing touching on the subject of slavery will be prohibited from passing through 
the mail. I again must repeat, that the senator has not expressed himself with 
sufBcient accuracy. The provisions of the bill are limited to the transmission 
of such papers in reference to slavery as are prohibited by the laws of the slave- 
holding states — that is, by eleven states of the Union — leaving the circulation 
through the mail without restriction or qualification as to all other papers, and 
wholly so as to the remaining thirteen states. But the senator seems to think 
that even this restriction, as limited as it is, w-ould be a very great inconveni- 
ence. It may, indeed, prove so to the lawless Abolitionists, who, without regard 
to the obligations of the Constitution, are attempting to scatter their firebrands 
throughout the Union. But is their convenience the only thing to be taken into 
the estimate ? Are the peace, security, and safety of the slaveholding states 
nothing ? or are these to be sacrificed for the accommodation of the Abolition- 
ists ? 

I have now replied directly, fully, and, I trust, successfully to the objections 
to the bill, and shall close what I intended to say by a few general and brief 
remarks. 

We have arrived at a new and important point in reference to the abolition 
question. It is no longer in the hands of quiet and peaceful, but I cannot add, 
harmless Quakers. It is now under the control of ferocious zealots, blinded by 
fanaticism, and, in pursuit of their object, regardless of the obligations of religion 
or morality. They are organized throughout every section of the non-slave- 
holdintr states ; they have the disposition of almost unlimited funds, and are in 
possession of a powerful press, which, for the first time, is enlisted in the cause 



marngmiMMaiamMa^mBmBum 



of abolition, and turned against tlie domestic institutions, a"nd the peace and se- 
curity of tlie South. To guard against the danger in this new and more men- 
acing form, tlie slaveholding states will be compelled to revise their laws 
against the introduction and circulation of publications calculated to disturb 
their peace and endanger their security, and to render them far more full and 
efficient than they have heretofore been. In this new state of things, the proba- 
ble conflict between the laws which those states may think proper to adopt, and 
those of the General Government regulating the mail, becomes far more impor- 
tant than in any former state of the controversy ; and Congress is now called 
upon to say what part it will take in reference to this deeply-interesting sub- 
ject. We of the slaveholding states ask nothing of the government but that it 
should abstain from violating laws passed within our acknowledged constitu- 
tional competency, and conceded to be essential to our peace and security. I 
am anxious to see how this question will be decided. I am desirous that my 
constituents should know what they have to expect, either from this govern- 
ment or from the non-slaveholding states. Much that I have said and done 
during the session has been with the view of affording them correct information 
on this point, in order that they might know to what extent they might rely upon 
others, and how far they must depend on themselves. 

Thus far (I say it with regret) our just hopes have not been realized. The 
Legislatures of the South, backed by the voice of their constituents, expressed 
through innumerable meetings, have called upon the non-slaveholding states to 
repress the movements made within the jurisdiction of those states against their 
peace and security. Not a step has been taken ; not a law has been passed, or 
even proposed ; and I venture to assert that none will be : not but what there is 
a favourable disposition towards us in the North, but I clearly see the state of 
political parties there presents insuperable impediments to any legislation on the 
subject. I rest my opinion on the fact that the non-slaveholding states, from the 
elements of their population, are, and will continue to be, divided and distracted 
by parties of nearly equal strength ; and that each will always be ready to seize 
on every movement of the other which may give them the superiority, without 
much regard to consequences as affecting their own states, and much less re- 
mote and distant sections. 

Nor have w-e been less disappointed as to the proceedings of Congress. Be- 
lieving that the General Government has no right or authority over the subject 
of slavery, we had just grounds to hope Congress would refuse all jurisdiction 
in reference to it, in whatever form it might be presented. The very opposite 
course has been pursued. Abolition petitions have not only been received in 
both houses, but received on the most obnoxious and dangerous of all grounds— 
that we are hound to receive them; that is, to take jurisdiction of the question of 
slavery whenever the Abolitionists may think proper to petition for its abolition, 
either here or in the states. 

Thus far, then, we of the slaveholding states have been grievously disappoint- 
ed. One question still remains to be decided — that presented by this bill. To 
refuse to pass this bill would be virtually to co-operate with the Abolitionists — 
would be to make the officers and agents of the postoffice department in efTect 
their agents and abettors in the circulation of their incendiary publications in 
violation of the laws of the states. It is your unquestionable duty, as I have 
demonstrably proved, to abstain from their violation ; and, by refusing or neglect- 
ing to discharge that duty, you would clearly enlist in the existing controversy, 
on the side of the Abolitionists, against the Southern States. Should such be 
your decision by refusing to pass this bill, I shall say to the people of the 
South, look to yourselves — you have nothing to hope from others. But I must 
tell the Senate, be your decision what it may, the South will never abandon the 
principles of this bill. If you refuse co-operation with our laws, and conflict 
should ensue between your and our law, the Southern States will never yield 



to the superiority of yours. We have a remedy in our hands, which, in such 
event, we shall not fail to apply. We have high authority for asserting, that in 
such cases " state interposition is the rightful remedy" — a doctrine first an- 
nounced by Jefferson — adopted by the patriotic and Republican State of Ken- 
tucky, by a solemn resolution in '98, and finally carried out into successful prac- 
tice on a recent occasion, ever to be remembered by the gallant state which I, 
in part, have the honour to represent. In this well-tested and efficient remedy, 
sustained by the principles developed in the report, and asserted in this bill, the 
slaveholding states have an ample protection. Let it be fixed — let it be riveted 
in every Southern mind, that the laws of the slaveholding states for the protec- 
tion of their domestic institutions are paramount to the laws of the General 
Government in regulation of commerce and the mail, and that the latter must 
yield to the former in the event of conflict ; and that,, if the government should 
refuse to yield, the states have a right to interpose, and we are safe. With 
these principles, nothing but concert would be wanting to bid defiance to the 
movements of the Abolitionists, whether at home or abroad ; and to place our 
domestic institutions, and, with them, our security and peace, under our own pro- 
tection, and beyond the reach of danger. 



XIV. 

SPEECH ON THE RECEPTION OF ABOLITION PETITIONS, FEBRUARY, 1837. 

If the time of the Senate permitted, I should feel it to be my duty to 
call for the reading of the mass of petitions on the table, in order that 
we might know what language they hold towards the slaveholding states 
and their institutions; but as it will not, I have selected indiscriminately 
from the pile, two: one from those in manuscript, and the other from the 
printed ; and, without knowing their contents, will call for ttte reading of 
them, so that we may judge, by them, of the character of the whole. 

(Here the secretary, on the call of Mr. Calhoun, read the two petitions.) 

Such, resumed Mr. C, is the language held towards us and ours; the 
peculiar institutions of the South, that on the maintenance of which the 
very existence of the slaveholding states depends, is pronounced to be 
sinful and odious, in the sight of God and man ; and this with a systematic 
design of rendering us hateful in the eyes of the world, with a view to a 
general crusade against us and our institutions. This, too, in the legis- 
lative halls of the Union ; created by these confederated states for the 
better protection of their peace, their safety, and their respective insti- 
tutions ; and yet we, the representatives of twelve of these sovereign states 
against whom this deadly war is waged, are expected to sit here in silence, 
hearing ourselves and cAir constituents day after day denounced, without 
uttering a word ; if we but open our lips, the charge of agitation is re- 
sounded on all sides, and we are held up as seeking to aggravate the evil 
which we resist. Every reflecting mind must see in all this a state of 
things deeply and dangerously diseased. 

I do not belong, said Mr. C, to the school w^hich holds that aggression 
is to be met by concession. Mine is the opposite creed, which teaches 
that encroachments must be met at the beginning, and that those who act 
on the opposite principle are prepared to become slaves. In this case, in 
particular, I hold concession or compromise to be fatal. If we concede 
an inch, concession would follow concession — compromise would follow 
compromise, until our ranks would be so broken that effectual resistance 
would be impossible. We must meet the enemy on the frontier, with a 



V 



....,,-.>.>,^»^,>««««^«»»i«.T,»,n^..Miiou...m.»»wimwn 



sent to receive,these insulting petitions, and the next demand will be that 
they be referred to a committee, in order that they may be deliberated 
and acted upon. At the last session, we were modestly asked to receive 
them simply to lay them on the table, without any view of ulterior action. 
I then told the senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. Buchanan), who strongly 
urged that course in the Senate, that it was a position that could not be 
maintained ; as the argument in favour of acting on the petitions, if we 
were bound to receive, could not be resisted. I then said that the next 
step would be to refer the petition to a committee, and I already see in- 
dications that such is now the intention. If we yield, that will be followed 
by another, and we would thus proceed, step by step, to the final consum- 
mation of the object of these petitions. We are now told that the most 
effectual mode of arresting the progress of abolition is to reason it down 5 
and with this view, it is urged that the petitions ought to be referred to a 
committee. That is the very ground which was taken at the last session 
in the other house ; but, instead of arresting its progress, it has since ad- 
vanced more rapidly than ever. The most unquestionable right may be 
rendered doubtful, if once admitted to be a subject of controversy, and 
that would be the case in the present instance. The subject is beyond 
the jurisdiction of Congress — they have no right to touch it in any shape 
or form, or to make it the subject of deliberation or discussion. 

In opposition to this view, it is urged that Congress is bound by the 
Constitution to receive petitions in every case and on every subject, 
whether within its constitutional competency or not. I hold the doctrine 
to be absurd, and do solemnly believe that it would be as easy to prove 
that it has the right to abolish slavery, as that it is bound to receive peti- 
tions for that purpose. The very existence of the rule that requires a 
question to be put on the reception of petitions, is conclusive to show 
that there isAp such obligation. It has been a standing rule from the 
commencem0t of the goveriyjpent, and clearly shows the sense of those 
who formed the Constitution on this point. The question on the recep- 
tion would be absurd, if, as is contended, we are bound to receive ; but 
I do not intend to argue the question ; I discussed it fully at the last ses- 
sion, and the arguments then advanced neither have nor can be answered. 
As widely as this incendiary spirit has spread, it has not yet infected 
this body, or the great mass of the intelligent and business portion 
of the North ; but unless it be speedily stopped, it will spread and work 
upward till it brings the two great sections of the Union into deadly con- 
flict. This is not a new impression with me. Several years since, in a 
discussion with one of the senators from Massachusetts (Mr. Webster), 
before this fell spirit had showed itself, I then predicted that the doctrine 
of the proclamation and the force bill — that this government had a right, 
in the last resort, to determine the extent of its own powers, and enforce 
it at the point of the bayonet, which was so warmly maintained by that 
senator — would at no distant day arouse the dormant spirit of Aboli- 
tionism ; I told him that the doctrine was tantamount to the assump- 
tion of unlimited power on the part of the government, and that such 
would be the impression on the public mind in a large portion of the 
Union. The consequence would be inevitable — a large portion of the 
Northern States believed slavery to be a sin, and would believe it to be 
an obligation of conscience to abolish it, if they should feel themselves 
in any degree responsible for its continuance, and that his doctrine would 
necessarily lead to the belief of such responsibility. I then predicted 
that it would commence, as it has, with this fanatical portion of society ; 
and that they would begin their operation on the ignorant, the weak, the 



young, and the thoughtless, and would gradually extend upward til] they 
became strong enough to obtain political control, when he, and others 
holding the highest stations in society, would, however reluctant, be 
compelled to yield to their doctrine, or be driven into obscurity. But 
four years have since elapsed, and all this is already in a course of regu- 
lar fulfilment. 

Standing at the point of time at which we have now arrived, it will not 
be more difficult to trace the course of future events now than it was then. 
Those who imagine that the spirit now abroad in the North will die away 
of itself without a shock or convulsion, have formed a very inadequate 
conception of its real character ; it will continue to rise and spread, un- 
less prompt and efficient measures to stay its progress be adopted. Al- 
ready it has taken possession of the pulpit, of the schools, and, to a con- 
siderable extent, of the press j those great instruments by which the mind 
of the rising generation will be formed. 

However sound the great body of the non-slaveholding states are at 
present, in the course of a few years thej^ will be succeeded by those who 
will have been taught to hate the people and institutions of nearly one 
half of this Union, with a hatred more deadlj- than one hostile nation 
ever entertained towards another. It is easy to see the end. By the 
necessary course of events, if left to themselves, we must become, finally, 
two people. It is impossible, under the deadly hatred which must spring 
up between the two great sections, if the present causes are permitted to 
operate unchecked, that we should continue under the same political sys- 
tem. The conflicting elements would burst the Union asunder, as power- 
ful as are the links which hold it together. Abolition and the Union can- 
not coexist. As the friend of the Union, I openly proclaim it, and the 
sooner it is known the better. The former may now be controlled, but 
in a short time it will be beyond the power of man to arrest the course 
of events. We of the South will not, cannot surrender our institutions. 
To maintain the existing relations betweeik the two races Bhabiting that 
section of the Union is indispensable to the peace and happiness of both. 
It cannot be subverted without drenching the country in blood, and extir- 
pating one or the other of the races. Be it good or bad, it has grown up 
with our society and institutions, and is so interwoven with them that to 
destroy it would be to destroy us as a people. But let me not be under- 
stood as admitting, even by implication, that the existing relations be- 
tween the two races, in the slaveholding states, is an evil : far otherwise ', 
I hold it to be a good, as it has thus far proved itself to be, to both, and 
"will continue to prove so, if not disturbed by the fell spirit of abolition. 
I appeal to facts. Never before has the black race of Central Africa, from 
the dawn of history to the present day, attained a condition so civilized 
and so improved, not only physically, but morally and intellectually. It 
came among us in a low, degraded, and savage condition, and, in the 
course of a few generations, it has grown up under the fostering care of 
our institutions, as reviled as they have been, to its present comparative 
civilized condition. This, with the rapid increase of numbers, is conclu- 
sive proof of the general happiness of the race, in spite of all the exag- 
gerated tales to the contrary. 

In the mean time, the white or European race has not degenerated. It 
has kept pace with its brethren in other sections of the Union where sla- 
very does not exist. It is odious to make comparison ; but I appeal to 
all sides whether the South is not equal in virtue, intelligence, patriotism, 
courage, disinterestedness, and all the high qualities which adorn our na- 
ture. I ask whether we have not contributed our full share of talents 
and political wisdom in forming and sustaining this political fabric j and 



aaammttMmmmaMiiiaMaaaiBiai 



whether we have not constantly inclined most strongly to the side of lib- 
erty, and been the first to see, and first to resist, the encroachments of 
power. In one thing only are we inferior — the arts of gain; we acknowl- 
edo-e that we are less wealthy than the Northern section of this Union, 
but I trace this mainly to the fiscal action of this government, which has 
extracted much from, and spent little among us. Had it been the reverse — 
if the exaction had been from the other section, and the expenditure with 

•us this point of superiority would not be against us now, as it was not at 

the formation of this government. 

But I take higher ground. I hold that, in the present state of civiliza- 
tion where two races of different origin, and distinguished by colour, 
and other physical diflerences, as well as intellectual, are brought to- 
gether, the relation now existing in the slaveholding states between the two 
is, instead of an evil, a good — a positive good. I feel myself called upon 
to speak freely upon the subject, where the honour and interests of those 
I represent are involved. I hold, then, that there never has yet existed a 
wealthy and civilized society in which one portion of the community did 
not, in point of fact, live on the labour of the other. Broad and general 
as is this assertion, it is fully borne out by history. This is not the 
proper occasion, but, if it were, it would not be difficult to trace the va- 
rious devices by which the wealth of all civilized communities has been 
so unequally divided, and to show by what means so small a share has 
been allotted to those by whose labour it was produced, and so large a 
share given to the non-producing class. The devices are almost innu- 
merable, from th'^ brute force and gross superstition of ancient times, to 
the subtle and artful fiscal contrivances of modern. I might well chal- 
lenge a comparison between them and the more direct, simple, and patri- 
archal mode by which the labour o*" the African race is among us com- 
manded by the European. I may say, with truth, that in few countries 
so much is left to the share of the labourer, and so little exacted from 
him, or where there is more kind attention to him in sickness or infirmi- 
ties of ao-e. Compare his condition with the tenants of the poor-houses 
in the most civilized portions of Europe — look at the sick, and the old 
and infirm slave, on one hand, in the midst of his family and friends, un- 
der the kind superintending care of his master and mistress, and compare 
it with the forlorn and wretched condition of the pauper in the poor- 
house. But I will not dwell on this aspect of the question: I turn to the 
political ; and here I fearlessly assert, that the existing relation between 
the two races in the South, against which these blind fanatics are waging 
war, forms the most solid and durable foundation on which to rear free 
and stable political institutions. It is useless to disguise the fact. There 
is, and*alvvays has been, in an advanced stage of wealth and civilization, 
a conflict between labour and capital. The condition of society in the 
South exempts us from the disorders and dangers resulting from this con- 
flict ; and which explains why it is that the political condition of the 
slaveholding states has been so much more stable and quiet than those of 
the North. The advantages of the former, in this respect, will become 
more and more manifest, if left undisturbed by interference from without, 
as the country advances in wealth and numbers. We have, in fact, but 
just entered that condition of society where the strength and durability of 
our political institutions are to be tested ; and I venture nothing in pre- 
dicting that the experience of the next generation will fully test how 
vastly more favourable our condition of society is to that of other sec- 
tions for free and stable institutions, provided we are not disturbed by 
the interference of others, or shall have sufficient intelligence and spirit 
to resist promptly and successfully such interference. It rests with our- 

F F 



selves to meet and repel them. I look not for aid to this government, of 
to the other states ; not but there are kind feelings towards us on the 
part of the o-reat body of the non-slaveholding states ; but, as kind as their 
feelino-s may be, we may rest assured that no political party in those 
states'^vill risk their ascendency for our safety. If we do not defend our- 
selves none will defend us ; if we yield, we will be more and more pressed 
as we'recede; and, if we submit, we will be trampled under foot. Be 
assured that emancipation itself would not satisfy these fanatics : that 
gained, the next step would be to raise the negroes to a social and polit- 
ical equality with the whites ; and, that being effected, we would soon find 
the present condition of the two races reversed. They, and their Northern 
allies, would be the masters, and we the slaves ; the condition of the 
white race in the British West India Islands, as bad as it is, would be hap- 
piness to ours ; there the mother-country is interested in sustaining the 
supremacy of the European race. It is true that the authority of the 
former master is destroyed, but the African will there still be a slave, 
not to individuals, but to the community — forced to labour, not by the au- 
thority of the overseer, but by the bayonet of the soldiery and the rod of 
the civil magistrate. 

Surrounded, as the slaveholding states are, with such imminent perils, I 
rejoice to think that our means of defence are ample, if we shall prove 
to have the intelligence and spirit to see and apply them before it is too 
late. All we want is concert, to lay aside all party differences, and unite 
with zeal and energy in repelling approaching dangers. Let there be 
concert of action, and we shall find ample means of security without re- 
sortino- to secession or disunion. I speak with full knowledge and a thor- 
ough examination of the subject, and, for one, see my way clearly. One 
thincr alarms me — the eager pursuit of gain which overspreads the land, 
and which absorbs every faculty of the mind and every feeling of the 
heart. Of all passions, avarice is the most blind and compromising — the 
last to see, and the first to yield to danger. I dare not hope that anything 
I can say will arouse the South to a due sense of danger ; I fear it is be- 
yond the power of mortal voice to awaken it in time from the fatal secu- 
rity into which it has fallen. 



XV. 

SPEECH ON THE PUBLIC DEPOSITES, MAY 28, 1836. 

The Senate then proceeded to the consideration of the bill to regtriate the 
deposites of the pubUc money. 

After some words from Mr. Wright in explanation, Mr. Calhoun said : This 
bill, which the senator from New-York proposes to strike out in order to sub- 
stitute his amendment, is no stranger to this body. It was reported at the last 
session by the Select Committee on Executive Patronage, and passed the Sen- 
ate after a full and deliberate investigation, by a mixed vote of all parties, of 
twenty to twelve. As strong as is this presumptive evidence in its favour, I 
would, notwithstanding, readily surrender the bill and adopt the amendment of 
the senator from New-York, if I did not sincerely believe that it is liable to 
strong and decisive objections. I seek no lead on this important subject ; my 
sole aim is to aid in applying a remedy to what I honestly believe to be a deep 
and dangerous disease of the body politic : and I stand prepared to co-operate 
with any one, be he of what party he may, who may propose a remedy, provi- 
ded it shall promise to be safe and efficient. I, in particular, am desirous of co- 



LaaMBm„m^M»m.»„.ww«.,^-»iu»uuu»»,. 



operating with the senator from New-York, not only because I desire the aid 
of his distinguished talents, but, still more, of his decisive influence with the 
powerful party of which he is so distinguished a member, and which now, for 
good or evil, holds the destiny of the country in its hands. It was in this spirit 
that I examined the amendment proposed by the senator ; and I regret to say, 
after a full investigation, I cannot acquiesce in it, as I feel a deep conviction 
that it will be neither safe nor efficient. So far from being substantially the 
same as the bill, as stated by the senator, I cannot but regard it as essentially 
different, both as to objects and means. The objects of the bill are, first, to se- 
cure the public interest as far as it is connected with the deposites ; and, next, 
to protect the banks in which they are made against the inflaence and control 
of the executive branch of this government, with the view both to their and 
the public interest. Compared with the bill, in respect to both, the proposed 
amendment will be found to favour the banks against the people, and the exec- 
utive against the banks. I do not desire the Senate to form their opinion on 
my authority. I wish them to examine for themselves ; and, in order to aid 
them in the examination, I shall now proceed to state, and briefly illustrate, the 
several points of diff"erence between the bill and the proposed amendment, ta- 
king them in the order in which they stand in the bill. 

The first section of the bill provides that the banks shall pay at the rate of 
two per cent, per annum on the deposites for the use of the public money. This 
provision is entirely omitted in the amendment, which proposes to give to the 
banks the use of the money without interest. That the banks ought to pay 
something for the use of the public money, all must agree, whatever diver- 
sity of opinion there may be as to the amount. According to the last return of 
the treasury department, there was, on the first of this month, $45,000,000 of 
public money in the thirty-six depository banks, which they are at liberty to 
use as their own for discount or business, till drawn out for disbursements, au 
event that may not happen for years. In a word, this vast amount is so much 
additional banking capital, giving the same, or nearly the same, profit to those 
institutions as their permanent chartered capital, without rendering any other 
service to the public than paying away, from time to time, the portion that might 
be required for the service of the government. Assuming that the banks real- 
ize a profit of six per cent, on these deposites (it cannot be estimated at less), 
it would give, on the present amount, nearly three millions of dollars per annum, 
and on the probable average public deposites of the year, upward of two mill- 
ions of dollars ; which enormous profit is derived from the public by compara- 
tively few individuals, without any return or charge, except the inconsiderable 
service of paying out the draughts of the treasury when presented. But it is due 
to the senator to acknowledge that his amendment is predicated on the suppo- 
sition that some disposition must be made of the surplus revenue, which would 
leave in the banks a sum not greater than would be requisite to meet the cur- 
rent expenditure : a supposition which necessarily must affect, very materially 
affect, the decision of the question of the amount of compensation the banks 
ought to make to the public for the use of its funds ; but, let the disposition be 
what it may, the omission in the amendment of any compensation whatever is, 
in my opinion, wholly indefensible. 

The next point of difference relates to transfer warrants. The bill prohibits 
the use of transfer warrants, except with a view to disbursement, while the 
amendment leaves them, without regulation, under the sole control of the treas- 
ury department. To understand the importance of this difference, it must be 
borne in mind that the transfer warrants are the lever by which the whole bank- 
ing operations of the country may be controlled through the deposites. By them 
the public money may be transferred from one bank to another, or from one state 
or section of the country to another state or section ; and thus one bank may be 
elevated and another depressed, and a redundant currency created in one state 



or section, and a deficient in another; and, through such redundancy or deii- 
ciency, all the moneyed engagements and business transactions of the whole 
community may be made dependant on the will of one man. With the present 
enormous surplus, it is difficult to assign limits to the extent of this power. The 
secretar}% or the irresponsible agent unknown to the laws, who, rumour says, 
has the direction of this immense power (we are permitted to have no certain 
information), may raise and depress stocks and property of all descriptions at 
his pleasure, by withdrawing from one place and transferring to another, to the 
unlimited gain of those who are in the secret, and certain ruin of those who are 
not. vSuch a field of speculation has never before been opened in any country ; 
a field so great, that the Rothschilds themselves might be tempted to enter it 
■with their immense funds. Nor is the control which it would give over the pol- 
itics of the country much less unlimited. To the same extent that it may be 
used to affect the interests and the fortunes of individuals, to the like extent it 
may be employed as an instrument of political influence and control. I do not 
intend to assert that it has or will be so employed ; it is not essential at pres- 
ent to inquire how it has or will be used. It is sufficient for my purpose to 
show, as I trust I have satisfactorily, that it may be so employed. To guard 
against the abuse of so dangerous a power, the provision was inserted in the 
bill to prohibit the use of transfer warrants, except, as stated, for the purpose of 
disbursement ; the omission of which provision in the amendment is a fatal ob- 
jection to it of itself, were there no other. But it is far from standing alone ; 
the next point of difference will be found to be not less striking and fatal. 

The professed object of both the bill and the amendment is to place the safe- 
keeping of the public moneys under the regulation and control of law, instead 
of being left, as it now is, at the discretion of the executive. However strange 
it may seem, the fact is, nevertheless, so, that the amendment entirely fails to 
effect the object which it is its professed object to accomj^lish. In order that 
it may be distinctly seen that what I state is the case, it will be necessary to 
view^ the provisions of the bill and the amendment in reference to the deposite 
separately, as they relate to the banks in which the public funds are now de- 
posited, and those which may hereafter be selected to receive them. 

The bill commences with the former, Avhich it adopts as banks of deposite^ 
and prescribes the regulations and conditions on the observance of which they 
shall continue such ; while, at the same time, it places them beyond the con- 
trol and influence of the executive department, by placing them under the pro- 
tection of law so long as they continue faithfully to perform their duty as fiscal 
agents of the government. It next authorizes the Secretary of the Treasurj- to 
select, under certain circumstances, additional banks of deposite, as the exigen- 
cy of the public service may requir?, on which it imposes like regulations and 
conditions, and places, in like manner, under the protection of law. In all this 
the amendment pursues a very different course. It l>egins with authorizing the 
secretary to select the banks of deposite, and limits the regulations and condi- 
tions it imposes on such banks ; leaving, by an express provision, the present 
banks wholly under the control of the treasury or the executive department, as 
they now are, without prescribing any time for the selection of other banks of 
deposite, or making it the duty of the secretary so to do. Tlie consequence is 
obvious. The secretary may continue the present banks as long as he pleases ; 
and so long as he may choose to continue them, the provisions of the amend- 
ment, so far as relates to the deposites, will be a dead letter ; and the banks, of 
course, instead of being under the control of the law, will be contrary, as I have 
said, to the professed object both of the bill and amendment — subject exclusive- 
ly to his will. 

The senator has attempted to explain this difference, but, I must say, veiy un- 
satisfactorily. He said that the bill prohibited the selection of other banks ; 
and, as he deemed others to be necessary, at certain important points, in con- 



.=^.«.»»,«»««»r-^,.».TI»»»„«U..»UUU...».M»l»WWtWtf 



sequence of the present enormous surplus, he inserted the provision authorizing 
the selection of other banks. The senator has not stated the provisions of the 
bill accurately ; so far from not authorizing, it expressly authorizes the selec- 
tion of other banks where there are now none ; but I presume he intended to 
limit his remarks to places where there are no existing banks of deposite. 
Thus limited, the fact is as he states ^ but it by no means explains the extraor- 
dinary omission (for such I must consider it) of not extending the regulations 
to the existing banks, as well as to those hereafter to be selected. If the public 
service requires additional banks at New-York and other important points, in 
consequence of the vast suras deposited there (as I readily agree it does), if no 
disposition is to be made of the surplus, it is certainly a very good reason for 
enlarging the provisions of the bill, by authorizing the secretary to select other 
banks at those points ; but it is impossible for me to comprehend how it proves 
that the regulations which the amendment proposes to impose should be ex- 
clusively limited to such newly-selected banks. Nor do I see why the senator 
has not observed the same rule, in this case, as that which he adopted in i-efer- 
ence to the compensation the banks ought to pay for the use of the public money. 
He omitted to provide for any compensation, on the ground that his amendment 
proposed to dispose of all the surplus money, leaving in the possession of the 
banks a sum barely sufficient to meet the current expenditure, for the use of 
which he did not consider it right to charge a compensation. On the same 
principle, it was unnecessary to provide for the selection of additional banks 
where there are now banks of deposite, as they would be ample if the surplus 
was disposed of. In this I understood the senator himself to concur. 

But it is not only in the important point of extending the regulations to the 
existing banks of deposite that the bill and the amendment difler. There is a stri- 
king dilference between them in reference to the authority of Congress over the 
banks of deposite embraced both in the bill and the amendment. The latter, fol- 
lowing the provision in the charter of the late Bank of the United States, authorizes 
the secretary to withdraw the public deposites, and to discontinue the use of any 
one of the banks whenever, in his opinion, such bank shall have violated the 
conditions on which it has been employed, or the public funds are not safe in 
its vaults, with the simple restriction, that he shall report the fact to Congress. 
We know, from experience, how slight is the check which this restriction im- 
poses. It not onl);- requires the concurrence of both houses of Congress to 
overrule the act of the secretary, where his power may be improperly exerci- 
sed, but the act of Congress itself, intended to control such exercise of power, 
may be overruled by the veto of the President, at whose will the secretary 
holds his place ; so as to leave the control of the banks virtually under the con- 
trol of the executive department of the government. To obviate this, the bill 
vests the secretary with the power simply of withdrawing the deposites and 
suspending the use of the bank as a place of deposite ; and provides that, 
if Congress shall not confirm the removal, the deposites shall be returned to the 
bank after the termination of the next session of Congress. 

The next point of dilTerence is of far less importance, and is only mentioned as 
tending to illustrate the different character of the bill and the amendment. The 
former provides that the banks of deposite shall perform the duties of commis- 
sioners of loans without compensation, in like manner as was the duty of the 
late Bank of the United States and its branches, under its charter. Among 
these duties is that of paying the pensioners — a very heavy branch of disburse- 
ment, and attended with considerable expense, and which will be saved to the 
government under the bill, but will be lost if the amendment should prevail. 

Another difference remains to be pointed out, relating to the security of the 
deposites. With so large an amount of public money in their vaults, it is im- 
portant that the banks should always be provided with ample means to meet 
their engagements. Wuh tliis view, the bill provides that the specie in the 



SFEECHtS Ut JUrtIS C. UAL,HUUW. 



vaults of the several banks, and the aggregate of the balance in their favour with 
other specie-paying banks, shall be equal to one fifth of the entire amount of 
their notes and bills in circulation, and their public and private deposites — a 
sum, as is believed, sufficient to keep them in a sound, solvent condition. The 
amendment, on the contrarj^, provides that the banks shall keep in their own 
vaults, or the vaults of other banks, specie equal to one fourth of its notes and 
bills in circulation, and the* balance of its accounts with other banks payable on 
demand. 

I regret that the senator has thought proper to change the phraseologv, and 
to use terras less clear and explicit than those in the bill. 1 am not certain 
that I comprehend the exact meaning of the provision in the amendment. What 
is meant by specie in the vaults of other banks ? In a general sense, all depos- 
ites are considered as specie ; but I cannot suppose that to be the meaning in 
this instance, as it would render the provision in a great measure inoperative. 
I presume the amendment means special deposites in gold and silver in other 
banks, placed there for safe keeping, or to be drawn on, and not to be used by 
the bank in which it is deposited. Taking that to be the meaning, what is there 
to prevent the same sum from being twice counted in estimating the means of 
the several banks of deposite ? Take two of them, one having S 100,000 in 
specie in its vaults, and the other the same amount in the vaults of the other bank, 
■which, in addition, has, besides, another $100,000 of its own ; what is there to 
prevent the latter from returning, under the amendment, 8200,000 of specie in 
its vaults, while the former would return 8100,000 in its own vaults, and an- 
other in the vaults of the other bank, making, in the aggregate, between them, 
8400,000, when, in reality, the amount in both would be but 8300,000 ? 

But this is not the only difference between the bill and amendment, in this 
particular, deserving of notice. The object of the provision is to compel the 
banks of deposite to have, at all times, ample means to meet their liabilities, so 
that the government should have sufficient assurance that the public moneys in 
their vaults would be forthcoming when demanded. With this view, the bill 
provides that the available means of the bank shall never be less than one fifth 
of its aggregate liabilities, including bills, notes, and deposites, public and pri- 
vate ; while the amendment entirely omits the private deposites, and includes 
only the balance of its deposites with other banks. This omission is the more 
remarkable, inasmuch as the greater jwrtion of the liabilities of the deposite 
banks must, with the present large surplus, result from their deposites, as every 
one who is familiar with banking operations will readily perceive. 

I have now presented to the Senate the several points of difference which I 
deem material between the bill and the amendment, with such remarks as to 
enable them to form their own opinion in reference to the difference, so that they 
may decide hov/ far the assertion is true with which I set out, that, wherever 
they differ, the amendment favours the banks against the interests of the public, 
and the executive against the banks. 

The senator, acting on the supposition that there would be a permanent surplus 
beyond the expenditures of the government, which neither justice nor regard to 
the public interest woidd permit to remain in the banks, has extended the provis- 
ions of his amendment, with great propriety, so as to comprehend a plan to with- 
draw the surplus from the banks. His plan is to vest the commissioners of the 
sinking fund with authority to estimate, at the beginning of every quarter, the 
probable receipts and expenditures of the quarter ; and if, in their opinion, the 
receipts, with the money in the treasury', should exceed the estimated expenditure 
by a certain sum, say 85,000,000, the excess should be vested in state stocks ; 
and if it should fall short of that sum, a sufficient amount of the stocks should 
be sold to make up the deficit. We have thus presented for consideration the 
important subject of the surplus revenue, and with it the question so anxiously 
and universally asked, What shall be done with the surplus? Shall it be ex- 



— ..«.»»r...^„».^^..^„,x^„.trrTn.,»Tmil»»»«M»IWHMllWUUWMHMMIWTm 



pended by the government, or remain where it is, or be disposed of as proposed 
by the senator ? or, if not, what other disposition shall be made of it ? questions, 
the investigation of which necessarily embraces the entire circle of our policy, 
and on the decision of which the future destiny of the country may depend. 

But before we enter on the discussion of this important question, it will be 
proper to ascertain what will be the probable available means of the year, in 
order that some conception may be formed of the probable surplus which jnay 
remain, by comparing it with the appropriations that may be authorized. 

According to the late report of the Secretary of the Treasury, there was de- 
posited in the several banks a little upward of S3.3,000,000 at the termination 
o( the first quarter of the year, not including the sum of about S 3,000,000 de- 
posited by the disbursing agents of the government. The same report stated 
the receipts of the quarter at about $11,000,000, of which lands and customs 
yielded nearly an equal amount. Assuming for the three remaining quarters an 
equal amount, it would give, for the entire receipts o( the year, $44,000,000. 
I agree with the senator, that this sum is too large. The customs will prob- 
ably average an amount throughout the year corresponding with the receipts 
of the first quarter, but there probably will be a considerable falling off in 
the receipts from the public lands. Assuming $7,000,000 as the probable 
amount, which I presume will be ample, the receipts of the year, subtract- 
ing that sura from 544,000,000, will be $37,000,000 ; and subtracting from 
that S 11,000,000, the receipts of the first quarter, would leave $26,000,000 as 
the probable receipts of the last three quarters. Add to this sum 833,000,000, 
the amount in the treasury on the last day of the first quarter, and it gives 
859,000.000. To this add the amount of stock in the United States Bank, which, 
at the market price, is worth at least $7,000,000, and we have $66,000,000, 
which I consider as the least amount at which the probable available means of 
the year can be fairly estimated. It will, probably, very considerably exceed 
this amount. The range may be put down at between $66,000,000 and 
873,000,000, which may be considered as the two extremes between which 
the means of the year may vibrate. But, in order to be safe, I have assumed 
the least of the two. 

The first question which I propose to consider is, Shall this sum be expend- 
ed by the government in the course of the year ? A sura nearly equal to the 
entire debt of the war of the Revolution, by which the liberty and independence 
of these states were established ; raore than five tiraes greater than the expen- 
diture of the government at the commencement of the present administration, 
— deducting the payments on account of the public debt — and more than four 
tiraes greater than the average annual expenditure of the present administration, 
making the same deduction, extravagant as its expenditure has been. The 
very magnitude of the sura decides the question against expenditure. It may 
be wasted, thrown away, but it cannot be expended. There are not objects on 
which to expend it ; for proof of which I appeal to the appropriations already 
made and contemplated. We have passed the navy appropriations, which, as 
liberal as they are admitted to be on all sides, are raised <mly about 82,000,000 
compared with the appropriations of last year. The appropriations for fortifi- 
cations, supposing the bills now pending should pass, will amount to about 
$3, .500,000, and would exceed the ordinary appropriations, assuming them at 
$1,000,000, which I hold to be ample, by 82,500,000. Add a million for ord- 
nance, seven or eight for Indian treaties, and four for Indian wars, and suppo- 
sing the companies of the regular army to be filled as recommended by the war 
department, the aggregate amount, including the ordinary expenditures, would 
be between thirty and thirty-five millions, and would leave a balance of at least 
$30,000,000 in the treasury at the end of the year. 

But suppose objects could be devised on which to expend the whole of the 
available means of the year, it would still be impossible to make the expend!- 



ture without immense waste and confusion. To expend so large an amonnt, reg- 
ularly and methodically, would require a vast increase of able and experienced 
disbursing officers, and a great enlargement of the organization of the govern- 
ment, in all the branches connected ^\^th disbursements. To effect such an en- 
lartrement, and to give a suitable organization, placed under the control of skil- 
ful and efficient officers, must necessarily be a work of time ; but, without it, 
so sudden and great an increase of expenditure would necessarily be followed 
by inextricable confusion and heavy losses. 

But suppose this difficulty overcome, and suitable objects could be devised, 
would it be advisable to make the expenditure ? Would it be wise to draw off 
so vast an amount of productive labour, to be employed in unproductive objects, 
in building fortifications, dead walls, and in lining the interior frontier with a 
large military force, neither of which would add a cent to the productive power 
of the country 1 

The ordinar}' expenditure of the government, under the present administra- 
tion, may be estimated, say at $18,000,000, a sum exceeding by five or six 
millions what, in my opinion, is sufficient for a just and efficient administration 
of the government. Taking eighteen from sixty-six would leave forty-eight 
millions as the surplus, if the affairs of the government had been so administer- 
ed as to avoid the hea\y expenditures of the year, which I firmly believe, by 
early and prudent management, might have been effected. The expenditure of 
this sum, estimating labour at $20 a month, would require 200,000 operatives, 
equal to one third of the whole number of labourers employed in producing the 
great staple of our country, which is spreading wealth and prosperity over the 
land, and controlling, in a great measure, the commerce and manufactures of 
the world. But take what will be the actual surplus, and estimate that- at half 
the sum which, Avith prudence and economy, it might have been, and it would 
require the subtraction of 100,000 operatives from their present useful employ- 
ment, to be employe-d in the unproductive service of the government. Would 
it, I again repeat, be wise to draw off this immense mass of productive labour, 
in order to employ it in building fortifications and swelling the military estab- 
lishment of the country ? Would it add to the strength of the Union, or give in- 
creased security to its liberty, or accelerate its prosperity l the great objects for 
which the government was constituted. 

To ascertain how the strength of any country may be best developed, its pe- 
culiar state and condition must be taken into consideration. Looking to ours 
with this view, who can doubt that, next to our free institutions, the main source 
of our growing greatness and power is to be found in our great and astonishing 
increase of numbers, wealth, and facility of intercourse 1 If we desire to see 
our country powerful, we ought to avoid any measure opposed to their develop- 
ment, and, in particular, ought to make the smallest possible draught, consistent 
with our peace and security, on the productive powers of the country. Let these 
have the freest possible play. Leave the resources of individuals under their 
own direction, to be employed in advancing their own and their country's wealth 
and prosperity, with the extraction of the least amount required for the expen- 
diture of the government ; and draw off not a single labourer from his present 
productive pursuits to the unproductive employment of the government, except- 
ing such as the public service may render indispensable. Who can doubt that 
such a policy would add infinitely more to the power and strength of the coun- 
try than the extravagtmt schemes of spending millions on fortifications and the 
increase of the military establishment ? 

Let us next examine how the liberty of the country may be affected by the 
scheme of disposing of the surplus by disbursements. And here I would ask. 
Is the liberty of the country at present in a secure and stable condition ? and, 
if not, by what is it endangered I and will an increase of disbursements aug- 
ment or diminish the danger 1 



.^.^„-»...>„«T^,,w— ^wm,_mrpxT.r.Tnor.nemtWHmi»HIilWllMllJ«UU«»BBMIHHHM 



Whatever may be the diversity of opinion on other points, there is not an in- 
telligent individual of any party, who regards his reputation, that will venture to 
deny that the liberty of the country is at this time more insecure and unstable 
than it ever has been. We all know that there is in every portion of the Union, 
and with every party, a deep feehng that our political institutions are undergoing 
a great and hazardous change. Nor is the feeling much less strong, that the 
vast increase of patronage and influence of the government is the cause of the 
great and fearful change which is so extensively affecting the character of our 
people and institutions. The effect of increasing the expenditures at this time, 
so as to absorb the surplus, would be to double the number of those who live, or 
expect to live, by the government, and in the same degree augment its patron- 
age and influence, and accelerate that downward course which, if not arrested, 
must speedily terminate in the overthrow of our free institutions. 

These views I hold to be decisive against the wild attempt to absorb the im- 
mense means of the government by the expenditures of the year. In fact, with 
the exception of a few individuals, all seem to regard the scheme either as im- 
practicable or unsafe ; but there are others, who, while they condemn the at- 
tempt of disposing of the surplus by immediate expenditures, believe it can be 
safely and expediently expended in a period of four or five years, on what they 
choose to call the defences of the country. 

In order to determine how far this opinion may be correct, it will be neces- 
sary first to ascertain what will be the available means of the next four or five 
years ; by comparing which with what ought to be the expenditure, we may 
determine whether the plan would, or would not, be expedient. In makino- the 
calculation, I will take the term of five years, including the present, and which 
will, of course, include 1840, after the termination of which, the duties above 
twenty per cent, are to go off', by the provisions of the Compromise Act, in 
eighteen months, when the revenue is to be reduced to the economical and just 
wants of the government. 

The available means of the present year, as I have already shown, will equal 
at least $66,000,000. That of the next succeeding four years (including 1840) 
may be assumed to be twenty-one millions annually. The reason for this as- 
sumption may be seen in the report of the select committee at the last session, 
which I have reviewed, and in the correctness of which I feel increased con- 
fidence. The amount may fall short of, but will certainly not exceed, the esti- 
mate in the report, unless some unforeseen event should occur. Assumino", 
then, $21,000,000 as the average receipts of the next four years, it will give an 
aggregate of $84,000,000, which, added to the available means of this year, 
will give $150,000,000 as the sum that will be at the disposal of the govern- 
ment for the period assumed. Divide this sum by five, the number of years, 
and it will give $30,000,000 as the average annual available means of the 
period. 

The next question for consideration is. Will it be expedient to raise the dis- 
bursement during the period to an average expenditure of $30,000,000 annual- 
ly ? The first, and strong objection to the scheme is, that it would leave in the 
deposite banks a heavy surplus during the greater part of the time, beginning 
with a surplus of upward of thirty millions at the commencement of next year, 
and decreasing at the rate of eight or nine millions a year till the terminati-on 
of the period. But, passing this objection by, I meet the question directly. It 
would be highly inexpedient and dangerous to attempt to keep up the disburse- 
ments at so high a rate. I ask. On what shall this money be expended 1 Shall 
it be expended by an increase of the militar}^ establishment ? by an enlarge- 
ment of the appropriations for fortifications, ordnance, and the navy, far beyond 
what is proposed for the present year ? Have those who advocate the scheme 
reflected to what extent this enlargement must be :Camed to absorb so great a 
sura 1 Even this year, with the extraordinary expenditure upon Indian treaties 

Gg 



and Indian wars, and with profuse expenditure in every other branch of service, 
the aggregate amount of appropriations will not greatly exceed $30,000,000, 
and that of disbursements will not, probably, equal that sum. 

To what extent, then, must the appropriations for the army, the navy, the 
fortifications, and the like, be carried, in order to absorb that sum, especially 
with a declining expenditure in several branches of the service, particularly in 
the pensions, which, during the period, will fall off more than a million of dol- 
lars ? But, in order to take a full view of the folly and danger of the scheme, 
it will be necessary to extend our view beyond 1842, in order to form some 
opinion of what will be the income of the government when the tariff shall be 
so reduced, under the Compromise Act, that no duty shall exceed twenty per 
cent, ad valorem. I know that any estimate made at this time cannot be con- 
sidered much more than conjectural ; but still, it would be imprudent to adopt a 
system of expenditure now, without taking into consideration the probable state 
of the revenue a few years hence. 

After bestowing due reflection on the subject, I am of the impression that 
the income from the imposts, after the period in question, will not exceed 
$10,000,000. It will probably fall below, rather than rise above, that sum. I 
assume, as the basis of this estimate, that our consumption of foreign articles 
will not then exceed $150,000,000. We all know that the capacity of the coun- 
try to consume depends upon the value of its domestic exports, and the profits of 
its commerce and navigation. Of its domestic exports it would not be safe to 
assume any considerable increase in any article except cotton. To what ex- 
tent the production and consumption of this great staple, which puts in motion 
so vast an amount of the industry and commerce of the world, may be increas- 
ed between now and 1842, is difficult to conjecture ; but I deem it unsafe to 
suppose that it can be so increased as to extend the capacity of the country to 
consume beyond the limits I have assigned. Assuming, then, the amount which 
I have, and dividing the imports into free and dutiable articles, the latter, ac- 
cording to the existing proportion between the two descriptions, would amount 
in value to something less than $70,000,000. According to the Compromise 
Act, no duty, after the period in question, can exceed twenty per cent., and the 
rates would range from that down to five or six per cent. Taking fifteen per 
cent, as the average, which would be, probably, full high, and allowing for the ex- 
penses of collection, the nett income would be something less than $1 0,000,000. 

The income from public lands is still more conjectural than that from cus- 
toms. There are so many, and such various causes in operation affecting this 
source of the public income, that it is exceedingly difficult to form even a con- 
jectural estimate as to its amount, beyond the current year. But, in the midst 
of this uncertainty, one fact may be safely assumed, that the purchases during 
the last year, and thus far this, greatly exceed the steady, progressive demand 
for public lands, from increased population, and the consequent emigration to 
the new states and territories. Much of the purchases have been, unquestion- 
ably, made upon speculation, with a view to resales, and must, of course, come 
into market hereafter in competition with the lands of the government, and to 
that extent must reduce the income from their sales. Estimating even the de- 
mand for public lands from what it was previous to the recent large sales, and 
taking into estimate the increased population and wealth of the country, I do 
not consider it safe to assume more than $5,000,000 annually from this branch 
of the revenue, which, added to the customs, would give for the annual receipts 
between fourteen and fifteen millions of dollars after 1842. 

I now ask whether it would be prudent to raise the public expenditures to 
the sum of $30,000,000 annually during the intermediate period, with the 
prospect that they must be suddenly reduced to half that amount ? Who does 
not see the tierce conflict which must follow between those who may be interest- 
ed in keeping up the expenditures, and those who have an equal interest against 



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an increase of the duties as the means of keeping them up ? I appeal to the 
senators from the South, whose constituents have so deep an interest in low du- 
ties, to resist a course so impolitic, unwise, and extravagant, and which, if 
adopted, might again renew the tariff, so recently thrown off by such hazard- 
ous and strenuous efforts, with all its oppression and disaster. Let us remem- 
ber what occurred in the fatal session of 1828. With a folly unparalleled, 
Congress then raised the duties to a rate so enormous as to average one half 
the value of the imports, when on the eve of discharging the debt, and when, 
of course, there would be no objects on which the immense income from such 
extravagant duties could be justly and constitutionally expended. It is ama- 
zing that there was such blindness then as not to see what has since follow- 
ed — the sudden discharge of the debt, and an overflowing treasury, without the 
means of absorbing the surplus ; the violent conflict resulting from such a state 
of things ; and the vast increase of the power and patronage of the government, 
with all its corrupting consequences. We are now about, I fear, to commit an 
error of a different character : to raise the expenditure far beyond all example, 
in time of peace, and with a decreasing revenue, which must, with equal cer- 
tainty, bring on another conflict, not much less dangerous, in which the strug- 
gle will not be to find objects to absorb an overflowing treasury, but to devise 
means to continue an expenditure far beyond the just and legitimate wants of 
the country. It is easy to foresee that, if we are thus blindly to go on in the 
management of our aflairs, without regard to the future, the frequent and violent 
concussion which must follow from such folly cannot but end in a catastrophe 
that will ingulf our political institutions. 

With such decided objections to the dangerous and extravagant scheme of 
absorbing the surplus by disbursements, I proceed to the next question, Shall 
the public money remain where it now is ? Shall the present extraordinary 
state of things, without example or parallel, continue, of a government, calling 
itself free, extracting from the people millions beyond what it can expend, and 
placing that vast sum in the custody of a few monopolizing corporations, selected 
at the sole will of the executive, and continued during his pleasure, to be used 
as their own from the time it is collected till it is disbursed ? To this question 
there must burst from the lips of every man who loves his country and its insti- 
tutions, and who is the enemy of monopoly, injustice, and oppression, an indig- 
nant no. And here let me express the pleasure I feel that the senator from 
New-York, in moving his amendment, however objectionable his scheme, has 
placed himself in opposition to the continuance of the present unheard-of and 
dangerous state of things ; and I add, as a simple act of justice, that the tone 
and temper of his remarks in support of his amendment were characterized by a 
courtesy and liberality which I, on my part, shall endeavour to imitate. But 
I fear, notwithstanding this favourable indication in so influential a quarter, the 
very magnitude of the evil (too great to be concealed) will but serve to perpetu- 
ate it. So great and various are the interests enlisted in its favovu-, that I 
greatly fear that all the eflbrts of the wise and patriotic to arrest it will prove 
unavailing. At the head of these stand the depository banks themselves, with 
their numerous stockholders and officers ; with their $40,000,000 of capital, and 
an equal amount of public deposites, associated into one great combination ex- 
tending over the whole Union, under the influence and control of the treasury 
department. The whole weight of this mighty combination, so deeply interest- 
ed in the continuance of the present state of things, is opposed to any change. 
To this powerful combination must be added the numerous and influential body 
who are dependant on banks to meet their engagements, and who, whatever 
may be their political opinions, must be alarmed at any change which may 
limit their discounts and accommodation. Then come the stock-jobbers, a 
growing and formidable class, who live by raising and depressing stocks, and 
who behold in the present state of things the most favourable opportunity of 



carrying on their dangerous and corrupting pursuits. With the control which 
the Secretary of the Treasury has over the banks of deposite, through transfer 
warrants, with the power of withdrawing the deposites at pleasure, he may, 
whenever he chooses, raise or depress the stock of any bank, and, if disposed 
to use this tremendous power for corrupt purposes, may make the fortunes of 
the initiated, and overwhelm in sudden ruin those not in the secret. To the 
stock-jobbers must be added speculators of every hue and form ; and, in particu- 
lar, the speculators in public lands, who, by the use of the public funds, are 
rapidly divesting the people of the noble patrimony left by our ancestors in the 
public domain, by giving in exchange what may, in the end, prove to be broken 
credit and worthless rags. To these we must add the artful and crafty poli- 
ticians, who wield this mighty combination of interests for political purposes. 
I am anxious to avoid mingling party politics in this discussion ; and, that I may 
not even seem to do so, I shall not attempt to exhibit, in all its details, the fear- 
ful, and, I was about to add, the overwhelming power which the present state 
of things places in the hands of those who have control of the government, 
and which, if it be not wielded to overthrow our insthutions and destroy all 
responsibility, must be attributed to their want of inclination, and not to their 
want of means. 

Such is the power and influence interested to continue the public money where 
it is now deposited. To these there are opposed the honest, virtuous, and patri- 
otic of every party, who behold in the continuance of the present state of things 
almost certain convulsion and overthrow of our liberty. There would be found 
on the same side the great mass of the industrious and labouring portion of the 
community, whose hard earnings are extracted from them without their knowl- 
edge, were it not that what is improperly taken from them is successfully used 
as the means of deceiving and controUinfj them. If such were not the case — 
if those who work could see how those who profit are enriched at their ex- 
pense — the present state of things would not be endured for a moment ; but as 
it is, I fear that, from misconception, and consequent want of union and co- 
operation, things may continue as they are, till it will be too late to apply a 
remedy. I trust, however, that such will not be the fact ; that the people will 
be roused from their false security ; and that Congress will refuse to adjourn till 
an efficient remedy is applied. In this hope, I recur to the inquiry, What shall 
that remedy be ? Shall we adopt the measure recommended by the senator 
from New- York, which, as has been stated, proposes to authorize the commis- 
sioners of the sinking fund to ascertain the probable income of each quarter, 
and, if there should be a probable excess above $5,000,000, to vest the surplus 
in the purchase of state stocks; but, if there shall be a deficiency, to sell so 
much of the stock previously purchased as would make up the difference ? 

I regret that the senator has not furnished a statement of facts sufficiently full 
to enable us to form an opinion of what will be the practical operation of his 
scheme. He has omitted, for instance, to state what is the aggregate amount of 
stocks issued by the several states : a fact indispensable in order to ascertain 
how the price of the stocks would be aflected by the application of the surplus to 
their purchase. All who are in the least familiar with subjects of this kind, 
must know that the price of stocks rises proportionably with the amount of the 
sum applied to their purchase. I have already shown that the probable surplus 
at the end of this year, notwithstanding the extravagance of the appropriations, 
will be between thirty and thirty-five millions ; and before we can decide un- 
derstandingly whether this great sum can with propriety be applied as the sen- 
ator proposes, we should know whether the amount of state stocks be sufficient 
to absorb it, without raising their price extravagantly high. 

The setiator should also have informed us, not only as to the amount of the 
stock, but how it is distributed among the states, in order to enable us to deter- 
mine whether his scheme would operate equally between them. In the ab- 



"'"^'""~" 



sence of correct information on both of these points, we are compelled to use 
such as we may possess, however defective and uncertain, in order to make up 
our mind on his amendment. 

We all know, then, that while several of the states have no stocks, and rnany 
a very inconsiderable amount, three of the large states (Pennsylvania, Ohio, and 
New- York) have a very large amount, not less in the aggregate, if I am cor- 
rectly informed, than thirty-five or forty millions. What amount is held by the 
rest of the states is uncertain, but I suppose that it may be safely assumed that, 
taking the whole, it is less than that held by those states. With these facts, 
it cannot be doubted that the application of the surplus, as proposed to be ap- 
plied by the senator, would be exceedingly unequal among the states, and that 
the advantage of the application would mainly accrue to these states. To most 
of these objections, the senator, while he does not deny that the application of 
the surplus will greatly raise the price of stocks, insists that the states issuing 
them will not derive any benefit from the advance, and, consequently, have no 
interest in the question of the application of the surplus to their purchase. 

If by states he means the government of the states, the view of the senator 
may be correct. They may, as he says, have but little interest in the market 
value of their stocks, as it must be redeemed by the same amount, whether that 
be high or low. But if we take a more enlarged view, and comprehend the 
people of the state as well as the government, the argument entirely fails. The 
senator will not deny that the holders have a deep interest in the application 
of so large a sura as the present surplus in the purchase of their stocks. He 
will not deny that such application must greatly advance the price ; and, of 
course, in determining whether the states having stocks will be benefited by 
applying the surplus as he proposes, we must first ascertain who are the hold- 
ers. Where do they reside ? Are they foreigners residing abroad ? If so, 
would it be wise to apply the public money so as to advance the interests of 
foreigners, to whom the states are under no obligation but honestly to pay to 
them the debts which they have contracted ? But if not held by foreigners, are 
they held by citizens of such states ? If such be the fact, will the senator deny 
that those states will be deeply interested in the application of the surplus, as 
proposed in his amendment, when the effects of such application must be, as is 
conceded on all sides, greatly to enhance the price of the stocks, and, conse- 
quently, to increase the wealth of their citizens ? Let us suppose that, instead 
of purchasing the stocks of the states in which his constituents are interested, 
the senator's amendment had proposed to apply the present enormous surplus 
to the purchase of cotton or slaves, in which the constituents of the Southern 
senators are interested, would any one doubt that the cotton-growing or slave- 
holding states would have a deep interest in the question ? It will not be de- 
nied that, if so applied, their price would be greatly advanced, and the wealth 
of their citizens proportionably increased. Precisely the same eff*ect would re- 
sult from the application to the purchase of stocks, with like benefits to the citi- 
zens of the states which have issued large amounts of stock. The principle is 
the same in both cases. 

But there is another view of the subject which demands most serious consid- 
eration. Assuming, what will not be questioned, that the application of the sur- 
plus, as proposed by the amendment, will be very unequal among the states, 
some having little or none, and others a large amount of stocks, the result would 
necessarily be to create, in effect, the relation of debtor and creditor between 
the states. The states Avhose stocks might be purchased by the commission- 
ers would become the debtors of the government ; and as the government would. 
in fact, be but the agent between them and the other states, the latter would, in 
reality, be their creditors. This relation between them could not fail to be pro- 
ductive of important political consequences, which would infiuence all the op- 
erations of the government. It would, in particular, have a powerful bearing 



upon the presidential election ; the debtor and creditor states each striving to 
give such a result to the elections as might be favourable to their respective in- 
terests ; the one to exact, and the other to exempt themselves from the pay- 
ment of the debt. Supposing the three great states to which I have referred, 
whose united influence would have so decided a control, to be the principal 
debtor states, as would, in all probability, be the fact, it is easy to see that the 
result would be, finally, the release of the debt, and, consequently, a correspond- 
ent loss to the creditor, and gain to the debtor states. 

But there is another view of the subject still more deserving, if possible, of 
attention than either of those which have been presented. It is impossible not 
to see, after what has been said, that the power proposed to be conferred by the 
amendment of the senator, of applying the surplus in buying and selling the 
stocks of the states, is one of great extent, and calculated to have powerful in- 
fluence, not only on a large body of the most wealthy and influential citizens 
of the states which have issued stocks, but on the states themselves. The 
next question is. In whom is the exercise of this power to be vested ? "Where 
shall we find individuals sufficiently detached from the politics of the day, and 
whose virtue, patriotism, disinterestedness, and firmness can raise them so far 
above political and sinister motives as to exercise powers so high and influen- 
tial exclusively for the public good, without any view to personal or political 
aggrandizement ? Who has the amendment selected as standing aloof from pol- 
itics, and possessing these high qualifications ? Who are the present commis- 
sioners of the sinking fund, to whom this high and responsible trust is to be 
confided ? At the head stands the Vice-president of the United States, with 
whom the Chief-justice of the United States, the Secretary of State, the Secre- 
tary of the Treasurj% and the Attorney-general, are associated ; all party men, 
deeply interested in the maintenance of power in the present hands, and having 
the strongest motives to apply the vast power which the amendment would con- 
fer upon them, should it become a law, to party purposes. I do not say it would 
be so applied ; but I must ask. Would it be prudent, would it be wise, would it 
be seemly, to vest such great and dangerous powers in those who have so 
strong a motive to abuse it, and who, if they should have elevation and virtue 
enough to resist the temptation, would still be suspected of having used the 
power for sinister and corrupt purposes ? I am persuaded, in drawing the 
amendment, that the senator from New- York has, without due reflection on the 
impropriety of vesting the power where he proposes, inadvertently inserted the 
provision which he has, and that, on review, he will concur with me, that, should 
his amendment be adopted, the power ought to be vested in others, less expo- 
sed to temptation, and, consequently, less exposed to suspicion. 

I have now stated the leading objections to the several modes of disposing of 
the surplus revenue which I proposed to consider ; and the question again recurs, 
What shall be done with the surplus ? The Senate is not uninformed of my 
opinion on this important subject. Foreseeing that there would be a large sur- 
plus, and the mischievous consequences that must follow, I moved, during the 
last session, for a select committee, which, among other measures, reported a 
resolution so to amend the Constitution as to authorize the temporary distribu- 
tion of the surplus among the states ; but so many doubted whether there would 
be a surplus at the time, that it rendered all prospect of carr}dng the resolution 
hopeless. My opinion still remains unchanged, that the measure then proposed 
was the best ; but so rapid has been the accumulation of the surplus, even be- 
yond my calculation, and so pressing the danger, that what would have been 
then an efficient remedy, would now be too tardy to meet the danger, and, of 
course, another remedy must be devised, more speedy in its action. 

After bestowing on the subject the most deliberate attention, I have come to 
the conclusion that there is no other so safe, so efficient, and so free from ob- 
jections as the one I have proposed, of depositing the surplus that may remain 



■-"^— "— -^— -" — ""^'"""'^■■■■■■M— ^^^^^— ^■«^»l^"^»^"^i— ^I^M^^^gm 



at tlie termination of the year, in the treasury of the several states, in the man- 
ner provided for in the amendment. But the senator from New- York objects 
to the measure, that it would, in effect, amount to a distribution, on the ground, 
as he conceives, that the states would never refund. He does not doubt but 
that they would, if called on to refund by the government ; but he says that Con- 
gress will, in fact, never make the call. He rests this conclusion on the sup- 
position that there would be a majority of the states opposed to it. He admits, 
in case the revenue should become deficient, that the Southern or staple states 
would prefer to refund their quota rather than to raise the imposts to meet the 
deficit ; but he insists that the contrary would be the case with the manufacturing 
states, which would prefer to increase the imposts to refunding their quota, on 
the ground that the increase of the duties would promote the interests of manu- 
factures, I cannot agree with the senator that those states would assume a po- 
sition so entirely untenable as to refuse to refund a deposite which their faith 
would be plighted to return, and rest the refusal on the ground of preferring to 
lay a tax, because it would be a bounty to them, and would, consequently, throw 
the whole burden of the tax on the other states. But, be this as it may, I can 
tell the senator that, if they should take a course so unjust and monstrous, he 
may rest assured that the other states would most miquestionably resist the in- 
crease of the imposts ; so that the government would have to take its choice, 
either to go without the money, or call on the states to refund the deposites. 
But I so far agree with the senator as to believe that Congress would be very 
reluctant to make the call ; that it would not make it till, from the wants of the 
treasury, it should become absolutely necessary ; and that, in order to avoid 
such necessity, it would resort to a just and proper economy in the public ex- 
penditures as the preferable alternative. I see in this, however, much good in- 
stead of evil. The government has long since departed from habits of econo- 
my, and fallen into a profusion, a waste, and an extravagance in its disburse- 
ments, rarely equalled by any free state, and which threatens the most disas- 
trous consequences. 

But I am happy to think that the ground on which the objection of the sena- 
tor stands may be removed, without materially impairing the provisions of the 
bill. It will require but the addition of a few words to remove it, by giving to 
the deposites all the advantages, without the objections, which he proposes by 
his plan. It will be easy to provide that the states shall authorize the proper 
officers to give negotiable certificates of deposite, which shall not bear interest 
till demanded, when they shall bear the usual rates till paid. Such certificates 
would be, in fact, state stocks, every way similar to that in which the senator 
proposes to vest the surplus, but with this striking superiority : that, instead of 
being partial, and limited to a few states, they would be fairly and justly appor- 
tioned among the several states. They would have another striking advantage 
over his. They would create among all the members of the confederacy, recip- 
rocally, the relation of debtor and creditor, in proportion to their relative weight 
in the Union ; which, in effect, would leave them in their present relation, and 
would, of course, avoid the danger that would result from his plan, which, as 
has been shown, would necessarily make a part of the states debtors to the rest, 
with all the dangers resulting from such relation. 

The next objection of the senator is to the ratio of distribution proposed in the 
bill among the states, which he pronounces to be unequal, if not unconstitution- 
al. He insists that the true principle would be to distribute the surplus among 
the states in proportion to the representa^tion of the House of Representatives, 
without including the senators, as is proposed in the bill, for which he relies on 
the lact, that, by the Constitution, representation and taxation are to be appor- 
tioned in the same manner among the states. 

The Senate will see that the effect of adopting the ratio supported by the 
senator would be to favour the large states, while that in the bill will be more 
favourable to the small. 



The state I in part represent occupies a neutral position between the two. 
She cannot be considered either a large or a small state, forming, as she does, 
one twenty-fourth part of the Union ; and, of course, it is the same to her which- 
ever ratio may be adopted. But I prefer the one contained in my amendment, 
on the o-round that it represents the relative weight of the states in the govern- 
ment. It is the weight assigned to them in the choice of the President and 
Vice-president in the electoral college, and, of course, in the administration of 
the laws. It is also that assigned to them in the making of the laws by the ac- 
tion of the two houses, and corresponds very nearly to their weight in the ju- 
dicial department of the government, the judges being nominated by the Presi- 
dent and confirmed by the Senate. In addition, I was influenced, in selecting 
the ratio, by the belief that it was a wise and magnanimous course, in case of 
doubt, to faVour the weaker members of the confederacy. The larger can al- 
ways take care of themselves ; and, to avoid jealousy and improper feelings, 
ought to act liberally towards the weaker members of the confederacy. To 
which may be added, that I am of the impression that, even on fhe principle as- 
sumed by the senator, that the distribution of the surplus ought to be apportion- 
ed on the ratio with direct taxation (which maybe well doubted), the ratio which 
I support would conform in practice more nearly to the principle than that which 
he supports. It is a fact not generally known, that representation in the other 
house, and direct taxes, should they be laid, woidd be very far from being equal, 
although the Constitution provides that they should be. The inequality would 
result from the mode of apportioning the representatives. Instead of apportion- 
ing them among the states, as near as may be, as directed by the Constitution, 
an artificial mode of distribution has been adopted, which, in its effects, gives to 
the large states a greater number, and to the small a less than that to which they 
are entitled. I would refer those who may desire to understand how this ine- 
quality is effected, to the discussion in this body on the apportionment bill un- 
der the last census. So great is this inequality, that, were a direct tax to be 
laid, New- York, for instance, would have at least three members more than her 
apportionment of the tax would require. The ratio which I have proposed 
would, I admit, produce as great an inequality in favour of some of the small states, 
particularly the old, whose population is nearly stationar}^ ; but among the new 
and growing members of the confederacy, which constitute the greater portion 
of the small states, it would not give them a larger share of the deposites than 
what they would be entitled to on the principle of direct taxes. But the objec- 
tion of the senator to the ratio of distribution, like his objection to the condition 
on which the bill proposes to make it, is a matter of small comparative conse- 
quence. I am prepared, in the spirit of concession, to adopt either, as one or 
the other may be more acceptable to the Senate. 

It now remains to compare the disposition of the surplus proposed in the bill 
with the others I have discussed ; and, unless I am greatly deceived, it pos- 
sesses great advantages over them. Compared with the scheme of expending 
the surplus, its advantage is, that it would avoid the extravagance and waste 
which must result from suddenly more than quadrupling the expenditures, with- 
out a corresponding organization in the disbursing department of the govern- 
ment to enforce economy and responsibiUty. It would also avoid the diversion 
of so large a portion of the industr\^ of the country from its present useful direc- 
tion to unproductive olijects, with heavy loss to the wealth and prosperity of the 
country, as has been shown, while it would, at the same time, avoid the increase 
of the patronage and influence of the government, with all their corruption and 
danger to the liberty and institutions of the country. But its advantages would 
not be limited simply to avoiding the evil of extravagant and useless disburse- 
ments. It would confer posuive benefits, by enabling the states to discharge 
their debts, and complete a system of internal improvements, by railroads and 
canals, which woidd not only greatly strengthen the bonds of the confederacy, 
but increase its power, by augmenting infinitely our resources and prosperity 



I do not deem it necessary to compare the disposition of the surplus which 
is proposed in the bill with the dangerous, and, I must say, wicked scheme of 
leai'ino- the public funds where they are, in the banks of deposite, to be loaned 
out by those institutions to speculators and partisans, without authority or con- 
trol of law. 

Compared with the plan proposed by the senator from New-York, it is suffi- 
cient, to prove its superiority, to say that, while it avoids all of the objections to 
which his is liable, it at the same time possesses all the advantages, with 
others peculiar to itself. Among these, one of the most prominent is, that it 
provides the only efficient remedy for the deep-seated disease which now af- 
flicts the body politic, and which threatens to terminate so fatally, unless it be 
speedily and effectually arrested. 

All who have reflected on the nature of our complex system of government, 
and the dangers to which it is exposed, have seen that it is susceptible, from its 
structure, to two dangers of opposite character, one threatening consolidation, 
and the other anarchy and dissolution. From the beginning of the government, 
we find a difference of opinion among the wise and patriotic to which the gov- 
ernment was most exposed : one part believing that the danger was that the 
government would absorb the reserved powers of the states, and terminate in 
consolidation, while the other were equally confident that the states would ab- 
sorb the powers of the government, and the system end in anarchy and disso- 
lution. It was this diversity of opinion which gave birth to the two great, hon- 
est, and patriotic parties which so long divided the community, and to the many 
political conflicts which so long agitated the country. Time has decided the 
controversy. We are no longer left to doubt that the danger is on the side of 
this government, and that, if not arrested, the system must terminate in an entire 
absorption of the powers of the states. 

Looking back, with the light which experience has furnished, we now clearly 
see that both of the parties took a false view of the operation of the system. It 
was admitted by both that there would be a conflict for power between the gov- 
ernment and the states, arising from a disposition on the part of those who, for 
the time being, exercised the powers of the government and the states, to en- 
large their respective powers at the expense of each other, and which would 
induce each to watch the other with incessant vigilance. Had such proved to 
be the fact, I readily concede that the result would have been the opposite to 
what has occurred, and the Republican, and not the Federal party, would have 
been mistaken as to the tendency of the system. But so far from this jealousy, 
experience has shown that, in the operation of the system, a majority of the 
states have acted in concert with the government at all times, except upon the 
eve of a political revolution, when one party was about to go out, to make room 
for the other to come in ; and we now clearly see that this has not been the result 
of accident, but that the habitual operation must necessarily be so. " The mis- 
conception resulted from overlooking the fact, that the government is but an 
agent of the states, and that the dominant majority of the Union, which elect 
and control a majority of the State Legislatures, would elect also those who 
would control this government, whether that majority rested on sectional inter- 
ests, on patronage and influence, or whatever basis it might, and that they would 
use the power both of the General and State Governments jointly, for aggran- 
dizement and the perpetuation of their power. Regarded in this light, it is not 
at all surprising that the tendency of the system is such as it has proved itself 
to be, and which any intelligent observer now sees must necessarily terminate 
in a central, absolute, irresponsible, and despotic power. It is this fatal ten- 
dency that the measure proposed in the bill is calculated to counteract, and 
which, I believe, would prove effective if now applied. It would place the 
states in the relation in which it was universally believed they would stand to 
this government at the time of its formation, and make them those jealous and 

H H 



OirijLd\^ncju 



vigilant guardians of its action on all measures touching the disbursements and 
expenditures of the government, which it was confidently believed they would 
be • which would arrest the fatal tendency to the concentration of ihe entire 
power of the system in this government, if any power on earth can. 

But it is objected that the remedy would be too powerful, and would produce 
an opposite and equally dangerous tendency. I coincide that such would be 
the danger, if permanently applied ; and, under that impression, and believing 
that the present excess of revenue would not continue longer, I have limited 
the measure to the duration of the Compromise Act. Thus limited, it will act 
sufficiently long, I trust, to eradicate the present disease, without superinducing 
one of an opposite character. 

But the plan proposed is supported by its justice, as well as these high con- 
siderations of political expediency. The surplus money in the treasury is not 
ours. It properly belongs to those who made it, and from whom it has been 
unjustly taken. I hold it an unquestionable principle, that the government has 
no right to take a cent from the people beyond what is necessary to meet its 
legitimate and constitutional wants. To take more intentionally would be rob- 
bery ; and, if the government has not incurred the guilt in the present case, its 
exemption can only be found in its folly — the folly of not seeing and guarding 
against a-vast excess of revenue, which the most ordinary understanding ought 
to have foreseen and prevented. If it were in our power — if we could ascertain 
from whom the vast amount now in the treasury was improperly taken, justice 
would demand that it should be returned to its lawful owners. But, as that is 
impossible, the measure next best, as approaching nearest to restitution, is that 
which is proposed, to deposite it in the treasuries of the several states, which 
will place it under the disposition of the immediate representatives of the peo- 
ple, to be used by them as they may think fit till the wants of the government 
may require its return. 

But it is objected that such a disposition would be a bribe to the people. A 
bribe to the people ! to return it to those to whom it justly belongs, and from 
whose pockets it should never have been taken. A bribe ! to place it in the 
char<^e of those who are the immediate representatives of those from whom we 
derive our authority, and who may employ it so much more usefully than we 
can. But what is to be done ? If not returned to the people, it must go some- 
how ; and is there no danger of bribing those to whom it may go ? If we dis- 
burse it, is there no danger of bribing the thousands of agents, contractors, and 
jobbers, through whose hands it must pass, and in whose pockets, and those of 
their associates, so large a part would be deposited 1 If, to avoid this, we leave 
it where it is, in the banks, is there no danger of bribing the banks in who&e 
custody it is, with their various dependants, and the numerous swarms of specu- 
lators which hover about them in hopes of participating in the spoil 1 Is there 
no danger of bribing the political managers, who, through the deposites, have the 
control of these banks, and, by them, of their dependants, and the hungry and vo- 
racious hosts of speculators who have overspread and are devouring the land ? 
Yes, literally devouring the land. Finally, if it should be vested as proposed 
by the senator from New- York, is there no danger of bribing the holders of 
state stocks, and, through them, the states which have issued them ? Are the 
agents, the jobbers, and contractors ; are the directors and stockholders of the 
banks ; are the speculators and stock-jobbers ; are the political managers and 
holders of state securities, the only honest portion of the community ? Are 
they alone incapable of being bribed ? And are the people the least honest, 
and most liable to be bribed? Is this the creed of those now in power? of 
■those who profess to be the friends of the people, and to place implicit confi- 
■ dence in their virtue and patriotism ? 

I have now (said Mr. Culhouu) stated what, in my opinion, ought to be done 
-•with the surplus. Another question still remains : not what shall, but what 



will be done with the surplus ? With a few remarks on this question, I shall 
conclude what I intended to say. 

There was a time, in the better days of the Republic, when to show what 
ought to be done was to ensure the adoption of the measure. Those days have 
passed away, I fear, forever. A power has risen up in the government greater 
than the people themselves, consisting of many, and various, and powerful in- 
terests, combined into one mass, and held together by the cohesive power of 
the vast surplus in the banks. This mighty combination will be opposed to 
any change ; and it is to be feared that, such is its influence, no measure to 
which it is opposed can become a law, however expedient and necessary, and 
that the public money will remain in their possession, to be disposed of, not as 
the public interest, but as theirs may dictate. The time, indeed, seems fast ap- 
proaching, when no law can pass, nor any honour be conferred, from the chief 
magistrate to the tide-waiter, without the assent of this powerful and interested 
combination, which is steadily becoming the government itself, to the utter sub- 
version of the authority of the people. Nay, I fear we are in the midst of it ; 
and I look with anxiety to the fate of this measure as the test whether we are 
or not. 

If nothing should be done — if the money which justly belongs to the people 
be left where it is, with the many and overwhelming objections to it — the fact 
will prove that a great and radical change has been effected ; that the govern- 
ment is subverted ; that tlie authority of the people is suppressed by a union of 
the banks and executive — a union a hundred times more dangerous than that of 
Church and State, against which the Constitution has so jealously guarded. It 
would be the announcement of a state of things from which, it is to be feared, 
there can be no recovery — a state of boundless corruption, and the lowest and 
basest subserviency. It seems to be the order of Providence that, with the 
exception of these, a people may recover from any other evil. Piracy, robbery, 
and violence of every description may, as history proves, be followed by vir- 
tue, patriotism, and national greatness ; but where is the example to be found 
of a degenerate, corrupt, and subservient people, who have ever recovered their 
virtue and patriotism ! Their doom has ever been the lowest state of wretch- 
edness and misery : scorned, trodden down, and obliterated forever from the list 
of nations. May Heaven grant that such may never be our doom ! 



XVI. 

SPEECH ON THE BILL FOR THE ADMISSION OF MICHIGAN, JANUARY 2, 1837. 

• Mr. Grundy moved that the previous orders of the day be postponed, 
for the purpose of considering the bill to admit the State of Michigan into 
the Union. 

Mr. Calhoun was opposed to the motion ; the documents accompanying 
the bill had but this morning been laid upon the tables, and no time had 
heen allowed for even reading them over. 

Mr. Grundy insisted on his motion. Of one point he was fully satis- 
fied, that Michigan had a right to be received into the Union ; on this, he 
presumed, there would be but little difference of opinion, the chief diffi- 
culty having respect to the mode in which it was to be done. There 
seemed more difference of opinion, and he presumed there would be 
more debate, touching the preamble than concerning the bill itself; but 
he could not consent to postpone the subject. Congress were daily pass- 
ing laws, the effect of which pressed immediately upon the people of 
Michigan, and concerning which they were entitled to have a voice and 



244 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOtJIT. 

a vote upon this floor ; and, therefore, the bill for their admission ought 
to receive the immediate action of the Senate. As to the documents, 
they were not numerous. The gentleman from South Carolina might 
readily run his eye over them, and he would perceive that the facts of 
the case were easily understood. Indeed, there was but one of any con- 
sequence respecting which there was any controversy. When the Senate 
adjourned on Thursday, many senators had been prepared, and were de- 
sirous to speak, although the documents were not then printed. It was 
the great principles involved in the case which would form the subjects 
of discussion, and they could as well be discussed now. He thought the 
Senate had better proceed. One fact in the case was very certain : there had 
been more votes for the members to the last convention than for the first. 
How many more was a matter of little comparative consequence. The 
great question for the Senate to consider was this ; What is the will of 
Michigan on the subject of entering the Union I 

If this could be decided, it was of less consequence whether the bill 
should or should not expressly state that the last convention, and the as- 
sent by it given, formed the ground of the admission of the state. 

Mr. Calhoun here inquired whether the chairman of the committee was 
to be understood as being now ready to abandon the preamble 1 If the 
Judiciary Committee were agreed to do this, he thought all difficulty 
would be at an end. 

Mr. Grundy replied, that, as chairman of the Judiciary Committee, he 
had no authority to reply to the inquiry, but, as an individual^ he consid- 
ered the preamble as of little consequence, and he should vote for the 
bill whether it were in or out. Michigan ought, undoubtedly^, to be ad- 
mitted, and all the consequences would result, v/hether the preamble were 
retained or not. He had received no authority from the committee to 
consent that it should be stricken out. For himself^ he was settled in the 
belief that Congress possessed full power to prescribe the boundaries of 
a territory, and that, when that territory passed into a state, the right re- 
mained still the same. Congress had already established the boundary of 
Ohio, and that settled the question. He never had perceived the necessity of 
inserting in the admission bill the section which made the assent of Mich- 
igan to the boundaries fixed for her by Congress a prerequisite to her 
admission, because the disputed boundary line was fixed by another bill j 
and, whether the preamble to this bill should be retained or not, Michigan 
could not pass the line, so that the preamble was really of very little 
consequence. 

Mr. Calhoun said that, in inquiring of the honourable chairman whether 
he intended to abandon the preamble of the bill, his question had had re- 
spect, not to any pledge respecting boundaries, but to the recognition of 
the second convention and of its doings. He watited to know whether 
the chairman was ready to abandon that principle. He had examined the 
subject a good deal, and his own mind was fully made up that Michigan 
could not be admitted on the ground of that second convention j but the 
Senate might set aside the whole of what had been done, and receive 
Michigan as she stood at the commencement of the last session, 

Mr. Grundy observed, that if the gentleman's mind was fully made up, 
then there could be no necessity of postponing the subject. The gentle- 
man has fully satisfied himself, and now (said Mr. G.) let us see if he can 
satisfy us. His argument, it seems, has been fully matured, and we are 
now ready to listen to it. Though I consider that there is no virtue in 
the preamble, and that the effect of the bill will be the same whether it 
is stricken out or retained, yet I am not ready to say that I shall vote to 
strike it out. I am ready to hear what can be said both for and against it. 



The question was now put on the motion of Mr. Grundy to postpone 
the previous orders, and carried, 22 to 16. So the orders were postponed, 
and the Senate proceeded to consider the bill, which having been again 
r€ad at the clerk's table, as follows : 

Ji Bill to admk the State of Michigan into the Union upon an equal footing 
with the, original States. 

Whereas, ia pursuance of the act of Congress of June the fifteenth, 
eighteen hundred and thirty-six, entitled, "An act to establish the northern 
boundary of the State of Ohio, and to provide for the admission of the 
State o£ Michigan into the Union, upon the conditions therein expressed," 
a convention of delegates, elected by the people of the said State of 
Michigan, for the sole purpose of giving their assent to the boundaries of 
the said State of Michigan as described, declared, and established in and 
by the said act, did, on the fifteenth of December, eighteen hundred and 
thirty-six, assent to the provisions of said act: therefore, 

Be it enacted, <§-c.. That the State of Michigan shall be one, and is here- 
by declared to be one of the United States of America, and admitted into 
the Union on. an equal footing with the original states, in all respects 
whatever. 

Sec. 2. <^nd be it fait her enacted. That the Secretary of the Treasury, in 
carrying into efl'ect the thirteenth and fourteenth sections of the act of 
the twenty-third of June, eighteen hundred and thirty-six, entitled, " An 
act to regulate the deposites of the public money," shall consider the 
State o[ Michigan as being one of the United States, 

Mr. Calhouii then rose, and addressed the Senate as follows : 

I have bestowed on this subject all the attention that was in my power, 
and, although actuated by a most anxious desire for the admission of 
Michigan into the Union, I find it impossible to give my assent to this 
bill. I am satisfied the Judiciary Committee has not bestowed upon the 
subject all that attention which its magnitude requires, and I can explain 
it on no other supposition why they should place the admission on the 
grounds they have. One o[ the committee, the senator from Ohio on my 
left (Mr. Morris), has pronounced the grounds as dangerous and revolu- 
tionary ; he might have gone farther, and, with truth, pronounced them 
utterly repugnant to the principles of the Constitution, 

I have not ventured this assertion, as strong as it is, without due reflec- 
tion, and weighing the full force of the terms I have used, and do not 
fear, with an impartial hearing, to establish its truth beyond the power 
of controversy. 

To understand fully the objection to this bill, it is necessary that we 
should have a correct conception of the facts. They are few, and may be 
briefly told. 

Some time previous to the last session of Congress, the Territory of 
Michigan, through its Legislature, authorized the people to meet in con- 
vention for the purpose of forming a state government. They met, accord- 
ingly, and agreed upon a constitution, which they forthwith transmitted 
to Congress. It was fully discussed in this chamber, and, objectionable 
as the instrument was, an act was finally passed, which accepted the con- 
stitution, and declared Michigan to be a state and admitted into the 
Union, on the single condition that she should, by a convention of the 
people, assent to the boundaries prescribed by the act. Soon after our 
adjournment, the Legislature of the State of Michigan (for she had been 
raised by our assent to the dignity of a state) called a convention of the 
people of the state, in conformity to the act, which met, at the time 



orjir-i^nr-c 



appointed, at Ann Arbour, After full discussion, the convention ivith- 
held its assent and formally transmitted the result to the President of the 
United States. This is the first part of the story. I will now give the 
sequel. Since then, during the last month, a self-constituted assembly 
met, professedly as a convention of the people of the state, but without 
the authority of the state. This unauthorized and lawless assemblage 
assumed the high function of giving the assent of the State of Michigan 
to the condition of admission, as prescribed in the act of Congress. They 
communicated their assent to the executive of the United States, and he 
to the Senate. The Senate referred his message to the Committee on the 
Judiciary, and that committee reported this bill for the admission of the 
state. 

Such are the facts, out of which grows the important question, Had this 
self-constituted assembly the authority to assent for the state 1 Had they 
the authority to do what is implied in giving assent to the condition of 
admission] That assent introduces the state into the Union, and pledges 
it, in the most solemn manner, to the constitutional compact which binds 
these states in one confederated body ; imposes on her all its obligations, 
and confers on her all its benefits. Had this irregular, self-constitued as- 
semblage, the authority to perform these high and solemn acts of sov- 
ereignty in the name of the State of Michigan '{ She could only come 
in as a state, and none could act or speak for her without her express au- 
thority ; and to assume the authority without her sanction is nothing 
short of treason against the state. 

Again : the assent to the conditions prescribed by Congress implies an 
authority in those who gave it to supersede, in part, the Constitution of 
the State of Michigan ; for her Constitution fixes the boundaries of the 
state as part of that instrument, which the condition of admission en- 
tirely alters, and, to that extent, the assent would supersede the Consti- 
tution ; and thus the question is presented, whether this self-constituted 
assembly, styling itself a convention, had the authority to do an act which 
necessarily implies the right to supersede, in part, the Constitution. 

But farther : the State of Michigan, through its Legislature, authorized 
a convention of the people, in order to determine whether the condition 
of admission should be assented to or not. The convention met, and, 
after mature deliberation, it dissented from the condition of admission ; and 
thus, again, the question is presented, whether this self-called, self-consti- 
tuted assemblage, this caucus — for it is entitled to no higher name — had 
the authority to annul the dissent of the state, solemnly given by a con- 
vention of the people, regularly convoked under the express authority of 
the constituted authorities of the state 1 

If all or any of these questions be answered in the negative — if the self- 
created assemblage of December had no authority to speak in the name 
of the State of Michigan — if none to supersede any portion of her Con- 
stitution — if none to annul her dissent from the condition of admission, reg- 
ularly given by a convention of the people of the state, convoked by the 
authority of the state — to introduce her on its authority would be not 
only revolutionary and dangerous, but utterly repugnant to the principles 
of our Constitution. The question, then, submitted to the Senate is. Had 
that assemblage the authority to perform these high and solemn acts 1 

The chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary holds that this self- 
constituted assemblage had the authority; and what is his reason'? Why, 
truly, because a greater number of votes were given for those who con- 
stituted that assemblage than for those who constituted the convention 
of the people of the state, convened under its constituted authorities. 
This argument resolves itself into two questions — the first of fact, and 



■ ■■■■■■ rmi»*i 



the second of principle. I shall not discuss the first. It is not necessary 
to do so. But, if it were, it would be easy to show that never was so 
important a fact so loosely testified. There is not one particle of official 
evidence before us. We have nothing but the private letters of individ- 
uals, who do not know even the numbers that voted on either occasion j 
they know nothing of the qualifications of voters, nor how their votes 
were received, nor by whom counted. Now, none knows better than the 
honourable chairman himself, that such testimony as is submitted to us 
to establish a fact of this moment, would not be received in the lowest 
magistrate's court in the land. But I waive this. I come to the question 
of the principle involved ; and what is it \ The argument is, that a greater 
number of persons voted for the last convention than for the first, and, 
therefore, the acts of the last of right abrogated those of the first j in 
other words, ihat mere numbers, without regard to the forms of law or the 
principles of the Constitution, give authority. The authority of numbers, 
according to this argument, sets aside the authority of law and the Constitution. 
Need I show that such a principle goes to the entire overthrow of our 
constitutional government, and would subvert all social order % It is the 
identical principle which prompted the late revolutionary and anarchical 
movement in Maryland, and which has done more to shake confidence in 
our system of government than any event since the adoption of our Con- 
stitution, but which, happily, has been frowned down by the patriotism 
and intelligence of the people of that state. 

What was the ground of this insurrectionary measure, but that the 
government of Maryland did not represent the voice of the numerical 
majority of the people of Maryland, and that the authority of law and the 
Constitution was nothing against that of numbers \ Here we find on this 
floor, and from the head of the Judiciary Committee, the same principle re- 
vived, and, if possible, in a worse form ; for, in Maryland, the anarchists 
assumed that they were sustained by the numerical majority of the people 
of the state in their revolutionary movements ; but the utmost the chair- 
man can pretend to have is a mere plurality. The largest number of 
votes claimed for the self-created assemblage is 8000 j and no man will 
undertake to say that this constitutes anything like a majority of the 
voters of Michigan ; and he claims the high authority which he does for 
it, not because it is a majority of the people of Michigan, but because it 
is a greater number than voted for the authorized convention of the peo- 
ple that refused to agree to the condition of admission. It may be shown, 
by his own witness, that a majority of the voters of Michigan greatly ex- 
ceed 8000. Mr. Williams, the president of the self-created assemblage, 
stated that the population of that state amounted to nearly 200,000 per- 
sons. If so, there cannot be less than from 20,000 to 30,000 voters, con- 
sidering how nearly universal the right of sufirage is under its Constitu- 
tion ; and it thus appears that this irregular, self-constituted meeting did 
not represent the vote of one third of the state; and yet, on a mere prin- 
ciple of plurality, we are to supersede the Constitution of Michigan, and 
annul the act of a convention of the people, regularly convened under the 
authority of the government of the state. 

But, says the senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. Buchanan), this assembly 
was not self-constituted. It met under the authority of an act of Con- 
gress; and that act had no reference to the state, but only to the people ; 
and that the assemblage in December was just such a meeting as that act 
contemplated. It is not my intention to discuss the question whether the 
honourable senator has given the true interpretation of the act, but, if it 
were, I could very easily show his interpretation to be erroneous ; for, if 
such had been the intention o{ Congress, the act surely would have spe 



jjijQ :irCjrjKjni:jj 



cified the time when the convention was to be held, who were to be the 
manao-ers who the voters, and would not have left it to individuals who 
might° choose to assume the authority to determine all these important 
points. I might also readily show that the word " convention" of the 
people as use'd in law or the Constitution, always means a meeting of the 
people' reo-ularly convened by the constituted authority of the state, in their 
hio-h sovereio-n capacity, and that it never means such an assemblage as 
the one in question. But I waive this ; I take higher ground. If the act 
be indeed, such as the senator says it is, then I maintain that it is utterly 
opposed to the fundamental principles of our Federal Union. Congress 
has no rio-ht Avhatever to call a convention in a state. It can call but one 
convention, and that is a convention of the United States to amend the 
Federal Constitution ; nor can it call that, except authorized by two thirds 
of the states. 

Ours is a Federal Republic — a union of states. Michigan is a state ; a 
state in the course of admission, and differing only from the other states 
in her federal relations. She is declared to be a state, in the most solemn 
manner, by your own act. She can come into the Union only as a state, and 
by her voluntary assent, given by the people of the state in convention, 
called by the constituted authority of the state. To admit the State of 
Michigan on the authority of a self-created meeting, or one called by the 
direct°authority of Congress, passing by the authorities of the state, would 
be the most monstrous proceeding under our Constitution that can be con- 
ceived ; the most repugnant to its principles, and dangerous in its conse- 
quences. It would establish a direct relation between the individual citi- 
zens of a state and the General Government, in utter subversion of the 
federal character of our system. The relation of the citizens to this 
government is through the states exclusively. They are subject to its 
authority and laws only because the state has assented they should be. 
If she dissents, their assent is nothing ; on the other hand, if she assents, 
their dissent is nothing. It is through the state, then, and through the 
state alone, that the United States government can have any connexion 
with the people of a state ; and does not, then, the senator from Pennsyl- 
vania see, that if Congress can authorize a convention of the people in 
the State of Michigan without the authority of the state, it matters not 
what is the object,'^ it may, in like manner, authorize conventions in any 
other state for whatever purpose it may think proper 1 

Michigan is as much a sovereign state as any other, differing only, as 
I have said, as to her federal relations. If we give our sanction to the 
assemblage of December, on the principle laid down by the senator from 
Pennsylvania, then we establish the doctrine that Congress has power to 
call at pleasure conventions within the states. Is there a senator on this 
floor who will assent to such a doctrine 1 Is there one, especially, who 
represents the smaller states of this Union, or the weaker section 1 Ad- 
mit the power, and every vestige of state rights would be destroyed. 
Our system would be subverted, and, instead of a confederacy of free and 
sovereign states, we should have all power concentrated here, and this 
would become the most odious despotism. He, indeed, must be blind, 
who does not see that such a power would give the Federal Government 
a complete control of all the states. I call upon senators now to arrest 
a doctrine so dangerous. Let it be remembered that, under our system, 
bad precedents live forever; good ones only perish. We may not feei 
all the evil consequences at once, but this precedent, once set, will surely 
be received, and will become the instrument of infinite evil. 

It will be asked, What shall be done 1 Will you refuse to admit Michi- 
gan into the Union I I answer, No : I desire to admit her ; and if the seii- 



ators from Indiana and Ohio will agree, I am ready now to admit her as 
she stood at the beginning of last session, without giving sanction to the 
unauthorized assemblage of December. 

But if that does not meet their wishes, there is still another by which 
she may be admitted. "We are told two thirds of the Legislature and peo- 
ple of Michigan are in favour of accepting the conditions of the act of 
last session. If that be the fact, then all that is necessary is, that the 
Legislature should call another convention. All difficulty will thus be re- 
moved, and there will be still abundant time for her admission at this ses- 
sion. And shall we, for the sake of gaining a few months, give our as- 
sent to a bill fraught with principles so monstrous as this 1 

We have been told that, unless she is admitted immediately, it will be 
too late for her to receive her proportion of the surplus revenue under 
the deposite bill. I trust that on so great a question a difficulty like this 
will have no weight. Give her at once her full share. I am ready to do 
so at once, without waiting her admission. I was mortified to hear on 
so grave a question such motives assigned for her admission, contrary to 
the law and Constitution. Such considerations ought not to be present- 
ed when we are settling great constitutional principles. I trust that we 
shall pass by all such frivolous motives on this occasion, and take ground 
on the great and fundamental principle that an informal, irregular, self-con- 
stituted assembly, a mere caucus, has no authority to speak for a sovereign 
state in any case whatever ; to supersede its Constitution, or to reverse its 
dissent, deliberately given by a convention of the people of the state, reg- 
ularly convened under its constituted authority. 



XVII. 

ON THE SAME SUBJECT, JANUARY 5, 1837. 

Mr. Grundy, chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary, having 
moved that the bill to admit the State of Michigan into the Union be now 
read a third time, 

Mr. Calhoun addressed the Senate in opposition to the bill. 

I have (said Mr. C.) been connected with this government more than 
half its existence, in various capacities, and during that long period I have 
looked on its action with attention, and have endeavoured to make my- 
self acquainted with the principles and character of our political institu- 
tions; and I can truly say, that within that time no measure has received 
the sanction of Congress which has appeared to me more unconstitutional 
and dangerous than the present. It assails our political system in its 
weakest point, and where, at this time, it most requires defence. 

The great and leading objections to the bill rest mainly on the ground 
that Michigan is a state. They have been felt by its friends to have so 
much weight, that its advocates have been compelled to deny the fact, as 
the only way of meeting the objections. Here, then, is the main point at 
issue between the friends and the opponents of the bill. It turns on a fact, 
and that fact presents the question. Is 3Iichigan a state ? 

If (said Mr. C.) there ever was a party committed on a fact — if there 
ever was one estopped from denying it — that party is the present majority 
in the Senate, and that fact that Michigan is a state. It is the very party 
who urged through this body, at the last session, a bill for the admission 
of the State of Michigan, which accepted her Constitution, and declared, 
in the most explicit and strongest terms, that she was a state. I will not 
take up the time of the Senate by reading this solemn declaration. It has 

1 1 



250 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

frequently been read during- this debate, and is familiar to all who hear 
me, and has not been questioned or denied. But it has been said there 
is a condition annexed to the declaration, with which she must comply- 
before she can become a state. There is, indeed, a condition ; but it has 
been shown by my colleague and others, from the plain wording of the 
act, that the condition is not attached to the acceptance of the Constitu- 
tion, nor the declaration that she is a state, but simply to h.e^ admission 
into the Union. I will not repeat the argument, but, in order to place the 
subject beyond controversy, I shall recall to memory the history of the 
last session, as connected with the admission of ^Michigan. The facts 
need but be referred to, in order to revive their recollection. 

There were two points proposed to be effected by the friends of the bill 
at the last session. The first was to settle the controversy, as to bound- 
ary, between Michigan and Ohio, and it was that object alone which im- 
posed the condition that Michigan should assent to the boundary pre- 
scribed by the act as the condition of her admission. But there was an- 
other object to be accomplished. Two respectable gentlemen, who had 
been elected by the state as senators, were then waiting to take their 
seats on this floor ; and the other object of the bill was to provide for 
their taking their seats as senators on the admission of the state, and for 
this purpose it was necessary to make the positive and unconditional dec- 
laration that Michigan was a state, as a state only could choose senators, 
by an express provision of the Constitution ; and hence, the admission was 
made conditional, and the declaration that she was a state was made ab- 
solute, in order to effect both objects. To show that I am correct, I will 
ask the secretary to read the third section of the bill. 

[The section was read, accordingly, as follows: 

" Sect. 3. ^nd he it farther e?iacted, That, as a compliance with the 
fundamental condition of admission contained in the last preceding sec- 
tion of this act, the boundaries of the said State of Michigan, as in that 
section described, declared, and established, shall receive the assent of a 
convention of delegates elected by the people of said state, for the sole 
purpose of giving the assent herein required ; and as soon as the assent 
herein required shall be given, the President of the United States shall 
announce the same by proclamation ; and thereupon, and without any faN 
ther proceeding on the part of Congress, the admission of the said state 
into the Union, as one of the United States of America, on an equal foot- 
ing with the original states in every respect whatever, shall be considered 
as complete, and the senators and representatives who have been elected 
by the said state as its representative in the Congress of the United States, 
shall be entitled to take their seats in the Senate and House of Repre- 
sentatives respectively, without farther delay."] 

Mr. Calhoun then asked. Does not every senator see the two objects — 
the one to settle the boundary, and the other to admit her senators to a 
seat in this body ; and that the section is so worded as to effect both, in 
the manner I have stated 1 If this needed confirmation, it would find it 
in the debate on the passage of the bill, when the ground was openly- 
taken by the present majority, that Michigan had a right to form her con- 
stitution, under the ordinance of 1787, without our consent, and that she 
was of right, and in fact, a state, beyond our control. 

I will (said Mr. C.) explain my own views on this point, in order that 
the consistency of my course at the last and present session may be 
clearly seen. 

My opinion was, and still is, that the movement of the people of Michi- 
gan in forming for themselves a state constitution, without waiting for the 
assent of Congress, was revolutionary, as it threw oif the authority of the 



United States over the territory ; and that we were left at liberty to treat 
the proceedings as revolutionary, and to remand her to her territorial 
condition, or to waive the irregularity, and to recognise what was done as 
rightfully done, as our authority alone was concerned. 

My impression was, that the former was the proper course ; but I also 
thought that the act remanding her back should contain our assent in the 
usual manner for her to form a constitution, and thus to leave her free to 
become a state. This, however, was overruled. The opposite opinion 
prevailed, that she had a perfect right to do what she had done, and that 
she was, as I have stated, a state both in fact and right, and that we had 
no control over her; and our act, accordingly, recognised her as a state 
from the time she had adopted her Constitution, and admitted her into the 
Union on the condition of her assenting to the prescribed boundaries. 
Having thus solemnly recognised her as a state, we cannot now undo 
what was then done. There were, in fact, many irregularities in the pro- 
ceedings, all of which were urged in vain against its passage ; but the 
presidential election was then pending, and the vote of Michigan was con- 
sidered of sufficient weight to overrule all objections and correct all ir- 
regularities. They were all, accordingly, overruled, and we cannot now 
go back. 

Such was the course, and such the acts of the majority at the last 
session. A few short months have since passed. Other objects are now 
to be effected, and all is forgotten as completely as if they had never ex- 
isted. The very senators who then forced the act through, on the ground 
that Michigan was a state, have wheeled completely round, to serve the 
present purpose, and taken directly the opposite ground! We live in 
strange and inconsistent times. Opinions are taken up and laid down, as 
suits the occasion, without hesitation, or the slightest regard to principles 
or consistency. It indicates an unsound state of the public mind, preg- 
nant with future disasters. 

I turn to the position now assumed by the majority to suit the present 
occasion ; and, if I mistake not, it will be found as false in fact, and as er- 
roneous in principle, as it is inconsistent with that maintained at the last 
session. They now take the ground that Michigan is not a state, and 
cannot, in fact, be a state till she is admitted into the Union ; and this on 
the broad principle that a territory cannot become a state till admitted. 
Such is the position distinctly taken by several of the friends of this bill, 
and implied in the arguments of nearly all who have spoken in its favour. 
In fact, its advocates had no choice. As untenable as it is, they were 
forced on this desperate position. They had no other which they could 
occupy. 

I have shown that it is directly in the face of the law of the last ses- 
sion, and that it denies the recorded acts of those who now maintain the 
position. I now go farther, and assert that it is in direct opposition to 
plain and unquestionable matter of fact. There is no fact more certain 
than that Michigan is a state. She is in the full exercise of sovereign 
authority, with a Legislature and a chief magistrate. She passes laws, she 
executes them, she regulates titles, and even takes away life — all on her 
own authority. Ours has entirely ceased over her, and yet there are those 
who can deny, with all these facts before them, that she is a state. They 
might as well deny the existence of this hall ! We have long since as- 
sumed unlimited control over the Constitution, to twist and turn, and deny 
it, as it suited our purpose ; and it would seem that we are presumptu- 
ously attempting to assume like supremacy over facts themselves, as if 
their existence or non-existence depended on our volition. I speak freely. 
The occasion demands that the truth should be boldly uttered. 



)ib)i SPEECHES OF JOHiN U. UALHOUW. 

But those who may not regard their own recorded acts, nor the plain 
facts of the case, may possibly feel the awkward condition in which 
comincr events may shortly place them. The admission of Michigan is 
not the onlj?^ point involved in the passage of this bill. A question will 
follow, which may be presented to the Senate in a very few days, as to 
the rio-ht of Mr. Norvell and Mr. Lyon, the two respectable gentlemen 
who have been elected senators by Michigan, to take their seats in this 
hall. The decision of this question will require a more sudden facing 
about than has been yet witnessed. It required seven- or. eight months 
for the majority to wheel about from the position maintained at the last 
session to that taken at this, but there may not be allowed them now as 
many days to wheel back to the old position. These gentlemen cannot 
be refused their seats after the admission of the state by those gentlemen 
who passed the act of the last session. It provides for the case. I now 
put it to the friends of this bill, and I ask them to weigh the question de- 
liberately — to bring it home to their bosom and conscience before they 
answer — Can a territory elect senators to Congress 1 The Constitution 
is express: states only can choose senators. Were not these gentlemen 
chosen long before the admission of Michigan ; before the Ann Arbour 
meeting, and while Michigan was, according to the doctrine:^ of the 
friends of this bill, a territory! Will they, in the face of the Constitu- 
tion, which they are sworn to support, admit as senators on this floor 
those who, by their own statement, were elected by a territory "? These 
questions may soon be presented for decision. The majoritj^, who are 
forcing this bill through, are already committed by the act of last session, 
and I leave theiji to reconcile as they can the ground they now take with 
the vote they must give when the question of their right to take their seats 
is presented for decision. 

A total disregard of all principle and consistency has so entangled this 
subject, that there is but one mode left of extricating ourselves without 
trampling the Constitution in the dust ; and that is, to return back to 
where we stood when the question was first presented; to acquiesce in 
the right of Michigan to form a constitution, and erect herself into a state, 
under the ordinance of 1787 ; and to repeal so much of the act of the last 
session as prescribed the condition on which she was to be admitted. 
This was the object of the amendment that I offered last evening, in order 
to relieve the Senate from its present dilemma. The amendment involved 
the merits of the whole case. It was too. late in the day for discussion, 
and I asked for indulgence till to-day, that I might have an opportunity 
of presenting my views. Under the iron rule of the present majority, the 
indulgence was refused, and the bill ordered to its third reading; and I 
have been thus compelled to address the Senate when it is too late to 
amend the bill, and after a majority have committed themselves both as 
to its principles and details. Of such proceedings I complain not. I, as 
one of the minority, ask no favours. All I ask is, that the Constitution be 
not violated. Hold it sacred, and I shall be the last to complain. 

I now return to the assumption that a territory cannot become a state 
till admitted into the Union, which is now relied on with so much con- 
fidence to prove that Michigan is not a state, I reverse the position. I 
assert the opposite, that a territory cannot be admitted till she becomes 
a state ; and in this I stand on the authority of the Constitution itself, 
which expressly limits the power of Congress to admitting new states 
into the Union. But, if the Constitution had been silent, he would indeed 
be ignorant of the character of our political system, who did not see that 
states, sovereign and independent communities, and not territories, can 
only be admitted. Ours is a union of states, a Federal Republic. States, 



ar tjEj^^riLjKi \jc uujiii \^» v/^xjxivune 



and not territories, form its component parts, bound together by a solemn 
leao-ue, in the form of a constitutional compact. In coming into the 
Union, the state pledges its faith to this sacred compact : an act which 
none but a sovereign and independent community is competent to per- 
form ; and, of course, a territory must first be raised to that condition be- 
fore she can take her stand among the confederated states of our Union. 
How can a territory pledge its faith to the Constitution 1 It has no will 
of its own. You give it all its powers, and you can at pleasure overrule 
all her actions. If she enters as a territory, the act is yours, not hers. 
Her consent is nothing without your authority and sanction. Can you, can 
Congress, become a party to the constitutional compact % How absurd. 

But I am told, if this be so — if a territory must become a state before it 
can be admitted — it would follow that she might refuse to enter the Union 
after she had acquired the right of acting for herself. Certainly she may. 
A state cannot be forced into the Union. She must come in by her own 
free assent^ given in her highest sovereign capacity through a convention 
of the people of the state. Such is the constitutional provision j and those 
who make the objection must overlook both the Constitution and the ele- 
mentary principles of our government, of which the right of self govern- 
ment is the first } the right of every people to form their own government, 
and to determine their political condition. This is the doctrine on which 
our fathers acted in our glorious Revolution, which has done more for 
the cause of liberty throughout the world than any event within the rec- 
ord of history, and on which the government has acted from the first, as 
regards all that portion of our extensive territory that lies beyond the 
limits of the original states. Read the ordinance of 1787, and the various 
acts for the admission of new states, and you will find the principle in- 
variably recognised and acted on, to the present unhappy instance, with- 
out any departure from it, except in the case of Missouri. The admis- 
sion of Michigan is destined, I fear, to mark a great change in the his- 
tory of the admission of new states ; a total departure from the old usage, 
and the noble principle of self-government on which that usage was found- 
ed. Everything, thus far, connected with her admission, has been irreg- 
ular and monstrous. I trust it is not ominous. Surrounded by lakes 
within her natural limits (which ought not to have been departed from), 
and possessed of fertile soil and genial climate, with every prospect of 
wealth, power, and influence, who but must regret that she should be 
ushered into the Union in a manner so irregular and unworthy of her fu- 
ture destiny 1 

But I will waive these objections, constitutional and all. I will sup- 
pose, with the advocates of the bill, that a territory cannot become a state 
till admitted into the Union. Assuming all this, I ask them to explain to 
me how the mere act of admission can transmute a territory into a state. By 
Avhose authority would she be made a state \ By ours \ How can we 
make a state 1 We can form a territory ; we can admit states into the 
Union ; but I repeat the question, How can we make a state 1 I had sup- 
posed this government was the creature of the states, formed by their 
authority, and dependant on their will for its existence. Can the crea- 
ture form the creator \ If not by our authority, then by whose 1 Not by 
her own ; that would be absurd. The very act of admission makes her a 
member of the confederacy, with no other or greater power than is pos- 
sessed by all the others ; all of whom, united, cannot create a state. By 
what process, then, by what authority can a territory become a state, if 
not one before admitted! Who can explain 1 How full of difficulties, 
compared to the long-established, simple, and noble process which has 
prevailed to the present instant ! According to the old usage, the Gen- 



eral Government first withdraws its authority over a certain portion of its 
territory, as soon as it has a sutiicient population to constitute a state. 
They are thus left to themselves freely to form a constitution, and to ex- 
ercise the noble right of self-government. They then present their Con- 
stitution to Congress, and ask the privilege (for one it is of the highest 
character) to become a member of this glorious confederacy of states. 
The Constitution is examined, and, if Republican, as required by the Fed- 
eral Constitution, she is admitted, with no other condition except such as 
may be necessary to secure the authority of Congress over the public do- 
main within her limits. This is the old, the established form, instituted 
by our ancestors of the Revolution, who so well understood the great 
principles of liberty and self-government. How simple, how sublime ! 
What a contrast to the doctrines of the present day, and the precedent 
which, I fear, we are about to establish ! And shall we fear, so long as 
these sound principles are observed, that a state will reject this high priv- 
ilege — will refuse to enter this Union 1 No, she will rush into the em- 
brace of the Union so long as your institutions are worth preserving. 
When the advantages of the Union shall have become a matter of calcu- 
lation and doubt j when new states shall pause to determine whether the 
Union is a curse or a blessing, the question which now agitates us will 
cease to have any importance. 

Having now, I trust, established, beyond all controversy, that Michigan 
is a state, I come to the great point at issue — to the decision of which all 
that has been said is but preparatory — Had the self-created assembly which 
met at Ann Arbour the authority to speak in the name of the people of 
Michio-an ; to assent to the conditions contained in the act of the last ses- 
sion ; to supersede a portion of the Constitution of the state, and to over- 
rule the dissent of the convention of the people, regularly called by the 
constituted authorities of the state, to the condition of admission \ I 
shall not repeat what I said when I first addressed the Senate on this bill. 
We all, by this time, know the character of that assemblage ; that it met 
without the sanction of the authorities of the state ; and that it did not 
pretend to represent one third of the people. We all know that the state 
had regularly convened a convention of the people, expressly to take into 
consideration the condition on which it was proposed to admit her into 
the Union, and that the convention, after full deliberation, had declined 
to give its assent by a considerable majority. With a knowledge of all 
these facts, I put the question, Had the assembly a right to act for the 
state \ Was it a convention of the people of ]\Iichigan, in the true, legal, 
and constitutional sense of that term] Is there one within the limits of 
my voice that can lay his hand on his breast and honestly say it was 1 
Is there one that does not feel that it was neither more nor less than a 
mere caucus — nothing but a party caucus — of which we have the strongest 
evidence in the perfect unanimity of those who assembled! Not a vote 
was (riven ajrainst admission. Can there be stronger proof that it was a 
meeting got up by party machinery, for party purpose ] 

But I go farther. It was not only a party caucus, for party purpose, 
hut a criminal meeting — a meeting to subvert the authority of the state, and 
to assume its sovereignty. I know not whether Michigan has yet passed 
laws to guard her sovereignty. It may be that she has not had time to 
enact laws for this purpose, which no community is long without ; but I 
do aver, if there be such an act, or if the common law be in force in the 
state, the actors in that meeting might be indicted, tried, and punished 
for the very act on which it is ?iow proposed to admit the state into the Umon. 
If such a meeting as this were to undertake to speak in the name of South 
Carolina, we would speedily teach its authors what they owed to the 



■" — 



authority and dignity of the state. The act was not only in contempt of 
the authority of the State of Michigan, but a direct insult on this govern- 
ment. Here is a self-created meeting, convened for a criminal object, 
which has dared to present to this government an act of theirs, and to 
expect that we are to receive this irregular and criminal act as a ful- 
filment of the condition which we had prescribed for the admission of the 
state ! Yet I fear, forgetting our own dignity, and the rights o( Michi- 
gan, that we are about to recognise the validity of the act, and quietly to 
submit to the insult. 

The year 1S36 (said Mr. C.) is destined to mark the most remarkable 
change in our political institutions since the adoption of the Constitution. 
The events of the year have made a deeper innovation on the principles 
of the Constitution, and evinced a stronger tendency to revolution, than 
any which have occurred from its adoption to the present day. Sir (said 
Mr. C, addressing the Vice-president), duty compels me to speak of facts 
intimately connected with yourself. In deference to your feelings as 
presiding officer of the body, I shall speak of them with all possible re- 
serve, much more reserve than I should otherwise have done if you did 
not occupy that seat. Among the first of these events which I shall no- 
tice, is tfie caucus of Baltimore ; that, too, like the Ann Arbour caucus, 
has been dignified with the name of the convention of the people. This 
caucus was got up under the countenance and express authority of the 
President himself; and its edict, appointing you his successor, has been 
sustained, not only by the whole patronage and power of the government, 
but by his active personal influence and exertion. Through its instru- 
mentality he has succeeded in controlling the voice of the people, and, 
for the first time, the President has appointed his successor ; and thus 
the first great step of converting our government into a monarchy has 
been achieved. These are solemn and ominous facts. Xo one who has 
examined the result of the last election can doubt their truth. It is now 
certain that you are not the free and unbiased choice of the people of 
these United States. If left to your own popularity, without the active 
and direct influence of the President, and the power and patronage of the 
government, acting through a mock convention of the people, instead of 
the highest, you would, in all probability, have been the lowest of the 
candidates. 

During the same year, the state in which this ill-omened caucus con- 
vened, has been agitated by revolutionary movements of the most alarm- 
ing character. Assuming the dangerous doctrines that they were not 
bound to obey the injunctions of the Constitution, because it did not place 
the powers of the state in the hands of an unchecked numerical major- 
ity, the electors belonging to the party of the Baltimore caucus, who had 
been chosen to appoint the state senators, refused to perform the func- 
tions for which they had been elected, with the deliberate intention to 
subvert the government of the state, and reduce her to the territory con- 
dition, till a new government could be formed. And now we have before 
us a measure not less revolutionary, but of an opposite character. In 
the case of ^Maryland, those who undertook, without the authority of 
law or Constitution, to speak and act in the name of the people of the 
state, proposed to place her out of the Union by reducing her from a 
state to a territory ; but in this, those who, in like manner, undertook to 
act for Michigan, have assumed the authority to bring her into the Union 
without her consent, on the very condition which she had rejected by a 
convention of the people, convened under the authority of the state. If 
we shall sanction the authority of the Michigan caucus to force a state 
into the Union without its assent, why might we not here sanction a 



similar caucus in Maryland, if one had been called, to place the state out^ 
of the Union 1 

These occurrences, which have distinguished the past year, mark" the 
commencement of no ordinary change in our political system. They an- 
nounce the ascendency of the caucus system over the regularly constituted au- 
thorities of the country. I have long anticipated this event. In early life 
my attention was attracted to the working of the caucus system. It was 
my fortune to spend five or six years of my youth in the northern por- 
tion of the Union, where, unfortunatelj^, the system has so long prevailed. 
Though young, I was old enough to take interest in public affairs, and to 
notice the working of this odious party machine ; and after-reflection, 
with the experience then acquired, has long satisfied me that, in the 
course of time, the edicts of the caucus would eventually supersede the 
authority of law and Constitution. We have at last arrived at the com- 
mencement of this great change, which is destined to go on till it has 
consummated itself in the entire overthrow of all legal and constitutional 
authority, unless speedily and effectually resisted. The reason is obvi- 
ous : for obedience and disobedience to the edicts of the caucus, where 
the system is firmly established, are more certainly and effectually re- 
warded and punished than to the laws and Constitution. Disobedience 
to the former is sure to be followed by complete political disfranchise- 
ment. It deprives the unfortunate individual who falls under its ven- 
geance of all public honours and emoluments, and consigns him, if depend- 
ant on the government, to poverty and obscurity ; while he who bows 
down before its mandates, it matters not how monstrous, secures to him- 
self the honours of the state, becomes rich, and distinguished, and power- 
ful. Offices, jobs, and contracts flow on him and his connexions. But 
to obey the law and respect the Constitution, for the most part, brings 
little except the approbation of conscience — a reward, indeed, high and 
noble, and prized by the virtuous above all others, but, unfortunately, little 
valued by the mass of mankind. It is easy to see what must be the 
end, unless, indeed, an effective remedy be applied. Are we so blind as 
not to see this — why it is that the advocates of this bill, the friends of the 
system, are so tenacious on the point that Michigan should be admitted 
on the authority of the Ann Arbour caucus, and on no other 1 Do we 
not see why the amendment proposed by myself, to admit her by rescind- 
ing the condition imposed at the last session, should be so strenuously 
opposed 1 Why even the preamble would not be surrendered, though 
many of our friends were willing to vote for the bill on that slight con- 
cession, in their anxiety to admit the state 1 

And here let me say that I listened with attention to the speech of the 
senator from Kentucky (Mr. Crittenden). I know the clearness of his 
understanding and the soundness of his heart, and I am persuaded, in 
declaring that his objection to the bill was confined to the preamble, that 
he has not investigated the subject with the attention it deserves. I feel 
the objections to the preamble are not without some weight ; but the 
true and insuperable objections lie far deeper in the facts of the case, 
which would still exist were the preamble expunged. It is these which 
render it impossible to pass this bill without trampling under foot the 
rights of the states, and subverting the first principles of our government. 
It would require but a few steps more to effect a complete revolution, 
and the senator from North Carolina has taken the first. I will explain. 
If you wish to mark the first indications of a revolution, the commence- 
ment of those profound changes in the character of a people which are 
working beneath, before a ripple appears on the surface, look to the 
change of language : you will first notice it in the altered meaning of im- 



'—'"^ 



portant words, and which, as it indicates a change m the leelings and 
principles of the people, become, in turn, a powerful instrument in accel- 
erating the change, till an entire revolution is efTected. The remarks of 
the senator will illustrate what I have said. He told us that the terms 
" convention of the people" were of very uncertain meaning and difRcuh 
to be defined ; but that their true meaning was, any meeting of the people, in 
their individual and primary character, for political purposes. I know it 
is difficult to define complex terms, that is, to enumerate all the ideas 
that belong to them, and exclude all that do not ; but there is always, in 
the most complex, some prominent idea which marks the meaning of the 
term, and in relation to which there is usually no disagreement. Thus, ac- 
cording to the old meaning (and which I had still supposed was its legal and 
constitutional meaning), a convention of the people invariably implied a 
meeting oi the people, either by themselves, or by delegates expressly 
chosen for the purpose, in their high sovereign authority^ in expressed con- 
tradistinction to such assemblies of individuals in their private character, 
or having only derivative authority. It is, in a word, a meeting of the 
people in the majesty of their power — in that in which they may right- 
fully make or abolish constitutions, and put up or put down governments 
at their pleasure. Such was the august conception which formerly entered 
the mind of every American when the terms "convention of the people" 
were used. But now, according to the ideas of the dominant party, as 
we are told on the authority of the senator from North Carolina, it means 
any meeting of individuals for political purposes, and, of course, applies 
to the meeting at Ann Arbour,, or any other party caucus for party pur- 
poses, which the leaders choose to designate as a convention of the peo- 
ple. It is thus the highest authority known to our laws and Constitution 
is gradually sinking to the level of those meetings which regulate the 
operation of political parties, and through which the edicts of their lead- 
ers are announced and their authority enforced; or, rather, to speak 
more correctly, the latter are gradually rising to the authority of the 
former. When they come to be completely confounded ; when the dis- 
tinction between a caucus and the convention of the people shall be com- 
pletely obliterated, which the definition of the senator, and the acts of 
this body on this bill, would lead us to believe is not far distant, this fair 
political fabric of ours, erected by the wisdom and patriotism of our an- 
cestors, and once the gaze and admiration of the world, will topple to the 
ground in ruins. 

It has, perhaps, been too much my habit to look more to the future and 
less to the present than is wise ; but such is the constitution of my mind, 
that, when I see before me the indications of causes calculated to effect 
important changes in our political condition, I am led irresistibly to trace 
them to their sources, and follow them out in their consequences. Lan- 
guage has been held in this discussion which is clearly revolutionary in 
its character and tendency, and which warns us of the approach of the 
period when the struggle will be between the conservatives and the destruc- 
tives. I understood the senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. Buchanan) as 
holding language countenancing the principle that the will of a mere nu- 
merical majority is paramount to the authority of law and Constitution. 
He did not, indeed, announce distinctly this principle, but it might fairly 
be inferred from what he said ; for he told us, the latter, where the Con- 
stitution gives the same weight to a smaller as to a greater number, might 
take the remedy into their own hand ; meaning, as I understood him, that 
a mere majority might, at their pleasure, subvert the Constitution and 
government of a state, which he seemed to think was the essence of De- 
mocracy. Our little state has a Constitution that couLd not stand a day 

Kk 



against such doctrines, and yet we glojry in it as the best in the Union, 
It is a Constitution which respects all the great interests of the statCj 
givino- to each a separate and distinct voice in the management of its po- 
liticaf affairs, by means of which the feebler interests are protected against 
the preponderance of the greater. We call our state a republic, a com- 
monwealth, not a democracy ; and let me tell the senator it is a far more 
popular government than if it had been based on the simple principle of 
the numerical majority. It takes more voices to put the machine of gov- 
ernment in motion than those that the senator would consider more pop- 
ular. It represents all the interests of the state, and is, in fact, the gov- 
ernment of the people, in the true sense of the term, and not of the mere 
majority, or the dominant interests. 

I am not familiar with the Constitution of Maryland, to which the sen- 
ator alluded, and cannot, therefore, speak of its structure with confidence ; 
but I believe it to be somewhat similar in its character to our own. That 
it is a government not without its excellence, we need no better proof 
than the fact that, though within the shadow of executive influence, it has 
nobly and successfully resisted all the seductions by which a corrupt and 
artful administration, with almost boundless patronage, has tempted to 
seduce her into its ranks- 
Looking, then, to the approaching struggle, I take my stand immova- 
bly. I am a conservative in its broadest arid fullest sense, and such / shall 
ever remain, unless, indeed, the government shall become so corrupt and disor- 
dered that nothing short of revolution can reform it. I solemnly believe that 
our political system is, in its purity, not only the best that ever was 
formed, but the best possible that can be devised for us. It is the only 
one by which free states, so populous and wealthy, and occupying so vast 
an extent of territory, can preserve their liberty. Thus thinking, I can- 
not hope for a better. Having no hope of a better, I am a conservative ; 
and, because I am a conservative, I am a state rights man. I believe that in 
the rights of the states are to be found the only effectual means of check- 
ing the overaction of this government; to resist its tendency to concen- 
trate all power here, and to prevent a departure from the Constitution ; 
or, in case of one, to restore the government to its original simplicity and 
purity. State interposition, or, to express it more fully, the right of a 
state to interpose her sovereign voice, as one of the parties to our consti- 
tutional compact, against the encroachments of this government, is the 
only means of sufficient potency to effect all this ; and I am, therefore, 
its advocate. I rejoiced to hear the senators from North Carolina (Mr. 
Brown) and Pennsylvania (Mr. Buchanan) do us the justice to distin- 
guish between nullification and the anarchical and revolutionary move 
ments in Maryland and Pennsylvania. I know they did not intend 
it as a compliment, but I regard it as the highest. They are right. Day 
and night are not more difllerent — more unlike in everything. They are 
unlike in their principles, their objects, and their consequences. 

I shall not stop to make good this assertion, as I might easily do. The 
occasion does not call for it. As a conservative and a state rights man, 
or, if you will have it, a nullifier, I have and shall resist all encroachments 
on the Constitution, Avhether it be the encroachment of this government 
on the states, or the opposite — the executive on Congress, or Congress 
on the executive. My creed is to hold both governments, and all the 
departments of each, to their proper sphere, and to maintain the author- 
ity of the laws and the Constitution against all revolutionary movements. 
I believe the means which our system furnishes to preserve itself are am- 
ple, if fairly understood and applied ; and I shall resort to them, however 
c&irrnpt and disordered the times, so long as there is hope of reforming 



IBBBBf 



the government. Ihe result is in the hands of the Disposer of ev^ents. 
-it is my part to do my duty. Yet, while I thus openly avow myself a 
conservative, God forbid I should ever deny the glorious, right of rebel- 
lion and revolution. Should corruption and oppression become intoler- 
able, and cannot otherwise be thrown off — if liberty must perish, or the 
government be overthrown, I would not hesitate, at the hazard of life, 
to resort to revolution, and to tear down a corrupt government, that 
could neither be reformed nor borne by freemen ; but I trust in God 
things will never come to that pass. I trust never to see such fearful 
times; for fearful, indeed, they would be, if they; should ever befall us. It 
is the last remedy, and not to be thought of till .common sense arid the 
voice of mankind would justify the resort. 

Before I resume my seat, I feel called on to make a few brief remarlis 
on a doctrine of fearful import, which has been broached in the course 
of this debate — :the right to repeal laws granting bank charters, and, of 
course, of railroadsj turnpikes, and joint-stock companies. It is a doc- 
trine of fearful import, and calculated to do infinite mischief. There are 
countless millions vested in such stocks, and it is a description of property 
of the rriost delicate character. To touch it is almost to destroy it. But, 
while I enter my protest against all such doctrines, I have been greatly 
alarmed with the thoughtless precipitancy (not to use a stronger phrase) 
with which the most extensive and dangerous privileges have been grant- 
ed of late. It can end in no good, and, I fear, may be the cause of con- 
vulsions hereafter. We already feel the effects on the currency, which 
no one competent of judging but must see is in an unsound condition. I 
must say (for truth compels me) I have ever distrusted the banking sys- 
tem, at least in its present form, both in this country and Great Britain. 
It will not stand the test of time; but I trust that all shocks or sudden 
revolutions may be avoided, and that it may gradually give way before 
some sounder and better-regulated system of credit, which the growing 
intelligence of the age may devise. That a better may be substituted I 
cannot doubt ; but of what it shall consist, and how it shall finally super- 
sede the present uncertain and fluctuating "currency, time alone can de- 
termine. AH I can see is, that the present must, one day or another, 
come to an end, or be greatly modified, if that, indeed, can save it frtom 
an entire overthrow. It has within itself the seeds of its own destruction. 



XVIIL 

SPEECH ON THE tilLL AUTHORIZING AN ISSUE OF TREASURY NOTES, 
SEPTEMBER 19, 1837. 

• Mr. President : An extraordinary course of events, vvith which all are 'too 
familiar to need recital, has separated, in fact, the government and the banks. 
What relation shall they bear hereafter ? Shall the banks again be used as 
fiscal agents of the government? Be the depositories of the public money? 
And, above all, shall their notes be considered and treated as money in the re- 
ceipts and expenditures of the government ? This is the great and leading 
question ; one of the first magnitude, and full of consequences. I have given 
,it my most anxious and deliberate attention, and have come to the conclugion 
that we have reached the period when the interests both of the government, 
and the banks forbid a- reunion. I now propose to offer my reasons for this: 
conclusion. I shall do it with that perfect frankness due to the subject, to the- 
country, and the position I occupy. All I ask is, that I may be heard with a 



candour and fairness corresponding to the sincerity with which I shall deliver 
my sentiments. 

Those who support a reunion of the banks and the government have to 
overcome a preliminary difficulty. They are now separated by operation of 
law, and cannot be united while the present state of things continues, without 
repealing the law which has disjoined them. I ask, Who is willing to propose 
its repeal ? Is there any one who, during the suspension of specie payments, 
would advocate their employment as the fiscal agents of the government, who 
■would make them the depositories of the public revenue, or who would receive 
and pay away their notes in the public dues ? If there be none, then it results 
that the separation must continue for the present, and that the reunion must be 
the work of time, and depending on the contingency of the resumption of specie 
payments. 

But suppose this difliculty to be removed, and that the banks were regularly 
redeeming their notes, from what party in this body can the proposition come, 
or by which can it be supported, for a reunion between them and the govern- 
ment ? Who, after what has happened, can advocate the reunion of the govern- 
ment with the league of state banks ? Can the opposition, who for years have 
been denouncing it as the most dangerous instrument of power, and efficient 
means of corrupting and controlling the government and country' ? Can thev, 
after the exact fulfilment of all their predictions of disastrous consequences 
from the connexion, now turn round and support that which they have so 
long and loudly condemned 1 We have heard much from the opposite side of 
untried experiments on the currency. I concur in the justice of the censure. 
Nothing can be more delicate than the currency. Nothing can require to be 
more delicately handled. It ought never to be tampered with, nor touched, im- 
til it becomes absolutely necessar}\ But, if untried experiments justly deserve 
censure, what condemnation would a repetition of an experiment that has failed 
deserve ? An experiment that has so signally failed, both in the opinion of sup- 
porters and opponents, as to call down the bitter denunciation of those who 
tried it. If to make the experiment was folly, the repetition would be madness. 
But if the opposition cannot support the measure, how can it be expected to 
receive support from the friends of the administration, in whose hands the ex- 
periment has so signally failed as to call down from them execrations deep and 
loud ? 

If, Mr. President, there be any one point fully established by experience 
and reason, I hold it to be the utter incompetency of the state banks to furnish, 
of themselves, a sound and stable currency. They may succeed in prosperous 
times, but the first adverse current necessarily throws them into utter confusion. 
Nor has any device been found to give them the requisite strength and stability 
but a great central and controlling bank, instituted under the authority of this 
government. I go farther : if we must continue our connexion with the banks 
— if we must receive and pay away their notes as money, we not only have 
the right to regulate, and give uniformity and stability to them, but we are bound 
to do so, and to use the most efficient means for that purpose. The Constitu- 
tion makes it our duty to lay and collect the taxes and duties uniformly through- 
out the Union ; to fulfil which, we are bound to give the highest possible equality 
of value throughout every part of the country, to whatever medium it may be 
collected in ; and if that be bank-notes, to adopt the most efiective means of ac- 
complishing it, which experience has shown to be a Bank of the United States. 
This has been long my opinion. I entertained it in 1816, and repeated it, in 
my place here on the deposite question, in 1834. The only alternative, then, 
is, disguise it as you may, between a disconnexion and a Bank of the tfnited 
States. This is the real issue to which all must come, and ought now to be 
openly and fairly met. 

But there are difficulties in the way of a National Bank, no less formidable 



BgMMBMMMMaana 



si-fjiiit^ncis ur jyjtiLy \^. ^^Ajunuuii. 



than a reconnexion with the state banks. It is utterly impracticable, at pres- 
ent, to establish one. There is reason to believe that a majority of the peo- 
ple of the United States are deliberately and unalterably opposed to it. At 
all events, there is a numerous, respectable, and powerful party — I refer to the 
old State Eights party — who are, and ever have been, from the beginning of 
the urovernment, opposed to the Bank, and whose opinions, thus long and firmly 
entertained, ought, at least, to be so much respected as to forbid the creation 
of one without an amendment of the Constitution. To this must be added the 
insuperable difficulty, that the executive branch of the government is openly 
opposed to it, and pledged to interpose his veto, on constitutional grounds, should 
a bill pass to incorporate one. For four years, at least, then, it will be imprac- 
ticable to charter a bank. What must be done in the mean time ? Shall the 
treasury be organized to perform the functions which have been recently dis- 
charged by the banks, or shall the state institutions be again employed until a 
bank can be created ? In the one case, we shall have the so much vilified and 
denounced sub-treasury, as it is called ; and in the other, difficulties insur- 
mountable would grow up against the establishment of a bank. Let the state 
institutions be once reinstated and reunited to the government as their fiscal 
agents, and they will be found the first and most strenuous opponents of a Na- 
tional Bank, by which they would be overshadowed and curtailed in their 
profits. I hold it certain, that in prosperous times, when the state banks are in 
full operation, it is impossible to establish a National Bank. Its creation, then, 
should the reunion with the state banks take place, will be postponed until 
some disaster similar to the present shall again befall the country. But it re- 
quires little of the spirit of prophecy to see that such anotlier disaster would be 
the death of the whole system. Already it has had two paralytic strokes — the 
third would prove fatal. 

But suppose these difficulties were overcome, I would still be opposed to the 
incorporation of a bank. So far from affiDrding the relief which many an- 
ticipate, it would be the most disastrous measure that could be adopted. As 
great as is the calamity under which the country is suffering, it is nothing to 
^what would follow the creation of such an institution under existing circum- 
stances. In order to compel the state institutions to pay specie, the Bank must 
have a capital as great, or nearly as great, in proportion to the existing institu- 
tions, as the late Bank had, when established, to those of that day. This would 
give it an immense capital, not much less than one hundred millions of dollars, 
of which a large proportion, say twenty millions, must be specie. From what 
source is it to be derived ? From the state banks ? It would empty their 
vaults, and leave them in the most helpless condition. From abroad, and Eng- 
land in particular ? it would reproduce that revulsive current which has lately 
covered the country with desolation. The tide is still running to Europe, and 
if forced back by any artificial cause before the foreign debt is paid, cannot 
but be followed by the most disastrous consequences. 

But suppose this difficulty overcome, and the Bank re-established, I ask, 
What would be the effects under such circumstances 1 Where would it find 
room for business, commensurate with its extended capital, without crushing 
the state institutions, enfeebled by the withdrawal of their means, in order to 
create the instrument of their oppression ? A few of the more vigorous might 
survive, but the far greater portion, with their debtors, creditors, and stock- 
holders, would be involved in common ruin. The Bank would, indeed, give a 
specie currency, not by enabling the existing institutions to resume, but by de- 
stroying them and taking their place. 

Those who take a different view, and so fondly anticipate relief from a Na- 
tional Bank, are deceived by a supposed analogy between the present situation 
of the country and that of 1816, when the late Bank was chartered, after the 
war with Great Britain. I was an actor in that scene, and may be permitted 



262 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

to speak in relation to it with some little authority. Between the two periods 
there is little or no analogy. They stand almost in contrast. In 1810, the 
government was a debtor to the banks ; now it is a creditor : a difference of the 
greatest importance, as far as the present question is concerned. The banks 
had over-issued, it is true, but their over-issues were to the government, a sol- 
vent and able debtor, whose credit, held by the banks in the shape of stock, was 
at par. It was their excessive issues to the government on its stock which 
mainly caused the suspension ; in proof of which, it is a remarkable fact, that 
the depreciation of bank paper, compared with gold and silver, was about equal to 
the proportion which the government stock held by the banks bore to their is- 
sues. It was this excess that hung on the market and depressed the value of 
their notes. The solution is easy. The banks took the government stock pay- 
able in twelve years, and issued their notes for the same, payable on demand^ 
in violation of the plainest principles of banking. It followed, of course, that 
when their notes were presented for payment, they had nothing but government 
stock to meet them. But its stock was at par, and all the banks had to do was 
to go into market with the stock they held and take up their notes ; and thus 
the excess which hung upon the market and depressed their value would have 
been withdrawn from circulation, and the residue would have risen to par, or 
nearly par, with gold and silver, when specie payments might be easily resumed. 
This they were imwilling to do. They were profiting every way : by drawing 
interest on the stock, by discounting on it as capital, and by its continued rise 
in the market. It became necessary to compel them to surrender these advan- 
tages. Two methods presented themselves : one a bankrupt law, and the oth- 
er a National Bank. I was opposed to the former then, as I am now. I re- 
garded it as a harsh, unconstitutional measure, opposed to the rights of the 
states. If they have not surrendered the rights to incorporate banks, its exer- 
cise cannot be controlled by the action of this government, which has no power 
but what is expressly granted, and no authority to control the states in the ex- 
ercise of their reserved powers. It remained to resort to a National Bank 
as the means of compulsion. It proved effectual. Specie payments were re- 
stored ; but even with this striking advantage, it was followed by great pressure in 
1818, 1819, and 1820, as all who are old enough to remember that period must ! 
recollect. Such, in fact, must ever be the consequence of resumption, when 
forced, under the most favourable circumstances ; and such, accordingly, it pro- 
ved even in England, with all her resources, and with all the caution she used 
in restoring a specie circulation, after the long suspension of 1797. What, then, 
"would be its effects in the present condition of the country, when the govern- 
ment is a creditor instead of a debtor ; where there are so many newly-created 
banks without established credit ; vvhen the over-issues are so great ; and when 
so large a portion of the debtors are not in a condition to be coerced ? As great 
as is the tide of disaster which is passing over the land, it would be as nothing 
to what would follow, were a National Bank to be established as the means of 
coercing specie payments. 

I am bound to speak without reserve on this important point. My opinion, 
then, is, that if it should be determined to compel the restoration of specie pay- 
ments by the agency of banks, there is but one way — but to that I have insu- 
perable objections — I mean the adoption of the Pennsylvania Bank of the Uni- 
ted States as the fiscal agent of the government. It is already in operation, 
and sustained by great resources and powerful connexions, both at home and 
abroad. Through its agency specie payments might undoubtedly be restored, 
and that with far less disaster than through a newly-created bank, but not with- 
out severe pressure. I cannot, however, vote for such a measure ; I cannot agree 
to give a preference and such advantages to a bank of one of the members of 
this confederacy, over that of others — a bank dependant upon the will of a state, 
and subject to its influence and control. I cannot consent to coiifer such favours 



. 



on the stockholders, many of whom, if rumour is to be trusted, are foreign cap- 
itaUsts and without claim on the bounty of the government. But if all these, 
and many other objections, were overcome, there is still one which I cannot sur- 
mount. 

There has been, as we all know, a conflict between one of the departments / ' 
of the o-<jvernment and that institution, in which, in my opinion, the department 
was the assailant ; but I cannot consent, after what has occurred, to give to the 
Bank a triumph over the government, for such its adoption as the fiscal agent 
of the government would necessarily be considered. It would degrade the 
p-overnment in the eyes of our citizens and of the world, and go far to make that 
Bank the government itself. 

But if all these difficulties were overcome, there are others, to me, wholly 
insurmountable. I belong to the State Rights party, which at all times, from 
the beginning of the government to this day, has been opposed to such an insti- 
tution, as unconstitutional, inexpedient, and dangerous. They have ever dread- 
ed the union of the political and moneyed power, and the central action of the 
government to which it so strongly tends, and at all times have strenuously 
resisted their junction. Time and experience have confirmed the truth of their 
principles ; and this, above all other periods, is the one at which it would be 
most dangerous to depart from them. Acting on them, I have never given my 
countenance or support to a National Bank but under a compulsion which I felt 
to be imperious, and never without an open declaration of ray opinion as unfa- 
vourable to a bank. 

In supporting the Bank of 1816, 1 openly declared that, as a question dc novo, 
I would be decidedly against the Bank, and would be the last to give it my sup- 
port. I also stated that, in supporting the Bank then, I yielded to the necessi- 
ty of the case, growing out of the then existing and long-established connexion 
between the government and the banking system. I look the ground, even at 
that early period, that so long as the connexion existed — so long as the govern- 
ment received and paid away bank-notes as money — they were bound to regu-/^ 
late their value, and had no alternative but the establishment of a National Bank. 
I found the connexion in existence and established before my time, and over 
which I could have no control. I yielded to the necessity in order to correct 
the disordered state of the currency, which had fallen exclusively under the 
control of the states. I yielded to what I could not reverse, just as any mem- 
ber of the Senate now would, who might believe that Louisiana was unconsti- 
tutionally admitted into the Union, but who would, nevertheless, feel compelled 
to vote to extend the laws to that state, as one of its members, on the ground 
that its admission was an act, whether constitutional or unconstitutional, which 
he could not reverse. 

In 1834 I acted in conformity to the same principle, in proposing the renew- ' 
al of the Bank charter for a short period. My object, as expressly avowed, was 
to use the Bank to break the connexion between the government and the bank- 
ing system gradually, in order to avert the catastrophe which has now befallen 
us, and which I then clearly perceived. But the connexion, which I believed 
to be irreversible in 1816, has now been broken by operation of law. It is now 
an open question. I feel myself free for the first time to choose my course on 
this important subject ; and, in opposing a bank, I act in conformity to principles 
wbich I have entertained ever since I have fully investigated the subject. 

But my opposition to a reunion with the banks is not confined to objections 
limited to a national or state banks. It goes beyond, and comprehends others of 
a more general nature relating to the currency, which to me are decisive. I 
am of the impression that the connexion has a most pernicious influence over 
bank currency ; that it tends to disturb that stability and uniformity of value 
which is essential to a sound currency, and is among the leading causes of that 
tendency to expansion and contraction which experience has shown is incident 



264 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN- 

to bank-notes as a currency. They are, in my opinion, at best, without there- 
c^isite qualities to constitute a currency even when unconnected with the gov- 
ernment, and are doubly disqualified by reason of that connexion, which sub- 
jects them to sudden expansions and contractions, and exposes them to fatal 
catastrophes, such as the present. 

I will explain my views. A bank-note circulates not merely on account of 
the credit of the institutions by which it is issued, but because government re- 
ceives it, like gold and silver, in payment of all its dues, and thus adds its own 
credit to that of the bank. It, in fact, virtually endorses on the note of every 
specie-paying bank " receivable by government in its dues." To understand 
how greatly this adds to the circulation of bank-notes, we must remember that 

\ government is the great money-dealer of the country, and the holder of immense 
public domains ; and that it has the power of creating a demand against every 
citizen as high as it pleases, in the shape of a tax or duty, which can be dis- 
charged, as the law now is, only by bank-notes or gold and silver. This, of 
course, cannot but add greatly to the credit of bank-notes, and contribute much 
to their circulation, though it may be difficult to determine with any precision 
to what extent. It certainly is very great. For why is it that an individual 
of the first credit, whose responsibility is so indisputable that his friend, of equal 
credit, endorses his note for nothing, should put his with his friend's, being their 
joint credit, into a bank, and take out the notes of the bank, which is, in fact, 
but the credit of the bank itself, and pays six per cent, discount between the 
credit of himself and his friend and that of the bank ? The known and estab- 
lished credit of the bank may be one reason, but there is another and powerful 
one. The government treats the credit of the bank as gold and silver in all its 
transactions, and does not treat the credit of individuals in the same manner. 
To test the truth, let us reverse the case, and suppose the government to treat 
the joint credit of the individuals as money, and not the credit of the bank, is it 
not obvious that, instead of borrowing from the bank and paying six per cent, dis- 
count, the bank would be glad to borrow from him on the same terms ? From 
this we may perceive the powerful influence which bank circulation derives 
from the connexion with the credit of the government. 

It follows, as a necessary consequence, that to the extent of this influence the 
issues of the banks expand and contract with the expansion and contraction of 
the fiscal action of the government; with the increase of its duties, taxes, in- 
come, and expenditure ; with the deposites in its vaults acting as additional cap- 
ital, and the amount of bank-notes withdrawn, in consequence, from circulation : 
all of which must directly affect the amount of their business and issues ; and 
bank currency must, of course, partake of all those vibrations to which the fis- 
cal action of the government is necessarily exposed, and, when great and sud- 
den, must expose the system to catastrophes such as we now witness. In 
fact, a more suitable instance cannot be selected, to illustrate the truth of what 
I assert, than the present, as I shall proceed to show. 

To understand the causes which have led to the present state of things, we 
must go back to the year 1824, when the tariff' system triumphed in Congress : 
a system which imposed duties, not for the purpose of revenue, but to encour- 
age the industry of one portion of the Union at the expense of the other. This 
was followed up by the act of 1828, which consummated the system. It rais- 
ed the duties so extravagantly, that out of an annual importation of sixty-four 
millions, thirty-two passed into the treasury : that is, government took one half 
for the liberty of introducing the other. Countless millions were thus poured 

■ into the treasury beyond the wants of the government, which became, in time, 
the source of the most extravagant expenditures. This vast increase of receipts 
and expenditures was followed by a corresponding expansion of the business oi 
the banks. They had to discount and issue freely to enable the merchants to 
pay their duty-bonds, as well as to meet the vastly increased expenditures of 



srrjftutirio ur junrt yj. \jALin\/\jnt 



the government. Another effect followed the act of 1828, which gave a still 
farther expansion to the action of the banks, and which is worthy of notice. It 
turned the exchange with England in favour of this country. That portion of 
the proceeds of our exports which, in consequence of the high duties, could no 
longer return with profit in the usual articles which we had been in the habit 
of receiving principally from that country in exchange for our exports, returned 
in gold and silver, in order to purchase similar articles at the North. This was 
the first cause which gave that western direction to the precious metals, the re-^- 
vulsive return of which has been followed by so many disasters. With the ex- 
change in our favour, and, consequently, no demand for gold and silver abroad, 
and the vast demand for money attendant on an increase of the revenue, almost 
every restraint was removed on the discounts and issues of the banks, especially 
in the Northern section of the Union, where these causes principally operated. 
With their increase, wages and prices of every description rose in proportion, 
followed, of course, by an increasing demand on the banks for farther issues. 
This is the true cause of that expansion of the currency which began about the 
commencement of the late administration, but which was erroneously charged 
by it to the Bank of the United States. It rose out of the action of the govern- 
ment. The Bank, in increasing its business, acted in obedience to the condi- 
tion of things at the time, and in conformity with the banks generally in the 
same section. It was at this juncture that the late administration came into 
power — a juncture remarkable in many respects, but more especially in relation 
10 the question of the currency. Most of the causes which have since termi- 
nated in the complete prostration of the banks and the commercial prosperity of 
the country were in full activity. 

Another cause, about that time (I do not remember the precise date),%egan 
to produce powerful effects : I refer to the last renewal of the charter of the 
Bank of England. It was renewed for ten years, and, among other provisions, 
contained one making the notes of that bank a legal tender in all cases except 
between the Bank and its creditors. The effect was to dispense still farther 
with the use of the precious metals in that great commercial country, which, of 
course, caused them to flow out in every direction through the various channels 
of its commerce. A large portion took their direction hitherward, and served 
still farther to increase the current which, from causes already enumerated, was 
already flowing so strongly in this direction, and which still farther increased 
the force of the returning current, on the turn of the tide. 

The administration did not comprehend the difliculties and dangers which 
surrounded it. Instead of perceiving the true reason of the expansion of the 
currency, and adopting the measures necessary to arrest it, they attributed it to 
the Bank of the United States, and made it the cause or pretext for waging war - 
on that institution. Among the first acts of hostility, the deposites were remo- 
ved, and transferred to selected state banks ; the effect of which, instead of resist- 
ing the tendency to expansion, was to throw off the only restraint that held the 
banking institutions of the country in check, and, of course, gave to the swell- 
ing tide, which was destined to desolate the country, a powerful impulse. 
Banks sprung up in every direction ; discounts and issues increased almost 
without limitation ; and an immense surplus revenue accumulated in the depos- 
ite banks, which, after the payment of the public debt, the most extravagant ap- 
propriations could not exhaust, and which acted as additional banking capital ; 
the value of money daily depreciated ; prices rose ; and then commenced those 
unbounded speculations, particularly in public lands, which was transferred, by 
millions of acres, from the public to the speculators for worthless bank-notes, 
till at length the swelling flood was checked, and the revulsive current burst its 
barriers, and overspread and desolated the land. 

The first check came from the Bank of England, which, alarmed at the loss 
of its precious metals, refused to discount American bills, in order to prevent a 

L L 



266 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

farther decrease of its cash means, and cause a return of those which it had 
lost. Then followed the objectionable manner of carrying into execution the 
deposite act, which, instead of a remedial measure, as it might have been if it 
had been properly executed, was made the instrument of weakening the banks, 
especially in the great commercial metropolis of the Union, where so large a 
portion of the surplus revenue was accumulated. And, finally, the treasury or- 
der, which still farther weakened those banks, by withdrawing their cash means 
to be invested in public lands in the West. 

It is often easy to prevent what cannot be remedied, which the present instance 
strongly illustrates. If the administration had formed a true conception of the 
danger in time, what has since happened might have then been averted. The 
near approach of the expiration of the charter of the United States Bank would 
have aflbrded ample means of staying the desolation, if it had been timely and 
properly used. I saw it then, and purposed to renew the charter for a limited 
period, with such modilications as would have effectually resisted the increas- 
ing expansion of the currency, and, at the same time, gradually and finally wear 
out the connexion between the Bank and the government. To use the expres- 
sion I then used, " to unbank the banks," to let down the system easily, and so 
to effect the separation between the Bank and the government, as to avoid the 
possibility of that shock which I then saw was inevitable without some such 
remedy. The moment was eminently propitious. The precious metals were 
flowing in on us from every quarter ; and the Aagorous measures I purposed to 
adopt in the renewal of the charter would have eflectually arrested the increase 
of banks, and checked the excess of their discounts and issues ; so that the ac- 
cumulating mass of gold and silver, instead of being converted into bank capital, 
and spelling the tide of paper circulation, would have been substituted in the 
place of bank-notes, as a permanent and wholesome addition to the currency of 
the country. 

But neither the administration nor the opposition sustained me, and the pre- 
cious opportunity passed unseized. I then clearly saw the coming calamity 
was inevitable, and it has neither arrived sooner, nor is it greater, than what I 
expected. 

Such are the leading causes which have produced the present disordered 
state of the currency. There are others of a minor character, connected with 
the general condition of the commercial world, and the operation of the execu- 
tive branch of the government, but which of themselves would have produced 
but little effect. To repeat the causes in a few words, the vast increase which 
the tariffs of 1824 and 1828 gave to the fiscal action of the government, com- 
bined with the causes 1 have enumerated, gave the first impulse to the expan- 
sion of the currency. That, in turn, gave that extraordinary impulse to over-tra- 
ding and speculation (they were effects, and not causes) which has finally ter- 
minated in the present calamity It may thus be ultimately traced to the con- 
nexion between the banks and the government ; and it is not a little remarkable, 
that the suspension of specie payments in 1816 in this country, and in 1797 in 
Great Britain, was produced by the same causes. 

There is another reason against the union of the government and the banks, 
intimately connected with that under consideration, which I shall next proceed 
to state. It gives an advantage to one portion of citizens over another, that 
is neither fair, equal, nor consistent with the spirit of our institutions. That the 
connexion between the Bank and the government, the receiving and paying away 
their notes as cash, and the use of the public money from the time of the col- 
lection to the disbursement, is the source of immense profit to the banks, cannot 
be questioned. It is impossible, as I have said, to ascertain with any precision 
to what extent their issues and circulation depend upon it, but it certaiidy con- 
stitutes a large proportion. A single illustration may throw light upon this 
point. Suppose the government were to take up the veriest beggar in the 



street, and enter into a contract with him, that nothing should be received in its 
dues or for the sales of its public lands in future, except gold and silver and his 
promissory notes, and that he should have the use of the public funds from the 
time of their collection until their disbursement. Can any one estimate the 
"wealth which such a contract would confer? His notes would circulate far 
and wide over the whole extent of the Union, would be the medium through 
which the exchanges of the country would be performed, and his ample and ex- 
tended credit would give him a control over all the banking institutions and 
moneyed transactions of the community. The possession of a hundred mill- 
ions would not give a control more effectual. I ask, Would it be fair, would 
it be equal, would it be consistent with the spirit of our institutions, to confer 
such advantages on any individual ? And if not on one, would it be if confer- 
red on any number ? And if not, why should it be conferred on any corporate 
body of individuals ? How can they possibly be entitled to benefits so vast, 
which all must acknowledge could not be justly conferred on any number of 
imincorporated individuals? 

I state not these views with any intention of bringing down odium on bank- 
ing institutions. I have no unkind feeling towards them whatever. I do not 
hold them responsible for the present state of things. It has grown up gradu- 
ally, without either the banks or the community perceiving the consequences 
which have followed the connexion between them. My object is to state facts 
as they exist, that the truth may be seen in time by all. This is an age of in- 
vestigation. The public mind is broadly awake upon this all-important subject. 
It affects the interests and condition of the whole community, and will be in- 
vestigated to the bottom. Nothing will be left unexplored ; and it is for the in- 
terest of both the banks and of the community that the evils incident to the 
connexion should be fully understood in time, and the connexion be gradually 
terminated, before such convulsions shall follow as to sweep away the whole 
system, with its advantages as well as its disadvantages. 

But it is not only between citizen and citizen that the connexion is unfair 
and unequal. It is as much so between one portion of the country and another. 
The connexion of the government with the banks, whether it be with a combi- 
nation of state banks or with a national institution, will necessarily centralize 
the action of the system at the principal point of collection and disbursement, 
and at which the mother-bank, or the head of the league of state banks, must 
be located. From that point, the whole system, through the connexion with 
the government, will be enabled to control the exchanges both at home and 
abroad, and with it the commerce, foreign and domestic, including exports and 
imports. After what has been said, these points will require but little illustra- 
tion. A single one will be sufficient ; and I will take, as in the former in- 
stance, that of an individual. 

Suppose, then, the government, at the commencement of its operation, had 
selected an individual merchant, at any one point in the Union, say New-York, 
and had connected itself with him, as it has with the banks, by giving him the 
use of the public funds from the time of their collection until their disburse- 
ment, and of receiving and paying away, in all its transactions, nothing but his 
promissory notes, except gold and silver ; is it not manifest that a decisive con- 
trol would be given to the port where he resided, over all the others ; that his 
promissory notes would circulate everywhere, through all the ramifications of 
commerce ; that they would regulate exchanges ; that they would be the me- 
dium of paying duty-bonds ; and that they would attract the imports and ex- 
ports of the country to the ports where such extraordinary facilities were afford- 
ed ? If such would clearly be the effects in the case supposed, it is equally 
clear that trie concentration of the currency at the same point, through the 
connexion of the government with the banks, would have equal, if not greater 
effects ; and that whether one general bank should be used as an agent, or a 



orr*c.Uiic<^ w-T u Villi \^. u^iijiix^ c 11 • 



league of banks, which should have their centre there. To other ports of the 
country, the trifling advantages which a branch or dejwsite bank would give in 
the safe keeping of the public revenue would be as nothing, compared to the 
losses caused to their conunerce by centralizing the moneyed action of the coun- 
try at a remote point. Other gentlemen can speak for their own section ; I 
can speak with confidence of that which I have the honour in part to repre- 
sent. The entire staple states, J feel a deep conviction, banks and all, would, 
in the end, be great gainers by the disseverance, whatever might be the tempo- 
rary inconvenience. If there be any other section in which the ellects would 
be different, it would be but to confirm the views which I have presented. 

As connected with this, there is a point well deserving consideration. The 
union between bank and government is not only a main source of that danger- 
ous expansion and contraction in the banking system which I have already il- 
lustrated, but is also one of the principal causes of that powerful and almost ir- 
resistible tendency to the increase of banks which even its friends see and de- 
plore. I dwelt on this point on a former occasion (on Mr. Webster's motion 
y'to renew the Bank charter in 1833), and will not repeat what I then said. But 
in addition to the causes then enumerated, there are many others very power- 
ful, and, among others, the one under consideration. They all maybe summed 
up in one general cause. We have made banking too profitable — far, very far 
too profitable — and, I may add, influential. One of the most ample sources of 
this profit and influence may be traced, as I have shown, to the connexion 
with the government ; and is, of course, among the prominent causes of the 
strong and incessant tendency of the system to increase, which even its friends 
see must finally overwhelm either the banks or the institutions of the country. 
With a view to check its growth, they have proposed to limit the number of 
banks and the amount of banking capital by an amendment of the Constitution ; 
but it is obvious that the eft'ects of such an amendment, if it were practicable, 
would but increase the profits and influence of bank capital ; and that, finally, it 
would justly produce such indignation on the part of the rest of the conununitv 
against such unequal advantages, that in the end, after a long and violent strug- 
gle, the overthrow of the entire system would follow. To obviate this ditlicul- 
ty, it has been proposed to add a limitation upon the amount of their business ; 
the efTects of which would be the accommodation of favourites, to the exclusion 
of the rest of the community, which would be no less fatal to the system. 
There can be, in fact, but one safe and consistent remedy — the rendering bank- 
ing, as a business, less profitable and influential ; and the first and decisive step" 
towards this is a disseverance between the banks and the government. To this 
may be added some effectual limitation on the denomination of the notes to be 
issued, which would operate in a similar manner. 

I pass over other important objections- to the connexion — the corrupting in- 
fluence and the spirit of speculation which it spreads far and wide over the 
land. Who has not seen and deplored the vast and corrupting influence brought 
to bear upon the legislatures to obtain charters, and the means necessary to 
participate in the profits of the institutions ? This gives a control to the gov- 
ernment which grants such favours of a most extensive and pernicious charac- 
ter, all of which must continue to spread and increase, if the connexion should 
continue, until the whole community must become one contaminated and cor- 
rupted mass. 

There is another and a final reason, which 1 shall assign against the reunion 
with the banks. W'e have reached a new era with regard to these institutions. 
He who would judge of the future by the past, in reference to them, will be 
wholly mistaken. The year 1833 marks the commencement of this era. That 
, extraordinary man who had the power of imprinting his own feelings on the 
community, then commenced his hostile attacks, which have left such eflects 
behind, that the war then commenced against the banks, I clearly see, will not 



tenmnate. unless there be a separation between them and the goremment , 
until one or the other triumphs : till the government becomes the bank, or the 
bank the aovemment. In resisting their union. I act as the friend of both. I 
have, as I hare said, no mikind feeling towards the banks. I am neither a back 
man nor an anti-bank man. I hare but Little connexion with them. ^Many of 
mv best friends, for whom I hare the highest esteem, have a deep interest in 
their prosperitv, and. as far as friendship or personal attachment extends, my 
inclination would be strongly in their favour. But I stand tip here as the rep- 
resentative of no particular interest. I look to the whole, and to the future, as 
well as the present ; and I shall steadily pursue that course which, under the 
most eularoed view, I believe to be my duty. In 1834 I saw the present crisis. 
I in vain, raised a warning voice, and endeavoured to avert it. I now see. 
■with equal certainty, one far more portentous. If this straggle is to go on; if 
the banks will insist upon a reunion with the government against the sense of a 
lartre and influential portion of the community ; and, above all, if they should 
succeed in eflFecting it, a reflux flood will inevitably sweep away the whole 
system. A deep poptjiar excitement is never without some reason, and ought 
ever to be treated with respect : and it is the part of wisdom to look timely into 
the cause, and correct it before the excitement shall become so great as to de- 
molish the object, with all its good and evil, against which it is directed. 

The only safe course for both government and banks is to remain, as they are, 
separated ;' each in the use of their own credit, and in the management of their 
own afiairs. The less the control and influence of the one over the ether the 
better. Confined to their legitimate sphere, that of afibrding temporary credit- 
to commercial and business men, bank-notes would furnish a safe and conveni- 
ent circulation in the range of commerce and business, within which the banks 
may be respectively situated, exempt almost entirely from those fluctuations and 
convulsions to which they are now so exposed : or, if they should occasionally 
be subject to them, the evil would be local and temporary, leaving undisturbed 
the action of the government and the general currency of the country, on the 
stability of which the prosperity and safety of the community so much depend. 

I have now stated my objections to the reunion of the government and the 
banks. If they are well founded ; if the state banks are of themselves incom- 
petent asents : if a Bank of the United States be impracticable, or, if practicable, 
would at this time be the destruction of a large portion of the existing banks, 
and of renewed and severe pecuniary distress : if it would be against the set- 
tled conviction of an old and powerful party, whose opposition time cannot 
abate ; if the union of government and banks adds to the unfimess of their notes 
for circulation, and be unjust and unequal between citizen and citizen, and one 
portion of the Union and another : and, finally, if it would excite an implacable 
and obstinate war, which could only terminate in the ovenhrow of the banking 
system or the institutions of the country — it then remains that the only alterna- 
tive would be permanently to separate the two. and to reorganize the treasury- 
so as to enable it to perform those duties which have heretofore been performe-i 
by the banks as its fiscal agents. This proposed reorganization has been called 
a sub-treasury : an tmfortunate word, calculated to mislead and conjure up diffi- 
culties and danger that do not in reality exist. So far from an exp>eriment; or 
some new device, it is only returning to the old mode of collecting and disburs- 
ing pubhc money, which, for thousands of jeaxs. has been the practice of all 
eidightened people tiU within the last century. 

In what maimer it is intended to reorganize the treasTiry by the bill reported, 
I do not know. I have been too much engaged to read it : and I can only say 
that, for one, I shall assent to no arrangement which provides for a treasury 
bank, or that can be perverted into one. If there can be any scheme more tatal 
than a reunion with the banks at this time, it would be such a project. Nor 
will I give mv assent to anv arrangement which shall add the least unnecessary 



patronage. I am the sworn (oe to patronage, and have done as much and suf- 
fered as much in resisting it as any one. Too many years have passed over 
me to change, at this late day, my course or principles. But I will say, that it 
IS impossible so to organize the treasury for the performance of its own functions 
as to oive to the executive a tenth part of the patronage it will lose by the pro- 
posed separation, which, when the bill for the reorganization comes up, I may 
have an opportunity to show. I have ventured this assertion after much reflec- 
tion, and with entire confidence in its correctness. 

But something more must be done besides the reorganization of the treasury. 
Under the resolution of 1816, bank-notes would again be received in the dues 
of the government, if the Bank should resume specie payments. The legal, as 
well as the actual connexion, must be severed. But I am opposed to all harsh 
or precipitate measures. No great process can be effected without a shock 
but through the agency of time. I, accordingly, propose to allow time for the final 
separation ; and with this view I have drawn up an amendment to this bill, 
which I shall offer at the proper time, to modify the resolution of 1816, by pro- 
viding that after the 1st of January next, three fourths of all sums due to the 
government may be received in the notes of specie-paying banks ; and that 
after the 1st of January next following, one half; and after the 1st of January 
next subsequent, one fourth; and after the 1st of January thereafter, nothing but 
the legal currency of the United States, or bills, notes, or paper issued under 
their authority, and which may by law be authorized to be received in their dues. 
If the time is not thought to be ample, I am perfectly disposed to extend it. 
The period is of little importance in my eyes, so that the object be effected. 

In addition to this, it seems to me that some measure of a remedial character, 
connected with the currency, ought to be adopted to ease off the pressure while 
the process is going through. It is desirable that the government should make 
as few and small demands on the specie market as possible during the time, so 
as to throw no impediment in the way of the resumption of specie payments. 
With this view, I am of the impression that the sum necessary for the present 
wants of the treasury should be raised by a paper, which should, at the same 
time, have the requisite qualities to enable it to perform the functions of a paper 
circulation. Under this impression, I object to the interest to be allowed on 
the treasury notes, which this bill authorizes to be issued, on the very opposite 
ground that the senator from 'Massachusetts bestows his approbation. He 
approves of interest, because it would throw them out of circulation, into the 
hands of capitalists, as a convenient and safe investment ; and I disapprove, 
because it will have that effect. I am disposed to ease off the process ; he, 
1 would suppose, is very little solicitous on that point. 

But I go fartlier. I am of the impression, to make this great measure suc- 
cessful, and secure it against reaction, some stable and safe medium of circula- 
tion, to take the place of bank-notes in the fiscal operations of the government, 
ought to be issued. I intend to propose nothing. It would be impossible, with 
so great a weight of opposition, to pass any measure without the entire support 
of the administration ; and if it were, it ought not to be attempted where so much 
must depend on the mode of execution. The best measure that could be devi- 
sed might fail, and impose a heavy responsibility on its author, unless it met 
with the hearty approbation of those who are to execute it. I intend, then, 
merely to throw out suggestions, in order to excite the reflection of others on 
a subject so delicate and of so much importance, acting on the principle that it 
is the duty of all, in so great a juncture, to present their views without reserve. 
y It is, then, my impression that, in the present condition of the world, a paper 
currency, in some form, if not necessary, is almost indispensable in financial 
and conunercial operations of civilized and extensive communities. In many 
respects it has a vast superiority over a metallic currency, especially in great 
and extended transactions, by its greater cheapness, lightness, and the facility 



of determining the amount. fhe great desideratum is, to ascertain what de- 
scription of paper has the requisite qualities of being free from fluctuation in 
value, and liability to abuse, in the greatest perfection. 1 have shown, I trust, 
that the bank-notes do not possess these requisites in a degree sufficiently hio-h 
for this purpose. I go farther. It appears to me, after bestowing the best re- 
flection I can give the subject, that no convertible paper, that is, no paper whose 
credit rests upon a promise to pay, is suitable for currency. It is the form of 
credit proper in private transactions between man and man, but not for a stand- 
ard of value to pertorm exchanges generally, which constitutes the appropriate 
functions of money or currency. The measure of safety in the two cases are 
wholly different. A promissory note, or convertible paper, is considered safe 
so long as the drawer has ample means to meet his engagements, and, in pass- 
ing from hand to hand, regard is had only to his ability and willingness to pay. 
Very different is the case in currency. The aggregate value of the currency 
of a country necessarilybears a small proportion to the aggreo-ate value of its 
property. This proportion is not well ascertained, and is probably subject to 
considerable variation in different countries, and at different periods in the same 
country. It may be assumed conjecturally, in order to illustrate what I say, at 
one to thirty. Assuming this proportion to be correct, which probably is not very 
far from the truth, it follows, that in a sound condition of the country, where the 
currency is metallic, the aggregate value df the coin is not more than one in 
thirty of the aggregate value of the property. It also follows that an increase 
in the amount of the currency, by the addition of a paper circulation of no in- 
trinsic value, but increases the nominal value of the aggregate property of the 
country in the same proportion that the increase bears to the whole amount of 
currency; so that, if the currency be doubled, the nominal value of the property 
will also be doubled. Hence it is, that when the paper currency of a country 
is in the shape of promissory notes, there is a constant tendency to excess. We 
look for their safety to the ability of the drawer ; and so long as his means are 
ample to meet his engagements, there is no distrust, without reflecting that, con- 
sidered as currency, it cannot safely exceed one in thirty in value compared to 
property ; and the delusion is farther increased by the constant increase in 
value of property with the increase of the notes, in circulation, so as to main- 
tain the same relative proportion. It follows, that a government may safely 
contract a debt many times the amount of its aggi^gate circulation ; but if it 
were to attempt to put its promissory notes in circulation in amount equal to its- 
debts, an explosion in the currency would be inevitable. And hence, with 
other causes, the constant tendency to an excessive issue of bank-notes in pros- 
perous times, when so large a portion of the community are anxious to obtain 
accommodation, and who are disappointed when good negotiable paper is re- 
fused by the banks, not reflecting that it would not be safe to discount beyond the 
limits I have assigned for a safe circulation, however good the paper offered. 

On what, then, ought a paper currency to rest ? I would say on demand and 
supply simply, which regulates the value of everything else— the constant de- 
mand which the government has on the community for its necessary suppHes. 
A medium resting on this demand, which simply obligates the government to 
receive it in all of its dues, to the exclusion of everything else except gold and 
silver, and which shall be optional with those who have demands on government 
to receive or not, would, it seems to me, be as stable in its value as those metals^- 
themselves, and be as little liable to abuse as the power of coining. It would 
contain within itself a self-regulating power. It could only be issued to those 
who had claims on the government, and to those only with their consent, and, 
of course, only at or above par with gold and silver, which would be its ha- 
bitual state ; for, as far as the government was concerned, it would be equal, 
in every respect, to gold and silver, and superior in many, particularly in regu- 
lating the distant exchanges of the country. Should, however, a demand for 



gold and silver from abroad, or other accidental causes, depress it temporarily, 
as compared with the precious metals, it would then return to the treasury ; and 
as it could not be paid out during such depression, its gradual diminution in the 
market would soon restore it to an equality, when it would again flow out into 
the general circulation. Thus there would be a constant alternate flux and re- 
flux into and from the treasury, between it and the precious metals ; but if at 
any time a permanent depression in its value be possible, from any cause, the 
only efl'ect would be to operate as a reduction of taxes on the community, and 
the only sufferer would be the government itself. Against this, its own interest 
would be a sufficient guarantee. 

Nothing but experience can determine what amount and of what denomina- 
tions might be safely issued, but it may be safely assumed that the country 
would absorb an amount greatly exceeding its annual income. Much of its ex- 
changes, which amount to a vast sum, as well as its banking business, would 
revolve about it, and many millions would thus be kept in circulation beyond 
the demands of the government. It may throw some light on this subject to 
state, that North Carolina, just after the Revolution, issued a large amount of pa- 
per, which was made receivable in dues to her. It was also made a legal ten- 
der, but v/hich, of course, was not obligatory after the adoption of the Federal 
Constitution. A large amount, say between four and five hundred thousand 
dollars, remained in circulation after that period, and continued to circulate for 
more than twenty years at par with gold and silver during the whole time, with 
no other advantage than being received in the revenue of the state, which was 
much less than $100,000 per annum. I speak on the information of citizens 
of that state, on whom I can rely. 

But whatever may be the amount that can be circulated, I hold it clear, that 
to that amount it would be as stable in value as gold and silver itself, provided 
the government be bound to receive it exclusively with those metals in all its 
dues, and that it be left perfectly optional with those who have claims on the 
government to receive it or not. It will also be a necessary condition, that 
notes of too small a denomination should not be issued, so that the treasury shall 
have ample means to meet all demands, either in gold or silver, or the bills of 
the government, at the option of those who have claims on it. With these con- 
ditions, no farther variation could take place between it and gold and silver 
than that which would be caused by the action of commerce. An unusual de- 
mand from abroad for the metals would, of course, raise them a little in their 
relative value, and depress, relatively, the government bills in the same propor- 
tion, which would cause them to flow into the treasury, and gold and silver to 
flow out ; while, on the contrary, an increased demand for the bills in the do- 
mestic exchange v/ould have the reverse efl^ect, causing, as I have stated, an 
alternate flux and reflux into the treasury between the two, which would at all 
times keep their relative values either at or near par. 

No one can doubt that the fact of the government receiving and paying away 
bank-notes, in all its fiscal transactions, is one of the principal sources of their 
great circulation ; and it was mainly on that account that the notes of the late 
Bank of the United States so freely circiflated over the Union. I would ask, then, 
"Why should the government mingle its credit with that of private corporations ? 
No one can doubt but that the government credit is better than that of any bank — 
more stable and more safe. Why, then, should it mix it up with the less perfect 
credit of those institutions ? Why not use its own credit to the amount of its own 
transactions ? Why should it not be safe in its own hands, while it shall be consid- 
ered safe in the hands of 800 private institutions, scattered all over the country, 
and which have no other object but their own private profit, to increase which, they 
almost constantly extend their business to the most dangerous extremes ? And 
why should the community be compelled to give six per cent, discount for the gov- 
ernment credit blended with that of the banks, when the superior credit of the 



of£jtjf^nejO ur juni^i o. U/AiiHUUiN. 



government could be furnished separately, without discount, to the mutual ad- 
vantage of the government and the community ? Why, let me ask, should the 
government be exposed to such difficulties as the present, by mingling its credit 
with the banks, when it could be exempt from all such by using, by itself, its 
own safer credit ? It is time the community, which has so deep an interest in 
a sound and cheap currency, and the equality of the laws between one portion 
of the citizens and the country and another, should reflect seriously on these 
things, not for the purpose of oppressing any interest, but to correct gradually 
disorders of a dangerous character, which have insensibly, in the long course 
of years, without being perceived by any one, crept into the state. The ques- 
tion is not between credit and no credit, as some would have us believe, but in 
what form credit can best perform the functions of a sound and safe currency. 
On this important point I have freely thrown out my ideas, leaving it to this 
body and the public to determine what they are worth. Believing that there 
might be a sound and safe paper currency founded on the credit of the govern- 
ment exclusively, I was desirous that those who are responsible, and have the 
power, should have availed themselves of the opportunity of the temporary de- 
ficit of the treasury, and the postponement of the fourth instalment, intended to 
be deposited with the states, to use them as the means of affording a circulation 
for the present relief of the country and the banks, during the process of separ- 
ating them from the government ; and, if experience should justify it, of furnish- 
ing a permanent and safe circulation, which would greatly facilitate the opera- 
tions of the treasury, and afford, incidentally, much facility to the commercial 
operations of the country. But a different direction was given, and when the 
alternative was presented of a loan, or the withholding of the fourth instalment 
from the states, I did not hesitate to give a decided vote for withholding it. My 
aversion to a public debt is deep and durable. It is, in my opinion, pernicious, 
and is little short of a fraud on the public. I saw too much of it during the late 
war not to understand something of the nature and character of public loans. 
Never was a country more egregiously imposed on. 

Having now presented my views of the course and the measures which the 
permanent policy of the country, looking to its liberty and lasting prosperity, re- 
quires, I come finally to the question of relief. I have placed this last, not that 
I am devoid of sympathy for the country in the pecuniary distress which now 
pervades it. No one struggled earlier or longer to prevent it than myself; nor 
can any one more sensibly feel the wide-spread blight which has suddenly 
blasted the hopes of so many, and precipitated thousands from aflluence to pov- 
erty. The desolation has fallen mainly on the mercantile class — a class which 
I have ever held in the highest estimation. No country ever had a superior 
body of merchants, of higher honour, of more daring enterprise, or of greater 
skill and energy. The ruin of such a class is a heavy calamity, and I am so- 
licitous, among other things, to give such stability to our currency as to prevent 
the recurrence of a similar calamity hereafter. But it was first necessary, in 
the order of things, that we should determine what sound policy, looking to the 
future, demands to be done at the present juncture, before we consider the 
question of relief; which, as urgent as it may be, is subordinate, and must yield 
to the former. The patient lies under a dangerous disease, with a burning 
thirst and other symptoms, which distress him more than the vital organs 
which are attacked. The skilful physician first makes himself master of the 
nature of the disease, and then determines on the treatment necessary for the 
restoration of health. This done, he next alleviates the distressing symptoms 
as far as is consistent with the restoration of health, and no farther. Such shall 
be my course. As far as I possibly can, consistently with the views I entertain, 
and what I believe to be necessary to restore the body politic to health, I will 
do everything in my power to mitigate the present distress. Farther I cannot go. 
" After the best reflection, I am of opinion that the government can do but lit- 

M M 



iJ74 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

tie in the way of relief; and that it is a case which must be mainly left to the 
constitution of the patient, who, thank God, is young, vigorous, and robust, with 
a constitution sufficient to sustain and overcome the severest attack. I dread 
the doctor and his drugs much more than the disease itself. The distress of 
the country consists in its indebtedness, and can only be relieved by payment 
of its debts. To effect this, industry, frugality, economy, and time are neces- 
sary. J rely more on the growing crop — on the cotton, rice, and tobacco of the 
South, than on all the projects or devices of politicians. I am utterly opposed 
to all coercion by this government. But government may do something to re- 
lieve the distress. It is out of debt, and is one of the principal creditors both 
of the banks and of the merchants, and should set an example of liberal indul- 
gence. This I am willing to give freely. I am also prepared to vote freely 
the use of government credit in some safe form, to supply any deficit in the cir- 
culation, during the process of recovery, as far as its financial wants will per- 
mit.- I see not what more can be safely done. But my vision may be obtuse 
upon this subject. Those who differ from me, and who profess so much sym- 
pathy for the public, seem to think that much relief may be afforded. I hope 
they will present their views. I am anxious to hear their prescriptions, and I 
assure them, that whatever they may propose, if it shall promise relief, and be 
not inconsistent with the course which I deem absolutely necessary for the 
restoration of the country to perfect health, shall cheerfully receive my support. 
They may be more keensighted than I am as to the best means of relief, but 
cannot have a stronger disposition to afford it. 

We have, Mr. President, arrived at a remarkable era in our political history. 
The days of legislative and executive encroachments, of tariffs and surpluses, 
of bank and public debt, and extravagant expendhure, are past for the present. 
The government stands in a position disentangled Irom the past, and freer to 
choose its future course than it ever has been since its commencement. We 
are about to take a fresh start. I move off under the State Rights banner, and 
o-o in the direction in which I have been so long moving. I seize the opportunity 
thoroughly to reform the government ; to bring it back to its original principles ; 
to retrench and economize, and rigidly to enforce accountability. I shall op- 
pose strenuously all attempts to originate a new debt ; to create a National 
Bank ; to reunite the political and money powers (more dangerous than Church 
and State) in any form or shape ; to prevent the operation of the compromise, 
which is gradually removing the last vestige of the tariff system ; and, mainly, 
I shall use my best efforts to give an ascendency to the great conservative prin- 
ciple of state sovereignty, over the dangerous and despotic doctrine of consoli- 
dation. I rejoice to think that the executive department of the government is 
now so reduced in power and means, that it can no longer rely on its influence 
and patronage to secure a majority. Henceforward it can have no hope of sup- 
porting itself but on wisdom, moderation, patriotism, and devoted attachment to 
the Constitution, which, I trust, will make it, in its own defence, an ally in ef- 
fecting the reform which I deem indispensable to the salvation of the country 
and its institutions. 

I look, sir, with pride to the wise and noble bearing of the little State Rights 
party, of which it is my pride to be a member, throughout the eventful period 
through which the country has passed since 1824. Experience already bears 
testimony to their patriotism, firmness, and sagacity, and history will do it jus- 
tice. In that year, as I have stated, the tariff system triumphed in the councils 
of the nation. We saw its disastrous political bearings — foresaw its surpluses, 
and the extravagances to which it would lead — we rallied on the election of 
the late President to arrest it through the influence of the executive department 
of the government. In this we failed. We then fell back upon the rights and 
sovereignty of the states ; and by the action of a small, but gallant state, and 
through the potency of its interposition, we brought the system to the ground, 



sustained as it was by the opposition and the administration, and by the whole 
power and patronage of the government. The pernicious overflow of the treas- 
ury, of which it was the parent, could not be arrested at once. The surplus 
was seized on by the executive, and, by its control over the banks, became the 
fruitful source of executive influence and encroachment. Without hesitation, 
we joined our old opponents on the tariff' question, but under our own flag, and 
without mero-ing in their ranks, and made a gallant and successful war against 
the encroachments of the executive. That terminated, we part with our late 
allies in peace, and move forward, lag or onward who may, to secure the fruits 
of our long, but successful struggle, under the old Republican flag of '98, which, 
though tattered and torn, has never yet been lowered, and, with the blessing of 
God, never shall be with my consent. 



XIX. 



SPEECH ON HIS AMENDMENT TO SEPARATE THE GOVERNMENT FROM THE BANKS, 

OCTOBER 3, 1837. 

Mr. President : In reviewing this discussion, I have been struck with the 
fact, that the argument on the opposite side has been limited, almost exclu- 
sively, to the questions of relief and the currency. These are, undoubtedly, im- 
portant questions, and well deserving the deliberate consideration of the Sen- 
ate ; but there are other questions involved in this issue of a far more elevated 
character, which more imperiously demand our attention. The banks have 
ceased to be mere moneyed incorporations. They have become great political 
institutions, with vast influence over the welfare of the community ; so much 
so, that a highly distinguished senator (Mr. Clay) has declared, in his place, 
that the question of the disunion of the government and the banks involved in 
its consequences the disunion of the states themselves. With this declaration 
sounding in our ears, it is time to look into the origin of a system which has 
already acquired such mighty influence ; to inquire into the causes which have 
produced it, and whether they are still on the increase ; in what they will ter- 
minate, if left to themselves ; and, finally, whether the system is favourable to 
the permanency of our free institutions ; to the industry and business of the 
country ; and, above all, to the moral and intellectual development of the com- 
munity. I feel the vast importance and magnitude of these topics, as well as 
their great delicacy. I shall touch them with extreme reluctance, and only be- 
cause I believe them to belong to the occasion, and that it would be a derelic- 
tion of public duty to withhold any opinion, which I have deliberately formed, 
on the subject under discussion. 

The rise and progress of the banking system is one of the most remarkable 
and curious phenomena of modem times. Its origin is modern and humble, 
and gave no indication of the extraordinary growth and ijiifluence which it was 
destined to attain. It dates back to 1609, the year that the Bank of Amsterdam 
was established. Other banking institutions preceded it ; but they were insula- 
ted, and not immediately connected with the systems which have since sprung up, 
and which may be distinctly traced to that bank, which was a bank of deposite 
— a mere storehouse — established under the authority of that great commer- 
cial metropolis, for the purpose of safe-keeping the precious metals, and facili- 
tating the vast system of exchanges which then centred there. The whole sys- 
tem was the most simple and beautiful that can be imagined. The depositor, 
on delivering his bullion or coin in store, received a credit, estimated at the 
standard value on the books of the bank, and a certificate of deposite for the 
amount, which was transferable from hand to hand, and entitled the holder to 



276 SPEECHES OF JOHJN U. i;Al.HULiN. 

■withdraw the deposite on payment of a moderate fee for the expense and hazard 
of safe-keeping. These certificates became, in fact, the circulating medium of 
the community, performing, as it were, the hazard and drudgerj^ while the pre- 
cious metals, which tliey, in truth, represented, guilder for guilder, lay quietly in 
store, without being exposed to the wear and tear, or losses incidental to actual 
use. It was thus a paper currency was created, having all the solidity, safety. 
and uniformity of a metallic, with the facility belonging to that of paper. The 
whole arrangement was admirable, and worthy of the strong sense and down- 
right honesty of the people with whom it originated. 

'^Out of this, which may be called the first era of the system, grew the bank of 
deposite, discount, and circulation — a great and mighty change, destined to ef- 
fect a revolution in the condition of modem society. It is not difficult to explain 
how the one system should spring from the other, notwithstanding the striking 
dissimilarity in features and character between the offspring and the parents A 
vast sum, not less than three millions sterling, accumulated and remained habit- 
ually in deposite in the Bank of Amsterdam, the place of the returned certifi- 
cates being constantly supplied by new depositors. With so vast a standing 
deposite, it required but little reflection to perceive that a very large portion of 
it might be withdrawn, and that a suflicient amount would be still left to meet 
the returning certificates ; or, what would be the same in effect, that an equal 
amount of fictitious certificates might be issued beyond the sum actually depos- 
ited. Either process, if interest be charged on the deposites withdrawn, or the 
fictitious certificates issued, would be a near approach to a bank of discount. 
This once seen, it required but little reflection to perceive that the same pro- 
cess would be equally applicable to a capital placed in bank as stock ; and from 
that the transition was easy to issuing bank-notes payable on demand, on bills 
of exchange, or promissory notes, having but a short time to run. These, com- 
bined, constitute the elements of a bank of discount, deposite, and circulation. 
Modem ingenuity and dishonesty would not have been long in percei\dng and 
turning such advantages to account; but the faculties of the plain Belgian was 
either too blunt to perceive, or his honesty too stern to avail himself of them. 
To his honour, there is reason to believe, notwithstanding the temptation, the 
deposites were sacredly kept, and that for every certificate in circulation, there 
was a ccfrresponding amount in bullion or coin in store. It was reserved for 
another people, either more ingenious or less scrupulous, to make the change. 
The Bank of England was incorporated in iGOi, eighty-five years after that 
X of Amsterdam, and was the first bank of deposite, discount, and circulation. 
Its capital was £1,200,000, consisthig wholly of government stock, bearing an 
interest of eight per cent, per annum. Its notes were received in the dues of 
the government, and the public revenue was deposited in the bank. It was au- 
thorized to circulate exchequer bills, and make loans to government. Let us 
pause for a moment, and contemplate this complex and potent machine, under 
its various character and functions. 

As a bank of deposite, it was authorized to receive deposites, not simply for 
safe-keeping, to be returned when demanded by the depositor, but to be used 
and loaned out for the benefit of the institution, care being taken always to be 
provided with the means of returning an equal amount, when demanded. As 
a bank of discount and circulation, it issued its notes on the faith of it5 capital 
stock and deposites, or discounted bills of exchange and promissory notes back- 
ed by responsible endorsers, charging an interest something greater than was 
authorized by law to be charged on loans ; and thus allowing it, for the use of 
its credit, a higher rate of compensation than what individuals were authorized 
to receive for the use and hazard of money or capital loaned out. It will, per- 
haps, place this point in a clear light, if we should consider the transaction in 
its true character, not as a loan, but as a mere exchange of credit. In discount- 
ing, the bank takes, in the shape of a promissory note, the credit of an indi- 



»l'liJiV;Hi;JS UF JOHiM C. CALHOUN. ii77 

vidual so good that another, equally responsible, endorses his note for nothing, 
and gives out its credit in the form of a bank-note. The transaction is obvious- 
ly a mere exchange of credit. If the drawer and endorser break, the loss is 
the Bank's ; but if the Bank breaks, the loss falls on the community ; and yet 
this transaction, so dissimilar, is confounded with a loan, and the bank per- 
mitted to charge, on a mere exchange of credit, in which the hazard of the 
breaking of the drawer and endorser is incurred by the Bank, and that of the 
Bank by the community, a higher sum than the legal rate of interest on a loan ; 
in which, besides the use of his capital, the hazard is all on the side of the 
lender. 

Turning from these to the advantages which it derived from its connexion 
with the government, we shall find them not less striking. Among the first of 
these in importance is the fact of its notes being received in the dues of the 
government, by which the credit of the government was added to that of the 
Bank, which added so greatly to the increase of its circulation. These, ao-ain 
when collected by the government, were placed in deposite in the Bank ; thus 
giving to it not only the profit resulting from their abstraction from circulation, 
from the time of collection till disbursement, but also that from the use of the 
public deposites in the interval. To complete the picture, the Bank, in its ca- 
pacity of lender to the government, in fact paid its own notes, which rested on 
the faith of the government stock, on which it was drawing eight per cent. ; 
so that, in truth, it but loaned to the government its own credit. 

Such were the extraordinary advantages conferred on this institution, and of 
which it had an exclusive monopoly ; and these are the causes which gave such 
an extraordinary impulse to its growth and influence, that it increased in a lit- 
tle more than a hundred years — from 1694, when the second era of the sys- 
tem commenced, with the establishment of the Bank of England, to 1797, when- 
it terminated — from jC1,200,000 to nearly £11,000,000, and this mainly by the 
addition to its capital through loans to the government above the profits of its 
annual dividends. Before entering on the third era of the system, I pause to 
make a few reflections on the second. 

I am struck, in casting my eyes over it, to find that, notwithstanding the great 
dissimilarity of features which the system had assumed in passing from a mere 
bank of deposite to that of deposite, discount, and circulation, the operation of 
the latter was confounded, throughout this long period, as it regards the effects 
on the currency, with the bank of deposite. Its notes were universally regard- 
ed as representing gold and silver, and as depending on that representation ex- 
clusively for their circulation ; as much so as did the certificates of deposite in the 
original Bank of Amsterdam. No one supposed that they could retain their 
credit for a moment after they ceased to be convertible into the metals on de- 
mand ; nor were they supposed to have the effect of increasing the aggregate 
amount of the currency ; nor, of course, of increasing prices. In a word, they 
were in the public mind as completely identified with the metallic currency as if 
every note in circulation had laid up in the vaults of the Bank an equal amount, 
pound for pound, into which all its paper could be converted the moment it was 
presented. 

All this was a great delusion. The issues of the Bank never did represent, 
from the first, the precious metals. Instead of the representatives, its notes 
were, in reality, the substitute for coin. Instead of being the mere drudges, 
performing all the out-door service, while the coins reposed at their ease in the 
vaults of the banks, free from wear and tear, and the hazard of loss or destruc- 
tion, as did the certificates of deposite in the original Bank of Amsterdam, they 
substituted, degraded, and banished the coins. Every note circulated became 
the substitute of so much coin, and dispensed with it in circulation, and thereby 
depreciated the value of the precious metals, and increased their consumption 
in the same proportion ; while it diminished in the same degree the supply, by 



278 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOtTrf. 

rendering mining less profitable. The system assumed gold and silver as the 
basis of its circulation ; and yet, by the laws of its nature, just as it increased 
its circulation, in the same degree the foundation on which the system stood 
was weakened. The consumption of the metals increased, and the supply di- 
minished. As the weight of the superstructure increased, just in the same pro- 
portion its foundation was undermined and weakened. Thus the germe of de- 
struction was implanted in the system at its birth ; has expanded with its growth, 
and must terminate, finally, in its dissolution, unless, indeed, it should, by some 
transition, entirely change its nature, and pass into some other and entirely dif- 
ferent organic form. The conflict between bank circulation and metallic (though 
not perceived in the first stage of the system, when they were supposed to be 
indissolubly connected) is mortal ; one or the other must perish in the struggle. 
Such is the decree of fate : it is irreversible. 

Near the close of the second era, the system passed the Atlantic, and took 
root in our country, where it found the soil still more fertile, and the climate 
more congenial than even in the parent country. The Bank of North America 
was established in 1781, with a capital of $400,000, and bearing all the fea- 
tures of its prototype, the Bank of England. In the short space of a little more 
than half a century, the system has expanded from one bank to about eight hun- 
dred, including branches (no one knows the exact number, so rapid the increase), 
and from a capital of less than half a million to about $300,000,000, without, 
apparently, exhausting or diminishing its capacity to increase. So accelerated 
has been its growth with us, from causes which I explained on a former occa- 
sion,* that already it has approached a point much nearer the limits beyond 
which the system, in its present form, cannot advance, than in England. 

During the year 1797, the Bank of England suspended specie payments : an 
event destined, by its consequences, to effect a revolution in public opinion in re- 
lation to the system, and to accelerate the period which must determine its fate. 
England was then engaged in that gigantic struggle which originated in the 
French Revolution, and her financial operations were on the most extended scale, 
followed by a corresponding increase in the action of the Bank, as her fiscal 
agent. It sunk under its over-action. Specie payments were suspended. 
Panic and dismay spread through the land — so deep and durable was the im- 
pression that the credit of the Bank depended exclusively on the punctuality of 
its payments. 

In the midst of the alarm, an act of Parliament was passed making the notes 
of the Bank a legal tender ; and, to the surprise of all, the institution proceeded 
on, apparently without any diminution of its credit. Its notes circulated freely 
as ever, and without any depreciation, for a time, compared with gold and silver ; 
and continued so to do for upward of twenty years, with an average diminution 
of about one per cent, per annum. This shock did much to dispel the delusion 
that bank-notes represented gold and silver, and that they circulated in conse- 
quence of such representation, but without entirely obliterating the old impres- 
sion which had taken such strong hold on the public mind. The credit of its 
notes during the suspension was generally attributed to the tender act, and the 
great and united resources of the Bank and the government. 

But an event followed of the same kind, under circumstances entirely differ- 
ent, which did more than any preceding to shed light on the true nature of the 
system, and to unfold its vast capacity to sustain itself without exterior aid. 
We finally became involved in the mighty struggle that had so long desolated 
Europe and enriched our country. War was declared against Great Britain in 
1812, and in the short space of one year our feeble banking system sunk \m- 
der the increased fiscal action of government. I was then a member of the 
other house, and had taken my full share of responsibility in the measures which 

* See Speech ou Mr. Webster's motion to renew the charter of the United States Bank in 1834 



bad led to that result. I shall never forget the sensation which the suspension, 
and the certain anticipation of the prostration of the currency of the country, as 
a consequence, excited in my mind. We could resort to no tender act ; we had 
no great central regulating power, like the Bank of England ; and the credit and 
resources of the government were comparatively small. Under such circum- 
stances, 1 looked forward to a sudden and great depreciation of bank-notes, and 
that they would fall speedily as low as the old continental money. Guess my 
surprise when I saw them sustain their credit, with scarcely any depreciation, 
for a time, from the shock. I distinctly recollect when I first asked myself the 
question, What was the cause ? and which directed my inquiry into the extraordi- 
nary phenomenon. 1 soon saw that the system contained within itself a self-sus- 
taining power ; that there was between the banks and the community, mutually, 
the relation of debtor and creditor, there being at all times something more due to 
the banks from the community than from the latter to the former. I saw, in this 
reciprocal relation of debts and credits, that the demand of the banks on the com- 
munity was greater than the amount of their notes in circulation could meet ; and 
that, consequently, so long as their debtors were solvent, and bound to pay at 
short periods, their notes could not fail to be at or near a par with gold and sil- 
ver. I also saw that, as their debtors were principally the merchants, they 
would take bank-notes to meet their bank debts, and that that which the mer- 
chant and the government, who are the great money-dealers, take, the rest of 
the community would also take. Seeing all this, I clearly perceived that self- 
sustaining principle which poised the system, self-balanced, like some celestial 
body, moving with scarcely a perceptible deviation from its path, from the con- 
cussion it had received. 

Shortly after the termination of the war, specie payments were coerced with 
us by the establishment of a National Bank, and a few years afterward, in Great 
Britain, by an act of Parliament. In both countries the restoration was follow- 
ed by wide-spread distress, as it always must be when effected by coercion ; 
for the simple reason that banks cannot pay unless their debtors first pay, and 
that to coerce the banks compels them to coerce their debtors before they have*^ 
the means to pay. Their failure must be the consequence ; and this involves 
the failure of the banks themselves, carrying with it universal distress. Hence 
I am opposed to all kinds of coercion, and am in favour of leaving the disease 
to time, with the action of public sentiment and the states, to which the banks 
are al'one responsible. 

But to proceed with ray narrative. Although specie payments were restored, 
and the system apparently placed where it was before the suspension, the great 
capacity it proved to possess of sustaining itself without specie payments, was 
not forgot by those who had its direction. The impression that it was indispen- 
sable to the circulation of bank-notes that they should represent the precious 
metals, was almost obliterated ; and the latter were regarded rather as restrictions ^- 
on the free and profUabte operation of the si/stem than as the means of Us security. 
Hence a feeling of opposition to gold and silver gradually grew up on the part 
of the banks, which created an esprit dii corps, followed by a moral resistance 
to specie payments, if I may so express myself, which in fact suspended, in a 
great degree, the conversion of their notes into the precious metals, long before 
the present suspension. With the growth of this feeling, banking business as- 
sumed a bolder character, and its profits were proportionably enlarged, and with 
it the tendency of the system to increase kept pace. The effect of this soon 
displayed itself in a striking manner, which was followed by very important con- 
sequences, which I shall next explain. 

It so happened that the charters of the Bank of England and the late Bank 
of the United States expired about the same time. As the period approached,, 
a feeling of hostility, growing out of the causes just explained, which had ex- 
cited a strong desire in the community, who could not participate in the profits 



SriiEiUrlrjO ur junii o« v/A^nuuiia 



of these two great monopolies, to throw off their restraint, began to disclose it- 
self ao-ainst both institutions. In Great Britain it terminated in breaking down 
the exclusive monopoly of the Bank of England, and narrowing greatly the spe- 
cie basis of the system, by making the notes of the Bank of England a legal 
tender in all cases, except between it and its creditors. A sudden and vast in- 
crease of the system, with a great diminution of the metallic basis in proportion 
to banking transactions, followed, which has shocked and weakened the stabil- 
ity of the system there. With us the result was different. The Bank fell un- 
der the hostility. All restraint on the system was removed, and banks shot up 
in every direction almost instantly, under the growing impulse which I have ex- 
plained, and which, with the causes I stated when I first addressed the Senate 
on this question, is the cause of the present catastrophe. 

With it commences the fourth era of the system, which we have just entered 
— an era of struggle, and conflict, and changes. The system can advance no 
farther in our country, without great and radical changes. It has come to a 
stand. The conflict between metallic and bank currency, which I have shown 
to be inherent in the system, has, in the course of time, and with the progress 
of events, become so deadly that they must separate, and one or the other fall. 
The degradation of the value of the metals, and their almost entire expulsion 
from their appropriate sphere as the medium of exchange and the standard of 
value, have gone so far, under the necessary operation of the system, that they 
are no longer sufficient to form the basis of the widely-extended system of bank- 
ing. From the first, the gra^atation of the system has been in one direction — 
to dispense with the use of the metals ; and hence the descent from a bank of de- 
posite to one of discount ; and hence, from being the representative, their notes 
have become the substitute for gold and silver ; and hence, finally, its present 
tendency to a mere paper engine, totally separated from the metals. One law 
has steadily governed the system throughout — the enlargement of its profits and 
influence ; and, as a consequence, as metallic currency became insufficient for 
circulation, it has become, in its progress, insufficient for the basis of banking 
operations ; so much so, that, if specie payments were restored, it would be but 
nominal, and the system would in a few years, on the first adverse current, 
sink down again into its present helpless condition. Nothing can prevent it but 
great and radical changes, which would diminish its profits and influence, so as 
effectually to arrest that strong and deep current which has carried so much of 
the wealth and capital of the community in that direction. Without that, the 
system, as now constituted, must fall ; unless, indeed, it can form an alliance 
''' with the government, and through it establish its authority by law, and make its 
credit, unconnected with gold and silver, the medium of circulation. If the al- 
liance should take place, one of the first movements would be the establishment 
of a great central institution ; or, if that should prove impracticable, a combina- 
tion of a few selected and powerful state banks, which, sustained by the govern- 
ment, would crush or subject the weaker, to be followed by an amendment of 
the Constitution, or some other device, to limit their number and the amount of 
their capital hereafter. This done, the next step would be to confine and con- 
solidate the supremacy of the system over the currency of the country, which 
would be in its hands exclusively, and, through it, over the industry, business, 
and politics of the countiy ; all of which would be wielded to advance its prof- 
its and power. 

The system having now arrived at this point, the great and solemn duty de- 
volves on us to determine this day what relation this government shall hereafter 
bear to it. Shall we enter into an alliance with it, and become the sharers of 
its fortune and the instrument of its aggrandizement and supremacy ? This is 
the momentous question on which we must now decide. Before we decide, it 
behooves us to inquire whether the system is favourable to the permanency of 
our free Republican institutions, to the industry and business of the country, and. 



above all, to our moral and intellectual development, the great object for which 
we were placed here by the Author of our being. 

Can it be doubted what must be the effects of a system whose operations have 
been shown to be so unequal on free institutions, whose foundation rests on an 
equality of rights 1 Can that favour equality which gives to one portion of the 
citizens and the country such decidjsd-advantages over the other, as I have shown 
it does in my opening remarks ? \Can that be favourable to liberty which ct»n- 
centrates the money power, and pTfces it under the control of a few powerful 
and wealthy individuals ? It is the remark of a profound statesman, that the 
revenue is the state ; and, of course, those who control the revenue control the 
state ; and those who can control the money power can the revenue, and through 
it the state, with the property and industry of the country, in all its ramifica- 
tions. Let us pause for a moment, and reflect on the nature and extent of this 
tremendous power. 

The currency of a country is to the community what the blood is to the hu- 
man system. It constitutes a small part, but it circulates through every portion, 
and is indispensable to all the functions of life. The currency bears even a 
smaller proportion to the aggregate capital of the community than what the blood 
does to the solids in the human system. What that proportion is, has not been, 
and perhaps cannot be, accurately ascertained, as it is probably subject to con- 
siderable variations. It is, however, probably between twenty-five and thirty-five 
to one. I will assume it to be thirty to one. With this assumption, let us sup- 
pose a community whose aggregate capital is $31,000,000 ; its currency would 
be, by supposition, one million, and the residue of its capital thirty millions. This 
being assumed, if the currency be increased or decreased, the other portion of 
the capital remaining the same, according to the well-known laws of currency, 
property would rise or fall with the increase or decrease ; that is, if the cur- 
rency be increased to two millions, the aggregate value of property would rise 
to sixty millions ; and, if the currency be reduced to $500,000, it would be re- 
duced to fifteen millions. With this law so well established, place the money 
power in the hands of a single individual, or a combination of individuals, and 
they, by expanding or contracting the currency, may raise or sink prices at 
pleasure ; and by purchasing when at the greatest depression, and selling at 
the o-reatest elevation, may command the whole property and industry of the 
community, and control its fiscal operations. )The banking system concentrates 
and places this power in the hands of those who control it, and its force in- 
creases just in proportion as it dispenses with a metallic basis. Never was an 
eno-ine invented better calculated to place the destiny of the many in the hands 
of the few, or less favourable to that equality and independence which lies at the 
bottom of our free institutions. 

These views have a bearing not less decisive on the next inquiry — the effects 
of the system on the industry and wealth of the country. Whatever may have 
been its effects in this respect in its early stages, it is difficult to imagine any- 
thuig more mischievous on all of the pursuits of life than the frequent and sud- 
den expansions and contractions, to which it has now become so habitually sub- 
ject that it may be considered its ordinary condition. None but those in the 
secret know what to do. AU are pausing and looking out to ascertain whether 
an expansion or contraction is next to follow, and what will be its extent and 
duration ; and if, perchance, an error be committed — if it expands when a con- 
traction is expected, or the reverse — the most prudent may lose by the miscalcu- 
lation the fruits of a life of toil and care. The consequence is, to discourage 
industry, and to convert the whole community into stock-jobbers and speculators. 
The evil is constantly on the increase, and must continue to increase just as the 
banking system becomes more diseased, till it shall become utterly intolerable. 
But its most fatal eflfects originate in its bearing on the moral and intellectual 
development of the community. The great principle of demand and supply gov- 

N N 



»i^£.rii;rlrjO ur jwnn y^. »^Ajjrnjuii. 



ems the moral and intellectual world no less than the business and commercial. 
If a community be so constituted as to cause a demand for high mental at- 
tainments, or if its honours and rewards are allotted to pursuits that require 
their development, by creating a demand for intelligence, knowledge, wisdom, 
justice, firmness, courage, patriotism, and the like, they are sure to be produced. 
But if, on the contrary, they be allotted to pursuits that require inferior qualities, 
the higher are sure to decay and perish. I object to the banking system, be- 
cause it allots the honours and rewards of the community, in a very undue pro- 
portion, to a pursuit the least of all favourable to the development of the higher 
mental qualities, intellectual or moral, to the decay of the learned professions, 
and the more noble pursuits of sciene, literature, philosophy, and statesmanship, 
and the great and more useful pursuits of business and industry. With the vast 
increase of its profits and influence, it is gradually concentrating in itself most 
of the prizes of life — wealth, honour, and influence, to the great disparagement 
and degradation of all the liberal, and useful, and generous pursuits of society. 
The rising generation cannot but feel its deadening influence. The youths 
l-'who crowd our colleges, and behold the road to honour and distinction termina- 
ting in a banking-house, will feel the spirit of emulation decay within them, and 
will no longer be pressed forward by generous ardour to mount up the rugged 
steep of science as the road to honour and distinction, when, perhaps, the high- 
est point they could attain, in what was once the most honourable and influential 
v/ of all the learned professions, would be the place of attorney to a bank. 

Nearly four years since, on the question of the removal of the deposites, 
although I was opposed to the removal, and in favour of their restoration, be- 
cause I believed it to be illegal, yet, foreseeing what was coming, and not 
wishing there should be any mistake as to my opinion on the banking system, 
I stated here in my place what that opinion was. I declared that I had long 
entertained doubts, if doubts they might be called, which were daily increasing, 
that the system made the worst possible distribution of the wealth of the com- 
munity, and that it would ultimately be found hostile to the farther advancement 
of civilization and liberty. This declaration was not lightly made ; and I have 
now unfolded the grounds on which it rested, and which subsequent events and 
reflection have matured into a settled conviction. 

With all these consequences before us, shall we restore the broken connex- 
ion ? Shall we again unite the government with the system ? And what are 
the arguments opposed to these high and weighty objections? Instead of meet- 
ing them and denying their truth, or opposing others of equal weight, a rabble 
of objections (I can call them by no better name) are urged against the separa- 
tion : one currency for the government, and another for the people ; separation 
of the people from the government ; taking care of the government, and not the 
people ; and a whole fraternity of others of like character. When I first saw 
them advanced in the columns of a newspaper, I could not but smile, in thinking 
how admirably they were suited to an electioneering canvass. They have a 
certain plausibility about them, which makes them troublesome to an opponent 
simply because they are merely plausible, without containing one particle of 
reason. I little expected to meet them in discussion in this place ; but since 
they have been gravely introduced here, respect for the place and company ex- 
acts a passing notice, to which, of themselves, they are not at all entitled. 

I begin with that which is first pushed forward, and seems to be most relied 
on — one currency for the government and another for the people. Is it meant 
that the government must take in payment of its debts whatever the people take 
in payment of theirs? If so, it is a very broad proposition, and would lead to 
important consequences. The people now receive the notes of non-specie- 
paying banks. Is it meant that the government should also receive them? 
They receive in change all sorts of paper, issued by we know not whom. 
Mu^t the government also receive them ^ They receive the notes of banks 



issuing notes under five, ten, and twenty dollars. Is it intended that the gov- 
ernment shall also permanently receive them ? They receive bills of exchange. 
Shall government, too, receive them? If not, I ask the reason. Is it because 
they are not suitable for a sound, stable, and uniform currency? The reason 
is good ; but what becomes of the principle, that the government ought to take 
whatever the people take? But I go farther. It is the duty of government 
to receive nothing in its dues that it has not the right to render uniform and 
stable in its value. We are, by the Constitution, made the guardian of the.- 
money of the country. For this the right of coining and regulating the value 
of coins was given, and we have no right whatever to receive or treat anything 
as money, or the equivalent of money, the value of which we have no right to 
regulate. If this principle be true, and it cannot be controverted, I ask. What 
right has Congress to receive and treat the notes of the state banks as monev ?•' 
If the states have the right to incorporate banks, what right has Conoressto 
regulate them or their issues? Show me the power in the Constitution. If 
the right be admitted, what are its limitations, and how can the right of subject- 
ing them to a bankrupt law in that case be denied ? If one be admitted, the 
other follows as a consequence ; and yet those who are most indignant against 
the proposition of subjecting the state banks to a bankrupt law, are the most 
clamorous to receive their notes, not seeing that the one power involves the 
other. I am equally opposed to both, as unconstitutional and inexpedient. We 
are next told, to separate from the banks is to separate from the people. The 
banks, then, are the people, and the people the banks — united, identified, and in- 
separable ; and as the government belongs to the people, it follows, of course, 
according to this argument, it belongs also to the banks, and, of course, is bound 
to do their biddings. I feel on so grave a subject, and in so grave a body, an 
almost invincible repugnance in replying to such arguments ; and I shall hasten 
over the only remaining one of the fraternity which I shall condescend to notice 
with all possible despatch. They have no right of admission here, and, if I 
were disposed to jest on so solemn an occasion, I should say they ought to be 
driven from this chamber, under the 47th rule.* The next of these formidable 
objections to the separation from the banks is, that the government, in so doing, 
takes care of itself, and not of the people. Why, I had supposed that the gov- 
ernment belonged to the people ; that it was created by them for their own use, 
to promote their interest, and secure their peace and liberty ; that, in takinw care 
of itself, it takes the most effectual care of the people ; and in refusincr all em- 
barrassing, entangling, and dangerous alliances with corporations of any de- 
scription, it was but obeying the great law of self-preservation. But enough ; I 
cannot any longer waste words on such objections. I intend no disrespect to 
those who have urged them ; yet these, and arguments like these, are mainly 
relied on to countervail the many and formidable objections, drawn from the 
highest considerations that can influence the action of governments or individu- 
als, none of which have been refuted, and many not even denied. 

The senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Webster) urged an argument of a very 
different character, but which, in my opinion, he entirely failed to establish. He 
asserted that the ground assumed on this side was an entire abandonment of a 
great constitutional function conferred by the Constitution on Congress. To 
establish this, he laid down the proposition, that Congress was bound to take 
care of the money of the country. Agreed ; and with this view the Constitu- 
tion confers on us the right of coining and regulating the value of coins, in or--^- 
der to supply the country with money of proper standard and value ; and is it 
an abandonment of this right to take care, as this bill does, that it shall not be 
expelled from circulation, as far as the fiscal action of this government extends ? 
But having taken this unquestionable position, the senator passed (by what 

* It is the rule regulating the admission of persons in the lobby of the Senate. 



country to the right of establishing a currency, and then to the right of estab- 
lishino- a bank currency, as I understood him. On both of these points I leave 
him in the hands of the senator from Pennsylvania (Mr. Buchanan), who, in an 
able and constitutional argument, completely demolished, in my judgment, the 
position assumed by the senator from Massachusetts. I rejoice to hear such 
an argument from such a quarter. The return of the great State of Pennsyl- 
vania to the doctrines of rigid construction and state rights sheds a ray of light 
on the thick, darkness which has long surrounded us. 

But we are told that there is not gold and silver enough to fill the channels 
of circulation, and that prices would fall. Be it so. What is that, compared to 
the dangers which menace on the opposite side ? But are we so certain that 
there is not a sufficiency of the precious metals for the purpose of circulation ? 
Look at France, with her abundant supply, with her channels of circulation full 
to overflowing with coins, and her flourishing industry. It is true that our sup- 
ply is insufficient at present. How could it be otherwise ? The banking sys- 
tem has degraded and expelled the metals — driven them to foreign lands — 
closed the mines, and converted their products into costly vases, and splendid 
utensils and ornaments, administering to the pride and luxury of the opulent, in- 
stead of being employed as the standard of value, and the instrument of making 
exchanges, as they were manifestly intended mainly to be by an all-wise Provi- 
dence. Restore them to their proper functions, and they will return from their 
banishment ; the mines will again be opened, and the gorgeous splendour of 
wealth will a'gain reassume the more humble, but useful, form of coins. 

But, Mr. President, I am not driven to such alternatives. I am not the ene- 
my, but the friend of credit — not as the substitute, but the associate and the as- 
sistant of the metals. In that capacity, I hold credit to possess, in many re- 
spects, a vast superiority over the metals themselves. I object to it in the form 
which it has assumed in the banking system, for reasons that are neither light 
nor few, and that neither have nor can be answered. The question is not 
whether credit can be dispensed with, but what is its best possible form — the 
most stable, the least liable to abuse, and the most convenient and cheap. I 
threw out some ideas on this impoftant subject in my opening remarks. I have 
heard nothing to change my opinion. I believe that government credit, in the 
form I suggested, combines all the requisite qualities of a credit circulation in 
the highest degree, and also that government ought not to use any other credit 
but its own in its financial operations. When the senator from Massachusetts 
made his attack on my suggestions, I was disappointed. I expected argument, 
and he gave us denunciation. It is often easy to denounce, when it is hard to 
refute ; and when that senator gives denunciations instead of arguments, I con- 
clude that it is because the one is at his command, and the other not. 

We are told the form I suggested is but a repetition of the old Continental 
money — a ghost that is ever conjured up by all who wish to give the banks an 
exclusive monopoly of government credit. The assertion is not true : there is 
not the least analogy between them. The one was a promise to pay when 
there was no revenue, and the other a promise to receive in the dues of gov- 
ernment when there is an abundant revenue. , 

We are also told that there is no instance of a government paper that did not 
depreciate. In reply, I affirm that there is none, assuming the form I pro- 
pose, that ever did depreciate. Whenever a paper receivable in the dues of 
government had anything like a fair trial, it has succeeded. Instance the case of 
North Carolina, referred to in my opening remarks. The draughts of the treas- 
ury at this moment, with all their encumbrance, are nearly at par with gold 
and silver ; and 1 might add the instance alluded to by the distinguished sena- 
tor from Kentucky, in which he admits that, as soon as the excess of the issues 
of the Commonwealth Bank of Kentucky were reduced to the proper point, its 



had a fixed paper circulation, in the form of bank-notes, but which were incon- 
vertible, of upward of $120,000,000, estimated in the metallic ruble, and which 
had for years remained without fluctuation, having nothing to sustain it but that 
it was received in the dues of the government, and that, too, with a revenue of 
only about $90,000,000 annually. I speak on the authority of a respectable 
traveller. Other instances, no doubt, might be added, but it needs no such 
support. How can a paper depreciate which the government is botmd to re- 
ceive in all its payments, and while those to whom payments are to be made 
are under no obligation to receive it ? From its nature, it can only circulate 
•when at par with gold and silver ; and if it should depreciate, none could be in- 
jured but the government. 

But my colleague objects that it would partake of the increase and decrease 
of the revenue, and would be subject to greater expansions and contractions 
than bank-notes themselves. He assumes that government would increase the 
amount with the increase of the revenue, which is not probable, for the aid of its 
credit would be then less needed ; but if it did, what would be the effect ? On 
the decrease of the revenue, its bills would be returned to the treasury, from 
■which, for the want of demand, they could not be reissued ; and the excess, 
instead of hanging on the circulation, as in the case of bank-notes, and expo- 
sing it to catastrophes like the present, would be gradually and silently with- 
drawn, without shock or injury to any one. It has another and striking advan- 
tage over bank circulation — in its superior cheapness, as well as greater stabili- 
ty and safety. UBank paper is cheap to those who make it, but dear, very dear, 
to those who use it-4fully as much so as gold and silver. It is the little cost 
of its manufacture, and the dear rates at which it is furnished to the communi- 
ty, which give the great profit to those who have a monopoly of the article. 
Some idea may be formed of the extent of the profit by the splendid palaces 
which we see under the name of banking-houses, and the vast fortunes which 
have been accumulated in this branch of business ; all of which must ultimate- 
ly be derived from the productive powers of the community, and, of course, adds 
so much to the cost of production. On the other hand, the credit of govern- 
ment, while it would greatly facilitate its financial operations, would cost no- 
thing, or next to nothing, both to it and the people, and, of course, would add 
nothing to the cost of production, which would give every branch of our indus- 
try, agriculture, commerce, and manufactures, as far as its circulation might ex- 
tend, great advantages, both at home and abroad. 

But there remains another and great advantage. In the event of war, it 
would open almost unbounded resources to carry it on, without the necessity of 
resorting to what I am almost disposed to call a fraud — public loans. I have 
already show^n that the loans of the Bank of England to the government were 
very little more than loaning back to the government its own credit ; and this^- 
is more or less true of all loans, where the banking system prevails. It was 
pre-eminently so in our late war. The circulation of the government credit, in 
the shape of bills receivable exclusively with gold and silver in its dues, and 
the sales of public lands, would dispense with the necessity of loans, by in- 
creasing its bills with the increase of taxes. The increase of taxes, and, of 
course, of revenue and expenditures, would be followed by an increased de- 
mand for government bills, while the latter would furnish the means of paying 
the taxes, without increasing, in the same degree, the pressure on the commu- 
nity. This, with a judicious system of funding, at a low rate of interest, would 
go far to exempt the government from the necessity of contracting public loans 
in the event of war. 

I am not, Mr. President, ignorant, in making these suggestions (I wish them 
to be considered only in that light), to what violent opposition every measure of 
the kind must be exposed. Banks have been so long in the possession of gov- 



imuHUiUUtHmMuuwmtuuuiiuumiuniuanutiHniHitnmuuumH 



ernmeni creaii, mai mey very naiurauy cunciuue iiiey nave an exclusive rignt 
to it, and consider the withdrawal of it, even for the use of the government it- 
self, as a positive injury. It was my fortune to take a stand on the side of the 
government against the banks during the most trying period of the late war — 
the winter of 1814 and 1815 — and never in my life was I exposed to more cal- 
umny and abuse — no, not e^en on this occasion. It was my first lesson on the 
subject. I shall never forget it. I propose to give a very brief narrative of the 
scenes through which I then passed ; not with any feeling of egotism, for I 
trust I am incapable of that, but to illustrate the truth of much I have said, and 
to snatch from oblivion not an unimportant portion of our financial history. I 
see the senators from Massachusetts (Mr. Webster) and of Alabama (Mr. 
King), who were then members of the House of Representatives, in their places, 
and they can vouch for the correctness of my narrative, as far as the memory 
of transactions so long passed will serve. 

The finances of the country had, at that time, fallen into great confusion. 
Mr. Campbell had retired from the head of the treasury, and the late Mr. Dal- 
las had succeeded — a man of talents, bold and decisive, but inexperienced in 
the affairs of the department. His first measure to restore order, and to furnish 
the supplies to carry on the war, was to recommend a bank of $50,000,000, to 
be constituted almost exclusively of the new stocks which had been issued du- 
ring the war, to the exclusion of the old, which had been issued before. The 
proposed bank was authorized to make loans to the government, and was not 
bound to pay specie during the war, and for three years after its termination. 

It so happened that I did not arrive here till some time after the commence- 
ment of the session, having been detained by an attack of bilious fever. I 
had taken a prominent part in the declaration of the war, and had every 
motive and disposition to sustain the administration, and to vote every aid 
to carry on the war. Immediately after my arrival, I had a full conversation 
with Mr. Dallas, at his request. I entertained very kind feelings towards 
him, and assured him, after he had explained his plan, that I would give it 
my early and favourable attention. At that time I had reflected but little on 
the subject of banking. Many of my political friends expressed a desire that I 
should take a prominent part in favour of the proposed bank. Their extreme 
anxiety aroused my attention, and, being on no committee (they had been ap- 
pointed before my arrival), I took up the subject for a full investigation, with 
every disposition to give it my support. I had not proceeded far before I was 
struck with the extraordinary character of the project : a bank of $50,000,000, 
whose capital was to consist almost exclusively of government credit in the 
shape of stock, and not bound to pay its debts during the war, and for three 
years afterward, to furnish the government with loans to carry on the war ! I 
saw at once that the effect of the arrangement would be, that government would 
borrow back its own credit, and pay six per cent, per annum for what they had 
already paid eight or nine. It was impossible for me to give it my support 
under any pressure, however great. I felt the difficulty of my situation, not 
only in opposing the leading measure of the administration at such a crisis, but, 
what was far more responsible, to suggest one of my own, that would aflxjrd 
relief to the embarrassed treasury. I cast my eyes around, and soon saw that 
the government should use its own credit directly, without the intervention of a 
bank ; which I proposed to do in the form of treasury notes, to be issued in the 
operations of the government, and to be funded in the subscription to the stock 
of the bank. Treasury notes were, at that time, below par, even with bank 
paper. The opposition to them was so great on the part of the banks, that they 
refused to receive them on deposite, or payment, at par with their notes ; while 
the government, on its part, received and paid away notes of the banks at par 
with its own. Such was the influence of the banks, and to such degradation 
did the government, in its weakness, submit. All this influence I had to en- 



I hesitated not. I saw the path of duly clearly, and determined to tread it, as 
sharp and rugged as it was. When the bill came up, I moved my amendment, 
the main features of which were, that, instead of government stock already is- 
sued, the capital of the bank should consist of funded treasury notes ; and that, 
instead of a mere paper machine, it should be a specie-paying bank, so as to be 
an ally, instead of an opponent, in restoring the currency to a sound condition 
on the return of peace. These were, with me, indispensable conditions. I 
accompanied ray amendment with a short speech of fifteen or twenty minutes, 
and so overpowering was the force of truth, that, notwithstanding the influence 
of the administration, backed by the money power, and the Committee of Ways 
and Means, which was unanimous, with one exception, as I understood, my 
amendment prevailed by a large majority; but it, in turn, failed — the opposition, 
the adherents of the administration, and those who had constitutional scruples, 
combining against it. Then followed various, but unsuccessful, attempts to 
charter a bank. One was vetoed by the President, and another was lost by the 
casting vote of the speaker (Mr. Cheves). After a large portion of the session 
was thus unsuccessfully consumed, a caucus was called, in order to agree on 
some plan, to which I, and the few friends who still adhered to me after such 
hard service, were especially invited. We, of course, attended. The plan of 
compromise was unfolded, which approached much nearer to our views, but 
which was still objectionable in some features. I objected, and required far- 
ther concessions, which were refused, and was told the bill could be pass- 
ed without us ; at which I took up my hat and bade good-night. The bill was 
introduced in the Senate, and speedily passed that body. On the second read- 
ing, 1 rose and made a few remarks, in which I entreated the house to remem- 
ber that they were about to vote for the measure against their conviction, as 
had been frequently expressed ; and that, in so doing, they acted under a suppo- 
sed necessity, which had been created by those who expected to profit by the 
measure. I then reminded them of the danger of acting under such pressure ; 
and I said that they were so sensible of the truth of what I uttered, that, if peace 
should arrive before the passage of the bill, it would not receive the support of 
fifteen members. 1 concluded by saying that I would reserve what I intended 
to say on the question of the passage of the bill, when I would express my 
opinion at length, and appeal to the country. My objections, as yet, had not 
gone to the people, as nothing that I had said had been reported — such was my 
solicitude to defeat the bill without extending our divisions beyond the walls of 
the house, in the then critical condition of the country. My object was to ar- 
rest the measure, and not to weaken confidence in the administration. 

In making the supposition, I had not the slightest anticipation of peace. 
England had been making extensive preparations for the ensuing campaign, 
and had made a vigorous attack on New-Orleans, but had just been repelled ; 
but, by a most remarkable coincidence, an opportunity (as strange as it may 
seem) was afforded to test the truth of what I said. Late in the evening of the 
day I met Mr. Sturges, then a member of Congress from Connecticut. He said 
that he had some information which he could not withhold from me : that a 
treaty of peace had been made ; and that it had actually arrived in New-York, 
and would be here the next day, so that I would have an opportunity of test- 
ing the truth of my prediction. He added, that his brother, who had a mercan- 
tile house in New- York, had forwarded the information to him by express, and 
that he had forwarded the information to connected houses in Southern cities, 
with direction to purchase the great staples in that quarter, and that he wished 
me to consider the information as confidential. I thanked him for the intelli- 
gence, and promised to keep it to myself. The rumour, however, got out, and 
the next day an attempt was made to pass through the bill ; but the house was 
unwilling to act till it could ascertain whether a treaty had been made. It ar- 



t1lllHJW».»w».*<MUWllItM«MH— » CT »w mn»»iijiii. » m « 



and I had the gratification of receiving the thanks of many for defeating the bill, 
who, a short time before, were almost ready to cut my throat for my perseve- 
rincr opposition to the measure. An offer was then made to me to come to my 
terms, which I refused, declaring that I would rise in my demand, and would 
agree to no bill which should not be formed expressly with the view to the 
speedy restoration of specie payments. It was afterward postponed, on the 
conviction that it could not be so modified as to make it acceptable to a major- 
ity. This was my first lessons on banks. It has made a durable impression 
on my mind. 

My colleague, in the course of his remarks, said he regarded this measure 
as a secret war waged against the banks. I am sure he could not intend to at- 
tribute such motives to me. I wage no war, secret or open, against the exist- 
ing institutions. They have been created by the legislation of the states, and 
are alone responsible to the states. I hold them not answerable for the present 
state of things, which has been brought about under the silent operation of time, 
without attracting notice or disclosing its danger. Whatever legal or constitu- 
tional rights they possess under their charters ought to be respected ; and, if 
attacked, I would defend them as resolutely as I now oppose the system. 
Against that I wage, not secret, but open and uncompromising hostilities, origi- 
nating not in opinions recently or hastily formed. I have long seen the true 
character of the system, its tendency and destiny, and have looked forward for 
many years, as many of my friends know, to the crisis in the midst of which 
we now are. My ardent wish has been to effect a gradual change in the bank- 
ing system, by which the crisis might be passed without a shock, if possible ; 
but I have been resolved for many years, that should it arrive in my time, I 
would discharge my duty, however great the difficulty and danger. I have thus 
far faithfully performed it, according to the best of my abilities, and, with the 
blessing of God, shall persist, regardless of every obstacle, with equal fidelity, 
to the end. 

He who does not see that the credit system is on the eve of a great revolu- 
tion, has formed a very imperfect conception of the past and anticipation of the 
future. What changes it is destined to undergo, and what new form it will ulti- 
mately assume, are concealed in the womb of time, and not given us to foresee. 
But we may perceive in the present many of the elements of the existing sys- 
tem which must be expelled, and others which must enter it in its renewed form. 
In looking at the elements at work, I hold it certain, that in the process there 
will be a total and final separation of the credit of government and that of indi- 
viduals, which have been so long blended. The good of society, and the in- 
terests of both, imperiously demand it, and the growing intelligence of the age 
will enforce it. It is unfair, imjust, unequal, contrary to the spirit of free insti- 
tutions, and corrupting in its consequences. How far the credit of govern- 
ment may be used in a separate form, with safety and convenience, remains to 
be seen. To the extent of its fiscal action, limited strictly to the function of 
the collection and disbursement of its revenue, and in the form I have suggested, 
I am of the impression it may be both safely and conveniently used, and with 
great incidental advantages to the whole community. Beyond that limit I see 
no safety, and much danger. 

What form individual credit will assume after the separation, is still more un- 
certain, but I see clearly that the existing fetters that restrain it will be thrown 
off. The credit of an individual is his property, and belongs to him as much 
as his land and houses, to use it as he pleases, with the single restriction, 
which is imposed on all our rights, that it is not to be used so as to injure 
others. What limitations this restriction may prescribe, time and experience 
will show ; but, whatever they may be, they ought to assume the character of 
general laws, obligatory on all alike, and open to all ; and under the provisions 



as they now use their land and houses, without any preference by special acts, 
in any form or shape, to one over another. Everything like monopoly must ul- 
timately disappear before the process which has begun will finally terminate. 

I see, not less clearly, that, in the process, a separation will take place be- 
tween the use of capital and the use of credit. They are wholly different, and, 
under the growing intelligence of the times, cannot much longer remain con- 
founded in their present state of combination. They are as distinct as a loan 
and an endorsement ; in fact, the one is but giving to another the use of our 
capital, and the other the use of our credit ; and yet, so dissimilar are they, that 
we daily see the most prudent individuals lending their credit for nothing, in 
the form of endorsement or security, who would not loan the most inconsider- 
able sum without interest. But as dissimilar as they are, they are completely 
confounded in banking operations, which is one of the main sources of the 
profit, and the consequent dangerous flow of capital in that direction. A bank 
discount, instead of a loan, is very little more, as I have shown, than a mere 
exchange of credit — an exchange of the joint credit of the drawer and endorser 
of the note discounted for the credit of the bank in the shape of its own note. 
In the exchange, the bank ensures the parties to the note discounted, and the 
community, which is the loser if the bank fails, virtually ensures the bank ; and 
yet, by confounding this exchange of credit with the use of capital, the bank is 
permitted to charge an interest for this exchange, rather greater than an indi- 
vidual is permitted to charge for a loan, to the great gain of the bank and loss 
to the community. I say loss, for the community can never enjoy the great and 
full benefit of the credit system, till loans and credit are considered as entirely 
distinct in their nature, and the compensation for the use of each be adjusted to 
their respective nature and character. Nothing would give a greater impulse 
to all the business of society. The superior cheapness of credit would add in- 
calculably to the productive powers of the community, when the immense gains 
which are now made by confounding them shall come in aid of production. 

Whatever other changes the credit system is destined to undergo, these are 
certainly some which it must ; but when, and how the revolution will end — 
whether it is destined to be sudden and convulsive, or gradual and free from 
shock, time alone can disclose. Much will depend on the decision of the present 
question^ and the course which the advocates of the system loill pursue. If the 
separation takes place, and is acquiesced in by those interested in the system, 
the prospect will be, that it will gradually and quietly run down, without shock 
or convulsions, which is my sincere prayer ; but if not — if the reverse shall be 
insisted on, and, above all, if it should be effected through a great political 
struggle (it can only so be effected), the revolution would be violent and convul- 
sive. A great and thorough change must take place. It is wholly unavoida- 
ble. The public attention begins to be roused throughout the civilized world 
to this all-absorbing subject. There is nothing left to be controlled but the 
mode and manner, and it is better for all that it should be gradual and quiet than 
the reverse. All the rest is destiny. 

I have now, Mr. President, said what I intended, without reserve or disguise. 
In taking the stand I have, I change no relation, personal or political, nor alter 
any opinion I have heretofore expressed or entertained. I desire nothing from the 
government or the people. My only ambition is to do ray duty, and shall follow 
wherever that may lead, regardless alike of attachments or antipathies, personal 
or political. I know full well the responsibility I have assumed. I see clearly 
the magnitude and the hazard of the crisis, and the danger of confiding the 
execution of measures in which I take so deep a responsibility, to those in 
whom I have no reason to have any special confidence. But all this deters me 
not, when I believe that the permanent interest of the country is involved. My 
course is fixed. I go fo-ward. If the administration recommend what I ap- 

Oo 



IMU111WIUlH«IW«IHlMllUMII«iUIMMUIIlHlHtWiH»tJimBlIltH 



prove on this great question, I will cheerfully give my support ; if not, I shall 
oppose ; but, in opposing, I shall feel bound to suggest what I believe to be the 
proper measure, and which I shall be ready to back, be the responsibility what 
it may, looking only to the country, and not stopping to estimate whether the 
benelit shall inure either to the administration or the opposition. 



XX. 

SPEECH ON THE SUB-TREASURY BU.L, FEBRUARY 15, 1838. 

I REGARD this measure, which has been so much denounced, as very little 
more than an attempt to carry out the provisions of the joint resolution of 1816, 
and the deposite act of 1836. The former provides that no notes but those of 
specie-paying banks shall be received in the dues of the government, and the 
latter tlial such banks only shall be the depositories of the public revenues and 
fiscal agents of the government ; but it omitted to make provisions for the con- 
tingency of a general suspension of specie payments, such as is the present. 
It followed, accordingly, on the suspension in May last, which totally separated 
the government and the banks, that the revenue was thrown in the hands of 
the executive, where it has since remained under its exclusive control, without 
any legal provision for its safe-keeping. The object of this bill is to supply 
this omission ; to take tlie public money out of the hands of the executive and 
j)Iace it under the custody of the laws, and to prevent the renewal of a connex- 
ion which has proved so unfortunate to both the government and the banks. 
13ut it is this measure, originating in an exigency caused by our own acts, and 
that seeks to make the most of a change effected by operation of law, instead 
of attempting to innovate, or to make another experiment, as has been errone- 
ously represented, which has been denounced under the name of the sub-treas- 
ury with such unexampled bitterness. 

In lieu of this bill, an amendment has been offered, as a substitute, by the 
senator from Virginia farthest from the chair (Mr. Rives), which, he informs 
us, is the first choice of himself and those who agree with him, and the second 
'Choice of those with whom he is allied on this question. If I may judge from 
•appearances, which can hardly deceive, he might have said their first choice 
under existing circumstances ; and have added, that, despairing of a National 
Bank, the object of their preference, they have adopted his substitute, as the 
only practical alternative at present. We have, then, the question thus nar- 
rowed down to this bill and the proposed substitute : it is agreed on all sides, 
that one or the other must be selected, and that to adopt or reject the one is to 
rejector adopt the other. The single question, then, is. Which shall we choose ? 
A deeply momentous question, which we are now called on to decide in behalf 
of the states of this Union ; and on our decision their future destiny must in a 
great degree depend, so long as their Union endures. 

In comparing the relative merits of the two measures, preparatory to a decis- 
ion, I shall touch very briefly on the principles and details of the bill. The 
former is well understood by the Senate and the country at large, and the latter 
has been so ably and lucidly explained by the chairman of the committee in his 
opening speech, as to supersede the necessity of farther remarks on them at 
this stage of the discussion. 1 propose, then, to limit myself to a mere general 
nummary, accompanied by a few brief observations. 

The object of the bill, as 1 have already stated, is to take the public funds out 
of the hands of the executive, where they have been thrown by operation of our 
acts, and to place them under the custody of law ; and to provide for a gradual 
and slow, but a perpetual separation between the government and the banks. 



It proposes to extend the process of separating to the year 1845, receiving du- 
ring the first year of the series the notes of such banks as may pay specie, and 
reducing thereafter the amount receivable in notes one sixth annually, till the 
separation shall be finally consummated at the period mentioned. 

The provisions of the bill are the most simple and effectual that an able com- 
mittal could devise. Four principal receivers, a few clerks, and a sufficient 
number of agents to examine the state of the public funds, in order to see that 
all is right, at an annual charge not exceeding forty or fifty thousand dollars at 
most, constitute the additional officers and expenditures required to perform all 
the functions heretofore discharged by the banks, as depositories of the public 
money and fiscal agents of the treasury. This simple apparatus will place the 
public treasury on an independent footing, and give to the government, at all 
times, a certain command of its funds to meet its engagements, and preserve its 
honour and faith inviolate. If it be desirable to separate from the banks, the 
government must have some independent agency of its own to keep and dis- 
burse the public revenue ; and if it must have such an agency, none, in my 
opinion, can be devised more simple, more economical, more effectual and safe 
than that provided by this bill. It is the necessary result of the separation, and 
to reject it, without proposing a better (if, indeed, a better can be), is to reject 
the separation itself. 

I turn, now, to the substitute. Its object is directly the reverse of that of the 
bill. It proposes to revive the league of state banks, and to renew our connex- 
ion with them, and which all acknowledge has contributed so much to corrupt 
the community, and to create a spirit for speculation heretofore unexampled in 
our history. 

The senator, in offering it, whether wisely or not, has at least acted consistent- 
ly. He was its advocate at first in 1834, when the alternative was between it and 
the recharter of the late Bank of the United States. He then defended it zealous- 
ly and manfully against the fierce assaults of his present allies, as he now defends 
it, when those who then sustained him have abandoned the measure. Whether 
wisely or not, there is something heroic in his adherence, and I commend him for 
it ; but I fear I cannot say as much for his wisdom and discretion. He acknowl- 
edged, with all others, the disasters that have followed the first experiment, 
but attributes the failure to inauspicious circumstances, and insists that the 
measure has not had a fair trial. I grant that a second experiment may suc- 
ceed after the first has failed ; but the senator must concede, in return, that 
every failure must necessarily weaken confidence, both in the experiment and 
the experimenter. He cannot be more confident in making this second trial 
than he was in the first ; and, if I doubted the success then, and preferred the 
sub-treasury to his league of banks, he must excuse me (or still adhering to my 
opinion, and doubting the success of his second trial. Nor ought he to be sur- 
prised that those who joined him in the first should be rather shy of trying 
the experiment again, after having been blown into the air, and burned and scald- 
ed by the explosion. But, if the senator has been unfortunate in failing to se- 
cure the co-operation of those who aided him in the first trial, he lias been com- 
pensated by securing the support of those who were then opposed to him. 
They are now his zealous supporters. In contrasting their course then and 
now, I intend nothing personal. I make no charge of inconsistency, nor do I 
intend to imply it. My object is truth, and not to wound the feelings of any 
one or any party. I know that to make out a charge of inconsistency, not only 
the question, but all the material circumstances must be the same. A change 
in either may make a change of vote necessary ; and, with a material variation 
in circumstances, we are often compelled to vary our course, in order to pre- 
serve our principles. In this case, I conceive that circumstances, as far as the 
present allies of the senator are concerned, have materially changed. Then 
the option was between a recharter of the late Bank and a league of state banks ; 



292 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOrN, 

but now the former is out of the question, and the option is between such a 
leao-ue and a total separation from the banks. This being the aUernative, thej' 
may well take that which they rejected in 1834, without subjecting themselves 
to the charge of inconsistency, or justly exposing themselves to the imputation 
of change of principle or opinion. I acquit them, then, of all such charges. 
They, doubtless, think now as they formerly did of the measure whiofe they 
denounced and rejected, but which a change of circumstances now compels them 
to support. But in thus acquitting them of the charge of inconsistency, they 
must excuse me if I should avail myself of the fact, that their opinion remains un- 
changed, as an argument in favour of the bill, against the substitute. The choice 
is between them. They are in the opposite scales. To take from the one is, 
in effect, to add to the other ; and any objection against the one is an argument 
equally strong in favour of the other. I, then, do avail myself of their many pow- 
erful objections in 1834 against the measure, which this substitute proposes now 
to revive. I call to my aid and press into my service every denunciation they 
then uttered, and every argument they then so successfully urged against it. 
They — no, we (for I was then, as now, irreconcilably opposed to the measure) 
charged against it, and proved whaf we charged, that it placed the purse and 
the sword in the same hands ; that it would be the source of boundless patron- 
age and corruption, and fatal, in its consequences, to the currency of the coun- 
try ; and I now avail myself of these, and all other objections then urged by us, 
in as full force against this substitute, as if you were again to rise in your pla- 
ces and repeat them now ; and, of course, as so many arguments, in effect, in 
favour of the bill ; and on their strength I claim your vote in its favour, unless, 
indeed, still stronger objections can be urged against it. I say stronger, be- 
cause time has proved the truth of all that was then said against the measure 
now proposed to be revived by this substitute. What was then prediction is 
now fact. But whatever objections have been, or may be urged against the 
bill, however strong they may appear in argument, remain yet to be tested by 
the unerring test of time and experience. Whether they shall ever be realized, 
must be admitted, even by those who may have the greatest confidence in them, 
to be at least uncertain ; and it is the part of wisdom and prudence, where ob- 
jections are equally strong against two nieasures, to prefer that which is yet un- 
tried to that which has been tried and failed. Against this conclusion there 
is but one escape. 

It may be said that we are sometimes compelled, in the midsJ of the many 
extraordinar}' circumstances in which we may be placed, to prefer that which is 
of itself the more objectionable to that which is less so ; because the former may 
more probably lead, in the end, to some desired result than the latter. To ap- 
ply the principle to this case. It may be said that the substitute, though of 
itself objectionable, is to be preferred, because it would more probably lead to 
the establishment of a National Bank than the bill, which you believe to be the 
only certain remedy for all the disorders that affect the currency. I admit the 
position to be sound in principle, but it is one exceedingly bold and full of dan- 
ger in practice, and ought never to be acted on but in extreme cases, and 
"where there is a rational prospect of accomplishing the object ultimately aimed 
at. The application in this case, I must think, would be rashness itself. It 
may be safely assumed, that the success of either, whichever may be adopted, 
the bill or the substitute, would be fatal to the establishment of a National Bank. 
It can never put down a successful measure to take its place ; and, of course, 
that which is most likely to fail, and replunge the country into all the disasters 
of a disordered currency, is that which would most probably lead to the restora- 
tion of a National Bank ; and to prefer the substitute on that account is, in fact, 
to prefer it because it is the worst of the two. But are you certain that another 
explosion would be followed by a bank ? We have already had two ; and it is 
far more probable that the third would impress, universally and indelibly, on the 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 293 

public mind, that there was something radically and incurably wrong in the sys- 
tem which would blow up the whole concern, National Bank and all. 

If I may be permitted to express an opinion, I would say you have pursued 
a course on this subject unfortunate both for yourselves and country. You are 
opposed both to the league of banks and the sub-treasury. You prefer a Na- 
tional Bank, and regard it as the only safe and certain regulator of the currency, 
but consider it, for the present, out of the question, and are therefore compelled 
to choose between the other two. By supporting the substitute, you will be 
held responsible for all the mischief and disasters that may follow the revival of 
the pet-bank system, as it has been called, with the almost certain defeat of 
your first and cherished choice ; and those you oppose will reap all the benefits 
of the power, patronage, and influence which it may place in their hands, with- 
out incurring any portion of the responsibility. But that is not all. The suc- 
cess of the substitute would be the defeat of the bill, v*^hich would, in like man- 
ner, place on you the responsibility of its defeat, and give those you oppose all 
the advantage of having supported it, without any of the responsibility that would 
have belonged to it had it been adopted. Had a different course been taken 
— had you joined in aiding to extend the custody of the laws over the public 
revenue in the hands of the executive, where your own acts have placed it, 
and for which you, of course, are responsible, throwing, at the same time, on 
those to whom you attribute the present disordered state of the currency the 
burden of the responsibility — you would have stood ready to profit by events. 
If the sub-treasury, contrary to your anticipation, succeeded, as patriots, you 
would have cause to rejoice in the unexpected good. If it failed, you would 
have the credit of having anticipated the result, and might then, after a double 
triumph of sagacity and foresight, have brought forward your favourite measure, 
with a fair prospect of success, when every other had failed. By not taking 
this course, you have lost the only prospect of establishing a National Bank. 

Nor has your course, in my opinion, been fortunate for the country. Had it 
been different, the currency question would have been decided at the called 
session ; and had it been decided then, the country would this day have been 
in a much better condition : at least the manufacturing and commercial section 
to the North, where the derangement of the currency is felt the most severely. 
The South is comparatively in an easy condition. 

Such are the difiiculties that stand in the way of the substitute at the very 
threshold. Those beyond are vastly greater, as I shall now proceed to show. 
Its object, as I have stated, is to revive the league of state banks ; and the first 
question presented for consideration is, How is this to be done — how is the 
league to be formed 1 how stimulated into life when formed ? and what, after it 
has been revived, would be the true character of the league or combination ? 
To answer these questions we must turn to its provisions. 

It provides that the Secretary of the Treasury shall select twenty-five specie- 
paying banks as the fiscal agents of the government, all to be respectable and 
substantial, and that the selection shall be confirmed by the joint vote of the two 
houses. It also provides that the shall be made the depositories of the public 
money, and that their notes shall be receivable in the dues of the government ; 
and that, in turn, for these advantages, they shall stipulate to perform certain 
duties, and comply with various conditions, the object of which is to give the 
Secretary of the Treasury full knowledge of their condition and business, with 
the view to supervise and control their acts, as far as the interest of the govern- 
ment is concerned. In addition to these, it contains other and important pro- 
visions, which I shall not enumerate, because they do not fall within the scope 
of the objections that I propose to urge against the measure. 

Now, I ask, What does all this amount to ? What but a proposal, on the part 
of the government, to enter into a contract or bargain with certain selected state 
banks, on the terms and conditions contained ? Have we the right to make such 



294 SPEECHES OF JOHN C CALHOrN. 

a bargain ? is the first question ; and to that I give a decided negative, which I 
hope to place on constitutional grounds that cannot be shaken. I intend to dis- 
cuss it, with other questions growing out of the connexion of the government 
with the banks, as a new question, for the first time presented for consideration 
and decision. Strange as it may seem, the questions growing out of it, as long 
as it has existed, have never yet been presented nor investigated in reference 
to their constitutionality. How this has happened, I shall now proceed to ex- 
plain, preparatory to the examination of the question which I have proposed. 

The union of the government and the banks was never legally solemnized. 
It originated shortly after the government went into operation, not in any legal 
enactment, but in a short order of the treasury department of not much more 
than half a dozen of lines, as if it were a mere matter of course. We thus 
glided imperceptibly into a connexion, which was never recognised by law till 
1816 (if my memory serves), but which has produced more important after- 
consequences, and has had a greater control over the destiny of this country, 
than any one of the mighty questions which have so often and deeply agitated 
the country. To it may be traced, as their seminal principle, the vast and ex- 
traordinary expansion of our banking system, our excessive import duties, un- 
constitutional and profuse disbursements, the protective tariff, and its associated 
system for spending what it threw into the treasury, followed in time by a vast 
surplus, which the utmost extravagance of the government could not dissipate, 
and, finally, by a sort of retributive justice, the explosion of the entire banking 
system, and the present prostrated condition of the currency, now the subject 
of our deliberation. 

How a measure fraught with such important consequences should at first, 
and for so long a time, escape the attention and the investigation of the public, 
deserves a passing notice. It is to be explained by the false conception of the 
entire subject of banking which, at that early period, universally prevailed in 
the community. So erroneous was it, that a bank-note was then identified in 
the mind of the public with gold and silver, and a deposite in bank was regarded 
as under the most safe and sacred custody that could be devised. The origi- 
nal impression, derived from the Bank of Amsterdam, where every note or cer- 
tificate in circulation was honestly represented by an equal and specific quantity 
of gold or silver in bank, and where every deposite was kept as a sacred trust, to 
be safely returned to the depositor when demanded, was extended to banks of 
discount, down to the time of the formation of our government, with but slight 
modifications. With this impression, it is not at all extraordinary that the de- 
posite of the revenue in banks for safe keeping, and the receipt of their notes 
in the public dues, should be considered a matter of course, requiring no higher 
authority than a treasury order ; and hence a connexion, with all the important 
questions belonging to it, and now considered of vast magnitude, received sa 
little notice till public attention was directed to it by its recent ruptiu-e. This 
total separation from the system in which we now find ourselves placed for the 
first time, authorizes and demands that we shall investigate freely and fully, not 
only the consequences of the connexion, but all the questions growing out of it, 
more especially those of a constitutional character ; and I shall, in obedience 
to this demand, return to the question from which this digression has carried me. 

Have we, then, the right to make the bargain proposed ? Have we the 
right to bestow the high privileges, I might say prerogatives, on them of 
being made the depositories of the public revenue, and of having their notes 
received and treated as gold and silver in the dues of the goverament, and 
in all its fiscal transactions 1 Have we the right to do all this in order to 
bestow confidence in the banks, with the view to enable them to resrarae 
specie payments ? What is the state of the case ? The banks are deeply in- 
debted to the country, and are unable to pay; and we are asked to. give them 
these advantages in order to enable them to pay their debts. Can we grant the 



SPiEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 295 

boon ■? In answering this important question, I begin with the fact that our 
government is one of limited powers. It can exercise no right but what is 
specifically granted, nor pass any law but what is necessary and proper to carry 
such power into effect. This small pamphlet (holding it up) contains the Con- 
stitution. Its ffrants of power are few and plain, and I ask gentlemen to turn 
to it and point out the power that authorizes us to do what is proposed to be 
done, or to show that the passage of this substitute is necessary to carry any 
of the granted powers into effect. If neither can be shown, what is proposed 
cannot be constitutionally done ; and till it is specifically pointed out, I am war- 
ranted in believing tha4^^ it cannot be shown. 

Our reason is often confounded by a mere name. An act, in the minds of 
many, may become of doubtful constitutional authority when applied to a bank, 
which none would for a moment hesitate to pronounce grossly unconstitutional 
when applied to an individual. To free ourselves from this illusion, I ask, 
Could this government constitutionally bestow on individuals, or a private asso- 
ciation, the advantages proposed to be bestowed on the selected banks, in order 
to enable them to pay their debts 1 Is there one who hears me, who would 
venture to say yes, even in the case of the most extensive merchant or mercan- 
tile concern, such as some of those in New- York or New-Orleans, at the late 
suspension, whose embarrassments involved entire sections in distress ? But, 
if not, on what principle can a discrimination be made in favour of the banks ? 
They are local institutions, created by the states for local purposes, composed, 
like private associations, of individual citizens, on whom the acts of the state 
cannot confer a particle of constitutional right under this Constitution that does 
not belong to the humblest citizen. So far from it, if there be a distinction, it 
is against the banks. They are removed farther from the control of this gov- 
ernment than the individual citizens, who, by the Constitution, are expressly 
subject to the direct action of this government in many instances, while the 
state banks, as constituting a portion of the domestic institutions of the states, 
and resting on their reserved rights, are entirely beyond our control ; so much 
so as not to be the subject of a bankrupt law, although the authority to pass 
one is expressly granted by the Constitution. 

On what possible ground, then, can the right in question be placed, unless, 
indeed, on the broad principle that these local institutions, intended for state 
purposes, have been so extended, and have so connected themselves with the 
general circulation and business of the country, as to affect the interest of the 
whole community, so as to make it the right and duty of Congress to regulate 
them ; or, in short, on the broad principle of the general welfare 1 There is 
none other that I can perceive ; but this would be to adopt the old and exploded 
principle, at all times dangerous, but pre-eminently so at this time, when such 
loose and dangerous conceptions of the Constitution are abroad in the land. If 
the argument is good in one case, it is good in all similar cases. If this gov- 
ernment may interfere with any one of the domestic institutions of the states, on 
the ground of promoting the general welfare, it may with others. If it may be- 
stow privileges to control them, it may also appropriate money for the same 
purpose ; and thus a door might be opened to an interference with state in- 
stitutions, of which we of a certain section ought at this time to be not a little 
jealous. 

The argument might be pushed much farther. We not only offer to confer 
great and important privileges on the banks to be selected, but, in turn, ask them 
to stipulate to comply with certain conditions, the object of which is to bring 
them under the supervision and control of this government. It might be asked,. 
Where is the right to purchase or assume such supervision or control? It 
might be repeated, that they are state institutions, incorporated solely for state 
purposes, and to be entirely under state control, and that all supervision on our 
part is in violation of the rights of the states. It might be argued that such su- 



296 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

pervision or control is calculated to weaken the control of the states o^er their 
own institutions, and to render them less subservient to their peculiar and local 
interests, for the promotion of which they were established, and too subservient 
to other, and, perhaps, conflicting interests, which might feel but little sympathy 
with those of the states. But I forbear. Other, and not less urgent objections 
claim mv attention. To dilate too much on one would necessarily sacrifice the 
claim of others. 

I next object that, whatever may be the right to enter into the proposed bar- 
o-ain, the mode in which it is proposed to make it is clearly unconstitutional, if 
I ricfhtly comprehend it. I am not certain that I do ; but, if I understand it right- 
ly, the plan is, for the Secretary of the Treasury to select twenty-five state banks, 
as described in the substitute, which are to be submitted to the two houses, to 
be confirmed or rejected by their joint resolutions, without the approval of the 
President ; in the same mode as they would appoint a chaplain, or establish a 
joint rule for the government of their proceedings. 

In acting on the joint resolution, if what I suppose be intended, each house 
would have the right, of course, to strike from it the name of any bank and in- 
sert another, which would, in fact, vest in the two houses the uncontrollable 
right of making the selection. Now if this be the mode proposed, as I infer 
from the silence of the mover, it is a plain and palpable violation of the Consti- 
tution. The obvious intention is to evade the veto power of the executive, 
which cannot be without an infraction of an express provision of the Constitu- 
tion, drawn up with the utmost care, and intended to prevent the possibility of 
evasion. It is contained in the 1st article, 7th section, and the last clause, 
which I ask the secretary to read : 

[" Every order, resolution, or vote, to which the concurrence of the Senate 
and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of adjourn- 
ment), shall be presented to the President of the United States ; and before the 
same shall take effect, shall be approved by him, or, being disapproved by him, 
shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, 
according to the rules and limitations prescribed in the case of a bill."] 

Nothing can be more explicit or full. It is no more possible to evade the 
executive veto, on any joint vote, than on the passage of a bill. The veto was 
vested in him not only to protect his own powers, but as an additional guard to 
the Constitution. I am not the advocate of executive power, which I have 
been often compelled to resist of late, when extended beyond its proper limits, 
as I shall ever be prepared to do when it is. Nor am I the advocate of legis- 
lative or judicial. I stand ready to protect all, within the sphere assigned by 
the Constitution, and to resist them beyond. To this explicit and comprehen- 
sive provision of the Constitution, in protection of the veto, there is but a single 
exception, resulting, by necessary implication, from another portion of the in- 
strument, not less explicit, which authorizes each house to establish the rules 
of its proceedings. Under this provision the two houses have full and uncon- 
trollable authority within the limits of their respective walls, and over those sub- 
ject to their authority, in their official character. To that extent they may pass 
joint votes and resolutions, without the approval of the executive ; but beyond 
that, without it they are powerless. 

There are in this case special reasons why his approval should not be eva- 
ded. The President is at the head of the administrative department of the gov- 
ernment, and is especially responsible for its good management. In order to 
hold him responsible, he ought to have due power in the selection of its agents, 
and proper control over their conduct. These banks would be by far the most 
powerful and influential of all the agents of the government, and ought not to be 
selected without the concurrence of the executive. If this substitute should be 
adopted, and the provision in question be regarded such as I consider it, there 
can be no doubt what must be the fate of the meastire. The executive will be 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 29t 

bound to protect, by the intervention of its constitutional right, the portion of 
power clearly allotted to that department by that instrument, which would make 
it impossible for it to become a law with the existing division in the two 
houses. 

I have not yet exhausted my constitutional objections. I rise to higher and to 
broader, applying directly to the very essence of this substitute. I deny your right 
to make a general deposite of the public revenue in a bank. IMore than half 
of the errors of life may be traced to fallacies originating in an improper use of 
words ; and among not the least mischievous is the application of this word to 
bank transactions, in a sense wholly different from its original meaning. Ori- 
ginally it meant a thing placed in trust, or pledged to be safely and sacredly 
kept, till returned to the depositor, without being used by the depositary while 
in his possession. All this is changed when applied to a deposite in bank. 
Instead of returning the identical thing, the bank is understood to be bound to 
return only an equal value ; and instead of not having the use, it is understood 
to have the right to loan it out on interest, or to dispose of it as it pleases, with 
the single condition, that an^qual amount be returned when demanded, which 
experience has taught is not always done. To place, then, the public money 
in deposite in bank, without restriction, is to give the free use of it, and to al- 
low them to make as much as they can out of it between the time of deposite 
and disbursement. Have we such a right ? The money belongs to the people 
— collected from them for specific purposes, in which they have a general in- 
terest — and for that only ; and what possible right can we have to give such 
use of it to certain selected corporations ? I ask for the provision of the Con- 
stitution that authorizes it. I ask if we could grant the use, for similar purpo- 
ses, to private associations or individuals ? Or, if not to them, to individual of- 
ficers of the government ; for instance, to the four principal receivers under this 
bill, should it pass. And if this cannot be done, that the distinction be point- 
ed out. 

If these questions be satisfactorily answered, I shall propound others still 
more difficult. I shall then ask. If the substitute should become a law, and 
the twenty-five banks be selected, whether they would not, in fact, be the treas- 
ury ? And if not, I would ask, Where would be the treasury 1 But if they 
would be the treasury, I would ask. If public money in bank would not be in 
the treasury ? And if so, how can it be drawn from it to be lent for the purpose 
of trade, speculation, or any other use whatever, against an express provision of 
the Constitution 1 Yes, as express as words can make it. I ask the secretary 
to read the 1st article, 9th section, and the clause next to the last. 

[" No money shall be drawn from the treasury but in consequence of appro- 
priations made by law ; and a regular statement and account of the receipts 
and expenditures of all public money shall be published from time to time."] 

How clear ! How explicit ! No money to be drawn from the treasury but 
ia consequence of appropriations made by law ; that is, the object on which the 
expenditure is to be made, to be designated by law, and the sum allotted to ef- 
fect it, specified ; and yet we have lived in the daily and habitual violation of 
this great fundamental provision, from almost the beginning of our political ex- 
istence to this day. Behold the consequences ! It has prostrated and ingulfed 
the very institutions which have enjoyed this illicit favour, and tainted, above 
all other causes, the morals and politics of the whole country. Yes, to this 
must be traced, as one of the main causes, the whole system of excessive reve- 
nue, excessive expenditure, and excessive surpluses ; and to them, especially 
the last, the disastrous overthrow of the banks and the currency, and the un- 
exampled degeneracy of public and private morals, which have followed. \^ e 
have suffered the affliction : may the blessing which follows chastisement, when 
its justice is confessed, come in due season. 

But I take still higher ground. I strike at the root of the mischief. I deny 

Pp 



298 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

the right of this government to treat bank-notes as money in its fiscal transac- 
tions. On this great question I never have before committed myself, though 
not generally disposed to abstain from forming or expressing opinions. In all 
instances in which a National Bank has come in question, I have invariably 
taken my ground, that if the government has the right to receive and treat bank- 
notes as money, it had the right, and was bound, under the Constitution, to 
regulate them so as to make them uniform and stable as a currency. The rea- 
sons for this opinion are obvious, and have been so often and fully expressed 
on former occasions, that it would be useless to repeat them now ; but I never 
examined fully the right of receiving, or made up my mind on it, till since the 
catastrophe in May last, which, as I have said, entirely separated the govern- 
ment from the banks. Previous to that period, it was an abstract question, with 
no practical bearing ; as much so as is now the constitutional right of admitting 
Louisiana into the Union. Things are now altered. The connexion is dis- 
solved, and it has become a practical question of the first magnitude. 

The mover of the substitute assumed as a postulate, that this government had 
a right to receive in its dues whatever it might thiflk proper. I deny the posi- 
tion in toto. It is one that ought not to be assumed, and cannot be proved, and 
which is opposed by powerful objections. The genius of our Constitution is 
opposed to the assumption of power. Whatever power it gives is expressly 
granted ; and if proof were wanted, the numerous grants of powers far more 
obvious, and apparently much more safe to be assumed than the one in question, 
would afford it. I shall cite a few striking instances. 

If any powers might be assumed, one would suppose that of applying money 
to pay the debts of the government, and borrowing it to carry on its operations, 
would be among them; yet both are expressly provided for by the Constitution. 
Again, to Congress is granted the power to declare war and raise armies and 
navies ; yet the power to grant letters of marque and reprisal, and to make 
rules for the regulation of the army and navy, are not left to assumption, as ob- 
vious as they are, but are given by express grant. With these, and other in- 
stances not less striking, which might be added, it is a bold step to assume, 
without proof, the far less obvious power of the government receiving whatever 
it pleases in its dues as money. Such an assumption would be in direct con- 
flict with the great principle which the State Rights party, with which the sen- 
ator (Mr. Rives) classes himself, have ever adopted in the construction of the 
Constitution. But, if the former cannot be assumed, it would be in vain to at- 
tempt to prove that it has been granted, or that it is necessary and proper to 
carry any of the granted powers into effect. No such attempt has been made, 
nor can be with success. On the contrary, there are strong objections to the 
power, which, in my opinion, cannot be surmounted. 

If once admitted, it would lead, by consequence, to a necessary interference 
with individual and state concerns never contemplated by the Constitution. Let 
us, for instance, suppose that, acting on the assumption of the senator, the gov- 
ernment should choose to select tobacco as an article to be received in pay- 
ment of its dues, which would be as well entitled to it as any other product, 
and in which the senator's constituents are so much interested. Does he not 
see the consequences ? In order to make its taxes imiform, which it is bound 
to do by the Constitution, and which cannot be done unless the medium in 
which it is paid is so, the government would have to assume a general control 
over the great staple in question ; to regulate the weight of the hogshead or 
package ; to establish inspections under its own officers in order to determine 
the quality, and whatever else might be necessary to make the payments into 
the treasury uniform. So, likewise, if the still greater staple, cotton, be- select- 
ed. The weight of the bale, the quality of the cotton, and its inspection, would 
all necessarily fall under the control of the government ; and does not the sena- 
tor see that the exercise of a power that must lead to such consequences — coa- 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 299 

sequences so far beyond the sphere assigned to this government by the Consti- 
tution — must be unconstitutional? Nor does the objection extend only to these 
and other staple articles. It applies with equal, if not greater force, to receiv- 
ing the notes of state banks, as proposed by the substitute, in the dues of the 
government and the management of its fiscal concerns. It must involve the 
government in the necessity of controlling and regulating state banks, as this 
substitute abundantly proves, as we\[ as the whole history of our connexion 
with them ; and it has been shown that banks are at least as far removed from 
the control of this government as the cultivators of the soil, or any other class 
of citizens. To this I might add another objection, not less strong, that for the 
government to receive and treat bank-notes as money in its dues, would be in 
direct conflict, in its effect, with the important power conferred expressly on 
Congress of coining money and regulating the value thereof; but as this will 
come in with more propriety in answer to an argument advanced by the senator 
from Massachusetts (Mr. Webster), I shall now state his argument, and reply 
to it. 

He asserted again and again, both now and at the extra session, that it is 
the duty of the government not only to regulate, but to furnish a sound curren- 
cy. Indeed, it is the principal argument relied on by the senator in opposition 
to the bill, which, he says, abandons this great duty. Now, if by currency be 
meant gold and silver coins, there will be but little difference between him and 
myself. To that extent the government has a clear and unquestionable right 
by express grant ; but if he goes farther, and intends to assert that the govern- 
ment has the right to make bank-notes a currency, which it is bound to regulate, 
then his proposition is identical in effect, though differently expressed, with that 
of the senator from Virginia (Mr. Rives), and all the arguments I have urged 
against it are equally applicable to his. I hold, on my part, that the power of 
the government on this subject is limited to coining money and regulating its 
value, and punishing the counterfeiting of the current coins — that is, of the 
coins made current by law, the only money known to the Constitution. It is 
time to make a distinction between money, or currency, if you please — between 
that which will legally pay debts, and mere circulation, which has its value 
from its promise to be paid in the former, and under which classification, bank- 
notes, as well as bills or promissory notes of individuals, fall. These are all in 
their nature private and local, and cannot be elevated to the level of currency, 
or money, in the fiscal transactions of government, without coming into conflict, 
more or less, with the object of the Constitution in vesting the power of coining 
money and regulating its value in Congress, as I shall now proceed to show. 
It will hardly be questioned that the object was to fix a standard, in order to 
furnish to the Union a currency of uniform and steady value, and was therefore 
united in the same sentence with the kindred power to fix the standard of 
weights and measures, the objects being similar. Now, if our experience has 
proved anything, it has amply shown that so long as the government is connect- 
ed with the banks, and their notes received in its transactions as money, so 
long it is impossible to give anything like stability to the standard of value ; and 
that the power of coining and regulating the coins becomes, in a great measure, 
a mere nullity. Every dollar issued in bank-notes, when it is made the substi- 
tute for money, drives out of circulation more or less of the precious metals ; 
and when the issue becomes exorbitant, gold and silver almost entirely disap- 
pear, as our experience at this time proves. The effects are analogous to 
alloying or clipping the coin, as far as stability of standard is concerned ; and 
it would be not less rational to suppose that such a power on the part of indi- 
viduals would be consistent with a uniform and stable currency, than to sup- 
pose the receiving and treating bank-notes as a substitute for money by the 
government would be. The only check or remedy is to restrict them to their 
proper sphere, to circulate in common with bills of exchange or other private 



300 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

and local paper, for the convenience of business and trade. So far from such a 
course operating injuriously on the people, or from being liable to the charge of 
formino- one currency for the people and another for the government, as has been 
so often and with such effect repeated, it is the very reverse. Government, by 
refusing to receive bank-notes, as it is bound to do, would, in fact, furnish a choice 
to the people, to take either money or notes at their pleasure. The demand of 
the government will always keep a plentiful supply of the former in the country, 
so as to afford the people a choice ; while the opposite would expel the money, 
and leave no option to them but to take bank-notes, or worse, as at present. 

I have now shown how it is proposed to form the league of banks, and have 
presented the constitutional impediments that stand in the way. These are 
numerous and strong ; so much so, that they ought to be irresistible with all, 
except the latitudinous in construction ; but I cannot expect they will produce 
their full effect. ' I know too well the force of long-entertained impressions, 
however erroneous, to be sanguine — how strongly the mind rebels against the 
expulsion of the old and the admission of new opinions. Yet in this case, 
where we clearly see how gradually and silently error crept in under the dis- 
guise of words, applied to new and totally different ideas, without exciting notice 
or alarm ; and when we have experienced such deep disasters in consequence 
of parting from the plain intent and meaning of the Constitution, I cannot but 
hope that all who believe that the success of the government depends on a rigid 
adherence to the Constitution, will lay aside all previous impressions, taken up 
without reflection, and give to the objections their due weight. 

I come now to the next point, to show how this league is to be revived or 
stimulated into life. Till this can be done, the substitute, should it become a 
law, would be a dead letter. The selection is to be made from specie-paying 
banks. None but such can receive the public deposites, or have their notes 
received in the dues of the government. There are none such now. The 
whole banking system lies inanimate, and must be vivified before it can be 
reunited with the government. No one is bold enough to propose a union with 
this lifeless mass. How, then, is the extinguished spark to be revivified ? How 
is the breath of life, the Promethean fire, to be breathed into the system anew ? 
is the question. This is the task. 

The mover tells us that it must be the Avork of the government. He says 
that it is bound to aid the banks to resume payments, and for that purpose 
ought to hold out to them some adequate inducement. He tells us that they 
have been long preparing, and had made great efibrts, but can go no farther ; 
have rolled the round, huge rock almost to the summit, but unless the govern- 
ment put forth its giant arm, and give the last push, it will recoil and rush down 
the steep to the bottom, and all past labour be lost. Now, what is this adequate 
inducement 1 What this powerful stimulus, which it is proposed the govern- 
ment should apply, in order to enable the banks to accomplish this Herculean 
task ? The substitute shall answer. 

It proposes to fix the 1st of July next for the period of resumption ; and, as 
the inducement to resume, it proposes to select twenty-five of the most respecta- 
ble and solid out of the resuming banks to be depositories of the public moneys 
and the fiscal agent of the government, as has been already stated. It also pro- 
poses — and this is the stimulus, the essence of the whole — to make the notes of 
such banks as may resume on or before that day exclusively receivable in the 
public dues. Here is a quid pro quo ; something proposed to be done, for 
which something is to be given. We tell the banks plainly. If you resume, we, 
on our part, stipulate to make twenty-five of you our fiscal agents and deposi- 
tories of the revenue ; and we farther stipulate, that those who resume by the 
time fixed, shall have the exclusive privilege, /oreurr, of having their notes re- 
ceivable in the dues of the government, in common with gold and silver. If 
the banks perform their part, we shall be boimd in honour and good faith to 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 301 

perform ours. It would be a complete contract, as obligatory as if sio-ned, 
sealed, and delivered. Such is the inducement. 

The next question is, Will it be adequate ? Yes, abundantly adequate. The 
battery is strong enough to awaken the dead to life ; the consideration sufficient 
to remunerate the banks for whatever sacrifice they may be compelled to make 
in order to resume payment. It is difficult to estimate the value of these hi^h 
privileges, or prerogatives, as I might justly call them. They are worth mill- 
ions. If you were to enter into a similar contract with an individual, I doubt 
not that he could sell out in open market for at least thirty, forty, or tifty mill- 
ions of dollars. I do, then, the mover the justice to say, that his means are am- 
ple to effect what he proposes. As difficult as is the work of resumption — and 
difficult it will turn out to be when tried — the inducement will prove all-sufficient. 
But the resumption, however desirable, may be purchased too dearly ; and such 
would prove to be the case, should the project succeed. Not only is the offer 
too great, but the mode of effecting it is highly objectionable. Its operation 
would prove not less disastrous than the bargain has been shown to be uncon- 
stitutional, which I shall now proceed to establish. 

The offer will have a double effect. It will act as a powerful stimulus to re- 
sumption, but will act, at the same time, with equal force to excite a struffo-Ie 
among the banks, not only to resume themselves, but to prevent others from re- 
suming. The reason is clear. The advantage to each will increase as the 
number of the resuming banks decreases ; and, of course, the great point of 
contest among the strong will be to restrict the proffered prize to the smallest 
number. The closer the monopoly the greater the profits. In this struggle, a 
combination of a few powerful and wealthy banks, the most respectable and 
solid, as designated in the substitute, will overthrow and trample down the res- 
idue. Their fall will spread desolation over the land. Whatever may be the 
fate of others in this desperate contest, there is one in relation to which no 
doubt can be entertained — I refer to the United States Bank of Pennsylvania, 
a long name, and a misnomer ; and which, for the sake of brevity, but with no 
personal disrespect to the distinguished individual at its head, I shall call Mr, 
Biddle's bank. That, at least, will be one of the winners, one of the twenty- 
five to whom the prize will be assigned. Its vast resources, its wealth and in- 
fluential connexions, both at home and abroad, the skill and ability of the offi- 
cer at its head, and, what is less honourable, the great resource it holds in the 
notes of the late United States Bank, of which more than six millions have been 
put into circulation, in violation, to say the least, of a trust, constituting more 
than five sixths of all its circulation, and which it is not bound to pay, with the 
still greater amount on hand, making, in the whole, more than twenty-six mill- 
ions, and which may be used in the same way, if not prevented, would place it be- 
yond all doubt among the victors. He starts without proper weights, and will 
lead the way from the first. Who the others may be is uncertain ; this will de- 
pend mainly upon his good-will and pleasure. It may be put down as certain^ 
whoever they may be, that they will be powerful and influential, and not unfa- 
vourable to his interest or aggrandizement. But the mischievous effect will not 
be limited to this deathlike struggle, in which so many must fall and be crush- 
ed, that might otherwise weather th6 storm. The forced resumption, for such 
it will be in effect, would be followed by wide-spread desolation. It is easy 
to sink to suspension, but hard to return to resumption. Under the most fa- 
vourable circumstances, and when conducted most leisurely and cautiously, the 
pressure must be severe ; but, if coerced or precipitated by bankrupt laws or 
temptations such as this, it will be ruinous. To make it safe and easy must 
be the work of time. Government can do but Uttle. The disease originates in 
excessive indebtedness, and the only remedy is payment or reduction of debts. 
It is estimated that, when the banks suspended payments, the community was 
indebted to them the enormous sum of $475,000,000. To reduce this within 



302 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

the proper limits is not the Avork of a few days, and can be but little aided by 
us. The industry and the vast resources of the country, with time, are the only 
remedies to be relied on for the reduction ; and to these, with the state legisla- 
tures, and the public opinion, the resumption must be left. To understand the 
subject fully, we must look, a little more into the real cause of the difficulty. 

This enormous debt was incurred in prosperous times. The abundant means 
of the banks, from the surplus revenue and a combination of other causes, indu- 
ced them to discount freely. This increased the circulation, and with its in- 
crease its value depreciated, and prices rose proportionably. With this rise, 
enterprise and speculation seized the whole community, and every one expect- 
ed to make a fortune at once ; and this, in turn, gave a new impulse to discounts 
and circulation, till the swelling tide bursted its barriers and deluged the land. 
Then began the opposite process of absorbing the excess. If it had been pos- 
sible to return it back to the banks, the sources from which it flowed, through 
its debtors, the speculating, enterprising, and business portion of the communi- 
ty, the mischief would have been in a great measure avoided. But circulation 
had flowed off into other reservoirs — those of the moneyed men and bankers, 
who hoard when prices are high, and buy when they are low. The portion thus 
drawn off and held in deposite, either in banks or the chests of individuals, was 
as effectually lost, as far as the debtors of the banks were concerned, as if it 
had been burned. The means of payment was thus diminished ; prices fell. in 
proportion, and the pressure increased as they fell. Though the amount in cir- 
culation be greatly reduced, yet the banks are afraid to discount, lest, on re- 
sumption, the hoarded mass of deposites held by individuals or other banks 
should be let loose, and, in addition to what might be put into circulation should 
discounts be made, would cause another inundation, to be followed by another 
suspension. How is this difficulty to be safely surmounted, but by unlocking 
the hoarded means ? And how is that to be done without deciding the curren- 
cy question ? This is the first and necessary step. That done, all will be able 
to calculate and determine what to do. The period of inaction and uncertainty 
would cease, and that of business revive. Funds that are now locked up would 
be brought again into operation, and the channels of circulation be replenished 
in the only mode that can be done with safety. Thus thinking, I am now, and 
have been from the first, in favour of an early decision, and averse to all coer- 
cion, or holding out temptation to resume ; leaving the disease to the gradual 
and safe operation of time, with as little tampering as possible. In the mean 
time, I hold it to be unwise to cease discounting, and to adopt an indiscriminate 
system of curtailment. Its effects are ruinous to the business of the countr\^, 
and calculated to retard rather than to accelerate a resumption. The true sys- 
tem, I would say, would be to discount business paper as freely as usual, and 
curtail gradually permanent debts. The former would revive business, and 
would increase the debts to the banks less than it would increase the ability of 
the community to pay them. 

Having now shown how this league or combination of banks is to be formed 
and revived, with the difficulties in the way, it remains to determine what will 
be the true character and nature of the combination when formed. It will con- 
sist of state banks retaining their original powers, that of discounting and all, 
without being in the slightest degree impaired. To these the substitute pro- 
poses to add important additions : to receive their notes as gold and silver in 
the public dues, to give them the use of the public deposites, and to organize 
and blend the whole into one, as the fiscal agent of the government, to be pla- 
ced under the immediate supervision and control of the Secretary of the Treas- 
ury. Now, what does all this amount to ? Shall I name the word — be not 
startled : A BANK — a government bank — the most extensive, powerful, and 
dangerous that ever existed. This substitute would be the act of incorpora- 
tion ; and the privileges it confers, so much additional banking capital, increas- 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 303 

ing immensely its powers, and giving it an unlimited control over the business 
and exchanges of the country. 

The senator from Virginia (Mr. Rives) was right in supposing that this new 
trial of the experiment would be made under very difl'erent circumstances from 
the first, and would have a different termination. That, too, like this, was a 
bank — a o-overnment bank — as distinguished from the late Bank, to which it 
was set up as a rival, and was at the time constantly so designated in debate. 
But circumstances now are indeed different, very different, and so would be the 
result of the experiment. This bank would not be the same rickety concern 
as the former. That ended in anarchy, and this would in despotism. I will 
explain. 

The former failed not so much in consequence of the adverse circumstances 
of the times, or any essential defect in the system, as from the want of a head 
— a common sensorium, to think, to will, and decide for the whole — which was 
indispensably necessary to ensure concert, and give unity of design and exe- 
cution. A head will not be wanting now. Mr. Biddle's bank will supply the 
defect. His would be not only one of the resuming banks, as I have shown, 
but would also be one of the twenty-five to be selected. If there should be 
the temerity to omit it, the present project would share the fate of its predeces- 
sor. Mr. Biddle's bank, at the head of those excluded, would be an overmatch 
for the selected, in skill, capital, and power, and the whole league would in- 
evitably be overthrown. But, if selected, the position of his bank in the league 
would be certain. Its vast capital, its extensive connexions, its superior au- 
thority, and his skill, abilities, and influence, would place it at the head, to 
think and act for the whole. The others would be as dependant on his as the 
branches of the late bank were on the mother institution. The whole would 
form one entire machine, impelled by a single impulse, and making a perfect 
contrast with its predecessor in the unity and energy of its operations. 

Nor would its fate be less dissimilar. Anarchy was inscribed on the first 
from the beginning. Its deficiency in the great and essential element to en- 
sure concert was radical, and could not be remedied. Its union with the gov- 
ernment could not supply it, nor avert its destiny. But very different would be 
the case of the present. Add its intimate union with the government, for 
which the substitute provides, to its other sources of power, and it would be- 
come irresistible. The two, government and bank, would unite and constitute 
a single power ; but which would gain the ascendency — whether the govern- 
ment would become the bank, or the bank the government — is neither certain 
nor material ; for, whichever it might be, it would form a despotic money-cracy 
(if I may be permitted to unite an English and a Greek word) altogether irre- 
sistible. 

It is ]jot a little surprising that the senator from Virginia (Mr. Rives), whose 
watchful jealousy could detect, as he supposed, the embryo of a government 
bank in the bill, should overlook this regular incorporation of one by his own 
substitute. Out of the slender materials of treasury warrants, and draughts to pay 
public creditors, or transfer funds from place to place, as the public service 
might require, and four principal receivers to keep the public money, he has 
conjured up, with the aid of a vivid imagination, a future government bank, 
which, he told us, with the utmost confidence, would rise like a cloud, at first 
as big as a hand, but which would soon darken all the horizon. Now, it is 
not a little unfortunate for his confident predictions, that these seminal princi- 
ples from which the bank is to spring have all existed, from the commence- 
ment of our government, in full force, except the four receivers, without show- 
ing the least tendency to produce the result he anticipates. Not only ours, but 
every civilized government, has the power to draw treasury warrants and trans- 
fer draughts ; nor has the power in a single instance terminated in a bank. Nor 
can the fact that the money is to be kept by receivers contribute in the least 



304 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

to produce one. The public funds in their hands will be as much beyond the 
control of the executive as it was in the vaults of the banks. But, to shorten 
discussion, I would ask, How can there be a bank without the power to dis- 
count or to use the deposites ? and out of which of the provisions of the bill 
could the treasury by any possibility obtain either, under its severe penalties, 
which prohibits the touching of the public money, except on warrants or draughts, 
drawn by those having authority in due form, and for the public service. 

But the danger which an excited imagination anticipates hereafter from the 
bill would exist in sober reality under the substitute. There it would require 
neither fancy nor conjecture to create one. It would exist with all its facul- 
ties and endowments complete — discount, deposites, and all — with immense 
means, guided by a central and directing head, and blended and united with 
the government, so as to form one great mass of power. "What a contrast 
with the bill ! How simple and harmless the one, with its four principal re- 
ceivers, twice as many clerks, and five inspectors, compared with this complex 
and mighty engine of power ! And yet there are many, both intelligent and 
patriotic, who oppose the bill and support the substitute, on the ground that the 
former would give more patronage and power than the latter ! How strange 
and wonderful the diversity of the human mind ! 

So far from being true, the very fact of the separation of the government 
from the banks, provided for in the bill, would, of itself, be the most decisive 
blow that could be given against government patronage, and the union of the 
two the most decisive in its favour. When their notes are received in the 
public dues as cash, and the public money deposited in their vauhs, the banks be- 
come the allies of the government on all questions connected with its fiscal action 
The higher its taxes and duties, the greater its revenue and expenditure : and 
the larger its surplus, the more their circulation and business, and, of course, the 
greater their profit ; and hence, on all questions of taxation and disbursements, 
and the accumulation of funds in the treasury, their interest would throw them 
on the side of the government, and against the people. 

All this is reversed when separated. The higher the taxation and disburse- 
ments, and the larger the surplus, the less would be their profit ; and their in- 
terest, in that case, would throw them with the people, and against the govern- 
ment. The reason is obvious. Specie is the basis of banking operations, and 
the greater the amount they can command the greater will be their business and 
profits ; but when the government is separated from them, and collects and pays 
away its dues in specie instead of their notes, it is clear that the higher the tax- 
es and disbursements, and the greater the surplus in the treasury, the more spe- 
cie will be drawn from the use of the banks, and the less will be left as the ba- 
sis of their operations ; and, consequently, the less their profit. Every dollar 
withdrawn from them would diminish their business fourfold at least; and 
hence a regard to their own interest would inevitably place them on the side 
to which I have assigned them. 

The effects on the politics of the country would be great and salutary. The 
weight of the banks would be taken from the side of the tax-consumers, where 
it has been from the commencement of the government, and placed on the side 
of the tax-payers. This great division of the community necessarily grows out 
of the fiscal action of the government. Take taxation and disbursement togeth- 
er, and it will always be found that one portion of the community pays into the 
treasury, in the shape of taxes, more than it receives back in that of disburse- 
ments, and that another receives back more than it pays. The former are the 
tax-payers, and the latter the consumers — making the great, essential, and con- 
trolling division in all civilized communities. If, with us, the government has 
been thrown on the side of the consumers, as it has, it must, in a considerable 
degree, be attributed to its alliance with the banks, whose influence has been, 
in consequence, at all times steadily and powerfully on that side. It is to this 



' SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUaX. 305 

miscliievous and unlioly alliance that may be traced the disasters which have 
befallen us, and the great political degeneracy of the country. Hence the pro- 
tective system ; hence its associated and monstrous system of disbursements ; 
hence the collection of more money from the people than the government could 
require ; hence the vast and corrupting surpluses ; hence legislative and execu- 
tive usurpations ; and, finally, hence the prostration of the currency, and the 
disasters which give rise to our present deliberations. Revive this fatal con- 
nexion — adopt this substitute, and all this train of evils will again follow, with re- 
doubled disasters and corruption. Refuse the connexion — adopt this bill, and 
all will be reversed, and we shall have some prospect of restoring the Consti- 
tution and country to their primitive simplicity and purity. The effect of the 
refusal on the patronage of the government would be great and decisive. Burke 
has wisely said, that the " revenue is the state in modern times." Violence 
and coercion are no longer the instruments of government in civilized commu- 
nities. Their reign is past. Everything is now done by money. It is not 
only the sinew of war, but of politics, over which, in the form of patronage, it 
exercises almost unlimited control. Just as the revenue increases or dimin- 
ishes, almost in the same proportion is patronage increased or diminished. 

But admit, for a moment, that neither the separation nor the connexion would 
have any sensible effect to increase or diminish the revenue, and that it would 
be of the same amount, whether the bill or substitute should be adopted, yet, 
even on that supposition, the patronage of the latter would be a hundred fold 
greater than the former. In estimating the amount of patronage of any meas- 
ure, three particulars must be taken into the calculation : the number of persons 
who may be affected by it, their influence in the community, and the extent of 
the control exercised over them. It will be found, on comparison, that the sub- 
stitute combines all these elements in a far greater degree than the bill, as I 
shall now proceed to show. I begin with the number. 

The bill provides, as has been stated, for four principal receivers, eight or 
ten clerks, and a suitable number of agents to act as inspectors, making, in the 
whole, say 25 individuals. These would constitute the only additional officers 
to keep and disburse the public money. The substitute, in addition to the offi- 
cers now iu service, provides for the selection of 25 banks, to be taken from the 
most powerful and inffiiential, and which would have, on an average, at the least 
100 officers and stockholders each, making, in the aggregate, 2500 persons 
who would be directly interested in the banks, and, of course, under the influ- 
ence of the government. 

As to the relative influence of the officers and the selected banks over the 
community, every impartial man must acknowledge that the preponderance 
would be greater on the side of the latter. Admitting the respectability of the 
receivers and other officers provided for in the bill, and the officers and stock- 
holders of the banks to be individually the same, still the means of control at 
the disposition of the former would be as nothing compared to that of the latter.. 
They would not touch a cent of public money. Their means would be limited 
to their salary, which would be too small to be felt in the community. Very 
different would be the case with the officers and stockholders of the banks. 
They, of all persons, are by far the most influential in the community. A 
greater number depend on them for accommodation and favour, and the success 
of their business and prospects in life, than any other class in society ; and 
this would be especially true of the banks connected with the government. 

It only remains, now, to compare the extent of the control that may be exer- 
cised by the government over the two, in order to complete the comparison ; 
and here, again, the preponderance will be found to be strikingly on the same 
side. The, whole amount of expenditure, under the bill, would not exceed 
$30,000 or $40,000 annually, at the very farthest, and this constitutes the 
whole amount of control which the government can exercise. There would be 



306 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. ^ 

no perquisites, no contracts, jobs, or incidental gains. The offices and salaries 
would be all. To that extent those who may hold them would be dependant 
on the government, and thus far they may be controlled. How stands the ac- 
count on the other side? What value shall be put on the public deposites in 
the banks ? What on the receivability of their notes as cash by the govern- 
ment ? What on their connexion with the government as their fiscal agent, 
which would give so great a control over the exchanges and business of the 
country ? How many millions shall these be estimated at, and how insig- 
nificant must the paltry sum of $30,000 or f 40,000 appear to those countless 
millions held, under the provisions of the substitute, at the pleasure of the gov- 
ernment ! 

Having now finished the comparison as to the relative patronage of the two 
measures, I shall next compare them as fiscal agents of the government ; and 
here let me say, at the outset, that the discussion has corrected an error which 
I once entertained. I had supposed that the hazard of keeping the public mon- 
ey under the custody of officers of the government would be greater than in 
bank. The senators from New-Hampshire and Connecticut (Messrs. Hubbard 
and Niles) have proved from the record, that the hazard is on the other side, 
and that we have lost more by the banks than by the collecting and disbursing 
officers combined. What can be done to increase the security by judicious se- 
lection of officers and proper organization is strongly illustrated by the fact, 
stated by the chairman (Mr. W^right) in his opening speech, that in the war 
department there has been no loss for 15 years — from 1821 to 1836 — on an 
expenditure certainly not less than $100,000,000. I take some pride in this 
result of an organization which I originated and established, when Secretary of 
War, against a formidable opposition. 

As to the relative expense of the two agencies, that of the bill, as small as it 
is, if we are to judge by appearances, is the greatest ; but if hj facts, the substi- 
tute would be much the most so, provided we charge it with all the advantages 
which the banks would derive from their connexion with the government, as 
ought in fairness to be done, as the whole ultimately comes out of the pockets 
of the people. 

In a single particular the banks have the advantage as fiscal agents. They 
would be the more convenient. To this they are entitled, and I wish to with- 
hold from them no credit which they may justly claim. 

The senator from Virginia (Mr. Rives) appeared to have great apprehension 
that the collection of the public dues in specie might lead to hoarding. He 
may dismiss his fears on that head. It is not the genius of modern and civil- 
ized governments to hoard ; and if it were, the banks will take care that there 
shall be no extraordinary accumulation of cash in the treasury. Pass the bill, 
and I underwrite that we shall never have again to complain of a surplus. It 
would rarely, if ever, in peace and settled times, exceed three or four millions at 
the outside. Nor is his apprehension that hoarding of specie would lead to 
war less groimdless. The danger is in another quarter. War is the harvest 
of banks, when they are connected with government. The vast increase of 
revenue and expenditures, and the enormous public loans, which necessarily 
inure mainly to their advantage, swell their profits in war to the utmost limits. 
But separate them from government, and war would then be to them a state of 
famine, for reasons which must be apparent after what has been said, which 
would throw their weight on the side of peace, and against war ; just as cer- 
tainly as I have shown that the separation would throw it on the side of tax- 
payers, and against the tax-consumers. 

I come, now, to the comparison of the eflects of the two measures on the 
currency of the country. In this respect, the senator from Virginia (Mr. Rives) 
seemed to think that his substitute would have a great superiority over the bill, 
but his reasons were to me wholly unsatisfactory. If we are to judge Irom ex- 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 307 

perience, it ought to be pronounced to be the worst possible measure. It has 
been in operation but twice (each for but a few years) since the commence- 
nient of the government, and it has so happened that the only two explosions 
of the currency occurred during those periods. But, without relying on these 
disastrous occurrences, we have seen enough to satisfy the most incredulous 
vhat there are great and radical defects in our bank circulation, which no remedy 
heretofore appUed has been able to remove. It originates in the excess of pa- 
per compared to specie, and the only effective cure is to increase the latter and 
reduce the former ; and this the substitute itself impUedly acknowledges, by pro- 
posing a remedy that would prove wholly inoperative. It proposes that, after a 
certain period mentioned, none of the banks to be selected should issue notes 
imder ten dollars. The effects would clearly be, not a diminution of the circu- 
lation of small notes, but a new division of the banking business, in which the 
issue of large notes would fall to the lot of the selected banks, and the small 
to the others, without restricting in the least the aggregate amount of paper 
circulation. 

But what the substitute would fail to do, the bill would effectually remedy. 
None doubt but the separation from the banks would greatly increase the pro- 
portion of specie to paper; but the senator from Virginia (Mr. Rives) appre- 
hends that its operation would be too powerful, so much so, in fact, as to destroy 
the banks. His argument is, that specie w'ould be always at a premium, and 
that it would be impossible for the banks to do business so long as that was 
the case. His fears are groundless. What he dreads would be but a temporary 
evil. The very fact that specie would bear a premium would have the double 
effect to diminish paper circulation and increase the importation of specie, tiU 
an equilibrium between the two would be restored, when they would be at par. 
At what point this would be effected is a little uncertain ; but the fear is, that 
with our decreasing revenue, instead of the specie being increased to excess, 
it would not be increased sufficiently to give the desired stability to the cur- 
rency. 

In this connexion, the senator urged an objection against the bill, which I 
regard as wholly groundless. He said that the payment of the dues of the gov- 
ernment iu specie would create a double demand: a domestic, as well as a 
foreign, the effects of which would be to increase greatly its fluctuations : and 
so deeply was he impressed with the idea, that he drew a vivid picture of its 
alternate flow from the coast to the interior, and from North to South, and back 
again. All this is the work of imagination. The effect would be directly the 
reverse. The more numerous the demands the less the fluctuation ; so much 
so, that the greatest stability would be where it exclusively performed the func- 
tion of circulation, and where each individual must keep a portion to meet his 
daily demands. This is so obvious, that I shall not undertake to illustrate it. 

But the superiority of the bill over the substitute would not be limited only to 
a more favourable proportion between specie and paper. It would have another 
important advantage, that cannot be well over-estimated : it would make a prac- 
tical distinction between currency and circulation — between the currency of the 
country and private and local circulation, under which head bank paper would 
be comprehended. The effects would be, to render a general explosion of the 
circulation almost impossible. Whatever derangements might occur would be 
local, and confined to some one particular commercial sphere ; and even within 
its limits there would be a sound currency to fall back on, not partaking of the 
shock, and which would greatly diminish the intensity and duration of the dis- 
tress. In the mean time, the general business and finances of the country 
would proceed, almost without feeling the derangement. 

With a few remarks on the comparative effects of the two measures on the 
industr)* and business of the country, I shall conclude the comparison. What 
has been said on their relative effects on the currency goes far to decide the 
question of their relative effects on business and industry. 



30S SPEECHES OF JOHX C. CALHOtX; 

I hold a sound and stable currency to be among the greatest encouragements 
to industry and business generally ; and an unsound and fluctuating one, now 
expanding and now contracting, so that no honest man can tell what to do, as 
among the greatest discouragements. The dollar and the eagle are the meas- 
ure of A'alue, as the yard and the bushel are of quantity ; and what would we 
think of the incorporation of companies to regulate the latter — to expand or 
contract, to shorten or lengthen them at pleasure, with the privilege to sell by 
the contracted or shortened, and buy by the expanded or lengthened ? Is it 
not seen that it would place the whole industry and business of the country 
under the control of such companies ? But it would not more certainly effect 
it than a similar control possessed by the money institutions of the country 
over the measure of value. But I go farther, and assert confidently, that the 
excess of paper currency, as well as its imsteadiness, is iinfavourable to the in- 
dustry and business of the countrj". It raises the price of everything, and, con- 
sequently, increases the price of production and consumption ; and is, in the 
end, hostile to every branch of industry. 

I hold that specie and paper have each their proper sphere : the latter for 
large and distant transactions, and the former for all others ; and that the near- 
er our circulation approaches gold and silver, consistently with convenience, 
the better for the industry and the business of the country. The more specie 
the better, till that point is reached. When attained, it would combine, in the 
greatest possible degree, soundness and facility, and Avould be favourable to the 
productive classes universally ; I mean men of business, planters, merchants, 
and manufacturers, as well as operatives. It would be particularly favourable 
to the South. Our great staples are cash articles everywhere ; and it was well 
remarked by the senator from Mississippi (Mr. Walker), at the extra session, that 
we sold at cash prices and bought at paper prices ; that is, sold low and bought 
high. The manufacturing, commercial, and navigating interests would also 
feel its beneficial effects. It would cheapen productions, and be to manufactu- 
rers in lieu of a protective tariff. Its effects would be to enable them to meet 
foreign competition, not by raising prices by high duties, but by enabling them 
to sell as cheap or cheaper than the foreigner, which would harmonize every 
interest, and place our manufactures on the most solid basis. It is the only 
mode by which the foreign market can ever be commanded ; and commanded 
it would be, with a sound and moderately expanded currency. Our ingenuity, 
invention, and industry are equal to those of any people ; and all our manu- 
facturers want is a sound currency and an even chance, to meet competition 
with succ^ess everywhere, at home or abroad. But with a bloated and fluctua- 
ting paper circulation this will be impossible. Among its many drawbacks, it 
levies an enormous tax on the communit^^ 

I have already stated that the community is estimated to have been indebted 
to the banks $475,000,000 at the suspension of specie payments. The inter- 
est on this sum, estimated at six per cent, (it ought to be higher), would give 
an annual income to those institutions of upward of thirty millions ; and this is 
the sum yearly paid by the community for bank accommodations, to the excess 
of which we owe our bloated and imstable circulation. Never was a circu- 
lation so worthless furnished at so dear a rate. How much of this vast in- 
come may be considered as interest on real capital it is difhcult to estimate ; 
but it would, I suppose, be ample to set down ten millions to that head, which 
would leave upward of twenty millions annually as the profits derived from 
banking privileges, over and above a fair compensation for the capital invested, 
which somebody must pay, and which must ultimately tall on the industry and 
business of the country. But this enormous expansion of the system is not as- 
tonishing, so great is the stimidus applied to its growth. Ingenious men of 
other ages devoted themselves in vain to discover the art of converting the ba- 
ser metals into gold and silver • but we have conferred on a portion of the com- 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 309 

munity an art still higher — of converting paper, to all intents and purposes, into 
the precious metals ; and ought we to be surprised that an article so cheap to 
the manufacturers, and so dear to the rest of the community, should be so great- 
ly over-supplied, and without any reference to the interest or to the wants of 
the community ? 

If we are to believe the senator from Virginia, and others on the same side, 
we owe almost all our improvements and prosperity to the banking system ; and 
if it should fail, the age of barbarism would again return. I had supposed that 
the bases of our prosperity were our free institutions, the wide-spread and fer- 
tile region we occupy, and the hereditary intelligence and energy of the stock 
from which we are descended ; but it seems that all these go for nothing, and 
that the banks are everything. I make no war on them. All I insist on is, that 
the government shall separate from them, which I believe to be indispensable, 
for the reasons I have assigned both now and formerly. But I cannot concur in 
attributing to them our improvements and prosperity. That they contributed to 
give a strong impulse to industry and enterprise in the early stages of their op- 
eration, I doubt not. Nothing is more stimulating than an expanding and de- 
preciating currency. It creates a delusive appearance of prosperity, which puts 
everything in motion. Every one feels as if he was growing richer as prices 
rise, and that he has it in his power, by foresight and exertion, to make his for- 
tune. But it is the nature of stimulus, moral as well as physical, to excite at 
first, and to depress afterward. The draught which at first causes unnatural 
excitement and energy, is sure to terminate in corresponding depression and 
weakness ; nor is it less certain that the stimulus of a currency, expanding be- 
yond its proper limits, follows the same law. We have had the exhilaration, 
and the depression has succeeded. We have had the pleasure of getting drunk, 
and now experience the pain of becoming sober. The good is gone, and the 
evil has succeeded ; and, on a fair calculation, the latter will be found to be 
greater than the former. Wliatever impulse the banking system was calculated 
to ^ive to our improvement and prosperity, has already been given ; and the 
reverse effects will hereafter follow, unless the system should undergo great and 
radical changes ; the first step towards which would be the adoption of the 
measure proposed by this bill. 

I have, Mr. President, finished what I intended to say. I have long antici- 
pated the present crisis, but did not, until 1837, expect its arrival in my time. 
W^hen I saw its approach, I resolved to do my duty, be the consequences to me 
what they might ; and I offer my thanks to the Author of my being, that he has 
given me the resolution and opportunity of discharging what I honestly believe 
to be my duty in reference to this great subject. 

How the question will be decided is acknowledged to be doubtful, so nearly 
are the two houses supposed to be divided ; but whatever may be its fate now, 
I have the most perfect confidence in its fnal triumph. The public attention 
is roused. The subject will be thoroughly investigated, and I have no fears but 
the side I support will prove to be the side of truth, justice, liberty, civilization, 
and the advancement of moral and intellectual improvement. 



XXL 

SPEECH IN REPLY TO MR. CLAY, ON THE SUB-TREASURY BILL, MARCH 10, 1838. 

I RISE to fulfil a promise I made some time since, to notice at my leisure 
the reply of the senator from Kentucky farthest from me (Mr. Clay), to 
my remarks when I first addressed the Senate on the subject now under 
discussion. 



310 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALnOtrW, 

On comparing with care the reply with the remarks, I am at a loss to 
determine Avhether it is the most remarkable for its omissions or mis- 
statements. Instead of leaving not a hair on the head of my arguments^ 
as the senator threatened (to use his not very dignified expression), he 
has not even attempted to answer a large, and not the least weighty por- 
tion ; and of that which he has, there is not one fairly stated or fairly an- 
swered. I speak literally, and without exaggeration; nor would it be dif- 
ficult to make good to the letter what I assert, if I could reconcile it to 
myself to consume the time of the Senate in establishing a long series 
of negative propositions, in which they could take but little interest, how- 
ever important they may be regarded by the senator and myself. To 
avoid so idle a consumption of the time, I propose to present a few in- 
stances of his misstatements, from which the rest may be inferred ; and^ 
that I may not be suspected of having selected them, I shall take them in 
the order in which they stand in his reply. 

The Senate will recollect, that when the senator from Virginia farthest 
from me (Mr. Rives) introduced his substitute, he accompanied it with 
the remark that it was his first choice, and the second choice of those 
who are allied with him on this occasion. In noticing this remark, I 
stated, that if I might judge from appearances, which could scarcely de- 
ceive one, the senator might have said not onljj^ the second, but, under 
existing circumstances, it v.'as their first choice ; and that, despairing of a 
bank for the present, they would support his substitute. Assuming this 
inference to be correct, I stated that the question was narrowed down, in 
fact, to the bill and substitute, of which one or the other must be selected. 
The senator from Kentucky, in his reply, omitted all these qualifications, 
and represented me as making the absolute assertion that, in the nature 
of the case, there was no other alternative but the bill or the substitute, 
and then gravely pointed out two others — to do nothing, or adopt a Na- 
tional Bank, as if I could possibly be ignorant of what was so obvious. 
After he had thus replied, not to what I really said, but his own misstate- 
ment of it, as if to make compensation, he proceeded in the same breath 
to confirm the truth of what I did say, by giving his support to the sub- 
stitute, which he called a half-way house, where he could spend some 
pleasant hours. Nothing is more easy than to win such victories. 

Having inferred, as has turned out to be the fact, that there was no 
other alternative at present but the bill and substitute, I next showed the 
embarrassment to which the gentleman opposite to me would be involved 
from having, four years ago, on the question of the removal of the de- 
posites, denounced a league of state banks similar to that proposed to be 
revived by the substitute. After enlarging on this point, I remarked, that 
if I might be permitted to state my opinion, the gentlemen had taken a 
course on this subject unfortunate for themselves and the country — un- 
fortunate for them, for, let what would come, they would be responsible. 
If the bill was lost, theirs would be the responsibility ; if the substitute was 
carried, on them the responsibility would fall ; and if nothing was done, 
it would be at their door ; and unfortunate for the country, because it had 
prevented the decision of the question at the extra session, which would 
not have failed to put an early termination to the present commercial and 
pecuniary embarrassment. This the senator, in his reply, met by sta- 
ting that I had called on him and his friends to follow my lead ; and thus 
regarding it, he made it the pretext of some ill-natured personal remarks, 
which I shall notice hereafter. I never dreamed of making such a call ; 
and what I said cannot be tortured, by the force of construction, to bear 
a meaning having the least semblance to it. 

After making these preliminary remarks, I took up the substitute, and 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 311 

showed that it proposed to make a bargain with the banks. I then 
stated the particulars and the conditions of the proposed bargain ; that its 
object was to enable the banks to pay their debts, and for that purpose it 
proposed to confer important privileges ; to give them the use of the pub- 
lic funds from the time of deposite to disbursement, and to have their 
notes received as cash in the dues of the government. I then asked if 
we had a right to make such a bargain. The senator, leaving out all 
these particulars, represented me as saying that the government had no 
riwht to make a bargain w'ith the banks j and then undertakes to involve 
me in an inconsistency in supporting the bill, because it proposes to bar- 
gain with the banks for the use of their vaults as a place of safe-keeping 
for the public money ; as if there was a possible analogy between the two 
cases. Nothing is more easy than to refute the most demonstrative ar- 
gument in this way. Drop an essential part of the premises, and the 
most irresistible conclusion, of course, fails. 

In the same summary and easy mode of replying to my arguments, the 
senator perverted my denial that the government had a right to receive 
bank-notes as cash, into the assertion that it had no right to receive any- 
thing but cash J and then accuses me with inconsistency, because I voted, 
at the extra session, for the bill authorizing the receipt of treasury notes 
in the dues of the government j as if any one ever doubted that it could 
receive its own paper, or securities, in payment of its own debts. Such 
are the misstatements of the senator, taken in their regular order as they 
stand in his reply, and they present a fair specimen of what he chooses 
to consider an answer to my argument. There is not one less unfairly 
stated, or unfairly met, than the instances I have cited. 

The senator presented two difficulties in reply to what I said against 
receiving bank-notes by the government, which demand a passing notice 
before I dismiss this part of the subject. He objected, first, that it was 
contrary to the provision of the bill itself, which authorizes the receipts 
of the notes of specie-paying banks for a limited time. To answer this 
objection, it will be necessary to advert to the object of the provision. 
By the provisions of the joint resolutions of 1816, the notes of specie- 
paying banks are made receivable in the dues of the government ; and, 
of course, on the resumption of specie payments, bank-notes would again 
be received by the government as heretofore, without limitation as to 
time, unless some provision be adopted to prevent it. In a word, the 
government, though wholly separated, in fact, at present from the banks, 
is not so by law ; and the object of the provision is to effect a permanent 
separation in law and in fact. This it proposes to do by a gradual repeal 
of the joint resolution of 1816, in order to prevent, as far as possible, any 
injurious efTects to the community or the banks. The senator, in making 
his objection, overlooks the broad distinction between the doing and un- 
doing of an unconstitutional act. There are some unconstitutional acts 
that are difficult, if not impossible, to be undone ; such, for instance, as 
the admission of Louisiana into the Union, admitting it to be unconstitu- 
tional, which I do not. There are others which cannot be undone sud- 
denly without wide-spread distress and ruin ; such as the protective tarifT, 
which, accordingly, the Compromise Act allowed upward of eight years 
for the gradual repeal. Such, also, is the case under consideration, 
•which, under the provisions of the bill, would be effected in seven j^ears. 
In all such cases, I hold it to be not only clearly constitutional for Con- 
gress to make a gradual repeal, but its duty to do so ; otherwise it would 
be often impossible to get clear of an unconstitutional act short of a rev- 
olution. 

His next objection was, that the reasons which would make the receipt 



312 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

of bank-notes unconstitutional, would also make the China trade so, which 
he represented as absorbing a large portion of the specie of the country. 
There is no analogj' whatever between the two cases. The very object 
of specie is to carry on trade, and it would be idle to attempt to regulate 
the distribution and fluctuation which result from its operation. Expe- 
rience proves that all attempts of the kind must either prove abortive or 
mischievous. In fact, it may be laid down as a law, that the more uni- 
versal the demand for specie, and the less that demand is interrupted, the 
more steady and uniform its value, and the more perfectly, of course, it 
fulfils the great purpose of circulation, for which it was intended. There 
are, however, not a few who, taking a different view, have thought it to 
be the duty of the government to prohibit the exportation of specie to 
China, on the very ground which the senator assumes, and I am not cer- 
tain but that he himself has been in favour of the measure. 

But the senator did not restrict himself to a reply to my arguments. 
He introduced personal remarks, which neither self-respect, nor a regard 
to the cause I support, will permit me to pass without notice, as adverse 
as I am to all personal controversies. Not only my education and dis- 
position, but, above all, my conception of the duties beloning to the sta- 
tion I occupy, indisposes me to such controversies. We are sent here, 
not to wrangle or indulge in personal abuse, but to deliberate and decide 
on the common interests of the states of this Union, as far as they have 
been subjected by the Constitution to our jurisdiction. Thus thinking 
and feeling, and having perfect confidence in the cause I support, I ad- 
dressed myself, when 1 was last up, directly and exclusively to the rea- 
son of the body, carefully avoiding every remark which had the least per- 
sonal or party bearing. In proof of this, I appeal to you, senators, my 
witnesses on this occasion. But it seems that no caution on my part 
could prevent what I was so anxious to avoid. The senator, having no 
pretext to give a personal direction to the discussion, made a premedi- 
tated and gratuitous attack on me. I say having no pretext, for there is 
not a shadow of foundation for the assertion that I called on him and his 
party to follow my lead, at which he seemed to take offence, as I have 
already shown. I made no such call, or anything that could be construed 
into it. It would have been impertinent, in the relation between myself 
and his party, at any stage of this question ; and absurd at that late period, 
when every senator had made up his mind. As there was, then, neither 
provocation nor pretext, what could be the motive of the senator in making 
the attack! It could not be to indulge in the pleasure of personal abuse, 
the lowest andbasest of all our passions, and which is so far beneath the dig- 
nity of the senator's character and station. Nor could it be with the view 
to intimidation. The senator knows me too long and too well to make such 
an attempt. I am sent here by constituents as respectable as those he 
represents, in order to watch over their peculiar interests, and take care 
of the general concern ; and if I were capable of being deterred by any 
one, or any consequence, in discharging my duty, from denouncing what 
I regard as dan2:erous or corrupt, or giving a decided and zealous sup- 
port°to what I think right and expedient, I would, in shame and confu- 
sion, return my commission to the patriotic and gallant state I represent, 
to be placed in more resolute and trustworthy hands. 

If, then, neither the one nor the other of these be the motive, what, I 
again repeat, can it be ? In casting my eyes over the whole surface, I 
can see but one— which is, that the senator, despairing of the sufi^ciency 
of his reply to overthrow my arguments, had resorted to personalities, in 
the hope, with their aid, to effect what he could not accomplish by main 
strength. He well knows that the force of an argument on moral or pa- 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 313 

litical subjects depends greatly on the character of him who advanced it ; 
and that to cast suspicion on his motive, or to shake confidence in his un- 
derstandincr, is often the most effectual mode to destroy its force. Thus 
viewed, his personalities may be fairly regarded as constituting a part 
of his reply to my argument ; and we, accordingly, find the senator throw- 
ing them in front, like a skilful general, in order to weaken my arguments 
before he brought on his main attack. In repelling, then, his personal 
attacks, I also defend the cause which I advocate. It is against that his 
blows are aimed, and he strikes at it through me, because he believes his 
blows will be the more effectual. 

Havino- o-iven this direction to his reply, he has imposed on me a double 
duty to repel his attacks — duty to myself and the cause I support. I shall 
not decline its performance ; and when it is discharged, I trust I shall 
have placed my character as far beyond the darts which he has hurled at 
it as my arguments have proved to be above his abilities to reply to them. 
In doino- this, I shall be compelled to speak of myself. No one can be 
more sensible than I am how odious it is to speak of one's self. 1 shall 
endeavour to confine myself within the limits of the strictest propriety ; 
but if anything- should escape me that may wound the most delicate ear, 
the odium ought, in justice, to fall, not on me, but the senator who, by 
his unprovoked and wanton attack, has imposed on me the painful neces- 
sity of speaking of myself. 

The leading charge of the senator — that on which all others depend, 
and which, being overthrown, they fall to the ground — is, that 1 have gone 
over ; have left his side, and joined the other. By this vague and indef- 
inite expression, I presume he meant to imply that 1 had either changed 
my opinion, or abandoned my principles, or deserted my party. If he did 
not mean one or all j if I have changed neither opinions, principles, nor 
party, then the charge meant nothing deserving notice. But if he in- 
tended to imply, what I have presumed he did, I take issue on the fact — 
1 meet and repel the charge. It happened fortunately for me, fortunately 
for the cause of truth and justice, that it was not the first time that I had 
offered my sentiments on the question now under consideration. There 
is scarcely a single point in the present issue on which I did not expli- 
citly express my opinion four years ago, in my place here, when the re- 
moval of the deposites, and the questions connected with it, were under 
discussion — so explicitly as to repel effectually the charge of any change 
on my part, and to make it impossible for me to pursue any other course 
but what I have without involving myself in gross inconsistency. 1 in- 
tend not to leave so important a point to rest on my bare assertion. 
What I assert stands on record, which I now hold in my possession, and 
intend, at the proper time, to introduce and read. But, before I do that, 
it will be proper I should state the questions now at issue, and my course 
in relation to them ; so that, having a clear and distinct perception of 
them, you may, senators, readily and satisfactorily compare and deter- 
mine whether my course on the present occasion coincides \vith the opin- 
ions I then expressed. 

There are three questions, as is agreed by all, involved in the present 
issue: Shall we separate the government from the banks, or shall we re- 
vive the league of state banks, or create a National Bank 1 I\Iy opinioo 
and course in reference to each are well known. 1 prefer the separation 
to either of the others ; and, as between the other two, 1 regard a Na- 
tional Bank as a more efficient and a less corrupting fiscal agent than u 
league of state banks. It is also well known that I have expressed my- 
self on the present occasion hostile to the banking system as it exists, 
and ap-ainst the constitutional power of making a bank, unless on the as- 

R R 



314 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

sumption that we have the right to receive and treat bank-notes as cash 
in our fiscal operations, which I, for the first time, have denied on the 
present occasion. Now, I entertained and expressed all these opinions, 
on a difl^erent occasion, four years ago, except the right of receiving bank- 
notes, in regard to which I then reserved my opinion ; and if all this should 
be fully and clearly established by the record, from speeches delivered 
and published at the time, the charge of the senator must, in the opinion 
of all, however prejudiced, sink to the ground. I am now prepared to 
introduce and have the record read. I delivered two speeches in the 
session of ISSS-Si, one on the removal of the deposites, and the other 
on the question of the renewal of the charter of the late Bank. I ask the 
secretary to turn to the volume lying before him, and read the three 
paragraphs marked in my speech on the deposites. I will thank him to 
raise his voice and read slowly, so that he may be distinctly heard ; and 
I must ask you, senators, to give your attentive hearing, for on the coin- 
cidence between my opinions then and my course now, my vindication 
against this unprovoked and groundless charge rests. 

[" If (said Mr. C.) this was a question of bank or no bank ; if it involved 
the existence of the banking system, it would indeed be a great question 
— one of the first magnitude ; and, with my present impression, long en- 
tertained and daily increasing, I would hesitate, long hesitate, before I 
would be found under the banner of the system. I have great doubts (if 
doubts they may be called) as to the soundness and tendency of the whole 
system, in all its modifications. I have great fears that it will be found 
hostile to liberty and the advance of civilization ; fatally hostile to liberty 
in our country, where the system exists in its worst and most dangerous 
form. Of all institutions affecting the great question of the distribution 
of wealth — a question least explored, and the most important of any in 
the whole range of political economy — the banking institution has, if not 
the greatest, among the greatest, and, I fear, most pernicious influence on 
the mode of distribution. Were the question really before us, I would 
not shun the responsibility, great as it might be, of freely and fully ofter- 
ing my sentiments on these deeply-important points ; but as it is, I must 
content myself with the few remarks which I have thrown out. 

"What, then, is the real question which now agitates the countrj^l I 
answer, it is a struggle between the executive and legislative departments 
of the government ; a struggle, not in relation to the existence of the 
bank, but which. Congress or the President, should have the power to 
create a bank, and the consequent control over the currency of the coun- 
try. This is the real question. Let us not deceive ourselves. This 
league, this association of banks, created by the executive, bound to- 
gether by its influence, united in common articles of association, vivified 
and sustained by receiving the deposites of the public money, and having 
their notes converted, by being received everywhere by the treasury, 
into the common currency of the country, is, to all intents and purposes, 
a Bank of the United States, the Executive Bank of the United States, as 
distinguished from that of Congress. 

'' However it might fail to perform satisfactorily the useful functions 
of the Bank of the United States, as incorporated by law, it would outstrip 
it, far outstrip it, in all its dangerous qualities: in extending the power, 
the influence, and the corruption of the government. It was impossible 
to conceive any institution more admirably calculated to advance these 
objects. Not only the selected banks, but the whole banking institutions 
of the country, and, with them, the entire money power, for the purposes 
of speculation, peculation, and corruption, would be placed under the 
control of the executive. A system of menaces and promises would be 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 315 

established : of menaces to the banks in possession of the deposites, but 
which mio-ht not be entirely subservient to executive views, and of prom- 
ises of future favours to those who may not as yet enjoy its favours. 
Between the two, the banks would be left without influence, honour, or 
honesty, and a system of speculation and stock-jobbing would commence 
unequalled in the annals of our country. 

" So long as the question is one between a Bank of the United States, 
incorporated by Congress, and that system of banks which has been cre- 
ated by the will of the executive, it is an insult to the understanding to 
discourse on the pernicious tendency and unconstitutionality of the Bank 
of the United States. To bring up that question fairly and legitimately, 
you must go one step farther — you must divorce the government and the 
banking system. You must refuse all connexion with banks. You must 
neither receive nor pay away bank-notes ; you must go back to the old 
system of the strong box, and of gold and silver. If you have a right to 
receive bank-notes at all — to treat them as money by receiving them in 
your dues, or paying them away to creditors — you have a right to create 
a bank. Whatever the government receives and treats as money is 
money ; and if it be money, then they have the right, under the Consti- 
tution, to regulate it. Nay, they are bound, by a high obligation, to adopt 
the most efficient means, according to the nature of that which they have 
recognised as money, to give to it the utmost stability and uniformity of 
value. And if it be in the shape of bank-notes, the most efficient means 
of giving those qualities is a Bank of the United States, incorporated by 
Congress. Unless you give the highest practical uniformity to the value 
of bank-notes — so long as you receive them in your dues and treat them 
as money, you violate that provision of the Constitution which provides 
that taxation shall be uniform throughout the United States. There is 
no other alternative. I repeat, you must divorce the government entirely 
from the banking system, or, if not, you are bound to incorporate a bank, 
as the only safe and efficient means of giving stability and uniformity to 
the currency. And should the deposites not be restored, and the present 
illegal and unconstitutional connexion between the executive and the 
league of banks continue, I shall feel it my duty, if no one else moves, to 
introduce a measure to prohibit government from receiving or touching 
bank-notes in any shape whatever, as the only means left of giving safety 
and stability to the currency, and saving the country from corruption and 
ruin." 

Such were my sentiments, delivered four years ago, on the question of 
the removal of the deposites, and now standing on record ; and I now 
call your attention, senators, while they are fresh in your minds, and be- 
fore other extracts are read, to the opinions I then entertained and ex- 
pressed, in order that you may compare them with those that I have ex- 
pressed, and the course I have pursued on the present occasion. In the 
first place, I then expressed myself explicitly and decidedly against the 
banking system, and intimated, in language too strong to be mistaken, 
that, if the question was then bank or no bank, as it now is, as far as 
government is concerned, I would not be found on the side of the bank. 
Now, I ask, I appeal to the candour of all, even the most prejudiced, is 
there anything in all this contradictory to my present opinions or course I 
On the contrary, having entertained and expressed these opinions, could 
I at this time, when the issue I then supposed is actually presented, have 
gone against the separation without gross inconsistency! Again: I then 
declared myself to be utterly opposed to a combination or league of state 
banks, as being the most efficient and corrupting fiscal agent the govern- 
ment could select, and more objectionable than a Bank of the United 



316 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

States. I acrain appeal, is there a sentiment or a word in all this contra- 
dictory to what I have said or done on the present occasion 1 So far 
otherwise is there not a perfect harmony and coincidence throughout, 
which considering the distance of time and the difference of the occasion, 
is truly remarkable, and this extending to all the great and governing 
questions now at issue 1 , ■ j- j 

But the removal of the deposites was not the only question discussed 
at that remarkable and important session. The charter of the United 
States Bank was then about to expire. The senator from Massachusetts 
nearest me (Mr. Webster), then at the head of the Committee on Finance, 
suo-o-ested, in his place, that he intended to introduce a bill to renew the 
charter. I clearly perceived that the movement, if made, would fail ; and 
that there was no prospect of doing anything to arrest the danger ap- 
proaching, unless the subject was taken up on the broad question of the 
currency'^; and that, if any connexion of the government with the banks 
could be justified at all, it must be in that relation. I am not among 
those who believe that the currency was in a sound condition when the 
deposites were removed in 1834. I then believed, and experience has 
proved I was correct, that it was deeply and dangerously diseased ; and 
that the most efficient measures were necessary to prevent the catas- 
trophe which has since befallen the circulation of the country. There 
was then not more than one dollar in specie, on an average, in the banks, 
including the United States Bank and all, for six of bank-notes in circu- 
lation and not more than one in eleven compared to the liabilities of the 
banks^ and this while the United States Bank was in full and active oper- 
ation,' which proves conclusively that its charter ought not to be re- 
newed, if renewed at all, without great modifications. I saw, also, that 
the expansion of the circulation, great as it then was, must still farther 
increase ; that the disease lay deep in the system ; that the terms on 
which the charter of the Bank of England was renewed would give a 
western direction to specie, which, instead of correcting the disorder, by 
substituting specie for bank-notes in our circulation, would become the 
basis of new banking operations that would greatly increase the swelling 
tide. Such were my conceptions then, and I honestly and earnestly en- 
deavoured to carry them into effect, in order to prevent the approaching 

catastrophe. 

The political and personal relations between myself and the senator 
from Massachusetts (Mr. Webster) were then not the kindest. We stood 
in opposition, at the preceding session, on the great question growing out 
of the conflict between the state I represented and the General Govern- 
ment, which could not pass away without leaving unfriendly feelings on both 
sides ; but, where duty is involved, I am not in the habit of permittmg 
my personal relations to interfere. In my solicitude to avert coming! 
dano-ers, I sought an interview, through a common friend, in order to com- 
pare opinions "as to the proper course to be pursued. We met, and con- 
versed freely and fully, but parted without agreeing. I expressed to him 
my deep regret at our disagreement, and informed him that, although I 
could not agree with him, 1 would throw no embarrassment in his way, 
but should feel it to be my duty, when he made his motion to introduce 
a bill to renew the charter of the Bank, to express my opinion at large 
on the state of the currency, and the proper course to be pursued, which 
I accordingly did. On that memorable occasion I stood almost alone. 
One party "supported the league of state banks, and the other the United 
States Bank, the charter of which the senator from Massachusetts (Mr. 
Webster) proposed to renew for six years. Nothing was left me but 
to place myself distinctly before the country on the ground I occupied, 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 317 

which T did, fully and explicitlj-, in the speech I delivered on the occasion. 
In justice to myself, I ought to have every word of it read on the pres- 
ent occasion. It would of itself be a full vindication of my course. 
I stated and enlarged on all the points to which I have already referred ; 
objected to the recharter as proposed by the mover, and foretold that 
Avhat has since happened would follow, unless something effectual was 
done to prevent it. As a remedy, I proposed to use the Bank of the 
United States as a temporary expedient, fortified with strong guards, in 
order to resist and turn back the swelling tide of circulation. With this 
view, I proposed to prohibit the issue of any note under ten dollars at 
first, and, after a certain interval, under twenty ; and to refuse to receive 
the notes of any bank that issued notes under five dollars, or that re- 
ceived the notes oC any bank that issued less, in order to make a total 
separation between the banks that should refuse to discontinue the issue 
of small notes and the others, in the hope that the influence of the latter, 
with the voice of the community, would ultimately compel a discontinu- 
ance. I proposed that the charter, with these and other provisions that 
might be devised by a committee appointed for the purpose, should be 
renewed for twelve years, two years longer than the Bank of England 
had been, in order to avail ourselves of the experience and wisdom 
of that great and enlightened nation. All this I proposed, expressly 
on the ground of undoing the system, graduallj'' and slowly, until a total 
disconnexion should be effected, if experience should show that it could 
be carried to that extent. My object was double — to get clear of the sys- 
tem, and to avert the catastrophe which has since befallen us, and which 
I then saw was approaching. 

To prove all this, I again refer to the record. If it shall appear from it 
that my object was to disconnect the government, gradually and cau- 
tiously, from the banking system, and with that view, and that only, I 
proposed to use the United States Bank for a short time, and that I ex- 
plicitly expressed the same opinions then as I now have on almost every 
point connected with the system, I shall not only have vindicated my 
character from the charge of the senator from Kentucky, but shall do 
more, much more, to show that I did all an individual, standing alone, as 
I did, could do, to avert the present calamities, and, of course, am free 
from all responsibility for what has since happened. I have shortened 
the extracts as far as was possible to do myself justice, and have left out 
much that ought, of right, to be read in my defence, rather than to weary 
the Senate. I know how difficult it is to command attention to reading 
of documents; but I trust that this, where justice to a member of the 
body, whose character has been assailed without the least provocation, 
will form an exception. The extracts are numbered, and I will thank the 
secretary to pause at the end of each, imless otherwise desired. 

[The secretary here read the following extract : 

"After a full survey of the whole subject, I see none, I can conjec- 
ture no means of extricating the country from its present danger, and 
to arrest its farther increase, but a bank, the agency of which, in some 
form or under some authority, is indispensable. The country has been 
brought into the present diseased state of the currency by banks, and 
must be extricated by their agency. We must, in a word, use a bank to 
unbank the banks, to the extent that may be necessary to restore a safe 
and stable currency ; just as we apply snow to a frozen limb in order to 
restore vitality and circulation, or hold up a burn to the flame to extract the 
inflammation. All must see that it is impossible to suppress the banking 
system at once. It must continue for a time. Its greatest enemies, and 
the advocates of an exclusive specie circulation, must make it a part of 



318 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN, 

their system to tolerate the banks for a longer or a shorter period. To 
suppress them at once would, if it were possible, work a greater revolu- 
tion — a frreater change in the relative condition of the various classes of 
the community, than would the conquest of the country by a savage ene- 
my. What, then, must be done 1 I answer, a new and safe system must 
gradually grow up under and replace the old ; imitating, in this respect, 
the beautiful process we sometimes see of a wounded or diseased part in 
a living organic body gradually superseded by the healing process of 
nature."] 

After having so expressed myself, which clearly shows that my object 
was to use the bank for a time in such a manner as to break the con- 
nexion with the system without a shock to the country or currency, I 
then proceeded and examined the question, whether this could be best 
accomplished by the renewal of the charter of the United States Bank, 
or through a league of state banks. After concluding what I had to say 
on that subject, in my deep solicitude I addressed the three parties in the 
Senate separately, urging such motives as I thought best calculated to 
act on them, and pressing them to join me in the measure suggested, in 
order to avert approaching danger. I began with my friends of the State 
Rights party, and with the administration. I have taken copious extracts 
from the address to the first, which will clearly prove how exactly my 
opinion, then and now, coincides on all questions connected with the banks. 
I now ask the secretary to read the extract numbered two. 

["Having now stated the measure nece^.saryto apply the remedy, I am 
thus brought to the question, Can the meas^r^e succeed ? which brings up 
the inquiry of how far it may be expected to receive the support of the 
several parties which compose the Senate, and on Avhich I shall next pro- 
ceed to make a few remarks. 

" First, then. Can the State Rights party give it their support 1 that party 
of which I am proud of being a member, and for which I entertain so 
strong an attachment — the stronger because we are few among many. 
In proposing this question, I am not ignoraiij of their long-standing con- 
stitutional objection to tjie Bank, on the ground that this was intended to 
be, as it is usually expressed, a hard-mon4j? government — a government 
whose circulating medium was intended to cbnsist of the precious metals, 
and for which object the power of coining money and regulating the value 
thereof was expressly conferred by the Constitution, I know how long 
and how sincerely this opinion has been entertained, and under how many 
difficulties it has been maintained. It i^ tfot my intention to attempt to 
change an opinion so firmly fixed, but I may be permitted to make a few 
observations, in order to present what appears to me to be the true ques- 
tion in reference to this constitutional point — in order that we may fully 
comprehend the circumstances under which we are placed in reference 
to it. With this view, I do not deem it necessary to inquire whether, in 
conferring the power to coin money and to regulate the value thereof, 
the Constitution intended to limit the power strictly to coining money 
and regulating its value, or whether it intended to confer a more general 
power over tlie currency ; nor do I intend to inquire whether the word 
coin is limited simply to the metals, or may be extended to other sub- 
stances, if, through a gradual change, they may become the medium of 
the general circulation of the world. 

" The very receipt of bank-notes, on the part of the government, in its 
dues, would, it is conceded, make them money as far as the government 
may be concerned, and, by a necessary 6onsequence, would make them, to a 
great extent, the currency of the country. I say nothing of the positive 
provisions in the Constitution which declare that ' all duties, imposts, and 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 3 19 

excises shall be uniform throughout the United Stales,' which cannot be, 
unless that in which they are paid should also have, as nearly as prac- 
ticable, a uniform value throughout the country. To effect this, where 
bank-notes are received, the banking power is necessary and proper with- 
in the meaning of the Constitution; and, consequently, if the government 
has the right to receive bank-notes in its dues, the power becomes con- 
stitutional. Here lies (said Mr. C.) the real constitutional question : Has 
the government a right to receive bank-notes, or not \ The question is 
not upon the mere power of incorporating a bank, as it has been com- 
monly argued ; though, even in that view, there would be as great a con- 
stitutional objection to any act on the part of the executive, or any other 
branch of the government, which should unite any association of state 
banks into one system, as the means of giving the uniformity and stability 
to the currency which the Constitution intends to confer. The very act 
of so associating or incorporating them into one, by whatever name called, 
or by whatever department performed, would be, in fact, an act of incor- 
poration. 

" But (said Mr. C.) my object, as I have stated, is not to discuss the 
constitutional questions, nor to determine whether the Bank be constitu- 
tional or not. It is, I repeat, to show where the difficulty lies — a diffi- 
culty which I have felt from the time I first came into the public service. 
1 found then, as now, the currency of the country consisting almost en- 
tirely of bank-notes. I found the government intimately connected with 
the system, receiving bank-notes in its dues, and paying them away, under 
its appropriations, as cash. The fact was beyond my control ; it existed 
long before my time, and without my agency ; and I Avas compelled to 
act on the fact as it existed, without deciding on the many questions 
which I have suggested as connected with this subject, and on many of 
which I have never yet formed a definite opinion. No one can pay less 
regard to precedent than I do, acting here in my representative and de- 
liberative character, on legal or constitutional questions ; but I have felt, 
from the beginning, the full force of the distinction so sensibly taken by 
the senator from Virginia (Mr. Leigh) between doing and undoing an act, 
and which he so strongly illustrated in the case of the purchase of Lou- 
isiana. The constitutionality of that act was doubted by many at the 
time, and, among others, by its author himself; yet he would be consid- 
ered a madman who, coming into political life at this late period, should 
now seriously take up the question of the constitutionality of the purchase, 
and, coming to the conclusion that it was unconstitutional, should propose 
to rescind the act, and eject from the Union two flourishing states and a 
growing territory."] 

I next ask the attention of the senators, especially from the Northern 
States, while the secretary reads the short address to the opposition, that 
they may see how distinctly I foresaw what was coming, and how anx- 
ious I was to avert the calamity that has fallen on the section where I 
anticipated it would. I ask the secretary to read the extract numbered 
three. 

["I next address myself to the members oi the opposition, who princi- 
pally represent the commercial and manufacturing portions of the coun- 
try, where the banking system has been the farthest extended, and where 
a larger portion of the property exists in the shape of credit than in any 
other section; and to whom a sound, stable currency is most necessary, 
and the opposite most dangerous. You have no constitutional objection ; 
to you it is a rhere question of expediency ; viewed in this light, can you 
vote for the proposed measure? a measure designed to arrest the ap- 
proach of events which I have demonstrated must, if not arrested, create 



320 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

convulsions and revolutions; and to correct a disease which must, if not 
corrected, subject the currency to continued agitations and fluctuations, 
and in order to give that permanence, stability, and uniformity, which are 
so essential to your prosperity. To effect this may require some dimi- 
nution on the profits of banking, some temporary sacrifice of interest ; 
but, if such should be the fact, it will be compensated in more than a hun- 
dred-fold proportion, by increased security and durable prosperity. If 
the system must advance in the present course without a check, and if 
explosion must follow, remember that where you stand will be the crater ; 
should the system quake, under your feet the chasm will open that will 
ingulf your institutions and your prosperity."] 

I regret to trespass on the patience of the Senate, but I wish, in justice 
to myself, to ask their attention to one more, which, though not imme- 
diately relating to the question under consideration, is not irrelevant to 
my vindication. I not only expressed my opinions freely in relation to 
the currency and the Bank, in the speech from which such copious ex- 
tracts have been read, but had the precaution to define my political posi- 
tion distinctly in reference to the political parties of the day, and the 
course I would pursue in relation to each. I then, as now, belonged to 
the party to which it is my glory ever to have been attached exclusively ; 
and avowed, explicitly, that I belonged to neither of the two parties, op- 
position or administration, then contending for superiority, which of itself 
ought to go far to repel the charge of the senator from Kentucky, that I 
have gone over from one party to the other. The secretary will read the 
last extract. 

[" I am the partisan, as I have said, of no class, nor, let me add, of any 
political party. I am neither of the opposition nor of the administration. 
If I act with the former in any instance, it is because I approve of their 
course on the particular occasion ; and I shall always be happy to act 
with them when I do approve. If I oppose the administration ; if I desire 
to see power change hands, it is because I disapprove of the general 
course of those in authority ; because they have departed from the prin- 
ciples on which they came into office ; because, instead of using the im- 
mense power and patronage put into their hands to secure the liberty of 
the country and advance the public good, they have perverted them into 
party instruments for personal objects. But mine has not been, nor will 
it be, a systematic opposition. Whatever measure of theirs I may deem 
right, I shall cheerfully support, and I only desire that they shall afford 
me more frequent occasions for support, and fewer for opposition, than 
they have heretofore done."] 

Such, senators, are my recorded sentiments in lS3-t. They are full and 
explicit on all the questions involved in the present issue, and prove, be- 
yond the possibility of doubt, that I have changed no opinion, abandoned 
no principle, nor deserted any party. I stand now on the ground I stood 
on then ; and, of course, if my relations to the two opposing parties are 
changed — if I now act with those that I then opposed, and oppose those 
with whom I then acted, the change is not in me. I, at least, have stood 
still. In saying this, 1 accuse none of changing. I leave others to ex- 
plain their position now and then, if they deem explanation necessary. 
]3ut, if I may be permitted to state my opinion, I would say that the 
change is rather in the questions and the circumstances than in the opin- 
ions or principles of either of the parties. The opposition were then, 
and are now. National Bank men ; and the administration, in like man- 
ner, were anti-national bank, and in favour of a league of state banks ; 
while I preferred then, as now, the former to the latter, and a divorce 
from banks to either. When the experiment of the league failed, the ad- 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 321 

ministration were reduced to the option between a National Bank and a 
divorce. They chose the latter, and such, I have no reason to doubt, 
would have been their choice had the option been the same four years 
ago. Nor have I any doubt, had the option been then between a league of 
banks and divorce, the opposition then, as now, would have been in favour 
of the league. In all this there is more apparent than real change. As 
to myself, there has been neither. If I acted with the opposition and op- 
posed the administration then, it was because I was openly opposed to 
the removal of the deposites and the league of banks, as I now am ; and 
if I now act with the latter and oppose the former, it is because I am now, 
as then, in favour of a divorce, and opposed to either a league of state 
banks or a National Bank, except, indeed, as the means of effecting a di- 
vorce gradually and safely. What, then, is my offence 1 What but re- 
fusing to abandon my first choice, the divorce from the banks, because 
the administration has selected it, and of going with the opposition for a 
National Bank, to which I have been, and am still opposed 1 That is all ; 
and for this I am charged with going over — leaving one party and joining 
the other. 

Had some guardian angel, Mr. President, whispered in my ear at the 
time, "Be cautious what you say 5 this question will not terminate here j 
four years hence it will be revived under very different circumstances, 
when your principles and duty will compel you to act with those you 
now oppose, and oppose those with whom you now act, and when you 
will be charged with desertion of principles," I could not have guarded 
myself more effectually than J have done. Yet, in the face of all this, the 
senator has not only made the charge, but has said in his place, that he 
heard, for the first time in his life, at the extra session, that 1 was opposed 
to a National Bank! I could place the senator in a dilemma from which 
there is no possibility of escape. I might say to him, you have either 
forgot or not what I said in 1834. If you have not, how can you justify 
yourself in making the charge you have ? But if you have — if you have 
forgot what is so recent, and what, from the magnitude of the question 
and the importance of the occasion, was so well calculated to impress itself 
on your memory, what possible value can be attached to your recollection 
or opinions as to my course on more remote and less memorable occa- 
sions, on which you have undertaken to impeach my conduct 1 He may 
take his choice. 

Having now established, by the record, that I have changed no opinion, 
abandoned no principle, nor deserted any party, the charge of the senator, 
with all the aspersions with which he accompanied it, falls prostrate to 
the earth. Here I might leave the subject and close my vindication. But 
I choose not. I shall follow the senator up, step by step, in his unprovoked, 
and, I may now add, groundless attack, with blows not less decisive and 
victorious. 

The senator next proceeded to state that, in a certain document (if he 
named it I did not hear him), I assigned, as the reason why I could not 
join in the attack on the administration, that the benefit of the victory 
would not inure to myself or my party, or, as he explained himself, be- 
cause it would not place myself and them in pov/er. I presume he refer- 
red to a letter in answer to an invitation to a public dinner offered me by 
my old and faithful friends and constituents of Edgefield, in approbation 
of my course at the extra session. 

[Mr. Clay : " I do."] 

The pressure of domestic engagements would not permit me to accept 
their invitation ; and, in declining it, I deemed it due to them and myself to 
explain my course, in its political and party bearing, more fully than I had 

S s 



322 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

done in debate. They had a right to know my reasons, and I expressed 
myself with tlie frankness due to the long and uninterrupted confidence 
that had ever existed between us. 

Havino- made these explanatory remarks, I now proceed to meet the 
assertion of the senator. I again take issue on the fact. I assigned no 
such reason as the senator attributes to me. I never dreamed nor thought 
of such a one ; nor can any force of construction extort it from what I 
said. No : my object was not power or place, either for myself or party. 
It was far more humble and honest. It was to save ourselves and our 
principles from being absorbed and lost in a party more numerous and 
powerful, but differing from us on almost every principle and question of 
policy. 

When the suspension of specie payments took place in May last (not 
unexpected to me), I immediately turned my attention earnestly to the 
event, considering it as one pregnant with great and lasting conse- 
quences. Eeviewing the whole ground, I saw nothing to change in the 
opinions and principles I had avowed in 1834, and I determined to carry 
them out as far as circumstances and my ability would enable me. But 
I saw that my course must be influenced by the position which the two 
great contending parties might take in reference to the question. I did 
not doubt that the opposition would rally either on a National Bank or a 
combination of state banks, with Mr. Biddle's at the head, but I was 
wholly uncertain what course the administration would adopt, and re- 
mained so until the message of the President was received and read by 
the secretary at his table. When I saw he went for a divorce, I never 
hesitated a moment. Not only my opinions and principles, long en- 
tertained, and, as I have shown, fully expressed years ago, but the high- 
est political motives, left me no alternative. I perceived, at once, that 
the object, to accomplish which we had acted in concert with the oppo- 
sition, had ceased ; executive usurpations had come to an end for the 
present ; and that the struggle with the administration was no longer for 
power, but to save themselves. I also clearly saw, that if we should unite 
with the opposition in their attack on the administration, the victory over 
them, in the position they occupied, would be a victory over us and our 
principles. It required no sagacity to see that such would be the result. 
It was as plain as day. The administration had taken position, as I have 
shown, on the very ground I occupied in ISSi, and which the whole 
State Rights party had taken, at the same time, in the other house, as its 
journals will prove. The opposition, under the banner of the Bank, were 
moving against them, for the very reason that they had taken the ground 
they did. 

Now, I ask, What would have been the result if we had joined in the 
attack \ No one can now doubt that the victory over those in power 
would have been certain and decisive, nor would the consequences have 
been the least doubtful. The first fruit would have been a National Bank. 
The principles of the opposition, and the very object of the attack, would 
have necessarily led to that. We would have been not only too feeble 
to resist, but would have been committed by joining in the attack with its 
avowed object to go for one, while those who supported the administra- 
tion would have been scattered to the winds. We should then have had a 
bank — that is clear ; nor is it less certain that in its train there would 
have followed all the consequences which have, and ever will follow, 
when tried — high duties, overflowing revenue, extravagant expenditures, 
large surpluses ; in a word, all those disastrous consequences which have 
well near overthrown our institutions, and involved the country in its 
present difficulties. The influence of the institution, the known princi- 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 323 

pies and policy of the opposition, and the utter prostration of the adminis- 
tration party, and the absorption of ours, would have led to these results 
as certainly as we exist. 

I now appeal, senators, to your candour and justice, and ask, Could I, 
having all these consequences before me, with my known opinions, and 
that of the party to which I belong, and to which only I owe fidelity, 
have acted differently from what I did 1 Would not any other course have 
justly exposed me to the charge of having abandoned my principles and 
party, with which I am now accused so unjustly 1 Nay, would it not 
have been worse than folly — been madness in me to have taken any 
other 1 And yet, the grounds which I have assumed in this exposition 
are the very reasons assigned in my letter, and which the senator has per- 
verted, most unfairly and unjustly, into the pitiful, personal, and selfish 
reason which he has attributed to me. Confirmative of what I say, I 
again appeal to the record. The secretary will read the paragraph marked 
in my Edgefield letter, to which, I presume, the senator alluded. 

[" As soon as I saw this state of things, I clearly perceived that a very 
important question was presented for our determination, which we were 
compelled to decide forthwith — Shall we continue our joint attack with 
the nationals on those in power, in the new position which they have 
been compelled to occupy ] It was clear, with our joint forces, we could 
utterly overthrow and demolish them, but it was not less clear that the 
victory would inure, not to us, but exclusively to the benefit of our allies 
and their cause. They were the most numerous and powerful, and the 
point of assault on the position which the party to be assaulted had taken 
in relation to the banks would have greatly strengthened the settled prin- 
ciples and policy of the national party, and weakened, in the same degree, 
ours. They are, and ever have been, the decided advocates of a National 
Bank, and are now in favour of one with a capital so ample as to be suf- 
ficient to control the state institutions, and to regulate the currency and 
exchanges of the country. To join them, with their avowed object, in 
the attack to overthrow those in power, on the ground they occupied 
against a bank, would, of course, not only have placed the government 
and country in their hands without opposition, but would have committed 
us, beyond the possibility of extrication, for a bank, and absorbed our 
party in the ranks of the National Republicans. The first fruits of the 
victory would have been an overshadowing National Bank, with an im- 
mense capital, not less than from fifty to a hundred millions, which would 
have centralized the currency and exchanges, and with them the com- 
merce and capital of the country, in whatever section the head of the in- 
stitution might be placed. The next would be the indissoluble union with 
political opponents, whose principles and policy are so opposite to ours, 
and so dangerous to our institutions, as well as oppressive to us."] 

I nov/ ask. Is there anything in this extract which will warrant the con- 
struction that the senator has attempted to force on it ^ Is it not mani- 
fest that the expression on which he fixes, that the victory would inure, 
not to us, but exclusively to the benefit of the opposition, alludes not to 
power or place, but to principle and policy'? Can words be more plain 1 
What, then, becomes of all the aspersions of the senator, his reflections 
about selfishness and the want of patriotism, and his allusions and illus- 
trations to give them force and effect 1 They fall to the ground, without 
deserving a notice, with his groundless accusation. 

But, in so premeditated and indiscriminate an attack, it could not be 
expected that my motives would entirely escape, and we accordingly find 
the senator very charitably leaving it to time to disclose my motive for 
going over. Leave it to time to disclose my motive for going over ! I, 



324 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOU??. 

who have changed no opinion, abandoned no principle, and deserted no 
party; I, who have stood stil! and maintained my ground against every 
difficulty, to be told that it is left to time to disclose my motive ! The 
imputation sinks to the earth, with the groundless charge on which it 
rests. I stamp it, with scorn, in the dust. I pick up the dart, which fell 
harmless at my feet, I hurl it back. What the senator charges on me 
unjustly, he has actually done. He went over on a memorable occasion, 
and did not leave it to time to disclose his motive. 

The senator next tells us that I bore a character for stern fidelity, 
which he accompanied with remarks implying that I had forfeited it by 
my course on the present occasion. If he means by stern fidelity a de- 
voted attachment to duty and principle, which nothing can overcome, the 
character is indeed a high one, and, I trust, not entirely unmerited. I 
have, at least, the authority of the senator himself for saying that it be- 
longed to me before the present occasion, and it is, of course, incumbent 
on him to show that I have since forfeited it. He will find the task a 
Herculean one. It would be by far more easy to show the opposite — that, 
instead of forfeiting, I have strengthened my title to the character ; in- 
stead of abandoning any principles, I have firmly adhered to them, and 
that, too, under the most appalling difficulties. If I were to select aa in- 
stance in the whole course of my life on which, above all others, to rest 
my claim to the character which the senator attributed to me, it would 
be this very one, Avhich he has selected to prove that I have forfeited it. 
I acted with the full knowledge of the difficulties I had to encounter, and 
the responsibility I must incur. I sav.' a great and powerful party, prob- 
ably the most powerful in the country, eagerly seizing on the catastrophe 
which had befallen the currency, and the consequent embarrassments 
that followed, to displace those in power, against whom they had been 
long contending. I saw that, to stand between them and their object, I 
must necessarily incur their deep and lasting displeasure. I also saw 
that, to maintain the administration in the position they had taken, to 
separate the government from the banks, I would draw down on me, with 
the exception of some of the Southern banks, the whole weight of that 
extensive, concentrated, and powerful interest — the most powerful by far 
of any in the whole community ; and thus I would unite against me a 
combination of political and moneyed influence almost irresistible. Nor 
was this all. I could not but see that, however pure and disinterested 
my motives, and however consistent my course -with all I had ever said 
or done, I would be exposed to the very charges and aspersions which I 
am now repelling. The ease with which they could be made, and the 
temptation to make them, I saw were too great to be resisted by the 
party morality of the day, as gi-oundless as I have demonstrated them to 
be. But there was another consequence that I could not but foresee, far 
more painful to me than all others. I but too clearly saw that, in so sud- 
den and complex a juncture, called on as I was to decide on my course 
instantly, as it were, on the field of battle, without consultation or ex- 
plaining my reasons, I would estrange for a time many of my political 
friends, who had passed through Avith me so many trials and difficulties, 
and for w'hom I feel a brother's love. But I saw before me the path of 
duty ; and, though rugged, and hedged on all sides with these and many 
other difficulties, I did not hesitate a moment to take it. Yes, alone, as 
the senator sneeringly says. After I had made up my mind as to mj'^ course, 
in a conversation with a friend about the responsibility I would assume, 
he remarked that my own state might desert me. I replied that it was 
not impossible ; but the result has proved that I under-estimated the intel- 
ligence and patriotism of my virtuous and noble state. I ask her pardon 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 325 

for the distrust implied in my answer j but I ask, with assurance it will be 
granted, on the grounds I shall put it — that, in being prepared to sacrifice 
her confidence, as dear to me as light and life, rather than disobey, on 
this great question, the dictates of my judgment and conscience, I proved 
myself not unworthy of being her representative. 

But if the senator, in attributing to me stern fidelity, meant, not devo- 
tion to principle, but to party, and especially the party o£ which he is so 
prominent a member, my answer is, that I never belonged to his party, 
nor owed it any fidelity j and, of course, could forfeit, in reference to it, 
no character for fidelity. It is true, we acted in concert against what we 
believed to be the usurpations of the executive 5 and it is true that, durino- 
the time, I saw much to esteem in those with whom I acted, and con- 
tracted friendly relations with many, which I shall not be the first to 
forget. It is also true that a common party designation was applied to 
the opposition in the aggregate, not, however, with my approbation ; but 
it is no less true that it was universally known that it consisted of two 
distinct parties, dissimilar in principle and policy, except in relation to 
the object for which they had united : the National Republican party, and 
the portion o[ the State Rights partj^ which had separated from the ad- 
ministration, on the ground that it had departed from the true principles 
o[ the original party. That I belonged exclusively to that detached portion, 
and to neither the opposition nor administration party, I prove by my ex- 
plicit declaration, contained in one of the extracts read from my speech 
on the currency in lS3i. That the party generally, and the state which. 
I represent in part, stood aloof from both of the parties, may be estab- 
lished from the fact that they refused to mingle in the party and political 
contests o[ the day. My state withheld her electoral vote in two succes- 
sive presidential elections ; and, rather than bestow it on either the 
senator from Kentucky, or the distinguished citizen whom he opposed, 
in the first of those elections, she threw her vote on a patriotic citizen 
of Virginia, since deceased, of her own politics, but who was not a can- 
didate ; and, in the last, she refused to give it to the worthy senator from 
Tennessee near me (Judge White), though his principles and views of 
policy approached so much nearer to hers than that of the party to which 
the senator from Kentucky belongs. But, suppose the fact was otherwise, 
and that the two parties had blended so as to form one, and that I owed 
to the united party as much fidelity as I do to that to which I exclusively 
belonged ; even on that supposition, no conception of party fidelity could 
have controlled my course on the present occasion. I am not among 
those who pay no regard to party obligations; on the contrary, I place 
fidelity to party among the political virtues, but I assign to it a limited 
sphere. I confine it to matters of detail and arrangement, and to minor 
questions of policy. Beyond that, on all questions involving principles, 
or measures calculated to afiect materially the permanent interests of the 
country, I look only to God and country. 

And here, Mr. President, I avail myself of the opportunity to declare 
my present political position, so that there may be no mistake hereafter. 
I belong to the old Republican State Rights party of 1798. To that, and 
that alone, I owe fidelity, and by that I shall stand through every change, 
and in spite of every difficulty. Its creed is to be found in the Kentucky 
Resolutions, and Virginia Resolutions and Report ; and its policy is to con- 
fine the action of this government within the narrowest limits compatible 
with the peace and security of these states, and the objects for which the 
Union was expressly formed. I, as one of the party, shall support all who 
support its principles and policy, and oppose all who oppose them. I have 
given, and shall continue to give, the administration a hearty and sincere 



326 SPEECHES OF JOHJ^t^-C^I^SJCf" 

Support on the great question now under discussion ; because I regard it 
as in strict conl'ormitj' to our creed and policy, and shall do everything 
in my power to sustain them under the great responsibility which they 
have assumed. But let me tell those who are more interested in sustain- 
ino- them than myself, that the danger which threatens them lies not here, 
but in another quarter. This measure will tend to uphold them, if they 
stand fast and adhere to it with fidelity. But, if they wish to know where 
the danger is, let them look to the fiscal department of the government. 
I said, years ago, that we were committing an error the reverse of the 
great and dangerous one that was committed in ]S"28, and to which we 
owe our present difficulties, and all we have since experienced. Then, 
we raised the revenue greatly, when ihe expenditures were about to be 
reduced by the discharge of the public debt ; and now, we have doubled 
the disbursements, when the revenue is rapidly decreasing: an error which, 
althourrh probably not so fatal to the country, will prove,, if immediate and 
vigorous measures be not adopted, far more so to those in power. The 
country will not, and ought not, to bear the creation of a new debt be- 
yond what may be temporarily necessary to meet the present embarrass- 
ment ; and any attempt to incrtase the duties must and ought to prove 
fatal to those who may make it, so long as the expenditures may, by econ-, 
omy and accountability, be brought within the limits of the revenue. ; 

But the. senator did not confine his attack to my conduct and motives 
in. reference to the present question. In his eagerness to weaken the 
cause I support, by destroying confidence in me, he made an indiscrimi- 
nate attack on my intellectual faculties, which he characterized as meta- 
physical, eccentric, too much of genius, and too litile common sense, and, 
of course, wanting a sound and practical judgment. 

Mr. President, according to my opinion, there is nothing of which those; 
who are endowed with superior mental faculties ought to be more eau-; 
tious than to reproach those with their deficiency to whom Providence, 
has been, less liberah The faculties of our mind are the immediate gift 
of our Creator, for which we are no. farther responsible than for their 
proper cultivation, according to our opportunities, and their proper appli- 
cation to control and regulate our actions. - Thus thinking,! trust I shall; 
be the last to assume superiority on my part, or reproach any one with., 
inferiority on his 5 but those who do not regard the rule when applied to 
others, cannot expect it to be observed when applied to themselves. The 
critic must expect to be criticized, and he who points out the faults of: 
others, to have his own pointed out. . • 

i- cannot retort on the senator the charge of being metaphysical. 1 
cannot accuse him of possessing the powers of analysis and generalization, 
those higher faculties of the mind (called metaphysical by those who do . 
not possess them) which decompose and resolve into th^ii; eleqients the 
complex masses of .ideas that exist in the world of mind, as chemistry 
doas'the bodies that surround us in the material world ; and without which 
those. deep and hidden causes which are in constant action, and producing 
such mighty changes in the condition, of society, would operate unseeu : 
and undetected. The absence of these higher qualities of mind is; coa- 
spicuous throughout the whole course of the senator's public life. To 
this it may be traced that he prefers the specious to the solid, and the 
plausible to the true. To the same cause, combined with an ardent tem-: 
perament, it is owing that we ever find him mounted on some popular 
and favourite measure, which, he whips along, cheered by the shouts of 
the multitude, and never dismounts till he has rode it down. Thus, at 
one time we find him mounted on the protective system, whi^h he. rode . 
down J at another, on internal improvement j and now he is mounted on 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 327 

a bank, which Avill surely share the same fate, unless those who are im-; 
mediately interested shall stop him in his headlong career. It is the fault 
of his mind to seize on a few prominent and striking advantages, and to 
pursue them eagerly, without looking to consequences. Thus, in the case 
of the protective system, he was struck with the advantages of manufac- 
tures; and, believing that high duties was the proper mode of protecting 
them, he pushed forward the system, without seeing that he was enriching 
OJie portion of the country at the expense of the other; corrupting the 
one and alienating the other ; and, finally, dividing the community into 
two great hostile interests, which terminated in the overthrow of, the 
system itself. So, now, he looks only to a uniform currency, and a b&nk 
a« a means of securing it, without once reflecting how far the banking 
system has progressed, and the difficulties that impede its farther prog- 
ress ; that banking and politics are running together, to their mutual de- 
struction ; and that the only possible mode of saving his favourite system 
is to separate it from the government. 

To the defects of understanding which the senator attributes to me, I 
make no reply. It is for others, and not me, to determine the portion of 
understanding which it has pleased the Author of my being to bestow on 
me. It is, however, fortunate for me, that the standard by which I shall 
be judged is not the false, prejudiced, and, as I have shown, unfounded 
opinion which the senator has expressed, but my acts. They furnish 
materials, neither few nor scant, to form a just estinuite of my mental 
faculties- I have now been more than twenty-six years continuously in 
the service of this government, in various stations, and have taken part in 
almost all the great questions which have agitated this country during 
this long and important period. Throughout the whole I have never fol- 
lowed events, but have taken my stand in advance, openly and freely, 
avowing my opinions on all questions, and leaving it to time and experi- 
ence to condemn or approve my course. Thus acting, I have often, and 
oji great questions, separated from those with whom I usually acted ; arid 
if I am really so defective in sound and practical judgment as the senator 
represents, the proof, if to be found anywhere, must be. found in such in- 
stances, or where I have acted on my sole responsibility. Now, I ask, In 
which, of the maiiy instances of the kind is such proof to be found 1 It is 
not my intention to call to the recollection of the Senate all such ; but 
that you, senators, may judge for yourselves, it is due, injustice to my- 
self, that I should suggest a few of the most prominent, which at the time 
were regarded as the senator now considers the present; and then, as 
now, because, where duty is involved, I would not submit to party tram- 
mels. 

I go back to the commencement of my public life, the war session, as 
it was usually called, of 1812, when I first took my seat in the other 
house, a young man without experience to guide me, and I shall select, 
as the first instance, the navy. At that time, the administration and the 
party to which I was strongly attached were decidedly opposed to this 
important arm of service. It was considered anti-republican to support 
it ; but acting with my then distinguished colleague, Mr. Cheves, who led 
the way, I did not hesitate to give it my hearty support, regardless of 
party ties. Does this instance sustain the charge of.the senator 1 ,. 

The next I shall select is the restrictive system of that day ; the em- 
bargo, the Non-importation and Non^intercourse Acts. This, too, was a 
party measure, which had been long and warmly cpntested, and, of course, 
the lines of party well drawn. Young and inexpetieiiced as I T^as, I saw 
its defects, and resolutely opposed it, almost alone &( i«-y -party. , The 
second or third speech I made, after 1 took my seat, Avas in open denun- 



32S SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

ciation of the system ; and I may refer to the grounds I then assumed^ 
the truth of which have been confirmed by time and experience, with pride 
and confidence. This will scarcely be selected by the senator to make 
good his charge. 

I pass over other instances, and come to Mr. Dallas's bank of 1814-15. 
'i'hat, too, was a party measure. Banking was then comparatively but 
little understood, and it may seem astonishing, at this time, that such a 
project should ever have received any countenance or support. It pro- 
posed to create a bank of $50,000,000, to consist almost entirely of what 
was called then the war stocks ; that is, the public debt created in carry- 
ing on the then war. It was provided that the bank should not pay spe- 
cie during the war, and for three years after its termination, for carrying 
on which it was to lend the government the funds. In plain language, 
the government was to borrow back its own credit from the bank, and 
pay to the institution six per cent, for its use. I had scarcely ever be- 
fore seriously thought of banks or banking, but I clearly saw through the 
operation, and the danger to the government and country ; and, regardless 
of party ties or denunciations, I opposed and defeated it in the manner I 
explained at the extra session. I then subjected myself to the very charge 
which the senator now makes ; but time has done me justice, as it will in 
the present instance. 

Passing the intervening instances, I come down to my administration 
of the war department, where I acted on my own judgment and respon- 
sibility. It is known to all that the department, at the time, was perfectly 
disorganized, with not much less than $50,000,000 of outstanding and un- 
settled accounts, and the greatest confusion in every branch of service. 
Though without experience, I prepared, shortly after I went in, the bill 
for its organization, and on its passage I drew up the body of rules for 
carrying the act into execution, both of which remain substantially un- 
changed to this day. After reducing the outstanding accounts to a few 
millions, and introducing order and accountability in every branch of ser- 
vice, and bringing down the expenditure of the army from four to two 
and a half millions annually, without subtracting a single com.fort from 
either officer or soldier, I left the department in a condition that might 
well be compared to the best in any country. If I am deficient in the 
qualities which the senator attributes to me, here in this mass of details 
and business it ought to be discovered. Will he look to this to make good 
his charge 1 

From the war department I was transferred to the chair which you now 
occupy. How I acquitted myself in the discharge of its duties, I leave it 
to the body to decide, without adding a word. The station, from its 
leisure, gave me a good opportunity to study the genius of the prominent 
measure of the day, called then the American System^ of which I profited. 
I soon perceived where its errors lay, and how it would operate. 1 clearly 
saw its desolating effects in one section, and corrupting influence in the 
other J and when I saw that it could not be arrested here, I fell back on 
my own state, and a blow was given to a system destined to destroy our 
institutions, if not overthrown, Avhich brought it to the ground. This 
brings me down to the present time, and where passions and prejudices 
are yet too strong to make an appeal with any prospect of a fair and im- 
partial verdict. I then transfer this, and all my subsequent acts, including 
the present, to the tribunal of posterity, with a perfect confidence that 
nothing will be found, in what I have said or done, to impeach my integ- 
rity or understanding. 

I have now, senators, repelled the attacks on me. I have settled the 
account and cancelled the debt between me and my accuser. I have not 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 329 

sought this controversy, nor have I shunned it when forced on me. I have 
acted on the defensive, and if it is to continue, which rests with the sena- 
tor, I shall throughout continue so to act. I know too well the advan- 
tage of my position to surrender it. The senator commenced the con- 
troversy, and it is but right that he should be responsible for the direc- 
tion it shall hereafter take. Be his determination what it may, I stand 
prepared to meet him. 



XXII. 

SPEECH IN FvEFLY TO MR. WEBSTER ON THE SUB-TREASURY BILL, MARCH 22, 1838. 

Mr. President : After having addressed the Senate twice, I should owe an 
apology, under ordinary circumstances, for again intruding myself on its pa- 
tience. But, after what fell from the senator from Massachusetts nearest to me 
(Mr. Webster), the other day, the greater part of which was not only directed 
against my arguments, but at me personally, I feel that my silence, and not my 
notice of his remarks, would require an apology. And yet, notwithstanding I 
am thus constrained again to address the Senate, I fear it will be impossible to 
avoid exciting some impatience, fatigued and exhausted as it must be by so long 
a discussion ; to prevent which, as far as practicable, I shall aim at as much 
brevity as possible, consistently with justice to myself and the side I support. 

The senator's speech was long and multifarious, consisting of many parts, 
which had little or no connexion with the question under consideration. For 
the sake of brevity and distinctness, I propose to consider it under four heads. 
First, his preliminary discourse, which treated at large of credits and banks, 
with very little reference to the subject. Next, his arguments on the question 
at issue ; and that to be followed by his reply to my arguments at this and the 
extra session ; and, finally, his conclusion, which was appropriated wholly to 
personal remarks, and a comparison between his and my public course, without 
having the slightest relation either to the subject or anything I had said in the 
debate, but which the senator obviously considered as the most important por- 
tion of his speech. He devoted one day almost wholly to it, and delivered him- 
self with an earnestness and vehemence which clearly manifested the impor- 
tance which he had attached to it. I shall, as in duty bound, pay my respects 
first to that which so manifestly occupied the highest place in his estimation, 
though standing at the bottom in the order of his remarks. 

The senator opened this portion of his speech with much courtesy, accom- 
panied by many remarks of respect and regard, which I understood to be an in- 
timation that he desired the attack he was about to make to be attributed to po- 
litical, and not personal motives. I accept the intimation, and shall meet him 
in the sense he intended. Indeed, there never has been between the senator 
and myself the least personal difference, nor has a word having a personal 
bearing ever passed between us in debate prior to the present occasion, with- 
in my recollection, during the long period we have been in public life, except 
on the discussion of the Force Bill and Proclamation ; Avhich, considering how 
often we have stood opposed on deep and exciting questions, may be regarded 
as not a little remarkable. But our political relations have not been on as good 
a footing as our personal. He seems to think that we had harmonized not 
badly till 1824, when, according to his version, I became too sectional for him 
to act any longer with me ; but which I shall hereafter show originated in a 
very different cause. My impression, I must say, is different, very different 
from that of the senator. From the commencement of our public life to the 
present time, we have differed on almost all questions involving the principles 

Tt 



330 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

of the government and its permanent policy, with the exception of a short inter- 
val while I was in the war department, when the senator agreed with the South 
on the protective system and some other measures, I do not consider our cas- 
ual concert during the last few years of the late administration, when we were 
both opposed to the executive power, as constituting an exception. It was un- 
derstood that we both adhered to our principles and views of policy without the 
least surrender, and our personal relations were formal and cold during the 
whole period. In fact, we moved in entirely different spheres. We differed 
in relation to the origin and character of the government, the principles on 
which it rested, and the poUcy it ought to pursue ; and I could not at all sym- 
pathize Avith the grave and deep tone with which the senator pronounced our 
final separation, as he was pleased to call it, and which, in my opinion, would 
have been much more appropriate to the separation of those who had been long 
and intimately united in- the support of the same principles and policy, than to 
the slight and casual relations, personal and political, which had existed be- 
tween us. . , . „ 
Setting, then, aside all personal motives, I may well ask. What pohtical grief, 
what keen disappointment is it, which at this time coidd induce him to make 
the attack he has on me, and, I might add, in the manner in which he made it? 
The senator himself shall answer the question. He has unfolded the cause of 
his grief, and pointed to the source of his disappointment. He told us that 
" victory was within reach, and my co-operation only was wanted to prostrate 
forever those in power." These few words are a volume. They disclose all. 
Yes, victory was within reach, the arm outstretched, the hand expanded to seize 
it, and I would not co-operate. Hence the grief, hence the keen disappoint- 
ment, and hence the waters of bitterness that have rolled their billows against 
me. And what a victory ! Not simply the going out of one party and the 
coming in of another ; not merely the expulsion of the administration, and the 
inductton of the opposition ; but a great political revolution, carrying with it the 
fundamental principles of the government and a permanent change of policy. 
It would have brought in, not only the senator and his party, but their pt^litical 
creed, as announced by him in the discussion on the Proclamation and Force 
Bill, with which he now taunts those in power— a fact to be noted and remem- 
bered. He, the champion of those measures, against whom I contended foot 
to foot for one entire session, now casts up to me, that in refusing to co-operate 
with him, I protect the party in power, not a small portion of whom, I have good 
reason to believe, were drawn by the adverse current of the times reluctantly 
from their own principles to the support of those measures, and with it the sen- 
ator and his principles. Yes, I repeat, it would have brought in the senator 
and his consolidation doctrines, which regard this government as one great Na- 
tional Republic, with the right to construe finally and conclusively the extent 
of its own powers, and to enforce its construction at the point of the bayonet ; 
doctrines which at a blow sweep away every vestige of state rights, and re- 
duce the states to mere petty and dependant corporations. It would also have 
brought in his policy— bank, tariff, and all. Even now, when victory is still un- 
certain, the senator announces the approach of the period when he shall move 
the renewal of the protective system : a precious confession, that dropped out 
in the heat of discussion. 

[Mr. Webster : " No, I spoke deliberately."] 

So much, then, the worse. That justifies all I have said and done ; that 
proves mv foresight and firmness, and will open the eyes of thousands, espe- 
cially in the South, who have heretofore doubted the correctness of my course 
on this question. 

The victory would not only have been complete had I co-operated, but it 
would also have been permanent. The portion of the State Rights party with 
which I acted would have been absorbed— yes, absorbed ; it is the proper word, 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 331 

and I use it in spite of the sarcasm of the senator. The other would have been 
scattered and destroyed, and the senator and his jiarly, and their principles and 
policy, would have been left undisputed masters of the field, unresisted and ir- 
resistible. The first fruits of the victory would have been the reunion of the 
political and money power — a wedded union, never more to be dissolved. The 
tariff would have been renewed — I may now speak positively, after the declara- 
tion of the senator — to be again followed by an overflowing revenue, profuse and 
corrupt expenditures, heavy surplus, and overwhelming patronage, which would 
have closed the door to wealth and distinction to all who refused to bend the 
knee at the shrine of the combined powers. All this was seen and fully com- 
prehended by the senator ; and hence again, I repeat, his deep grief, his keen 
disappointment, and his attacks on me for refusing to co-operate. 

The senator must have known that, in refusing, I acted on principles and 
opinions long entertained and fully declared years ago. In my reply to his as- 
sociate in this joint war on me, in which I am attacked at once in front and rear, 
I demonstrated, to the satisfaction of the Senate, the truth of what I assert so 
completely, that the senator's associate did not even attempt a denial. And 
yet. such is the depth of the senator's grief and disappointment, that it hurried 
him to a repetition of exploded charges, which, in his cooler moments, he must 
know to be unfounded. He repeated the stale and refuted charge of a somer- 
set, of going over, and of being struck with a sudden thought ; and summoned 
up all his powers of irony and declamation, of which he proved himself to be a 
great master on the occasion, to make my Edgefield letter, in which I assigned 
my reason for refusing to co-operate, ridiculous. I see in all this but the dis- 
appointed hopes of one who had fixed his gaze intensely on power that had 
eluded his grasp, and who sought to wreak his resentment on him who had re- 
fused to put the splendid prize in his hands. He resorted to ridicule, because 
it was the only weapon that truth and justice left him. He well knows how 
much deeper are the wounds that they inflict than the slight punctures that the 
pointed, but feeble, shafts of ridicule leave behind ; and he used the more harm- 
less weapon only because he could not command the more deadly. That is in 
my hand. I brandish it in his eyes. It is the only one I need, and I intend to 
use it freely on this occasion. 

After pouring out his wailing in such doleful tones because I would not co- 
operate in placing him and his party in power, and prostrating my own, the sen- 
ator next attacks me because I stated in my Edgefield letter, as I understood 
him, that I rallied on General Jackson with the view of putting down the tariflf 
by executive influence. I have looked over that letter with care, and can find 
no such expression. [Mr. Webster : " It was used at the extra session."] I was 
about to add, that I had often used it, and cannot but feel surprised that the sen- 
ator should postpone the notice of it till this late period, if he thought it deserv- 
ing reply. Why did he not reply to it years ago, when I first used it in debate 1 
But the senator asked what I meant by executive influence. Did I mean his 
veto ? He must have asked the question thoughtlessly. He must know that 
the veto can only apply to bills on their passage, and could not possibly be used 
in case of existing laws, such as the tarifl" acts. He also asked if there was 
concert in putting down the tariff" between myself and the present chief magis- 
trate. I reply by asking him a question, to which, as a New-England man, he 
cannot object. He has avowed his determination, in a certain contingency, 
which he thinks is near, that he will move the renewal of the tariff". I ask. Is 
there concert on that point between him and his associate in this attack? 
And, finally, he asks if I disclosed my motives then. Yes : I am not in the 
habit of disguising them. I openly and constantly avowed that it was one of 
my leading reasons in supporting General Jackson, because I expected he would 
use his influence to eflfect a gradual, but thorough reduction of the tariff, that 
would reduce the system to the revenue point ; and when I saw reason to doubt 



332 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

whether he would accomplish what I deem so important, I did not wait the 
event of his election, but moved openly and boldly in favour of state interposition 
as a certain remedy, which would not fail to eflect the reduction, in the event 
he should disappoint me. 

The senator, after despatching" my letter, concluded his speech by volunteer- 
inor a comparison between his and my public character, not very flattering to 
me, but highly complimentary to himself. He represented me as sectional ; in 
the habit of speaking constantly of the unconstitutional and oppressive opera- 
tions of the tariff, which he thought very unpatriotic ; of having certain sinister 
objects in view in calling on the South to unite, and of marching oft' under the 
State Rights banner, while he paints himself in the most glowing and opposite 
colours. There is, Mr. President, no disputing about taste ; such are the ef- 
fects of a diflerence of organization and education, that what is offensive to one 
is often agreeable to another. According to my conception, nothing can be 
more painful than to pronounce our own praise, particularly in contrast with 
another, even when forced to do so in self-defence ; but how one can rise in 
his place when neither his motive nor his conduct is impeached, and when 
there is nothing in the question or previous discussion that could possibly jus- 
tify it, and pronounce a eulogy on himself, which a modest man would blush 
to pronounce on a Washington or a Franklin to his face, is to me utterly in- 
comprehensible. But if the senator, in pronouncing his gorgeous piece of au- 
tobiography, had contented himself in simply proclaiming, in his deep tone, to 
the Senate and the assembled multitude of spectators, that he came into Con- 
gress as the representative of the American people ; that if he was born for any 
good, it was for the good of the whole people, and the defence of the Constitu- 
tion ; that he habitually acted as if acting in the eyes of the framers of the Con- 
stitution ; that it would be easier to drive these pillars from their bases than to 
drive or seduce him from his lofty purpose ; that he would do nothing to weak- 
en the brotherly love between these states, and everything that they should re- 
main united, beneficially and thoroughly, forever, I would have gazed in silent 
wonder without uttering a word at the extraordinary spectacle, and the happy 
self-delusion in which he seems to exist. But when he undertook, not only to 
erect an image to himself, as an object of self-adoration, but to place alongside 
of it a carved figure of myself, with distorted limbs and features, to heighten 
and render more divine his own image, he invited, he challenged, nay, he com- 
pelled me to inquire into the high qualities which he arrogates to himself, and 
the truth of the comparison which he has drawn between us. If the inquiry 
should excite some remhiiscences not very agreeable to the senator, or disturb 
the happy self-delusion in which he reposes, he must not blame me, but his 
own self-sufficiency and boasting at my expense. 

" Know yourself" is an ancient maxim, the wisdom of which I never before 
so fully realized. How imperfectly even the talented and intelligent know 
themselves ! Our understanding, like our eyes, seems to be given, not to see our 
own features, but those of others.' How diffident we ought to be of any favour- 
able opinion that we may have formed of ourselves ! That one of the distin- 
guished abilities of the senator, and his mature age, should form so erroneous 
an opinion of his real character, is indeed truly astonishing. I do not deny 
that he possesses many excellent qualities. My object is truth, and I hitend 
neither to exaggerate nor detract. But I must say that the character which he 
attributes to himself is wholly unlike that which really belongs to him. So far 
from that universal and ardent patriotism which knows neither place nor person, 
that he ascribes to himself, he is, above all the distinguished public men with 
whom I am acquainted, remarkable for a devoted attachment to the interest, the 
institutions, and the place where Providence has cast his lot. I do not cen- 
sure him for his local feelings. The Author of our being never intended that 
creatures of our limited faculties should embrace with equal intenseness of af- 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 333 

fection the remote and the near. Such an organization would lead us con- 
stantly to intermeddle with what we would but imperfectly understand, and of- 
ten to do mischief where we intended good. But the senator is far from being 
liable to such a charge. His affections, instead of being too wide and bound- 
less, are too concentrated. As local as his attachment is, it does not embrace 
all within its limited scope. It takes in but a class even there — powerful, in- 
fluential, and intelligent, but still a class which influences and controls all his 
actions, and so absorbs his affections as to make him overlook large portions of 
the Union, of which I propose to give one or two striking illustrations. 

I must, then, remind the senator that there is a vast extent of our wide-spread 
Union, which lies south of Mason and Dixon's line, distinguished by its pecu- 
liar soil, climate, situation, insthutions, and productions, which he has never 
encircled within the warm embraces of his universal patriotism. As long as 
he has been in public life, he has not, to the best of my knowledge, given a 
single vote to promote its interest, or done an act to defend its rights. I wish 
not to do him injustice. If 1 could remember a single instance, I would cite it ; 
but 1 cannot, in casting my eyes over his whole course, call to mind one. As 
boundless and ardent, then, as is his patriotism, according to his own account, 
it turns out that it is limited by metes and bounds, that exclude nearly one half 
of the whole Union ! 

But it may be said that this total absence of all manifestation of attachment 
to an entire section of the Union is not to be attributed to the want of an ardent 
desire to promote its interest and security, but of occasion to exhibit it. Unfor- 
tunately for the senator, such an excuse is without foundation. Opportunities 
are daily and hourly offering. The section is the weakest of the two, and its 
peculiar interest and institutions expose it constantly to injustice and oppression, 
which afford many and fine opportunities to display that generous and noble pa- 
triotism which the senator attributes to himself, and which delights in taking the 
side of the assailed against the assailant. Even now, at this moment, there is an 
opportunity which one professing such ardent and universal attachment to the 
whole country as the senator professes would greedily embrace. A war is 
now, and has been systematically and fiercely carried on, in violation of the 
Constitution, against a long-standing and widely-extended institution of that 
section, that is indispensable, not only to its prosperity, but to its safety and ex- 
istence, and which calls loudly on every patriot to raise his voice and arm in 
its defence. How has the senator acted ? Has he raised his mighty arm in 
defence of the assailed, or thundered forth his denunciation against the assail- 
ants ? These are searching questions. They test the truth of his imiversal 
and boasted attachment to the whole country ; and in order that the Senate may 
compare his acts with his professions, I propose to present more fully the facts 
of the case, and his course. 

It is well known, then, that the section to which I refer is inhabited by two 
races, from different continents, and descended from different stocks ; and that 
they have existed together under the present relation from the first settlement 
of the country. It is also well known that the ancestors of the senator's con- 
stituents (I include the section) brought no small portion of the ancestors of the 
African, or inferior race, from their native home across the ocean, and sold them 
as slaves to the ancestors of our constituents, and pocketed the price, and prof- 
ited greatly by the traffic. It is also known, that when the Constitution was 
formed, our section felt much jealousy lest the powers which it conferred 
should be used to interfere with the relations existing between the two races ; 
to allay which, and induce our ancestors to enter the Union, guards, that were 
deemed effectual against the supposed danger, were inserted in the instrument. 
It is also known that the product of the labour of the inferior race has furnished 
the basis of our widely-extended commerce and ample revenue, which has 
supported the government, and diffused wealth and prosperity through the other 



384 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

section. This is one side of the picture. Let us now turn and look at the 
other. 

How has the other section acted ? I include not all, nor a majority. We 
have had recent proof, during the discussion of the resolutions I offered at the 
commencement of the session, to what great extent just and patriotic feelings 
exist in that quarter, in reference to the subject under consideration. I then 
narrow the question, and ask, How has the majority of the senator's constituents 
acted, and especially a large portion of his political supporters and admirers ? 
Have they respected the title to our property, which we trace back to their an- 
cestors, and wliich, in good faith and equity, carries with it an implied warranty, 
that binds them to defend and protect our rights to the property sold us ? 
Have they regarded their faith plighted to us on entering into the constitutional 
compact which formed the Union, to abstain from interfering with our property, 
and to defend and protect us in its quiet enjoyment ? Have they acted as those 
ought who have participated so largely in the profits derived from our labour ? 
No; they are striving night and day, in violation of justice, plighted faith, and 
the Constitution, to divest us of our property, to reduce us to the level of those 
whom they sold to us as slaves, and to overthrow an institution on which our 
safety depends. 

I come nearer home. How has the senator himself acted ? He who has 
such influence and weight with his constituents, and who boasts of his univer- 
sal patriotism and brotherly love and affection for the whole Union ? Has he 
raised his voice to denounce this crying injustice, or his arm to arrest the blow 
of the assailant, which threatens to dissever the Union, and forever alienate 
one half of the community from the other ? Has he uttered a word in condem- 
nation of violated faith, or honour trampled in the dust ? No ; he has sat quiet- 
ly in his place, without moving a finger or raising his voice. Without raising 
his voice did I say? I mistake. His voice has been raised, not for us, but 
for our assailants. His arm has been raised, not to arrest the aggressor, but to 
open the doors of this chamber, in order to give our assailants an entrance here, 
where they may aim the most deadly blow against the safety of the Union, and 
our tranquillity and security. He has thrown the mantle, not of protection, over 
the Constitution, but over the motive and character of those whose daily avoca- 
tion is to destroy every vestige of brotherly love between these states, and to 
convert the Union into a curse instead of a blessing. He has done more. 
The whole Senate have seen him retire from his seat to avoid a vote on one of 
the resolutions that I moved, with a view to rally the patriotic of every portion of 
the community against this fell spirit, which threatens to dissolve the Union, 
and turn the brotherly love and affection in which it originated into deadly hate ; 
which was so obviously true that he could not vote against it, but which he dodg- 
ed, rather than throw his weight on our side, and against our assailants. And 
yet, while these things are fresh in our recollection, notorious, known to all, the 
senator rises in his place, and proclaims aloud that he comes in as the repre- 
sentative of the United States; that, if he was born for any good, it was for the 
good of the whole people, and the defence of the Constitution ; that he always 
acts as if under the eyes of the framers of the Constitution ; that it would be easier 
to drive these pillars from their bases than him from his lofty purpose ; that he 
will do nothing to destroy the brotherly love between these states, and every- 
thing that the Union may exist forever, beneficially and thoroughly for all ! 
What a contrast between profession and performance ! What strange and extra- 
ordinary self-delusion. 

But this is not the only instance. There is another, in which the contrast be- 
tween the course of the senator and his lofty pretension of unbounded and ar- 
dent patriotism is not less astonishing. I refer to the protective tariff, and his 
memorable and inconsistent course in relation to it. 

Its history may be told in a few words. It rose subsequent to the late war 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 335 

with Great Britain. The senator's associate in this attack was its leading sup- 
porter and author. Its theory rested on the principle, that all articles which 
could be made in our country should be protected ; and it was an axiom of the 
system, that its perfection consisted in prohibiting the introduction of all such 
articles from abroad. To give the restrictions on commerce necessary to eflect 
its object a plausible appearance, they were said to be for the protection of home 
industry, and the system itself received the imposing name of the American 
System. Its effects were desolating in the staple states. The heavy duties 
imposed on their foreign exchanges left scarcely enough to the planter to feed 
and clothe his slaves and educate his children, while wealth and prosperity 
bloomed around the favoured portion of the Union. 

The senator was at first opposed to the system. As far back as the autumn 
of 1820, he delivered a speech to the citizens of Boston, in Faneuil Hall, in 
opposition to it, in which he questioned its constitutionality, and denounced its 
inequality and oppression. 

His speech was followed by a series of resolutions imbodying the substance 
of what he had said, and which received the sanction of himself and constitu- 
ents, who, at that time, were less interested in manufactures than in commerce 
and navigation, which suffered in common with the great staple interests of the 
South. I ask the secretary to read the resolutions : 

[" Resolved, That no objection ought ever to^be made to any amount of taxes 
equally apportioned, and imposed for the purpose of raising revenue necessary 
for the support of government ; but that taxes imposed on the people for the 
sole benefit of any class of men, are equally inconsistent with the principles of 
our Constitution, and with sound judgment. 

" Resolved, That the supposition that until the supposed tariff, or some simi- 
lar measure, be adopted, we are, and shall be dependant on foreigners for the 
means of subsistence and defence, is, in our opinion, altogether fallacious and 
fanciful, and derogatory to the character of the nation. 

" Resolved, That high bounties on such domestic manufactures as are prin- 
cipally benefited by that tariff, favour great capitalists rather than personal in- 
dustry, or the owners of small capitals, and therefore that we do not perceive 
its tendency to promote national industry. 

" Resolved, That we are equally incapable of discovering its beneficial ef- 
fects on agriculture, since the obvious consequence of its adoption would be, that 
the farmer must give more than he now does for all he buys, and receive less 
for all he sells. 

" Resolved, That, in our opinion, the proposed tariff, and the principles on 
■which it is avowedly formed, would, if adopted, have a tendency, however dif- 
ferent may be the motives of those who recommend them, to diminish the in- 
dustry, impede the prosperity, and corrupt the morals of the people."] 

What can be more explicit or decided ? They hold the very sentiments and 
language which I have so often held on this floor. That very system was then 
pronounced to be unconstitutional, unequal, and oppressive, and corrupting in 
its effects, by the senator and his constituents, for pronouncing which now he 
accuses me of being sectional, and holding language having a mischievous ef- 
fect on the rising generation. 

Four years after this, in April, 1824, the senator delivered another speech 
against the system, in reply to the then speaker, and now his associate on this 
occasion, in which he again denounced the inequality and oppression of the 
system with equal force, in one of the ablest arguments ever delivered on the 
subject, and in which he completely demolished the reasons of his then oppo- 
nent. But an event was then fast approaching which was destined to work a 
mighty and sudden revolution in his views and feelings. A few months after, 
the presidential election took place ; Mr. Adams was elected by the co-opera- 
tion of the author of the American System, and the now associate of the sena- 



336 SPEECHES OF JOHN C CALHOUN. 

tor. Those who had been enemies came together. New political comhina.- 
tions were formed, and the result was a close alliance between the East and 
the West, of which that system formed the basis. A new light bursted in on 
the senator. A sudden thought struck him, but not quite as disinterested as 
that of the German sentimentalist. He made a complete somerset, heels over 
head ; went clear over ; deserted the free-trade side in a twinkling, and joined 
the restrictive policy, and then cried out that he could no longer act with me, 
whom he had left standing where he had just stood, because I was too section- 
al ! At once everything the senator had ever said or done was forgotten — en- 
tirely expunged from the tablets of his memory. His whole nature was changed 
in an instant, and thereafter no measure of protection was too strong fo.r his 
palate. With a few contortions and slight choking, he even gulped down, a few 
years after, the bill of abomination — the tariff of 1828 — a measure which raised 
the duties so high as to pass one half of the aggregate amount in value of the 
whole imports into the public treasury. I desire it to be noted and remembered 
that, out of an importation of sixty-four millions of dollars, including every de- 
scription of imports, the free and dutied articles, the government took for its 
share thirty-two millions under the tariff of 1828 ; and that the senator, yes, he, 
the defender of the Constitution and equal protector of every section and inter- 
est, voted for that measure, notwithstanding his recent denunciation of the sys- 
tem as unconstitutional, unequal, and oppressive ! But he did more, and things 
still more surprising, as the sequel will show. 

The protective tariff did not change the character of its operation with the 
change of the senator. Its oppressive and corrupting effects grew with its 
growth, till the burden became intolerable under the tariff of 1828. Desolation 
spread itself over the entire staple region. Its commercial cities were de- 
serted. Charleston parted with its last ship, and grass grew in her once busy 
streets. The political condition of the country presented a prospect not less 
dreary. A deep and growing conflict between the two great sections agitated 
the whole country, and a vast revenue, beyond its most extravagant wants, gave 
the government, especially the executive branch, boundless patronage and power, 
which were rapidly changing the character of the government, and spreading 
corruption far and wide through every condition of society. Something nmst 
be done, and that promptly. Every hope of reformation, or change through this 
government, had vanished. The absorbing force of the system had drawn into 
its support a fixed majority in the community, which controlled, irresistibly, 
every department of the government. But one hope was left short of revolu- 
tion, and that was in the states themselves, in their sovereign capacity as par- 
ties to the constitutional compact. Fortunately for the country and our institu- 
tions, one of the members of the Union was found bold enough to interpose her 
sovereign authority, and declare the protective tariff that had caused all this 
mischief, and threatened so much more, to be unconstitutional, and therefore 
null and void, and of no effect within her limits ; and thus an issue was formed, 
which brought events to a crisis. 

We all remember what followed. The government prepared to assert by 
force its usurped powers. The Proclamation was issued, and the war message 
and Force Bill followed, and the state armed to maintain her constitutional rights. 
How, now, I ask, did the senator act in this fearful crisis ; he who had, but a 
short time before, pronounced the system to be unconstitutional, unequal, unjust, 
and oppressive ? Did he feel any sym})athy for those who felt and thought as 
he did but a brief period before ? Did he make any allowance for their falling 
into the same errors (if such he then considered them) into which he himself had 
fallen ? Did he show that ardent devotion to preserve the brotherly love be- 
tween the members of the Union he now so boastingly professes ? Did he, 
who calls himself the defender of the Constitution, feel any compunction in re- 
sorting to force to execute laws which he had pronounced to be in violation of 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 337 

tlie Constitution ? Did he, who manifested such deep distrust of those in power, 
who had been foremost in proclaiming their usurpations, and calling on the 
patriotic of all parties to oppose them, show any dread in clothing the President 
with unlimited power to crush one of the members of the Union, and which, 
after accomplishing that, might be so readily turned to crush the liberty of all ? 
Quite the reverse. A sudden thought again struck him. He again, in a twink- 
lino-, forgot the past, and rushed over into the arms of power, and took his posi- 
tion in the front rank, as the champion of the most violent measures, to enforce 
laws at the point of the bayonet which he had pronounced unconstitutional, 
unjust, and oppressive ! and this, too, at the hazard of civil Avar, and the mani- 
fest danger of subverting the Constitution and liberties of the country ; refusing 
all terms of adjustment, and resisting to the last, with violence, the bill which 
compromised and settled the conflict ! And yet, with all this fresh in the recol- 
lection of himself and all present, he can rise in his place and proclaim himself 
the universal patriot ; the defender of the Constitution and benefactor of every 
portion of the Union ; the man who has done everything to preserve brotherly 
love between its members, and who is ready to make every sacrifice to make it 
beneficial to all the parties I 

But what is more extraordinary, what is truly wonderful and astonishing, is, 
while these words were on his tongue, he, in the same breath, with a full knowl- 
edge of all the disastrous consequences which have, and must necessarily follow 
the renewal of the protective system, should declare that he anticipates the 
speedy arrival of the time when he will again undertake to revive the system ! 
More cannot be added. The contrast between the senator's course and the 
character which he ascribes to himself cannot be rendered more striking. I 
shall not add another instance, as many of them as are at my command. A 
volume could not more conclusively prove how unfounded are his pretensions 
to that lofty, universal, and ardent patriotism which he claims for himself, and 
how strong the delusion under which he is in regard to his true character. 

Let us now turn and inquire what has been my course ; I, whom he repre- 
sents as sectional, whose course he pronoimces to be unfriendly to the Union, 
because I now call the protective system unconstitutional and oppressive ; who, 
he intimates, desires to unite the South for no patriotic purpose, and represents 
as going off under the State Rights banner. And here, Mr. President, let me 
say, I put in no claim to the lofty destiny to which the senator says he was 
born. Instead of coming here, like the senator, as the representative of the 
whole people, I appear in the more humble character of the representative of one 
of the states of this Union, sent here to watch over her particular interests, 
and to promote the general interest of all, as far as the Constitution has con- 
ferred power upon us, and as it can be done without oppression to the parts. 
These are my conceptions of my representative character, with the trust con- 
fided to me, and the duties attached to it, which I endeavour to discharge with 
industry, fidelity, and all the abilities which it has pleased my Creator to confer 
on me. Instead of falling short of what I profess, I trust my public life, if ex- 
amined with candour, will show that I have ever so interpreted my duty to my 
state as to permit it in no instance to interfere with the just claims of the Union. 
It is my good fortune to represent a state which holds her character far above 
her interest, and which claims the first place, when a sacrifice is to be made 
for the safety and happiness of all, and would hold me to strict account if, in 
representing her interest, I should forget what is due to her honour among her 
confederates. All her acts prove that she is as liberal in making concessions, 
when demanded by the common good, as she is prompt and resolute to resist 
aggression to promote the interest of others at her expense. Acting in the 
same spirit, as her representative, I have never failed to meet and repel aggres- 
sions, while, I trust, I have on no occasion been unmindful of her honour, and 
the general interests of the whole Union. Having made these remarks, I shall 

Uu 



338 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

now proceed to show that, as humble as my pretensions are, and as sectional 
and unpatriotic as he has thought proper to represent me, my course for lib- 
erality and a just regard to the interest of e\ery portion of the Union will not 
suffer in comparison with his, as lofty as are his pretensions. 

In making the inquiry I have into the course of the senator in relation to the 
section to Avhich I belong, I called on him to point out a single instance, with 
all his boasted patriotism, in which he had given a vote to promote its interests, 
or done an act to defend its rights ; but now, when the inquiry is into my course 
in relation to his section, I propose to reverse the question, and to apply to my- 
self a much more severe test than I did to him. I ask, then. From what meas- 
ure, calculated to promote the interests of his section, have I ever withheld my 
support, except, indeed, the protective tariff, and certain appropriations, which, 
according to my mode of construing the Constitution, I regard as unconstitu- 
tional, and would, of course, be bound to oppose, wherever the benefit should 
fall 1 I call on the senator to point out a single instance ; and, if he desires it^ 
I will yield him the floor, in order to give him an opportunity to do so. Will 
the senator call, on his part, for instances in which I have supported the inter- 
est of his section ? I can point to numerous : to my early and constant sup- 
port of the navy ; to my resistance to the system of embargoes, Non-importation 
and Non-intercourse Acts ; to my generous course in support of manufactures 
that sprung up during the war, in which my friends think I went too far ; to the 
liberal terms on which the tariff controversy was settled, and the fidelity with 
which I have adhered to it ; and to the system of fortifications for the defence 
of our harbours, which I projected and commenced, and which is so important 
to the two great interests of commerce and navigation, in which his section has 
so deep a stake. To which I might add many more ; but these are sufficient 
for one, represented as so sectional, against the blank list of the senator in rela- 
tion to my section, with all his claim to ardent and universal patriotism. If we 
turn to the West, my course will at least bear comparison with his for liberality 
towards that great and growing section of our countr}% To pass over other in- 
stances, I ask him what measure of his can be compared with the cession I 
have proposed of the public lands to the new states on the liberal conditions 
proposed ? It is a measure above all others calculated to promote their interest, 
to elevate their character, to terminate their political dependance, and to raise 
them to a complete equality with the old states for the mutual benefit of us and 
them, but which, sectional as I am represented to be, proved too liberal for the 
senator, with all his wide-extended and ardent attachment to the whole Union. 

But it seems that I mean something very sinister in my call on the South to 
unite, and the senator very significantly asks me what is meant. I have nothing 
to disguise, and will readily answer. If he would look at home, and open his 
eyes to the systematic and incessant attacks made on our peace and quiet by 
his constituents — if he would reflect on his threat to renew^ the system of op- 
pression from which we have freed ourselves with such difficulty and danger — 
and bear in mind that we are the weaker section, and, without union among our- 
selves, cannot resist the danger that surrounds us — he will see that there is 
neither mystery nor danger in the call. I go farther. Our union is not only 
necessary to our safety and protection, but is also to the successful operation of 
our system. We constitute the check to its over-action ; and, as experience 
proves, we are the only power through which, when disordered, reformation can 
he peaceably effected. Our union is dangerous to none, and salutan/ to all. 
The machine never works well when the South is divided, nor badly when it 
is united. 

The senator next tells us that I declared I would march off under the State 
Rights banner, which he seized on to impugn my patriotism and to boast of his 
own. It is an easy task, by misstating or garbling, to distort the most elevated 
or correct sentiment. In this case, the senator, by selecting a single member 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN, 339 

of l^e sentence, and throwing a strong emphasis on " off," gave a meaning di- 
rectly the opposite of representing me as abandoning the cause of the Constitu- 
tion and country, and himself as being their champion, which, it seems, was 
sufficient for his purpose. The declaration is taken from my opening speech at 
the extra session ; and, that the Senate may judge for itself, I shall give the en- 
tire passage : 

** We are about to take a fresh start. I move off under the State Rights ban- 
ner, and go in the direction in which I have been so long moving. I seize the 
opportunity thoroughly to reform, the government ; to bring it back to its origi- 
nal priacipies ; to retrench, economize, and rigidly to enforce accountability. I 
shall oppose strenuously all attempts to originate a new debt, to create a Na- 
tional Bank, to reunite the 'political and money power (more dangerous than 
Church and State) in any form or shape." 

This is what I did declare, and which the senator represents as deserting the 
Constitution and country ; and this is the way I am usually answered. I know 
not whether I have greater cause to complain or rejoice at the fact that there is 
scarcely an argument or a sentiment of mine which is attempted to be met, that 
is not garbled or misstated. If I have reason to complain of the injustice, I 
have, at the same time, the pleasure to reflect that it is a high impUed compli- 
ment to the truth and correctness of what I say. 

There still remains an important chapter to complete the comparison between 
the public character of the senator and myself; I mean the part which we took in 
the late war between Great Britain and this country. I intended at one time to 
enter on it, and to trace the rise and progress of the war, with its various vicis- 
situde of disasters and victories, and the part which the senator and his political 
associates acted at that important period ; but these are bygone events, belong- 
ino- to the historian, in whose hands I am content to leave them, and shall not 
recur to them unless the senator should provoke me hereafter by a renewal of 
his attack. 

Having now despatched the personalities of the senator, I turn, next, to his 
ar<yument, which, as I have stated, consists of three parts : the preliminary dis- 
course on credit and banks ; the discussion of the question at issue ; and the re- 
ply to my remarks at this and the extra session. I shall consider each, as I 
have begun, in the reverse order. The argument of the senator is, indeed, so 
miscellaneous and loosely connected, that it is a matter of but little importance 
in what order it is considered. 

when he announced his intention to reply to my remarks, both at this and 
the extra session, I anticipated that they would be met fully, if not satisfactori- 
ly, point by point. Guess, then, my surprise on finding him pass by, without 
even attempting an answer to the numerous objections which I made to the 
union of the political and money power, as^affecting the morals, the politics, the 
currency, the industry, and prosperity of the country, which, if the fourth part 
be true, is decisive of the question, and noticing but two out of the long list in 
his reply. If we may judge of the strength of those which he has passed over 
by his inconclusive answer (as I shall presently show) to the two which he se- 
lected, my argument may be pronounced to be impregnable. I shall begin with 
his reply to my remarks at the present session. 

It will be remembered, among other objections against the connexion with the 
banks, I urged that the government had no right to make a general deposite in 
bank, or receive the notes of banks in the public dues. I placed the first on 
the ground that, when public money was placed in deposite in banks, and pass- 
ed to the credit of the government, it was, if ever, in the treasury ; and that it 
could not be drawn out and used for any purpose, unless under an appropriation 
made by law, without violating an express provision of the Constitution, which 
provides that no money should be drawn out of the treasury but in consequence 
of appropriation by law. I then urged, that to place money in general deposite 



340 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOr??. 

in banks, with the implied imderstanding always attached to such transactions, 
that they should have the right to draw it out and use it as they please till call- 
ed for by the government, was a manifest violation of this provision of the Con- 
stitution. 

In support of the other objection against receiving bank-notes in the public 
dues, I laid down the known and fundamental rule of construction on all ques- 
tions touching the powers of this government, that it had no right to exercise 
any but such as are expressly given by the Constitution, or that may be neces- 
sary to carry into effect the granted powers. I then insisted that no such pow- 
er was granted, nor was its exercise necessary to cany any granted power into 
effect ; and concluded, that the power could not be exercised unless compre- 
hended under one or the other head. To which 1 added the farther objection, 
that if we had the right to receive the notes of state banks in our dues as cash, 
it would necessarily involve the right of taking them under our control and reg- 
ulation, which would bring this government necessarily into conflict with the 
reserved rights of the states ; and to this I added, that the receipt of bank-notes 
by the government tended to expel gold and silver from circulation, and depre- 
ciate and render their value more fluctuating, and, of course, could not be rec- 
onciled with the object of the express power given to Congress to coin money 
and regulate the value thereof, to which it is as repugnant in its effects as the 
debasing or the clipping the current coin would be. I at the same time con- 
ceded that the practice of the government had been opposite from the commence- 
ment. Such are my reasons, and how have they been met ? 

The senator commenced by stating that he would consider the two objections 
together, as they were connected ; but, instead of that, he never uttered anoth- 
er word in relation to the right of making a general deposite. That was sur- 
rendered without an attempt to meet my objections, which, at least, proved his 
discretion. He next undertook to show that precedents were in favour of re- 
ceiving bank-notes, which I had conceded, and no one disputed. Among other 
things, he stated I was the first to authorize the receiving of bank-notes by law, 
and, in proof, referred to my amendment to the joint resolution of 1816, which 
authorizes the receipt of the notes of specie-paying banks in the dues of the 
government. He stated that the resolution, as proposed by himself, provided 
that nothing but gold and silver and the notes of the United States Bank should 
be received, and that my amendment extended it to the notes of state banks. 
This is all true, but is not the whole truth. He forgot to inform the Senate that, 
at the time, the notes of non-specie-paying banks, as well as specie-paying, were 
received in the dues of the government, and that my amendment limited, instead 
of enlarging, the existing practice. He also forgot to state that, without my 
amendment, the notes of the United States Bank would have been exclusively 
received in the public dues, and th^t I was unwilling to bestow a monopoly of 
such immense value on that insthution, which would have been worth ten times 
the amount of the bonus it gave for its charter. 

After bestowing much time to establish what none denied, the senator at 
length came to the argument ; and what do you suppose were the convincing 
reasons he urged against my positions ? Why, simply that he had no time to 
reply to them ! with which, and the erroneous assertion that I had denied that 
the government could exercise any incidental power, he passed over all the 
weighty objections I had urged against the constitutionality of receiving and 
treating bank-notes as cash in the public dues. It was thus he met the only 
argiuTient he attempted to answer of the many and strong ones which I have 
urged in support of my opinion on this important question, and to which he pro- 
posed to make a formal reply. 

I shall next notice the reply he attempted to my remarks at the late session. 
And here, again, he selected a single argument, and to which his answer was 
not less inconclusive and unsatisfactory than to that wMch I have just consider- 



SPEECHES or JOHN C. CALHOUN. 341 

ed. Among other objections to the union of the government with the banks, I 
stated that it would tend to centralize the circulation and exchanges of the coun- 
try' ; to sustain which, I showed that no small portion of the credit and circula- 
tion of the banks depended on the public deposites, and the fact that the govern- 
ment received and treated their notes as cash in its dues. I then showed that 
it was that portion which pre-eminently gave a control over the circulation and 
exchanges of the country. In illustration, I asked, if the government, when it 
first went into operation, had selected a merchant of New-York, and entered 
into a contract with him that he should have the free use of the public revenue 
from the time it was collected till it was disbursed, and that nothing but his prom- 
issory notes, except gold and silver, should be received in the public dues, 
whether it would not give him a great and decided control over the circulation 
and exchanges of the country, accompanied with advantages to the port where 
he resided, over all others. I next asked, whether the location of a Bank of 
the United States at the same place, with the same privileges, would not give 
equal control and advantages ; nay, much greater ; as, in addition, it would 
concentrate at the same place an immense amount of capital collected from ev- 
ery portion of the country. 

Such was my argument, which the senator, months after it was delivered, 
undertakes to controvert ; but, I must say, for my life I could not understand his 
reasons. He lost his usual clearness, and became vague and obsciure, as any 
one must who attempts to refute what is so perfectly evident. To escape from 
his difhculty, he, with his usual address, confounded what I had said on an- 
other subject vnth. another point, which he thought more easily answered, and 
against which he directed his attack. He stated that I proposed a government 
paper, and that my notion is, that all the paper that circulates should be gov- 
ernment paper ; and then insisted that it would be the union of the political and 
money power, and would do more to centralize the currency and exchanges 
dian the connexion of the government with the banks. 

Now, unfortunately for the senator, I proposed no such thing, and expressed 
no notion of the kind, nor anything like it. He may search every speech I 
have delivered at this and the extra session, and he can find nothing to justify 
his assertion. To put this beyond all dispute, I will quote what I did say, and 
the only thing that I ever did that could afford him even a pretext for his asser- 
tions. The extracts are taken from my remarks at the extra session. 

*' I intend to propose nothing. It w^ould be impossible, with so great a weight 
of opposition, to pass any measure without the entire support of the administration ; 
and, if it were, it ought not to be attempted when so much must depend on the 
mode of execution. The best measure that could be devised might fail, and im- 
pose a heavy responsibility on its author, unless it met with the hearty appro- 
bation of those who are to execute it. I, then, intend merely to throw out sug- 
gestions, in order to excite the reflections of others," &c. 

" Believing that there might be a sound and safe paper currency founded on 
the credit of the government exclusively, I was desirous that those who are re- 
sponsible and have the power, should have availed themselves of the opportu- 
nity of the temporary deficit in the treasury, and the postponement of the fourth 
instalment intended to be deposited with the states, to use them as the means 
of affording a circulation ybr the present relief of the country and the banks, du- 
ring the process of separating them from the government^'' &c. 

Here is not a word about proposing ; on the contrary, I expressly stated I 
proposed nothing ; that I but threw out suggestions for reflection. Instead of 
excluding all paper from circulation, I suggested the use, not of treasury notes, 
as he stated, or any other paper containing a promise to pay money, but sim- 
ply one which should contain a promise to be received in the dues of the gov- 
ernment ; and that, too, only to the extent necessary to meet the temporary de- 
ficit of the treasury, and to alleviate the process of separating from the banks ; 



342 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

and this he has arbitrarily construed and perverted to suit his purpose, in the 
manner I have shown. 

It is a great misfortune that there should be brought into this chamber the 
habits contracted at the bar, where advocates contend for victory, without being 
scrupulous about the means ; while here the only object ought to be truth and 
the good of the country. All other considerations ought to be forgotten within 
these walls, and the only struggle ought to be to ascertain what is truth, and cal- 
culated to promote the honour and happiness of the community. Great individ- 
ual injustice is done by such misstatejnents of arguments. The senator's speech 
will be published and circulated in quarters where my correction of his state- 
ments will never reach, and thousands will attribute opinions to me that I nev- 
er uttered nor entertained. 

The suggestions which he has so perverted have been a favourite topic of 
attack on the part of the senator, but he has never yet stated nor met what I 
really said truly and fairly ; and, after his many and unsuccessful attempts to 
show what I suggested to be erroneous, I now undertake to afSrm positively, 
and without the least fear that I can be answered, what heretofore I have but sug- 
gested — that a paper issued by government, with the simple promise to receive 
it in all its dues, leaving its creditors to take it or gold and silver, at their op- 
tion, would, to the extent that it would circulate, form a perfect paper circula- 
tion, which could not be abused by the government ; that would be as steady and 
uniform in value as the metals themselves ; and that if, by possibility, it should 
depreciate, the loss would fall, not on the people, but on the government itself; 
for the only effect of depreciation wothd be virtually to reduce the taxes, to pre- 
vent which the interest of the government would be a sufficient guarantee. I 
shall not go into the discussion now, but on a suitable occasion I shall be able 
to make good every word I have uttered. I would be able to do more — to prove 
that it is within the constitutional power of Congress to use such a paper, in 
the management of its finances, according to the most rigid rule of construing 
the Constitution ; and that those, at least, who think that Congress can author- 
ize the notes of private state corporations to be received in the public dues, are 
estopped from denying its right to receive its own paper. If it can virtually en- 
dorse by law, on the notes of specie-paying banks, " Receivable in payment of the 
public dues," it surely can order the same words to be written on a blank piece 
of paper. 

Such is the character of the paper I suggested, and which the senator says 
would do more to centralize the circulation and exchanges than the union of the 
government and the banks, which, however, he signally failed to prove. That 
it would have a greater tendency than the exclusive receipt in its dues of gold 
and silver, I readily acknowledge, and to that extent I think it objectionable ; 
for I do not agree with the senator that there should be some one great empo- 
rium, which should have control of the commerce, currency, and exchanges of 
the Union. I hold it desirable in neither a political nor commercial point of 
view, and to be contrary to the genius of our institutions and the spirit of the 
Constitution, which expressly provides, among other things, that no preference 
shall be given to the ports of one state over another. But that a receivable 
paper, such as I suggested, would have a greater, or as great tendency to cen- 
tralize the commerce and currency of the country as the union with the banks, 
I utterly deny ; and, if I had no other reason, the vehement opposition of the 
senator, who approves of such tendency, would be conclusive ; but there are 
others that are decisive. 

The centralizing tendency of such a paper would result exclusively from the 
facility it would afford to remittance from distant portions of the Union, in which 
respect it would stand just on a par with bank-notes when received in the dues 
of the public ; while the latter would, in addition, give to the favoured port 
where the mother-bank might be located (or the head of the league of state 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 343 

banks), the immense profits from the use of the public deposites, and the still 
greater from having their notes received in government dues. The two united 
would afford unbounded facilities in the payment of custom-house bonds, and 
give millions of profit annually, derived exclusively from the use of govern- 
ment credit. This great facility and vast increase of profit would give a great 
and decided advantage to the commerce of the section where the head of the 
system might be located, and which, in a great measure, accounts for the de- 
cay of the commerce of the South, where there were no banks when this gov- 
ernment was established, and which, of course, gave to the other section ex- 
clusively all the benefit derived from the connexion. If specie had from the first 
been exclusively received in the public dues, the present commercial inequali- 
ty would never have existed ; and, I may add, it never will cease till we return 
to the constitutional currency. What the senator has said as to the union of 
the political and money powers, and the tendency to extravagance from the use 
of treasury notes and their depreciation, is so clearly inapplicable to the de- 
scription of paper I suggested, that I do not deem it necessary to waste words 
in reply to it. 

Having now repelled his reply to my remarks at this and the extra session, I 
shall next proceed to notice his argument on the question under discussion, 
which, extraordinar}'' as it may seem, constitutes by far the most meager and 
inconsiderable portion of his speech. The structure he reared with so much 
labour is composed of a little centre building, of some twenty or thirty feet 
square, with an extended wing on each side, and a huge portico in front. I 
have, I trust, effectually demolished tile wings, and propose next to go through 
the same process with the centre building. 

As long as was the speech, it contained but three, or, at the utmost, four ar- 
guments, directly applicable to the question under discussion ; of which two 
have again and again been repeated by him every time he has addressed the 
Senate ; another was drawn from an argument of mine in favour of the bill, which 
the senator has misstated, and pressed into his service against it ; and the other 
is neither altogether new, nor very well founded, nor, from its character, of much 
force. I shall begin with it. 

The senator objected to the collection of the public dues in gold and silver, 
because, as he conceives, it would be exceedingly inconvenient ; in proof of 
which, and in order to present as strong a picture as possible, he went into mi- 
nute calculations and details. He first supposed that the average peace reve- 
nue would be equal to thirty millions annually, and the average deposites to 
twenty-one. He then estimated that this vast sum would have to be counted 
at least five times in the year, and then estimated that it wo\dd require eight 
hundred thousand dollars to be counted daily, which would require a host of 
officers, in his opinion, to perform the task. The answer to all this is easy. 
In the first place, the senator has over-estimated the average receipts by at least 
one hundred per cent. Fifteen millions ought to be much nearer the truth than 
thirty. Even that I regard as ex.ceeding what the expenditure ought to be ; 
and I venture to assert, that no administration which expends more on an aver- 
age for the next few years can maintain itself, unless there should be some un- 
expected demand on the treasury. In the next place, twenty-one millions is 
at least five times too large for the average deposites. Should this bill pass, 
three millions would be much nearer the truth. We shall hear no more of sur- 
pluses when the revenue is collected in gold and silver. This would make a 
great deduction in his estimate of the trouble and labour in counting. But I give 
the senator his own estimate, and ask him if he never heard of other and short- 
er modes than counting of ascertaining the amount in coins. Does he not 
know that it can be ascertained with as much certainty and exactness by weight 
as by counting, and with more despatch, when the amount is large, in coins 
than in his favourite bank-notes? If I am not misinformed, it is the mode 



344 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

adopted at the English Exchequer, and it is done with the greatest possible 
promptitude by experienced individuals, so that his formidable objection van- 
ishes. 

But the senator next tells us that I stated, in my remarks, that the bill, should 
it pass, would place the banks and the government in antagonist relation to each 
other, which he considers as a very weighty objection to it. I again must 
correct his statement. I made no such remark ; I, indeed, said, when the banks 
were connected, with the government, they had a direct interest in increasing 
its fiscal action. The greater the revenue and expenditures, and the larger the 
surplus, the greater would be their profit ; but, when they were separated, the 
reverse would take place. That the greater amount of gold and silver collected 
and withdrawn from circulation, the less would be left for banking operations, 
and, of course, the less their profit ; and that, in one case, they would be the allies, 
and, in the other, the opponents of the government, as far as its fiscal action was 
concerned ; or, to express it more concisely, when united with the government^ 
they would be on the side of the tax-consumers, and, when separated, on that of 
the tax-payers. Such were my remarks ; and I now ask. Is it not true ? Can 
any one deny it ? Or, admitting its truth, can its importance be disputed ? Were 
there no other reasons in favour of the bill, I would consider this of itself de- 
cisive. It would be almost impossible to preserve our free institutions with the 
weight of the entire banking system thrown on the side of high taxes and ex- 
travagant disbursements, or to destroy it if thrown into the opposite scale. 

But the senator regards the expression of tax-consumers and tax-payers as 
mere catch-words, of dangerous import, and tending to divide society into the 
hostile parties of rich and poor. I take a very difi'erent view. I hold that the 
fiscal action of the government must necessarily divide the community into the 
two o-reat classes of tax-payers and tax-consumers. Take taxation and dis- 
bursements together, and it is unavoidable that one portion of the community 
must pay into the treasury, in the shape of taxes, more than they receive back 
in disbursements, and another must receive more than they pay. This is the 
great disturbing principle in all government'--, especially those that are free, 
around which all other causes of political divisions and distractions finally rally. 
Were it otherwise — if the interest of every portion and class of the community 
was the same in reference to taxation and disbursements, nothing would be 
more easy than to establish and preserve free institutions ; but as it is, it is the 
most difficult of all tasks, as history and experience prove. This principle of 
disorder lies deep in the nature of men and society, and extends equally to pri- 
vate associations as to political communities. There will necessarily spring 
up in both a stockholding and direction interest; the latter of which, without 
wise provisions and incessant vigilance, will absorb the former, of which the 
winding up of many a bank will prove. 

The Wvo remaining arguments of the senator have been often asserted, and 
as often refuted, and I shall despatch them with a few words. He tells us, as 
he has often done, that we are bound to regulate the currency ; and that the 
Constitution has given to Congress the express power to regulate it, with many 
other expressions of similar import. It is manifest that the whole argument 
turns on the ambiguity of the word currency. If by it is meant the current 
coin of the United States, no one can doubt that Congress has the right to reg- 
ulate it. The power is expressly given by the Constitution, which says, in so 
many words, that it shall have power to coin money and regulate the value 
thereof; but if it is intended to include bank-notes, as must be the intention of 
the senator, there is no such express power given in the Constitution. It is a 
point to be proved, and not assumed ; and every attempt of the senator to prove 
it has ended in signal failure. He has not, and cannot meet the answer which 
he received from the senator from Pennsylvania, at the extra session ; and his 
repetition of the assertion, after so decisive an answer, serves but to prove how 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 345 

much more easy it often is to refute an argument than to silence him who ad- 
vanced it. But I do not despair even of silencing the senator. There is one 
whose authority on this point I am sure he must respect : I mean himself. 
When the bill granting a charter to the late United States Bank was under 
discussion in the other house, in 1816, he then took the opposite side, and ar- 
gued with great force against the very right for which he now so obstinately 
contends. He then maintained that the framers of the Constitution were hard- 
money men ; that currency meant the current coin of the United States, and 
that Congress has no right to make any other. But the senator shall speak for 
himself; and, that he may be heard in his own words, I shall read an extract 
from his speech delivered at the time : 

" Mr. Webster first addressed the house. He regretted the manner in which 
this debate had been commenced, on a detached feature of the bill, and not a 
question affecting the principle ; and expressed his fears that a week or two 
would be lost in the discussion of this question to no purpose, inasmuch as it 
might ultimately end in the rejection of the bill. He proceeded to reply to the ar- 
guments of the advocates of the bill. It was a mistaken idea, he said, which he 
had heard uttered on this subject, that we were about to reform the national cur- 
rency. No nation had a better currency, he said, than the United States ; there 
was no nation which had guarded its currency with more care ; for the framers 
of the Constitution, and those who enacted the early statutes on this subject, 
were hard-money men ; they had felt, and therefore duly appreciated, the evils of 
a paper medium; they, therefore, sedulously guarded the currency of the United 
States from debasement. The legal currency of the United States was gold and 
silver coin ; this was a subject in regard to which Congress had run into no 
folly. 

" What, then, he asked, was the present evil ? Having a perfectly sound na. 
tional currency, and the government having no poiver, in fact, to make a?iy thing 
else current but gold and silver, there had grown up in different states a currency 
of paper issued by banks, setting out with the promise to pay gold and silver, 
which they had been wholly unable to redeem ; the consequence was, that there 
was a mass of paper afloat, of perhaps fifty millions, which sustained no imme- 
diate relation to the legal currency of the country — a paper which will not enable 
any man to pay money he owes to his neighbour, or his debts to the government. 
The banks had issued more money than they could redeem, and the evil was 
severely felt, &c. Mr. W. declined occupying the time of the house to prove 
that there was a depreciation of the paper in circulation ; the legal standard 
of value was gold and silver ; the relation of paper to it proved its state, and 
the rate of its depreciation. Gold and silver currency, he said, was the law of 
the land at home, and the law of the world abroad ; there could, in the present 
state of the world, be no other currency. In consequence of the immense paper 
issues having banished specie from circulation, the government had been obli- 
ged, in direct violation of existing statutes, to receive the amount of their taxes 
in something which was not recognised by law as the money of the country, 
and which was, in fact, greatly depreciated, &c. This was the evil." 

What can be more decisive ? What more pointed ? They are the very doc- 
trines which he is in the daily habit of denouncing under the name of Loco-foco. 
The senator may hereafter be regarded as the father of the party, and I deem 
it not a little unnatural that he should be so harsh and cruel to his offspring. 

But it may be said that I then advocated the opposite side. Be it so, and it 
follows that his authority and mine stand as opposing qualities on the opposite 
sides of an equation ; and I feel confident that the senator will readily admit 
that his will, at least, be sufficient to destroy mine. 

I readily acknowledge that my opinion, after the lapse of upward of twenty 
years, with the light which experience in this long period has shed on the 
banking system, has undergone considerable changes. It would be strange if 

X X 



346 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

it had not. I see more clearly now than I did the true, character of the sys- 
tem, and its dangerous tendency ; but I owe it to myself, and the truth of the 
cause, to say I was, even at that early period, far from being its advocate, and 
would then have been opposed to the system had it been a new question. But 
I then regarded the connexion between the government and the banks indisso- 
luble, and acquiesced in ajgtate of things that I could not control, and which I 
considered as established. The government was then receiving the notes of 
non-specie-paying banks in its dues, to its own discredit, and heavy loss to its 
creditors. The only practical alternative was at that period between a league 
of state banks and a Bank of the United Stdtes, as the fiscal agent of the gov- 
ernment. I preferred then, as I now do, the latter to the former, as more effi- 
cient, and not a whit more unconstitutional ; and, if I now were again placed 
in the same state of things that I then was, with all my present feelings and 
views, I could hardly have acted differently from what I then did. 

The senator greatly mistakes in supposing that I feel any disposition to re- 
pudiate or retract what I then said. So far from it, I have, I think, just cause 
to be proud of the remarks I made on the occasion. It put the question of the 
bank, for the first time, on its true basis, as far as this government is concern- 
ed, and the one on Avhich it has ever since stood ; which is no small compli- 
ment to one then so inexperienced as myself. All I insist on is, that the report 
contains but a very hasty sketch — a mere outline, as the reporter himself says 
— of my remarks, in which four fifths are omitted, and that it would be doing me 
great injustice to regard it as containing a full exposhion of my views. But, as 
brief as it is, what is reported cannot be read, in a spirit of fairness, without 
seeing that I regarded the question at the time as a mere practical one, to be 
decided, under all the circumstances of the case, without involving the higher 
questions which, now that the connexion between the government and the 
banks is broken, come rightfully into discussion. At that time the only ques- 
tion, as I expressly stated, was, not whether we should be connected with the 
bank, for that was existing in full force, but whether it was most advisable, ad- 
mitting the existence of the connexion, that the United States, as well as the 
separate states, should exercise the power of banking. I have made these re- 
marks, not that I regard the question of consistency, after so great a change of 
circumstances, of much importance, but because I desire to stand where truth 
and justice place me on this great question. 

The last argument of the senator on the question at issue was drawn from 
the provision of the Constitution which gives to Congress the right to regulate 
commerce, and which, he says, involves the right and obligation to furnish a 
sound circulating medium. The train of his reasoning, as far as I could com- 
prehend it, was, that without a currency commerce could not exist, at least to 
any considerable extent, and, of course, there would be nothing to regulate ; 
and, therefore, unless Congress furnished a currency, its power of rogulating 
commerce would become a mere nullity ; and from which he inferred the right 
and obligation to furnish not only a currency, but a bank currency ! Whatever 
may be said of the soundness of the reasoning, all must admit that his mode of 
construing the Constitution is very bold and novel. To what would it lead ? 
The same clause in that instrument which gives Congress the right to coin 
money and regulate the value thereof, gives it also the kindred right to fix the 
standard of weights and measures. They are just as essential to the existence 
of Congress as the currency itself. The yard and the bushel are not less impor- 
tant in the exchange of commodities than the dollar and the eagle ; and the very 
train of reasoning which would make it the right and duty of the government 
to furnish the one, would make it equally so to furnish the other. Again : com- 
merce cannot exist without ships and other means of transportation. Is the gov- 
ernment also bound to furnish them ? Nor without articles or commodities to be 
exchanged, such as cotton, rice, tobacco, and the various products of agriculture 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 347 

and manufactures. Is it alfio bound to furnish them ? Nor these, in turn, -with- 
out labour ; and must that, too, be furni-ihed ? If not, I ask the senatfjr to make 
the distinction. Where will he draw the line, and on what principles ? Does 
he not see that, according to this mode of construction, the higher powers 
granted in the Constitution would carry all the inferior, and that this would 
become a government of unlimited powers ? Take, for in.stance, the war power, 
and apply the same mode of construction to it, and what fxjwer would thiere be 
that Congress could not exercise — nay, be bound to exercise ? Intelligence, 
morals, wealth, numbers, currency, all are important elements of power, and 
may become so to the defence of the Union and safety of the countr)' ; and, ac- 
cording to the senator's reasoning, the government would have the right, and 
would be in duty bound to take charge of the schools, the pulpits, the industry, 
the population, as well as tlift currency of the country; and these would com- 
prehend the entire circle of legislation, and leave the state governments as use- 
less appendages of the system. 

Having now, I trust, taken down to the ground the little centre buildinj/, with 
its four apartments, nothing remains of the entire structure but the huge portico 
in front, and on which I shall next commence the work of demolition. The 
senator opened his discourse on credits and bank-s by asserting that bank credit 
was, in truth and reality, so much capital actually added to the community. I 
waive the objection, that neither credit nor the banking system is involved in 
the question ; and that those who are opposed to the union of the political and 
money power opfKJse that union with other reasons, on the ground that it is un- 
favourable to a full development of the credit system, and dangerous to the banks 
themselves, which they believe can only be saved from entire destruction by 
the separation ; and it follows, of course, all that he said in relation to them is 
either a begging of the question or irrelevant. But, assuming what he said to 
be applicable, I shall show that it is either unfounded in fact or erroneous in 
conclusion. 

So far from agreeing with the senator, that what he calls bank credit is so 
much real capital added to the country, I hold the opposite — that banks do not 
add a cent of capital or credit. Regarded strictly, the credit of banks is limit- 
ed to the capital actually paid in. Tliis, usually, is the only sum for which the 
stockholders are liable ; and, without what are called banking privileges, they 
would not have a cent of credit beyond that amount. But the capital subscribed 
and paid is not created by the banks. It is drawn out of the general fund of 
the country. Now, I ask. What constitutes its credit beyond its capital ? In 
the first place, and mainly, it is derived from the fact that both General and 
State Governments receive and treat bank-notes as cash, and thereby, to the 
extent of their fiscal action, virtually give them the use of their credit. It i.s an 
existing credit, belonging to them exclusively, and is neither created nor in- 
creased by permitting the banks to use it. In the next place, the deposites 
with the banks, both public and private, add a large amount to their credit ; but 
this, again, is either the property or credit of the government and individuals, 
which they are permitted to use, and which they neither create nor increase. 
Finally, notes and bonds, or other credits discounted by the banks, make up 
their credit, which are neither more nor less than the credit of the drawers and 
endorsers, on wliich the banks do business. They take in the paper or credit 
of others, payable at a given day, deduct the interest in advance, and give out 
their own credit or notes, payable on demand, without interest ; that is, the 
credit of their own paper rests on the credit of the paper discounted or taken 
in exchange, which credit they neither create nor increase. In a word, all 
their credit beyond the capital actually paid in is but the credit of the public 
or individuals, on which, by what are called banking privileges, they are permit- 
ted to do business and make profit ; and, so far from creating credit or capita], 
they, in fact, add not a cent of capital or credit to that which previously existed. 



34S SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

But the senator next tells us that there is three hundred millions of banking 
capital in the Union, and that it is real bona fide solid capital, as much so as the 
plantations of the South. This is certainly news to me. I had supposed that 
this vast amount was little more than a fictitious mass of credit piled on credit, 
in the erection of which but little specie or real capital was used ; and that, 
when a new bank was created, the wheelbarrow was put in motion to roll the 
specie from the old to the new institution, till it got fully under way, when it 
was rolled back again. But it seems that all this is a mistake ; that the whole 
capital is actually paid in cash, and is as solid as terra firma itself. This cer- 
tainly is a bold assertion, in the face of facts daily occurring. There have 
been, if I mistake not, four or five recent bank explosions in the senator's own 
town, in which the whole vanished into thin air, leaving nothing behind but 
ruin and desolation. What has become of that portion of his solid capital ? 
Did the senator ever hear of a plantation thus exploding and vanishing ? And 
I would be glad to know how large a portion of his three hundred millions of 
solid capital will finally escape in the same way ? A few years may enable us 
to answer this question. 

The senator next, by way of illustration, undertook to draw a distinction be- 
tween bank credit and government credit, or public stocks, in which he was 
not very successful. It would be no difficult task to prove that they both rest 
substantially on debt, and that the government stock may be, and is to a great 
extent, actually applied in the same mode as bank credit in the use of exchanges 
and business. It in fact constitutes, to a great extent, the very basis of banking 
operation ; but, after having occupied the Senate so long, it would be unreason- 
able to consume their time on what was introduced as a mere illustration. 

The senator next undertook to prove the immense advantage of banking in- 
stitutions. He asked. What would be done with the surplus capital of the coun- 
try, if it could not be invested in bank stocks ? In this new and growing coun- 
try, with millions on millions of lands of the best quality still lying unimproved ; 
with vast schemes of improvements, constantly requiring capital ; with the im- 
mense demand for labour for every branch of business, the last question I ever 
expected to hear asked is that propounded by the senator. I had supposed the 
great difficulty was to find capital, and not how to dispose of it, and that this 
difficulty had been one of the main reasons assigned in favour of the banking 
system. 

The next benefit he attributed to the system was the vast amount of lands 
which had passed out of the hands of the public into that of individuals of late, 
which he estimated, during the last three years, at thirty-six millions of acres, 
forming a surface equal in extent to England, and which, he stated, would rise 
in value greatly, in consequence of their passing into private hands. That this 
immense transfer has been effected by the banks, I admit ; but that it is to be 
considered an advantage to the country, I certainly never expected to hear ut- 
tered anywhere, especially on this floor, and by one so intelligent as the sen- 
ator. I had supposed it was infinitely better for the community at large, and 
particularly for those not in affluent circumstances, that the lands should remain 
in possession of the government than of speculators, till wanted for settlement ; 
and that one of the most decided objections to our banking system is, that it be- 
comes the instrument of making such immense transfers whenever the currency 
becomes excessive. This is a point not without interest, and I must ask the 
Senate to bear with me while I pause for a few moments to explain it. 

The effect of an expanding currency is to raise prices, and to put speculation 
in motion. He who buys, in a short time seems to realize a fortune, and every 
one is on the look-out to make successful investments ; and thus prices receive 
a constant upward impulse, with the exception of the public lands, the price of 
which is fixed at $1 25, excepting such as are sold at public auction. The rise 
of other landed property soon creates a new demand for the public lands, and 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUiN'. 349 

Bpeculation commences its giant operations in that quarter. Vast purchases are 
Jiiade, and the revenue of the government increases in proportion to the increased 
sales. The payment is made in bank-notes, and these pass from the land-offices 
to the deposite banks, and constitute a large surplus for new banking facilities 
and accommodations. Applicants from all quarters press in to partake of the 
rich harvest, and the notes repass into the hands of speculators, to be reinvested 
in the purchase of public lands. They again pass through the hands of re- 
ceivers, and thence to the banks, and again to the speculators ; and every revo- 
lution of the wheel increases the swelling tide, which sweeps away millions of 
the choicest acres from the government to the monopolizers for bank-notes, 
which, in the end, prove as worthless as the paper on which they are written. 
Had this process not been arrested by the Deposite Act of 1836, and had the 
banks avoided an explosion, in a short time the whole of the public domain, the 
precious inheritance of the people of this Union and their descendants, would 
have passed through the same process with the thirty-six millions of acres 
which the senator so highly commends. What took place then will again take 
place at the very next swell of the paper tide, unless, indeed, this bill should 
become a law, which would prove an effectual check against its recurrence. 

The senator next attributes our extraordinary advance in improvement and 
prosperity to the banking system. He puts down as nothing our free institu- 
tions ; the security in which the people enjoy their rights, the vast extent of 
our country, and the fertility of its soil, and the energy, industry-, and enterprise 
of the stock from which we are descended. All these, it seems, are as dust. 
The banks are everything, and without them we would have b6en but little ad- 
vanced in improvement or prosperity. It is much more easy to assign our pros- 
perity to the banking system than to prove it. That in its early stages it con- 
tributed to give an impulse to industry and improvement, I do not deny ; but that, 
in its present excess, it impedes rather than promotes either, I hold to be cer- 
tain. That we are not indebted to it for our extraordinary advance and im- 
provements, wholly or mainly, there is an argument which I regard as decisive. 
Before the Revolution we had no banks, and yet our improvement and pros- 
perity, all things considered, were as great anterior to it as since, whether we 
regard the increase of population or wealth. At that time not a bank-note was 
to be seen, and the whole circulation consisted either of gold and silver, or the 
colonial paper money, Avhich all now, and especially the senator, consider so 
worthless. Had the senator lived during that period, he might, with equal 
plausibility, have attributed all the improvement and prosperity of the country to 
the old colonial paper money, as he now does to the banks ; and have denounced 
any attempt to change or improve it as an overthrow of the credit system, as 
warmly as he now does the separation of the government from the banks. I tell 
the senator that the time is coming when his present defence of the banking 
system, as it is now organized, will be considered as extraordinary as we now 
Avould regard a defence of the old and exploded system of colonial paper money. 
He seems not to see that the system has reached a point where great changes 
are unavoidable, and without which the whole will explode. The state of its 
manhood and vigour has passed, and it is now far advanced in that of decrepi- 
tude. The whole system must be reformed, or it must perish in the natural 
course of events. The first step towards its renovation is the measure he de- 
nounces in such unmeasured terms — the separation from the government ; and 
the next a separation between discount and circulation. The two are incom- 
patible ; and so long as they are united, those frequent vicissitudes of contractions 
and expansions, to which bank circulation is so subject, and which is rapidly 
bringing it into discredit, must continue to increase in frequency and intensity, till 
it shall become as completely discredited as Continental money. 

The senator seems not to be entirely unaware of the danger to which the 
system is exposed from its frequent vibrations and catastrophes. He tells us, 



350 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

by way of apology, that had it not been for the specie circular, the present catas- 
trophe would not have occurred. That it hastened it, I do not in the least 
doubt ; but that we should have escaped without it, I wholly deny. The causes 
of the explosion lay deep — far beneath the circulars, and nothing but the most 
efficient measures, during the session immediately after the removal of the de- 
posites, could have prevented it. That was the crisis, which, having passed 
without doing anything, what has since followed was inevitable. But admit- 
ting what he says to be true, what a picture of the system does it exhibit ! 
How frail how, unstable must it be, when a single act of the executive could 
bring it to the ground, and spread ruin over the country ! And shall we again 
renew our connexion with such a system, so liable, from the slightest cause, to 
such disasters ? Does it not conclusively show that there is some deep and 
inherent defect in its very constitution, which renders it too unsafe to confide 
in without some radical and thorough reform ? 

The senator himself seems conscious of this. He entered into the question 
of its expansions and contractions, and suggested several remedies to correct an 
evil which none can deny, and which all must see, if not corrected, must end 
in the final overthrow of the system. He told us that the remedy was to be 
found in the proportion between bullion and circulation, and that the proper rule 
to enforce the due proportion between the two was, when exchange was 
against us, for the banks to curtail. I admit that the disease originates in the 
undue proportion, not between bullion and circulation, but between it and the 
liabilities of the banks, including deposites as well as circulation (the former is 
even more important than the latter), and that the remedy must consist in en- 
forcing that proportion. But two questions here present themselves : What is 
that due proportion ? and how is it, under our system of banking, to be enfor- 
ced ? There is one proportion which we know to be safe ; and that is when, for 
every dollar of liability, there is a dollar in bullion or specie ; but this would 
bring us back again to the old, honest, and substantial Bank of Amsterdam, so 
much abused by all the advocates of banks of discount. If that proportion be 
transcended — if we admit two or three to one to be the due proportion, or any 
other that would make banking more profitable and eligible than the mere loan- 
ing of money, or other pursuits of society, the evil under which we now suflfer 
would continue. Too much capital would continue to flow into banking, to be 
again followed by the excess of the system, with all its train of disasters. But 
admit that such would not be the fact, how are we to compel the twenty-six 
states of this Union to enforce the due proportion, all of which exercise the 
right of establishing banks at pleasure, and on such principles as they may 
choose to adopt ? It can only be done by an amendment of the Constitution ; 
and is there any one so wild and visionary as to believe that there is the least 
prospect of such an amendment ? Let gentlemen who acknowledge the defect, 
before they insist on a reunion with a system, acknowledged to be exposed, as 
as it now stands, to such frequent and dangerous vicissitudes, first apply a rem- 
edy and remove the defect, and then ask for our co-operation. 

But the senator tells us that the means of enforcing the due proportion is to 
be found in the regulation of the exchanges ; and for this purpose the only rule 
necessary to be observed is to curtail when exchanges are against us, and as a 
counterpart, I suppose, to enlarge when in our favour. How much dependance 
is to be put on this rule, we have a strong illustration in the late catastrophe, 
under which the country is now suffering. The exchanges remained in our 
favour till the very last ; and before the rule, on which the senator so confi- 
dently relies, could be applied, the shock was felt and the banks ingulfed ; and 
this will ever be the case, when preceded by a general expansion in the com- 
mercial world, such as preceded the late. 

The cause of that commenced on the other side of the Atlantic, and origina- 
ted mainly in the provisions on which the recharter of the Bank of England 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 361 

was renewed, which greatly favoured extension of banking operations in a 
country which may be considered as the centre of the commercial system of 
the world. The effect of these provisions was a depreciation of the value of 
gold and silver there, and their consequent expulsion to other countries, and 
especially to ours, which turned the exchange with England in our favour ; and 
which, in combination with other causes, the removal of the deposites, and the 
expiration of the charter of the late Bank of the United States, was followed by 
a great corresponding expansion of our banking system. The result of this 
state of things was a great increase of the liabilities of the banks compared 
with their specie in both coimtries, which laid the train for the explosion. The 
Bank of England first took the alarm, and began to prepare to meet the threat- 
ened calamity. It was unavoidable, and the only question was, where it should 
fall. The weakness of our system, and the comparative strength of theirs, turn- 
ed the shock on ours, but of the approach of which the exchanges gave, as I 
have stated, no indications almost to the last moment. And even then, so arti- 
ficial are exchanges, and so liable to be influenced by other causes besides the 
excess of currency on one side and the deficit on the other, after it began to 
show unfavourable indications, we all remember that a single individual, at the 
head of a state institution, I mean Mr. Biddle, by appearing in New- York, and 
bringing into market bonds on England drawn on time, turned the current, and 
restored the exchange. All this conclusively proves, that when there is a gen- 
eral expansion (the most dangerous of all), exchanges give no indication of the 
approach of danger, and, of course, their regulation, on which the senator relies, 
affords no protection against it. 

I might go farther, and show that at no time is it to be relied on as the index 
of the relative expansion or contraction in different countries, and that it is lia- 
ble to be influenced by many circumstances besides those to which I have al- 
luded, some of which are fleeting, and others more permanent. It presupposes 
the perfect fluidity of currency, and that it is not liable to be obstructed or im- 
peded by natural or artificial causes in its ebbs and flows ; which is far from 
being true, as I have already shown in the instance of Mr. Biddle's operation 
preceding the late shock. In fact, it may be laid down as a rule, that where 
the currency consists of convertible paper, resting on a gold and silver basis, the 
small portion of specie which may be required to uphold the whole has its flu- 
idity obstructed by so many and such powerful causes as to afford no certain 
criterion of the relative expansion of the currency between it and other coun- 
tries, and, of course, afford no certain rule of regulating banking operations. 
The subject is one that would require more time to discuss than I can bestow 
on the present occasion ; but of its truth we have a strong illustration in the 
state of things preceding the late shock, when, as I have stated, the exchanges 
remained favourable to the banks, while the vast amount of our imports, and the 
unusual character of many of the articles imported, clearly indicated that our 
currency was relatively greatly expanded compared with those countries with 
which we have commercial relations. 

To correct the defects of the system, the senator must go much deeper. 
The evil lies in its strong tendency to increase ; and that, again, in the extra- 
ordinary and vast advantages which are conferred on it beyond all other pur- 
suits of the community, which, if not diminished, must terminate in its utter de- 
struction, or an entire revolution in our social and political system. It is not 
possible that the great body of the community will patiently bear that the cur- 
rency, which ought to be the most stable of all things, should be the most fluc- 
tuating and uncertain ; and that, too, in defiance of positive provisions in the 
Constitution, which all acknowledge were intended to give it the greatest pos- 
sible stability. 



352 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 



XXIII. 



SPEECH ON THE BILL TO PREVENT THE INTERFERENCE OF CERTAIN FEDERAL 
OFFICERS IN ELECTIONS, FEBRUARY 22, 1839. 

Mr. Calhoun said: I belong, Mr. President, to that political school 
which regards with a jealous eye the patronage of this government, and 
believes that the less its patronage the better, consistently with the ob- 
jects for which the government was instituted. Thus thinking, I have 
made no political move of any importance, for the last twelve or thirteen 
years, w^hich had not for its object, directly or indirectly, the reduction 
of patronage. But, notwithstanding this, I cannot bring my mind to sup- 
port this bill, decidedly as I approve of its object. Among other diffi- 
culties, there is a constitutional objection which I cannot surmount, and 
which I shall, without farther remark, proceed to state and consider. 

This bill proposes to inflict the penalty of dismission on a large class 
of the officers of this government who shall electioneer, or attempt to 
control or influence the election of public functionaries either of the 
General or State Governments, without distinguishing between their offi- 
cial and individual character as citizens ; and the question is. Has Con- 
gress the constitutional right to pass such a lawl That, again, involves 
a prior, and still more general question : Has this government the author- 
ity to interfere with the electoral rights of the citizens of the states 1 

In considering this general question, I shall assume, in the first place, 
what none will deny, that it belongs to the states separately to determine 
who shall, and who shall not, exercise the right of suffrage ; and, in the 
second, that it belongs to them, in like manner, to regulate that right ; that 
is, to pass all laws that may be necessary to secure its free exercise on 
the one hand, and to prevent its abuse on the other. I next advance the 
proposition, which no one in the least conversant with our institutions, or 
familiar with the Constitution, will venture to question, that, as far as 
citizens are conceryied, this right belongs solely to the states^ to the entire ex- 
clusion of the General Government^ which can in no wise touch or interfere 
with it without transcending the limits of the Constitution. Thus far 
there can be no difference of opinion. 

But a citizen may be also an officer of this government, which brings 
up the question. Has it the right to make it penal for him to use his offi- 
cial power to control or influence elections'! Can it, for instance, make 
it penal in a collector or other officer who holds a bond, in his official 
character, on a citizen, to threaten to enforce it if he should refuse to 
vote for his favourite candidate X I regard this proposition as not less 
clear than the preceding. Whenever the government invests an indi- 
vidual with power which may be used to the injury of others or the pub- 
lic, it is manifest that it not only has the right, but that it is in duty 
bound to prevent its abuse, as far as practicable. But it must be borne 
in mind that a citizen does not cease to be one in becoming a federal 
officer. This government must, accordingly, take special care, in sub- 
jecting him to penalties for the abuse of his official powers, that it does 
not interfere in any wise with his private rights as a citizen, and which 
are, as has been stated, under the exclusive control of the states. But 
no such care is taken either in this bill or the substitute proposed by its 
author. Neither makes any distinction whatever between the official and 
private acts of the officer as a citizen. The broadest and most comprehen- 
sive terms are used, comprehending and subjecting all acts, without dis- 
crimination as to character, to the proposed penalty. Under its pro- 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 353 

visions, if an officer should express an opinion of any candidate, say of 
a president, who was a candidate for re-election, whether favourable or 
unfavourable, or to whisper an opinion relating to his administration, 
whether good or bad, he would subject himself to the penalty of this bill, 
as certainly as if he had brought the whole of his official power to bear 
directly on the freedom of election. That a bill, containing such broad 
and indiscriminate provisions, transcends the powers of Congress, and 
violates in the officer the electoral rights of the citizen, held under the 
authority of his state, and guarantied by the provision of the Constitu- 
tion, which secures the freedom of speech to all, is too clear, after what 
has been said, to require additional illustration. It cannot pass without 
enlarging the power of the government by the abridgment of the rights 
of the citizen. 

But it may be replied, that these are instances where the government 
has subjected its officers to penalties for acts of a private character, over 
which the Constitution has given it no control. Such, undoubtedly, is the 
fact, and its right to do so, in the instances referred to in the discussion, 
cannot be denied ; but all such cases are distinguished from that under 
consideration by lines too broad to be mistaken. In all of them, the acts 
prohibited were, in the first place, such as were incompatible with the 
official duties enjoined ; as in the case of the prohibition of commissaries 
to purchase or deal in articles similar to those that are made their official 
duty to purchase, in order to prevent fraud on the public. And in the 
next, the acts prohibited involved only civil rights, belonging to the officer 
as an individual, and not political rights, which belong to him as a citizen. 
The former he may yield at pleasure, without discredit or disgrace, but 
the latter he cannot surrender without debasing himself, and giving up a 
sacred trust vested in him, by the state of which he is a member, for the 
common good ; nor can this government demand its surrender without 
transcending its powers, and infringing the rights of the states and their 
citizens. •, ' 

It may also be said that, in most cases, it would be impossible to dis- 
tinguish between the official and the political acts of the officer, so as to 
subject the former to penal restraints, without interfering with the latter ; 
and that it would, in practice, render ineffisctive the admitted right of the 
government to punish its officers for the abuse of their official powers. 
It may be so, but little or no evil can result. Whatever defect of right 
this government may labour under in such cases, is amply made up by 
the plenary power of the states, which has an unlimited control over the 
electoral rights of its citizens, whether officers of this government or not. 
To them the subject may be safely confided. It is they who are partic- 
ularly interested in seeing that a right so sacred shall not be abused, nor 
the freedom of election be impaired. We must not forget that states and 
the people of the states are our constituents and superiors, and we but 
their agents ; and that, if the right in question be abused, or the freedom 
of election be impaired, it is they, and not we, who must mainly suffer, 
and who, of course, are the best judges of the evil and the remedy. If 
the policy of the states demands it, they may impose whatever restraint 
they please on the federal officers within their respective limits, in order 
to guard against their control or influence in elections, and, if it be neces- 
sary, to divest them entirely of the right of suffrage. To those who are 
so much more interested and competent to judge and act on this subject 
than we are, I am for leaving the decision as to what ought to be done, 
and the application of the remedy. Entertaining these views, I am forced 
to the conclusion that this bill is unconstitutional, and, if there were no 
other reason to oppose its passage, I would be compelled to vote against it. 

Y Y 



354 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

But there are others sufficiently decisive to compel me to withhold mj 
support, were it possible to remove the constitutional objection. So far 
from restricting the patronage of the President, should the bill become a 
law, it would, if I mistake not, greatly increase his influence. He has 
now the almost unlimited power of removing the officers of this govern- 
ment : a power, the abuse of which has been the subject of much, and, in 
my opinion, of just complaint on the part of the chamber to which the 
mover of this bill belongs, on the ground that it was calculated to increase 
unduly the power and influence of that department of the government. 
Now, what is the remedy this bill proposes for that evil 1 To put restric- 
tions on the removing power'? The very reverse. To make it the duty, 
as it is now the right of the President, to remove ; and, in discharging this 
high duty, he is made the sole judge, without limitation or appeal. The 
fate of the accused would be exclusively in his hand, whether charged 
with the offence of opposing or supporting his administration. Can any 
one, the least conversant with party morals, or the working of the human 
heart, doubt how the law would be executed! Is it not certain that it 
would be most rigidly enforced against all officers who should venture to 
oppose him, either in the Federal or State Governments, with a corre- 
sponding indulgence and lenity towards those who supported him \ A 
single view, without prolonging the discussion, will decide. Should there 
he a president of such exalted virtue and patriotism as to make no dis- 
crimination between friend and foe, the law would be perfectly useless ; 
hut if not, it would be made the pretext for indiscriminate removal of all 
who may refuse to become his active and devoted partisans j and it would 
thus prove either useless, or wo7-se than useless. 

With the object which the mover of the bill has in view, it seems to 
me he ought to take the very opposite course ; and, instead of making it 
the duty of the President to remove, he ought to impose restrictions on 
the power of removal, or to divest him entirely of it. Place the office- 
holders, with their yearly salaries, beyond the reach of the executive 
power, and they would in a short time be as mute and inactive as this 
hill proposes to make them. Their voice, I promise, would then be 
scarcely raised at elections,, or their persons be fo.und at the polls. 

But suppose the immediate oibject of the bill accomplished, and the 
office-holders rendered perfectly silent and passive, it might even then be 
doubted whether it would cause any diminution in the influence of patron- 
age over elections. It would, indeed, greatly reduce the influence of the 
office-holders. They would become the most insignificant portion of the 
community, as far as elections were concerned. But just in the same 
proportion as they might sink, the no less formidable corps of office-seek- 
ers would rise in importance. The struggle for power between the ins 
and the outs would not abate in the least, in violence or intensity, by the 
-silence or inactivity of the office-holders, as the amount of patronage, the 
stake contended for, would remain undiminished. Both sides, those in 
and those out of power, would turn from the passive and silent body of 
incumbents, and court the favour of the active corps that panted to sup- 
plant them ; and the result would be an annual sweep of the former, after 
every election, to make room to reward the latter, and that on whichever 
side the scale of victory might turn. The consequence would be rotation 
with a vengeance. The wheel would turn round with such velocity that 
anything like a stable system of policy would be impossible. Each tem- 
porary occupant that might be thrown into office by the whirl, would 
seize the moment to make the most of his good fortune before he might 
be displaced by his successor, and a system (if such it might be called) 
would fallow not less corrupting than unstable. 



SPSECilES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 355 

With these decisive objections, I cannot give my support to the bill ; 
but I wish it to be distinctly understood that, in withholding it, I neither 
retract nor modify any sentiment I have expressed in relation to the pat- 
ronage of this government. I have looked over, since the commence- 
ment of this discussion, the report I made as chairman of a select com- 
mittee on the subject in 1835, and which has been so frequently referred 
to in debate by those on the opposite side of the chamber, and I find 
nothing which I would omit if I had now to drav/ it, but much which 
time and reflection would induce me to add, to strengthen the grounds I 
then assumed. There is not a sentence in it incompatible with the views 
I have presented on the present occasion. 

I might here, Mr. President, terminate my remarks, as far as this bill 
is concerned; but as the general question of patronage is at all times one 
of importance under our system of government, and especially so, in my 
opinion, at this present juncture, I trust that I shall be indulged in ofTer- 
ing m.y opinion somewhat more at large in reference to it. 

If it be desirable to reduce the patronage of the government (and I 
hold it to be eminently so), we must strike at the source — the root, and 
not the branches. It is the only way that will not, in the end, prove falla- 
cious. The main sources of patronage may be found in the powers, the 
revenue, and the expenditures of the government ; and the first and neces- 
sary step towards its reduction is to restrict the powers of this government 
within the rigid limits prescribed by the Constitution, Every extension of its 
powers beyond would bring within its control subjects never intended 
to be placed there, followed by increased patronage, and augmented ex- 
penditure and revenue. 

We must, in the next place, take care not to call the acknowledged 
powers of the government into action beyond the limits which the com- 
mon interest may render necessary, nor to pervert them into means of 
doing what it was never intended by the Constitution we should have the 
right to do. Of all the sources of power and influence, the perversion 
of the powers of the government has proved, in practice, the most fruit- 
ful and dangerous ; of which our political history furnishes many exam- 
ples, especially in reference to the money power, as will appear in the 
course of my remarks. 

After restricting the powers of the government within proper limits, 
the next important step would be to bring down the income and expen- 
ditures to the smallest practicable amount. It is a primary maxim under 
our system, to collect no more money than is necessary to the economi- 
cal and constitutional wants of the government. We have, in fact, no 
right to collect a cent more. Nothing can tend more powerfully to cor- 
rupt public and private morals, or to increase the patronage of the gov- 
ernment, than an excessive or surplus revenue, as recent and sad experi- 
ence has abundantly proved. Nor is it less important to restrict the ex- 
penditures within the income. It is, in fact, indispensable to a restricted 
revenue, as the increase of the former must, in the end, lead to an in- 
crease of the latter. Nor must an exact administration, and a rigid ac- 
countability in every department of the government, be neglected. It is 
among the most efficient means of keeping down patronage and corrup- 
tion, as well as the revenue and expenditures, just as the opposite is 
among the most prolific source of both. 

It is thus, and thus only, that we can reduce effectually the patronage 
of the government to the least amount consistent with the discharge of 
the few but important duties with which it is charged, and render it, 
what the Constitution intended it should be, a cheap and simple govern- 
ment, instituted by the states for their mutual security, and more perfect 



356 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

protection of their liberty and tranquillity. It is the way pointed out by 
Jefferson and his associates of the Virginia school, which has ever been 
distinguished for its jealous opposition to patronage, as the bane of our 
political system, as is so powerfully illustrated in the immortal documents 
so frequently referred to in this duscussion — the report to the Virginia 
Legislature on the Alien and Sedition Law, in the year 1799. 

But there is, and ever has been from the first, another and opposing , 
school, that regarded patronage with a very different eye, not as a bane, 
but as an essential ingredient, without which the government would be 
impracticable ; and whose leading policy is, to enlist in its favour the 
more powerful classes of society, through their interest, as indispensable 
to its support. If we cannot take lessons from this school on the ques- 
tion of reduction of patronage, we may at least learn, what is of vast im- 
portance to be known, how^, and by what means this school has reared up 
a system, which has added so vastly to the power and patronage of the 
government, beyond what was contemplated by its framers, as to alarm 
its wisest and best friends for its fate. With the view of furnishing this 
information, so intimately connected with the object of these remarks, I 
propose to give a very brief and rapid narrative of the rise and progress 
of that system. 

At the head of this school stands the name of Hamilton, than which 
there is none more distinguished in our political history. He is the per- 
fect type and impersonation of the National or Federal school (I use 
party names with reluctance, and only for the sake of brevity), as Jeffer- 
son is of the State Rights Eepublican school. They were both men of 
eminent talent, ardent patriotism, great boldness, and comprehensive and 
systematic understanding. They were both men who fixed on a single 
object far ahead, and converged all their powers towards its accomplish- 
ment. The difference between them is, that Jefferson had more genius, 
Hamilton more abilities ; the former leaned more to the side of liberty, 
and his great rival more to that of power. They both have impressed 
themselves deeply on the movements of the government ; but, as yet, 
Hamihon far more so than Jefferson, though the impression of the latter 
is destined in the end, as I trust, to prove the more durable of the two. 

It has been the good fortune of the school of which Mr. Jefferson is the 
head to imbody their principles and doctrines in written doctrines (the 
report referred to, and the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions), which are 
the acknowledged creed of the party, and may at all times be referred to 
in order to ascertain what they are in f^ict. The opposite school has left 
no such written and acknowledged creed, but the declaration and acts 
of its great leader leave little doubt as to either its principles or doctrines. 
In tracing them, a narrative of his life and acts need not be given. It will 
suffice to say, that he entered early in life into the army of the Revolu- 
tion, and became a member of the military family of Washington, whose 
confidence he gained and retained to the last. He next appeared in the 
convention which framed the Constitution, where, with his usual boldness, 
he advocated a President and Senate for life, and the appointment, by this 
government, of the governors of the states, with a veto on state laws. 
These bold measures failing, he retired from the convention, it is said, in 
disgust; but afterward, on more mature reflection, became the zealous 
and able advocate of the adoption of the Constitution. He saw, as he 
thought, in a scheme of government which conferred the unlimited power 
of taxing and declaring war, the almost unbounded source of power, in 
resolute and able hands ; hence his declaration, that though the gov- 
ernment was weak in its organization, it would, when put in action, find 
the means of supporting itself: a profound reflection, proving that he 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 357 

clearly saw how to make it, in practice, what his movements in the Con- 
vention liad failed to accomplish in its organization. Nor has he left it 
in doubt as to what were the means on which he relied to efl'ect his ob- 
ject. We all recollect the famous assertion of the elder Adams, that the 
" British Constitution," restored to its original principles, and freed from 
corruption, was the wisest and best ever formed by man ; and Hamilton's 
reply, that the British Constitution, freed from corruption, would be im- 
practicable, but, with its corruption, was the best that ever existed. To 
realize what was intended by this great man, it must be understood that 
he meant not corruption in its usual sense of bribery. He was too able 
and patriotic to resort to such means, or to the petty policy of this bill. 
Either of these modes o[ operation was on too small a scale for him. 
Like all great and comprehensive minds, he acted on masses, without 
much regard to individuals. He meant by corruption something far 
more powerful and comprehensive; that policy which systematically 
favoured the great and powerful classes of society, with the view of 
binding them, through their interest, to the support of the government. 
This was the single object of his policy, and to which he strictly and 
resolutely adhered throughout his career, but which, whether suited or 
not to the British system of government, is, as time has shown, uncon- 
genial and dangerous to ours. 

After the Constitution was adopted, he was placed at the head of the 
treasury department, a position which gave full scope to his abilities, and 
placed ample means at his disposal to rear up the system he meditated. 
\Vell and skilfully did he use them. His first measure was the adoption 
of the funding system, on the British model ; and on this the two schools, 
which have ever since, under one form or another, divided the country, 
and ever will divide it, so long as the government endures, came into 
conflict. They were both in favour of keeping the public faith, but differed 
as to the mode of assuming the public debt, and the amount that ought 
to be assumed. The policy of Hamilton prevailed. The amount as- 
sumed was about $80,000,000, a vast sum for a country so impoverished, 
and with a population so inconsiderable as we then had. The creation 
of the system, and the assumption of so large a debt, gave a decided and 
powerful impulse to the government, in the direction in which it has since 
continued to move, almost constantly. 

This was followed by a measure adopted on his own responsibility, and 
in the face of law, but which, though at the time it attracted little atten- 
tion or opposition, has proved the most powerful of all the means em- 
ployed in rearing up and maintaining his favourite system. I refer to 
the treasury order directing the receipt of bank-notes in the dues of the 
government, and which Avas the first link of that unconstitutional and un- 
holy alliance between this government and the banks that has been fol- 
lowed by such disastrous consequences. I have, Mr. President, been ac- 
cused of extravagance in asserting that this unholy connexion with the 
paper system was the great and primary cause of almost every departure 
from the principles of the Constitution, and of the dangers to which the 
government has been exposed. I am happy to have it in my power to 
show that I do not stand alone in this opinion. Our attention has lately 
been attracted, by one of the journals of this city, to a pamphlet contain- 
ing the same sentiment, published as far back as 1794; the author of 
which was one of the profoundest and purest statesmen to whom our 
country has ever given birth, but who has not been distinguished in pro- 
portion to his eminent talent and ardent patriotism. In confirmation of 
what I assert, I will thank the senator from North Carolina near me (Mr. 
Strange) to read a paragraph taken from the pamphlet, which contains 



358 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUPT. 

expressions as strong as any I have ever used in reference to the point in 
question. 

Mr. Strange read as follows : 

" Funding and banking systems are indissolubly connected with every 
commercial and political question by an interest generally at enmity Avith 
the common good. In the great cases of peace and war, of fleets and 
armies, and of taxation and navigation, their cries will forever resound 
throughout the continent. Whereas, the undue bias of public officers is 
bounded by known salaries, and persons not freeholders are hardly, if at 
all, distinguishable from the national interest. One observation is ad- 
duced in proof of this doctrine. Paper fraud, knowing the restiffness 
of liberty when oppressed, is under an impulse to strengthen itself by alli- 
ances with legislative corruption^ with a military force, and with siinilur for- 
eign systems. War with Britain can be turned by it to great account. In 
case of victory, a military apparatus, united to it by large arrears, and an 
aversion to being disbanded, will be on one hand. In case of defeat, 
paper will constitute an engine of government analogous to the English 
system. Can Republicanism safely intrust a legislative paper junto with the 
management of such a war \ If it does, no prophetic spirit is necessary 
to foretell that paper will be heaped upon liberty, from the same design 
with which mountains were heaped upon the giants by the dissolute junto 
of Olympus." 

The next movement he made was the boldest of the whole series. 
The union of the government with the paper system was not yet com- 
plete. A central control was wanting, in order to give to it unity of ac- 
tion and a full development of its power and influence. This he sought 
in a National Bank, with a capital of $10,000,000, to be composed princi- 
pally of the stock held by the public creditors ; thus binding more 
strongly to the government that already powerful class, by giving them, 
through its agency, increased profit, and a decided control over the cur- 
rency, exchanges, and the business transactions of the country. On the 
question of chartering the bank, the great battle was fought between the 
two schools. The contest was long and obstinate, but victory ultimately 
declared in favour of the national Federal school. 

The leader of that school was not content with these great achieve- 
ments. His bold and ardent mind was not of a temper to stop short oi 
the end at which he aimed. His next movement was to seize on the 
money power 5 and he put forth able reports, in which he asserted the 
broad principle, that Congress was under no other constitutional restriction 
in the use of the public money but the general welfare, and that it might be 
appropriated to any purpose whatever believed to be calculated to pro- 
mote the general interest, and as freely to the objects not enumerated as 
those that were specified in the Constitution. To this he added another, 
and, perhaps, more dangerous assumption of power — that the taxing 
power, which was granted expressly to raise revenue, might be used as 
a protective power for the encouragement of manufactures, or any other 
branch of industry which Congress might choose to foster ; and thus it 
was, in fact, perverted from a revenue to a penal power, through which 
the entire capital and industry of the Union might be controlled. Con- 
gress was not prepared, at that early stage, to follow so bold a lead ; but 
the seed was sown by a skilful hand, to sprout when the proper season 
arrived. 

When he retired from office, no controlling mind was left to perfect the 
system which he had commenced with such consummate skill and suc- 
cess ; and shortly after, under the administration of the elder Adams, the 
Alien and Sedition Acts, and the quasi war with France, as it was called^ 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 359 

followed the violent and precipitate measures of less sagacious and power- 
ful minds, and which, in their reaction, expelled their authors from power, 
and raised Jefferson to the presidency. 

He came in as a reformer ; but, with the most ardent desire and the 
hio^hest capacity to effect a reformation, he could do little to change the 
direction which his rival had impressed at the outset on the political 
machine. Economy, indeed, was introduced, and the expenditures re- 
duced, but the ligatures which united the government with the paper sys- 
tem were too strong to be bursted. The funded debt, though greatly re- 
duced by him, could not be extinguished. The charter of the United 
States Bank had still half its term to run, and the use of banks and bank- 
notes in the fiscal transactions of the government had taken too strong 
a hold to be superseded at once. In the mean time, the agitation caused 
by the gigantic conflict between France and England reached our distant 
and peaceful shores, and the administration was almost exclusively occu- 
pied in efforts to prevent aggressions on our rights, and preserve our neu- 
trality. To effect that, every expedient was attempted ; negotiation, em- 
bargo, non-importation, and non-intercourse, but in vain. War followed, 
and with it all hopes of carrying out the reform contemplated by Jeffer- 
son when he came into power failed. 

When peace arrived, the country was deeply in debt. Capital and in- 
dustry had taken new directions in consequence of the long interruption 
of our foreign commerce, and the public attention was completely diverted 
from the questions which had brought into conflict the two great political 
schools, and which had so long divided the country. 

The season had now arrived when the seed which had been so skilfully 
sowed by Hamilton, as has been stated, began to germinate, and soon 
shot forth with the most vigorous growth. Duties came to be imposed 
without regard to revenue, and money appropriated without reference to 
the granted powers. Tariff followed tariff in rapid succession, carrying in 
their train a profusion of expenditures on harbours, roads, canals, pensions, 
and a host of others, comprehending objects of almost every description. 
In such rapid succession did the protective duties follow, that in 1828, 
in the short space of twelve years after the termination of the late war, 
they reached the enormous amount of nearly one half of the aggregate 
value of the entire imports, after deducting the reshipments. Beyond 
this point the system never advanced, and fortunately for the country it 
did not. Had it continued its progress a few years longer, the enormous 
patronage which it placed at the disposal of the chief magistrate would 
have terminated our form of government, by enabling him to nominate 
his successor, or by plunging the country into a revolution, to be fol- 
lowed by disunion or despotism, as was foretold would be the conse- 
quence in the report to the Legislature of Virginia, so often referred to, 
if the system it reprobated were carried out in practice. But, happily, 
with the tariff of 1828 the reaction commenced, and has been ever since 
progressing. How, or by whom it was commenced, and has been urged 
forward to the present point, this is not the proper occasion to state. All I 
propose now is to state its progress, and mark the point at which it has 
arrived. 

The first step of this retrograde movement was the overthrow of the 
administration of the younger Adams. He came into power on the ex- 
treme principles and doctrines of the Federal national school, and on them 
he placed the hope of maintaining his elevation. For the truth of this 
assertion I appeal to his inaugural address, and his messages to the two 
houses at the openings of the annual sessions ; and to expel his administra- 
tion from power was, of course, a preliminary and indispensable step to- 



360 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

wards the restoration of the principles and doctrines of the opposite 
school ; and, fortunately, this was effected by a decided majority at the 
expiration of his first term. 

The next step was the final discharge of the funded debt ; and for this 
important step, at so early a period, the country is indebted principally to 
a friend, now, unfortunately, no more—the amiable, the talented, the patri- 
otic Lowndes — the author of that simple, but etiective measure, the Sink- 
ing Fund Act, passed shortly after the termination of the late war. 

But the most formidable of all the obstacles, the source of the vast 
and corrupting surplus, with its host of extravagant and unconstitutional 
expenditures — the protective tariff— still remained in full force, and ob- 
structed any farther progress in the reaction that had commenced. By 
what decided and bold measures it was overcome is well known to all, 
and need not be told on this occasion. It is sufficient to say that, after a 
long and desperate struggle, the controversy terminated in the Compromise 
Act, which abandoned the protective principle, and has, I trust, closed for- 
ever what has proved in this government a most prolific source of power, 
patronage, and corruption. 

The next step in the progress was the overthrow of the Bank of the 
United States— the centre and soul of the paper system— a step that may 
justly be regarded as not inferior to any other in the whole series. That 
was followed by the Deposite Act of 1836, which transferred to the treas- 
uries of the states the vast surplus which continued to flow in upon us, 
notwithstanding the great reduction under the Compromise Act. This 
decisive measure disburdened our surcharged treasury, and has forced 
on this government the necessity of retrenchment and economy, and there- 
by has greatly strengthened and accelerated the reaction. So necessary 
is the reduction of tlie income to reform, that I am disposed to regard it 
as a political maxim in free states, that an impoverished treasury, once in 
a generation at least, is almost indispensable to the preservation of their 
institutions and liberty. 

The next stage in the progress was the suspension of the connexion 
between the government and the banks, in consequence of the suspension 
of specie pay°nents. This occasion afforded an opportunity to strike the 
first blow against that illegitimate and unholy alliance. It was given de- 
cidedly, boldly, and vigorously, but still with only partial success. The 
interest in favour of maintaining the connexion was too powerful to be 
overcome at once ; but, though not broken, the tie is greatly weakened, 
and nothing now is wanting to sever forever this fatal knot but to follow 
up what ha°s already been done by persevering and energetic blows. 

This is the point to which the reaction has already reached ; and the 
question now to be considered is, To what point ought it to be urged, and 
what are the intermediate obstacles to be overcome 1 I am, for myself, 
prepared to answer. I have no concealment. My aim is fixed. It is no 
less than to turn back the government to where it was when it com- 
menced its operation in 1789 ; to obliterate all the intermediate measures 
originating in the peculiar principles and policy of the school to which I 
am°opposed, and which experience has proved to be so da-ngerous and 
uncongenial to our system ; to take a fresh start, a new departure, on the 
State Rights Republican tack, as was intended by the framers of the Con- 
stitution. That is the point at which I have aimed for more than twelve 
years, and towards which I have persisted, during the whole period, to 
urge my way, in defiance of opposing difficulties, dangers, and discourage- 
ments, and from which nothing shall drive me (while in public life) till 
the object at which I aim is accomplished. By far the most formidable 
difficulties are already surmounted. Those that remain are comparatively 
insignificant. 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 361 

Among these, the most important and difficult, by far, is to separate the 
government from the banks, but which, after the blows the connexion has 
received, will require not much more than unyielding firmness and perse- 
verance. This done, the great work of freeing the government entirely 
from the paper system, on which Hamilton laid ihe foundation of his whole 
system, will have been achieved. 

The next is to carry out, in the revision of the tariff, which must take 
place at the next or succeeding session, the provisions of the Compromise 
Act, that there shall be no duty laid but what may be necessary to the eco- 
nomical and constitutional wants of the government. Should this be ac- 
complished, there will be an end to the protective system, with all the 
evil that followed, and must ever follow, in its train. Nor can I believe, 
after what we have experienced, and what has been said during this ses- 
sion, that there will be any insuperable difficulty in effecting an object so 
intimately connected with the peace and tranquillity of the Union. 

Having freed the government from the paper and protective systems, 
the next step in importance is, to put a final stop to internal improve- 
ments, the construction and improvement of harbours, and the extrava- 
gant waste on what we are pleased to call the pension system, but which 
has departed from every principle justly belonging to such a system. No 
government was ever before burdened with an expenditure so absurd and 
monstrous. It confounds all distinctions between the deserving and un- 
deserving, and yearly draws millions from the treasury without any just 
claim on the public bounty, and ought to be both arrested and reformed. 

A single step more brings the government to the destined point — I 
mean a thorough reformation in the administrative department of the 
government. I doubt not but that every branch needs reform. There 
are, doubtless, numerous defalcations in addition to those brought to 
light. The fault has been more in that system (a brief narrative of which 
I have given) than in those who have been charged with the administration 
of the government. For years money was as dirt. The treasury was 
oppressed with it, and the only solicitude was, how to get clear of what 
was considered a useless burden. Hence the vast increase of expendi- 
tures, hence the loose and inattentive administration of our fiscal con- 
cerns ; hence the heavy defalcations. Nor are these remarks confined to 
the executive department of the government ; they apply to all, to the two 
houses of Congress as well as to other branches. But there is no longer 
a surplus. The treasury is exhausted, and the work of retrenchment, 
economy, and accountability is forced on us. Reform in the fiscal action 
of the government can no longer be delayed, and I rejoice that such is 
the fact. Economy and accountability are virtues belonging to free and 
popular governments, and without which they cannot long endure. The 
assertion is pre-eminently true when applied to this government, and 
hence the prominent place they occupy in the creed of the State Rights 
and Republican school. 

Having taken these steps, every measure of prominence originating in 
the principles or policy of the national Federal school will become oblit- 
erated, and the government will have been brought back, after the lapse 
of fifty years, to the point of original departure, when it may be put on 
its new tack. To guard against a false steerage thereafter, one impor- 
tant measure, in addition to those enumerated, will be indispensable — to 
place the new states, as far as the public domain is concerned, in a con- 
dition as independent of the government as the old. It is as much due 
to them as it is indispensable to accomplish the great object in view. 
TIr3 public domain within these states is too great a stake to be left un- 
der the control of this government. It is difficult to estimate the vast 

Zz 



362 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

addition it makes to its power and patronage, and the controlling and 
corrupting influence which it may exercise ov^er the presidential election, 
and, through that, the strong impulse it may receive in a wrong direction. 
Till it is removed, there can be no assurance of a successful and safe 
steerage, even if every other sinister influence should be removed. 

It would be presumptuous in me, Mr. President, to advise those who 
are charged with the administration of the government what course to 
adopt ; but, if they would hear the voice of one who desires nothing for 
himself, and whose only Avish is to see the country prosperous, free, and 
happy, 1 would say to them, you are placed in the most remarkable junc- 
ture that has ever occurred since the establishment of the Federal Gov- 
ernment. By seizing the opportunity, you may bring the vessel of state 
to a position where she may take a new tack, and thereby escape all the 
shoals and breakers into the midst of which a false steerage has run her, 
and bring her triumphantly into her destined port with honour to your- 
selves and safety to those on board. Take your stand boldly ; avow 
your object ; disclose your measures, and let the people see clearly that 
you intend — what Jefi'erson designed to do, but, from adverse circum- 
stances, could not accomplish — to reverse the measures originating in 
principles and policy uncongenial to our political system — to divest the 
government of all undue patronage and influence — to restrict it to the few 
great objects intended by the Constitution — in a word, to give a complete 
ascendency to the good old Virginia school over its antagonist, which 
time and experience have proved to be dangerous to our system of govern- 
ment — and you may count with confidence on their support, without look- 
ing to other means of success. Should the government take such a 
course at this propitious moment, our free and happy institutions may be 
perpetuated for generations ; but, if a different, short will be their duration. 

On this question of patronage let me add, in conclusion, that, according 
to my conception, the great and leading error in Hamilton and his school 
originated in a mistake as to the analogy between ours and the British 
system of government. If we w^ere to judge by their outward form, there 
is, indeed, a striking analogy between them in many particulars; but, if 
we look within, at their spirit and genius, never were two free govern- 
ments so perfectly dissimilar. They are, in fact, the very opposites. 
Of all free governments that ever existed — no, I will enlarge the propo- 
sition — of all governments that ever existed, free or despotic, the British 
government can bear the largest amount of patronage, the greatest exac- 
tion and pressure on the people, without changing its character or run- 
ning into revolution. The greater, in fact, its patronage, the stronger it 
is, till the pressure begins to crush the mass of population with its super- 
incumbent weight. But directly the opposite is the case with ours. Of 
all governments that ever existed, it can stand under the least patronage, 
in proportion to the population and wealth of the country, without chan- 
ging its character or the hazard of a revolution. I have not made these 
assertions lightly. They are the result of much reflection, and can be 
sustained by conclusive reasons drawn from the nature of the two gov- 
ernments J but this is not the proper occasion to discuss the subject. 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 363 



XXIV. 

SPEECH ON THE REPORT OF MR. GRUNDY, OF TENNESSEE, IN RELATION TO THE 
ASSUMPTION OF THE DEBTS OF THE STATES BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, FEB- 
RUARY 5, 1840. 

On Mr. Grundy's report in relation to the assumption of the debts of the 
states by the Federal Government, Mr. Calhoun said : . 

When I have heard it asserted, again and again, in this discussion, that this 
report was uncalled for ; that there was no one in favour of the assumption of 
state debts ; and that the resolutions were mere idle, abstract negatives, of no sort 
of importance, I could not but ask myself. If all this be so, why this deep ex- 
citement ? why this ardent zeal to make collateral issues ? and, above all, why 
the great anxiety to avoid a direct vote on the resolutions ? To these inquiries 
I could find but one solution ; and that is, disguise it as you may, there is, in 
reality, at the bottom, a deep and agitating question. Yes, there is such a ques- 
tion. The scheme of assuming the debts of the states is no idle fiction. The 
evidence of its reality, and that it is now in agitation, bursts from every quarter, 
within and without these walls, on this and on the other side of the Atlantic ; not, 
indeed, a direct assumption, for that would be too absurd ; and harmless, be- 
cause too absurd ; but in a form far more plausible and dangerous — an assump- 
tion in effect, by dividing the proceeds of the sales of the public lands among 
the states. 

I shall not stop to show that such distribution, under existing circumstances, 
with the deep indebtedness and embarrassment of many of the states, would be, 
in reality, an assumption. We all know that, without such indebtedness and 
embarrassment, the scheme of distribution would not have the least chance for 
adoption, and that it would be perfectly harmless, and cause no excitement ; 
but plunged, as the states are, in debt, it becomes a question truly formidable, 
and on which the future politics of the country are destined for years to turn. 
If, then, the scheme should be adopted, it must be by the votes of the indebted 
states, in order to aid their credit and lighten their burden ; and who is so blind 
as not to see that it would be in truth, what I have asserted it to be in eflect, 
to that extent an assumption of their debts ? 

Here, then, we have the real question at issue, which has caused all this ex- 
citement and zeal : a question pregnant with the most important consequences, 
immediate and remote. What I now propose is, to trace rapidly and briefly 
some of the more prominent which would result from this scheme, should it ever 
become a law. 

The first and most immediate would be to subtract from the treasury a sum 
equal to the annual proceeds of the sales of the public lands. I do not intend 
to examine the constitutional question whether Congress has or has not the 
right to make the subtraction, and to divide the proceeds among the states. It 
is not necessary. The committee have conclusively shown that it has no such 
power ; that it holds the pubhc domain in trust for the states in their federal ca- 
pacity as members of the Union, in aid of their contribution to the treasury ; 
and that to denationalize the fund (if I may use the expression), by distributing 
it among the states for their separate and individual uses, would be a manifest 
violation of the trust, and wholly unwarranted by the Constitution. Passing, 
then, by the constitutional question, I intend to restrict my inquiry to what 
would be its fiscal and moneyed effects. 

Thus regarded, the first effect of the subtraction would be to cause an equal 
deficit in the revenue. I need not inform the Senate that there is not a surplus 
cent in the treasury ; that the most rigid economy will be necessary to meet 
the demands on it during the current year ; that the revenue, so far from being 



364 SPEFXHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

on the increase, must be rapidly reduced, under existing laws, in the next two 
years ; and that every dollar withdrawn, by subtracting the proceeds of the pub- 
lic lands, must make a corresponding deficit. We are thus brought to the ques- 
tion. What would be the probable annual amount of the deficit, and how is it to 
be supplied ? 

The receipts from the sales of the public lands, I would suppose, may be safe- 
ly estimated at five millions of dollars at least, on an average, for the next ten. 
or fifteen years. They were about six millions the last year. The first three 
quarters gave within a fraction of five and a half millions. The estimate for 
this year is three and a half millions, making the average of the two years but 
little short of five millions. If, with these data, we cast our eyes back on the 
last ten or fifteen years, we shall come to the conclusion, taking into considera- 
tion our great increase of population and wealth, and the vast quantity of public 
lands held by the government, that the average I have estimated is not too high. 
Assuming, then, that the deficit would be five millions, the next inquiry is. How 
shall it be supplied ? There is but one way : a corresponding increase of the 
duties on imports. We have no other source of r,evenue but the postofflce. No 
one would think of laying it on that, or to raise the amount by internal taxes. 
The result, then, thus far, would be to withdraw from the treasury five millions 
of the proceeds of the sales of the public lands to be distributed among the 
states, and to impose an equal amount of duty on imports to make good the de- 
ficit. Now, I would ask. What is the difference, regarded as a fiscal transac- 
tion, between withdrawing that amount for distribution, and imposing a similar 
amount of duties on the imports to supply its place, and that of leaving the pro- 
ceeds of the sales of the lands in the treasury, and imposing an equal amount 
of duties for distribution ? It is clearly the same thing, in effect, to retain the 
proceeds of the public lands in the treasury and to impose the duties for distri- 
bution, or to distribute the proceeds, and thereby force the imposition of the du- 
ties to supply the place. 

It is, then, in reality, a scheme to impose five millions of additional duties on 
the importations of the country, to be distributed among the states ; and I now 
ask, Where is the senator who will openly avow himself an advocate of such a 
scheme ? I put the question home, solemnly, to those on the opposite side. Do 
you not believe that such a scheme would be unconstitutional, unequal, unjust, 
and dangerous ? And can you, as honest men, do that in effect, by indirect 
means, which, if done directly, would be clearly liable to every one of those ob- 
jections ? 

I have said such would be the case, regarded as a fiscal transaction. In a 
political point of view, the distribution of the proceeds of the sales of the land 
would be the worst of the two. It would create opposing and hostile relations 
between the old and new states in reference to the public domain. Heretofore 
the conduct of the government has been distinguished by the greatest liberality, 
not to say generosity, towards the new states, in the administration of the pub- 
lic lands. Adopt this scheme, and its conduct will be the reverse. Whatever 
might be granted to them, would subtract an equal amount from the sum to be 
distributed. An austere and rigid administration would be the result, followed 
by hostile feelings on both sides, that would accelerate the conflict between 
them in reference to the public domain : a conflict advancing but too fast by the 
natural course of events, and which any one, in the least gifted with foresight, 
must see, come when it will, would shake the Union to the centre, unless pre- 
vented by wise and timely concession. 

Having shown that the scheme is, in effect, to impose duties for distribution, 
the next question is, On whom will they fall ? I know that there is a great di- 
versity of opinion as to who, in fact, pays the duties on imports. I do not in- 
tend to discuss that point. We of the staple and exporting states have long set- 
tled the question for ourselves, almost unanimously, from sad experience. We 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C, CALHOUN. 365 

know how ruinously high duties fell on us ; how they desolated our cities and 
exhausted our section. We also know how rapidly we have been recovering 
as they have been going off, in spite of all the difficulties of the times, and the 
distracted and disordered state of the currency. It is now a fixed maxim with 
us that there is not a whit of difference, as far as we are concerned, between 
an export and import duty — between paying toll going out or returning in — or 
goino- down to market or returning back. If this be true, of which we have no 
doubt, it is a point of no little importance to us of the staple states to know what 
portion of the duties will fall to our lot to pay. We furnish about three fourths 
of the exports, with about two fifths of the whole population. Four fifths of 
five millions is four millions, which would be the measure of our contribution ; 
and two fifths of five millions is two millions, which would be our share of the 
distribution ; that is to say, for every two dollars we would receive under this 
notable scheme, we would pay four dollars to the fund from which it would be 
derived. 

1 now ask, W^hat does it amount to, but making the income of the states, to 
the amount of five millions annually, common property, to be distributed among 
them, according to numbers, or some such ratio, without the least reference to 
their respective contribution? And what is that but rank agrarianism — agra- 
rianism among the states? To divide the annual income is as much agrarian- 
ism as to divide property itself; and would be as much so divided among twen- 
ty-six states, as among twenty-six individuals. Let me admonish the members 
opposite, if they really apprehend the spirit of agrarianism as much as might be 
inferred from their frequent declarations, not to set the fatal example here, in 
their legislative capacity. Remember, there is but one step between dividing 
the income of the states and that of individuals, and between partial a!id a gen- 
eral distribution. 

Proceeding a step farther in tracing consequences, another question presents 
itself : On what articles shall the duties be laid ? On the free or the dutied ar- 
ticles ? Shall they be laid for revenue or for protection ? Is it not obvious that 
so large an amount as five millions, equal to one third of the present income 
from that source, and probably not much less than one half what it will be at 
the end of two years, cannot be raised without rousing from its slumber the tar- 
iff question, with all its distraction and danger? Should that, however, not be 
the case, there is another consequence connected with this, that cannot fail to 
rouse it, as I shall now proceed to explain. 

The act of distributing the sales of the public lands among the states, of it- 
self, as well as the amount to be distributed, will do much to resuscitate their 
credit. It is the desired result, and the leading motive for the act. Five mill- 
ions annually (the amount assumed), on a' pledge of the public domain, would, 
of itself, be a sufficient basis for a loan of ninety or a hundred millions of dol- 
lars, if judiciously managed. But suppose that only one half should be applied, 
as the means of negotiating loans abroad, in order to complete the old or to com- 
mence new works of improvement, or other objects. I ask, What would be the 
effect on our imports, of negotiating a loan in England, or elsewhere in Europe, 
of forty or fifty millions, in the course of the next year or two ? Can any one 
doubt, from past experience ? We all know the process. Very little gold or 
silver is ever seen in these negotiations. A credit is obtained, and that placed 
in bank there, or with wealthy bankers. Bills are drawn on this country, and 
then sold to merchants. These are transmitted to Europe, and the proceeds 
returned in goods, swelling the tide of imports in proportion to the amount. 
The crash of our manufactures follows, and that, in turn, by denunciations 
against over-importing and over-trading, in which those Avho have been most 
active in causing it are sure to join, but will take special care to make not the 
least allusion to the real source Avhence it flows. And can it be doubted, 
that with the increase of the cause, the clamour for protection will increase, un- 



366 SPEECHES OP JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

til, vvith united voices, the friends of the system would demand its renewal ? If 
to this we add, that, under the Compromise Act, the tariff must be revived and re- 
modelled, who can look at such a concurrence ot powerful causes without see- 
ing that it would be almost impossible to prevent the revival of the protective 
system, should the scheme of distribution be adopted ? I hazard nothing in as- 
serting that the renewal would certainly follow ; and, as this would be one of 
the most prominent and durable consequences of that scheme, I propose to con- 
sider it fully, in its most important bearings. 

One of the most striking features of the system is its tendency to increase. 
Let it be once recognised, and let the most moderate duties be laid for protec- 
tion — but put the system in motion, and its course would be onward, onward, by 
an irresistible impulse, as I shall presently show from past experience ; and 
hence the necessity of vigilance, and a determined resistance to every course 
of policy that may, by possibility, lead to its renewal. This tendency to increase 
results from causes inherent and inseparable from the system, and has evinced 
itself by the fact, that every tariff for protection has invariably disappointed its 
friends in the protection anticipated, and has been followed periodically, after 
short intervals, by a demand for another tariff with increased duties, to aflbrd the 
protection vainly anticipated from its predecessor. Such has been the result 
throughout, from 1816 to 1828, when the first and last protective tariffs were 
laid, which I propose now to show, by a very brief historical sketch of the rise 
and progress of the system. 

The late war, with the embargo and other restrictive measures that preceded 
it, almost expelled our commerce from the ocean, and diverted a vast amount 
of capital that had been employed in it to manufactures. Such was the cause 
that led to the system. After the termination of the war, there was, on the part 
of Congress and the country, the kindest feeling towards the manufacturing in- 
terest, accompanied by a strong desire so to adjust the duties (indispensable to 
meet the expenses of government, and to pay the public debt) as to afford them 
ample protection. The manufacturers were consulted, and the act of 1816 was 
modelled to their wishes. They regarded it as affording sufficient and perma- 
nent protection ; and I, in my then want of experience as to the nature of the 
system, did not dream that we would hear any more of tariff, till it would be- 
come necessary to readjust the duties, after the discharge of the public debt. 
Vain expectation! Two years had not passed away before the manufacturers 
were as clamorous as ever for additional protection ; and, to meet their wishes, 
new duties were laid from time to time, with the same result ; but the clamour 
still returned, till 1824', when the tariff of that year passed, which was believed 
on all sides to be ample, and was considered, like that of 1816, to be a final 
adjustment of the question. It was under this impression that the South acqui- 
esced (reluctantly) in the very high duties it imposed. The late General 
Hayne, then a distinguished member of this body, took a very active part 
against it ; and I well remember, after its passage, that he consoled himself 
with the belief that, though oppressive, it would be the last. His expectation 
proved as vain as mine in 1816. Before two years had passed, we were again 
besieged with the cry of the inadequacy of the protection ; and in the summer 
of 1827, a large convention of manufacturers from all parts was held at Harris- 
burg, in Pennsylvania, to devise a new and more ample scheme of protection, 
to be laid before Congress at the next session. That movement ended in the 
adoption of the tarifl'of 1828, which, in order to make sure work, went far be- 
yond all its predecessors in the increase of duties. They were raised on the 
leading articles of consumption from forty to fifty per cent, above former duties, 
as high as they were. I speak conjecturally, without any certain data. In 
less than three years, even that enormous rise proved to be insufficient, as I 
shall presently show, and would certainly have been followed by new demands 
for protection, had not the small but gallant state I represent arrested its far- 



SPEECHES OP JOHN C, CALHOUN. 367 

tlier progress — no, that is not strong enough — brought the system to the ground, 
against the resistance of the administration and opposition — never, I trust, to 
rise again. 

The fact disclosed by this brief historical sketch is, that there is a constant 
tendency to increase in the protective system ; and that every increase of duty, 
however high, requires periodically, after a short interval, an additional increase. 
This, as I have stated, is not accidental, but is the result of causes inherent in 
the system itself, in the present condition of our country. It originates in the 
fact, that every increase of protection is necessarily followed by an expansion 
of the currency, which expansion must continue to enlarge till the increased 
price of production, in consequence, shall become equal to the increased duty, 
and when the importation of the articles prohibited may again take place with 
profit. That is the principle ; and as it is essential to the peace and prosperi- 
ty of the country that it should be clearly understood, I intend to establish its 
truth beyond doubt or cavil ; and for that purpose, shall begin with the tariff of 
1828, the last and by far the boldest of the series, with the view of illustrating, 
in its case, the operation of the principle. I entreat the Senate to give me its 
fixed attention. The principle, well understood, will shed a flood of light on 
the past and present difficulties of the country, and guide us in safety in our fu- 
ture course. 

To give a clear conception of the operation of the tariff of 1828, it will be 
necessary to premise that it comprehended all the leading articles of consump- 
tion that could be manufactured in our country, amounting in value to not much 
less than one half of the whole of the imports ; that the duties on these articles 
Avere increased enormously, as has been stated — say not less than forty or fifty 
per cent. ; that the average domestic exports at the time were not much short of 
sixty millions of dollars, and the imports for consumption about the same ; that 
the revenue from the imports was about half that sum ; and that, of the exports, 
about three fourths consisted of the great agricultural staples of the South. 
What, then, with these facts, must have been its necessary operations on the 
currency of the manufacturing states ? We export to import. It is impossible 
to continue to export for any considerable length of time without a correspond- 
ing return of imports. It would be to give away our labour for nothing. Our 
exports, then, continuing at an average of sixty millions, in what, under the 
operation of the tariff of 1828, must the corresponding imports to the same 
amount return ? Not, certainly, to the same extent as before its passage, in the 
articles on which it had so greatly increased the duties ? Its object in raising 
them was to give our manufacturers the home market, by excluding the foreign 
articles of the same description. If it failed in that, it failed in accomplishing 
any good whatever, and became an unmixed evil, without benefit to any one. 
The return, then, of imports, must have been principally in articles on which 
the duties were not raised as far as the consumption of the country would war- 
rant, and the balance, after paying what was due abroad in gold and silver. 
The first effect, then, must have been to turn the foreign exchange in our 
favour : a most important consequence connected with the increase of gold and 
silver in relation to the currency. The next must have been to turn the domes- 
tic exchanges still more strongly against the staple states, and in favour of the 
manufacturing. To understand this portion of the operation, I must again re- 
peat, that the object of the tarift' was to cut off the consumption of the foreign 
articles, in order that they should be supplied by our ov/n manufactures. The 
necessary consequence of this must have been to diminish the demand abroad, 
and to increase it in the manufacturing states, and thereby to turn the influx of 
gold and silver to that point, in order to purchase the supplies there, which we 
have been in the habit of obtaining from abroad. These causes, combined, must 
have had the effect of adding greatly to the capacity of the banks in that quarter 
to extend their discounts and accommodations, and with it the circulation of 



368 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

their notes. With a growing supply of specie, and the exchange favourable in 
every direction, as must have been the case, there is no limit to the business 
of banks, nor are they slow to perceive or to act on such favourable circum- 
stances. Nor must we overlook another powerful cause in operation, the fiscal 
action of the government, through the operation of which the vast sums collect- 
ed under such high duties were transferred to the same quarter, to be applied in 
discharge of the public debt, and disbursed on the innumerable objects of ex- 
penditure there. 

Under the operation of such powerful causes, there could not but be a vast 
and sudden expansion of the currency where they were in such great activity, 
and with that expansion a corresponding increase of prices and the cost of pro- 
duction. Nor could this state of things cease till the increased cost of produc- 
tion became equal to the duty imposed for protection. At that point, and not 
before, must specie cease to flow in, and the exchange to be favourable ; but 
when reached, the tide must turn, importations of the protected articles would 
recommence, specie flow out, and exchanges become adverse. This must be 
so obvious, that it would only darken to attempt to make it more clear. With 
the turn of the tide the banks must contract, and pecuniary embarrassment and 
distress follow. Such, under the operation of the causes assigned, must be the 
result, for reasons which appear to me irresistible. But, sir, I do not mean to 
leave so important a point to the mere force of argument, however clear and 
certain. I intend to prove by incontestable authority of documents, such was, 
in fact, exactly the result. I intend to place the principle laid down, as I have 
said, beyond doubt or cavil. 

The first authority I shall adduce is from the* report of a Committee of the 
House, made in February, 1832, by Campbell P. White, the chairman, then a 
member from the city of New-York. The report is evidently drawn with great 
care, and by one familiar with the subject, and has the advantage of being on 
another subject (the currency), without any reference to the tariff or protective 
system, and evidently without any knowledge of its operation. Hear, then, 
what the report says : 

" The recent export of specie has swept away the delusive colouring given to 
the actual result of production in 1829, 1830, artd the early part o/" 1831. Real 
estate appreciated greatly ; local stocks commanded unheard-of prices ; ware- 
houses and dwellings were improved and embellished, and money was so abun- 
dant, that it could readily be obtained to any amount upon promissory notes. 
How changed is the general aspect of things within a few months ? All our 
solid possessions and means of industry remain, land continues to be equally 
productive, labour is recompensed with its usual reward ; the seasons have not 
been unfriendly. Whence, then, this lamentable change in our affairs ? Why 
this great scarcity of money ; depreciation in value of all commodities, and of 
all property ; great commercial distress, and absolute impossibility with many 
solvent persons to discharge their just debts, so speedily and grievously suc- 
ceeding the gratifying and prosperous picture which was so lately presented?" 

What a confirmation of the deductions of reason, both in the swelling tide of 
prosperity and the turning ebb of adversity. The sketch of the latter is not 
unsuited to the present time ; good seasons, and productive years, and every 
element, apparently, of plenty and prosperity, and yet deep and wide-spread 
distress ; though at that time there had been no removal of deposites, nor had 
the sub-treasury been heard of, to which gentlemen are now disposed to at- 
tribute all the calamities which afflict the country. 

The author of the report could give no satisfactory answer to his question, 
whence all this sudden and unlooked-for calamity ; but he has furnished us 
with the means of tracing it clearly to the tariff" of 1828. It went into opera- 

* Document 278, House of Representatives. • 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 369 

tion on the Isl of September of that year, and the next year fek the swelling, 
but dehisive tide of an expanding currency ; the exchange turned in our favour ; 
gold and silver, following the impulse, flowed in ; banks began to enlarge their 
discounts and circulation. It continued to swell with a stronger and stronger 
current through all the subsequent year, and the first part of the next, nearly 
three years, according to the usual period, when it began to ebb ; and then 
followed the reverse scene, so feelingly described by the author, and which to 
him appeared so unexpected and unaccountable. It was at this point, had not 
the movements in the South arrested the farther progress of the system, that 
there would have been another clamour for additional duties. The distress, as 
usual, would have been attributed to over-importation, and that to the want of 
adequate protection, and in 1832 (the usual period of four years having inter- 
vened), another protective tariff would have been inflicted, to be followed by 
the same train of consequences, and with equal disappointment to its authors. 

Now, sir, to show that the flowing in of the precious metals, in consequence 
of the tariff of 1828, is not a mere assumption, I have extracted from the public 
documents, for the years 1829 and 1830, the imports and exports of gold and 
silver, which I hold in my hand. The import in 1829 was $7,403,612, and 
the export $4,311,134, making an excess of imports over exports of $3,092,478 ; 
and for 1830, $8,155,964 against $1,241,622, making an excess of imports of 
$6,914,342; making, in the two years, an excess of imports of $10,006,810. 
By turning to the report already cited, it will be seen that the estimated amount 
of specie in the country on the 1st of January, 1830, was but $25,000,000, of 
which $5,000,000 were in circulation, and $20,000,000 in the vaults of the 
banks ; so that the addition to the specie in the two years was forty per cent. 
on the whole amount. 

It now remains to be shown what was the effect of this great proportional 
increase of specie, and the favourable state of the exchange which it indi- 
cates, on the banks in the manufacturing states. The report will furnish the 
information, not fully, but enough to satisfy every reasonable man. It gives 
the following statement of the amount of bank-notes in circulation in 1830 and 
1832, respectively, in the states of Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New- York, 
and Pennsylvania, including the Bank of the United States, which will show 
the vast increase in the short space of two years. 

Here Mr. C. read the following statement ; 





1830: 


1832 Relative increase of circulatioa 








in two years. 


Massachusetts, 


$4,73:0,000 


$7,700,000 


65 


3er ct. 


Rhode Island, 


6k,000 


1,340,000 


100 


a 


New- York, 


10,000,000 


14,100,000 


40 


a 


Pennsylvania, 


7,300,000 


8,760,000 


20 


a 


Bank U. States, 


15,300,000 


24,600,000 


67 


a. 




$38,000,000 


$56,500,000 





These are, it will be borne in mirid, the principal manufacturing states. In 
the period of two years, we find their bank circulation, taken in the aggregate, 
expanded from thirty-eight to fifty-six and a half millions of dollars, making an 
increase of sixteen and a half millions, equal to forty-four per cent. But this 
falls far short of the actual increase. The year 1829 is not included. It must 
have been one of great expansion, as the import of specie greatly exceeded its 
exports ; which, with the favourable state of the exchange implied, must have 
greatly increased the business of the banks and the circulation of their notes. 
The reverse must have been the case in 1832, which is included, as we know by 
the report itself, that that year, and the latter part of the preceding, were a period 
of severe contraction. If a return could be had of 1829, 1830, and the early part 

A AA 



370 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOTJN. 

of 1831, 1 venture nothing in asserting that we should find the comparison, com- 
pared with 1828, the year of the tariff, far greater in proportion. 

That there is no mistake in attributing this great expansion to the tariff, might 
be farther shown, if additional proof were necessary after such conclusive evi- 
dence, from the fact that it is impossible to assign any other adequate cause. 
As iar as can be seen, there was no other cause in operation, political or com- 
mercial, that could have produced the results. It was a period of profound 
peace, and the exports and imports of the country steady to an unusual degree. 
Should doubt, however, still remain in the mind of any one after all this ac- 
cumulation of evidence, I will next call the attention of the Senate to a fact 
which must be conclusive with all disposed to receive the truth. By tm-ning 
to the table showing the extent of bank circulation in 1830 and 1832 in the 
four states already referred to, it will be seen that the expansion was greater 
or less, just as the states, respectively, were more or less manufacturing. It 
Avill not be doubted that Rhode Island is the most manufacturing of the four, 
and we accordingly find there the greatest expansion ; and that for the simple 
reason, that there the causes assigned must have been in the state of the great- 
est activity. Her bank circulation doubled in the short space of two years, as 
appears by the table. ^lassachusetts is the next ; and we find hers is the next 
highest, being sixty-five per cent. New- York is still less so, and hers is but 
forty per cent. ; and Pennsylvania, the least of the four, had, excluding the 
Bank of the United States, increased only twenty per cent. If the statement 
had extended farther South, and taken in the staple states, I venture little in 
making the assertion that, instead of expansion, their bank circulation would, for 
the same period, have bee.a found in |he opposite state, for the reverse reason. 
It will be seen that the Bank of the Uhited States had expanded sixty-seven per 
cent. This great increase, compared to the local banks of Pennsylvania, may 
probably be attributed parijy to loans negotiated farther East, and not improba- 
bly because her accommodations were somewhat enlarged, from causes con- 
nected with her effbrts, at the time, to obtain a renewal of her charter. 

I trust that I have now established, to. the entire satisfaction of the Senate, 
the truth of the great principle which ha^ been laid down — that every increase 
of protective duties is necessarily foll®ved, in the present condition of our 
country, by an expansion of the currencVj which must continue to increase till 
the increased price of production, causea)by the expansion, shall be equal to 
the duty imposed, when a new tariff w'ij|, be required. Assuming, then, the 
principle as incontrovertible, it follows that' the natural tendency of the protect- 
ive system is to expand, in seeking to ac6omplish its object, till it terminates 
in explosion. It would be easy to show, from what has already been stated, 
that this tendency must continue till the exports shall be so reduced as to be 
barely sufficient to meet the demands of the country for the articles not included 
in the protection ; as it must be obvious, so long as they exceed that amount, 
so long must specie continue to be imported, and the exchange to be in otir 
favour" till the protection is broken down by the expansion of the currency. 

The consummation, therefore, of the system must be one of two things— ex- 
plosion, or the red;uction of the exports,;so as not to exceed the amount of the 
unprotected article^ ; but either termination must prove disastrous to the system ; 
the former by a sudden and violent overthrow, and the latter by the impoverish- 
Tnent of customers, djid raising up of rivals as they ceased to be customers. To 
have a just conception of its operation in this particular, it will be necessary to 
bear in mind, that the\South and the West are the great consumers of the prod- 
ucts of the North and East ; and that the capacity of the South to consmne 
depends on her great agricultural staples almost exclusively, and that their sale 
and consumption depend mainly on the foreign market. What, then, would be 
the effect of reducing her exports to the point indicated, say to forty or fifty mill- 
ions'^of dollars 1 Most certainly, to diminish her capacity to consume the prod- 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 371 

acts of the North and East in the same proportion, followed by a correspond- 
ing diminution of the revenue, and the commerce and navigation of the coun- 
try. But the evil would not end there, as great as it would be. It would have 
an equal or greater effect on the consumption of the West. That great and 
growing section is the provision portion of the Union. Her wide and fertile 
region gives her an unlimited capacity to produce grain and stock of every de- 
scription ; and these, for the most part, find their market in the staple states. 
Cut off their exports, and their market would be destroyed ; and with it the 
means of the West, to a great extent, for carrying on trade with the Northern 
and Eastern States. To the same extent, they, and the staple states, would be 
compelled to produce their own supplies ; and would thus, from consumers, be 
converted into rivals with the other section. 

How much wiser for all would be the opposite system of low duties, with the 
market of the world opened to our great agricultural staples ? The effects would 
be a vast increase of our exports, with a corresponding increase of the capacity 
to consume on the part of the South and West, making them rich and content- 
ed customers, instead of impoverished and discontented rivals of the other sec- 
tion. It is time that this subject should be regarded in its true light. The 
protective system is neither more nor less than a war on the exports. I again 
repeat, if we cannot import, we cannot long export ; and just as we cut off or 
burden the imports, to the same extent do we, in effect, cut off and burden the 
exports. This I have long seen, and shall now proceed to prove, by reference 
to the public documents, that ray assertion is sustained by facts. The table of 
exports shows that during the seven years, from 1824 to 1831, our domestic 
exports remained nearly stationary, notwithstanding the great increase of our 
population during that period. Your statute-book will show that during the 
same period the protective system was in its greatest vigour. The first relax- 
ation took place in December, 1830, under the act of the 20th of May of the 
same year, which made a great deduction in the duties on coffee and tea. I 
shall now turn to the table, and give the exports Qf domestic articles for those 
years, beginning with 1824. 

Here Mr. C. read the folow.ing statement: X- 

In 1824 the domestic exports were $-^0, 649, 500 

1825 " ■ " » 66,944,745 

1826 " " " 53,055,710 

1827 " " " 58,921,691 

1828 " " " 56,009,669 

1829 " *• " 55,700,193 

1830 " " " 59,462,029 

If we take the average of the first three and the last of these years, we shall 
find that the former is a million and a half greater than the latter, showing an 
actual falling off, instead of an increase, to that extent in our exports. 

With 1831, the reduction of duties commenced on the articles mentioned; 
and in December, 1833, the first great reduction took place under the Compro- 
mise xA.ct. I shall turn to the same table, beginning with 1831, and read a 
statement of the exports for the eight years under the approach to the free-trade 
system. It is but an approach. I invite special attention to the rapid rise al'ter 
the great reduction in December, 1833. 

In 1831 the domestic exports were $61,277,057 



1832 
1833 
1834 
1835 
1836 
1837 
1838 



63,137,470 
70,317,698 
81,034,162 
101,189,082 
106,916,680 
95,564,414 
96,033,821 



372 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

How rapid the rise just as the weights are removed ! The increase, since 
the wreat reduction in 1833, has nearly doubled the aA-erage exports compared 
■with the average of the seven tariff years preceding 1831, and would have quite 
doubled them, had not the expanded and deranged condition of the currency, 
and the consequent embarrassment of commerce, prevented it. 

But what will appear still more extraordinary- to those who have not reflect- 
ed on the operation of the protective system, is the great increase of the ex- 
ports of our domestic manufactures, as the duties go off, following, in that re- 
spect, the same law that regulates the exports of the great agricultural staples. 
It is a precious fact that speaks volumes, and which demands the serious con- 
sideration of the manufacturing portion of the Union, I well remember the 
sanguine expectations of the friends of the system, of the great increase of the 
exports of domestic manufactures which they believed would follow the tariff 
of 1828. Well, we now have the result of experience under that act, and also 
imder that of a partial approach to free trade, and the result is exactly the re- 
verse of the anticipations of the friends and advocates of protection. So far 
from increasing, under the tariff of 1828, the exports of manufactured articles 
actually diminished, while they have rapidly increased just as they have gone 
off. 

But the table of exports shall speak for itself. Durmg the four years, under 
the tariff of 1824, that is, from that year to 1829, Avhen the tariff of 1828 went 
into operation, the exports of domestic manufactures gradually declined from 
$5,729,797, in the year 1825, to $5,548,354 in the year 1828. From that time 
it steadily declined, under the tariff of 1828, each succeeding year showing a 
falling off compared with the preceding, till 1833, declining, throughout the pe- 
riod, from $5,412,320 in 1829, to $5,050,633 in 1832, and showing an aggre- 
gate falling off, during the whole tariff regime of eight years, from 1825 to 1832, 
of nearly $700,000. At this point we enter on the relaxation of the system ; 
and there has been an onward move, with but little vibration, throughout the 
whole period, till the present time. The last year we have is 1838, when the 
exports exceeded any preceding year. They amounted to $8,397,078, being 
an increase, during the six years of the reduction of duties, of $3,346,445, 
against a falling off, in the, preceding eight years of protection, of $700,000 : 
an increase of sixty-five per cent, in six years, and this in the midst of all the 
embarrassment of commefrce, and expansion, and derangement of the currency, 
and, let me add, what ha^ been so much dreaded by the friends of manufactures, 
the mighty increase of ti^' exports of our great agricultural staples during the 
same period : a clear priBC^ that, under the free-trade system, the one does not 
interfere with the other. """Let no friend of manufactures suppose that this inter- 
esting result is accidental. It is the operation of fixed laws, steady and immu- 
table in their course, as I shall hereafter show. , ; 

Now, sir, I feel myself, with these facts, warranted in asserting that, if the 
deranged state of the currency had not interfered, the great mantifacturing in- 
terest would have gone on in a flourishing condition during the whole period 
of the reduction under the Compromise Act, proving thereby, to the satisfaction 
of all, the fallacy of the protective system. Any supposed loss, from the re- 
duction of duties, would have been much more than made up by the increased 
ability of the South and West to consume, and the rapidly growing importance 
of the foreign market. 

But I have not yet done with the system. It has additional and heaAy sins 
to answer for. The tariff of 1828 is' the source in which has originated that 
very derangement of the currency which so greatly embarrasses, at this time, 
the very interest it was intended to protect, as well as all other branches of in- 
dustry. Bold as is the assertion, I am prepared to establish it to the letter. 

It "has already been proved that the great expansion of the currency in 1829, 
1830, and 1831, was the immediate effect of the tarift' of 1828. It remains to 



SPEECHES OP JOHN C. CALHOUN. 373 

be shown that the cause of the still greater and longer continued expansion 
which has terminated in the overthrow of the banking system, and the deep 
and almost universal distress of the country, may be clearly traced back to the 
same source. To do this, we must return to the" year 1832, and trace the chain 
oi events to this time. In that year the public debt was finally discharged. 
The vast revenue which had been poured into the treasury by the tariff of 1828, 
and which had accelerated the payment of the public debt, could, after its dis- 
charge, no longer be absorbed in the ordinary expenditures of the government, 
and a surplus began to accumulate in the treasury. The late Bank of the Uni- 
ted States was then the fiscal agent of the government, and the depository of its 
revenue. Its growing amount, and prospects of great future increase, began to 
act on the cupidity of many of the leading state banks, and some of the great 
brokers of New- York. Hence their war against that institution ; and hence, 
also, the removal of the deposites. The late President I believe to have beeix 
really hostile to the Bank on principle ; but there would have been httle or no 
motive to remove them, had it not been for their growing importance, and the 
hostility wliich the desire of possessing them had excited. They were remo- 
ved, and placed in the vaults of certain state banks. To this removal and de- 
posite in the state banks, the members over the way are in the habit of attribu- 
ting all the disorders of the currency which have since followed. Now I ask, 
in the first place. Is it not certain, if it had not been for the surplus revenue, the 
deposites would not have been removed? And, in the second, would there 
have been a surplus had it not been for the tariff of 1828 ? 

Again : Is it not equally clear that it was the magnitude of the surplus, and 
not the removal, of itself, that caused the after derangement and disorder ?' If 
the surplus had been but two or three millions, the ordinary sum in deposite, it 
would have been of httle importance where it was kept, whether in the vaults 
of the Bank of the United States, or those of the states ; but involving, as it 
did, fifty millions and more, it became a question of the highest importance. I 
again ask, To what is this great surplus to be attributed but to the same cause ? 
Yes, sir, the tariff of 1828 caused the surplus, and the surplus the removal and 
all the after disasters in the currency, aggravated, it is true, by being deposited 
in the state banks ; but it may be doubted whether the disaster would have been 
much less had they not been removed. Be that, however, as it may, it is not 
material, as I have shown that that surplus itself was the motive for the removal. 
We all remember what occurred after the removal. The surplus poured into 
the treasury by millions, in the form of bank-notes. The withdrawal from cir- 
culation, and locking up in the vaults of the deposite banks, so large an amount, 
created an immense vacuum, to be replenished by repeating the issues, which 
gave to the banks the means of unbounded accommodations. Speculation now 
commenced on a gigantic scale ; prices rose rapidly, and one party, to make 
the removal acceptable to the people, urged the new depositories to discount 
freely^ while the other side produced the same effect by censuring them for not 
affording as extensive accommodations as the Bank of the United States would 
have done, had the revenue been left with it. Madness ruled the hour. The 
whole community was intoxicated with imaginary prospects of realizing im- 
mense fortunes. With the increased rise of prices began the gigantic specula- 
tions in the public domain, the price of which, being fixed 'by law, could not 
partake of the general rise. To enlarge the room for their operations, I know 
not how many millions (fifty, I should suppose, at least, of the public revenue) 
were sunk in purchasing Indian lands, at their fee simple price nearly, and re- 
moving tribe after tribe to the West, at enormous cost ; thus subjecting millions 
on millions of the choicest public lands to be seized on by the keen and greedy 
speculator. The tide now swelled with irresistible force. From the banks 
the deposites passed by discounts into the hands of the land speculators ; from 
them into the hands of the receivers, and thence to the banks ; and again and 



374 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

again repeating the same circle, and at every evolution passing millions of 
acres of the public domain from the people into the hands of speculators, for 
Avorthless rags. Had this state of things continued much longer, every acre of 
the public lands worth possessing would have passed from the government. 
At this stage the alarm took place. The revenue was attempted to be squan- 
dered by the wildest extravagance ; resolutions passed this body calling on 
the departments to know how much they could spend, and much resentment 
was felt because they could not spend fast enough. The Deposite Act was 
passed and the Treasury Circular issued, but, as far as the currency was con- 
cerned, in vain. The explosion followed, and the banks fell in convulsions, to be 
resuscitated for a moment, but to fall again from a more deadly stroke, under 
which they now lie prostrate. 

I have now presented, rapidly, the unbroken chain of events up to the prolif- 
ic source of our disasters, and down to the present time. In addition to the 
causes originating directly in the tariff of 1828, there were several collateral 
powerful ones, Svhich have contributed to the present prostrated condition of the 
currency and the banks, but which wovdd have been comparatively harmless of 
themselves. Among these was the important change in the charter of the 
Bank of England, at the last renewal, about the time our surplus revenue began 
to accumulate, by which its notes were made a legal tender in all cases except 
between the Bank and its creditors. The obvious effect of this modification 
was to diminish the demand for specie in that great mart of the world, and, in 
consequence, must have tended powerfully to keep the exchange with us in an 
easy condition while the tide of circulation was rapidly rising to a dangerous 
height. But there was another cause which contributed still more powerfully 
to the same result : I refer to the great loans negotiated abroad by states and 
corporations. To these I add the operation of the United States Bank of 
Pennsylvania, the direct object of which, in some of its more prominent trans- 
actions, was to prevent the exchange from becoming adverse to us. 

By the operation of these causes combined, the exchanges were kept easy 
for years, notwithstanding the vast expansion which our circulation had attain- 
ed, from the powerful action of the more direct causes to which I have adverted. 
The stroke was delayed, but not averted, and fell but the heavier and more fa- 
tally because delayed. And where did it fall, when it came, most heavily? 
Where the measure which caused it originated — on the heads of its projectors. 
Behold how error, folly, and vice, in the ways of an inscrutable Providence, 
turn back on their authors. 

It is full time for the North, and more especially for New-England, to pause 
and ponder. If they would hear the voice of one who has ever wished them 
well, I would say that the renewal of the protective system would be one of the 
greatest calamities that could befall you. Whatever incidental good could be 
derived from it, you have already acquired. It would, if renewed, prove a pure, 
unadulterated evil. The very reverse is your true policy. The great question 
for you to decide is, how to command the foreign market. The home market, 
of itself, is too scanty for your skill, your activity, your energy, your unequalled 
inventive powers, your untiring industry, your vastly increased population, and 
accumulated capital. Without the foreign market, your unexampled march to 
wealth and improvement must come to a stand. How, then, are you to obtain 
command of the foreign market? That is the vital question. 

The first and indispensable step is a thorough reformation of the cuiTency. 
Without a solid, stable, and uniform currency, you never can fully succeed. The 
present currency is incurably bad. It is impossible to give it solidity or stabili- 
ty. A convertible bank currency, however well regulated, is subject to violent 
and sudden changes, which must forever unfit it to be the standard of value. 
It is by far the most sensitive of all to every change, commercial or political, 
foreign or domestic ; as may be readily illustrated by reference to the ordinary 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 375 

action of foreign exchanges on such currency. For this purpose, let us assume 
that our ordinary circulating medium, when exchanges are easy, amounts to 
$100,000,000, consisting, as it does, of convertible bank paper. Let us sup- 
pose that it is all issued by what are called sound specie-paying banks, with a 
circulation of three dollars of paper for one dollar in specie, which is regarded 
as constituting safe banking. Next, suppose exchange abroad turns against us, 
to the amount of $10,000,000. Is it not clear tbat, instead of reducing the cir- 
culation by that amount, that is, to $90,000,000, which it would do if it con- 
sisted only of specie, it would be reduced three times the amount ; that is, to 
$70,000,000 ? Let us now suppose the exchange to turn the other way, from 
this point of depression, and to be kept flowing in that direction till it came to 
be $10,000,000 in our favour, instead of that amount against us. The result 
would be, under the operation of the same law, not to increase our circulation 
to $110,000,000 only, which would be the case if consisting of specie, but to 
$130,000,000; making a diiierence between the extreme points of depression 
and elevation of $60,000,000 — more than equal to one half of the usual amount of 
circulation by supposition, with a corresponding increase of prices — instead of 
$20,000,000, equal only to a fifth, and with but a proportional effect on prices. 
A change the other way, from the extreme point of elevation to that of extreme 
depression, would cause the reverse effect. I hold it certain that no honest 
industry, pursued with the view to moderate and steady profit, can be safe in 
the midst of such sudden and violent vicissitudes — vicissitudes as if from sum- 
mer to winter, and from winter to summer, without the intervention of fall or 
spring. Such great and sudden changes in the standard of value must be par- 
ticularly fatal with us, with our moderately accumulated capital, compared to 
the effect on the greater accumulation abroad, in older countries. In stating the 
case supposed, I have assumed numbers at random, without pretending to ac- 
curacy as applied to our country, simply to illustrate the principle. The actual 
vibration may be greater or less than that supposed, but in every country where 
bank circulation prevails it must be greater and greater, just in proportion to 
the extent of its prevalence. 

For this diseased state of your currency there is but one certain remedy — 
to return to the ciurrency of the Constitution. Read that instrument, and hear 
what it says. " Congress shall coin money and regulate the value thereof; no 
state shall emit bills of credit, or make anything but gold and silver a legal tend- 
er." Here are positive and negative provisions : a grant of power to Congress, 
and a limitation on the power of the states in reference to the currency. Can 
you doubt that the object was to give to Congress the control of the currency ? 
What else is the meaning " to regulate" the value thereof? Can you doubt that 
the currency was intended to be specie ? What else is the meaning " to coin 
woney V Can you doubt, on the other hand, that it was the intention that the 
states should not supersede the currency which Congress was authorized to es- 
tablish ? What else is the meaning of the provisions that they shall not issue 
bills of credit, or make anything but gold and silver a legal tender ? Can we 
doubt, finally, that the country is not in the condition that the Constitution in- 
tended, as far as the currency is concerned ? Does Congress, in point of fact, 
regulaXe the currency ? No. Does it supply a coin circulation ? No. Do 
the states, in fact, regulate it? Yes, «Does it consist of paper issued by the 
authority of the states ? Yes. Is this paper, in effect, a legal tender? Yes. 
It has expelled the currency of the Constitution, and we are compelled to take 
it or nothing. Well, then, as the currency is in an unconstitutional condition, 
the conclusion is irresistible that the Constitution has failed to effect what it in- 
tended, as far as the currency is concerned ; but whether it has failed by mis- 
construction, or the want of adequate provisions, is not yet decided. Thus 
much, however, is clear, that it is through the agency of bank paper that it has 
foiled, and the power intended to be conferred on Congress over the currency 



376 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

has been superseded. But for that, the power of Congress over the cnrrency 
would have been this day in full force, and the currency itself in a constitutional 
condition. Nor is it less clear that the Constitution cannot be restored while 
the cause which has superseded it remains ; and this presents the great ques- 
tion, How can it be removed 1 I do not intend to discuss it on this occasion. 
I shall only say that the task is one of great delicacy and difficulty, requiring 
much wisdom and caution, and in the execution of which precipitation ought 
to be carefully avoided ; but when executed, then, and not till then, shall we 
have the solid, stable, and uniform currency intended by the Constitution, and 
which is indispensable, not only to the full success of our manufactures, and all 
other branches of productive industry, but also to the safety of our free institu- 
tions. 

The next indispensable step to secure to the manufacturers the foreign mar- 
ket is low duties, and light burdens on productions ; yes, as low and light as 
the wants of the government will permit. The less the burden— the freer and 
broader the scope given to the products of our manufactures— the better for 
them. Above all, avoid the renewal of the protective system. It would be 
fatal, as far as the foreign market is concerned. 

Its hostile effects I have already shown from the table of exports, and shall 
now, by a few brief remarks, prove that it must be so. Passing by other rea- 
sons, I shall present but one, but that one is decisive. It has been shown that 
the effect of the protective system is to expand the currency in the manufactu- 
ring sections, until the increased price of production shall become equal to the 
duty imposed for protection, when the importation of the protected articles must 
again take place ; that is to say, that its effects are to enable foreign manufac- 
turers to meet ours in our own country, under the disadvantage of paying high 
additional duties. How, then, with that resuh, would it be possible for our man- 
ufacturers to meet the foreign fabrics of the same description abroad, where there 
can be no duty to protect them ? There can be no answer. The reason is de- 
cisive. 

I do not wish, in what I have said, to be considered the advocate of low wa- 
ges. I am in favour of high wages ; and agree that, the higher the wages, the 
stronger the evidence of prosperity ; provided (and that is the important point) 
they are so naturally, by the effectiveness of industry, and not in consequence 
of an inflated currency, or any artificial regulation. When I say the effective- 
ness of industry, I mean to comprehend whatever is calculated to make the la- 
bour of one country more productive than that of others. I take into consider- 
ation skill, activity, energy, invention, perfection of instruments and means, me- 
chanical and chemical ; abundance of capital, natural and acquired ; facility of 
intercourse and exchanges, internal and external ; and, in a word, whatever may 
add to the productiveness of labour. High wages, when attributable to these, 
is the certain evidence of productiveness, and is, on that account, and that only, 
the evidence of prosperity. It is easily understood. Just as such labour would 
command, when compared with the less productive, a greater number of pounds 
of sugar or tea, a greater quantity of clothing or food, in the same proportion 
would it command more specie, that is, higher wages for a day's work. But, 
sir, here is the important consideration : high wages from such a cause require 
no protection — no, not more than the hi^i wages of a man against the low wa- 
ges of a boy, of man against women, or the skilful and energetic against the 
awkward and feeble. On the contrary, the higher such wages, the less the pro- 
tection required. Others may demand protection against it— not it against oth- 
ers. The very demand of protection, then, is but a confession of the want of 
effectiveness of labour (from some cause) on the side that makes it ; but, as a 
general rule, it will turn out that protection, in most cases, is a mere fallacy ; 
certainly so when its effects are an artificial expansion of the currency. So 
far are high wages from being the evidence of prosperity in such cases, or, in 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 377 

fact, whenever caused by high protection, high taxes, or any other artificial 
cause, it is the evidence of the very reverse, and always indicates somethino- 
■wrong, and a tendency to derangement and decay. 

Having arrived at this conclusion, I will now hazard the assertion, that in 
no country on earth is labour, taking it all in all, more effective than ours, and 
especially in the Northern and Eastern portions. What people can excel our 
Northern and New-England brethren in skill, invention, activity, energy, per- 
severance, and enterprise ? In what portion of the globe will you find a posi- 
tion more favourable to a free ingress and egress, and facility of intercourse, 
external and internal, through the broad limits of our wide-spread country — a 
region surpassed by none, taking into consideration extent and fertility ? Where 
will you find such an abundant supply of natural capital, the gift of a kind Prov- 
idence ; lands cheap, plenty, and fertile ; water power unlimited ; and the supply 
of fuel, and the most useful of metals, iron, almost without stint 1 It is true, in 
accumulated capital, the fruits of past labour, through a long succession of ages, 
not equal to some other countries, but even in that far from being deficient, and 
to whatever extent deficient, would be more than compensated by the absence 
of all restrictions, and the lightness of the burden imposed on labour, should our 
government, state and general, wisely avail itself of the advantages of our situ- 
ation. If these views be correct, there is no country where labour, if left to 
itself, free from restriction, would be more eftective, and where it would com- 
mand greater abundance of every necessary and comfort, or higher wages ; and 
where, of course, protection is less needed. Instead of an advantage, it must, 
in fact, prove an impediment. It is high time, then, that the shackles should 
be thrown ofi' industry, and its burden lightened, as far as the just wants of the 
government may possibly admit. We have arrived at the manhood of our vig- 
our. Open the way — remove all restraints — take off the swaddling cloth that 
bound the limbs of infancy, and let the hardy, intelligent, and enterprising sons 
of New-England march forth fearlessly to meet the world in competition, and 
she will prove, in a few years, the successful rival of Old England. The for- 
eign market once commanded, all conflicts between the different sections and 
industry of the country would cease. It is better for us and you that our cot- 
ton should go out in yarn and goods than in the raw state ; and when that is 
done, the interests of all the parts of this great confederacy — North, East, South, 
and West — with every variety of its pursuits, would be harmonized, but not till 
then. 

If the course of policy I advocate be wise as applied to manufactures, how 
much more strikingly so must it be when to the other two great interests of that 
section, commerce and navigation ? I pass the former, and shall conclude what 
I intended to say on this point with a few remarks applicable to the latter. 
Navigation (I mean that employed in our foreign trade) is essentially our out- 
side interest, exposed to the open competition of all the world. It has met, and 
met successfully, the competition of the lowest wages, not only without protec- 
tion, but with heavy burdens on almost every article that enters into the outfit, 
the rigging, and construction of our noble vessels, the timber excepted. If, with 
such onerous burdens, it has met in successful rivalry the navigation of all other 
countries, what an impulse it would receive if the load that bears down its 
springs were removed ! and what immense additions that increased impulse 
would give, not only to our wealth, but to the means of national influence and 
safety, where only we can be felt, and in the quarter from which only external 
danger is to be apprehended ! 

I have now, Mr. President, concluded what I proposed to say when I rose 
to address the Senate. I have limited my remarks to the prominent conse- 
quences, in a pecuniary and fiscal view, which would result should the scheme 
of assumption be adopted. There are higher and still more important conse- 
quences, which I have not attempted to trace ; I mean the effects, morally and 

B B B 



378 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

politically, as resulting from those which I have traced, and presented to the Sen- 
ate. This, I hope, may be done by some other senator in the course of the 
discusion. ' But I have said enough to show that the scheme which these reso- 
lutions are intended to condemn ought to be avoided, as the most fatal poison 
and the most deadly pestilence. It is, in reality, but a scheme of plunder. Let 
blood be lapped, and the appetite will be insatiable. 

But the states are deeply in debt, and it may be asked. What shall be done ? 
I know that they are in debt— deeply in debt. 1 deplore it. Yes, in debt, I 
am not afraid to' assert it, in many instances, for the most idle projects, got up 
and pursued in the most thoughtless manner. Nor am I ignorant how deep 
pecuniary embarrassments, whether of states or individuals, blunt every feeling 
of honest pride and deaden the sense of justice ; but I do trust that there is not 
a member of this great and proud confederacy so lost to every feeling of self- 
respect and sense of justice as to desire to charge its individual debts on the 
common fund of the Union, or to impose them on the shoulders of its more pru- 
dent associates ; or, let me add, to dishonour itself, and the name of an iVmeri- 
can, by refusing to pay the foreigner what it justly owes. Let the indebted 
states remember, in time, that there is but one honest mode of paying its del)ts — 
stop all farther increase, and impose taxes to discharge what they owe. There 
is not a state, even the most indebted, with the smallest resources, that has not 
ample resources to meet its engagements. For one, I pledge myself; South 
Carolina is also in debt. She has spent her thousands in wasteful extrava- 
gance on one of the most visionary schemes that ever entered into the head of 
a thinking man. I dare say this even of her ; I, who on this floor stood up to 
defend her almost alone against those who threatened her with fire and sword, 
but who now are so squeamish about state rights as to be shocked to hear it 
asserted that a state was capable of extravagant and wasteful expenditures. 
Yes, I pledge myself that she will pay punctually every dollar she owes, should 
it take the fast cent, without inquiring whether it was spent wisely or foolishly. 
Should I in this be by possibility mistaken — should she tarnish her unsullied 
honour, and bring discredit on our common country by refusing to redeem her 
plighted faith (which I hold impossible), deep as is my devotion to her, and 
mother as she is to me, I would disown her. 



XXV. 



SPEECH ON HIS RESOLUTIONS IN REFERENCE TO THE CASE OF THE EN- 
TERPRISE, MARCH 13, 1840. 

The following resolutions, submitted by Mr. Calhoun on the 4th inst., were 
taken up for consideration : 

" Resolved, That a ship or a vessel on the high seas, in time of peace, en- 
gaged in a lawful voyage, is, according to the laws of nations, under the exclu- 
sive jurisdiction of the state to which her flag belongs ; as much so as if con- 
stituting a part of its own domain. 

" Resolved, That if such ship or vessel should be forced, by stress of weather, 
or other unavoidable cause, into the port of a friendly power, she would, under 
the same laws, lose none of the rights appertaining to her on the high seas ; 
but, on the contrary, she, and her cargo and persons on board, with their prop- 
erty, and all the rights belonging to their personal relations, as established by 
the' laws of the state to which they belong, would be placed under the protec- 
tion which the laws of nations extend to the unfortunate under such circum- 
stances. 

" Resolved, That the brig Enterprise, which was forced unavoidably, by stress 



SPEECflES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 379 

of weatnei, Into Port Hamilton, Bemuitia Island, while on a lawful voyage on 
the high seas, from one port of the Union to another, comes within the princi- 
ples embraced in the foregoing resolutions ; and that the seizure and detention 
of the negroes on board, by the local authority of the island, was an act in vio- 
lation of the laws of nations, and highly unjust to our own citizens, to whom 
they belong." 

The resolutions having been read, 

Mr. Calhoun said : The case referred to in these resolutions is one of the 
three which have been for so long a period a subject of negotiation between our 
government and that of Great Britain, without, however, receiving the attention 
which, in my opinion, is due to the importance of the principle involved. The 
other two were those of the Comet and Encomium. In order to have a clear 
understanding of the bearing of these resolutions, and the principles they em- 
brace, it will be necessary to give a brief narrative of each of these cases. 

The Comet is the first in order of time. She sailed from this District in the 
latter part of the year 1830, destined for New-Orleans, having, among other 
things, a number of negroes on board. Her papers were regular, and her voy- 
age in all respects lawful. She was stranded on one of the false keys of the 
Bahama Islands, opposite to the coast of Florida, and almost in sight of our own 
shores. The persons on board, including the negroes, were taken by the 
wreckers, against the remonstrance of the captain and owners, into Nassau, 
New-Providence, where the negroes were forcibly seized and detained by the 
local authorities. 

The case of the Encomium is in almost every particular similar. It occurred 
in 1834. She sailed from Charleston, destined, also, for New-Orleans, with ne- 
groes on board, on a voyage in like manner lawful, was stranded near the same 
place, taken in the same way, into the same port, where the negroes were also 
forcibly seized and detained by the local authorities. It so happens that I am 
personally acquainted with the owners of the negroes in this case. They were 
citizens of North Carolina, of high respectability, one of them recently presi- 
dent of the state Senate, and their negroes were shipped for New-Orleans with 
the view of emigration and permanent settlement in one of the Southwestern 
States. 

The other is the case of the Enterprise, referred to in the resolutions. She 
sailed, in 1835, from this District, destined for Charleston, South Carolina, and, 
like the others, on a lawful voyage, with regular papers. She was forced, un- 
avoidably, by stress of weather, into Port Hamilton, Bermuda Island, where the 
negroes on board w*re, in like manner, forcibly seized and detained by the lo- 
cal authorities. 

The owners of the negroes, after applying in vain to the local authorities for 
their surrender, made application to the government for redress of injury ; and 
the result, after ten years' negotiation, is, that the British government has agreed 
to compensate the owners of the Comet and Encomium, on the ground that 
these cases occurred before the act for the abolition of slavery in her colonies 
had gone into operation, and refused compensation in the case of the Enter- 
prise, because it occurred afterward. 

Such are the material facts, drawn from the correspondence itself, and ad- 
mitted in the course of the negotiation. What I propose, in the first place, is, 
to show that the principle on which compensation was allowed in the cases of 
the Comet and Encomium, embraces also that of, the Enterprise ; that no dis- 
crimination whatever can be made between them ; and that, in attempting to 
make a discrimination, the British minister has assumed the very point in con- 
troversy, or, to express it in more familiar language, has begged the question. 
I shall rest my argument exclusively on the admissions necessarily involved in 
the two cases, without looking to any other authority. They will be found, if 
I do not greatly mistake, ample of themselves for my purpose. 



380 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

What, then, is the principle necessarity involved, in allowing compensation 
in those cases 1 It will not be necessary to show that the allowance was not a 
mere act of gratuity to our citizens. No one will suspect that. It was. on the 
contrary, reluctantly yielded, after years of negotiation, only on the conviction 
that the rights of our citizens in the negroes could no longer be disputed, and, 
of course, the injustice of their seizure and detention. This brings me to a 
question of vital importance in this discussion, to which I must ask the Senate 
to give me its fixed attention ; and that is, On what did this right of our citizens 
to the negroes rest ? Not, certaiidy, on the British laws, either expressed or 
implied. So far otherwise, they expressly prohibited, in the broadest and most 
unqualified terms, persons from being brought in or retained as slaves, under 
heavy penalty and forfeiture of property ; declared the persons offending to be 
felons, and subjected them to be transported beyond sea, or to be confined and 
kept at hard labour for a term of years.* But one answer can be given to the 
question : that it rested on the laws of their own country. It was only by them 
that they could possibly have a right to the negroes. And here we meet the 
vital question, How is it that a right resting on our laws should be valid and 
respected within the limits of the British dominion, against the express prohibi- 
tion of an act of Parliament ? 

The answer can only be found in the principles embraced in the first and 
second of these resolutions. The former affirms the acknowledged principle 
that a ship or vessel on the high seas, in time of peace, and engaged in a law- 
ful voyage, is, by the law of nations, under the exclusive jurisdiction of the state 
to which her fiag belongs ; and the second, that if forced by stress of weather, 
or other unavoidable cause, into a port of a friendly power, she would lose none 
of the rights appertaining to her on the high seas ; but, on the contrary, she, 
with her cargo and persons on board, including their property, and all the rights 
belonging to their personal relations, would be placed under the protection 
which the law of nations extends to the unfortunate in such cases. 

It is on this solid basis that the rights of our citizens rested. The laws of 
nations, by their paramount authority, overruled, in those cases, the municipal 
laws of Great Britain, even within her territorial limits ; and it was to their au- 
thoritative voice that her government yielded obedience in compensating our 
citizens for the violation of rights placed under their sacred protection. 

Having now established the principle necessarily implied in ihe allowance 
of compensation in the cases of the Comet and Encomium, it will be an easy 
task to show that it equally embraces the case of the Enterprise. It is admit- 
ted by the British minister that there is no other distinction between it and the 
other two, except that it occurred after, and the others before the act abolishing 
slavery in the colonies went into operation ; and it must, of course, be equally 
comprehended in the principles embraced in the first and second resolutions, 
in virtue of which compensation was made, as has been shown ; unless, indeed, 
that act had the eflect of preventing it, which I shall now show it could not, ac- 
cording to the law of nations. 

A simple but decisive view will be sufficient for the purpose. I have just 
shown that the act of Parliament for abolishing the slave-trade, although it ex- 
pressly prohibited the introduction of slaves within the limits of the British ter- 
ritory, or detaining them in that condition when brought in, so far from overru- 
Ihig, were overruled by the principles embraced in these resolutions. If that 
act did not overrule the laws of nations in those cases, how, I ask, could the 
act for the abolition of slavery in the colonies overrule them in a case in every 
essential circumstance acknowledged to be the same ? Can a possible reason 
be assigned ? The authority by which the two were enacted is the same, and 
the one as directly applicable to the case as the other. If, indeed, there be a 

'^ See act to amend and consolidate the laws relating to the abolition of the slave-trade, 5th sec, 
4 c., p. 113, 6 vol., Evan's Statutes. 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. S3] 

difference, the one for the abolition of the slave-trade is, of the two, the most 
applicable. That act directly prohibits the introduction of slaves within the 
British dominion in the most unqualified manner, or the retaining them, when in- 
troduced, in that condition ; while the object of the act for the abolition of sla- 
very in the colonies was to emancipate those who were such under the author- 
ity of the British laws. It is true it abolishes slavery in the British dominions, 
but that is no more than had previously been done, as far as slaves brought into 
her dominions were concerned, by the act for abolishing the slave-trade. And yet 
"we see that act was overruled by the law of nations, in the case of the Con;iet 
and Encomium. How, then, is it possible, that of two laws, enacted by the 
same authority, both being equally applicable, the one, when applied to the same 
case, should be overruled by the law of nations, and the other overrule it ? It is 
clear that it is impossible ; and that, if the one cannot divest the rights of our 
citizens, neither can the other ; and, of course, that the principle on which com- 
pensation was allowed in the cases of the Encomium and the Comet, equally 
embraces that of the Enterprise. Both acts were, in truth, but municipal laws ; 
and, as such, neither could overrule the laws of nations, nor divest our citizens 
of their rights in the case under consideration. In the nature of things, the laws 
of nations, which have for their object the regulation of the intercourse of states, 
must be paramount to municipal laws, where their provisions happen to come 
into conflict. If not, they would be without authority. If this be so, there can 
be no discrimination between the three cases, and all ought to be allowed ; or, 
if not, none ; and, in that case, our citizens would have no just claim for com- 
pensation in either. It follows that the principle which embraces one embra- 
ces all. There can be no just distinction between them ; and I shall next pro- 
ceed to show that, in attempting to make a distinction w^here there is no differ- 
ence, the British negotiator has been compelled to assume the very point in 
controversy between the two governments. In doing this, I propose to follow 
his argument step by step, and prove the truth of my assertion at each step. 

He sets out with laying down the rule by which he asserts that those claims 
should be decided, which, he says, " is, that those claimants must be considered 
entitled to compensation who were lawfully in possession of their slaves within 
the British territory, and who were disturbed in their legal possession of those 
slaves by functionaries of the British government." I object not to the rule. 
If our citizens had no right to their slaves at any time after they entered the 
British territory — that is, if the mere fact of entering extinguished all right to 
them (for that is the amount of the rule) — they could, of course, have no claim 
on the British government, for the plain reason that the local authority, in seiz- 
ing and detaining the negroes, seized and detained what, by supposition, did 
not belong to them. That is clear enough ; but let us see the application : it 
is given in a few words. He says, " Now the owners of the slaves on board 
the Enterprise never were lawfully in possession of those slaves within the 
British territory ;" assigning for reason, " that, before the Enterprise arrived at 
Bermuda, slavery had been abolished in the British Empire"— an assertion 
■which I shall show, in a subsequent part of my remarks, to be erroneous. From 
that, and that alone, he comes to the conclusion, " that the negroes on board the 
Enterprise had, by entering within the British jurisdiction, acquired rights which 
the local courts were bound to protect " Such certainly would have been the 
case if they had been brought in, or entered voluntarily. He who enters volun- 
tarily the territory of another state, tacitly submits himself, with all his rights, 
to its laws, and is as much bound to submit to them as its citizens or subjects. 
No one denies that ; but that is not the present case. They entered not volun- 
tarily, but from necessity ; and the very point at issue is, whether the British 
municipal laws could divest their owners of property in their slaves on entering 
British territory, in cases such as the Enterprise, when the vessel has been 
forced into their territory by necessity, through an act of Providence, to save 



382 SPEECHES OP JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

the lives of those on board. We deny that they can, and maintain the opposite 
ground : that the law of nations, in such cases, interposes and protects the ves- 
sel and those on board, with their rights, against the municipal laws of the state, 
to which they have never submitted, and to w*hich it would be cruel and inhu- 
man, as well as unjust, to subject them. Such is clearly the point at issue be- 
tween the two governments ; and it is not less clear that it is the very point 
assumed by the British negotiator in the controversy. 

He felt, in assuming his ground, that the general principle was against him, 
according to which, the municipal laws yield to the laws of nations in such 
case ; and, in order to take himself out of its operation, he attempted to make a 
distinction equally novel and untenable. He asserts "that there is a distinc- 
tion between laws bearing on the personal liberty of man and laws bearing upon 
the property which man may claim in irrational animals or inanimate things ;" 
and concedes " that if a ship, containing such animals or things, were driven 
by stress of weather into a foreign port, it would be highly unjust that the own- 
er should be stripped of what belongs to him, through the application of the mu- 
nicipal law of the state to which he had not voluntarily submitted himself." 
Yes, it would be both unjust and inhuman ; and because it would be so, it is 
contrary to the law of nations, which is but the rules of justice and humanity 
applied to the intercourse of nations ; and therefore it is that it interposes in 
cases like the present, and places under its protection the rights of the unfortu- 
nate, even against the municipal laws of the place. 

But he asserts that the principle does not extend to the cases in which rights 
of property in persons are concerned (for such must be the meaning, or it is 
wholly irrelevant to the question at issue), because " there are three parties to 
the transaction — the owner of the cargo, the local authority, and the alleged 
slave ; and the third party is no less entitled than the first to appeal to the local 
authority for such protection as the law of the land may afford him." This is 
the position on which the British negotiator mainly rests his argument ; and if 
this fails, the whole must fall to the ground. It is not difficult to see, from 
what he says of two parties appealing to the local authority, that he tacitly puts 
aside the law of nations, and assumes the parties to be under the municipal 
law of the place ; and, also, that those laws, and not the law of nations, are 
the standard by which their rights are to be judged ; but is it not manifest that 
this is an assumption, in another form, of the point in controversy ? Against it, 
unsustained, and unsustainable, by authority or reason, I shall oppose what, to 
him, must be the highest authority — that of the British government itself — in 
the cases of the Comet and Encomium, backed by unanswerable reasons. 

If the distinction be true at all, between property in persons and property in 
things, or irrational animals, it was, to the full, as applicable to those cases as 
it is to that of the Enterprise. In them the right of ])roperty in persons was in- 
volved, and the three parties included, to the same extent as in that. Nor was 
personal liberty less concerned. As far as British laws could affect the rights 
of our citizens, the negroes belonging to the Comet and Encomium were as free 
as those belonging to the Enterprise. An act of Parliament, as has been shown, 
forbade their introduction, and forfeited the rights of their owners, thereby ma- 
king them free with rights to maintain, as far as British legislation could make 
them so ; and yet, after full and mature investigation and reflection for the space 
of ten years, it was admitted that the same rule applied to them which, it is con 
ceded, would apply in similar cases to property in things or irrational animals. 
NoAv I ask. If the act for the abolition of the slave-trade, which directly forbids 
the introduction of negroes as slaves, and forfeits the rights of their owners, did 
not, as we have seen, justify the distinction in the cases of the Comet and Enco- 
mium, now attempted to be made between the two descriptions of property, how 
could the act for the abolition of slavery justify it in the case of the Enterprise 1 
In the former, there were all the parties, with their respective rights, just the 



SPEECHES OP JOHN C. CALHOUN. 383 

same as in the latter ; and if the local authorities were not bound to recognise 
and protect the negroes in the one case, why, I ask, were they in the other ? 
Can a satisfactory answer be given ? And if not, what becomes of the dis- 
tinction, with all its consequences, attempted to be deduced from it ? 

The British negotiator, as if conscious of the weakness of the position, at- 
tempts immediately to fortify it. He says, " If, indeed, a municipal law be 
made which violates the laws of nations, a question of another kind may arise. 
But the municipal law which forbids slavery is no violation of the laws of na- 
tions. It is, on the contrary, in strict harmony with the laws of nations ; and, 
therefore, when slaves are liberated according to such municipal law, there is 
no wrong done, and there can be no compensation granted :" a position pregnant 
with meaning, as will hereafter appear, but I must say, like all his others, a 
mere assumption of the point at issue, expressed in vague and indefinite lan- 
guage. 

If, in asserting that a municipal law abolishing slavery is not a violation of 
the laws of nations, it is meant that it is not a violation of those laws for a state 
to abolish slavery which exists under its authority, it may be readily admitted, 
without prejudice to the rights of our citizens in the case in question, though it 
is a little remarkable that the British government allowed compensation to 
their own subjects by this very act under which slavery was abolished — author- 
ity in direct contradiction to the assertion that no compensation can be granted 
when the act is applied to the case of our citizens, forced, without their con- 
sent, into its territory. 

But if, instead of that, it be meant that all municipal laws not in violation of 
the laws of nations are valid against those laws, when they come in conflict 
with them, how can the distinction, attempted to be drawn between the rights 
of property in things or irrational animals, and in persons, be justified ? or how 
can the allowance of compensation in the cases of the Comet and Encomium 
be explained ? I put the question. Was the law for the abolition of the slave- 
trade a violation of the laws of nations ? And if not a violation, as it certainly 
was not, how came compensation to be granted in those cases ? Can an an- 
swer be given ? And if not, what becomes of the distinction attempted to be 
taken ? 

But another meaning may be intended — that it was no violation of the law 
of nations to extend the act for the abolition of slavery in the British territories 
to cases such as the Enterprise. If that is intended, it would be like all the 
other distinctions which have been attempted — but an assumption of the point 
in controversy. 

I have now stated, in his own words, every argument advanced by the Brit- 
ish negotiator to sustain the distinction which he has attempted between the 
cases of the Comet and Encomium and that of the Enterprise, and have, I trust, 
established, beyond controversy, that there is no rational ground Avhatever for 
the distinction. When again pressed on the subject by our minister, who was 
not satisfied with his arguments, he assumed the broad ground that Great Brit- 
ain had the right to forbid the recognition of slavery within her territory ; and 
as our claim was inconsistent with such right, it could not be allowed, and on 
this closed the correspondence. It is easy to see, if she has such right, in the 
broad and unqualified sense in which it is laid down, and applied to the case in 
question, it extends to all rights whatever, whether it be right of property in 
things and irrational animals, or growing out of personal relations, whether 
founded in consent or not. All are either the creatures of positive enactments, 
or subject to be regulated and controlled by municipal laws ; and she has just 
the same right to prohibit the recognition of any one, or all of those rights with- 
in her territory, as the one in question. But who can doubt that such prohibi- 
tion, if extended to cases of distress such as the Enterprise, would be a most 
flagrant violation of the laws of nations, as understood and acted on by all civil- 



384 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOL'N. 

ized nations^ and even as admitted and acted on by herself in the cases of the 
Comet and Encomium ? 

To us this is not a mere abstract question, nor one simply relating to the free 
use of the high seas. It comes nearer home. It is one of free and safe passage 
from one port to another of our Union ; as much so to us as a question touch- 
ing the free and safe use of the channels between England and Ireland on the 
one side, and the opposite coast of the Continent on the other, woidd be to 
Great Britain. To understand its deep importance to us, it must be borne in 
mind that the island of Bermuda lies but a short distance off our coast, and that 
the channel between the Bahama Islands and Florida is not less than two hun- 
dred miles in length, and on an average not more than fifty wide ; and that through 
this long, narrow, and difficult channel, the immense trade between our ports on 
the Gulf of Mexico and the Atlantic coast must pass, which, at no distant pe- 
riod, will constitute more than half of the trade of the Union. The principle 
set up by the Brhish government, if carried out to its full extent, would do 
much to close this all-important channel, by rendering it too hazardous for use. 
She has only to give an indefinite extension to the principle applied to the case 
of the Enterprise, and the work would be done ; and why has she not as good 
a right to apply it to a cargo of sugar or cotton as to the slaves who produced it ? 

I have now, I trust, established, to the satisfaction of the Senate, what I pro- 
posed when I commenced — that the principle on which compensation was al- 
lowed in the cases of the Comet and Encomium, equally embraces that of the 
Enterprise ; that no just distinction can be made between them ; apd that the 
British negotiator, in attempting to make a distinction, was forced to assume the 
point in controversy. And here I might conclude my remarks, as far as these 
resolutions are concerned ; but there are other questions connected with this 
subject, not less important, which demand attention, and which I shall now pro- 
ceed to consider. 

It is impossible to read the correspondence between the two governments 
without the impression that the question involved in the negotiation was one of 
deep embarrassment to the British ministry. The great length of the negotia- 
tion, considering the simplicity and paucity of the points involved, the long de- 
lay before an answer could be had at all, and the manifest embarrassment in 
making the distinction between the cases allowed and the one rejected, plainly 
indicate that there was some secret, unseen difficulty in the way, not directly 
belonging to the questions involved in the cases. What was that difficulty ? 
If I mistake not, it v/ill be found in the condition of things in England, and es- 
pecially in reference to those in power. It is my wish to do the ministry am- 
ple justice, as I believe they were desirous of doing us ; but it is not to be dis- 
guised that there was no small difficulty in the way, from the state of things 
under which they acted, and which I shall next explain. 

The present Whig ministry held, and still hold their power, as is well known, 
by a precarious tenure. Their party is, in fact, in a minority, and can only 
support themselves against the powerful party in opposition by such adven- 
titious aid as can be conciliated. Among the subdivisions of party in Great 
Britian, the Abolition interest is one of no little power, and it will be seen at 
once that the question involved in the negotiation is one in reference to which 
they would have no little sensibility. Like all other fanatics, they have little 
regard either to reason or justice, where the object of their enthusiasm is con- 
cerned. To do us justice, without offending such a party, in such a case, was no 
easy task ; and to offend them, without losing the ascendency of their party 
and the reins of government, was almost impossible. The ministry had to act 
imder these conflicting considerations ; and I intend no disrespect in saymg 
that the desire of conciliating so strong a party, and thereby retaining place, 
when opposed to the demands of justice, could not be without its weight. The 
course, accordingly, taken, was such as might have been anticipated from these 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN, 3S5 

opposing motives. To satisfy our urgent claim for justice, compensation was 
allowed in two of the cases ; and, to avoid offending a powerful and zealous par- 
ty, a distinction was taken between them and the other, the effects of which 
would be to close the door against future demands of the kind. I mean not to 
say that deliberate and intentional injustice was done ; but simply, that these 
conflicting causes, which it is obvious, from the circumstances of the case, must 
have been in operation, would, by a natural and an unseen bias, lead to that re- 
sult. 

But another question of far greater magnitude, grbwing out of the foregoing, 
presents itself for consideration : To what must that result finally lead, if Great 
Britain should persist in the decision which it has made ? I hold it impossible 
for her to maintain the position she has taken. She must abandon it as un- 
tenable, and take one of two other positions ; either that her municipal laws are 
paramount to the law of nations, when they come into conflict ; or that slavery 
— the right of man to hold property in man — is against the law of nations. It 
is only on the one or other of these suppositions that the act for abolishing 
slavery can have the force she attributes to it. 

The former she cannot take, without virtually abolishing the entire system 
of international laws. She could not think of assuming that her municipal 
laws were paramount, without admitting those of other states also to be so ; 
which would be to annul the system, and substitute in its place universal vio- 
lence, discord, and conflict. This would force her on the other alternative, 
which, if it were true, would give her a solid foundation for the rejection of 
our claim, on the incontestable principle that the laws of nations would not en- 
force that which violates themselves. Nor are there wanting indications, in 
the correspondence (to some of which I have alluded), that the position she 
has taken in reference to the Enterprise is but preliminary to the adoption of 
that alternative. There are, however, many difliculties to be got over before 
she can openly take it. 

It would require, in the first place, no small share of effrontery for a nation 
which has been the greatest slave-dealer on earth ; a nation which has dragged 
a greater number of Africans from their native shores to people her possessions, 
and to sell to others, and which forced our ancestors to purchase slaves from 
her against their remonstrance, while colonies (not, improbably, the ancestors 
of the owners of those slaves to purchase the ancestors of the slaves, for which 
she now refuses compensation) — it would, I repeat, require no small effrontery 
to turn round and declare that she neither had, nor could have, the right to the 
property she sold us ; nor could we, without deep crime, retain possession. We 
all know what such conduct would be called among individuals, without, indeed, 
followed by a tender back of the purchase money, with ample compensation for 
damages ; and there is no good reason why it should be called by a less harsh 
epithet when applied to the conduct of nations. 

But there is another dilficulty. The avowal of the principle would place her 
in conflict with all the authorities on the law of nations, and the custom of all 
ages, past and present, and would bring her into collision with all nations, 
whose institutions would be outlawed by the avowal ; and what, perhaps, she 
would most regard, it would put her in conflict with herself. Yes, she who 
refused to compensate our citizens for property unjustly seized and detained 
under her authority, on the ground that she had forbade the recognition of 
slavery in her territory, had then, and has at this day, hundreds of thousands 
of slaves in the most wretched condition, held by her subjects in her Eastern 
possessions ; and worse, by herself. With all her boast, she is a slaveholder, 
and hires out and receives hire for slaves. I speak on high authority — the 
Asiatic Journal for 1838, printed in her own metropohs. 

Here the secretary read the following extracts from page 221 : 

" Government of Slaves l\ Malabar. — We know that there is not a ser- 

C cc 



3S6 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

vant of government in the South of India who is not intimately acquainted with 
the alarming fact, that hundreds of thousands of his fellow-creatures are fettered 
down for life to the degraded destiny of slavery. We know that these unfortu- 
nate beings are not, as is the case in other countries, serfs of the soil, and inca- 
pable of being transferred, at the pleasure of their owners, from one estate to 
another. No : they are daily sold, like cattle, by one proprietor to another ; the 
husband is separated from the wife, and the parent from the child. They are 
loaded with every indignity ; the utmost possible quantity of labour is exacted 
from them, and the most meager fare that human nature can possibly subsist on 
is doled out to support them. The slave population is composed of a great 
variety of classes : the descendants of those who have been taken prisoners in 
time of war, persons who have been kidnapped from the neighbouring states, 
people who have been born under such circumstances as that they are consid- 
ered without the pale of the ordinary castes ; and others who have been smug- 
gled from the coast of Africa, torn from their country and their kindred, and 
destined to a more wretched lot, and, as will be seen, to a more enduring cap- 
tivity than their brethren of the Western world. Will it be believed, that gov- 
ernment itself participates in this description of property ; that it actually holds 
possession of slaves, and lets them out for hire to the cultivators of the country, 
the rent of a whole family being two fanams, or half a rupee per annum ?" 

But why dwell on these comparatively few slaves ? The whole of Hindos- 
tan, with the adjacent possessions, is one magnificent plantation, peopled by 
more than one hundred millions of slaves, belonging to a company of gentlemen 
in England, called the East India Company, whose power is far more unlimit- 
ed and despotic than that of any Southern planter over his slaves : a power 
upheld by the sword and bayonet, exacting more, and leaving less, by far, of the 
product of their labour to the subject race than is left under our own system, 
with much less regard to their comfort in sickness and age. This vast system 
of servitude carries with itself the elements of increase : not, it is true, by the 
African slave-trade, but by means not less inhuman, that of organizing the sub- 
ject race into armies, and exhausting their strength and life in reducing all 
around to the same state of servitude. 

But it may be said, that the East India Company is but a department of the 
Brhish government, through which it exercises its control, and holds in sub- 
jection that vast region. Be it so. I stickle not for nice distinctions. But 
how stands the case under this aspect? If it be contrary to the laws of nature, 
or nations, for man to hold man in subjection individually, is it not equally con- 
trary for a body of men to hold another in subjection ? And if that be true, is 
it not as much so for one nation to hold another in subjection ? If man indi- 
vidually has an absolute right to self-government, have not men aggregated into 
states, or nations, an equal right? If there be a difference, is not the right the 
more perfect in a people, or nation, than in the individuals who compose it? 
And is not the subjection of one people to another usually accompanied with 
at least as much abuse, cruelty, and oppression, as that of one individual to 
another ? Is it possible to make a distinction which shall justify the one and 
condemn the other ? And if not, what right, then, I ask, has Great Britain to 
hold India in subjection, if it be contrary to the laws of nature or nations fur 
one man to hold another in subjection ? Or, what right to hold Canada, or her 
numerous subject colonies, all over the globe ? Or, to come nearer to the point, 
in what light does it place her boasted abolition of slavery in the West Indies 1 
What has she, in reality, done there, but to break the comparatively mild and 
guardian authority of the master, and to substitute in its place her own direct 
and unlimited power? What but to replace the overseer by the army, the 
sheritT, the constable, and the tax-collector? Has she made her slaves free? 
given them the right of self-government? Is it not mockery to call their pres- 
ent subject condition freedom ? What would she call it if it were hers — 11", by 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 387 

some calamity to her and the civilized world, she should fall under similar sub- 
jection to France, or some other power ? Would she call that freedom, or the 
most galling and intolerable slavery ? 

But I approach near home. I cross the Atlantic, passing unnoticed subju- 
gated Ireland, with her eight millions of people, and only ninety thousand vo- 
ters, and placing myself on the boasted shores of England herself, I ask, How 
will the principle work there ? 

It was estimated by Burke, if my memory serves me, shortly before the be- 
ginning of this century, that the British public, estimating as such all who ex- 
ercised influence over the government, did not exceed 200,000 individuals. 
Since then it has, no doubt, greatly increased by the extension of the right of 
suffi-age and other causes. Say that it has trebled or quadrupled, and,*to be 
liberal, that it amounts to seven or eight hundred thousand. In this small por- 
tion, then, is vested the supreme control and dominion over the twenty-five 
millions, which constitute the population of the British Isles. If, then, it be 
contrary to the laws of nature or nations for man to hold man in subjection, 
or one nation another, how can a small part or class of a community hold the' 
rest? Or on what principle, according to that maxim, can these few hundred 
thousands hold so many millions ? If the right of self-government forbids the 
subjection of one man to another, does it not equally forbid that of a small por- 
tion of the community over the residue ? And if so, must not the maxim termi- 
nate in the utter overthrow of the present political and social system of Great 
Britain and the rest of Europe ? 

What a picture is presented to the mind in contemplating the present state 
of things in England ! We behold a small island in the German Ocean under 
the absolute control of a few hundred thousand individuals, holdino- in unlimited 
subjection not less than one hundred and fifty millions of human beino-s, dis- 
persed over every part of the globe, making not less than two hundred to 'each 
of the dominant class ; and yet that class propagating a maxim, with more than 
missionary zeal, that strikes at the foundation of this mighty power ! I would 
say to her, and other powers impelled by like madness, You are attempting 
what will prove impossible. You lay down a maxim which you would limit in 
its application, so as to suit your own safety and convenience. Vain hope in 
this inquiring and investigating age. You cannot make a monopoly of a principle 
so as to vend it for your own benefit. It will be carried out to its ultimate re- 
sults, when its reaction will be terrific on your social and political condition. 
Already it begins to show its fruits. The subject mass of your population, un- 
der the name of Chartists, are now clamouring for the benefit of the maxim, as 
applied to themselves. They demand practically, in their case, the benefit of 
the principle you propagate at a distance ; and for so doing, are cut down with- 
out mercy. My object is not to censure the course adopted towards them. It 
is not for me to judge what your safety may require. I am simply showing that 
the maxim on which you profess to act in relation to the West India colonies, 
and which you must apply to our case, in order to sustain your decision, begins 
to. be applied to your own at home. It is only the beginning. Already it is 
passing into a higher and more intellectual class, who are applying it to the 
present social and political condition of Europe. A body of men, not incon- 
siderable either for numbers or talents, on the Continent of Europe, and par- 
ticularly in France, are busy in making such application. They are men not 
of a character to stop short, or be intimidated by final results. • Already they 
proclaim that social or political slavery — that which results from the subjection 
of the great mass of society to the small governing class, is worse than domes- 
tic slavery — that which exists within the Southern portion of our Union, in its 
mildest and most mitigated form. In illustration, I will read an extract from 
the Paris correspondent of the National Intelligencer, said to be Mr. Walsh, 
taken from the work of the Abb6 Lamannais : 



388 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOVW. 

" The abbe exclaims, ' In good sooth, T am not in the least astonished th'di 
so many, viewing only the material side of things, and the present separated 
from the future, should, in the midst of our boasted civilization, regret the an- 
cient domestic slavery. Thirty-three millions of Frenchmen, true serfs of this 
era, crouch ignominiously under the domination of two hundred thousand priv- 
ileged masters, and supreme dispensers of their lot. Such is the fruit of our 
struggles for half a century. Slaves, arise and break your chains ! let them no 
longer degrade in you the name of man ! Eighteen centuries of Christianity 
have elapsed, and we still live under the pagan system.' " 

To this I add another extract, taken from another of the public journals, which 
will give some idea what are the fruits of slavery in the form so vehemently de- 
nounced by the abbe : 

" England and Ireland. — It's enough to make one's heart bleed, if all were 
true in the winter pictures drawn of the starved, suffering condition of the peas- 
antry in the bogs — their cabins inundated with rains and mud — the bodies of 
the labourers saturated with wet, sleeping on fireless hearths, and peat at the ex- 
orbitant price of a penny a sod — too exorbitant to cook the very few potatoes 
they may have. Parallel to these scenes, the English operatives are stated to 
be reduced to dire extremity; and around these dark and gloomy spots we have 
narratives of the luxurious and voluptuous life led by the favoured few of the 
gentry and nobility." 

If such is the condition of what the abbe calls " the serfs of this era" in the 
most civilized country in Europe, well may our domestic slave, in the midst 
of plenty, and under the guardian care of a master, identified with him in inter- 
est, rejoice at his comparative happy condition. The exaggerated picture drawn 
by the most infuriated Abolitionist can find nothing in the whole region of the 
South to equal this picture of misery and want ; and yet it is Great Britain, 
wherein such a contrast of wretchedness and voluptuousness exists, that wages 
such unrelenting hostility against domestic slavery I She wars against herself. 
The maxim she now pushes against others will, in turn, be pushed against her. 
She is preparing the way for universal discord within and without. The move- 
ment began with Wilberforce, and other misguided men like him, who, although 
humane and benevolent, looked at the surface of things, with little knowledge 
of the springs of human action, or the principles on which the existing social 
and political fabric of Europe rests ; and, I may add, like all other enthusiasts, 
without much regard as to the means employed in accomplishing a favourite 
object. 

There never before existed on this globe a nation that presented such a spec- 
tacle as Great Britain does at this moment. She seems to be actuated by the 
most opposite and conflicting motives. While apparently actuated by so much 
zeal, on this side of the Cape of Good Hope, in the cause of humanity and lib- 
erty, she appears to be actuated, on the other side, by a spirit of conquest and 
domination not surpassed by Rome in the haughtiest days of the Republic. 
She has just subjected, and added to her vast empire in the East, the country 
between India and Persia ; and is at this moment, if we are to believe recent 
accounts, preparing an extensive expedition against the oldest of nations, con- 
taining a population not less than a fourth of the human race — a nation that 
lias lived tluough generations of nations, and which was old and civilized be- 
fore the governments of Western Europe came into existence ; I need scarcely 
say I refer to China. Let me add to her other claims to respect and venera- 
tion, that, of all despotic governments, it seems to me (judging from the scanty 
evidence we have of a people so secluded) it is the wisest and most parental. 
And for what, if we may believe report, is Great Britain about to wage war 
against this venerable and peaceful people ? To force on them the use of opi- 
um, the product of her slaves on her Hindu plantation, against the resistance of 
the Chinese government. And what is the extent and character of this trade ? 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 389 

It is calculated it would have reached the last year, had it not been interrupted, 
forty thousand chests, or more than live millions of pounds, worth about twenty 
millions of dollars ; sufficient, by estimate, to supply thirteen or fourteen millions 
of opium smokers, and to cause a greater destruction of life annually than the 
aggregate number of negroes in the British West India colonies, whose condi- 
tion has been the cause of so much morbid sympathy. It is against the trade 
in this pernicious and poisonous drug, carried on by fraud and smuggling, that 
the Chinese government has taken the most energetic and decisive measures, 
as it was called to do by the highest consideration of policy and humanity. Of 
all deaths, none is more wretched than that occasioned by this seductive, but 
fatal drug. The subject slowly expires, with all the powers and functions of 
mind and body completely exhausted, a spectacle odious to behold. 

Such is the trade which, it is said, the expedition is intended to enforce, 
against the decrees of the Chinese government. The rumour, I hope, is "round- 
less. I hope, for the honour of England, for the honour of modern civilization, 
and the Christian name, that its object is far different ; and that, instead of en- 
forcing a traffic so abominable, it is intended to co-operate with the wise and 
humane policy of the Chinese government in suppressing it ; and that, so far 
from aiding smugglers and ruffians, it is intended to seize and punish them 
as they deserve. If, however, rumour should prove true, what a contrast it 
would exhibit between the conduct of Great Britain in that and this quarter of 
the globe ! There wc find her extending her power and dominion, regardless 
of justice or humanity; while here we find her in the depth of sympathy for a 
band of negroes, brought into our ports under a suspicion of murder and piracy, 
intermeddling in their behalf with our own and the Spanish governments, and 
that, too, at the solicitation of an abolition society of her own subjects ! Strange 
as this may seem, it is true. I hold in my hand evidence of the fact, which I 
request the secretary to read. 

The secretary then read the following : 

"Foreign Office, London, December 23, 1839. 
" Sir — With reference to the memorial of the Glasgow Emancipation Soci- 
ety, dated the 25th of October last, on behalf of the negroes vdio took posses- 
sion of the Amistad, and were subsequently carried to New-London, in the Uni- 
ted States of America, I am directed by Viscount Palmerston to state to you, 
for the information of the above-mentioned society, that his lordship has direct- 
ed her majesty's minister at Washington to interpose his good offices in their 
behalf, in order that they may be restored to liberty ; and his lordship has far- 
ther instructed her majesty's charge d'affaires at Madrid to call upon the Span- 
ish government to issue immediately strict orders to the authorities of Cuba, 
that, if the request of the Spanish minister at Washington is complied with, the 
negroes in question may be put in possession of their liberties. 

" Her majesty's charge d'affaires at Madrid has likewise been instructed to 
urge the Spanish government to cause the laws against the slave-trade to be en- 
forced against Messrs. Ruiz and Montez, and against all other Spanish subjects 
concerned in the transaction in question. 

" I am, sir, your most obedient, humble servant, 

"W. Fox Strang WAVS, 
"Wm. p. Patton, Esq., &c., Glasgow." 

Yes, strange ways indeed, if it might be permitted, on so grave an occasion, 
to allude to a name. Strange ways — making millions of slaves in one hemi- 
sphere — forcing, by fire and sword, the poisonous product of their labour on an 
old and civilized people, while, in another, interposing, in a flood of sympathy, 
in behalf of a band of barbarous slaves, with hands imbrued with blood ! I trust 
such officious intermeddling will be met as it deserves. Has it come to this, 
that we cannot touch a subject connected with an African without the inter- 



390 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

ference of another government, at the solicitation of a foreign society, instiga- 
ted, no doubt, by a foreign faction among om-selves ? I mean not a faction of 
foreigners, but of our own people, who, in their fanatical zeal, have lost every 
feeling belonging to an American, and transferred their allegiance to a foreign 

power. 

In making these remarks, I have not been actuated by feelings of hostility 
towards Great Britain. My motive is far different. With all her faults, I ad- 
mire and esteem her for many and great qualities. My desire is peace. It is 
the wish of the civilized world, and I would regard war between the two kin- 
dred people as among the greatest of calamities. But justice is indispensable 
to peace among nations. Our maxim ought to be, neither to do, nor submit to 
-vvTong — to ask for nothing but justice, and to accept nothing less ; but never 
disturb peaceful relations till every means of obtaining justice has been tried in 
vain. I have, in this case, acted in that spirit. I believe, solemely, that jus- 
tice has been withheld. To prove that has been my object. I trust I have 
done it to the satisfaction of the Senate. I also believe that justice has been 
withheld on grounds utterly untenable, and which, if persisted in, must lead, in 
the end, to the avowal of a principle, on the part of Great Britain, that must 
strike a fatal blow at the peace of the two countries ; and, in its reaction, on 
the social and political condition of Great Britain and the rest of Europe. Thus 
belie\ang, I have attempted to point to some of the disastrous consequences 
which must follow, with the view of rousing attention to the question at issue 
between the two governments in the case under consideration, in order to ob- 
tain redress of injury. If, in making my remarks, I have assailed her, it is'hJe- 
cause we have been assailed, as I conceive, in assuming the principle on which 
justice has been withheld. 

The immediate object I had for introducing these resolutions was to take the 
sense of the Senate on the subject to which they refer ; and which embraces 
a principle vital to us of the South, and of deep interest to the rest of the Union. 
My conviction is strong that we have justice on our side ; and I wish to afford 
to our brethren in the other sections an opportunity of exhibiting a proof of their 
attachment to the common interest, by sustaining a cause where we are partic- 
ularly concerned, as we did, at the last session, by sustaining unanimously one 
where thev were.* 

I have no particular wish as to the mode of disposing of the resolutions. All 
I desire is a direct vote on them ; but I am indifferent whether they shall be 
first referred and reported on, or be discussed and decided on without reference. 
I leave the Senate to decide which com-se shall be adopted. 



XX VI. 

SPEECH ON THE BANKRUPT BILL, JUNE 2, 1840, 

Mr. Calhoun said: It was impossible to listen to this discussion withok 
being struck with the difficulty of the subject, and the number and delicacy of 
the questions involved. The relation of creditor and debtor was, indeed, the 
all-pervading one in our country, and ought not to be touched without much de- 
liberation and caution. This bill, and the amendment proposed, taken together, 
embrace this universal relation, almost to its utmost extent and minutest rami- 
fication, and ought to be examined with corresponding care and attention. 

I was at first inclined to favour the bill ; but the discussion and reflection have 
brought me to the conclusion that it is unconstitutional, and therefore could not 
recefve my support, if there were no other objection. The power of Congress 
* Referring to the case of Maine. 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 391 

is restrictecl, by the Constitution, to establishing laws on the subject of bank- 
ruptcies. That isthe limit of its power. It cannot go an inch beyond, on the sub- 
ject of this bill, without violating the Constitution. Thus far all must be agreed. 

After full and deliberate investigation, I cannot regard this bill as one on the 
subject of bankruptcy. It relates, in my opinion, to another, but connected, sub- 
ject, not embraced in the Constitution — that of insolvency, miscalled vohmtar}' 
bankruptcy, as I hope to be able to establish. . 

In order to understand the ground on which my opinion rests, it will be ne- 
cessary to premise — what none have denied, or can deny — that, at the time of 
the formation of the Constitution, there existed, both in this country and in Eng- 
land, from which we derived our laws, two separate systems of laws, growing 
out of the relation of creditor and debtor : the one known as the system of bank- 
ruptcy, and the other of insolvency. The two systems had existed together in 
England for centuries, and in this country from an early period of our colonial 
governments. It would be useless to waste the time of the Senate in accumu- 
lating proof of a fact beyond controversy. This very bill, and the only one 
ever passed by Congress on the sij^ject of bankruptcy, bear internal evidence 
of the fact. The decisions of judges recognise the distinction, and elementary 
works place them under distinct heads, and in separate chapters. The distinc- 
tion is one neither of form nor accident. The two systems, in commercial 
communities, naturally grow up out of the relation of creditor and debtor, but 
originate in different motives, and have different objects, which give different 
character and genius to the two. 

The system of insolvent laws grew out of the debtor side of the relation, and 
originated in motives of humanity for the unfortunate but honest debtor, depri- 
ved of the means of paying his debts by some of the various unforeseen acci- 
dents of life, and, in consequence, exposed to the oppression of unfeeling cred- 
itors. Their object is to relieve him from the power of his creditors, on an 
honest surrender of all his property for their benefit. 

Very different are the motives and objects in which the laws of bankruptcy 
originated. They grew out of the creditor side of the relation, and form a por- 
tion of the mercantile or commercial code of laws. Their leading object is to 
strengthen the system of conunercial credit, with the view of invigorating and 
extending commercial enterprise ; and we accordingly find that the system 
commenced in the commercial Republic of Venice, and has been confined ex- 
clusively, as far as my knowledge extends, to commercial communities. Though 
growing out of the same relation, and to that extent connected, the two are as 
different in genius and character as the different aspects of the relation out of 
which they grow. The one looks to credit and the creditor interest, and the 
other to the debtor, and the obligations of humanity towards him when, with- 
out demerit on his part, he is utterly deprived of the means of meeting his en- 
gagements. 

It is true, indeed, that the insolvent system, in its humanity for the debtor, is 
not unmindful of the interest of the creditor ; and the bankrupt system, in guard- 
ing the interest of credit and creditors, does not forget that of the debtor. But 
this, though it has, to a certain extent, blended the two, and caused some con- 
fusion in practice, cannot obliterate the essential and broad distinction between 
them. Nor is it necessary, with my object, to trace the history of the legisla- 
tion in relation to them, in this country and England, with the judicial decisions, 
in order to show that the two systems, though blended and confounded in part, 
have, nevertheless, retained their distinctive features. It is enough for me that 
there were, when the Constitution was adopted, two separate systems, known 
both to our laws and the English, such as I have described. 

I next assert, that the members of the Convention that framed the Constitu- 
tion could not have been ignorant of the fact that there were two such systems, 
known by the nam.e.$ of bankrupt and insolvent laws. The Convention abounded 



392 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

with, able lawyers, many of whom were among the most distinguished and in- 
fluential members of the body, and could not but be as perfectly familiar with 
the whole subject as we now are, after this long and able discussion. 

Now sir, I ask, Is it to be supposed that, if they intended to delegate to Con- 
gress power over both systems, these able and cautious men, so familiar with 
the distinction between them, would not have included both by name ? And is 
it not conclusive, that in not doing so, and in limiting the grant to bankruptcy 
alone, that it was their intention to grant that only, to the exclusion of insolven- 
cy ? Do we not feel that, if we were framing a constitution, with our present 
knowledge of the subject, that such would be our course ? If we intended to 
grant both, would we not insert both ? And would not the insertion of bank- 
ruptcy only be intended to exclude insolvency ? The conclusion appears ir- 
resistible. How is it met? By admitting (for it cannot be denied) that such 
would be the case if the words of the Constitution are to be taken in their le- 
gal sense ; but it is asserted that our Constitution was made for the people at 
large ; and on this assumption it is inferred that it ought to be interpreted, in all 
cases, according to the ordinary meaning of ihe words used, and not in their le- 
gal sense. Having arrived at this conclusion, it is next contended that, accord- 
ing to their ordinary sense, bankruptcy and insolvency are convertible terras, 
and of the same meaning ; and it is thence inferred that the framers of the Con- 
stitution intended to comprehend both under the former. 

I might well deny both the premises and conclusion. It might be easily 
shown that in many cases the words of the Constitution must, and have been, 
constantly taken in their legal sense ; and that, according to the established rules 
of construction, they ought to be so taken in this. It might be also shown that 
they are not convertible in common use ; that insolvency is the general term, 
and includes bankruptcy. But I deem all this imnecessary. I admit, for the 
sake of argiunent, both premises and conclusion, but deny the application. Ta- 
ken unconnected with other words, insolvency and bankruptcy may be admitted 
to have the same meaning, and that the one may stand for the other ; but that 
is not this case. In the Constitution, bankruptcy stands in connexion with law ; 
which, attaching itself to it, fixes its meaning. Now, sir, I assert, however the 
terms bankruptcy and insolvency may be confounded, standing alone, no one — 
no, not the most uninformed, confounds bankrupt laws with insolvent laws. 
They never call the insolvent laws of the states bankrupt laws. They may 
not be able to draw the distinction with any precision, but they know that they 
are not the same. 

But admit that there is doubt. I ask. What is the rule of interpretation to be 
applied to the Constitution in case of doubt ^ It is a fundamental principle, that 
Congress has no right to exercise any power whatever that is not granted by 
the Constitution. To do so would be an act of usurpation, and, if knowingly 
done, a violation of oath. Hence, in cases of doubt, it is a just caution to take 
the words in their limited sense, and not their broad and comprehensive — a 
rule at all times considered as essential to the safety of the Constitution by those 
of the State Rights creed. Apply it to this case, and the controversy ceas- 
es. Let me add, that there are few subjects in reference to which it is more 
necessary to apply the most rigid rules of construction than to that of the all- 
pervading relation of debtor and creditor. It is one on which the slightest en- 
croachment is dangerous, and might, in its consequences, draw into the vortex 
of this government the whole of that vast relation in its fullest extent, and with 
it the entire money transactions of the Union, as will be manifest in the sequel. 

If, after what has been said, doubts should still exist, they may be removed 
by turning to another provision of the Constitution, standing in close connexion 
with this. I have said that the bankrupt system grew out of the commercial 
policy, and made a part of it. The .provision I refer to is that which grants to 
Congress the power of regulating commerce. This grant carried with it several 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOrX. 393 

Others, as connected powers ; such as that of coinmg money and regulating 
the value thereof; fixing a uniform standard of weights and measures : and we 
accordingly find these, with the power of establishing the laws of bankruptcy, 
all grouped together, and following, in close connexion, the parent power of 
regulating commerce ; just where we would expect to find it, regarded in the 
light I do, but not if taken in the broader and more general sense of insolvency, 
in which it would comprehend far more than what relates to trade, and what, 
under our system, belongs to the mass of local and particular powers reserved to 
the states. 

So irresistible does the conclusion at which I have arrived appear to me, 
that I have been forced to inquire how it is that any one in favour of a strict 
construction of the Constitution could come to a different, and can find but one 
explanation. We are in the midst of great pecuniary embarrassment, suddenly 
succeeding a period of several years of an opposite character. There are thou- 
sands who, but a short time since, regarded themselves as rich, now reduced 
to poverty, with a weight of debt bearing them down, from which they can never 
expect to extricate themselves without the interposition of government. The 
prevailing opinion is, that the legislatures of the states can apply no remedy 
beyond the discharge of the person, and that there is no other power which 
can give a discharge against debts, and relief from the burden, but Congress. 
That so large and enterprising a portion of our citizens should be reduced to so 
hopeless a condition, makes a strong appeal to our feelings, of which I am far 
from being insensible. It is not at all surprising that, under the influence of 
such feelings, judgment should yield to sympathy ; and that, under the impres- 
sion there is no other remedy, one should be sought in a loose and unsafe con- 
struction of the Constitution ; and hence the broad construction contended for. 
I appeal to the candour of my State Rights friend, who difiers from me on this 
occasion, if what I state is not the true explanation. If I mistake not, it might 
be safely asserted that there is not one among them who would yield the power 
to this government, if he believed the state legislature could apply a remedy. 
I, on my part, neither assert nor deny that they can; but I do assert that, if 
the states cannot discharge the debt, neither can Congress. 

I hold it clear, if by discharging the debt be meant releasing the obligation 
of a contract, either in whole or in part, that neither this government nor 
that of any of the states possesses such a power. The obligation of a contract 
belongs not to the civil or political code, but to the moral. It is imposed by an 
authority higher than human, and can be discharged by no power under heaven 
without the assent of him to whom the obligation is due. It is binding on con- 
science itself. If a discharged debtor had in his pocket the discharges of every 
government on earth, he would not be an honest man should he refuse to pay 
his debts, if ever in his power. In this sense, this government is just as pow- 
erless to discharge a debt as the most inconsiderable state in the Union. 

But the subject may be viewed in a ditierent light. It may be meant that 
government is not bound to lend its aid to a hard and griping creditor in the 
cruel attempt to coerce the honest but unfortunate debtor, who has lost his all, 
to pa}- his debts, when it is utterly beyond his power. Certainly not ; and, in 
that sense, every government has the right to discharge the debt, as well as the 
person. They both stand on the same ground. It is a question of mere discre- 
tion when, and in what manner, the government will give its aid to enforce the 
demand of the creditor ; but, thus regarded, state legislatures are just as com- 
petent to discharge the debt, under their insolvent laws, or, in the absence of 
our legislation, under their bankrupt laws, as Congress itself. In proof of what 
is asserted, I might cite the laws of many of the states, and my own among 
others, which discharge the debt, as well as the person, as far as the suing 
creditors are concerned — the constitutionality of which, so far as I know, has 
never been questioned. It would, indeed, be a riolent and unreasonable pre- 

Ddd 



394 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

sumption to suppose that, in granting the right to establish laws of bankruptcy, 
the states intended to leave Congress free to discharge the debt, and, at the 
same time, imposed on themselves an obligation to forbear the exercise of the 
same power in the case of insolvency or bankruptcy, should Congress decline 
to exercise the power granted. Nor can such be the intention of the provision 
in the Constitution which prohibits the states from passing laws impairing the 
obligation of contracts. The history of the times amply proves that the prohi- 
bition was intended to apply to stay laws, and others of a similar description, 
which state legislatures had been in the habit of passing, in periods like the 
present, when a sudden contraction of our always unstable currency had suc- 
ceeded a wide expansion, and when large portions of the community, with 
ample means, found themselves unable to meet their debts, but who, with in- 
dulgence, would be able to meet all demands. The objects of all these laws 
were either to afford time, or to protect the debtor against the hardship of pay- 
ing the same nominal amount, but in reality a much greater, in consequence of 
a change in the standard of value, resulting from a contraction of the currency. 
As plausible as was the object, experience had proved it to be destructive of 
credit and injurious to the community, and hence the prohibition. To extend 
it beyond, and give a construction which would compel the states, whether 
they would or not, to lend their aid to the merciless creditor, who would re- 
duce to despair an innocent, but unfortunate debtor, without benefit to himself, 
and thereby to render him a burden to himself and society, would be abhorrent 
to every feeling of humanity and principle of sound policy. It is impossible 
for me to believe that such was the intention of the Constitution. Nor can I 
be reconciled to a construction which must have the effect of enlarging the 
power of this government, and contracting those of the states, in relation to the 
delicate and all-pervading relation of debtor and creditor, by throwing on the 
side of the former the powerful consideration of humanity and sympathy for a 
large and unfortunate portion of the community. 

Having now established, I trust, satisfactorily, that the framers of the Con- 
stitution, in restricting the power of Congress to establishing laws of bank- 
ruptcy, intended to exclude those of insolvency, it remains to be shown that 
this bill belongs to the latter class, and is, therefore, unconstitutional. And 
here I might shift the burden of proof to the other side, and demand of them 
to prove that it is a bankrupt, and not an insolvent bill. They who claim to 
exercise a power under this government are bound to exhibit the grant, and to 
prove that the power proposed to be exercised is within its limits — to show, in 
this case, what a law of bankruptcy is— how far its limits extend — that this bill 
does not go. beyond; and, in particular, that it does not cover the ground be- 
longing to the connected power of insolvency reserved to the states. Till that 
is done, they have no right to expect our votes in its favour. The task is im- 
possible. Every feature of the bill bears the impress of insolvency. The 
arguments urged for and against it demonstrate it. Have its advocates utter- 
ed a word, in urging its passage, in favour of credit or creditors ? On the con- 
trary, have not their warm and eloquent appeals been in behalf of the unfortu- 
nate and honest debtors, who have been reduced to hopeless insolvency by the 
embarrassment of the times ? And has it not been attacked on the ground that 
it would be ruinous to credit, and unjust and oppressive to creditors ? Every 
word uttered on either side proves that it belongs to the class of insolvent 
laws, and is, therefore, unconstitutional. As such, it cannot receive my sup- 
port, were it free from other objections. 

But as decidedly as I am opposed to the bill, I am still more so to the amend- 
ment proposed as a substhute by the minority of the committee. It contains a 
provision in favour of insolvent debtors similar to that of the bill, and is, of 
course, liable to the same objections. But it goes much farther, and provides 
for a comprehensive system of compulsory bankruptcy, as it is called ; that is. 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 395 

as I unaersLEtnd it, bankruptcy as intended by the Constitution. As far as the 
provisions of this portion of the bill are limited to individuals, I admit its consti- 
tutionality, but object to it on the broad ground of expediency. 

It is impossible for any one to doubt, who will examine the history of our 
legislation, that there must be some powerful objection to the passage of laws 
of bankruptcy by Congress. No other proof is needed than the fact, that 
although the government has been in operation for more than half a century, 
and the power is unquestionable, yet, in that long period, notwithstanding the 
numerous and strenuous efforts that have been made, but a single act has 
passed ; and that, though limited to tive years, was repealed before the expira- 
tion of the time. If we inquire into the cause, we shall find it, in part at least, 
in the genius of our institutions and the character of our people, which are ab- 
horrent to whatever is arbitrary or harsh in legislation, than which there is 
none, in its wide range, more so than the laws of bankruptcy. They give the 
creditors the most summary and efficient process against the debtors, of which 
we may be satisfied by looking into the provisions of this amendment. On the 
mere suspicion of insolvency or fraud, one or more creditors, to whom not less 
than five hundred dollars is due, may take out a process of bankruptcy against 
the debtor, by applying to a judge of the Federal Court; and on his order, with- 
out jury, he may be divested of his property, and the whole of his estate placed 
in the hands of assignees, with authority to wind up and settle his afl^airs, and 
distribute the proceeds among his creditors. 

But, as repugnant as a process so summary and arbitrary is to the genius and 
character of our institutions and people, there is another objection connected 
with our currency still stronger. It has been the misfortune of our country at 
all times, with the exception of some short intervals, to be cursed with an 
unsound and unstable paper currency, subject to sudden and violent expan- 
sions and contractions. It belongs to such currency, in the period of its ex- 
pansion, to excite a universal spirit of enterprise and speculation, particularly 
in a country so new and rapidly increasing, and of such vast capacity for in- 
crease as ours. Universal indebtedness is the result, followed, on the contrac- 
tion, by wide-spread embarrassment, reducing thousands to hopeless insolvency, 
and leaving a still greater number, though possessed of ample property to pay 
their debts in ordinary times, without money, or the means of getting it, to meet 
the demands against them. What can be imagined more oppressive, unjust, or 
cruel, than to place, at such a period, such a power in the hands of hard and 
grasping creditors ? 

Now, sir, we are in the midst of such a one — a period of almost unexampled 
contraction, following one remarkable above all others for the extent and dura- 
tion of the expansion ; for the universality and boldness of speculation, and the 
extent and severity of the embarrassment which has followed. Such is the 
period selected to arm the creditors against the debtors, with the harsh sum- 
mary and arbitrary power of a bankrupt law — a period, such as the states in 
former times interposed, with stay laws, valuation laws, and others of like 
description, to save the debtor struggling against an adverse current, and who, 
if allowed time, could save himself and family from poverty. This amendment 
proposes to reverse this humane but misguided policy, and, instead of inter- 
posing in favour of the embarrassed but solvent debtors, to arm their creditors 
with more powerful means to crush them. I say misguided policy. I will not 
call it unjust. On the contrary, there is a strong principle of justice at the 
bottom in favour of interposing at such a period as the present, if it could be 
done on principles of sound policy. The condition in which so large a portion 
of our people now find themselves, in debt, with ample means of discharging 
all they owe if time be allowed, but incapable of immediate payment, is much 
less their fault than that of the improvident legislation of the states, counte- 
nanced by this government, and by which the solid and stable currency of the 



396 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

Constitution has been expelled, and an unsound, vacillating one of bank-notes 
substituted in its place, incapable of discharging debts. By its sudden, violent, 
and unexpected fluctuations, alternately raising and depressing prices, tempting 
at the one period to contract debts, and leaving debtors at the other without the 
means of paying, the whole country, even the cautious and prudent, has become 
involved in debt and embarrassment. To this cause may be traced the present 
condition of the country, and the many similar ones through which the country 
has of late so frequently passed, in which few are out of debt ; and of the in- 
debted, though few are actually insolvent, but a small portion could pay their 
debts, if demanded in legal currency. And shall we, who are, at least in part, 
responsible for such a state of things, at such a period, when the debtors are 
so much at the mercy of the creditors, reversing the ill-judged but humane 
policy wisely prohibited to the states by the Constitution, of interposing in fa- 
vour of the debtors, arm the creditors with new and extraordinary powers of 
enforcing their demands ? Who is there that does not feel that it would be 
impolitic, cruel, and unjust? But it is only at such periods that bankrupt laws 
are proposed ; and is it at all wonderful that the instinctive feelings of the com- 
munity have so steadily and strongly resisted their adoption 1 

Onno occasion has there been stronger cause for resistance than the present, 
for on none would such a law be more impolitic and cruel ; and such, if I may 
judge from the discussion, is the feeling of this body. Standing alone, and 
limited to individuals, I doubt whether the portion of the amendment under im- 
mediate consideration would receive a single vote, although it is the only part 
which is clearly and unquestionably within the limits of the Constitution. It 
may, then, well be asked. If it is without supporters, why is it inserted ? But 
one answer can be given : because it is felt, as obnoxious as it is, to be indis- 
pensable to the passage of the provisions connected with it. One portion of 
the Senate is so intent on passing the part in favour of insolvent debtors, that 
they are willing to take with it the compulsory portion in favour of creditors ; 
while another, from a strong desire to include corporations, are willing to com- 
prehend the other provisions, though they denounce the provisions in favour of 
insolvent debtors, standing alone, as fraudulent, unjust, and unconstitutional. 
It is thus the two extremes unite in favour of a measure that neither would 
support alone ; and a feature of the bill, obnoxious of itself, but constitutional, 
is made to buoy up other portions, which, if not clearly unconstitutional, to say 
the least, are of doubtful constitutionality. 

Let me say to those who represent the portion of the Union where the indebt- 
ness is the greatest, and who, on that account, favour the provisions for the re- 
lief of the insolvent, that the operation of the amendment, should it pass, will 
disappoint them. The part in favour of the debtors may, indeed, throw off the 
burden from many who are now hopelessly insolvent, and restore their useful- 
ness to themselves and society ; but the other provisions will reduce a far great- 
er number to insolvency, who might otherwise struggle through their embar- 
rassments, with a competency left for the support of themselves and families. 
I cannot be mistaken. Should the amendment, as it now stands, become a law, 
instead of reUeving, it would crush the indebted portion of the Union. In or- 
der to make good the assertion, I shall now turn to the novel and important pro- 
vision which places certain corporations, and banks among them, under this 
compulsory process. 

I am not the apologist of banks or corporations generally, nor am I the advo- 
cate of chartered privileges. On the contrary, there is not a member of the body 
more deeply impressed with the evils of the banking system, as now modified, 
or more opposed to grants of privileges to one portion of the community at the 
expense of the rest. My opinions on these points have not been recently or 
hastily formed. I long since embraced them, after much reflection and obser- 
vation, and am prepared to assert and maintain them on all proper occasions. 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 397 

Bur, sir, T am not to be caught by words : I have too much experience for that. 
It is in vain that I am told that this is a contest between corporations and indi- 
viduals — the artificial, legal person, called a body politic, and the individual 
man, as formed by his Creator. All this is lost on me. I look not to where 
the blow is professedly aimed, but beyond, where it must fall. The corporate 
ideal thing at which it is said to be directed is intangible, and without the ca- 
pacity of hearing, seeing, or feeling ; but there are beneath thousands on thou- 
sands, not shadows, but real, sensitive human beings, on whom the blow will 
fall with vengeance. Before we act, let us look at things as they really are, 
and not as we may imagine them in the fervour of debate. 

The states have, by an unwise and dangerous legislation, centralized in banks 
and other corporations, to a very great extent, the relation of creditor and debt- 
or. Were I to assert that these central points could not be touched without 
touching, at the same time, that wide-spread and all-pervading relation, in its 
minutest and remotest ramification, I would scarcely express myself too strong- 
ly. To subject them to this measure would, then, be to subject to it, in reali- 
ty, almost the entire relation of creditor and debtor. It would be bankrupting 
by wholesale — a prompt and forced settlement of the aggregate indebtedness 
of the country, under all the pressue of existing pecuniary embarrassments, made 
manifold greater by the measure itself. 

In order that the Senate may have some idea how vast and comprehensive 
the measure is, I will give a statement from the paper in my hand, which con- 
tains the most recent account we have of the number and condition of the banks. 

There were, then, by estimation, on the first of January last, upward of nine 
hundred banks, including branches, with a capital of upward of three hundred 
and fifty millions, having debts due to them of more than four hundred and sixty 
millions, and by them of more than two hundred and seventy millions, making 
the aggregate indebtedness, to and by them, upward of seven hundred and ten 
millions of dollars, with a supply of specie but little exceeding thirty-three mill- 
ions. By including the banks, this vast amount of indebtedness, concentrated 
in the banking system, would be subject to the operation of the law, should the 
measure be adopted. But the amendment extends far beyond, and takes in all 
corporations for manufacturing, commercial, insurance, or trading purposes ; or 
which issue, pay out, or emit bills, draughts, or obligations, with the intention of 
circulating them as a substitute for money ; which would add to the indebted- 
ness brought within its operations hundreds of millions more. Never was a 
scheme of bankruptcy so bold and comprehensive adopted, or even proposed, 
before : no, not in England itself, where the power of Parliament is omnipotent, 
and where the system has been in operation for three centuries. 

Such is the measure proposed to be adopted at such a period as this, when 
there is a universal and intense pecuniary embarrassment — when one half of 
the banks have suspended payments, and when their available means of meet- 
ing their debts are so scanty. At such a period, and under such circumstances, 
any credhor or creditors, to whom a bank or other corporation may owe not 
less than five hundred dollars, may demand payment ; and if not paid in fifteen 
days, may take out process of bankruptcy, on application to the federal courts, 
and place the corporation, with all its debts, credits, and assets, in the hands 
of trustees, to be wound up, and the proceeds distributed among its creditors. 
I venture nothing in asserting that one half of the banks, in numbers, and 
amount of capital, and a large portion of the other corporations, might be forth- 
with placed in commission, should the measure be adopted ; which, including 
debts, credits, capital, and assets, would amount at least to seven or eight hun- 
dred milUons ; all to be converted into cash, and distributed among those enti- 
tled to it. How is this to be done ? Where is the cash to be had at such a 
period as this, particularly when one half of the banks would be closed, and 
their notes, equalling one half of the present scanty supply of currency, would 



398 SPEECHES OP JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

cease to circulate I What sacrifices, what insolvencies, what beggary, what 
frauds, what desolation and ruin would follow ! 

But would the calamity fall with equal vengeance on all the land, or would 
there be some favoured, exempted portion, while desolation would overshadow 
the residue ? Let the document* which I hold answer. It is a communica- 
tion from the President, transmitting a report from the Secretary of the Treasury 
to this body, dated the 8th of January last, containing a list of the suspended 
and non-suspended banks of last year, arranged according to states, beginning 
with Maine. I find, on turning to the document, that there are nine hundred 
and fifty-nine banks, including branches, in the Union ; of which five hundred 
and thirty-eight are in New-England and New-York. Of this number, but sev- 
en are suspended, if Rhode Island be excepted. Her banks all suspended, but 
I understand have since resumed. The senator near me from that state (Mr. 
Knight) can answer whether such is the fact. 

[Mr. Knight assented.] 

There are, then, sir, in New-England and New-York five hundred and thirty- 
one banks which are not suspended, and but seven that are. Now, sir, if we 
cross the Hudson, and cast our eyes South and West, we shall find the oppo- 
site state of things. We shall find there four hundred and twenty-one banks, of 
which three hundred and sixty-eight suspended in whole or part, and fifty-three 
not. It is probable that the present proportion is still more unfavourable. 

Can we doubt, with these facts, where the storm will rage with all its deso- 
lating fury ? Is there any one so credulous as to believe that any one of the 
suspended banks throughout that vast region, or many of the non-suspended, 
imder the panic which the passage of the act would cause, could meet their 
debts, and thereby escape the penalties of the act ? And, if not, is there any 
one here prepared to place at once all the banks south and west of New- York, 
with few exceptions, in the hands of assignees, under the jurisdiction and con- 
trol of the federal courts ? Is there any willing that their doors should be all 
at once closed ; their notes cease to circulate ; their affairs wound up ; their 
debts to and from them to be forthwith collected ; their property and assets con- 
verted into money by federal officers, acting under federal authority, and all that 
might be left from plunder, fraud, and forced sales, distributed among creditors ? 
And how, I ask, is so mighty a concern, amounting, in the aggregate, certainly 
to not less than five or six hundred millions of dollars, to be at once wound up ? 
Where is the money to be found to pay the debts to and from the banks, and 
to purchase the vast amount of property held by them and their debtors, which 
must be brought at once under the hammer 1 Where found, after their notes 
have ceased to circulate (as they would, as soon as process of bankruptcy is ta- 
ken out against them), and before specie could come in to supply their place ? 
Were it possible to carry through the measure, it would spread unheard-of de- 
struction and desolation 'through the vast portion of the Union on which the 
blow would fall ; such as the marching of hostile armies from one extremity to 
another, the sweep of tornadoes, the outpouring of floods, or the withholding 
from the parched and thirsty earth the fertilizing droppings of the clouds, Avould 
give but a faint conception. But it would be impossible. If you were to adopt 
the measure, you would ordain what would not, could not, be executed. Pub- 
lic hidignation would paralyze the hand of the grasping creditor stretched to 
execute it, and sweep your act from the statute-book ere it could be enforced. 

I turn now from the immediate effects of the measure, were it possible to 
carry it into effect, to inquire what would be its permanent, if adopted. Its first 
effect, after the desolating storm had passed over, would be to centralize the 
control over all the banks that might be spared, or thereafter chartered, in the 
banks located where the public revenue would be principally collected and dis- 

* No. 72 of the Senate, present session. 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN, 399 

bursed ; and where that would be I need not say. The reason is obvious. 
The fiscal action of the government would keep the exchanges steadily and per- 
manently in its favour. Now, sir, every man of business knows that the banks 
located at the point where exchanges are permanently favourable can control 
those where they are unfavourable. The reason is obvious. The former can 
draw on the latter with profit ; and, through their draughts, command their specie 
or notes at pleasure, while the reverse is the case with the latter. Hence, the 
consequence would be control on one side and dependance on the other, in- 
creasing with the increasing amount of collection and disbursements, which, 
by their absorbing character, would draw with them the imports and exports, 
with an increased control over the exchanges. Add to this the power which 
this measure would place in the hands of the banks at the favoured points, and 
I hazard nothing in asserting that it would at all times be in their power to crush, 
by a sudden and unexpected run, the banks elsewhere, which might incur their 
displeasure, with greater ease, and more effectually, than the late United States 
Bank, in its most palmy days, ever could. 

The next permanent effect would be, to place the whole banking system un- 
der the control of this government. It would hold over the banks the power 
of life and death. The process of bankruptcy against an incorporation is but 
another name for its death-warrant. It would give, with the power of destroy- 
ing, that of regulating them, without regard to their chartered rights. The same 
bold construction that would authorize Congress to subject them to a bankrupt 
law, would give it the power to determine at pleasure what shall or shall not 
constitute acts of bankruptcy ; by which it might limit the extent of their busi- 
ness, fix the proportion of specie to liability, and make it a condition for one 
dollar in circulation, there should be a dollar in their vaults. The possession 
of such a power would give Congress more unlimited control over the banks 
than that which the states that incorporated them possess, or which you woidd 
possess over a Bank of the United States chartered by yourselves. Your pow- 
er over such an institution, and the states over their own banks, would be lim- 
ited by the acts of incorporation ; while yours over the banks of the states, with 
the bankrupt power in your hands, would be without any other limitation except 
your discretion. 

It is easy to see that the complete subjugation of the state banks to your will 
would be the result of such unlimited control ; and not less easy that, with their 
subjugation, the conflict between this government and the banks would cease, to 
be followed by a close and perpetual alliance. It is in the nature of govern- 
ments to wage war with whatever is opposed to its will, and to take under pro- 
tection that which it has subdued ; nor would the banks be found to be an ex- 
ception. They would be forced to conciliate the good-will of the government, 
on which both their safety and profit would depend ; and in no way could they 
more effectually do that than by upholding its power and authority. They 
would be thus forced, by the strongest appeals to both their fear and hope, into 
the political arena, with their immense power and influence, and to take an ac- 
tive and decided part in all the party strifes of the day, throwing their weight 
always on the side which their safety and profit might dictate. The end would 
be the very reverse of that for which we, who are in favour of a divorce of gov- 
ernment and banks, have been contending for the last three years. Instead of 
divorce, there would be union ; instead of excluding the banks from the politi- 
cal struggles of the day, they would be forced to be active and zealous partisans 
in self-defence ; and, instead of leaving the banks to ttie control of the states, 
from which they derive their charters, you would assume over them a control 
more powerful and unlimited than has ever been before exercised over them by 
this government, either through the pet-banks or a National Bank. This control 
would be the greatest at the principal points of collection and disbursement-^ 
the very point where that of the local banks would be the greatest over all oth- 



400 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

ers. It follows that the government would have the most decisive and complete 
control over those that would control all others ; and, by lending their power- 
ful aid and influence to maintain their control, would, in reality, control the 
whole banking system ; thus making, in effect, the banks at the favoured points 
the National Bank, and the rest virtually but branches. If to this we add the 
control which it would give over the other and powerful corporations enumera- 
ted in the amendment, it may be safely asserted that the measure, if adopted, 
would do more to increase the power of this government, and diminish that of 
the states — to strengthen the cause of consolidation, and weaken that of state 
rights — than any which has ever been assumed by Congress. 

Having pointed out the consequences, I now demand, in the name of the 
Constitution, what right has Congress to extend a bankrupt act over the incor- 
porated institutions of the states, and thereby seize on this immense power ? 
The burden of proof is on those who claim the right, and not on us, who op- 
pose it. I repeat, ours is a government of limited powers ; and those who claim 
to exercise a power must show the grant — a clear and certain grant, in case 
of a power so pregnant with consequences as this. 

I ask, then, those who claim this power. On what grounds do they place it ? 
Do they rest it on the nature of the power, as being peculiarly applicable to 
banks, and the other corporations proposed to be embraced ? If so, frail is the 
foundation. Never was power more unsuited to its object — so much so, that 
language itself has to be forced and perverted to make it applicable. Taking 
corporations in their proper sense, as bodies politic, and there is scarcely a sin- 
gle portion of the whole process, beginning with the acts of bankruptcy, and 
extending to the final discharge, applicable to them. What one of the numer- 
ous acts of bankruptcy can they commit ? Can they depart from the state, or 
be arrested, or be imprisoned, or escape from prison, or, in a word, commit any 
one of the acts without which an individual cannot be made a bankrupt ? No ; 
but they may stop payment, and thereby subject themselves to the act. True ; but 
how is the process to be carried through 1 The provision requires the bank- 
rupt to be sworn : can you swear corporations ? It requires divers acts to be 
done by the bankrupt, under the penalty of imprisonment : can you imprison a 
corporation ? It directs a discharge to be given to the bankrupt, which ex- 
empts his person and future acquisitions : can a corporation receive the benefit 
of such discharge 1 No : the process itself is the dissolution, the death of the 
corporation. It is thus that language is forced, strained, and distorted, in order 
to bring a power so inapplicable to the subject to bear on corporations. It 
would be just as rational to include corporations in insolvent laws, which none 
has been, as yet, so absurd as to think of doing. 

The right, then, cannot be inferred from the nature of the power. On what, 
then, can it stand ? On precedents ? I admit that if, at the period of the adop- 
tion of the Constitution, it was the practice to include corporations in acts of 
bankruptcy, it would go far to establish that it was intended by the Constitution 
to include them. But the reverse is the fact. As long as the system has been 
in operation, there is not a case where a corporation was ever included, cither 
in England, this country, or any other, as far as can be ascertained, nor ever 
proposed to be. The attempt in this case is a perfect novelty, without prece- 
dent or example ; and all the force which it is acknowledged the practice of 
including them would have given in favour of the right, is thus thrown with a 
weight equally decisive against it. 

But we have not yet approached the real difficulty. If the power was ever 
so appropi'iate, and the only one that was — if precedents were innumerable — it 
would only prove that this government would have the right of applying the 
power to incorporations of its own creating. It could not go an inch beyond, 
and would leave the great difficulty untouched — the right of Congress to include 
state corporations in an act of bankruptcy passed by its authority ! Where 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 401 

is such a power to be found in the Constitution ? It seems to be forgotten that 
this and the state governments are co-ordinate governments, emanating from 
the same authority, and making together one complex, but harmonious and beau- 
tiful system, in which each, within its allotted sphere, is independent and coequal 
with the other. If one has a right to create, the other cannot have the right to 
destroy. The principle has been carried so far, that in the case of the State 
of Maryland and M'Colough, the Supreme Court, after elaborate argument, 
decided that a state, in the exercise of its undoubted right of taxing, could not 
tax a Branch Bank of the United States, located in its limits, on the ground that 
the right of taxing, in such case, involved the right of destroying. Admit, then, 
Congress had the right to include corporations of its own creation, still, accord- 
ing to the principle thus recognised, it could not include those created by the 
states, unless, indeed, the fundamental principle of our system, admitted even 
by the extreme consolidation school of politics, that each government is co- 
equal and independent within its sphere, should be denied, and the absolute 
sovereignty of this government be assumed. If, then, the states have a right 
to create banks, and other corporations enumerated in the amendment, it follows 
that Congress has not the right to destroy them ; nor, of course, to include them 
in an act of bankruptcy, the very operation of which, when applied to corpora- 
tions, is to destroy. 13ut whether they have or have not the right, belongs not 
to Congress to decide. The right of the separate legislatures of the states to 
decide on their reserved powers is as perfect as that of Congress to decide on 
the delegated. Each must judge for itself in carrying out its powers. To 
deny this, would be virtually to give a veto to Congress over the acts of the 
state legislatures — a power directly refused by the Convention, though anxious- 
ly pressed by the national party in that body. 

Such and so conclusive is the argument against the right ; and how has it 
been met ? We are told that the states have greatly abused the power of in- 
corporation, I admit it. The power has been sadly and dangerously abused. 
I stand not here to defend banks or other incorporations, or to justify the states 
in granting charters. No ; my object is far different. I have risen to defend 
the Constitution, and to resist the inroads on the rights of the states. In the 
discharge of that duty, I ask, Can the abuse of the right of granting bank or oth- 
er charters give you the right to destroy or regulate them ? Are you ready to 
admit the same rule, as applied to your own powers ? Have the state legis- 
latures abused their powers more than Congress has its powers 1 Has it not 
abused, and grossly abused, its powers of laying taxes and appropriating mon- 
ey ? And what assurance is there, with these examples before us, that Con- 
gress would not equally abuse the right of controlling state corporations, which 
is so eagerly sought to be vested in it by some ? But we are also told that 
bank paper — worthless, irredeemable bank paper — has deranged the currency, 
and ought to be suppressed. I admit the fact. I acknowledge the mischief, 
but object to the remedy, and the right of applying it. I go farther. If the evil 
could give us the right to apply any of our powers to remedy it, regardless of 
the Constitution, the taxing power would be far more simple, efficient, and less 
mischievous in its application. It vv'ould be applied to the specific evil. That 
which has deranged the currency, and defeated the object of the Constitution in 
relation to it, is the circulation of bank-notes. There lies the evil, and to divest 
the banks of the right of circulation is to eradicate it. For that purpose, what 
remedy could be more simple, safe, and efficacious than the taxing power, were 
it constitutional ? By its means, bank-notes might be gradually and quietly sup- 
pressed, and the banks left in full possession of all their other functions unim- 
paired. There is but one objection to it, but that a decisive one — its unconsti- 
tutionality. It would be a perversion of the taxing power, given to raise reve- 
nue. To apply it to suppress or regulate the circulation of bank-notes would be 

to CHANGE ITS NATURE ENTIRELY, from a TAXING tO a PENAL pOWCr, and is 

E E E 



402 SPEECHES OF JOHN C, CALH0t7N. 

therefore unconstitutional ; but not more so than to include banks and other cor- 
porations in an act of bankruptcy, as proposed by the amendment, while in every 
other respect it would be greatly preferable. 

One other ground still remains to be considered. The authority of influen- 
tial names has been resorted to, in order to supply the defect of argument. The 
names of two distinguished individuals, who formerly filled the treasury de- 
partment, have been introduced — Mr. Dallas and Mr. Crawford — in favour of 
the right of including banks. If this was a question to be decided by authority, 
it would be easy to show that their opinions, as able as they were, would be 
entitled to little weight in this case. It was casually and incidentally given in 
a report on another subject, and that calculated to lead them to an erroneous 
view in reference to this power. Such an opinion, given under such circum- 
stances, by the ablest judge, would have little weight in a private case, even in 
a court of justice, and ought to have none in this body on a great constitutional 
question. Besides, it is well known that the opinion of both was in favour of 
the constitutionality of a National Bank, and that, too, after a full and deliberate 
consideration of the subject. Now, sir, I put the question to the senators who 
have quoted their casual opinion in favour of the constitutionality of including 
banks in a bankrupt law. Are they willing to adopt their well-considered and 
solemnly delivered opinion in favour of the right to incorporate a bank ? And 
if not, how, on the ground of precedent, can they adopt the one and reject the 
other ? The names of other distinguished individuals have been quoted — Ran- 
dolph, Macon, White, Smith, and others — but, in my opinion, unfairly quoted. 
It is true, they voted in 1827, when the Bankrupt Bill was then before the Sen- 
ate, in favour of an amendment to include the banks ; but it is equally so, that 
the amendment was moved at the end of a loag debate, when the Senate was 
exhausted, and that it was but slightly discussed. But, what is of more im- 
portance, they were opposed to the bill ; and, as the amendment came from a 
hostile quarter, and was clearly intended to embarrass the bill, it is not improb- 
able that it received the votes of many with the view of destroying the bill, 
without thinking whether it was constitutional or not ; just as some, no doubt, 
will vote against the opposite. amendment, to strike the banks out, now imder 
consideration, from the belief that it is the most effectual means of destroying 
this bill. But if the question is to be decided by weight of names, and the vote 
on the occasion to be the test, the weight is clearly on the opposite side. The 
vote stood 12 to include the banks, and 35 against ; and among the latter will be 
found names not less influential— that of Tazewell, Rowan, Hayne, Berrien, the 
present Secretary of the Treasury, and, finally, that of the present chief magis- 
trate. But why attempt to decide this question by the weight of names, how- 
ever distinguished ? Do we not know that all those referred to belonged to the 
political school which utterly repudiates the authority of precedents in constru- 
ing the Constitution, and who, if they were now all alive, and here present as 
members of the Senate, would not regard the name of any man in deciding this 
important constitutional question ? 

I have now presented the result of my reflections on this important measure. 
To sum up the whole in a few words, I am of the opinion that the whole proj- 
ect, including the bill and the amendment, is unconstitutional, except the 
provisions embracing compulsory bankruptcy, as it is called, as far as it relates 
to individuals ; and that, under existing circumstances, to be highly inexpedient. 
Thus thinking, I shall vote, in the first instance, against striking out the bill 
and inserting the amendment ; and, if that succeeds, against the bill itself. 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 403 

XXVII. 

SPEECH ON THE PROSPECTIVE PRE-EMPTION BILL, JANUARY 12, 1841. 

The bill to establish a permanent prospective pre-emption system in 
favour of settlers on the public lands, who shall inhabit and cultivate the 
same, and raise a log cabin thereon, being the special order of the day, 
was taken up, the question being on the proposition by Mr. Crittenden to 
recommit the bill, with instructions to report a bill to distribute the pro- 
ceeds of the sales of the public lands among the states ; which Mr. Cal- 
houn offered to amend, by substituting a bill to cede the public lands to 
the states in which they lie, upon certain conditions. 

Mr. Calhoun said : I regard the question of the public lands, next to 
that of the currency, the most dangerous and difficult of all which de- 
mand the attention of the country and the government at this important 
juncture of our affairs. I do not except a protective tariff", for I cannot 
believe, after what we have experienced, that a measure can again be 
adopted Avhich has done more to corrupt the morals of the country, pub- 
lic and private, to disorder its currency, derange its business, and to 
weaken and endanger its free institutions, except the paper system, with 
which it is so intimately allied. 

In offering the amendment I propose, I do not intend to controvert the 
justice of the eulogium which has been so often pronounced on our land 
system in the course of this discussion. On the contrary, 1 believe that 
it was admirably adjusted to effect its object, when first adopted ; but it 
must be borne in mind that a measure, to be perfect, must be adapted to 
circumstances, and that great changes have taken place, in the lapse of 
fifty years, since the adoption of our land system. At that time, the vast 
region now covered by the new states, which have grown up on the pub- 
lic domain, belonged to foreign powers, or was occupied by numerous 
Indian tribes, with the exception of a few sparse settlements on the in- 
considerable tracts to which the title of the Indians was at that time ex- 
tinguished. Since then a mighty change has taken place. Nine states 
have sprung up as if by magic, with a population not less, probably, than 
two fifths of the old states, and destined to surpass them in a few years 
in numbers, power, and influence. That a change so mighty should so 
derange a system intended for an entirely different condition of things as 
to render important changes necessary to adapt it to present circum- 
stances, is no more than might have been anticipated. It would, indeed, 
have been a miracle had it been otherwise ; and we ought not, therefore, 
to be surprised that the operation of the system should afford daily evi- 
dence that it not only deranged, but deeply deranged, and that its derange- 
ment is followed by a train of evils that threaten disaster, unless a timely 
and efficient remedy should be applied. I would ask those who think 
differently, and who believe the system still continues to work well. Was 
it no evil, that session after session, for the last ten or twelve years, 
Congress should be engaged in angry and deeply agitating discussions, 
growing out of the public lands, in which one side should be denounced 
as the friends, and the other as the enemies, of the new states'! Was the 
increasing violence of this agitation from year to year, and threatening 
ultimately, not only the loss of the public domain, but the tranquillity and 
peace of the country, no evil 1 Is it well that one third of the time of Con- 
gress should be consumed in legislating on subjects directly or indirectly 
connected with the public lands, thereby prolonging the sessions propor- 
tionally, and adding to the expense upward of $200,000 annually 1 Is it 



404 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOrN. 

no evil that the government should own half the lands within the liTnit.* 
of nine members of this Union, and over which they can exercise no au- 
thority or control 1 Is it nothing that the domain of so many states 
should be under the exclusive legislation and guardianship of this govern- 
ment, contrary to the genius of the Constitution, which, intending to 
leave to each state the regulation of its local and peculiar concerns, dele- 
gated to the Union those only in which all had a common interest 1 If to 
all these he added the vast amount of patronage exercised by this govern- 
ment through the medium of the public lands over the new states, and 
through them over the whole Union, and the pernicious influence there- 
by brought to bear on all other subjects of legislation, can it be denied 
that many and great evils result from the system as it now operates, 
which call aloud for some speedy and efficient remedy 1 

But why should I look beyond the question before us to prove, by the 
confession of all, that there is some deep disorder in the system 1 There 
are now three measures before the Senate, each proposing important 
changes, and the one or the other receiving the support of every mem- 
ber of the body ; even of those who cry out against changes. It is too 
late, then, to deny the disordered state of the system. The disease is 
admitted, and the only question is, What remedy shall be applied % 

I object both to the bill and the amendment proposed by the senator from 
Kentucky (Mr. Crittenden), because, regarded as remedial measures, they 
are both inappropriate and inadequate. Neither pre-emption, nor distri- 
bution of the revenue received from the public lands, can have any pos- 
sible effect in correcting the disordered action of the system. I put the 
question, Would one or the other contribute in the smallest degree to di- 
minish the patronage of the government, or the time consumed on ques- 
tions growing out of the public lands, or shorten the duration of the ses- 
sions, or withdraw the action of the government over so large a part of 
the domain of the new states, and place them and their representatives 
here on the same independent footing with the old states and their rep- 
resentatives, or arrest the angry and agitating discussions which year 
after year distract our councils, and threaten so much mischief to the 
country 1 Far otherwise would be the effect. It would but increase the 
evil, by bringing into more decided conflict the interests of the new and old 
states. Of all the ills that could befall them, the former would regard the 
distribution as the greatest, while the latter would look on the pre-emp- 
tion system, proposed by the bill, as little short of an open system of 
plunder, if we may judge from the declarations which we have heard in 
the course of the debate. 

As, then, neither can correct the disease, the question is, What remedy 
can 1 I have given to this question the most deliberate and careful ex- 
amination, and have come to the conclusion that there is, and can be, no 
remedy short of cession — cession to the states respectively within which 
the lands are situated. The disease lies in ownership and administration, 
and nothing short of parting with both can reach it. Part with them, and 
you will at once take away one third of the business of Congress : shorten 
its sessions in the same proportion, with a corresponding saving of ex- 
pense ; lop off a large and most dangerous portion of the patronage of 
the government ; arrest these angry and agitating discussions, which do 
so much to alienate the good feelings of the different portions of the ' 
Union, and disturb the general course of legislation, and endanger, ulti- 
mately, the loss of the public domain. Retain them, and they must con- 
tinue, almost without mitigation, apply what palliatives you may. It is 
the all-sufficient and only remedy. 

Thus far would seem clear. I do not see how it is possible for any 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 405 

one to doubt that cession would reach the evil, and that it is the only 
remedj^ that would. If, then, there should be any objection, it can only 
be to the terms or conditions of the cession. If these can be so adjusted 
as to give assurance that the lands shall be as faithfully managed by the 
states as by this government, and that all the interests involved shall be 
as well, or better secured than under the existing system, all that could 
be desired would be effected, and all objections removed to the final and 
quiet settlement of this great, vexed, and dangerous question. In saying 
all objections, I hold that the right of disposing of them as proposed, 
especially when demanded by high considerations of policy, and when it 
can be done without pecuniary loss to the government, as I shall here- 
after show, cannot be fairly denied. The Constitution gives to Congress 
the unlimited right of disposing of the public domain, and, of course, 
without any other restrictions than what the nature of that trust and terms 
of cession may impose j neither o{ which forbids their cession in the man- 
ner proposed. 

That the conditions can be so adjusted, I cannot doubt. I have care- 
fully examined the whole ground, and can perceive no difficulty that can- 
not be surmounted. I feel assured that all which is wanting is to attract 
the attention of the Senate to the vast importance of doing something 
that will effectually arrest the great and growing evil, resulting from the 
application of the system, as it exists, to that portion of the public do- 
main lying in the new states. That done, the intelligence and wisdom 
of the body will be at no loss to adjust the details in such manner as will 
effectually guard every interest, and secure its steady and faithful man- 
agement. 

In the mean time, I have adopted the provisions of the bill introduced 
originally by myself, and twice reported on favourably by the Committee 
on Public Lands, as the amendment 1 intend to offer to the amendment 
of the senator from Kentucky (Mr. Crittenden), as containing the general 
outlines of the conditions and provisions on which the lands may be dis- 
posed of to the states with safety and advantage to the interest of the 
government and the Union, and great benefit to those states. The details 
may, no doubt, be greatly improved; for which I rely on the intelligence 
of the body and critical examination of the committee, should the amend- 
ment be adopted and referred. At the present stage, I regard nothing 
but the great principles on which it rests, and its outlines, to be at issue; 
and I do hope that all who may concur with me on principle will give 
the amendment their support, whatever imperfection they may suppose to 
exist in its modifications. A measure relating to a question so vast and 
complicated can be perfected in its details, however sound the principles 
on which it rests, or correct its general outlines, only by the joint con- 
sultation and counsel. With these remarks, it will not be necessary for 
me, at this stage, to give more than a general summary of the provisions 
of the proposed amendment. i 

Its object is to instruct the committee so to amend the bill as to dis- 
pose of all the public lands lying in the states of Alabama, Louisiana, Mis- 
sissippi, Arkansas, Missouri, Illinois, Michigan, Ohio, and Indiana, with, 
the exception of sites for forts, navy and dock yards, arsenals, magazines, 
and other public buildings ; the cession not to take place till after the 
30th of June, 1842, and then only on the states respectively agreeing to 
the conditions prescribed in the amendment ; that is, to pass acts irrev- 
ocably to adhere to those conditions, the most prominent of which is to 
pay annually, on a day fixed, to the United States sixty-five per cent, of 
the gross proceeds of the sales of the lands ; that the land laws, as they 
now stand, and as proposed to be modified by the amendment, shall re- 



406 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

main unchanged, except with the consent of Congress ; that the cession 
shall be in full of the five per cent, fund thereafter to accrue to those states ; 
that they shall be exclusively liable for the cost of surveys, sales, extinc- 
tion of Indian titles, and management generally ; that the states may, 
widiin certain prescribed limits, gradually reduce the price of the lands 
that may remain unsold after having been offered for sale ten years or 
upward; may grant, for a limited period, the right of pre-emption for 
ninety days to the actual settlers, at each step in the reduction of price ; 
and, finally, that if the conditions of cession be violated by a state in any 
particular, all titles or grants to land thereafter sold by the state to be 
null and void : thus giving the measure the force and solemnity of a com- 
pact, and placing the whole under the protection of the courts, which 
would pronounce the titles to be void if made after an infraction of the 
conditions of the cession. 

It is not my intention to go into an investigation of these various con- 
ditions at this time. On a question of reference, where the principle, 
only is at issue, it is not necessary. It is sufficient to say that the lead- 
ing object is to make as little change in the land system, as it now ex- 
ists, as is consistent with the object in view, and to adopt such provisions 
as will enforce the faithful performance of the terms of cession on the 
part of the states, with the least compensation for their expense and 
trouble, and loss to the government, in a pecuniary point of view, con- 
sistent with the arrangement. If it can be made to appear that there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that the states will faithfully comply with 
these conditions, and that there will be no pecuniary loss to the govern- 
ment, compared with the system as it now stands, in consequence of the 
proposed disposition, it would seem difficult to conceive what substantial 
objection there can be to the measure. 

I am thus brought to the great, I might say the only question admitting 
a doubt as to the expediency of the measure. Will the states adhere to 
their contract 1 or, to express it differently, would there be danger that 
the government would lose the land, in consequence of the states refusing 
to comply with the conditions of the cession 1 And if not, will the pe- 
cuniary loss to the government be such as to make it inexpedient, even 
if there be full assurance that the terms of cession will not be violated ] 

Before I enter on the discussion of these important points, it will be 
proper to make a few remarks on the extent of the interest that would be 
embraced in the cession. Without it, there would be but an imperfect 
conception of the subject. 

The quantity of public lands lying in the new states, and embraced in 
the amendment, was estimated to be, on the 1st of January, IS^O, about 
160,000,000 of acres. It has been reduced since by sales, the exact 
quantity not known ; but it will not materially vary the amount. The 
Indian title has been extinguished to nearly the Avhole, and about three 
fourths have been surveyed and platted, of which a larger part has been 
long in the market (much more than twenty years), and has been picked 
and culled, over and over again, with the view of taking all worth having, 
at the present price, even during the great expansion of currency, and 
consequent rise in price, and speculation in public lands, in 1835, 1836, 
and 1837. If compared in quantity to the remainder of the public do- 
main, it will be found to be not equal to one sixth part of the whole. In 
this respect, it is a far more limited measure than that proposed by the 
senator from Kentucky, to which mine is an amendment. That embraces 
not only the proceeds of the whole public domain, exceeding 1,000,000,000 
acres, but includes, in addition, the large sums drawn from the duties on 
imports, which are annually expended on its sales and management, all 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 407 

of which he proposes permanently to distribute. It is also more limited 
in its application than the original bill, which embraces all the lands to 
which the Indian title is extinguished, as well territories as states, which 
greatly exceeds the quantity lying in the latter. 

Having now shown the object and the character, with the scope of this 
measure, I shall next proceed to the great, and I must say, in my opinion, 
the only question that admits of controversy. Will the states adhere faith- 
fully to the terms of the cession 1 Or, on the contrary, will they violate 
a compact solemnly entered into, on just and liberal principles, mutually 
beneficial to both, and which will place them, a^ to their domain, on the 
same independent footing on which the other states stand 1 

I would ask, at the outset, Is there anything in their history to justify 
a suspicion of a want of good faith 1 Have they been in the habit of vio- 
lating contracts'! If so, point out a single instance 1 Instead of givinor 
ground to excite suspicion, 1 rejoice to say their history affords many 
and striking examples of exact and faithful compliance with their engao-e- 
ments. They all have standing compacts with the government, entered 
into on their admission into the Union, which impose important limita- 
tions on what otherwise would be their unquestioned right as independ- 
ent members of the Union ; and, among others, the important one, not 
only of not taxing the vast portion of their domain held by the United 
States within their limits, but also, for the period of five years after sale, 
the portion held by purchasers. To their honour be it said, that, in the 
long period which has elapsed from the admission of the oldest of these 
states, there has not beeii a single instance of a violation on their part of 
their plighted faith. With so striking an example of fidelity to engage- 
ments, with what justice can it be objected that the states will violate 
their plighted faith to a contract every w^ay advantageous to them, as well 
as to the rest of the Union 1 

But I take higher ground, and put the question. With what propriety 
can we object to the want of faith on the part of the states to their en- 
gagements ? What is our Constitution but a compact between the states 1 
and how do we hold seats here but in virtue of that compact 1 And is it 
for us to turn round and question the faith on which our system stands, 
and through which we have our political existence 5 and this, too, when it 
is notorious that the state governments have adhered with far more fidelity 
than this to the constitutional compact 1 Many and great violations are 
charged, and truly charged to us, while few, very few, can be justly at- 
tributed to them. 

But, admitting there might be danger of losing the lands, should they 
be disposed of as proposed, from the want of good faith on the part of the 
states, I boldly assert that the danger of their being lost is far greater if 
the present system should, unfortunately, be continued, and that, too, 
under circumstances vastly more disastrous to the peace and safety of the 
Union. What I have asserted comes from deep and solemn conviction, 
resulting from a long and careful examination of this vast and complicated 
subject. 

Those who have not given special attention to it, and the progress of 
our land system, can form no just conception of the danger to which the 
public lands are exposed. The danger is twofold : that they will be lost 
by the mere progress of settlement, without payment, in consequence of 
the vast quantity beyond the wants of the country, to which the Indian 
title is extinguished ; and if that should not be the case, they will be from 
the growing conflict between the old and new states, in consequence of 
th-e rapid increase of the latter, and the great difference in their respect- 
ive views of the policy proper to be adopted in reference to them. Both 



408 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN, 

causes are operating with powerful effect ; and if they do not speedily 
attract the attention of the government and the country, they will cer- 
tainly terminate before long, either by their separate or joint action, ia 
the loss of the public domain. Nothing but a full understanding of the 
causes of danger, and the application of a prompt and efficient remedy, can 
prevent it ; and what I propose is to present a brief sketch of my views 
in reference to both. 

As important as it is, few have turned the attention it deserves to the 
almost miraculous extension of our land system. In the comparatively 
short time in which it haabeen in operation, the Indian title has been ex- 
tinguished, in round numbers, to 320,000,000 of acres ; of which there has 
been sold 81,000,000, and granted away, for various purposes, 12,600,000 ; 
leaving in the possession of the government, on the 1st of January, 1840, 
226,000,000, a larger portion of which is surveyed, platted, and in the 
market : showing that the progress of extinguishing the titles of the In- 
dians has far outrun the demands of the country for government lands, as 
great as it has been. In fact, the reality far exceeds the statement, as 
strong as that is ; for, of the eighty-one millions of acres sold, upward of 
thirty-eight millions were sold in the years 1835, 1836, and 1837, during 
the great expansion of the currency and rage for speculation in lands, of 
which but a small portion, perhaps not a third, was for settlement ; and 
of the residue, a greater part, say twenty millions, is still for sale in the 
hands of large purchasers. Making proper allowance for the speculative 
operations of those years, the actual sale of the public lands for settle- 
ment, during the period of fifty years which has elapsed from the begin- 
ning of the government, would not probably exceed sixty millions of 
acres, about one fourth as much as that to which the Indian title is now 
extinguished. 

But numbers can give but a verjr imperfect conception of the vast ex- 
tent of the region to which the Indian title is extinguished, and of which 
the government is the sole and exclusive proprietor. To form a correct 
idea of its great magnitude, it will be necessary to compare it to portions 
of the Union, the extent of which is familiar to all. To enable me to do 
that, a friend has furnished me with a statement, from which it appears 
that, if all the land now unsold, and to which the Indian title is extinguish- 
ed, was grouped together, it would be equal in extent to all New-Eng- 
land, New-York, New-Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, 
and a third of North Carolina. But this falls far short of the vast extent 
of the region throughout which it lies dispersed — a region equalling all 
the old Atlantic States, taking in all Florida, the states of Alabama and 
Mississippi, and half of Tennessee. Into this vast and unoccupied domain, 
our people, with a multitude of foreigners, are pouring yearly in one in- 
cessant tide, by thousands on thousands, seeking new homes : some with 
the means of purchasing, who select the best lands ; others with insuffi- 
cient means, who select their place, and settle, with the hope of pur- 
chasing in a short time ; and a large class without means, who settle on 
spots, without any fixed intention but to remain so long as they are un- 
disturbed, generally on tracts of inferior quality, having the advantage of 
a spring, with a small portion of more fertile land, sufficient for their 
limited cultivation, but not sufficient to induce a purchaser to take it at 
the government price. This class of settlers has greatly increased, if I 
am correctly informed, Avithin the last ten or fifteen years, and is still 
rapidly increasing, especially in the West and Southwestern States, 
where the proportion of good to inferior land is comparatively small, and 
must continue to increase with accelerated rapidity, so long as the pres 
ent land system rem.ains as it is. 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 409 

Those who have had an opportunity of witnessing the effect of such 
occupancy on the minds of the settlers, will not be at a loss to anticipate 
the consequences which must follow, unless arrested. Occupation long 
and undisturbed, accompanied by improvement, however limited, cannot 
fail to be associated with the idea of property in the soil. It is that, in 
♦fact, which constitutes the primitive right in land. This will be felt in 
common by all the occupants similarly situated — will be sure to create an 
esprit de corps, accompanied by mutual respect for each other's rights, 
which would not fail to make it dangerous for any one to disturb the 
rights of another. This feeling will not be long in showing itself towards 
the emigrant intruder, as he would be considered, coming in with the 
view of purchase. He would find it not a little hazardous to enter 
and purchase a spot held by a mere occupant, or squatter, if you will, 
and oust him of his possession. In a short time, no one who regards 
his peace and safety will attempt it ; and then, the feeling, which began 
with the poorer class, will extend rapidly upward to the more wealthy, 
until, finally, none will look to any other title but occupancy and im- 
provement ; and all, the rich and poor, will become squatters, with a com- 
mon interest to maintain and defend each other, when the public lands 
will be lost, and cease to be any longer a source of revenue, if nothing 
be done to stop it. For the truth of the picture, I appeal to the senators 
from the new states, especially from the Western and Southwestern. We 
have thus presented the difficult question, What is to be done to remedy it 1 
It is perfectly natural that the first impression should be, to keep out 
intruders on the public lands. The lands belong to the people of the 
Union as common property, and it would seem contrary to reason and 
justice that any one should be permitted to enter on and appropriate the 
use of that to himself, without paying for it, which belongs to all ; and 
we accordingly find not a small portion of the Senate who insist on keep- 
ing out and expelling all intruders as the proper remedy. But in this 
case, like many others, we must look beyond mere abstract right. What 
seems so plausible would, when tried, prove impracticable. We need no 
other proof than the fact that no administration has ever undertaken it, 
even when it would have been an easy task, comparatively to what it now 
would be. How is it to be done 1 By the marshals and their deputies 1 
Can they expel from their homes the vast host of occupants on the pub- 
lic lands, all hardy and bold men, familiar with the use of the most deadly 
of weapons 1 Would you employ the army'? It would be found almost 
as impotent as the civil authority. If the whole military was employed 
in this, to the neglect of all other service, there would be more than five 
hundred and fifty square miles for each officer and soldier, supposing 
your establishment to be full. No : were it possible to employ the mili- 
tary in so odious a service in this free country, you would have to double 
your force, at a cost greater than the annual income from the land ; and 
the work would be ever beginning, and never ending. If you drive them 
away and destroy their improvements, as soon as the force was with- 
drawn they would return to their possession. I had some experience, 
while secretary at war, of the difficulty of expelling and keeping ofl in- 
truders ; and I found that the message which brought intelligence of the 
withdrawal of the force was immediately followed by that which brought 
information that the intruders had returned. 

But the senator from Kentucky (Mr. Clay) deems all this as merely 
imaginary, and asserts that intruders may readily be kept off the public 
lands. I will not attempt to reply to his reason for this opinion. He 
and his political friends will soon be in power with a chief of their own 
selection, and in whose firmness and energy they express high confidence. 

F F F 



410 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

In six weeks the time will come round which brings him into power, and 
we shall see what will follow. Without pretending to the spirit of proph- 
ecy, I feel I hazard nothing in predicting that what is deemed so easy to 
be done when out of power will be pronounced impracticable when in. 
The senator would have too much prudence to give the advice ; but, if 
not, the President elect will, I conjecture, have too much discretion to act 
on it. 

If, however, I should be mistaken, and the attempt should be made to 
expel the occupants from the public lands, I hazard nothing in predicting 
that the administration will go out of power with ten times the majority 
with which it came in, as great as that was. The bitterest enemy could 
not give more fatal advice. 

If, then, this powerful tide of emigration, which is flowing in on the 
public lands, cannot be arrested, what ought, or can be done, to prevent 
the loss of the public domain by the action of the causes alreadj- explain- 
ed ? This is the difficult question. In answer, I say, we must do as we 
are often compelled to do in our progress through life — accommodate 
ourselves to circumstances; to mitigate evils we cannot overcome, and 
retard or lessen those we cannot prevent. Such are the laws to which 
beings of our limited powers and control over events must necessarily 
yield. 

Without, then, undertaking the impossible task of arresting the tide of 
emigration or expelling the settlers, I would advise the adoption of the 
most judicious and efficient measures of converting them into freeholders, 
with the least sacrifice consistent with effecting that object. The first 
step towards this should be to unite the interests of this government 
with that of the states within which the lands lie, so as to combine the 
power and influence of the two for their preservation. Without it no- 
thing can be done. If they should not be united, the necessary conse- 
quence would be, that the interest of the states would be invariably found 
to be opposed to that of the government, and its weight thrown on the 
side of the settlers on all questions between them, of which we have daily 
proof in our proceedings. In the end, their united power and influence 
would prevail. If this indispensable step be not taken in a short time, 
instead of graduation and pre-emption, we shall have a demand, not to be 
resisted, for donations and grants to the settlers. A leading inducement 
with him to dispose of the lands to the states was to eflect this important 
union of interest. It is the only way by which it can be accomplished ; 
and, to render it sufficiently strong to effect the object intended, I am in 
favour of a liberal compensation to the states for the expense and trouble 
of their management. 

But something more is indispensable to prevent the loss of'^the lands ; 
and that is, to hold out adequate inducements to the settlers to become 
freeholders by purchasing the land. This can be efl'ected with the least 
loss to the government, and the greatest advantage to the settlers, by a 
judicious system of graduation and pre-emption, and it is with that view 
that provisions are made for both in the amendment which 1 intend to 
ofl'er. It provides that the states may, at their discretion, reduce the 
price of all lands which have been ofi'ered at sale ten years and upward, 
to one dollar per acre, after the 30th of June, 1842; and all that may be 
in market for fifteen years and upward, to seventy-five cents per acre, 
after the 30th of June, 1847; and all that may have been twenty years 
and upward, to fifty cents per acre, after the 30th of June, 1852; and all 
that have been twenty-five years and upward, to twenty-five cents, after 
the 30th of June, 1857 ; and all that have been thirty years and upward, 
to twelve cents, after the 30th of June, 1862 ; and all that should remain 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 411 

unsold five years thereafter to be surrendered to the states 5 with the right, 
also, at their discretion, to allow pre-emption for ninety days to settlers, 
at each step in the reduction of the price. It also provides that all latids, 
after having been offered for sale in those states, shall, at the expiration 
of ten years from the time of being offered, become subject, in like man- 
ner, to graduation and pre-emption. 

The object of these provisions is to hold out inducements to the settlers 
to purchase, by bringing the lands, within a reasonable period, to a price 
which would not only justify, but hold out strong inducement to them to 
purchase. One great difficulty in the way of purchasing, as the system 
now stands, is, that the great body of the lands are not worth, in reality, 
the price of $1 25, at which they are sold by the government. There ap- 
pears to be a great mistake on this point, which it is important to correct. 
Instead of almost every acre, as is supposed by some gentlemen in de- 
bate, to be worth that sum, the reverse position is true, that none was 
Avorth it but that which was, at the time, coming in demand by purchasers. 
I rest the assertion on the well-established principle that demand and 
supply regulate price, and the fact that an article which is in the market 
at a fixed price, open to the demand of all, and is not taken, is the best 
proof that the price is above the market value at the time. It is in vain 
to talk of intrinsic value — a thing wholly different from price. There are 
many things of the highest intrinsic value that have no price, as air and 
water, while many of but small value would, from their great scarcity, 
command a very high one. In the language of business, a thing is worth 
what it will sell for, and no one is willing to give more, unless compelled 
by some particular reason. The occupants of the public lands partake 
of this feeling. They are unwilling to give for the inferior lands, which 
for the most part they occupy, $1 25, when a small part only of the best 
lands offered for sale would command that, and feel that they have some- 
thing like justice on their side in not giving so high a price for their pos- 
sessions. 

This feeling must be met, and it is proposed to meet it bj^ the provis- 
ions for graduation and pre-emption which I have just stated ; a policy 
so liberal towards a large, though poor class, not less honest and patriotic 
than the rest of the community, could not fail to have a happy effect, not 
only in reference to them, but in a more enlarged point of view. One of 
the most important would be the great increase of the number of small 
freeholders, which, in the hour of danger, would prove of vast importance, 
especially in the weakest portion of the Union — in the Southwestern 
States — where the provision would have the greatest effect. It would be 
the class that would furnish the hardiest and best soldiers, with the ad- 
vantage of being inured to the climate. Combined and modified as they 
would be, they cannot but have a powerful weight in inducing the occu- 
pants to purchase. It will work a revolution in his character. He will 
regard himself, on his little domain, more a freeholder than a squatter; 
and, as the price in the descending scale of graduation approaches the 
price that lands such as he occupies would sell for, his industry and econ- 
omy would be exerted to be prepared with the requisite means to make the 
purchase. The liberal character of the policy would impress him with deep 
feelings of respect for the justice and care of the government ; and the 
security it would affo.rd would put an end to the esprit de corps, which 
otherwise would be so strong ; and all, combined with the influence of 
the states on the side of the government, would, I feel confident, guard 
eftectually against the danger of losing the lands, as far as the occupants 
are concerned, in the only way that would be practicable. 

The amendment proposes to leave it to the states to graduate and grant 



412 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

pre-emptions or not, at their discretion, within the limits prescribed. The 
conditions of the several states are very different in reference to the ex- 
pediency of exercising the right. In the uniformly fertile region in the 
upper portion of the great Valley of the Mississippi, it may not be neces- 
sary to resort to either, or, if so, to a very limited extent ; while in the 
Southwestern States, including Arkansas, it would be indispensable ; and 
hence the propriety of giving the right, but leaving the exercise to the 
discretion of the states. Each state would be the most competent judo-e 
whether it should be exercised or not, and to what extent. 

Having considered the provisions intended to guard against the danger 
of losing the lands from mere occupancy without payment, I next pro- 
pose to make some remarks on that of their being lost, in consequence 
of the conflicting policy between the new and old states in reference to 
them, should the present system be continued. To understand this dan- 
ger, we must have a just conception of the cause in which it originates, 
which I will endeavour first to explain. 

In the nature of things, it is impossible that the new and old states can 
take the same view of the policy proper to be adopted in reference to 
the public domain. Their respective position, interest, and extent of 
knowledge in reference to it, are wholly different, which cannot but have 
a correspondent effect on their views. The old states stand in reference 
to the new somewhat in the light of an absent owner of a large estate, and 
not without some degree of his feelings, while the new stand, in some 
degree, in the situation of those who occupy and work his estate, with 
feelings not a little akin to those which belong to that relation. That 
such is the case, and that it leads to diverse views of the policy that 
ought to be adopted, and that, again, to conflict between them, the ques- 
tions now before us, the discussion now going on, the feelings it excites, 
and the j-early and violent agitation of those questions for the last eight 
or ten years, abundantly prove. Nor is it less clear that they have in- 
creased, and must increase with the growth and influence of the new 
states over the action of the government, till their rapid growth will give 
them the ascendency, when they will decide it in their own way, under 
the high pretensions and excited feeling of real or supposed injustice, 
which must necessarily grow out of a long-continued and violent conflict. 
It is, in like manner, clear that the evil originates in the ownership and 
administration by the government of the lands lying in the new states, 
and constituting a large portion of their territory. If to these considera- 
tions it be added, that the questions growing out of this great subject 
must extend to and embrace, and influence in their bearings, every other 
question of public policy, as is illustrated by the amendment for distribu- 
ting the proceeds of the sales of the lands among the states, which, in its 
consequences, takes in the v.^hole circle of our legislation, and that it 
must enter into and influence all our political struggles, especially that in 
which all others are concentrated — the presidential election — some con- 
ception may be formed of the distracting influence, the agitation and dan- 
ger which must grow out of this great question if not speedily settled. 

If something be not done, it is not difficult to see that ihe danger from 
these causes and that from occupancy must run together, and that their 
combined forces will be altogether irresistible. The occupants on the 
public lands lying within the states are voters, with a weight at the polls 
equal to the most wealthy, and, of course, an equal influence over the 
election of President and Vice-president, members of Congress, and 
state governments. I hazard little in asserting that, if they have not al- 
ready, from their numbers, a decided influence over all the elections in 
many of the new states, they will in a very short period, from their rapid 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 413 

increase, if nothing should be done to arrest the evil. That influence 
would be felt here, and movements would be made to satisfy the demands 
of so numerous and powerful a class, till, with their growing influence, 
the proposition will be boldly made to give, as has been stated, the land 
vv'ithout purchase ; to which, from the necessity of the case, the govern- 
ment will be compelled to yield, in order to avoid the danger of being 
seized and kept in ojien defiance of its authority. 

Against this, the only ground that can be devised, as far as I can see, 
is the one I have proposed — to dispose of the land to the states — to 
part with ownership and administration, the root of the evil — on fair and 
equitable conditions, with the best possible provisions that can be devised 
to ensure the faithful performance of the compact. If that, with the pro- 
visions against the danger from occupancy, cannot prevent the loss of the 
public lands, I know not what can. I have as strong confidence as the 
nature of the subject will admit, that it will, when perfected in its details 
by the wisdom of the Senate, prove all-sufficient, not only to prevent the 
loss of the public domain, but to arrest the many and growing evils to 
which I have alluded as incident to the system "».s it now exists. But if in 
that it is possible I should err, with all the caution I have taken to come 
to a correct conclusion, I feel assured I cannot in asserting that the dan- 
ger would be far less, under the amendment I intend to propose, than it 
would be should the system continue as it now stands ; and that if the 
public domain is to be lost, it is far beHer it should be under the former 
than the latter. It would be with I'ar kss intermediate hazard, and, in 
the end, with less violence and shock lo our political fabric. In the one 
case we could lose nothing but the value of the land, which I shall pres- 
ently show is far less than usually estimated, while, in the other, no one 
can estimate Avhat the loss may not b« 

Having now, I trust, shown, to the aatisfaction of the Senate, that no- 
thing short of disposing of the public lands on just, equitable, and liberal 
terms, can remedy the evils, and guard against the dangers incident to 
the system under existing circumstances, it only remains to consider 
what would be the effects of the measure on the revenue compared with 
the present system. Should I be able to prove, as I hope to do, that 
even in that respect it will bear a highly advantageous comparison, it 
would yield more, and that when most needed, noiv, when the treasury 
will require replenishing, every solid objection to its adoption would, I 
trust, be removed. 

There was a great and prevalent mistake as to the true value of the 
public lands, as I have just intimated. They are estimated as if every 
acre was worth $1 25 paid down, without taking into account that only a 
small quantity could be sold annually at that price, and that by far the 
greater portion of the income from the sales can only be received through 
a long series of years, extending to a very remote period. In estimating 
yyhjiX is their true value, we must not forget that time has the same effect 
on value which distance has on magnitude, and that, as the largest ob- 
jects in the universe dwindle to a point, when removed to the distance of 
the stars, so the greatest value, when it can only be realized at remote 
periods, diminishes almost to nothing. It is in consequence of this dif- 
ference between present and future value, that a sum paid down is Avorth 
twice as much as an equal sum to be paid sixteen years hence, estimated 
at 6 per cent, simple interest, and four times as much as a like sum to be 
paid at the end of thirty-two years. I do not take fractions of years into 
the estimate. The principle is familiar to all who are in the habit of cal 
culating the present value of annuities for a given number of years, and 
is as applicable to regular annual incomes from land, or any other source, 



414 SPEECHES OP JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

as it is from what is usually called an annuity. On the same principle, 
discounts are made on payments in advance. But we are in the daily 
habit of overlooking this plain and familiar principle, known to every 
business man in the management of his own affairs, in estimating the 
value of the public domain. In consequence of such oversight, the 
160,000,000 of acres lying in the new states have been estimated to be 
worth $200,000,000, at $1 25 per acre — a sum nearly eight times greater 
than its real value, supposing that it would give an annual income averaging 
$2,500,000, and admitting every acre will be sold at $1 25 — a supposition 
far greater than will ever be realized. The Committee on Public Lands, 
at the last session, assuming these data, proved incontestably that the 
true present value did not exceed twenty-six millions and a half of dol- 
lars. They showed, in the first place, that a permanent income forever 
of $2,500,000 would be worth but a fraction more than forty-one millions 
of dollars in hand, as that sum, at six per cent., Avould give an equal in- 
come. They next showed, that to derive an income of $2,500,000 from 
the one hundred and sixty millions of acres in the new states, would ex- 
haust every acre in eighty years ; and that, of course, instead of being a 
permanent income, it would be one only for that period, which would re- 
duce its value to about thirty-four millions of dollars, which would be its 
present value, if there was no expense attending its sales and manage- 
ment. That is, however, far from being the case. Applying the same 
rule of calculation to the annual expense incident to their management, 
including what would be saved by the government if the cession should 
be made, ascertained to be about $550,000 annually, they find the present 
value of the land to be the sum stated ($26,500,000). The result, assuming 
the data to be correct, is incontrovertible ; and that sum would constitute 
the entire amount of the loss under the present system, if the lands were 
really to be given aw'ay by the proposed cession, as has been most un- 
fairly charged on the other side of the chamber. 

I propose to apply the same principle to the same lands, to show its 
present value under the operation of the measure I intend to propose. 
Should it be adopted, the whole of the lands in question would be sold, I 
assume, in twenty-five years from the time they become subject to the 
graduating process — which is much more probable than that the whole 
would be sold in eighty years at the present price of $1 25 per acre. I 
next assume that equal quantities would be sold during each period of 
graduation. I next assume that the portion not yet offered for sale, and 
which, according to the amendment, would not be subject to graduation, 
and which is estimated, in the report of the Committee on Public Lands, 
to amount to a little more than 62,000,000 of acres, would yield an average 
revenue during the ten years equal in proportion to what the 160,000,000 
of acres are estimated to yield. It is, probably, much less than what they 
would, as they will, for the first time, be ofiered for sale. I also estimate 
that the lands that have been offered, and which have not yet run ten 
years, and will, of course, be held till then at $1 25, will, with that which 
will be sold on the first reduction to $1, average $1 12i. I have also 
estimated the whole period, including that which is now in progress to- 
wards ten years, and the first period of reduction, as one period of fifteen 
years, and that the entire amount sold during the entire period will only- 
equal the average of the other periods of graduation (five years): an esti- 
mate greatly under the truth. 

On these data I have based the calculations, which have been made 
with great care, and I find the present value of the lands would be more 
than a third more, under my proposed amendment, than under the exist- 
ing system J and that the excess would be sufficient to pay the 35 per 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 415 

cent, proposed to be allowed to the new states for their expense and 
trouble, leaving the 65 to be received by the government, equal to the 
entire present value of the lands under the existing system. Such is the 
vast difference between receiving a smaller amount by annual payments, 
during half of a long period, and a much larger one, in like manner, during 
double of the time. 

There are but two of the data on which the calculation is based which 
can be supposed to have any material effect on the result, which can 
possibly prove to be over-estimated : the one, that all the lands will be 
sold during the period of graduation, which, however, is quite as proba- 
ble, to say the least, as that all will be sold in eighty years at $1 25 ; and 
the other, that equal quantities would be sold during each step of the re- 
duction. It is not improbable this may not prove to be the case, and that 
larger quantities would be sold towards the latter stages of the gradua- 
tion, at low prices, than during the earlier stages, at higher prices^ which 
affect the result. The other supposition, that equal sums would be re- 
ceived at each period, would probably be much too low; and the truth 
may probably prove to be between them; but, even on that assumption, 
the present value, under the measure I propose, would greatly exceed 
that under the present system, so much so as to be quite sufficient to 
cover the 13 per cent, proposed to be allowed to the states for their 
trouble, above the expense of managing the lands, including the saving 
to the government by the cession. I have assumed that additional allow- 
ance, because it nearly corresponds to that proposed to be given in the bill 
for distribution (introduced by the author of the scheme) to the new 
states above that allowed to the old. I refer to the bill that passed both 
houses, and was vetoed by the President. That allowed 12^ per cent., 
which, for the sake of facility in calculating, I have enlarged to 13 per 
cent. 

I have, I trust, now successfully met the only two objections which 
can, in my opinion, be urged with any plausibility against the measure I 
intend to propose, by proving, not only that there would be reasonable 
assurance that the states would abide by the terms of the cession, but 
that it is the only measure which can be devised to prevent the almost 
certain loss of the public domain under the operation of the system as it 
now stands ; and that, instead of a loss, there would be a clear pecuniary 
gain. If I have succeeded in doing so, I have done all that ought, accord- 
ing to my conception, to be necessary to obtain the support of the body. 
But I cannot be ignorant that there are members from the new states 
who prefer supporting this bill to the measure I intend to propose ; not 
that they think it better, but because they believe it has the best prospect 
of passing. In this I think they are mistaken. It is not probable that 
either can pass the present session. It is now but a few weeks to its ter- 
mination, and it is impossible, in the midst of the crowd of other business, 
that any important measure, not indispensable, can get through, especially 
a system of pre-emption and graduation which has been so long strug- 
gling, unsuccessfully, to pass both houses. But if it cannot pass noiv. there 
is little jyrospect that it can the next four years, against the opposition of 
the coming, when it could not with the aid of the present and late 
administrations. 

With this prospect, I put it to my friends from the new states. Is there 
not danger in pressing these isolated measures, which cannot settle the 
vexed and dangerous questions of the public lands, and which, at best, 
can be pressed on grounds only interesting to those states, that they will 
lose not only a favourite measure, but cause the passage of the most ob- 
noxious to them of all measures, that of distribution \ I ask them, Can 



416 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

they hope to oppose successfully a measure so seductive to so many 
members of the Union, by a measure so partial in its operation, and 
which, so far from appealing to the reason or sympathy of two thirds of 
the states, secures but a reluctant vote from any of them j more from 
party feelings and associations than any conviction of its justice or expe- 
diency 1 Let me tell my friends, that if the struggle is to continue between 
this bill and the scheme for distribution, it is, on their part, a desperate 
one. Defeat is certain ; and there is no way to avoid it (if it be not already 
too late) but to enlarge the issue — to raise it above mere local or pecuni- 
ary considerations to the broad and elevated ground of a final settlement 
of this deep and agitating question, on just and satisfactory principles, 
and thereby arrest the countless evils rushing through that channel on the 
country. It is only thus that an antagonist of sufficient strength can be 
reared up against the dangerous and corrupting scheme of distribution. 
A measure seductive to many of the states, unfortunately overwhelmed 
by debt, could only be successfully opposed by one which would make a 
powerful appeal to truth, justice, and patriotism. As strong as may be 
the appeal to the necessity of embarrassed states, a still stronger may 
be made to the higher and more commanding considerations of duty 
and patriotism. Such an issue, I believe, the measure I propose would 
tender to the country. I solemnly believe it to be founded on truth, and 
sustained by justice and high considerations of policy ; and all it needs 
to ensure it success, if I mistake not, is the earnest and determined sup- 
port of the states which not only have the deepest stake, but whose inde- 
pendence and equality, honour and pride, as nicmbers of this proud re- 
public of states, are involved. 

Having now presented my views of the amendment I intend to offer, 
with a motion to strike out the amendment of the senator from Kentucky 
and insert mine, I shall conclude with a few remarks in reference to the 
leading feature of his amendment, the distribution of the proceeds of the 
public lands among the states. 

It is not my intention to enter on the discussion of a measure which 
I cannot but regard as palpably unconstitutional, as well as dangerous 
and corrupting in its tendency. I do not deem it necessary, as I ex- 
pressed my opinion fully on the subject at the last session. I intend, at this 
time, to make a few remarks, in order to show that, viewed under every 
possible aspect, it must be regarded as either foolish, idle, or unjust. 

It is admitted, on all sides, that the treasury is embarrassed, and that 
no part of the revenue can be withdrawn without making a corresponding 
deficit, which must be supplied by taxes on the people in one i'orm or 
another, and that the witltclrawal of the revenue from the land would 
cause a deficit, so to be supplied, of not less, probably, than f!5, 000,000 
annually. The whole process, then, would consist in giving to the peo- 
ple of the several states their proportional share of the five millions of 
the revenue from the lands, to be collected back from the people of the 
United States, in the shape of a tax on imports, or some other subject, to 
the same amount. Now, sir, I ask, Is it not clear, if a state should re- 
ceive by its distributive share a less sum than the people of that state 
would have to pay in taxes to supply the deficit, it would be, on their part, 
foolish to support the distribution ? So, again, if they should receive the 
same amount they paid instead of a less, would it not be idle ? And if 
more, would it not be unjust? Can any one deny these conclusions'? 
How, then, can a scheme, which implies the one or the other of these 
alternatives (laying aside all other weighty objections), have any chance to 
be adopted 1 But two answers can be given. The one, that the states 
which would receive more from the distribution than their people would 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 417 

have to pay to make Tip the deficit, can outvote the others, and are pre- 
pared to act on the principle of the strong plundering the weak; and the 
other, that a majority of the states want the money to pay their debts or 
to spend in favourite schemes, and prefer shifting the responsibility of 
taxing to the General Government to assuming it themselves, without re- 
garding whether their people would contribute more or less than they 
may receive. They are afraid to lay taxes, lest the people should see 
the sums extracted from their pockets, and turn them out ; and, to avoid 
this, would transfer the task to the General Government, because they 
can take from the people, through the tax on imports, without being de- 
tected as to the amount. 

I take the opportunity, before I sit down, to tender my thanks for the 
honourable and high-minded suggestion of the senator from Missouri 
(Mr. Linn), considering the interior quarter of the Union from which he 
comes, to set apart the proceeds of the lands as a permanent fund for the 
navy. 

[Mr. Linn, in an audible voice : " The navy and the defences of the 
country."] 

I would rejoice to see such a disposition of it, and do hope that he will 
move an amendment to that effect. I would gladly receive it as a modi- 
fication of my amendment, and would regard it as a great improvement. 
The navy, sir, is the right arm of our defence, and is equally important 
to every section— the North and South, the East and West, inland and 
seaboard. When I loQJc at the condition of our country, and the world, 
I feel that too earnest and too early attention cannot be bestowed on the 
arm of defence on which the country must mainly rely, not only for sus- 
taining its just weight and influence in the scale of nations, but also for 
protection. 



XXVIII. 

SPEECH ON THE BILL TO DISTRIBUTE THE PROCEEDS OF THE PUBLIC LANDS, 
JANUARY 23, 1841. 

On the amendment proposed by Mr. Crittenden to the Pre-emption Bill, to 
distribute the proceeds of the public lands among the states, 

Mr. Calhoun said that the proposition of the senator from Kentucky (Mr. 
Crittenden) to distribute the proceeds of the sales of the public lands among 
the several states, was no stranger in this chamber. His colleague {Mr. Clay) 
had introduced it many years since, when he was in the opposition, and had 
often pressed its passage as an opposition measure, and once with success, 
while the treasury was groaning under the weight of a surplus revenue, of 
which Congress was willing to free it on almost any terms. It was then 
vetoed by General Jackson, and has had to contend ever since against the 
resistance of his and the present administration. 

But it is now, for the first time, introduced under different auspices, not as 
an opposition, but an administration measure — a measure of the coming ad- 
ministration, if we may judge from indications that can scarcely deceive. It is 
brought in by a senator who, if rumour is to be credited, is selected as a mem- 
ber of the new cabinet (Mr. Crittenden), backed by another in the same condi- 
tion (Mr. Webster), stipported by a third (Mr. Clay), who, all know, must ex- 
ercise a controlling influence over that administration. It is, then, fair to pre- 
sume that it is not only a measure, but a leading measure of General Harrison's 
administration, pushed forward in advance of his inauguration by those who 

Go G 



418 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOrN. 

have the right of considering themselves his organs on this floor. Regarded in 
this liffht, il acquires a vastly increased importance — so much so as to demand 
the most serious and deliberate consideration. Under this impression, I have 
carefully re-examined the measure, and have been confirmed in the opinion pre- 
viously entertained, that it is perfectly unconstitutional, and pregnant with the 
most disastrous consequences ; and what I now propose is to present the re- 
sult of my reflection under each of these views, beginning with the former. 

Whether the government can constitutionally distribute the revenue from the 
pubUc lands among the states, must depend on the fact whether they belong 
to them in their united Federal character, or individually and separately. If 
in the former, it is manifest that the government, as their common agent or 
trustee, can have no right to distribute among them for their individual, separ- 
ate use, a fund derived from property held in their united and Federal charac- 
ter, without a special power for that purpose, which is not pretended. A posi- 
tion so clear of hself, and resting on the established principles of law, when 
applied to individuals holding property in like manner, needs no illustration. 
If, on the contrary, they belong to the states in their individual and separate 
character, then the government would not only have the right, but would be 
bound to apply the revenue to the separate use of the states. So far is incon- 
trovertible ; which presents the question, In which of the two characters are 
the lands held by the states 1 

To give a satisfactory answer to this question, it will be necessar}' to dis- 
tinguish between the lands that have been ceded by the states, and those that 
have been purchased by the government out of the common funds of the 
Union. 

The principal cessions were made by Virginia and Georgia : the former, of 
all the tract of country between the Ohio, the Mississippi, and the lakes, in- 
cluding the states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Michigan, and the Territory 
of Wisconsin ; and the latter, of the tract included in Alabama and Mississippi. 
I shall begin with the cession of Virgniia, as it is on that the advocates for dis- 
tribution mainly rely to establish the right. 

I hold in ray hand an extract of all that portion of the Virginia deed of ces- 
sion which has any bearing on the point at issue, taken from the volume lying 
on the table before me, with the place marked, and to which any one desirous 
of examining the deed may refer. The cession is " to the United States in 
Conoress as°serabled, for the benefit of said states." Every word implies the 
state°s in their umted Federal character. That is the meaning of the phrase 
United States. It stands in contradistinction to the states, taken separately 
and individually; and if there could be, by possibility, any doubt on that point, 
it would be removed by the expression "in Congress assembled" — an assem- 
blage which constituted the very knot that united them. I regard the execu- 
tion of such a deed, in such an assemblage, to the United States so assembled, 
so conclusive that the cession was to them in their united and aggregate char- 
acter, in contradistinction to their individual and separate character, and, by 
necessary consequence, the lands so ceded belonged to them in their former, 
and not in their latter character, that I am at a loss for words to make it clear- 
er. To deny it, would be to deny that there is any truth in language. 

But, as strong as this is, it is not all. The deed proceeds, and says that all the 
lands so ceded " shall be considered a common fund for the use and benefit of such 
of the United States as have become members of the Confederation, or Federal 
alliance of said states, Virginia inclusive ;" and concludes by saying, " And shall 
he faithfully and bona fide disposed of for that purpose, and for no other use and 
purpose whatever." "if it were possible to raise a doubt before, these full, clear, 
and explicit terms would dispel it. It is impossible for language to be clearer. 
To be " considered a common fund," an expression directly in contradistniction 
to separate or individual, and is, by necessary implication, as clear a negative of 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. ^lO 

the latter, as if it had been positively expressed. This common fund to " be for 
the use and benefit of such of the United States as have become, or shall be- 
come, members of the Confederation or Federal alliance ;" that is, as clear as 
languaoe can express it, for their common use in their united Federal charac- 
ter, Virginia being included as the grantor, out of abundant caution. 

[Here Mr. Clay said, in an audible voice, there were other words not cited. 
To which Mr. Calhoun replied :] 

I am glad to hear the senator say so, as it shows, not only that he regards 
the expressions cited standing alone, as clearly establishing what I contend 
for, but on what he relies to rebut my conclusion. I shall presently show that 
the expression to which he refers will utterly fail him. The concluding words 
are, " Shall be faithfully and bona fide disposed of for that use, and no other use 
and purpose whatever." For that use — that is, the common use of the states, 
in their capacity of members of the Confederation or Federal alliance — and no 
other ; as positively forbidding to use the fund to be derived from the lands for the 
separate use of the states, or to be distributed among them for their separate or 
individual use, as proposed by this amendment, as it is possible for words to do. 
So far, all doubt would seem to be excluded. 

But there are other words to which the senator refers, and on which the ad- 
vocates of the measure vainly rely to establish the right. After asserting that 
it shall be considered a common fund for the use and benefit of the states that 
are, or shall become, members of the Confederation or Federal alliance, Virginia 
inclusive, it adds, " according to their usual respective proportions in the general 
charge and expenditure." Now, I assert, if these words were susceptible of a 
construction that the fund was intended for the separate and individual use and 
benefit of the states, which I utterly deny, yet it would be contrary to one of 
the fundamental rules of construction to give them that meaning. I refer to the 
well-known rule, that doubtful expressions, in a grant or other instrument, are 
not to be so construed as to contradict what is clearly and plainly expressed, as 
would be the case in this instance, if they should be so construed as to mean 
the separate and individual use and benefit of the states severally. But they 
are not susceptible of such construction. Whatever ambiguity may be supposed 
to attach to them, will be readily explained by reference to the history of the 
times. The cession was made under the old Articles of Confederation, accord- 
ing to which the general or common fund of the Union was raised, not by tax- 
ation on individuals, as at present, but by requisition on the states, proportioned 
among them according to the assessed value of their improved lands. An ac- 
count had, of course, to be kept between each state and the common treasury ; 
and these words were inserted simply to direct that the funds from the ceded 
lands were to be credited to states according to the proportion they had to con- 
tribute to the general or common fund respectively, in order, if not enough 
should be received from the lands to meet their contribution, they should be 
debited with the deficit ; and, if more than sufficient, credited with the excess 
in making the next requisition. The expression can have no other meaning; 
and, so far from countenancing the construction that the common fund from the 
lands should be applied to the separate use of the states, it expressly provides 
how it shall be credited to the confederated or allied states, in their account 
current with the general or common fund of that confederacy. The opposhe 
interpretation would imply the most palpable contradiction and absurdity. 

But it is asked, What would have to be done if there had been a permanent 
surplus? Such a case was scarcely supposable, with the heavy debt of the 
Revolution, and the small yield from the land at the time ; but if it had occurred, 
it would have been an unforeseen contingency, to be provided for by the United 
States, to whom the fund belonged, and not by Congress, as its agent or trus- 
tee for its management. 

That this expression was intended merely to direct how the account should 



420 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUX. 

be kept, and not to make that the separate property of the states individually 
which had been declared, in the most emphatic mannei^to belong to them, and 
to be used by them as a common fund, in their united Federal character, we 
would have the most conclusive proof, if what has been stated already v/as not 
so, in the fact that, in the deeds of cession from all the other states, Massachu- 
setts, Connecticut, New-York, North Carolina, and South Carolina, these words 
are omitted. 

As to the cession from Georgia, it is impossible that there should be two 
opinions about it. It was made under the present government, and in the very 
words of the Virginia cession, excepting the words " according to their usual 
respective proportion in the general charge and expenditure." The omission, 
■while the other portion was exactly copied, is significant. The old system of 
requisition on the states to supply the common treasury, under the Articles of 
Confederation, had been superseded by taxes laid directly on the people, under 
the present government, and it was no longer necessary to provide for the mode 
of keeping the account, and for that reason was omitted. But the cession by 
Georgia ivas, in reality, a purchase. The United States has paid full consider- 
ation Ifor the land, including the expense of extinguishing the Indian titles, and 
other charges ; and, of course, the portion of the public domain acquired from 
that state may be fairly considered as standing on the same principle, as far as 
the present question is concerned, as that purchased from foreign powers. 

So undeniable is the conclusion that the lands ceded by the states were ce- 
ded to them in their united and aggregate character as a Federal community, and 
not in their separate and individual, that the senator from Massachusetts was 
forced to admit, if I understood him correctly {and if not, I wish to be correct- 
ed), that they were so ceded in the first instance, but only for the purpose of 
paying the public debt ; and that, on its final discharge, the lands became the 
separate property of the states. This, sir, is a perfectly gratuitous assumption 
on the part of the senator, and is directly opposed by the deeds of cession, 
which expressly provide that it shall be a common fnnd for the use and benefit 
of the states in their united and Federal character, without restriction to the pub- 
lic debt, or limitation in point of time, or any other respect. This bold and un- 
warranted assertion may be regarded as an implied acknowledgment, on his 
part, of the trath of the construction for which I contend, and on which the gov- 
ernm.ent has ever acted, but now attempted to be changed on a false assumption. 
The residue of the public lands, including Florida and all the region beyond 
the Mississippi, extending to the Pacific Ocean, and constituting by far the 
greater part, stands on a different footing. They were purchased out of the 
common funds of the Union, collected by taxes, and belong, beyond ail ques- 
tion, to the people of the United States, in their Federal and aggregate capacity. 
This has not been, and cannot be denied ; and yet it is proposed to distribute 
the common fund derived from the sales of these, as well as from the ceded 
lands, in direct violation of the admitted principle that the agent or tnistee of a 
common concern has no right, without express authority, to apply the pint funds 
to the separate use and benefit of its individual members. 

But, setting aside the constitutional objection, as conclusive as it is, I ask, 
What consideration of expediency — what urgent necessity is there for the adop- 
tion, at this time, of a measure so extraordinary as a surrender to the states, for 
their individual use, of the important portion of the revenue derived from the pub- 
lic domain, which it is probable will not fall short, on an average of the next 
ten years, of five millions of dollars ? Is the treasury now burdened with a sot- 
plus far beyond the wants of the government, for which all are anxious to de- 
vise some measure of relief, as was the case when the senator introduced and 
passed his scheme of distribution formerly ? On the contrary, is it not in the 
verj' opposite condition — one of exhaustion, with a deficit, according to the 
statement qf that senator, and those who act with him, of many millions of 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 421 

dollars ? And is not the revenue still declining, so that in a short time the pres- 
ent deficit will be doubled ? To take a broader view, I would ask. Is the con- 
dition of the country less unfavourable to the adoption of the measure than the 
state of the treasury ? Is there an individual capable of taking a comprehen- 
sive view of our foreign relations at this moment, who does not see the impe- 
rious necessity of applying every dollar that can be spared to guard against 
coming dangers, more especially on that element where a revolution so extra- 
ordinary is going on, by the all-powerful agency of steam, both as to the means 
of attack and defence ? 

If, then, the state of the treasury and the condition of the country so urgent- 
ly demand the retention of this important branch of revenue for the common, 
use and objects for which the government was created, what possible motives 
can impel those who are shortly to be charged with its administration to bring 
forward, at such a period, the extraordinary proposition to take from the neces- 
sities of the treasury and the country so large a sum, to be distributed among 
the states for their separate and individual use ? To this question but one an- 
swer has been, or can be given — that many of the states want the money. They 
have contracted debts for their own individual and local purposes beyond their 
ordinary means, and which the dominant party in those states are unwilling to 
meet by raising taxes on their own people, for fear of being turned out of pow- 
er. The result has been a loss of credit, followed by a depreciation of their 
bonds, held by rich capitalists at home and abroad. The immediate object of 
this scheme is to raise the credit of the indebted states by distributing the rev- 
enue from the lands ; that is, to surrender about one fourth of the permanent rev- 
enue of the Union, and that the most certain, to enhance the value of the state 
bonds, now greatly depressed, because some of the indebted states do not choose 
to raise, by taxes on their own people, the means of paying their own debts. 
To have a true conception of the whole case, it must be borne in mind that 
these bonds were taken by the capitalists on this and the other side of the At- 
lantic on speculation, in the regular course of business, as a profitable invest- 
ment, and many of them at great depreciation ; and that the demand on the 
common treasury is substantially to make good, not only their losses, but to ena- 
ble them to realize their anticipated profits. Such is the object. 

We are thus brought to the question. In what manner is this deficit of at least 
five millions to be supplied ? By taxes^additional taxes on the commerce of 
the country, preparing the way for still higher by combining the indebted states 
with the tariff interest, to impose heavier burdens on that important but oppress- 
ed branch of industry. Wines and silks are to be selected, under the plea 
of taxino- luxury ; and much manoeuvring has been resorted to in order to enlist 
the tobacco interest in favour of the tax, with, I fear, too much success. They 
are, I admit, fair objects of taxation, and ought to bear their due proportion of 
the public burden. I am prepared to act on that opinion when the tarifl' comes 
up for revision, as it must at the next session. I go farther : Fix the amount 
which the just and necessary wants of government may require, including 
the revenue from the lands, and I will cheerfully agree to lay as much on lux- 
uries as gentlemen will agree to reduce on necessaries. It is my favourite sys- 
tem, and I am prepared to go as far as any one in that direction. But I shall 
not agree to impose a cent on luxuries or necessaries, on the rich or poor, to 
pay the debts for which this government is in no way responsible, and which 
we cannot pay without a palpable violation of the Constitution, and gross injus- 
tice to the great body of the community. I was struck with the fact that, while 
the senator (Mr. Webster) held out at one moment that the duties on wines and 
silks would fall on the consumers, and, by consequence, on the rich, in the very 
next he informed us that they would not rise in price in consequence of the du- 
ties, and, of course, they would entirely escape from them. To prove that they 
would not increase in price in consequence of the duties, he assumed assprin- 



422 SPEECHES OF JOHX C. CALHOUN, 

ciple, that where one country is the principal producer of certain articles, as 
France was of wines and silks, and another a principal consumer of them, as 
the United States were, a duty imposed on them by the latter would have the 
efTect, not of raising the price in the country where it was laid, but to reduce 
it where they were produced ; that is, to reduce it in France, and not to raise 
it in the United States. 

Now, I put it to the senator whether the loss, taking his own conclusion, 
could fall on the French producers of wines and silks, without, in its reac- 
tion, falling also on the American producers of the products given in exchange 
for them — that is, the growers of tobacco, rice, and cotton, which furnish al- 
most exclusively the means of payment ? Is it not clear, if they cannot sell as 
high or as much to us, in consequence of the duties, that we, in turn, cannot 
sell as high or as much to them, in consequence of the fall of price on their prod- 
ucts ? Their loss must be followed by ours ; and it follows, according to the 
senator's own reasoning, that the five millions which is proposed to be raised 
by duties, to make good the deficit caused by the distribution, would be filched 
from the pockets of the honest and industrious producers of our great staples, 
and not, as alleged by the senator, from the wealthy consumers of wines and 
silks. It is out of their hard earnings that the means must be raised to enhance 
the value of the bonds of the states in the hands of foreign capitalists. The sen- 
ator must surely hold in low estimation the intelligence and spirit of the South- 
ern planter, in supporting such a proposition. 

But I take still stronger grounds. The necessary effect of all duties is to 
diminish the imports ; and the consequence of diminishing the imports is to dim- 
inish, in the same proportion, the exports. Imports and exports are dependant 
each on the other. If there can be no imports, there can be no exports ; and 
if there be no exports, there can be no imports. The exports pay for the im- 
ports, and the imports pay for the exports — the one always-implies the other. So, 
if the imports are limited in amount, the exports must be limited, when fairly 
estimated, to the same amount, and vice versa. But the effects of all duties, 
whether they fall on the consumers of the articles on which they are laid, or on 
the producers, must be to diminish the amount of the imports, and, by conse- 
quence, of the exports. In a word, duties on imports aflect the amount of tie 
exports to the same extent that they do the imports ; and it would have just the 
same eflect in the end, whether the deficit of five millions which would be caus- 
ed by the distribution, be raised by a duty on tobacco, rice, and cotton, or on 
the wines and silks for which they might be exchanged. The loss would fall 
in either case on the same interest, and to the same amount, and those immedi- 
ately connected with it. 

But I rise to higher grounds. As bad as the scheme is in a financial view, 
it is far worse in a political. The most deadly enemy of our system could 
not, in my opinion, propose a measure better calculated to subvert the Con- 
stitution and the government. It would necessarily place the state govern- 
ments in direct antagonist relations with this on all questions except that of col- 
lecting and distributing the revenue, which would end in defeating all the ob- 
jects for which it was instituted, and reduce it, ultimately, to the odious capacity 
of a mere tax-collector for the state governments. In this there can be no 
mistake. 

The money to be distributed would go, not to the people of the states indi- 
vidually, but to the state legislatures ; or, to be more specific, to the majority, 
or, rather, to the dominant portion of the majority, which for the time might have 
the control. They, and their friends and supporters, would profit by the scheme. 
The money distributed would be applied in the most el!ective way to secure 
their ascendeney, and to give them the lion's share of the profit. The domi- 
nant party in the states would thus be enlisted to continue and enlarge the dis- 
tribution ; and when it is added, that the suras expended in the states would 



SPEECHES OF JOHN' C. CALHOUN. 423 

embrace powerful local interests, which would be seen and felt in its efTccls by 
large portions of the people, while the expenditures of the oovernment would 
be on objects of a general character, connected, for the most part, with the de- 
fence of the country against foreign danger, which would be little felt or regard- 
ed by the great body of the community, except in war, or on the eve of hostil- 
ities, I hazard nothing in asserting, that the interests in favour of distributing 
the revenue would overpower that of expenditures by the General Government, 
even on the most necessary objects, the consequence of which would be such 
as has been stated. Be assured that the system, once fairly commenced, woidd 
go on and enlarge itself, till every branch of revenue wotdd be absorbed, when 
the o-overnment, divested of all its constitutional functions, woidd expire, imder 
universal scorn and contempt. Such must be the end of this most dangerous 
and unconstitutional measure, should it ever be adopted. 

But the senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Webster), and others, allege that 
the cession of the lands to the new states is itself but a mode of distribution, 
with a view, doubtless, to weaken the force of my objections to this amendment. 
If it be so, I can only say that it is not intended ; and if I can be satisfied that 
it is, I would be the first to denounce it. Its object is to remedy what I believe 
to be great and growing disorders in the operation of our land system, as it now 
exists ; but as dangerous as I regard them, I would never consent to remedy 
them by a measure which I regard as vastly more dangerous. But the senator 
will, if I mistake not, find it far more easy to call it a scheme of distribution 
than to prove it to be so, or even that it is in the slightest degree analogous to 
it in any particular, as I hope to prove in some subsequent stage oi^ tliis discus- 
sion. 

I have heard, Mr. President, with pleasure, the deep denunciations levelled 
against the whole scheme of distribution, whether apj)lied to the revenue from 
lands or taxes. It strenglhens my confidence in the force of truth, and the 
conviction that, if one has the courage to do his duty, regardless of defeat for 
the time, he may hope to outlive error and misrepresentation. Let me add, if 
any of the denunciations were aimed at me, they passed harmless over me, 
and fell on another, against whom I would be the last to utter a censure in his 
retirement and declining years, however opposed to him while in power. The 
Senate will understand that I refer to General Jackson. It is far from agree- 
able to me to introduce his name here, or to speak of myself; but I am com- 
pelled, from the remarks made in a certain quarter, to do so, not from any feel- 
iiw of egotism (for I am too inconsiderable to involve what concerns me indi- 
vidually in the discussion of so grave a subject), but that I may not be weaken- 
ed, as the opponent of this most dangerous measure, by any misconception of 
env past course in relation to the scheme of distribution. 

'it has, sir, been my fortune to be opposed to the scheme from the beginning. 
It originated with a former member of this body, Mr. Dickerson, of New-Jersey, 
and recently Secretary of the Navy, as far back as the year 1827. His pro- 
posed object was to strengthen the protective tariff interest, by distributing pari 
of its proceeds (if I remember correctly, five millions of dollars) annually 
among the stales, in the manner proposed by this amendment. I took my 
stand'against it, promptly and decidedly, on its first agitation, as a measure 
dangerous and unconstitutional, and well calculated to fix the protective system 
permanently on the country. The next year, the oppressive tariff of 1828 was 
passed, and the year afterward General Jackson was elected President, with 
the expectation, as far as South Carolina supported him, that he would use his 
patronage and influence to repeal that obnoxious act, or at least greatly reduce 
the burden it imposed. 

But it was the misfortune of General Jackson and the country, that when he 
arrived here to assume the reins of government, he was strongly prepossessed 
in favour of the plan of distributing the surplus revenue, after the final payment 



424 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

of the public debt, under the impression that it Avould be impossible to repeal 
that act, or reduce the duties it imposed. How he received so dangerous an 
impression, I have never understood ; but so it was. I speak not from my own 
knowledge, but from information that is tmquestionable, that his inaugural ad- 
dress contained a passage in favour of the distribution, when it was laid before 
those whom he had selected for his first cabinet ; and that it was with difficul- 
ty he assented to omit it, so strongly was he impressed in its favour — no doubt 
honestly and sincerely impressed. His first message to Congress, in Decem- 
ber, 1829, contained a strong recommendation of that scheme, which was re- 
peated, with additional arguments in its favour, in his second message the suc- 
ceeding year. A recommendation from so high and influential a quarter could 
not but have a powerful effect on public opinion. The governors of two great 
states, Pennsylvania and New- York, recommended it to their legislatures, who 
adopted resolutions in its favour. That the views which he then entertained 
may be fully imderstood, I ask the secretary to read the portions of the two 
messages, which he will find marked in the volumes on his table, in the order 
of their respective dates. 

[The secretary read the following extracts from President Jackson's mes- 
sages, 1st and 2d sessions, 2Gth Congress : 

" First Session, Twenty-sixlk Congress. 

" After the extinction of the public debt, it is not probable that any adjust- 
ment of the tariff, upon principles satisfactory to the people of the Union, will, 
until a remote period, if ever, leave the government without a considerable sur- 
plus in the treasury beyond what may be required for its current service. As 
then the period approaches when the application of the revenue to the payment 
of debt will cease, the disposition of the surplus will present a subject for the 
serious deliberation of Congress, and it may be fortunate for the country that 
it is yet to be decided. Considered in connexion with the difficulties which 
have heretofore attended appropriations for purposes of internal improvement, 
and with those which this experience tells us will certainly arise whenever 
power over such subjects may be exercised by the General Government, it is 
hoped that it may lead to the adoption of some plan which will reconcile the 
diversified interests of the states, and strengthen the bonds which unite them. 
Every member of the Union, in peace and in war, will be benefited by the im- 
provement of inland navigation and the construction of highways in the several 
states. Let us, then, endeavour to attain this benefit in a mode which will be 
satisfactory to all. That hitherto adopted has, by many of our fellow-citizens, 
been deprecated as an infraction of the Constitution, while by others it has 
been viewed as inexpedient. All feel that it has been employed at the expense 
of harmony in the legislative councils. 

" To avoid these evils, it appears to me that the most safe, just, and federal 
disposition which could be made of the surplus revenue, would be its apportion- 
ment among the several states, according to their ratio of representation ; and, 
should this measure not be found warranted by the Constitution, that it would 
be expedient to propose to the states an amendment authorizing it. I regard 
an appeal to the source of power, in cases of real doubt, and where its exercise 
is deemed indispensable to the general welfare, as among the most sacred of 
all our obligations. 

" Second Session, Tvoenty-sixth Congress. 

" I have heretofore felt it my duty to recommend the adoption of some plan 
for the distribution of the surplus funds which may at any time remain in the 
treasury after the national debt shall have been paid, among the states, in pro- 
portion to the number of their representatives, to be applied by them to objects 
of internal improvement. 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 425 

" Although this plan has met with favour in some portions of the Union |it has 
also elicited objections which merit deliberate consideration. A brief nonce of 
these objections here will not, therefore, I trust, be regarded as out of place. 

" They rest, as far as they have come to my knowledge, on the following 
grounds : 1st. An objection to the ratio of distribution ; 2d. An apprehension 
that the existence of such a regulation would produce improvident and oppres- 
sive taxation to raise the funds lor distribution ; 3d. That the mode proposed 
would lead to the construction of works of a local nature, to the exclusion of 
such as are general, and as would, consequently, be of a more useful character ; 
and, last, that it would create a discreditable, and injurious dependance on the 
part of the state governments upon the Federal power. Of those who object to 
the ratio of representation as the basis of distribution, some insist that the im- 
portations of the respective states would constitute one that would be more equi- 
table ; and others, again, that the extent of their respective territories would 
furnish a standard which would be more expedient, and sufficiently equitable. 
The ratio of representation presented itself to my mind, and it still does, as one 
of obvious equity, because of its being the ratio of contribution, whether the 
funds to be distributed be derived from the customs or from direct taxation. It 
does not follow, however, that its adoption is indispensable to the establishment 
of the system proposed. There may be considerations appertaining to the sub- 
ject which would render a departure, to some extent, from the rule of contribu- 
tion proper. Nor is it absolutely necessary that the basis of distribution be 
confined to one ground. It may, if, in the judgment of those whose right it is 
to fix it, it be deemed politic and just to give it their character, have regard 
to several. 

" In my first message, I stated it to be my opinion, that ' it is not probable that 
any adjustment of the tariff, upon principles satisfactory to the people of the 
Union, vvill, until a remote period, if ever, leave the government without a con- 
siderable surplus in the treasury beyond what may be required for its current 
service.' I have had no cause to change that opinion, but much to confirm it. 
Should these expectations be realized, a suitable fund would thus be produced 
for the plan under consideration to operate upon ; and if there be no such fund, 
its adoption will, in my opinion, work no injury to any interest; for I cannot 
assent to the justness of the apprehension that the establishment of the propo- 
sed system would tend to the encouragement of improvident legislation of the 
character supposed. Whatever the proper authority, in the exercise of constitu- 
tional power, shall, at any time hereafter, decide to be for the general good, 
will in that, as in other respects, deserve and receive the acquiescence and 
support of the whole country ; and we have ample security that every abuse of 
power in that regard, by agents of the people, will receive a speedy and effect- 
ual corrective at their hands. The views which I take of the future, founded 
on the obvious and increasing improvement of all classes of our fellow-citizens, 
in intelligence, and in public and private virtue, leave me without much appre- 
hension on that head. 

" 1 do not doubt that those who come after us will be as much alive as we are 
to the obligation upon all the trustees of political power to exempt those for whom 
they act from all unnecessary burdens ; and as sensible of the great truth, that 
the resources of the nation beyond those required for immediate and necessary 
purposes of government, can nowhere be so well deposited as in the pockets of 
the people."] 

Such, I repeat, were, unfortunately, the opinions which General Jackson en- 
tertained on this all-important question when he came into power. I saw the 
danger in its full extent, and did not hesitate to take an open and decided stand 
against the measure which he so earnestly recommended ; and that was the 
first question on which we separated. In placing myself in opposition to him 

H HH 



426 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

on a measure so vital, I was not ignorant of the hazard to which I exposed my- 
self, but the sense of duty outweighed all other considerations. I clearly saw 
that there would be an increased surplus revenue after the final payment of the 
public debt, a period then rapidly approaching ; and that, if it was once distribu- 
Ded to the states, it would rivet on the country the tariff of 1828, to be followed 
by countless disasters from the combined effects of the two measures. Had it 
been adopted, the last ray of hope of repealing or reducing that oppressive and 
ruinous measure would have vanished. It would, by its seductive influence, 
have drawn over to its support the very states whose prosperity it was crushing, 
not excepting South Carolina itself. The process is not difficult to explain. 

For that purpose, I will take the case of South Carolina, and will assume 
that her citizens paid, under the tariff of 1828, four millions of dollars into the 
treasury of the Union, which is probably not far from the truth, and would have 
received back under the proposed distribution of the surplus but one fourth, ma- 
king one million. The sum to be distributed, as has already been staled, would 
not have been returned to the people, but to the treasury of the state, to be 
disposed of by the Legislature ; or, to speak more specifically, by the small 
portion which, for the time, would have had control over the dominant majori- 
ty of the Legislature. All who have experience in the affairs of government, 
will readily understand that no disposition would have been made of it but what 
they, and their friends and supporters, would have had a full share of the profits 
and political advantages to be derived from its administration and expenditure. 
Thus an interest would be created on the part of the controlling influence in 
the state for the time, adverse to it — an interest to sustain the tarifi", as the means 
of sustaining the distribution ; and that for the plain reason, that they would re- 
ceive more from the former than they would pay, as citizens, under the duties. 

Now, sir, when we reflect that the amount taken by the duties out of the 
pockets of the people was extracted in so round-about and concealed a manner, 
that no one — no, not the best informed and shrewdest calculator, could ascertain 
with precision what he paid, while that received back from distribution would 
have been seen and felt by those into whose hands it would have passed, it will 
be readily understood, not only how those who participated directly in its ad- 
vantages, but the people themselves, would have been so deluded as to believe 
that they gained more by the distribution than what they lost by the tarifl', es- 
pecially when the dominant influence in the state would hwe been interested 
in creating and keeping up the delusion. 

It is thus that the result of the scheme would have been to combine and unite 
into one compact mass the dominant interests of all the states, with the great 
dominant interest of the Union, to perpetuate a system of plundering the people 
of the products of their labour, especially the South, to be divided among those, 
with their partisans, who could control the politics of the country. It was 
against this daring and profligate scheme that South Carolina interposed her sov- 
ereign authority, and by that interposition, as I solemnly believe, saved the Con- 
stitution and the liberty of the country. 

But that step, as bold and decisive as it was, could not accomplish all. To 
save the manufacturing interest, and avoid the hazard of reaction, it was neces- 
sary to reduce the duties on the protected articles gradually and slowly. The 
consequence was a continued overflow of the treasury, notwithstanding the duty 
on every article not produced in the country was repealed, amounting in val- 
ue to one half of the whole, to such an enormous extent had the protective du- 
ties been raised. A remedy had to be applied to meet the corrupting and dan- 
gerous influence of this temporary surplus, till the gradual reduction of the pro- 
tective duties under the Compromise Act would bring them to the ordinary wants 
of the government. There was but one remedy, and that was to take it from 
the treasury. The flow was too great for the most lavish expenditures to keep 
down. I saw, in advance, that such would be the case ; and, with the design 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUX. 427 

of devising a remedy beforehand, niOA'ed for a special committee, with the view 
mainly of freeing the treasury of its surplus, as the great source of executive 
influence and power. The committee, concurring in that opinion, recommend- 
ed that the Constitution should be so amended as to enable Congress to make 
a temporary distribution. The report fully explains the reasons for believing 
there would be a large and corrupting surplus, and why, under the peculiar cir- 
cumstances of the case, the distribution as proposed was the only remedy. I 
have marked a portion of it that will show the opinion I then entertained in ref- 
erence to distribution, and which I ask the secretary to read. 

[" Second Session, Twenty-third Congress. 

" Your committee are fully aware of the many and fatal objections to the dis- 
tribution of the surplus revenue among the states, considered as a part of the 
ordinary and regular system of this government. They admit them to be as 
great as can be well imagined. The proposition itself, that the government 
should collect money for the purpose of such distribution, or should distribute a 
surplus for the purpose oi perpetuating taxes, is too absurd to require refutation ; 
and yet what would be when applied, as supposed, so absurd and pernicious, 
is, in the opinion of your committee, in the present extraordinary and deeply 
disordered state of our affairs, not only useful and salutary, but indispensable to 
the restoration of the body politic to a sound condition ; just as some potent 
medicine, which it would be dangerous and absurd to prescribe to the healthy, 
may, to the diseased, be the only means of arresting the hand of death. Dis- 
tribution, as proposed, is not for the preposterous and dangerous purpose of rais- 
ing a revenue for distribution, or of distributing the surplus as a means of per- 
petuating a system of duties or taxes, but a temporary measure to dispose of an 
unavoidable surplus while the revenue is in the course of reduction, and which 
cannot be otherwise disposed of without greatly aggravating a disease that 
threatens the most dangerous consequences, and which holds out the hope, not 
only of arresting its farther progress, but also of restoring the body politic to a 
state of health and vigour. The truth of this assertion a few observations will 

suffice to illustrate. 

****** 

" It may, perhaps, be thought by some that the power which the distribution 
among the states would bring to bear against the expenditure, and its consequent 
tendency to retrench the disbursements of the government, would be so strong 
as not only to curtail useless or improper expenditure, but also the useful and 
necessary. Such, undoubtedly, would be the consequence, if the process were 
too long continued ; but, in the present irregular and excessive action of the 
system, when its centripetal force threatens to concentrate all its powers in a 
single department, the fear that the action of this government will be too much 
reduced by the measure under consideration, in the short period to which it is 
proposed to limit its operation, is without just foundation. On the contrary, if 
the proposed measure should be applied in the present diseased state of the gov- 
ernment, its effect would be like that of some powerful alterative medicine, op- 
erating just long enough to change the present morbid action, but not sufficient- 
ly long to superinduce another of an opposite character."] 

The measure recommended was not adopted. It was denied, and violently 
denied, that there would be a surplus, and I left it to time to decide which opin- 
ion was correct. A year rolled round, and conclusively decided the point. In- 
stead of overrating, experience proved I had greatly under-estimated the surplus, 
as I feU confident at the time I had. It more than doubled even my calcula- 
tion. I again revived the measure ; but before it coidd be acted on, instructions 
from state legislatures, with intervening elections, turned the majority in the 
Senate, which had been opposed to the administration, into a minority. I ac- 



428 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

quiesced, and gave notice that I would not press the measure I had introduced, 
and would leave the responsibility with the majority, to devise a remedy for 
what was at last acknowledged to be a great and dangerous evil. All felt that 
something must be done, and that promptly. In the greatly expanded state of 
the currency, the enormous surplus had flowed off in the direction of the pub- 
lic lands, and, by a sort of rotary motion, from the deposite banks to the spec- 
ulators, and from them to the receivers, and back again to the banks, to per- 
form the same round again, rapidly absorbing every acre of the public lands. 
No one saw more clearly than the senator from New-York (Mr. Wright), that 
an effectual and speedy remedy was indispensable to prevent an overwhelming 
catastrophe ; and he promptly proposed to vest the surplus in the stocks of the 
states, to which I moved an amendment to deposite it in their treasuries, as be- 
ing more equal and appropriate. These were acknowledged to be the only al- 
ternatives to leaving it in the deposite banks. Mine succeeded, and the pas- 
sage of the Deposite Act, which is now unjustly denounced in a certain quarter 
as distribution, and not as deposite, as it really is, followed. 

As far as I am concerned, the denunciation is utterly unfounded. I regard- 
ed it then, and still do, as simply a deposite — a deposite, to say the least, as 
constitutional as that in state banks, or state stocks held by speculators and 
stock-jobbers on both sides of the Atlantic, and far more just and appropriate 
than either. But while I regard it as a deposite, I did then, and now do, believe 
that it should never be withdrawn but in the event of war, when it would be 
found a valuable resource. 

But had it been in reality a distribution, it would be, in my opinion, if not al- 
together, in a great measure justified, under the peculiar circumstances of the 
case. The surplus was not lawfully collected. Congress has no right to take a 
cent from the people but for the just and constitutional wants of the country. 
To take more, or for other purposes, as in this case, is neither more nor less 
than robbery — more criminal for being perpetrated by a trustee appointed to 
guard their interest. It in fact belonged to those from whom it was unjustly 
plundered ; and if the individuals, and the share of each, could have been as- 
certained, it ought, on every principle of justice, to have been returned to them. 
But as that was impossible, the nearest practicable approach to justice was to 
return it proportionably, as it was, to the states, as a deposite, till wanted for the 
use of the people from whom it was unjustly taken, instead of leaving it with 
the banks, for their use, which had no claims whatever to it, or vesting it in 
state stocks, for the benefit of speculators and stock-jobbers. 

As brief as this narrative is, I trust it is sufficient to show that the advocates 
of this amendment can find nothing in my former opinion or course to weaken 
my resistance to it, or to form the show of a precedent for the extraordinary 
measure which it proposes. So far from it, the Deposite Act, whether viewed 
in the causes which led to it. or its object and effect, stands in direct contrast 
with it. 

We stand, sir, in the midst of a remarkable juncture in our affairs ; the most 
remarkable, in many respects, that has occurred since the foundation of the gov- 
ernment ; nor is it probable that a similar one will ever again occur. This gov- 
ernmeut is now left as free to shape its policy, unembarrassed by existing engage- 
ments or past legislation, as it teas ichcn it frst urnt into operation, and even more 
so. The entire system of policy originating in the Federal consolidation school 
has fallen prostrate. We have now no funded debt, no National Bank, no con- 
nexion with the banking system, no protective tariff. In a word, the paper sys- 
tem, with all its corrupt and corrupting progeny, has, as far as this government 
is concerned, vanished, leaving nothing but its bitter fruits behind. The great 
and solemn question now to be decided is, Shall we again return and repeat the 
same system of policy, with all its disastrous effects before us, and under which 
the country is now suffering, to be again followed with tenfold aggravation ; 



SPEECHES or JOHN C. CALHOUN. 429 

or, profiting by past experience, seize the precious opportunity to take the only 
course which can save the Constitution and liberty ol' the country — that of the 
old State Rights Republican policy of 1793 ? Such is the question submitted 
for our decision at this deeply important juncture ; and on that decision hangs 
the destiny of our country. A few years must determine. Much, very much 
will depend on the President elect. If he should rest his policy on the broad 
and solid principles maintained by his native state, in her purest and proudest 
days, his name will go down to posterity as one of the distinguished benefactors 
of the country ; but, on the contrary, if he should adopt the policy indicated by 
the amendment, and advocated by his prominent supporters in this chamber, and 
attempt to erect anew the fallen temple of consolidation, his overthrow, or that 
of his country, must be the inevitable consequence. 



XXIX. 

speech in reply to the speeches of mfv. webster and mr. clay, on mr. 
Crittenden's amendment to the pre-emption bill, January 30, 1841. 

Mr. Calhoun said: No one who had attended to this debate could doubt 
that the cession of Virginia, on which the right to distribute the revenue from 
the public lands had heretofore been placed, was altogether too narrow to sup- 
port that measure. The portion of the public domain ceded by her is small in 
amount when compared with the whole, and by far the better portion of it had 
already been disposed of, leaving a residue altogether too inconsiderable to ef- 
fect the object intended by the distribution. The other, and much the larger 
portion of the public domain, consisting of Alabama, Mississippi, Florida, and 
the entire region west of the Mississippi River, was purchased out of the com- 
mon fund of the Union, and no construction which could be put on the deed of 
cession from Virginia could possibly apply to it. This was seen and felt by 
the two leading advocates of this amendment on the other side of the chamber 
(Mr. Clay and Mr. Webster), and they, accordingly, endeavoured to find some 
other ground on which to place the right, broad enough to support the whole ; 
and found it, as they supposed, in the provision of the Constitution which gives 
to Congress the power to dispose of the territories and other property belonging 
to the United States. In this they both concurred, so far as the revenue deri- 
ved from the lands was concerned. But the senator from Massachusetts, with 
bolder views than his associate, extended the right of distributing, as I under- 
stood him, to the entire revenue — comprehending as well that received from 
taxes as from lands. 

[Mr. Webster interposed, and denied that he had said so.] 
I stand corrected, and am happy to hear the denial of the gentleman. I had 
so understood him, and am gratified that he had so restricted the right as to ex- 
clude the revenue from taxes. But I cannot be mistaken in asserting that both 
of the senators concur in regarding the power conferred, in the provision refer- 
red to, as having no limitation whatever but the discretion of Congress. If such 
be the true construction, it would, of course, give the right of making the pro- 
posed distribution ; which presents the question, Has Congress the right of dis- 
posing of the public domain, and all the other property belonging to the Union, 
and the revenue derived therefrom, as it pleases, without any constitutional re- 
strictions whatever 1 

Before I proceed to discuss that question, it will be Avell to ascertain what 
is the extent and value of the property embraced. The public domain, as has 
been frequently stated in the course of the debate, embraces more than one 
thousand millions of acres ; and the other property includes the public build- 



430 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

ings, dock and navy yards, forts, arsenals, magazines, ships of war, cannon, 
arms of all descriptions, naval stores, and munitions of war. It is difficult to 
estimate the value of the whole. The public domain alone, according to the 
estimate of the gentlemen (not mine), at $1 25 per acre, is worth upward of 
81,200,000,000; and, including the value of the other property, the whole, at 
the lowest estimate, must far exceed $1,500,000,000, and probably would equal 
not less than $2,000,000,000. Such is the extent and value of the property 
over which the two senators claim for Congress unlimited and absolute ricrht to 
dispose of at its good-will and pleasure. And the question recurs, Have thev 
such right 1 A graver question has never been presented for our consideration, 
whether we regard the principles, the amount of property, or the consequences 
involved. 

Now, sir, in order to test the right, it is my intention to propound a few questions 
to the senators, to which I hope they Avill give explicit answers. Suppose, then, 
in the progress of time, an administration should come in (I make no allusion 
to the next) which should think an established church indispensable to uphold 
the morals, the religion, and the political institutions of the country : would it 
have the right to select some one of the religious sects — say the Methodist^ 
Baptist, Presbyterian, Episcopalian, or Catholic — and erect it into a splendid 
hierarchy, by endowing it out of this ample fund ? 

[Mr. Webster : " The Constitution expressly prohibits it."] 

I hear the answer with pleasure. It assigns the true reason. Here, then, 
we have a limitation in the Constitution, by the confession of the senator ; and., 
of course, there is one restriction, at least, on the unlimited right which he and 
his friend claimed for Congress over this vast fund. Having made good this 
step, I proceed to take another. 

Suppose, then, that such an administration should undertake to colonize 
Africa, with the view of Christianizing and civilizing it, and, for that pur- 
pose, should propose to vest this vast fund, or a portion of it, in the Coloni- 
zation Society : would Congress have the right of doing so ? Or, to take a 
still stronger case, suppose a majority of Congress should become abolition- 
ists : would it have the right to distribute this vast sum among the various abo- 
lition societies, to enable them to carry out their fanatical schemes ? The sena- 
tor is silent. I did not anticipate an answer. He cannot say yes ; and to say 
no would be to surrender the whole ground. Nor can he say, as he did, that 
it is prohibited by the Constitution. I will relieve the senator. I answer for 
him : Congress has no such right, and cannot exercise it without violation of 
the Constitution. But why not ? The answer is simple, but decisive : because 
Congress has not the right to exercise any power except what is expressly 
granted by the Constitution, or may be necessary to execute the granted pow- 
ers ; and that in question is neither granted, nor necessary to execute a granted 
power. 

Having gained this important point, I next ask the senators. Would Congress 
have the right to appropriate the whole, or part, of this vast fund to be drawn 
directly from the treasury, in payment of the principal or interest of the state 
bonds I And if not (as they certainly would not, for the reason already assign- 
ed), has it the right to give it to the states to be so applied ? Can it do that in- 
directly by an agent, which it cannot constitutionally do directly by itself ? If 
so, I would be glad to hear the reason. I might proceed and propound ques- 
tion after question, equally embarrassing ; but abstain, lest I should exhaust the 
patience of the Senate. 

But there is one question of a different character which I must propound, and 
to which I would be glad to have the answers of the two ingenious and learned 
senators. They are both agreed, as I now understand the senator from Massa- 
chusetts, that the revenue from taxes can be applied only to the objects specif- 
ically enumerated in the Constitution, and in repudiating the general welfare 



SPEECHES OP JOHN C. CALHOUN. 431 

principle, as applied to the money power, as far as the revenue may be derived 
from that source. To this extent, they profess to be good State Rights Jeffer- 
sonian Republicans. Now, sir, I would be happy to be informed by either of 
the able senators — I regret that one (Mr. Clay) is not in his seat — by what po- 
litical alchymy the revenue from taxes, by being vested in land or other proper- 
ty, can, vv^hen again turned into revenue by sales, be entirely freed from all the 
constitutional restrictions to which they were liable before the investment, ac- 
cording to their own confessions ? A satisfactory explanation of so curious and 
apparently incomprehensible a process would be a treat. 

The senator from Kentucky (Mr. Clay) failing to find any argument to sus- 
tain the broad and unqualified right of distributing the revenue from the public 
lands as Congress might think proper, sought to establish it by precedent. For 
that purpose he cited, as a precedent, the distribution of arras among the states ; 
which, he contended, sanctioned also the distribution of the revenue from the 
lands among them. The senator forgot that it is made the duty of Congress, 
under an express provision of the Constitution, " to provide for arming the mili- 
tia ;" and that the militia force belongs to the states, and not to the Union ; and, 
of course, that, in distributing arms among the states with the view of arming 
them. Congress but fulfil a duty enjoined on them by the Constitution. 

The palpable misconception, as I must consider it, into which the two sena- 
tors have fallen in reference to this important question, originates, as I con- 
ceive, in overlooking other provisions of the Constitution. They seem not to 
advert to the fact that the lands belong to the United States — that is, to the states 
in their united and Federal character ; and that the government, instead of being 
the absolute proprietor, is but an agent appointed to manage the joint concern. 
They overlook a still more important consideration — that the United States, in 
their united and Federal character, are restricted to the express grants of pow- 
ers contained in the Constitution, which says " that the powers not delegated 
to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are 
reserved to the states respectively, or to the people ;" and, also, that the Con- 
gress of the United States, as the common agent, is restricted expressly, in the 
exercise of its powers, to the objects specified in the instrument, and passing 
such laws only as may be necessary and proper for carrying them into execu- 
tion. It follows that Congress can have no right to make the proposed distri- 
bution, or use its powers to effect any other object, except such as are express- 
ly authorized, without violating and transcending the limits prescribed by the 
Constitution. 

It is thus the whole fabric erected by the arguments of the two senators falls 
to the ground by the giving way of the foundation on which they rest, except 
the small portion of lands embraced in the Virginia cession ; which I will next 
proceed to show stands on gi-ound not more solid. It will not be necessary, 
for that purpose, to travel over the arguments which I offered, when last up, 
against the right to make the distribution, attempted to be deduced from that 
cession, and which have been so much enlarged and strengthened by the able 
and lucid speech of the senator from New- York (Mr. Wright). I propose sim- 
ply to reply, in this connexion, to the arguments of the senator from Kentucky 
(Mr. Clay), w^ho I again have to regret is not in his place. 

His first position was, that the resolution of the old Congress, which recom- 
mended to the states to cede the land to the Union, held out, as motives, the 
payment of the debt contracted in the Revolution, and the inducement it offer- 
ed to the states to adopt the Articles of Confederation. From this he inferred 
that these constituted the sole objects of the cession. I admit that, if there was 
any ambiguity in the deeds of cession as it respects the objects of the cession, 
a reference to the resolution which proposed it might be fairly made, in order 
to ascertain the intention of the parties ; but that is not the case. The deeds 
are couched in the broadest and most comprehensive terms, and make an abso- 



432 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

lute cession of the lands to the United States, as a common fund, without lim 
itation as to the objects. 

But the argument on which he mainly rehed was, that, ahhough the cession 
is to the United States in their united and Federal character, to be administered 
by Congress as a common agent, the use is for the states in their separate and 
individual character. If the fact were so, the argument would be strong ; but 
it happens to be the very reverse. It is expressly provided in the Virginia ces- 
sion, that the land should be considered a common fund, for the use and benefit 
of the states, as members of the Confederation or Federal alliance, and for no other 
Use or purpose whatever. The senator will not venture to deny that common is 
the very opposite of separate ; and, of course, the distinction on which he so 
much relied, that the use was separate, falls to the ground. 

His next position rested on the expression in the deed of cession, " according 
to their usual respective proportion in the general charge and expenditure," 
which has been bandied about so often in this and former discussions on this sub- 
ject, that I will not go over the argument again, as conclusive as I consider it, as 
I am sure the Senate must be surfeited to nausea v,'ith those Avords. I take 
higher ground, which I regard as conclusive, be their meaning what they may. 

It will not be denied that the Constitution must override the deeds of cession, 
and that of Virginia among the rest, whenever they come in conflict ; and that, 
for the plain reason that the parties to both were the same, and had, of course, 
a right, in adopting the Constitution, to change or modify the previous acts of 
cession as they pleased. Now, sir, I repeat, without fear of contradiction, that 
the Constitution, in superseding the old system of requisition on the states, as 
the mode of raising the common supplies of the Union, by the system of taxing 
the people directly, superseded this particular provision, which all admit had 
reference to the former system of requisition. The senator himself in reality 
admits such to be the fact, by proposing to distribute the revenue from the lands 
according to federal numbers — the rule of imposing direct taxes under the Con- 
stitution — instead of the assessed value of improved lands — the rule of making 
requishions under the old confederation. This provision, then, being thus su- 
perseded, the lands are left as the property of the Union, for the common use 
of the states which compose it, freed from these disputed words, and without 
the semblance of a doubt ; and the Constitution, accordingly, speaks of the pub- 
lic lands, in broad and unqualified terms, as belonging to the United States. 

The last ground assumed by the senator was, that, as the lands are common 
property, it is competent for Congress, as the common agent, to divide their 
proceeds among the United States, as joint-owners. It might be true in the 
case of individuals owning a joint-farm, to be worked in common, as supposed 
by the senator ; but that is not analogous to the case of the United States, 
where there is a joint concern, ybr specif c objects, with a common agent to 
carry it into effect, for the joint interest of the concern, tvithout any authority to 
distribute the profits. In such a case, it would be contrary to the plainest dic- 
tates of reason,\ind the established principles of law, for the agent to undertake 
to apply to the separate and individual use of the partners what was intended 
by them for the joint concern. It would be to make that separate which his 
principals intended to be common. 

When I look, Mr. President, to what induced the states, and especially Vir- 
ginia, to make this magnificent cession to the Union, and the high and patriotic 
motives urged by the old Congress to induce them to do it, and turn to what is 
now proposed, I am struck with the contrast, and the great mutation to which 
human afHiirs are subject. The great and patriotic men of former times re- 
garded it as essential to the consummation of the Union, and the preservation 
of the public faith, that the lands should be ceded as a common fund ; but now, 
men distinguished for their ability and influence, and who are about to assume 
the high trust of administering the government, are striving with all their might 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 433 

(and that, too, when this fund is most needed) to undo their holy work. Yes, 
sir : distribution and cession are the very reverse in character and efi'ect ; the 
tendency of one is to union, and the other to disunion. The wisest of modern 
statesmen, and who had the keenest and deepest glance into futurity (Edmund 
Burke), truly said that the revenue is the state ; to which I add, that to dis- 
tribute the revenue in a confederated community among its members is to dis- 
solve the community — that is, with us, the Union ; as time will prove, if ever 
this fatal measure should be adopted. 

There is another contrast, not less striking. The states composing the old 
confederation, in their extreme jealousy of power, adopted the system of requi- 
sition as the means of supplying the common treasury ; but that proving insuf- 
ficient, it was changed, with the adoption of the present Constitution, into the 
system of laying taxes directly on individuals. But now, it is proposed to re- 
store virtually the exploded system of requisition, but in the reverse order — 
requisitions of the states on the Union, instead of the Union on the states ; and 
thereby reversing the relation which the wise and patriotic founders of our po- 
litical institutions regarded as essential to liberty. They regarded it as a 
fundamental principle, that the people should grant the supplies to the govern- 
ment, in order to keep it dependant on them. But now this is to be reversed ; 
and the government, in the shape of distribution, is to grant supplies to the peo- 
ple. How is this to be done ? How can the government, which, with all its 
legislation, does not produce a cent, grant supplies to those who are the pro- 
ducers of all ? I will tell you : the supplies to be distributed to the states are 
to be collected in a roundabout, concealed manner, under the plausible pretext 
of taxing luxuries (wines and silks), to be paid by the rich, or nobody, as we 
are told, to meet the requisitions of the governments of the states, lest their 
constituents should turn them out for taxing them directly and openly. Yes : 
we are plainly told that the states have surrendered the right of taxing imports, 
the most easy and convenient mode of raising a revenue — that is, the most con- 
cealed and ingenious way to the pockets of the people ; and that it is the duty 
of this government, to which this convenient contrivance is intrusted, to raise 
supplies by its use, not only to meet its own wants, but also to meet those of 
the states. What monstrous and dangerous perversion ! 

If (continued Mr. Calhoun) I have been successful in demonstrating the 
litter unconstitutionality of this dangerous scheme, as I trust I have, the Sen- 
ate will not expect me to follow the senator from Kentucky (Mr. Clay) in his 
excursive flights in favour of the expediency of this, his favourite and cherished 
scheme. If Congress has no right to adopt it, there is an end of the whole 
affair ; but there is one of the good effects he imputes to it that I cannot pass 
in silence. He asserted that it would finally settle the disputes and agitations 
growing out of questions connected with the public lands, by reconciling and 
harmonizing all conflicting interests, and restoring kind feelings in relation to 
them between the old and new states. Such are his anticipations ; but will 
they be realized 1 Let the tone with which the senators from Missouri (Mr. 
Linn) and Arkansas (Mr. Sevier) denounced his scheme, answer. Does he 
not know that every senator from the new states, with the exception of those 
from Indiana, are opposed to his measure ? Can he, in the face of such facts, 
really hope for a final settlement of the vexed question of the public lands, or a 
restoration of harmony between the old and new states in relation to them ? 
On the contrary, will it not imbitter the feelings on both sides ? Can he ex- 
pect that the new states would see with favour a mortgage laid on that portion 
of the public domain lying within their limits, for the security of the holders of 
state bonds? Such, virtually, would be the case should the distribution be 
made. The holders would regard it as a pledge ; and to withhold it, when 
once made, as a violation of faith. 

Would it conciliate the staple states — the growers of rice, cotton, and 

I I J 



434 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

tobacco — on which the tax to make good the deficiency caused by the distribu 
tion must principally fall ? It is in vain you tell them that the duties on winea 
and silks would fall on the consumers, or on the producers of those articles 
abroad. They know, by woful experience, that it matters little to them 
whether the duty be laid on the export of the staples they produce, or the im- 
portation of products received in exchange ; whether the duties be paid on 
their products going out of port, or the return cargo coming in. Viewing it in 
that light, the people of those states will regard the measure as a cunningly- 
devised scheme to pay the debts of others at their expense. 

Would it, I again ask, reconcile the states free from debt ? Will they be 
satisfied to be taxed to pay the debts of the states which have been less cau- 
tious in their engagements than themselves 1 I ask the senators from New- 
Hampshire, Would their state, happily free from all debt, be satisfied ? 

Instead of the final settlement of the question, or the restoration of harmony, 
it would unsettle the whole subject of the public lands, and throw the apple of 
discord among the states. 

Havino- now said what I intended on the immediate question under consider- 
ation, I avail myself of the opportunity to reply to the objections which have 
been made to the proposition I offered in an earlier stage of this discussion, 
to cede to the new states the lands lying within their respective limits, on just 
and equitable conditions. The Senate will recollect that the debate on that 
measure terminated unexpectedly, and without affording me an opportunity of 
answering the objections against it. As there will probably be no other oppor- 
tunity of meeting them, I trust it will be a sufficient apology for doing so on 
this occasion. 

I begin with what, to me, would be the most formidable objection — that, un- 
der the garb of a cession, the measure is, in fact, but a mode of distribution. I 
reply, as on a former occasion, Prove it, and I shall renounce it at once, and 
forever. But I cannot take assertion for proof, however boldly made. Until it 
is proved, I shall regard the charge of distribution, coming as it does from the 
open advocates of that measure, as originating in a conscious feeling that, so far 
from being popular, the scheme has no hold on the affections of the people. 
If they believed it to be popular, those who so warmly oppose cession would 
be the last to call it distribution. 

It is next objected that it is a gift of the lands to the new states. Be it so. 
I would infinitely rather make a gift of the whole than to adopt the fatal policy 
of distribution ; and, if it should be necessary to defeat it, I would regard a sur- 
render of the whole as a cheap sacrifice. I go farther, and hold that if the 
lands, instead of being regarded as the property of the Union, should be regard- 
ed as the property of the states separately, the new states would have the best 
right to the portion within their limits. They possess, unquestionably, the 
eminent domain, which would have carried with it the property in the public 
lands within their borders respectively, had they not surrendered it by special 
agreement on their admission into the Union. But that agreement was with 
the United States, and the surrender of the property in the lands was to them ; 
and it may be fairly questioned how far the agreement, on their admission, 
would be binding on them, should the revenue from the lands be perverted from 
the use of the United States to that of the states separately, as is proposed by 
this scheme of distribution. 

But is the cession a gift ? Does it propose a surrender of the land for no- 
thing ? Is 65 per cent, of the gross proceeds to be paid into the treasury no- 
thing? Is it nothing to put an end to the angry and agitating debates which 
we witness session alter session, constantly increasing in violence ? Nothing 
to save the time, and labour, and expense of Congress ? Nothing to curtail 
one fourth of the patronage of the government, and that of the most dangerous 
character? Nothing to raise the new states to a level with the old ? Nothing 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 435 

to remove ihis great disturbing cause, which so injuriously influences our legis- 
lation ? Is it nothing, linally, to substitute a system in lieu of the present, as 
far as the lands lying within the new states are concerned, which, in addition 
to all these considerations, proposes the only practical method of preventing the 
loss of the lands, and which, so far from a pecuniary loss, will bring more into 
the treasury than the present system 1 I boldly assert that such would be the 
case ; as I may well do now, as no one opposed to the measure has ventured 
to question the correctness of the calculation, or the data on which it rests. 

But the senator from Kentucky (Mr. Clay) says it is a gift, because 35 per 
cent, is too high a compensation to the states for their expense and trouble in 
managing the land. He estimates the actual expense, all things included, at 
2i per cent, on the gross receipts, and says that all beyond that is a gift to the 
states. He has ventured this assertion with the report of the Committee on the 
Public Lands at the last session before him, containing in detail, from the 
proper departments, an estimate of the expense which, on a supposition that 
the average annual sale of the portion of the land in question would average two 
and a half millions, would amount to 22 per cent. The senator has omitted all 
the expenses except that of selling the lands, when, by turning to the tables, 
he will find that nearly one third is yet to be surveyed and platted : that a large 
amount must be paid for extinguishing Indian titles, and removing Indians to 
the West. He also overlooks that the 5 per cent, fund is to be surrendered by 
those states : a sum of itself equal to double the amount which he has estima- 
ted as the entire expense to which the states would be subject. 

To these large items must be added donations, which, instead of being made, 
as they have heretofore been, by Congress, are, if made by the states, to be paid 
for by them at the selling price of the land at the time, allowing them 35 per 
cent. ; and also the sums spent on internal improvement, which, with the excep- 
tion of the portion spent on the Mississippi and Ohio, are to terminate ; and, final- 
ly, the saving of expense in our legislation, and in the General Land Office, in 
consequence of the cession. All of which the senator has omitted — omitted, 
notwithstanding they are to be found in the report before him, and to which he 
has referred in the debate. These, as I have stated, amount to 22 per cent, on 
the gross amount of the sales ; to which the committee has added 13 per cent., 
making the 35 — not as a gratuity, but on the ground of liberal compensation be- 
yond mere expense and saving to this government, as being right of itself, and 
necessary to ensure the hearty co-operation of the states in carrying out a 
measure that would be highly beneficial to the whole Union, and which could 
not be successfully carried out without such co-operation on the part of the 
states. Not a cent has been proposed to be allowed which could be avoided, 
with just regard to sound policy. 

But the senator was not content v/ith holding out the difference of what he 
was pleased to regard the actual expense, and the 35 per cent, as a gift. He 
took stronger grounds, and pronounced it to be a gift of all the public lands, on 
the assumption that the cession would be extended to the states hereafter to 
come in, on their admission ; and, next, to the territories ; and, finally, to the 
whole of the public domain. I will not undertake to reply to a mere assump- 
tion without proof, farther than to say, that every measure of sound policy may 
be in like manner condemned, if it is to be assumed that what we have wisely 
done, under all the circumstances of the case, may form a precedent for others 
to do under dissimilar circumstances, and without regard to the principle on 
which we acted. In proposing the measure I have, I yield to the necessity of 
remedying a great and growing evil, originating in the fact that this govern- 
ment is the owner and administrator of a large portion of the territories of nine 
states of this Union, and which cannot be remedied so long as their ownership 
and adnunistratorship continue. It is the number and influence of the states in 
which they exist that give such magnitude and danger to the evil ; and what 



436 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOtN. 

we may do now, under such circumstances, caxmot constitute a precedent, to be 
extended in the manner which the senator supposes it will be. On the con- 
trary, by adopting the measure, we would enlist the new states, now opposed to 
the old on almost all questions growing out of the public lands, to aid in vigi- 
lantly guarding the residue of the public domain. 

The senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Webster) took different gi"Ounds. He 
insisted that cession necessarily implies gift ; and therefore, as I suppose, 
the one I have proposed is a gift, in spite of the many valuable considerations 
inducing to it. I do not attach the same meaning to the word which he does ; 
but, as I have no taste for verbal criticism, I have assented to the request of a 
friend to change "cession" to "dispose of" — the words used in the Constitu- 
tion, and which, on the authority of the two senators, are of such comprehen- 
sive meaning as to confer on Congress unlimited power to do as they please 
"with the public lands. 

But it seems that, so soon as I had availed myself of this comprehensive 
term, it forthwith contracted to the narrowest limits. 1 was told the lands could 
not be disposed of to the states. Why not ? They can be disposed of to indi- 
viduals, and to companies of individuals ; and why not to that company or com- 
munity of individuals which constitutes a state ? Can any good reason be as- 
signed ? 

I am next told that we may dispose of them absolutely, but not conditionally. 
I again repeat the question. Why not ? What is it that limits our power ? We 
can dispose of the lands to individuals on condition, of which there are striking 
instances in lands containing lead mines. They are leased for a term of years, 
on condition that one tenth of the lead be paid to the government in kind. If 
this can be done for a term of years, what is to prevent it from being done for- 
ever, on the same condnion ? And, if so, why may we not prescribe the rules 
on which the mines shall be worked ? If all this can be done in the case of 
individuals, what is to prevent it from disposing of the public lands to the states 
on the conditions proposed, and to prescribe the rules to be observed by them 
in the sales and management ; that is, to adopt the measure I have proposed ? 

It is next objected, that it is not a disposition of the lands, but merely a trans- 
fer of the administration of them to the states. I deny the fact. It is intended, 
and is, in reality, a conditional disposition or sale to the states. But if it were 
otherwise, and as supposed, I ask. What is there to prevent Congress from dis- 
posing of the lands by an agency, or to employ the states as the agent, and pre- 
scribe the rules by which they shall be disposed of? I can see ho solid objec- 
tion to such arrangement, but do not deem it necessary to discuss the point, 
because the fact is not as is supposed. 

Then follows the objection, that it would create the relation of creditor and 
debtor between this government and the states. Admit it to be the fact : I ask^ 
Is that relation more objectionable, or as much so, as that which now exists of 
landlord and tenant, growing out of ownership and administration in this gov- 
ernment of so large a part of the domain of these states — a relation which is the 
parent of so many evils, both to them and us ? But, to put an end to the objec- 
tion, I have, on the suggestion of some of the members from the new states, so 
modified my proposition as to provide that the 65 per cent, of the proceeds of 
the sales coming to the government shall be paid directly to its own ofiicers — 
say the marshals in each of the states. Now I ask the opponents of the meas- 
ure to join me, and, by the cession, to put an end, in the only way it can be 
done, to the still more objectionable relation of landlord and tenant between this 
government and the states. 

It is farther objected, that it would not settle the question. It is said, if we 
cede the lands, the next demand would be to relinquish that portion of the pro- 
ceeds of their sales which is to be paid to the government ; that concession 
would have to follow concession, till the whole would be lost. This, sir, is the 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 4^7 

old answer which the advocates of existing abuses are ever ready to give those 
who complain. It is the answer of Lord North in the controversy which led 
to our Revolution. He refused to yield the disputed right of taxing the colo- 
nies, on the ground that to yield would not satisfy them. If taxation was sur- 
rendered, he said it would not settle the question ; that their next demand 
would be to surrender the right of regulating their commerce. The result of 
such blind obstinacy was the dismemberment of the British Empire. 

There is not a feature which more strongly distinguishes the firm and en- 
lightened statesman from the obstinate or weak than that of knowino- when it 
is proper to make concessions, as the means of avoiding, in the end, the humil- 
iation of submission on the one hand, or the moditication of defeat on the other ; 
and never was there an occasion or a question when it was more politic than 
at this time, and on this question. It may now be made with dignity. The 
question may now be adjusted on just and honourable terms ; but, if it be de- 
layed, the new states will decide it, in a few years, in their own way, without ask- 
ing our leave, by their rapid relative increase in population and political weight. 

They are now anxious for a fair adjustment, and we may satisfy them with- 
out making any real sacrifice on our part ; and it is doing injustice to them to 
suppose that, after soliciting a measure so liberal, and from which they would 
derive such advantages, they would suddenly turn round and condemn what 
they had solicited, and make the palpably unjust demand, that we should sur- 
render the portion of the proceeds coming to the government. There is no- 
thing in their past history that would warrant such an imputation on their char- 
acter. 

It was next objected, that the measm-e was unequal ; and, to prove it so, the 
case of Ohio, which has but a small amount of public lands within its limits to 
be disposed of, was contrasted with that of Illinois, which has a large amount ; 
and, because the portion of the proceeds to be allowed to the states (35 per 
cent, of the gross amount) would be small in the case of the former when com- 
pared with that of the latter, the measure is pronounced unequal and unjust. If 
it were a scheme of distribution, as has been erroneously alleged, such mio-ht 
be the fact; but as, instead of that, it is a mere compensation or commissioa 
for trouble, expense, responsibilities to be incurred, and services rendered, so 
far from being unequal, because the amount to be received in the one case was 
not equal to that in the other, it is precisely the reverse. Equality of compen- 
sation for equal expense and service is equal, but equality for unequal expense 
and service would be glaringly unequal ; and, had I proposed to allow Ohio 
the same amount of compensation for the expense and trouble of managing the 
small portion of the public domain in her limits as that to be allowed to Illinois 
for the management of the large portion within hers, instead of allowing a com- 
pensation to each proportioned to their respective expenses and services, it 
would, so far from being equal, have been grossly unequal, and would have 
been so pronounced by those who now make this objection. 

In this connexion, I must say that I cannot but regret that the senator from 
Ohio (Mr, Allen), in answer to the senator from Kentucky (Mr. Clay) on this 
alleged inequality between Ohio and Illinois, did not meet him by denying the 
truth of his allegation, instead of the manner he did ; which had, to say the least, 
the appearance oi sustaining the side to which he is most opposed, against that 
to which he is less. 

(Mr. Allen rose to explain. Mr. Calhoun said he did not doubt that the sen- 
ator gave the true explanation of his vote, but did not think it was called for at 
the time, and that the effect was as he had stated.) 

Another objection was, that it did not extend to the territories. This objec- 
tion had the advantage (what few others had) of being founded in fact, but was 
unfounded in reason. Had it been extended to them, it would have gone be- 
yond the mischief; and would have been wholly improper. The evil, I repeat, 



438 SPEECHES OF JOHN C CALHOUPT. 

originates in the fact of the government being the owner and administrator of 
so large a portion of the domain of nine states of the Union (being more than 
one third of the whole) ; and must increase, so long as it remains, with the in- 
creased number and relative weight of the new states. They will soon be in- 
creased to twelve, by the admission of the three territories, with a correspond- 
ing increase of weight in the government. The territories, on the contrary, 
are without political weight ; and, of course, with the object in view, it would 
have been preposterous to have included them. 

As little force is there in the objection, that some of the states would not ac- 
cept of the cession. It is possible that Ohio and Indiana might not, but not 
probable, as the amount of public land within their borders is inconsiderable. 
But what of that 1 Should it prove to be the case, what possible injury could 
result ? The fact of not accepting would be proof conclusive that the evil to be 
removed acted with but little relative force in either, and that the old system 
might be left to go on quietly in both, until the land within their limits was all 
disposed of. But the case is very different in the other seven. In them it is 
in active operation ; and they would gladly accept of the cession, as the only 
remedy that can reach the disease, consistently with the interests of all con- 
cerned. 

I come now to the final objection — that the land system is working well, and 
that we ought to adhere to the old maxim, " Let well enough alone." I say 
the final, as it is the last I recollect. If (as is possible — I took no notes) I 
have omitted to notice any objection made by the opponents of the measure, I 
call on them to name it now, that I may answer it before I proceed to notice 
the one just stated. 

When I first addressed the Senate on this subject, at the opening of the dis- 
cussion, I admitted that the system worked well at first ; but I must limit the 
admission to its earliest stages. From the beginning it contained within itself 
the seeds of mighty disorders, and of great evils to the country, if nothing 
should be done to avert them. If I do not greatly mistake the tendency of the 
system as it stands, it is to extinguish the Indian titles far more rapidly than the 
demands of our increasing population require, and to disperse our population 
over a larger space than is desirable for the good of the country. That the for- 
mer of these evils exists in reality, the proof is conclusive ; and that it is al- 
ready the cause of much difficulty and danger, and that both are rapidly on the 
increase, so as to threaten the loss of the lands themselves, I have, I trust, con- 
clusively shown in my former remarks. It is sufficient here to repeat, in order 
to show that the Indian title has been too rapidly extinguished, that the govern- 
ment has sold, from the beginning of the system (now almost half a eentur}'), 
but little more than eighty millions of acres ; and that not less than twenty mill- 
ions, probably, are held by large holders, who purchased on speculation to sell 
again ; making the actual demand for land for settlement not exceeding, prob- 
ably, sixty millions in that long period of time. But during the same period 
the Indian litle has been extinguished to about three hundred and twenty mill- 
ions of acres, of which about two hundred and twenty-six millions remain un- 
sold — exceeding fourfold the demand for lands in consequence of the increase 
of our population. Such is the fact. To what cause is it to be attributed ? I 
feel confident it will be principally found in the land system itself, which has 
been so indiscriminately praised during the discussion. 

But, before I proceed to assign my reasons, it will be proper to pause and re- 
flect on the influence that the occupation of the aborigines whom we are so ra- 
pidly expelling has had, through the mysterious dispensation of Providence, on 
the prosperity and greatness of our country. They were precisely in the con- 
dition most favourable to that mode of settlement which was best calculated to 
secure liberty, civilization, and prosperity. Had they been more numerous or 
powerful, the settlement of our country would either not have been made at all,. 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 439 

or would have been by the immediate agency and superintendence of the gov- 
ernment, with a force not only sutficient to expel or subjugate the aborigines 
(as in Mexico by the Spaniards, and Hindostan by the English), but also suffi- 
cient to keep the colonies in subjection. How great a change such a mode of 
settlement would have made in the destiny of our country is not necessary to 
be explained on this occasion. But as it was, they were not too strong to pre- 
vent settlement by hardy and enterprising emigrants, inspired, in some instances, 
with a holy zeal to preserve their religious faith in its purity ; in others, by the 
love of adventure and gain ; and in all, with a devotion to liberty. It is to set- 
tlements formed by individuals so influenced, and thrown, from the beginning, on 
their own resources almost exclusively, that we owe our enterprise, energy, love 
of liberty, and capacity for self-government. 

But there is another consideration not less important connected with the oc- 
cupancy and condition of the aborigines. Had they not existed at all, or been 
too weak to prevent our people from spreading out over the vast extent of the 
continent without resistance, or resistance too feeble to keep them within mod- 
erate limits, in the rapid and wide outspread after game, pasturage, or choice 
spots on which to settle down, the far larger portion would have lost all the arts 
of civilized life, and become fierce herdsmen and barbarians, like our ancestors ; 
and like them, in their frequent inundations over Southern Asia and Europe, 
would have overflowed and desolated the civilized agricultural and commercial 
settlements along the coast, excepting such as might be protected by walls and 
fortitications. 

It is to this fortunate combination of facts connected with the aboriginal pop- 
ulation — that they were not strong enough to prevent settlements in the manner 
they were actually formed, while they were sufficiently strong to prevent the 
too rapid spread of our population over the continent — that we owe, in a great 
measure, our wonderful success. A change in either the one or the other would 
have changed entirely, in all probability, the destiny of our country. 

The bearing of this digression on the point under consideration will be 
readily perceived. We have grown, indeed, to be so powerful, that the abo- 
rigines can no longer resist us by force, and when there is no danger that the 
arts of civilized life would be lost by the spreading out of our population ; but 
the aboriginal population would not, therefore, cease to perform an important 
function in our future growth and prosperity, if properly treated. They are the 
land-wardens or keepers of our public domain, until our growth and increase 
of population require it, as the means of new settlements. But till then, our 
interests, no less than justice to them, require that their occupancy should con- 
tinue ; and if the extinguishment of their title should continue to outrun the 
regular demand of our population for settlement as rapidly in proportion here- 
after as it has heretofore, it is difficult to conceive the confusion and difliculty 
which must follow. Those we now experience are nothing to those which 
would come. That such must, however, prove to be the case to a great ex- 
tent, if our land system continue as it is, I hold to be certain. The cause, as 
I have said, is inherent in the system as it exists; and, if not corrected, will 
impel our population, by its necessary operation, from the states to the terri- 
tories, and from them to the Indian possessions ; which I shall now proceed 
to explain. 

The system, as it now stands, embraces three powerful causes, all of which 
conspire to produce these results : pre-emption, as proposed by this bill, before 
survey and sale ; the auction system, under its actual operation ; and a fixed 
minimum for all the lands,, be the quality or the time which they have been 
offered for sale what they may. They act together, and jointly contribute to 
the results I have attributed to them. 

My friends from the new states, who are so much attached to pre-emption 
as proposed by this bill, must excuse me for speaking my opinion freely of 



440 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

their favourite measure. The consequences involved are too important to 
keep silence. 

What, then, is this pre-emption principle ? and how does it operate as a part 
of the existing land system ? It is neither more nor less than to say to ever}' 
one, when the Indian title is extinguished to a new portion of the public do- 
main, that you may go, and search, and take all the choice parts, the fertile 
spots, the favourable localities, the town sites, or whatever other advantages 
any portion may possess, at $1 25 per acre; and that not to be paid till the 
lands are offered at auction, which may be many years thereafter. What, 
then, is its operation, but to give pick and choice of the public domain to the 
active and enterprising, who are best acquainted with the tract of country to 
which the Indian title is extinguished, with the speculating capitalists, who 
may choose to associate with them ? It is like spreading out a large table, 
having a few choice and costly dishes intermixed with ordinary fare, and open- 
ing the door to the strong, and the few that may be nearest, to rush in and select 
the best dishes for themselves, before the others at a distance can enter and 
participate. And can we wonder, with such advantages, that there should be 
an active and powerful interest constantly at work to extinguish the titles of 
the Indians in rapid succession, without regard to the demand of our increasing 
population ; to spread out table after table, that they may gorge their appetites 
on the choicest dishes, and slake their thirst with the most costly wines ; leav- 
ing the ordinary fare, with the crambs and bones, to the rest of the commu- 
nity ? 

But this is not all. After this picking and choosing, under the pre-emption, 
as it has heretofore operated, and which it is now proposed to make prospective 
and perpetual, comes the auction system ; that is, the sales of the lands at ven- 
due to the highest bidder. Nothing could be more just and equal, if fairly car- 
ried out ; but it is notorious that the very opposite is the case under its actual 
operation. Instead of leaving the lands to be disposed of to the bids of indi- 
viduals, according to their conception of the value of each tract, the whole is 
arranged beforehand, by combinations of powerful and wealthy individuals, to 
take the choice of the lands left by the pre-emptioners, and to run down all 
individual competition, so that no one can obtain what he wants without join- 
ing them ; and thus another powerful interest is united with the former, to ex- 
tinguish the Indian title — to spread out another table. 

The next feature of the system so much lauded operates the same way — I 
refer to what is called the minimum price ; that is, of fixing one invariable 
price of $1 25 an acre for all lands not sold at auction, without regard, as has 
been said, to quality, or the time it has been in market. The effect of this, 
Avith a quantity on hand to which the Indian title is extinguished, so far ex- 
ceeding the demand of the community, is to sink the value of all the unsold 
land which has not been offered at auction to a price below the minimum, ex- 
cept a small portion of the best, which is annually purchased. Taking the ag- 
gregate of the whole of the lands in the new states, it would, according to its 
estimated present value by the Committee on the Public Lands, not be worth, 
on an average, more than 16i cents per acre. The result is, that no one is 
willing to give the minimum for the inferior or less valuable portion. Hence 
comes that great and growing evil, of occupancy without purchasing ; which 
threatens the loss of the public domain, unless arrested by some speedy and 
decisive remedy. It has already extended far beyond what is thought of by 
those who have not looked into the subject, and is still rapidly progressing. I 
have taken some pains to ascertain to what extent it has extended in two of the 
states — Illinois and Alabama. It is probable that there are not less than thirty 
thousand voters in those states, residing on public lands as mere occupants, 
without title. In a single congressional district in Alabama, there are, by esti- 
mate, six thousand voters. But, as great as this evil is, it is not all. The fixed 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 441 

minimum price co-operates with the pre-emption and auction systems to impel 
emigrants, especially of the more wealthy class, to turn from the states to the 
territories, where the land has been less culled over ; and from the territories 
to the Indian lands, for the same reason ; thus urging forward our population 
farther and farther, and driving before them the Indian tribes, unmindful of the 
dispensation of a kind Providence, which placed them as a restraint on the too 
rapid dispersion of our population. 

There is another and powerful cause co-operating to the same result, which 
must not be passed unnoticed. I refer to the vast expenditures in the last 
twelve or fifteen years, in holding treaties with the Indians, and in extinguish- 
ing their titles, including reservations, and removing them to the West ; equal- 
ling, in some instances, the fee-simple value of the lands, and in many others 
not much less. These immense expenditures, amounting, in the period speci- 
fied, I know not to how many millions (not less, certainly, than forty or fifty), 
have made such treaties a great money-making affair, the profits of which have 
been divided between influential Indian chieftains and their white associates, 
and have greatly contributed not only to increase the force of the other causes 
in the too rapid extinguishment of Indian titles, but to diflTuse widely the bane- 
ful spirit of speculation. 

Such are the inherent defects of the system, and the results to which they 
have led, and must continue to lead, so long as it can find subjects on which to 
operate, if not remedied. The measure I have proposed would apply an effi- 
cient remedy, as far as the public lands in the new states are concerned. The 
combined action of graduation and pre-emption applied to lands which have 
been offered for sale, as provided for by the amendment I oftered, would, in a 
few years, convert the occupants without title into freeholders ; while, at the 
same time, it would tend powerfully to prevent the population of the new states 
from emigrating, and turn towards those the tide of emigration from the old 
states, and, to the same extent, counteract the too rapid spreading out of our 
population, and extinguishment of the titles of the Indians. But nothing can 
effectually remedy the defects of the system but a radical change. What that 
ought to be, would require much reflection to determine satisfactorily ; but it 
seems to me, on the best reflection I can give it, that if, in lieu of public sales 
at auction, a system of graduation and pre-emption had been introduced from 
the first, fixing a maximum price sufficiently high when the lands are first of- 
fered for sale, and descending gradually, at short intervals of one or two years, 
to the present minimum price, and then, in the manner proposed in the measure 
which I have brought forward, giving the right of pre-emption at every stage, 
from first to last, to the settlers, it would have averted most of the evils incident 
to the present system, and, at the same time, have increased the revenue from 
the lands. It would have checked the spirit of speculation, concentrated our 
population within the proper limits, prevented the too rapid extinguishment of 
Indian titles, and terminated our ownership and administration of the lands in 
the new states, by disposing of them within a moderate period of time, and 
prevented most of the mischievous consequences which have been experienced. 
The introduction of such a change, or some such, founded on the same prin- 
ciples, in reference to lands not yet offered for sale in the territories, and the 
portion of the public domain lying beyond, and to which the Indian title is not 
yet extinguished, would, in combination with the measure I have proposed, go 
far to restore the system to a healthy action, and put a stop to the farther prog- 
ress of the evil, and remedy, in a great measure, those already caused. I 
throw out these suggestions for reflection, without intending to propose any 
other measure, except the one I have already. 

Kk K 



442 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

XXX. 

SPEECH ON THE CASE OF m'lEOD, JUNE 11, 1841. 

The business before the Senate being the motion of Mr. Eives to refer 
so much of the President's Message as relates to our foreign affairs to 
the Committee on Foreign Affairs. 

Mr. Calhoun said : I rise with the intention of stating, very briefly, the 
conclusion to which my reflections have brought me on the question 
before us. 

Permit me, at the outset, to premise, that I heartily approve of the 
principle so often repeated in this discussion, that our true policy, in 
connexion with our foreign relations, is neither to do nor to suffer wrong, 
not only because the principle is right of itself, but because it is, in its 
application to us, wise and politic, as well as right. Peace is pre-emi- 
nently our policy. Our road to greatness lies not over the ruins of others, 
but in the quiet and peaceful development of our immeasurably great in- 
ternal resources — in subduing our vast forests, perfecting the means of 
internal intercourse throughout our widely-extended countrj^, and in 
drawing forth its unbounded agricultural, manufacturing, mineral, and 
commercial resources. In this ample field all the industry, ingenuity, enter- 
prise, and energy of our people may find full employment for centuries to 
come ,• and through its successful cultivation we may hope to rise, not only 
to a state of prosperity, but to that of greatness and influence over the 
destiny of the human race, higher than has ever been attained by arms by 
the most renowned nations of ancient or modern times. War, so far 
from accelerating, can but retard our march to greatness. It is, then, not 
only our duty, but our policy to avoid it, as long as it can be, with honour 
and a just regard to our right ; and, as one of the most certain means of avoid- 
ing war, we ought to observe strict justice in our intercourse with others. 
But that is not of itself sufficient. We must exact justice as well as ren- 
der justice, and be prepared to do so 5 for where is there an example to 
be found of either individual or nation that has preserved peace by 
yielding to unjust demands'? 

It is in the spirit of these remarks that I have investigated the subject 
before us, without the slightest party feelings, but with an anxious desire 
not to embarrass existing negotiations between the two governments, or 
influence, in any degree, pending judicial proceedings. My sole object 
is to ascertain whether the principle already stated, and which all ac- 
knowledge to be fundamental in our foreign policy, has, in fact, been re- 
spected in the present case. I regret to state that the result of my inves- 
tigation is a conviction that it has not. I have been forced to the con- 
clusion that the Secretary of State has not met the peremptory demand of 
the British government for the immediate release of M'Leod as he ought ; 
the reasons for which, without farther remark, I will now proceed to 
state. 

That demand, as stated in the letter, rests on the alleged facts, that the 
transaction for which M'Leod was arrested is a public one ; that it was 
undertaken by the order of the colonial authorities, who were invested 
with unlimited power to defend the colony ; and that the government at 
home has sanctioned both the order and its execution. On this allega- 
tion the British minister, acting directly under the orders of his govern- 
ment, demanded his immediate release, on the broad ground that he, as 
well as others engaged with him, was " performing an act of public duty, 
for which he cannot be made personally and individually responsible to 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 443 

the laws and tribunals of any foreign country 5" thus assuming, as a uni- 
versal principle of international law, that where a government authorizes 
or approves of an act of an individual, it makes it the act of the govern- 
ment, and thereby exempts the individual from all responsibility to the 
injured country. To this demand, resting on this broad and universal 
principle, our Secretary of State assented, and, in conformity, gave the 
instruction to the attorney-general which is attached to the correspond- 
ence ; and we have thus presented for our consideration the grave question, 
Do the laws of nations recognise any such principle ? 

I feel that I hazard nothing in saying they do not. No authority has 
been cited to sanction it, nor do I believe that any can be. It would be 
no less vain to look to reason than to authority for a sanction. The laws 
of nations are but the laws and morals, as applicable to individuals, so far 
modified, and no farther, as reason may make necessary in their applica- 
tion to nations. Now there can be no doubt that the analogous rule, when 
applied to individuals, is, that both principal and agents, or, if you will, 
instruments, are responsible in criminal cases ; directly the reverse of the 
rule on which the demand for the release of M'Leod is made. Why, I 
ask, should the rule in this case be reversed when applied to nations, 
which is universally admitted to be true in the case of individuals ] Can 
any good reason be assigned^. To reverse it when applied to individ- 
uals, all must see, would lead to the Avorst of consequences, and, if I do 
not greatly mistake, must in like manner, if reversed when applied to 
nations. Let us see how it would act when brought to the test of par- 
ticular cases. 

Suppose, then, that the British, or any other government, in contempla- 
tion of war, should send out emissaries to blow up the fortifications 
erected at such vast expense for the defence of our great commercial 
jjiarts — New-York and others — and that the band employed to blow up 
Fort Hamilton, or any other of the fortresses for the defence of New- 
York, should be detected in the very act of firing the train : would the 
production of the most authentic papers, signed by all the authorities of 
the British government, make it a public transaction, and exempt the vil- 
lains from all responsibility to our laws and tribunals 1 Or would that 
government dare make a demand for their immediate release \ Or, if 
made, would ours dare yield to it, and release them % The supposition, 
I know, is altogether improbable, but it is not the less, on that account, 
calculated to test the principle. 

But I shall next select one that may possibly occur. Suppose, then, in 
contemplation of the same event, black emissaries should be sent from 
Jamaica to tamper with our slaves in the South, and that they should be 
detected at midnight in an assembly of slaves, where they were urging 
them to rise in rebellion against their masters, and that they should 
produce the authority of the home government, in the most solemn form, 
authorizing them in what they did : ought that to exempt the cut-throats 
from all responsibility to our laws and tribunals 1 Or, if arrested, ought 
our trovernment to release them on a peremptory demand to do sol 
And if that could not be done forthwith, from the embarrassment of^ state 
laws and state authorities, ought this government to employ counsel and 
to use its authority and influence to effect itl And if that could not ac- 
complish its object, would it be justified in taking the case into their own 
tribunals, with the view of entering a nolle prosequi '( 

But, setting aside all suppositious cases, I shall take one that actually 
occurred — that of the notorious Henry, employed by the colonial author- 
ity of Canada to tamper with a portion of our people, prior ^to the late 
war, with the intention of alienating them from the government, and ef- 



444 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

fecting- a disunion in the event of hostilities. Suppose he had been de- 
tected and arrested for his treasonable conduct, and that the British gov- 
ernment had made the like demand for his release, on the ground that he 
was executing the orders of his government, and was not, therefore, lia- 
ble, personally or individually, to our laws and tribunals: I ask. Would 
our government be bound to comply with the demand ^. 

To all these questions, and thousands of others that might be asked, 
no right-minded man can hesitate for a moment to answer in the nega- 
tive. The rule, then, if it does exist, must be far from universal. But 
does it exist at all 1 Does it even in a state of war, when, if ever, if we 
may judge from the remarks of gentlemen on the opposite side, it must] 
They seemed to consider nothing more was necessary to establish the 
principle for which they contend but to show that this, and all other cases 
of armed violence on the part of one nation or its citizens against another, 
is, in fact, war ; informal war, as they call it, in contradistinction from one 
preceded by a declaration in due form. 

Well, then, let us inquire if the principle for which they contend, that 
the authority or the sanction of his government exempts an individual 
from all responsibility to the injured government, exists even in case 
of war. 

Turning, then, from a state of peace to that of war, we find, at the very 
threshold, a very important exception to the rule, if it exists at all, in the 
case of spies. None can doubt that, if a spy is detected and arrested, he 
is individually and personally responsible, though his pockets should be 
filled with all the authority the country which employed him could give. 

But is the case of spies the only exception 1 Are they alone person- 
ally and individually responsible 1 Far otherwise. The war may be de- 
clared in the most solemn manner; the invaders may carry with them the 
highest authority of their government ; and yet, so far from exempting 
them individually, officers, men, and all, may be slaughtered and destroyed 
in almost every possible manner, not only without the violation of inter- 
national laws, but with rich honour and glory to their destroyers. Talk 
of the responsibility of the government exempting their instruments from 
responsibility! How, let me ask, can the government be made responsi- 
ble but through its agents or instruments 1 Separate the government 
from them, and what is it but an ideal, intangible thing 1 True it is, 
when an invading enemy is captured or surrenders, his life is protected 
by the laws of nations as they now stand ; but not because the authority 
of his government protects it, or that he is not responsible to the invaded 
country. It is to be traced to a different and higher source — the prog- 
ress of civilization, which has mitigated the laws of war. Originally it 
was diffisrent. The life of an invader might be taken, whether armed or 
disarmed. He who captured an enemy had a right to take his life. The 
older writers on the laws of nations traced the lawfulness of making a 
slave of a prisoner to the fact that he who captured him had a right to 
take his life; and, if he spared it, a right to his service. To commute 
death unto servitude was the first step in mitigating the horrors of war. 
That has been followed by a farther mitigation, which spares the life of a 
prisoner, excepting the cases of spies, to whom the laws of war, as they 
stood originally, are still in force. But, because their lives are spared, 
prisoners do not cease to be individually responsible to the invaded coun- 
try. Their liberty, for the time, is forfeited to it. Should they attempt 
to escape, or if there be danger of their being released by superior force, 
their lives may be still taken, without regard to the fact that they acted 
under the authority of their country. A demand on the part of their gov- 
ernment for an immediate release, on the ground assumed in this case, 
would be regarded as an act of insanity. 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C, CALHOL'N. 445 

Now, sir, if the senators from Virginia and Massachusetts (Mr. Rives 
and Mr. Choate) could succeed in making the case of the attack on the 
Caroline to be an act of war, it would avail them nothing in their attempt 
to defend the demand of Mr. Fox or the concession of Mr, Webster. 
M'Leod, if it be war, would be a prisoner of war, Avhich, if it protected his 
life, would forfeit his liberty. In that character, so far from his government 
having a right to demand his immediate release under a threat of war, our 
government would have the unquestionable right to detain him till there was 
a satisfactory termination of the war by the adjustment of the question. 

To place this result in a stronger view, suppose, after the destruction 
of the Caroline, the armed band which perpetrated the act had been cap- 
tured, on their retreat, by an armed force of our citizens, would they not, 
if the transaction is to be regarded as war, justly have been considered 
as prisoners of war, to be held as such in actual confinement, if our gov- 
ernment thought proper, till the question was amicably settled 1 And 
would not the demand for their immediate release, in such a case, be re- 
garded as one of the most insolent ever made by one independent coun- 
try on another l And can the fact that one of the band has come into our 
possession as M'Leod has, if it is to be considered as war, vary the case 
in the least 1 Viewed in this light, the authority or sanction of the British 
government would be a good defence against the charge of murder or 
arson, but it would be no less so against his release. 

But this is not a case of war, formal or informal, taking the latter in the 
broadest sense. It has not been thought so, nor so treated, by either 
government ; and Mr. Webster himself, in his reply to Mr. Fox, which has 
been so lauded by the two senators, speaks of it as " a hostile intrusion 
into the territory of a power at peace.'''' The transaction comes under a 
class of cases fully recognised by writers on international law as distinct 
from war — that of belligerants entering with force the territories of neu- 
trals ; and it only remains to determine whether, when viewed in this, its 
true light, our secretary has taken the grounds which our rights and honour 
required against the demand of the British minister. 

Thus regarded, the first point presented for consideration is, whether 
Great Britain, as a belligerant, was justified in entering our territory 
under the circumstances she did. And here let me remark, that it is a 
fundamental principle in the laws of nations, that every state or nation 
has full and complete jurisdiction over its own territory, to the exclusion 
of all others — a principle essential to independence, and, therefore, held 
most sacred. It is accordingly laid down by all writers on those laws 
who treat of the subject, that nothing short of extreme necessity can justify 
a belligerant in entering, with an armed force, on the territory of a neu- 
tral power, and, when entered, in doing any act which is not forced 
on them by the like necessity which justified the entering. In both oi 
the positions I am held out by the secretary himself. The next point to 
be considered is. Did Great Britain enter our territory in this case under 
any such necessity! and, if she did, were her acts limited by such neces- 
sity \ Here, again, I may rely on the authority of the secretary, and, if it 
had not already been quoted by both of the senators on the other side 
who preceded me, I would read the eloquent passage towards the close 
of his letter to Mr. Fox, which they did with so much applause. With 
this high authority, I may then assume that the government of Great 
Britain, in this case, had no authority under the laws o{ nations, either to 
enter our territory, or to do what was done in the destruction of the Car- 
oline, after it was entered. 

Now, sir, I ask, under this statement of the case. What ought to have 
been our reply when the peremptory demand was made for the immediate 



446 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

release of M'Leod 1 Ought not our Secretary of State to have told 
Mr. Fox that we regarded the hostile entry into our territory, and what 
was perpetrated after the entry, as without warrant under the laws of 
nations! That the fact had been made known to his government lono' 
since, immediately after the transaction 1 That we had received no 
explanation or answer ] That we had no reason for believing that his 
government had sanctioned the act 1 That 31'Leod had been arrested 
and indicted under the local authority of New-York, without possibility 
of knowing that the transaction had been sanctioned by it 1 That we 
still regarded the transaction in the light we originally did, and could not 
even consider the demand till the conduct of which we had complained was 
explained \ But, in the mean time, that M'Leod might have the benefit 
of the fact on his trial, that the transaction was sanctioned by his govern- 
ment, it would be transmitted, in due form, to those who had charge of 
his defence 1 

Here let me say that I entirely concur with Mr. Forsyth, that the ap- 
proval of the British government of the transaction in question was an 
important fact in the trial of M'Leod, without, however, pretending to 
offer an opinion whether it would be a valid reason against a charge of 
murder, of which the essence was killing with malice prepense. It is a 
point for the court and jury, and not for us, to decide. Nor do I intend 
to venture an opinion whether, if found guilty, with the knowledge of the 
fact that his government approved of his conduct, it ought not to be good 
cause for his pardon, on high considerations of humanity and policy. I 
leave both questions, without remark, to those to whom the decision 
properly belongs, except to express my conviction that there is not, and 
has not been, the least danger that any step would be taken towards him 
not fully sustained by justice, humanity, and sound policy. Any step 
which did not strictly comport with these would shock the whole com- 
munity. 

Having taken the ground, I have indicated that we ought to have re- 
ceived explanation before we responded to a peremptory demand ; there 
we ought to have rested till we had first received explanation. It is a 
maxim, that he who seeks equity must do equity ; and, on the same 
principle, a government that seeks to enforce the laws of nations in a 
particular case against another, ought to show that it has first observed 
them, on its own part, in the same transaction, or at least show plausible 
reasons for thinkiug that it had. None but a proud and haughty nation 
like England would think of making the demand she has without even 
deigning to notice our complaints against her conduct in connexion with 
the same transaction ; and I cannot but think that, in yielding to her de- 
mand under such circumstances, the secretary has not only failed to ex- 
act what is due to our rights and honour as an independent people, but 
has, as far as the influence of the example may efTect it, made a danger- 
ous innovation on the code of international laws. I cannot but think the 
principle in which the demand to which he yielded was made is highly 
adverse to the weaker power, which we must admit ourselves yet to be 
when compared to Great Britain. Aggressions are rarely by the weak 
against the stronger power, but the reverse ; and the practical effect of 
the principle, if admitted, would be to change the responsibility of de- 
claring war from the aggressor, the stronger power, to the aggrieved, 
the weaker ; a disadvantage so great, that the alternative of abandoning 
the demand of redress for the aggression would almost invariably be 
forced on the weaker, rather than to appeal to arms. This case itself will 
furnish an illustration. We have been told again and again, in this dis- 
cussion, that, in yielding to the demand to release M'Leod, we do not sur- 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 447 

render our right to hold Great Britain responsible ; that we have the 
power and will to exact justice by arms. This may be so ; but is it not 
felt on all sides that this is, I will not say empty boasting, but that it is 
all talk 1 After yielding to the peremptory demand for his immediate re- 
lease ; after sending the attorney-general to look after his safety, and 
employing able counsel to defend him against the laws of the state, the 
public feeling must be too much let down to think of taking so bold and 
responsible a measure as that of declaring war. The only hope we could 
ever have had for redress for the aggression would have been to demand 
justice of the British government before we answered her demand on us ; 
and I accordingly regard the acquiescence in the demand for release, 
without making a demand of redress on our part, as settling all questions 
connected with the transaction. Thus regarding it, I must say that, 
though I am ready to concede to Mr. Webster's letter in reply to Mr. 
Fox all the excellences which his friends claim for it, the feeling that it 
was out of place destroyed all its beauties in my eyes. Its lofty senti- 
ments and strong condemnation of the act would have shown to advan- 
tage in a letter claiming redress on our part before yielding to a per- 
emptory demand ; but, afterward, it looked too much like putting on 
airs when it was too late, after having made an apology, and virtually con- 
ceded the point at issue. In truth, the letter indicates that Mr. Webster 
was not entirely satisfied with his ready compliance with Mr. Fox's de- 
mand, of which the part where he says he is not certain that he correctly 
understood him in demanding an immediate release furnishes a striking 
instance. 

There could be but little doubt as to what was meant ; but the assump- 
tion of one afforded a convenient opportunity of modifying the oround 
he iirst took. 



XXXI. 

SPEECH ON THE DISTRIBUTION BILL, AUGUST 24, 1841. 

Mr. Calhoun said : If this bill should become a law, it would make a wi- 
der breach in the Constitution, and be followed by changes more disastrous, 
than any one measure which has ever been adopted. It would, in its violation 
of the Constitution, go far beyond the general-welfare doctrine of former days, 
which stretched the power of the government as far as it was then supposed 
was possible by construction, however bold. But, as wide as were the limits 
which it assigned to the powers of the government, it admitted by implication 
that there were limits ; while this bill, as I shall show, rests on principles which, 
if admitted, would supersede all limits. 

According to the general- welfare doctrine, Congress had power to raise 
money, and appropriate it to all objects which it might deem calculated to pro- 
mote the general welfare — that is, the prosperity of the states, regarded in their 
aggregate character as members of the Union, or, to express it more briefly, 
and in language once so common, to national objects ; thus excluding, by ne- 
cessary implication, all that were not national, as falling within the spheres of 
the separate states. As wide as are these limits, they are too narrow for this 
bill. It takes in what is excluded under the general- welfare doctrine, and as- 
sumes for Congress the right to raise money to give, by distribution, to the 
states ; that is, to be applied by them to those very local state objects to which 
that doctrine, by necessary implication, denied that Congress had a right to ap- 
propriate money ; and thus superseding all the limits of the Constitution, as far, 



448 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

at least, as the money power is concerned. The advocates of this extraordi- 
nary doctrine have, indeed, attempted to restrict it, in their argument, to revenue 
derived from the public lands ; but facts speak louder than words. To test the 
sincerity of their argument, amendments after amendments have been offered to 
limit the operation of the bill exclusively to the revenue derived from that 
source, but which, as often as offered, have been steadily voted down by their 
united votes. But I take higher ground. The aid of those test votes, as strong 
as they are, is not needed to make good the assumption that Congress has the 
right to lay and collect taxes for the separate use of the states. The circum- 
stances under which it is attempted to force this bill through speak, of them- 
selves, a language too distinct to be misunderstood. 

The treasury is exhausted ; the revenues from the public lands cannot be 
spared ; they are needed for the pressing and necessary wants of the govern- 
ment. For every dollar withdrawn from the treasury and given to the states, 
a dollar must be raised from the customs to supply its place : that is admitted. 
Now, I put it to the advocates of this bill, Is there, can there be, any real dif- 
ference, either in principle or effect, between raising money from customs to 
be divided among the states, and raising the same amount from them to supply 
the place of an equal sum withdrawn from the treasury to be divided among the 
states ? If there be a difference, my faculties are not acute enough to perceive 
it, and I would thank any one who can to point it out. But, if this difficulty could 
be surmounted, it would avail nothing, unless another, not inferior, can also be 
got over. The land from which the revenue proposed to be divided is derived 
"was purchased (with the exception of the small portion, comparatively, lying 
between the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers) out of the common funds of the Union, 
and with money derived, for the most part, from customs. I do not exempt the 
portion acquired from Georgia, which was purchased at its full value, and cost 
as much, in proportion, as Florida purchased from Spain, or Louisiana from 
France. 

If money cannot be raised from customs or other sources for distribution, I 
ask. How can money, derived from the sales of land purchased with money rais- 
ed from the customs or other sources, be distributed among the states ? If the 
money could not be distributed before it was vested in land, on what principle 
can it be when it is converted back again into money by the sales of the land 1 
If, prior to the purchase, it was subject, in making appropriations, to the limits 
prescribed by the Constitution, how can it, after having been converted back 
again into money by the sale of the land, be freed from those limits ? By what 
art, what political alchymy, could the mere passage of the money through the 
lands free it from the constitutional shackles to which it was previously subject ? 

But if this difficulty, also, could be surmounted, there is another, not less 
formidable and more comprehensive, still to be overcome. If the lands belong 
to the states at all, they must belong to them in one of two capacities — either 
in their federative character, as members of a common Union, or in their separ- 
ate, as distinct and independent communities. If the former, this government, 
which was created as a common agent to carry into effect the objects for which 
the Union was formed, holds the lands, as it does all its other delegated pow- 
ers, as a trustee for the states in their Federal character, for the execution of 
those objects, and no other purpose whatever ; and can, of course, under the 
grant of the Constitution " to dispose of the territories or other property belong- 
ing to the United States," dispose of the lands only under its trust powers, and 
in execution of the objects for which they were granted by the Constitution. 
"When, then, the lands, or other property of the United States, are disposed of 
by sale — that is, converted into money — the trust, with all its limitations, at- 
taches as fully to the money as it did to the lands or property of which it is 
the proceeds. Nor would the government have any more right to divide the 
land or the money among the states — that is, to surrender it to them— than it 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 449 

would have to surrender any other of its delegated powers. If it may surren- 
der either to the states, it may also surrender the power of declaring war, lay- 
ing duties, or coining money. They are all delegated by the same parties,' held 
under the same instrument, aud in trust, for the execution of the same objects. 
The assumption of such a right is neither more nor less than the assumption of 
a right paramount to the Constitution itself— the right on the part of the gov- 
■ ernment to destroy the instrument and dissolve the Union, from which it derives 
its existence. To such monstrous results must the principle on which this bill 
rests lead, on the supposition that the lands — that is, the territories — belono- to 
the United States, as they are expressly declared to do by the Constitution" 

But the difficulty would not be less if they should be considered as belong- 
ing to the states in their individual and separate character. So considered, 
what right can this government possibly have over them ? It is the agent or 
trustee for the United States ; the states as members of a common Union, and 
not of the states individually, each of which has a separate government of its 
own to represent it in that capacity. For this government to assume to repre- 
sent them in both capacities would be to assume all power — to centralize the 
whole system in itself. But, admitting this bold assumption, on what princi- 
ple of right or justice, if the lands really belong to the states — or, which is the 
same thing, if the revenue from the lands belong to them— can this government 
impose the various limitations prescribed in the bill ? What right has it, on that 
supposition, to appropriate funds belonging to the states separately to the use 
of the Union, in the event of war, or in case the price of the lands should be 
increased above a dollar and a quarter an acre, or any article of the tariff above 
twenty per centum ad valorem ? 

Such, and so overwhelming, are the constitutional difficulties which beset 
this measure. No one who can overcome them — who can bring himself to 
vote for this bill — need trouble himself about constitutional scruples hereafter. 
He may swallow without hesitation, bank, tariff, and every other unconstitu- 
tional measure which has ever been adopted or proposed. Yes : it would be 
easier to make a plausible argument for the constitutionality of the most mon- 
strous of the measures proposed by the Abolitionists — for abolition itself — than 
for this detestable bill ; and yet we find senators from slaveholding states, the 
very safety of whose constituents depends on a strict construction of the Con- 
stitution, recording their names in favour of a measure from which they have 
nothing to hope and everything to fear. To what is a course so blind to be at- 
tributed, but to that fanaticism of party zeal, openly avowed on this floor, which 
regards the preservation of the power of the Whig party as the paramount con- 
sideration ? It has staked its existence on the passage of this and the other meas- 
ures for which this extraordinary session w^as called ; and when it is brought to 
the alternative of their defeat or success, in the anxiety to avoid the one and 
secure the other, constituents. Constitution, duty, and country — all are forgotten. 
A measure which would make so wide and fatal a breach in the Constitu- 
tion could not but involve in its consequences many and disastrous changes in 
our political system, too numerous to be traced in a speech. It would require 
a volume to do them justice. As many as may fall within the scope of my re- 
marks, I shall touch in their proper place. Suffice it for the present to say, 
that such and so great would they be, as to disturb and confound the relations of 
all the constituent parts of our beautiful but complex system — of that between 
this and the co-ordinate governments of the states, and between them and their 
respective constituency. Let the principle of the distribution of the revenue, 
on which this bill rests, be established, and it would follow, as certainly as it is 
now before us, that this government and those of the states would be placed in 
antagonist relations on all subjects except the collection and distribution of rev- 
enue ; which would end, in time, in converting this into a mere machine of 
collection and distribution for those of the states, to the utter neglect of all the 

L L L 



450 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CAI^HOUN, 

functions for which it was created. Then the proper responsibility of each to 
their respective constituency would be destroyed ; then would succeed a scene 
of plunder and corruption without parallel, to be followed by dissolution, or an 
entire change of system. Yes ; if any one measure can dissolve this Union, 
this is that measure. The revenue is the state, said the great British states- 
man, Burke. With us, to divide the revenue among its members is to divide 
the Union. This bill proposes to divide that from the lands. Take one step 
more, to which this will lead if not arrested — divide the revenue from the cus- 
toms, and what of union would be left? I touched more fully on this, and 
other important points connected with this detestable measure, during the dis- 
cussions of the last session, and shall not now repeat what I then said. 

What I now propose is, to trace the change it would make in our financial 
system, with its bearings on what ought to be the policy of the government. I 
have selected it, not because it is the most important, but because it is that 
which has heretofore received the least attention. 

This aovernraent has heretofore been supported almost exclusively from two 
sources of revenue — the lands and the customs ; excepting a short period at its 
commencement, and during the late war, when it drew a great portion of its 
means from internal taxes. The revenue from lands has been constantly and 
steadily increasing whh the increase of population, and may, for the next ten 
years, be safely estimated to yield an annual average income of $5,000,000, if 
they should be properly administered : a sum equal to more than a fourth of 
what the entire expenditures of the government ought to be with due economy, 
and restricted to the objects for which it was instituted. 

This bill proposes to withdraw this large, permanent, and growing source of 
revenue from the treasury of the Union, and to distribute it among the several 
states ; and the question is, Would it be wise to do so, viewed as a financial 
measure, in reference to what ought to be the policy of the government ? which 
brings up the previous question, What ought that policy to be 1 In the order of 
nhino's, the question of policy precedes that of finance. The latter has refer- 
ence to, and is dependant on, the former. It must first be determined what 
•ouo-ht to be done, before it can be ascertained how much revenue will be re- 
quired, and on what it ought to be raised. 

To the question, then. What ought to be the policy of the government? the 
shortest and most comprehensive answer which I can give is, that it ought to 
be the very opposite of that for which this extraordinary session was called, and 
of which this measure forms so prominent a part. The effect of these measure* 
is to divide and distract the country within, and to weaken it without ; the very 
reverse of the objects for which the government was instituted — which was to 
give peace, tranquillity, and harmony within, and power, security, and respect- 
ability without. We find, accordingly, that without, where strength was re- 
quired, its powers are undivided. In its exterior relations — abroad, this gov- 
ernment is the sole and exclusive representative of the united majesty, sover- 
eignty, and power of the states constituting this great and glorious Union. To 
the rest of the world we are one. Neither state nor state government is 
known beyond our borders. Within it is different. There we form twenty- 
six distinct, independent, and sovereign communities, each with its separate 
government, whose powers are as exclusive within as that of this government 
is without, with the exception of three classes of powers which are delegated 
■to it. The first is, those that were necessary to the discharge of its exterior 
! functions— such as declaring war, raising armies, providing a navy, and raising 
revenue. The reason for delegating these requires no explanation. The next 
class consists of those powers that were necessary to regulate the exterior or 
international relations of the states among themselves, considered as distmct 
communities— powers that could not be exercised by the states separately, and 
the re<nilation of which was necessary to their peace, tranquillity, and that free 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 451 

intercourse, social and commercial, which ought to exist between confederated 
states. Such are those of regulating commerce between the states, coinintr 
money, and fixing the value thereof, and the standard of weights and measures. 
The remaining class consists of those powers which, though not belonging to 
the exterior relations of the states, are of such nature that they could not be ex- 
ercised by states separately without one injuring the other — such as imposing 
duties on imports ; in exercising which, the maritime states, having the ad- 
vantage of good ports, would tax those who would have to draw their supply 
through them. In asserting that, with these exceptions, the powers of the states 
are exclusive within, I speak in general terms. There are, indeed, others not 
reducible to either of these classes, but they are too few and inconsiderable to 
be regarded as exceptions. 

On the moderate and prudent exercise of these, its interior powers, the suc- 
cess of the government, and with it our entire political system, mainly depend. 
If the government should be restricted in their exercise to the objects for which 
they are delegated, peace, harmony, and tranquillity would reign within ; and 
the attention of the government, unabsorbed by distracting questions within, and 
its entire resources unwasted by expenditures on objects foreign to its duties, 
would be directed with all its energy to guard against danger from without, to 
give security to our vast commercial and navigating interest, and to acquire that 
weight and respectability for our name in the family of nations which ought to 
belong to the freest, most enterprising, and most growing people on the globe. 
If thus restricted in the exercise of these, the most delicate of its powers, and 
in the exercise of which only it can come in conflict with the governments of 
the states, or interfere with their interior policy and interest, this government, 
with our whole political system, would work like a charm, and become the ad- 
miration of the world. The states, left undisturbed within their separate spheres, 
and each in the full possession of its resources, would, with that generous ri- 
valry which always takes place between clusters of free states of the same or- 
igin and language, and which gives the greatest possible impulse to improve- 
ment, carry excellence in all that is desirable beyond any former example. 

But if, instead of restricting these powers to their proper objects, they should 
be perverted to those never intended ; if, for example, that of raising revenue 
should be perverted into that of protecting one branch of industry at the expense 
of others ; that of collecting and disbursing the revenue into that of incorpora- 
ting a great central bank, to be located at some favoured point, and placed under 
local control ; and that of making appropriations for specified objects, into that 
of expending money on whatever Congress should think proper — all this would 
be reversed. Instead of harmony and tranquillity within, there would be dis- 
cord, distraction, and conflict, followed by the absorption of the attention of the 
government, and exhaustion of its means and energy on objects never intended 
to be placed under its control, to the utter neglect of the duties belonging to the 
exterior relations of the government, and which are exclusively confided to its 
charge. Such has been, and ever must be, the effect of perverting these pow- 
ers to objects foreign to the Constitution. When thus perverted, they become 
unsqual in their action, operating to the benefit of one part or class to the inju- 
ry of another part or class — to the benefit of the manufacturing against the ag- 
ricultural and commercial portions, or of the non-productive against the produ- 
cing class. The more extensive the country, the greater would be the inequali- 
ty and oppression. In ours, stretching over two thousand square miles, they 
become intolerable when pushed beyond moderate limits. It is then conflicts 
take place, from the struggle on the part of those who are benefited by the op- 
eration of an unequal system of legislation to retain their advantage, and on the 
part of the oppressed to resist it. When this state of things occurs, it is nei- 
ther more nor less than a state of hostility between the oppressor and oppressed 
— war waged not by armies, but by laws ; acts and sections of acts are sent by 



452 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN, 

the stronger party on a plundering expedition, instead of divisions and brigades, 
Avhich often return more richly laden with spoils than a plundering expedition 
after the most successful foray. 

That such must be the effect of the system of measures now attempted to be 
forced on the government by the perversion of its interior powers, I appeal to 
the A'oice of experience in aid of the dictates of reason. I go back to the be- 
ginning of the government, and ask, What, at its outset, but this very system of 
measures caused the great struggle which continued down to 1828, when the 
system reached its full growth in the tariff of that year ? And what, from thaS 
period to the termination of the late election which brought the present party 
into power, has disturbed the harmony and tranquillity of the country, deranged 
its currency, interrupted its business, endangered its liberty and institutions, but 
a struggle on one side to overthrow, and on the other to uphold the system ? 
In that struggle it fell prostrate : and what now agitates the country, what caus- 
es this extraordinary session, with all its excitement, but the struggle on the 
part of those in power to restore the system ; to incorporate a bank ; to re-enact 
a protective tariff; to distribute the revenue from the lands ; to originate anoth- 
er debt, and renew the system of wasteful expenditures ; and the resistance on 
the part of the opposition to prevent it? Gentlemen talk of settling these ques- 
tions : they deceive themselves. They cry peace, peace, v/hen there is no 
peace. There never can be peace till they are abandoned, or till our free and 
popular institutions are succeeded by the calm of despotism ; and that not till 
the spirit of our patriotic and immortal ancestors, who achieved our independ- 
ence and established our glorious political system, shall become extinct, and their 
descendants a base and sordid rabble. Till then, or till our opponents shall be 
expelled from power, and their hope of restoring and maintaining their system 
of measures is blasted, the struggle will be continued, the tranquillity and har- 
mony of the country be disturbed, and the strength and resources of the govern- 
inent be wasted within, and its duties neglected without. 

But, of all the measures which constitute this pernicious system, there is not 
one more subversive of the objects for which the government was instituted, 
none more destructive of harmony within and security without, than that now 
under consideration. Its direct tendency is to universal discord and distraction ; 
to array the new states against the old, the non-indebted against the indebted, 
the staple against the manufacturing ; one class against another ; and, finally, 
the people against the government. But I pass these. My object is not to 
trace political consequences, but to discuss the financial bearings of this meas- 
ure, regarded in reference to what ought to be the policy of the government ; 
which, I trust, I have satisfactorily shown ought to be, to turn its attention, en- 
ergy, and resources from within to without, to its appropriate and exclusive 
sphere, that of guarding against danger from abroad ; gaving free scope and pro- 
tection to our commerce and navigation, and that elevated standing to the coun- 
try to which it is so fairly entitled in the family of nations. It becomes neces- 
sary to repeat, preparatory to what I propose, that the object of this measure is 
to withdraw the revenue from the public lands from the treasury of the Union, 
to be divided among the states ; that the probable annual amount that Vv'ould be 
so drawn would average the next ten years not less than five millions of dol- 
lars ; and that, to make up the deficit, an equal sum must be laid on the imports. 
Such is the measure, regarded as one of finance ; and the question is, AVould 
it be just, wise, expedient, considered in its bearings on what ought to be the 
policy of the government 1 

The measure, on its face, is but a surrender of one of the two sources of rev- 
enue to the states, to be divided among them in proportion to their joint delega- 
tion in the two houses of Congress, and to impose a burden to an equal amount 
on the imports ; that is, on the foreign commerce of the country. In every view 
I can take, it is preposterous, unequal, and unjust. Regarded in its most fa- 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 453 

vourable aspect— that is, on the supposition that the people of each state would 
pay back to the treasury of the Union, through the tax on the imports, in order 
to make up the deficit, a sum equal to that received by the state as its distribu- 
tive share ; and that each individual would receive of that sum an amount equal 
in proportion to what he paid of the taxes— what would that be but the folly of 
giving with one hand and taking back with the other ? It would, in fact, be 
worse. The expense of giving and taking back must be paid for, which, in this 
case, would be one not a little expensive and troublesome. The expense of 
collecting the duties on imports is known to be about ten per cent. ; to which 
must be added the expense and trouble of distribution, with the loss of the use 
of the money while the process is going on, which may be fairly estimated at 
iwo per cent, additional ; making, in all, twelve per cent, for the cost of the 
process. It follows that the people of the state, in order to return back to the 
treasury of the Union an amount equal to the sum received by distribution, would 
have each to pay, by the supposition, twelve per cent, more of taxes than his 
share of the sum distributed. That sum (equal to six hundred thousand dollars 
on five millions) would go to the collectors of the taxes— the custom-house of- 
ficers — for their share of the public spoils. 

But it is still worse. It is unequal and unjust, as well as foolish and absurd. 
The case supposed would not be the real state of the facts. It would be scarce- 
ly possible so to arrange a system of taxes under which the people of each state 
would pay back a sum just equal to that received ; much less that the taxes 
should fall on each individual in the state in the same proportion that he would 
receive of the sura distributed to the state. But, if this be possible, it is certain 
that no system of taxes on imports— especially the bill sent from the other house 
— can make such equalization. So far from that, I hazard nothing in asserting 
that the staple states would pay into the treasury, under its operation, three 
times as much as they would receive on an average by the distribution, and 
some of them far more ; while to the manufacturing states, if we are to judtre 
from their zeal in favour of the bill, the duties it proposes to impose would be 
bounties, not taxes. If judged by their acts, both measures — the distribution 
and the duties — would favour their pockets. They would be gainers, let who 
may be losers in this financial game. 

I3ut be the inequality greater or less than my estimate, what could be more 
unjust than to distribute a common fund in a certain proportion among the states, 
and to compel the people of the states to make up the deficit in a different pro- 
portion ; so that some shall pay more, and others less, than what they respect- 
ively received ? What is it but a cunningly-devised scheme to take from one 
state and to give to another — to replenish the treasuries of some of the states 
from the pockets of the people of the others ; in reality, to make them support 
the governments and pay the debts of other states, as well as their own \ Such 
must be the necessary result, as between the states which may pay more than 
they receive, and those which may receive more than they pay ; the injustice 
and inequality will increase or decrease, just in proportion to the respective ex- 
cess or deficit between receipts and payments, under this flagitious contrivance 
for plunder. 

But I have not yet reached the reality of this profligate and wicked scheme. 
As unequal and unjust as it would be between state and state, it is still more so 
regarded in its operation between individuals. It is between them its true 
character and hideous features fully disclose themselves. The money to be 
distributed would not go to the people, but to the legislatures of the states; 
while that to be paid in taxes to make up the deficiency would be taken from 
them individually. A small portion of that which would go to the legislatures 
would ever reach the pockets of the people. It would be under the control and 
management of the dominant party of the Legislature, and they under the con- 
trol and management of the leaders of the party. That it would be administer- 



454 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. Cx^LHOUN. 

ed to the advantage of themselves, and their friends and partisans ; and that they 
would profit more by their use and management of an irresponsible fund, taken 
from nobody knows who, than they would lose as payers of the taxes to supply 
its place, will not be doubted by any one who knows how such things are man- 
aged. What would be the result ? The whole of the revenue from the im- 
mense public domain would, if this wicked measure should become the settled 
policy, go to the profit and aggrandizement of the leaders, for the time, of the 
dominant party in the twenty-six state legislatures, and their partisans and sup- 
porters ; that is, to the most influential, if not the most wealthy clique, for the 
time, in the respective states ; while the deficiency would be supplied from the 
pockets of the great mass of the community, by taxes on tea, cofTee, salt, iron, 
coarse woollens, and, for the most part, other necessaries of life. And what is 
that but taking from the many and giving to the few — from those who look to 
their own means and industry for the support of themselves and families, and 
giving to those who look to the government for support, to increase the profit 
and influence of political managers and their partisans, and diminish that of the 
people ? When it is added that the dominant party in each state for the time 
would have a direct interest in keeping up and enlarging this pernicious fund, 
and that their combined influence must for the time be irresistible, it is difficult 
to see by what means the country can ever extricate itself from this measure, 
should it be once established, or what limits can be prescribed to its growth, 
or the extent of the disasters which must follow. It contains the germe of 
mighty and fearful changes, if it be once permitted to shoot its roots into our 
political fabric, unless, indeed, it should be speedily eradicated. 

In what manner the share that would fall to the states would, in the first in- 
stance, be applied, may, for the most part, be anticipated. The indebted states 
would probably pledge it to the payment of their debts ; the effect of which 
would be to enhance their value in the hands of the holders— the Rothschilds, 
the Barings, the Hopes, on the other side of the Atlantic, with wealthy brokers 
and stock-jobbers on this. Were this done at the expense of the indebted states, 
none could object. But far difl^erent is the case when at the expense of the 
Union, by the sacrifice of the noble inheritance left by our ancestors, and when 
the loss of this great and permanent fund must be supplied from the industry 
and property of a large portion of the community, who had no agency or respon- 
sibihty in contracting the debts, or benefit from the objects on which the funds 
were expended. On what principle of justice, honour, or Constitution, can this 
government interfere, and take from their pockets to increase the profit of the 
most wealthy individuals in the world ? 

The portion that might fall to the states not indebted, or those not deeply so, 
would probably, for the most part, be pledged as a fund on which to make new 
loans for new schemes similar to those for which the existing state debts were 
contracted. It may not be applied so at first ; but such would most likely be 
the application on the first swell of the tide of expansion. Supposing one 
half of the whole sum to be derived from the lands should be so applied : esti- 
mating the income from that source at five millions, the half would furnish tho 
basis of a new debt of forty or fifty millions. Stock to that amount would be 
created — would find its way to foreign markets, and would return, as other 
stocks of like kind have, in swelling the tide of imports in the first instance, 
but in the end by diminishing them to an amount equal to the interest on the 
sum borrowed, and cutting ofl^ in the same proportion the permanent revenue 
from the customs ; and this, when the whole support of the government is about 
to be thrown exclusively on the foreign commerce of the country. So much 
for the permanent effects, in a financial view, of this measure. 

The swelling of the tide of imports, in the first instance, from the loans, 
would lead to a corresponding flush of revenue, and that to extravagant ex- 
penditures, to be followed by embarrassment of the treasury, and a glut of 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 455 

goods, which would bring on a corresponding pressure on the manufacturers ; 
when rny friend from Massachusetts (Mr. Bates), and other senators from that 
quarter, would cry out for additional protection, to guard against the necessary 
consequences of the very measure they are now so urgently pressing through 
the Senate. Such would be the consequences of this measure, regarded as one 
of finance, and in reference to its internal operatioii. It is not possible but that 
such a measure, so unequal and unjust between state and state, section and 
section — between those who live by their own means and industry, and those 
who live or expect to live on the public crib — would add greatly to that discord 
and strife within, and weakness without, which are necessarily consequent on 
the entire system of measures of which it forms a part. 

But its mischievous effects on the exterior relations of the country would not 
be limited to its indirect consequences. There it would strike a direct and 
deadly blow, by withdrawing entirely from the defences of the country one of 
the only two sources of our revenue, and that much the most permanent and 
growing. It is now in the power of Congress to pledge permanently this great 
and increasing fund to that important object — to completing the system of forti- 
fications, and building, equipping, and maintaining a gallant navy. It was pro- 
posed to strike out the whole bill ; to expunge the detestable project of distri- 
bution, and to substitute in its place the revenue from the public lands, as a 
permanent fund, sacred to the defences of the country. And from what quar- 
ter did this patriotic and truly statesmanlike proposition come ? From the far 
and gallant West ; from a senator (Mr. Linn) of a state the most remote from 
the ocean, and secure from danger. And by whom was it voted down ? Strange 
to tell, by senators from maritime states — states most exposed, and having the 
deepest interest in the measure defeated by their representatives on this floor. 
Wonderful as it may seem, Louisiana, Mississippi, Georgia, and South Caro- 
lina, each gave a vote against it. North Carolina, Virginia, Maryland, Dela- 
ware, and New-Jersey, gave each two votes against it. New-York gave one ; 
and every vote from New-England, but two from New-Hampshire and one from 
Maine, was cast against it. Be it remembered in all after times, that these 
votes from states so exposed, and having so deep a stake in the defence of the 
country, were cast in favour of distribution — of giving gratuitously a large por- 
tion of the fund from the public domain to wealthy British capitalists, and 
against the proposition for applying it permanently to the sacred purpose of de- 
fending their own shores from insult and danger. How strange that New- 
York and New-England, with their hundreds of millions of property, and so 
Eiany thousands of hardy and enterprising sailors annually afloat, should give 
so large a vote for a measure above all others best calculated to withdraw pro- 
tection from both, and so small a vote against one best calculated to afford them 
protection ! But, strange as that may be, it is still more strange that the staple 
slates — the states that will receive so little from distribution, and which must 
pay so much to make up the deficiency it will cause — states so defenceless on 
their maritime frontier — should cast so large a vote for their own oppression, 
and against their own defence ! Can folly, cap party infatuation, be the cause 
one or both, go farther ? 

Let me say to the senators from the commercial and navigating states, in all 
soberness, that there is now a warm and generous feeling diffused throughout 
the entire Union in favour of the arm of defence with which your interest and 
glory are so closely identified. Is it wise, by any act of yours, to weaken or 
alienate such feelings ? And could you do an act more directly calculated to 
do so ? Remember, it is a deep principle of our nature not to regard the safety 
of those who do not regard their own. If you are indifferent to your own 
safety, you must not be surprised if those less interested should become still 
more so. 

Bui as much as the defences of the country would be weakened directly by 



456 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

the. withdrawal of so large a fund, the blow would be by no means so heaiy as 
that which, in its consequences, would fall on them. That would paralyze the 
right arm of our power. To understand fully how it would have that effect, we 
must look not only to the amount of the sum to be withdrawn, but also on what 
the burden would fall to make up the deficiency. It would fall on the com- 
merce of the country, exactly where it would do most to cripple the means of 
defence. To illustrate the truth of what I state, it will be necessary to inquire 
what would be our best system of defence. And that would involve the prior 
question, From what quarter are we most exposed to danger ] With that I shall 
accordingly begin. 

There is but one nation on the globe from which we have anything serious 
to apprehend, but that is the most powerfid that now exists or ever did exist. 
I refer to Great Britain. She is, in effect, our near neighbour, though the wide 
Atlantic divides us. Her colonial possessions stretch along the whole extent 
of our Eastern and Northern borders, from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean. 
Her power and influence extend over the numerous Indian tribes scattered 
along our Western border, from our Northern boundary to the infant Republic 
of Texas. But it is on our maritime frontier, extending from the mouth of the 
Sabine to that of St. Croix — a distance, with the undulations of the coast, of 
thousands of miles, deeply indented with bays and navigable rivers, and studded 
with our great commercial emporiums ; it is there, on that long line of frontier, 
that she is the most powerful, and we the weakest and most vulnerable. It is 
there she stands ready, with her powerful navy, sheltered in the commanding- 
positions of Halifax, Bermuda, and the Bahamas, to strike a blow at any point 
she may select on this long line of coast. Such is the quarter from which only 
we have danger to apprehend ; and the important inquiry which next presents 
itself is, How can we best defend ourselves against a power so formidable, thus 
touching us on all points, excepting the small portion of our boundary along 
which Texas joins us ? 

Every portion of our extended frontier demands attention, inland as well as 
maritime ; but with this striking difference : that on the former, our power is 
as much greater than hers as hers is greater than ours on the maritime. There 
we would be the assailant, and whatever works may be erected there ought to 
have reference to that fact, and look mainly to protecting important points from 
sudden seizure and devastation, rather than to guard against any permanent 
lodgment of a force within our borders. 

The difficult problem is the defence of our maritime frontier. That, of course, 
must consist of fortifications and a navy ; but the question is. Which ought to 
be mainly relied on, and to what extent may the one be considered as superse- 
ding the other? On both points I propose to make a few remarks. 

Fortifications, as the means of defence, are liable to two formidable objec- 
tions, either of which is decisive against them as an exclusive system of de- 
fence. The first is, that they are purely defensive. Let the system be ever 
so perfect, the works located to the greatest advantage, and planned and con- 
structed in the best manner, and all they can do is to repel attack. They can- 
not assail. They are like a shield without a sword. If they should be regard- 
ed as sufficient to defend our maritime cities, still they cannot command re- 
spect, or give security to our widely-spread and important commercial and nav- 
igating interests. 

But regarded simply as the means of defence, they are defective. Fortifica- 
tions are nothing without men to garrison them ; and if we should have no oth- 
er means of defence, Great Britain could compel us, with a moderate fleet sta- 
tioned at the points mentioned, and with but a small portion of her large milita- 
ry establishment, to keep up on our part, to guard our coast, ten times the force, 
at many times the cost, to garrison our numerous forts. Aided by the swiftness 
of steam, she could menace at the same time every point of our coast ; while 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 457 

we, ignorant of the time or point where the blow might fall, would have to stand 
prepared, at every moment and at every point, to repel her attack. A hundred 
thousand men constantly under arms would be insufficient for the purpose ; and 
we would be compelled to yield, in the end, ingloriously, without striking a 
blow, simply from the exhaustion of our means. 

Some other mode of defence, then, must be sought. There is none other but 
a navy. I, of course, include steam as well as sails. If we want to defend 
our coast and protect our rights abroad, it is absolutely necessary. The only 
questions are, How far ought our naval force to be carried ? and to what extent 
would it supersede the system of fortification 1 

Before I enter on the consideration of this important point, I owe it to my- 
self and the subject to premise that my policy is peace, and that I look to the 
navy but as the right arm of defence, not as an instrument of conquest or a""ran. 
dizement. Our road to greatness, as I said on a late occasion, lies not over the 
ruins of others. Providence has bestowed on us a new and vast region, abound- 
ing in resources beyond any country of the same extent on the globe. Ours 
is a peaceful task — to improve this rich inheritance ; to level its forests ; cul- 
tivate its fertile soil ; develop its vast mineral resources ; give the greatest ra- 
pidity and facility of intercourse between its widely-extended parts ; stud its 
wide surface with flourishing cities, towns, and villages ; and spread over it 
richly-cultivated fields. So vast is our country, that generations after genera- 
tions may pass away in executing this task, during the whole of which time we 
would be rising more surely and rapidly in numbers, wealth, greatness, and in- 
fluence, than any other people have ever done by arms. But, to carry out suc- 
cessfully this, our true plan of acquiring greatness and happiness, it is not of 
itself sufficient to have peace and tranquillity within. These are, indeed, neces- 
sary, in order to leave the states and their citizens in the full and undisturbed 
possession of their resources and energy, by which to work out, in generous 
rivalry, the high destiny which certainly awaits our country if we should be but 
tnze to ourselves. But, as important as they may be, it is not much less so to 
have safety against external danger, and the influence and respectability abroad 
necessary to secure our exterior interests and rights (so important to our pros- 
perity) against aggression. I look to a navy for these objects, and it is within 
the limits they assign I would confine its growth. To what extent, then, with 
these views, ought our navy to be carried ? In my opinion, any navy less than 
that which would give us the habitual command of our own coast and seas, 
would be little short of useless. One that could be driven from sea and kent 
in harbour by the force which Great Britain could safely and constantly allot 
to our coast, would be of little more service than an auxiliary aid to our fortifi- 
cations in defending our harbours and maritime cities. It would be almost as 
passive as they are, and would do nothing to diminish the expense, which I have 
shown would be so exhausting, to defend the coast exclusively by fortifications. 

But the difficult question still remains to be solved : What naval force would 
be sufficient for that purpose ? It will not be expected that I should give more 
than a conjectural answer to such a question. I have neither the data nor the 
knowledge of naval warfare to speak with anything like precision, but I feel 
assured that the force required would be far less than what would be thought 
when the question is first propounded. The very idea of defending ourselves 
on the ocean against the immense power of Great Britain on that element has 
something startling at the first blush. But, as greatly as she outnumbers us in 
ships and naval resources, we have advantages that countervail that, in refer- 
ence to the subject in hand. If she has many ships, she has also many points 
to guard, and these as widely separated as are the parts of her widely-extended 
empire. She is forced to keep a home fleet in the Channel, another in the Bal- 
tic, another in the Mediterranean, one beyond the Cape of Good Hope, to guard 
her important possessions in the East, and another in the Pacific. Our situa- 

M M M 



458 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

tion is the reverse. We have no foreig-n possessions, and not a point to guard 
beyond our own maritime frontier. There our whole force may be concentra- 
ted, ready to strike wlienever a vulnerable point is exposed. If to these advan- 
tages be added, that TOth France and Russia have large naval forces ; that be- 
tween us and them there is no point of conflict ; that they both watch the naval 
supremacy of Great Britain with jealousy ; and that nothing is more easy than 
for us to keep on good terms with both powers, especially with a respectable 
naval force at our command, it will be readily petceived that a force far short 
of that of Great Britain would effect what I contemplate. I would say a force 
equal to one third of hers would suffice ; but if not, certainly less than half would. 
And if so, a naval force of that size would enable us to dispense with all forti- 
fications, except at important points, and such as might be necessary in refer- 
ence to the navy itself, to the great relief of the treasury, and saving of means 
to be applied to the navy, where it would be far more efficient. The less con- 
siderable points might be safely left to the defence of cheap works, sufficient to 
repel plundering attacks ; as no large fleet, such as would be able to meet us, 
with such a naval force as that proposed, would ever think of disgracing itself 
by attacking places so inconsiderable. 

Assuming, then, that a navy is indispensable to our defence, and that one less 
than that supposed would be in a great measure useless, we are naturally led to 
look into the sources of our naval power preparatory to the consideration of the 
question how they will be affected by imposing on commerce the additional 
burden this bill would make necessary. 

Two elements are necessary to naval power — sailors and money. A navy 
is an expensive force, and is only formidable when manned with regularly-bred 
sailors. In our case, both of these depend on commerce. Commerce is indis- 
pensable to form a commercial marine, and that to form a naval marine ; while 
commerce is with us, if this bill should pass, the only source of revenue. A 
flourishing commerce is, then, in every respect, the basis of our naval power ; 
and to cripple commerce is to cripple that power — to paralyze the right arm of 
our defence. But the imposition of onerous duties on commerce is the most 
certain way to cripple it. Hence this detestable and mischievous measure, 
which surrenders the only other source of revenue, and throws the whole bur- 
den of supporting the government exclusively on commerce, aims a deadly blow 
at the vitals of our power. 

The fatal eff'ect of high duties on commerce is no longer a matter of specula- 
tion. The country has passed recently through two periods — one of protective 
tariffs and high duties, and the other of a reduction of duties ; and we have the 
effects of each in our official tables, both as it regards our tonnage and com- 
merce. They speak a language not to be mistaken, and far stronger than any 
one could anticipate who has not looked into the tables, or made himself well 
acquainted with the powerful operation of low duties in extending navigation 
and commerce. As much as I had anticipated from their effects, the reduction 
of the duties — the lightening of the burdens of commerce — have greatly ex- 
ceeded my most sanguine expectation. 

I shall begin with the tonnage, as more immediately connected with naval 
power ; and, in order to show the relative eff'ects of high duties and low on our 
navigation, I shall compare the period from 1824, when the first great increase 
of protective duties took place, to 1830 inclusive, when the first reduction of 
duties commenced. During these seven years, which include the operation of 
the two protective tariffs of 1824 and 1828 — that is, the reign of the high pro- 
tective tariff' system — our foreign tonnage fell off' from 639,972 tons to 576,475, 
equal to 61,497; our coasting tonnage from 719,190 to 615,310, equal to 
103,880 tons — making the falling oft' in both equal to 165,370 tons. Yes ; to 
that extent (103,880) did our coasting tonnage decline— the very tonnage, the 
increase of which, it was confidently predicted by the protective party, would 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 459 

make up for every possible loss in our foreign tonnage from their miserable 
quack system. Instead of that, the falling otf in the coasting trade is even 
greater than in the foreign ; proving clearly that high duties are not less inju- 
rious to the home than to the foreign trade. 

I pass now to the period (I will not say of free trade — it is far short of that) 
of reduction of high protective duties ; and now mark the contrast between the 
two. I begin with the year 1831, the first after the reduction was made on a few 
articles (prmcipally coffee and tea), and will take in the entire period down to 
the last returns — that of 1840 — making a period of ten years. This period in- 
cludes the great reduction under the Compromise Act, which is not yet com- 
pleted, and which, in its farther progress, would add greatly to the increase, if 
permitted to go through undisturbed. The tonnage in the foreign trade increas- 
ed during that period from 576,475 tons to 899,764, equal to 323,288 tons — not 
much less than two thirds of the whole amount at the commencement of the pe- 
riod ; and the coasting for the same period increased from 615,310 to 1,280,999, 
equal to 665,699 tons — more than double ; and this, too, when, according to the 
high tariff' doctrine, our coasting trade ought to have fallen oft' instead of in- 
creasing (in consequence of the reduction of the duties), and thus incontestably 
proving that low duties are not less favourably to our domestic than to our for- 
eign trade. The aggregate tonnage for the period has increased from 1,191,776 
to 2,180,763 — nearly doubled. Such, and so favourable to low duties in refer- 
ence to tonnage, is the result of the comparison between the two periods. 

The comparison in reference to commerce will prove not less so. In ma- 
king the comparison, I shall confine myself to the export trade, not because it 
gives results more favourable — for the reverse is the fact — but because the 
heavy loans contracted by the states during the latter period (between 1830 
and 1841) gave a factitious increase to the imports, which would make the 
comparison appear more favourable than it ought in reality to be. Their eft'ects 
were different on the exports. They tended to decrease rather than increase 
their amount. Of the exports, I shall select domestic articles only, because 
they only are aff'ected by the rate of the duties, as the duties on foreign articles, 
paid or secured by bond on their importation, are returned on reshipment. 
With these explanatory remarks, I shall now proceed to the comparison. 

The amount in value of domestic articles exported for 1825 was $66,944,745, 
and in the year 1830, $59,462,029 ; making a falling off", under the high tariff' 
system, during that period, of $7,482,718. Divide the period into two equal 
parts of three years each, and it will be found that the falling off" m the aggre- 
gate of the latter part, compared to the former, is $13,090,255 ; showing an 
average annual decrease of $4,963,418 during the latter part, compared with 
the former. 

The result will be found very diff'erent on turning to the period from 1330, 
when the reduction of the duties commenced, to 1840, during the whole of 
which the reduction has been going on. The value of domestic exports for 
1831 was $61,277,057, and for 1840, $113,895,634; making a difference of 
$52,618,577, equal to eighty-three per cent, (omitting fractions) for the ten 
years. If the period be divided into two equal parts of live years each, the 
increase of the latter, compared to the former, will be found to be $139,089,371 ;^ 
making an average annual increase for the latter period (from 1835 to 1840) ol 
$27,817,654. This rapid increase began with the great reduction under the 
Compromise Act of 1833. The very next year after it passed, the domestic 
exports rose from $81,034,162 to $101,189,082— just like the recoil which 
takes place when the weight is removed from the spring. 

But my friends from the manufacturing states will doubtless say that this 
vast increase of exports from reduction of duties was confined to the great ag- 
ricultural staples, and that the eff'ects were the reverse as to the export ot do- 
mestic manufactures. With their notion of protection, they cannot be prepared 



460 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

to believe that low duties are favourable to them. I ask them to give me their 
attention while I show how great their error is. So far from not partaking of 
this mighty impulse from reduction, they felt it more powerfully than other ar- 
ticles of domestic exports, as I shall now proceed to show from the tables. 

The exports of domestic manufactures during the period from 1824 to 1832 
inclusive — that is, the period of the high protective duties under the tariffs of 
1824 and 1828— fell from $5,729,797 to $5,050,633, making a dechne of 
$679,133 during that period. This decline was progressive, and nearly uni- 
form, from year to year, through the whole period. In 1833 the Compromise 
Act was passed, which reduced the duties at once nearly half, and has since 
made very considerable progressive reduction. The exports of domestic man- 
ufactures suddenly, as if by magic, sprung forward, and have been rapidly and 
uniforndy increasing ever since ; having risen, in the eight years, from 1832 to 
1840, from $505,633 to $12,108,538, a third more than double in that short 
period, and that iiiimediately following a great decline in the preceding period 
of eight years, under high duties. 

Such were the blighting effects of high duties on the tonnage and the com- 
merce of the country, and such the invigorating effects of their reduction. 
There can be no mistake. The documents from which the statements are 
taken are among the public records, and open to the inspection of all. The re- 
sults are based on the operations of a series of years, showing them to be the 
consequence of fixed and steady causes, and not accidental circumstances ; 
while the immediate and progressive decrease and increase of tonnage, both 
coastwise and foreign, and of exports, including manufactured as well as other 
articles, with the laying on of high duties, and the commencement and progress 
of their reduction, point out, beyond all controversy, Jdgh duties to be the cause 
of one, and reduction — low duties — that of the other. 

It will be in vain for the advocates of high duties to seek for a different ex- 
planation of the cause of these striking and convincing facts in the history of 
the two periods. The first of these, from 1824 to 1832, is the very period when 
the late Bank of the United States was in the fullest and most successful oper- 
ation ; when exchanges, according to their own showing, were the lowest and 
most steady, and the currency the most uniform and sound ; and yet, with all 
these favourable circumstances, which they estimate so highly, and with no 
hostile cause operating from abroad, our tonnage and commerce, in every branch 
on which the duties could operate, fell off: on the contrary, during the latter 
period, when all the hostile causes which they are in the habit of daily denoun- 
cing on this floor, and of whose disastrous consequences we have heard so many 
eloquent lamentations ; yes, in spite of contractions and expansions ; in spite of 
tampering with the currency, and the removal of the deposites ; in spite of the 
disordered state of the whole machinery of commerce ; the deranged state of the 
currency, both at home and abroad ; in spite of the state of the exchanges, and 
of what we are constantly told of the agony of the country, both have increas- 
ed* — rapidly increased — increased beyond all former example ! Such is the 
overpowering effect of removing weights from the springs of industry, and stri- 
king off shackles from the free exchange of products, as to overcome all adverse 
causes. 

Let me add, Mr. President, that of this highly prosperous period to industry 
(however disastrous to those who have over-speculated, or invested their funds 
in rotten and swindling institutions), the most prosperous of the whole, as the 
tables will show, is that during the operation of the Sub-treasury — a period 
when some progress was made towards the restoration of the currency of the 
Constitution. In spite of the many difficulties and embarrassments of that try- 
ing period, the progressive reduction of the duties, and the gradual introduction 
of a sounder currency, gave so vigorous a spring to our industry as to overcome 
them all ; showing clearly, if the country was blessed with the full and steadv 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 461 

operation of the two, under favourable circumstances, that it would enjoy a de- 
gree of prosperity exceeding what even the friends of that measure anticipated. 
Having now shown that the navy is the right arm of our defence ; that it de- 
pends on commerce for its resources, both as to men and means ; and that high 
duties destroy the growth of our commerce, including navigation and tonnage, 
I have, I trust, satisfactorily established the position which I laid down — that 
this measure, which would place the entire burden of supporting the govern- 
ment on commerce, would paralyze the right arm of our power. Vote irdown, 
and leave commerce as free as possible, and it will furnish ample resources,' 
skilful and gallant sailors, and an overflowing treasury, to repel danger far from 
our shores, and maintain our rights and dignity in our external relations. With 
the aid of the revenue from land, and proper economy, we might soon have 
ample means to enlarge our navy to that of a third of the British, with duties 
far below the limits of 20 per cent, prescribed by the Compromise Act. The 
annual appropriation, or cost of the British navy, is about $30,000,000. Ours, 
with the addition of the appropriation for the home squadron made this session, 
is (say) $6,000,000 ; requiring only the addition of four millions to make it 
equal to a third of that of Great Britain, provided that we can build, equip, man, 
and maintain ours as cheaply as she can hers. That we can, with proper 
management, can scarcely be doubted, when we reflect that our navigation, 
which involves almost all the elements of expense that a navy does, su'ccess- 
fully competes with hers over the world. Nor are we deficient in men — gal- 
lant and hardy sailors — to man a navy on as large a scale as is suggested. Al- 
ready our tonnage is two thirds of that of Great Britain, and will, in a short 
time, approach an equality with hers, if our commerce should be fairly treated. 
Leave, then, in the treasury the funds proposed to be withdrawn by this de- 
testable bill ; apply it to the navy and defences of the country ; and even at its 
present amount, with small additional aid from the impost, it will give the 
means of raising it, with the existing appropriation, to the point suggested ; 
and, with the steady increase of the fund from the increased sales of lands, 
keeping pace with the increase of our population, and the like increase of com- 
merce under a system of light and equal duties, we may, with proper economv 
in the collection and disbursements of the revenue, raise our navy steadily, 
■without feeling the burden, to half the size of the British, or more, if more be 
needed for deience and the maintenance of our rights. Beyond that we outrht 
never to aim. 

I have (said Mr. C.) concluded what I proposed to say. I have passed over 
many and weighty objections to this measure, which I could not bring within 
the scope of my remarks without exhausting the patience of the body. And 
now, senators, in conclusion, let me entreat you in the name of all that is good 
and patriotic — in the name of our common country, and the immortal fathers of 
our Revolution and founders of our government — to reject this dangerous bill. 
I implore you to pause, and ponder before you give your final vote for a meas- 
ure which, if it should pass and become a permanent law, would do more to 
defeat the ends for which this government was instituted, and to subvert the 
Constitution, and destroy the liberty of the country, than any which has ever 
been proposed. 



462 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 



XXXII. 

SPEECH ON THE TREASURY NOTE BILL, JANUARY 25, 1842. 

Mr. Calhoun said: There is no measure that requires greater caution, 
or more severe scrutiny, than one to impose taxes or raise a loan, be the 
form what it may. I hold that government has no right to do either ex- 
cept Avhen the public service makes it imperiously necessary, and then 
only to the extent that it requires. I also hold that the expenditures can 
only be limited by limiting the supplies. If money is granted, it is sure 
to be expended. Thus thinking, it is a fundamental rule with me not to 
vote for a loan or tax bill till I am satisfied it is necessary for the public 
service, and then not, if the deficiency cian be avoided by lopping off un- 
necessary objects of expenditure, or the enforcement of an exact and ju- 
dicious economy in the public disbursements. Entertaining these opin- 
ions, it was in vain that the chairman of the Finance Committee pointed 
to the estimates of the year as a sufficient reason for the passage of this 
bill as amended. Estimates are too much a matter of course to satisfy 
me in a case like this. I have some practical knowledge of the subject, 
and know too well how readily old items are put down, from year to year, 
without much inquiry whether they can be dispensed with or reduced, 
and new ones inserted, without much more reflection, to put much reli- 
ance on them. To satisfy me, the chairman must do what he has not 
even attempted: he must state satisfactorily the reasons for every new 
item, and the increase of every old one, and show that the deficiency to 
meet the revenue cannot be avoided by retrenchment and economy. 
Until he does that, he has no right to call on us to vote this heavy addi- 
tional charge of five millions of dollars on the people, especially at a 
period of such unexampled pecuniary embarrassment. Having omitted 
to perform this duty, I have been constrained to examine for myself the 
estimates in a very hasty manner, with imperfect documents, and no op- 
portunity of deriving information from the respective departments. But, 
with all these disadvantages, I have satisfied myself that this loan is un- 
necessary ; that its place may be supplied, and more than supplied, by 
retrenchment and economy, and the command of resources in the power 
of the government, without materially impairing the efficiency of the 
public service j my reasons for which I shall now proceed to state. 

The estimates of the Secretary of the Treasury for the expenditures of 
the year are $32,997,258, or, in round numbers, thirty-three millions, em- 
braced under the following heads : the civil list, including foreign inter- 
course and miscellaneous, amounting to $4,000,987 37 ; military, in all 
its branches, $11,717,791 83 ; navy, $8,705,579 83 ; permanent appropri- 
ations, applicable to the service of the year, $1,572,906; and treasury 
notes to be redeemed, $7,000,000. 

Among the objects of retrenchment, I place at the head the great in- 
crease that is proposed to be made to the expenditures of the navy, com- 
pared with that of last year. It is no less than $2,508,032 13, taking 
the expenditure of last year from the annual report of the secretary. I 
see no sufficient reason, at this time, and in the present embarrassed 
condition of the treasury, for this great increase. I have looked over 
the report of the secretary hastily, and find none assigned, except general 
reasons for an increased navy, which I am not disposed to controvert. 
But I am decidedly of the opinion that the commencement ought to be 
postponed till some systematic plan is matured, both as to the ratio of in- 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 463 

crease and the description of force of which the addition should consist, 
and till the department is properly organized and in a condition to enforce 
exact responsibility and economy in its disbursements. That the depart- 
ment is not now properly organized and in that condition, we have the 
authority of the secretary himself, in which I concur. I am satisfied that 
its administration cannot be made effective under the present organiza- 
tion, particularly as it regards its expenditures. I have very great respect 
for the head of the department, and confidence in his ability and integ- 
rity. If he would hear the voice of one who wishes him well, and who 
takes the deepest interest in the branch of service of which he is the 
chief, my advice would be, to take time ; to look about ; to reorganize 
the department in the most efficient manner, on the staff" principle ; and to 
establish the most rigid accountability and economy in the disbursements 
before the great work of a systematic increase is commenced. Till that 
is done, add not a dollar to the expenditure. Make sure of the foundation 
before you begin to rear the superstructure. I am aware that there will 
be a considerable increase this year in the navy, compared to the expen- 
diture of last year, in consequence of the acts of the extraordinary ses- 
sion. This may deduct several hundred thousand dollars from the amount 
I propose to retrench ; but I cannot doubt that an improved administra- 
tion of the moneyed affairs of the department, with the very great reduc- 
tion in prices and wages, a saving may be made more than sufficient to 
make up for that deduction. In speaking of improved administration, I 
comprehend the marine corps. And here I deem it my duty to remark, 
that the estimates for that branch of the service appear to me to be very 
large. The corps is estimated at one thousand privates, and its aggre- 
gate expense at $502,292. Tlris strikes me to be far too large for so 
small a corps, of long standing, stationed at convenient and cheap points, 
and at a period when the price of provisions, clothing, and all other arti- 
cles of suppy is low. A large portion, I observe, is for barracks, which, 
if proper at all, surely may be postponed till the finances are placed in 
better condition. 

I shall now pass from the naval to the military department ; and here I 
find an estimate of $1,-508,032 13 for harbours, creeks, and the like. 1 
must say that I am surprised at this estimate. All who have been members 
of the Senate for the last eight or ten years must be familiar with the 
history of this item of expenditure. It is one of the branches of the old, 
exploded American System, and almost the only one which remains. It 
has never been acquiesced in, and was scarcely tolerated when the treas- 
ury was full to overflowing with the surplus revenue. Of all the extrav- 
agant and lawless appropriations of the worst of times, I have ever re- 
garded it as the most objectionable — unconstitutional, local in its charac- 
ter, and unequal and unjust in its operation. Little did I anticipate that 
such an item, and of so large an amount, would at this time be found in 
the estimates, when the treasury is deeply embarrassed, the credit of 
the government impaired, and the revenue from the lands surrendered to 
the states and territories. Such an item, at such a period, looks like in- 
fatuation ; and I hope the Committee on Finance, when it comes to take 
up the estimates, will strike it out. It certainly ought to be expunged, 
and I shall, accordingly, place it among the items that ought to be 
retrenched. 

Passing to the treasury department, I observe an estimate of $43,932 
for surveys of public lands ; and, under the head of " balances of appro- 
priations on the 31st of December, 1841, required to be expended in lSi2," 
$200,000 for the same object: making together $24:3,932, which ought 
either not to be in the estimates, or, if put there, ought to be credited in the 



464 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOITN. 

receipts of the year. The reason will be apparent when it is stated that 
the Distribution»Act deducts the expenses incident to the administration 
of the public lands, and, among others, that for surveying ; and, of course, 
it must be deducted from the revenue from the lands, before it is distrib- 
uted among the states, and brought to the credit of the treasury. It is, 
in fact, but an advance out of the land fund, to be deducted from it before 
it is distributed. There are several other items in the estimates con- 
nected with the expenses incident to the administration of the public 
lands to which the same remarks are applicable, and which would make 
an additional deduction of many thousand dollars, but the exact amount 
of which I have not had time to ascertain. These several items, taken 
together, make the sum of S4',317,322 25, that may fairly be struck from 
the estimates. To these there are, doubtless, many others of consider- 
able amount that might be added, had I the time and means for full in- 
vestigation. Among them, I would call the attention of the chairman to 
an item of $158,627 17, under the name of " patent fund," and comprised 
among the balances of appropriations on the 31st of December last, and 
which will be required for this year. I have not had time to investigate 
it, and am uninformed of its nature. I must ask the chairmain to explain. 
Does it mean receipts of money derived from payments for patents 1 If 
so, it ought to be passed to the treasury, and classed under the receipts 
of the year, and not the appropriations, unless, indeed, there be some act 
of Congress which has ordered otherwise. If it be an appropriation, I 
would ask, To what is it appropriated, and to what particular objects is it 
to be applied this j^ear 1 The chairman will find it in page 40 of the docu- 
ment containing the estimates. 

I would ask the chairman, also, whether the interest on the trust funds, 
including both the Smithsonian and Indian, which may not be applied to 
the object of the trusts during the year, have been comprehended in the 
receipts of the year 1 We pay interest on them, and have the right, of 
course, to their use till required to be paid over. The interest must be 
considerable. That of the former alone is about $30,000 annually. 

I would also call his attention to the pension list. I observe the dimi- 
nution of the number of pensioners for the last year is very considerable, 
and, from the extreme age of the revolutionary portion, there must be a 
rapid diminution till the list is finally closed. I have not had time to in- 
vestigate the subject sufficiently to say to what amount the treasury may 
be relieved from that source, but I am informed, by a friend w^ho is fa- 
miliar with the subject, that a very great reduction of expenditure, say 
$300,000 annually, for some years, may be expected under that head. 
Under these various heads, and others, which a careful examination might 
designate, I feel confident that a reduction might be made by retrench- 
ment in the estimates to the amount of the sum proposed to be borroAvcd 
by this bill, as amended, without materially impairing the efficiency of 
the government. 

I shall next proceed to examine what reduction may be made by strict 
economy in the public disbursements j by which I mean, not parsimony, 
but that careful and efficient administration of the moneyed affairs of the 
government which guards against all abuse and waste, and applies every 
dollar to the object of appropriations, and that in the manner best calcu- 
lated to produce the greatest result. This high duty properly appertains 
to the functions of the executive, and Congress can do but little more than 
to urge on and sustain that department of the government to which it be- 
longs in discharging it, and which must take the lead in the work of 
economy and reform. My object is to show that there is ample room for 
the work, and that great reduction may be made in the expenditures by 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 465 

such an administration of the moneyed affairs of the government as I have 
described. But how is this to be made apparent ] Can it be done by 
minute examination of the various items of the estimates and expendi- 
tures I Can a general state of looseness, of abuses, or extravagance in 
the disbursements, be detected and exposed by such examination I All 
attempts of the kind have failed, and must continue to do so. It would 
be impracticable to extend such an inquiry through the various heads of 
expenditures. A single account might be selected, that would occupy a 
committee a large portion of a session ; and, after all their labour, it 
would be more than an even chance that they would fail to detect abuses 
and mismanagement, if they abounded ever so much. They lie beyond 
the accounts, and can only be reached by the searching and scrutinizing 
eyes of faithful and vigilant officers charged with the administrative 
supervision. 

There is but one way in which Congress can act with effect in testing 
whether the public funds have been judiciously and economically applied 
to the objects for which they were appropriated, and, if not, of holding 
those charged with their administration responsible ; and that is, by com- 
paring the present expenditures with those of past periods of acknowl- 
edged economj', or foreign contemporaneous service of like kind. If, on 
such comparison, the differences should be much greater than they should 
be, after making due allowance, those who have the control should be 
held responsible to reduce them to a proper level, or to give satisfactory 
reasons for not doing it ; and that is the course which I intend to pursue. 
They who now have the control, both of Congress and the executive de- 
partment, came into power on a solemn pledge of reform ; and it is but 
fair that they should be held responsible for the reformation of the abuses 
and mismanagement which they declared to exist, and the great reduction 
of expenses which they pledged themselves to make if the people should 
raise them to power. 

But I am not so unreasonable as to expect that reform can be the work 
of a day. I know too well the labour and the time it requires to entertain 
any such opinion. All I ask is, that the work shall be early, seriously, and 
systematically commenced. It is to be regretted that it has not already 
commenced, and that there is so little apparent inclination to begin. We 
had a rio-ht to expect that the chairman of the Committee on Finance, in 
brinffinff° forward a new loan of $5,000,000, would have at least under- 
taken to inform us, after a full survey of the estimates and expenditures, 
•whether any reduction could be made, and, if any, to what amount, before 
he asked for a vote adding so great an addition to the public debt. I can- 
not but regard the omission as a bad omen. It looks like repudiation of 
solemn pledges. But what he has failed to do I shall attempt, but in a 
much less full and satisfactory manner than he might have done, with all 
his advantages as the head of the committee. For the purpose of com- 
paring, I shall select the years 1823 and 1840. I select the former be- 
cause^it is one of the years of the second term of .Mr. Monroe's adminis- 
tration, and which, it is admitted now, administered the moneyed affairs 
of the cTovernment with a reasonable regard to economy ; but at that time 
it was "thought by all to be liberal in its expenditures, and by some even 
profuse, as several senators ^vhom 1 now see, and who were then members of 
Congress, will bear witness. But I select it for a still stronger reason. 
It is°the year which immediately preceded the first act professedly passed 
on the principles of the protective policy. The intervening time between 
the two periods comprehends the two acts of 18-24 and 1828, by which that 
policy was carried to such great extremes. To those acts, connected with 
the banking system, and the connexion of the banks with the government, is 

N N N 



466 SPEECHES OP JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

to be attributed that train of events which has involved the country and 
the government in so many difficulties j and, among- others, that vast in- 
crease of expenditures which has taken place since 1823, as will be shown 
by the comparison I am about to make. 

The disbursements of the government are comprised under three great 
heads: the civil list, including foreign intercourse and miscellaneous j the 
military; and the navy, I propose to begin with the first, and take them 
in the order in which they stand. 

The expenditures under the first head have increased since 1823, when 
they were $2,022,093, to $5,4.92,030 98, the amount in 1840 ; showing an 
increase, in seventeen years, of2y\to 1, while the population has increas- 
ed only about -^ to 1, that is, about 75 per cent. ; making the increase of ex- 
penditures, compared to the increase of population, about 3^^ to 1. This 
enormous increase has taken place although a large portion of the expendi- 
tures under this head, consisting of salaries to officers and the pay of mem 
bars of Congress, have remained unchanged. The next year, in 1841, the 
expenditure rose to $6,196,560. I am, however, happy to perceive a con- 
siderable reduction in the estimates for this year compared with the last 
and several preceding years; but still leaving room for great additional 
reduction to bring the increase of expenditures to the same ratio with the 
increase of population, as liberal as that standard of increase would be. 

That the Senate may form some conception, in detail, of this enormous 
increase, I propose to go more into particulars in reference to two items — 
the contingent expenses of the two houses of Congress, and that of col- 
lecting the duties on imports. The latter, though of a character belong- 
ing to the civil list, is not included in it, or either of the other heads ; as 
the expenses incident to collecting the customs are deducted from the 
receipts before the money is paid into the treasury. 

The contingent expenses (they exclude the pay and mileage of mem- 
bers) of the Senate, in 1823, were $12,841 07, of which the printing cost 
$6349 56, and stationary $1631 51 ; and that of the House $37,848 95, 
of which the printing cost 822,314 41, and the stationary $3877 71. In 
1840, the contingent expenses of the Senate were $77,447 22, of which 
the printing cost $31,285 32, and the stationary $7061 77; and that of 
the House $199,219 57, of which the printing cost $65,086 46, and the 
stationary $36,352 99. The aggregate expenses of the two houses to- 
gether rose from $50,690 02 to $276,666, being an actual increase of 
5_4_ to 1, and an increase, in proportion to population, of about If--, to 1. 
But, as enormous as this increase is, the fact that the number of mem- 
bers had increased not more than about ten per cent, from 1823 to 1840, 
is calculated to make it still more strikingly so. Had the increase kept 
pace with the increase of members (and there is no good reason why it 




in a still more striking view, the contingent expenses in 1823 were at the 
rate of $144 per member, which one would suppose was ample, and in 
1840, $942. This vast increase took place under the immediate eyes of 
Congress ; and yet we were told at the extra session, by the present chair- 
man of the Finance Committee, that there was no room for economy, and 
that no reduction could be made ; and even in this discussion he has in- 
timated that little can be done. As enormous as are the contingent ex- 
penses of the two houses, I infer, from the very great increase of expen- 
ditures under the head of civil list generally, when so large a portion is 
for fixed salaries, which have not been materially increased for the last 
seventeen years, that they are not much less so throughout the whole 
rano-e of this branch of the public service. 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 467 

I shall now proceed to the other item, which I have selected for more 
particular examination, the increased expenses of collecting the duties on 
imports. In 1823 it was $766,699, equal to 3^%% per cent, on the amount 
collected, and j\% on the aggregate amount of imports; and in 1840 it 
had increased to $1,542,319 24, equal to 14 Jj\ per cent, on the amount 
collected, and to lyo\ on the aggregate amount of the imports, beino- an 
actual increase of nearly a million, and considerably more than double 
the amount of 1823. In 1839 it rose to $1,714,515. 

From these facts, there can be little doubt that more than a million 
annually may be saved under the two items of contingent expenses of 
Congress and the collection of the customs, without touching the other 
great items comprised under the civil list, the executive and judicial de- 
partments, the foreign intercourse, lighthouses, and miscellaneous. It 
Avould be safe to put down a saving of at least half a million for them. 

I shall now pass to the military, with which I am more familiar. I pro- 
pose to confine my remarks almost entirely to the army proper, including 
the Military Academy, in reference to which the information is more full 
and minute. I exclude the expenses incident to the Florida war, and the 
expenditures for the ordnance, the engineer, the topographical, the In- 
dian, and the pension bureaus. Instead of 1823, for which there is no 
official and exact statement of the expenses of the army, I shall take 1821, 
for which there is one made by myself, as secretary of war, and for the 
minute correctness of which I can vouch. It is contained in a report 
made under a call of the House of Representatives, and comprises a com- 
parative statement of the expenses of the army proper for the years 
1818, 1819, 1820, 1821, respectively, and an estimate of the expense of 
1822. It may be proper to add, which I can with confidence, that the 
comparative expense of 1823, if it could be ascertained, would be found 
to be not less favourable than 1821. It would, probably, be something 
more so. 

With these remarks, I shall begin with a comparison, in the first place, 
between 1821 and the estimate for the army proper for this year. The 
average aggregate strength of the army in the year 1821, including offi- 
cers, professors, cadets, and soldiers, was 8109, and the proportion of 
officers, including the professors of the Military Academy, to the sol- 
diers, including cadets, was 1 to 12J/7r» ^^^ the expenditure $2,180,093 
53,* equal to $263 91 for each individual. The estimate for the army 
proper, for the year 1842, including the Military Academy, is S4,453,370 
16. The actual strength of the army, according to the return accompa- 
nying the message at the opening of the session, was $11,169. Assuming 
this to be the average strength for this year, and adding for the average 
number of the academy, professors and cadets, 300, it will give, within a 
very small fraction, $390 for each individual, making a difference of 
$136 in favour of 1821. How far the increase of pay, and the additional 
expense of two regiments of dragoons, compared to other descriptions of 
troops, would justify this increase, I am not prepared to say. In other 
respects, I should suppose, there ought to be a decrease rather than an 
increase, as the price of clothing, provisions, forage, and other articles of 
supply, as well as transportation, is, I presume, cheaper than in 1821. 
The proportion of officers to soldiers I would suppose to be less in 1842 
than 1821, and, of course, as far as that has influence, the expense of the 
former ought to be less per man than the latter. With this brief and im- 
perfect comparison between the expense of 1821 and the estimates for 
this year, I shall proceed to a more minute and full comparison between the 
former and the year 1837. I select that year, because the strength of the 
* See Document 38 (H. R.), 1st Session, l"th Congress. 

E 



468 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

army, and the proportion of officers to men (a very material point as it 
relates to the expenditure), are almost exactly the same. 

On turning to document 165 (H. R., 2d sess., 26th Con.), a letter will be 
found from the then secretary of war (Mr. Poinsett), giving a comparative 
statement, in detail, of the expense of the army proper, including the Mil- 
itary Academy, for the years 1837, 1838, 1839, and 184-0. The strength 
of the army for the first of these years, including officers, professors, 
cadets, and soldiers, was 8107, being two less than in 1821. The pro- 
portion of officers and professors to the cadets and soldiers ll^/o? ^^' 
ing -Vo more than 1821. The expenditure for 1837, $3,308,011, being 
$1,127,918 more than 1821. The cost per man, including officers, pro- 
fessors, cadets, and soldiers, was, in 1837, $408 03, exceeding that of 
1821 $144 12 per man. It appears, by the letter of the secretary, that 
the expense per man rose, in 1838, to $464 35 ; but it is due to the head 
of the department at the time to say, that it declined under his adminis- 
tration, the next year, to $381 65, and, in the subsequent, to $380 63. 
There is no statement for the year 1841, but, as there has been a falling 
off in prices, there ought to be a proportionate reduction in the cost, es- 
pecially during the present year, when there is a prospect of so great a 
decline in almost every article which enters into the consumption of the 
army. Assuming that the average strength of the army will be kept equal 
to the return accompanying the President's message, and that the expen- 
diture of the year should be reduced {o the standard of 1821, the expense 
of the army would not exceed $2,895,686, making a diffisrence, compared 
with the estimates, of $1,557,684 ; but that, from the increase of pay, and 
the greater expense of the dragoons, cannot be expected. Having no 
certain information how much the expenses are necessarily increased 
from those causes, I am not prepared to say what ought to be the actual 
reductions, but, unless the increase of pay, and the increased cost, because 
of the dragoons, are very great, it ought to be very considerable. 

I found the expense of the army in 1818 including the Military Acad- 
emy, to be $3,702,495, at a cost of $451 57 per man, including officers, 
professors, cadets, and soldiers, and reduced it, in 1821, to $2,180,098, at 
a cost of $263 91, and making a difference between the two years, in 
the aggregate expenses of the army, of $1,522,397, and $185 66 per man. 
There was, it is true, a great fall of prices in the interval ; but allowing' 
for that, by adding to the price of every article entering into the supplies 
of the army a sum sufficient to raise it to the price of 1818, there was 
still a difference in the cost per man of $163 95. This great reduc- 
tion was effected without stinting the service or diminishing the supplies, 
either in quantity or quality. They were, on the contrary, increased in 
both, especially the latter. It was effected through an efficient organiza- 
tion of the staff, and the co-operation of the able officers placed at the 
head of each of its divisions. The cause of the great expense at the 
former period was found to be principally in the neglect of public prop- 
erty, and the application of it to uses not warranted by law. There is 
less scope, doubtless, for reformation in the army now. I cannot doubty 
however, but that the universal extravagance which pervaded the country 
for so many years, and which increased so greatly the expenses both of 
government and individuals, has left much room for reform in this as well 
as other branches of the service. 

In addition to the army, there are many other and heavy branches of 
expenditure embraced under the military head — fortifications, ordnance, 
Indians, and pensions — the expenditures of which, taken in the aggregate, 
greatly exceed the army ; the expenses of all of which, for the reason to 
which I have alluded, may, doubtless, be much reduced. 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 469 

In turning to the navy, I have not been able to obtain informatiou 
which would enable me to make a similar comparison between the two 
periods in reference to that important arm ; but I hope, when the infor- 
mation is received which has been called for by the senator from Maine 
(Mr. Williams), ample data will be obtained to enable me to do so on 
some future occasion. In place of it, 1 propose to give a comparative 
statement of the expense oH the British navy and ours for the year 1840. 
The information in reference to the former is taken from a work of 
authority, the Penny Cyclopaedia, under the head of " Navy." 

The aggregate expense of the British navy in the year 1840 amounted 
to 4,980,353 pounds sterling, deducting the expense of transport for troops 
and convicts, which does not properly belong to the navy. That sum, at 
$4 80 to the pound sterling, is equal to $23,905,694 46. The navy was 
composed of 392 vessels of war of all descriptions, leaving out 36 steam- 
vessels in the packet-service, and 23 sloops fitted for foreign packets. 
Of the 392, 98 were line-of-battle ships, of which 19 were building; 116 
frigates, of which 14 were building ; 68 sloops, of which 13 were build- 
ing ; 44 steam-vessels, of which 16 were building j and 66 gun-brigs, 
schooners, and cutters, o[ which 12 were building. 

The effective force of the year, that which was in actual service, con- 
sisted of 3400 officers, 3998 petty officers, 12,846 seamen, and 9000 ma- 
rines, making an aggregate of 29,244. The number of vessels in actual 
service was 175, of which 24 were line-of-battle ships, 31 frigates, 30 
steam-vessels, and 45 gun-brigs, schooners, and cutters, not including the 
30 steamers and 24 sloops in the packet-service, at an average expendi- 
ture of $573 for each individual, including officers, petty officers, seamen, 
and marines. 

Our navy is composed at present, according to the report of the secre- 
tary accompanying the President's message, of 67 vessels, of which 11 are 
line-of-battle ships, 17 frigates, 18 sloops of war, 2 brigs, 4 schooners, 4 
steamers, 3 store ships, 3 receiving vessels, and 5 small schooners. The 
estimates for the year are made on the assumption that there will be in 
service, during the year, 2 ships of the line, 1 razee, 6 frigates, 20 sloops, 
11 brigs and schooners, 3 steamers, 3 store ships, and 8 small vessels, 
makinof in the ao^crreg'ate 53 vessels. The estimates for the year, for the 
navy and marine corps, as has been stated, is $8,705,579 83, considerably 
exceeding one third of the entire expenditures of the British navy for 
1840. I am aware that there is probably a much larger expenditure ap- 
plied to the increase of the navy in our service than in the British, in pro- 
portion to the respective forces ; and I greatly regret that I have not the 
materials to ascertain the difference, or to compare the expenses of the 
two navies in the various items of building, outfit, and pay, and the rela- 
tive expenses of the two per man, per gun, and per ton. The comparison 
would be highly interesting, and would throw much light on the subject 
of these remarks. We know our commercial marine meets successfully 
the British in fair competition; and, as the elements of the expenses of 
the commercial and naval marine are substantially the same in time of 
peace, when impressment is disused in the British service, our navy ought 
not to bear an unfavourable comparison with theirs on the score of ex- 
pense. Whether it does, in fact, I am not prepared to say, with the ma- 
terials I have been able to collect; but it does seem to me, when I com- 
pare the great magnitude of their naval establishment with the small- 
ness of ours, and the aggregate expense of the two, that ours, on a full 
comparison, will be found to exceed theirs by far in expense, however 
viewed. 

I hope what I have stated will excite inquiry. It is a point of vast im- 

Xx 



470 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

portance. If we can bring our expenditures to an equality, or nearly so, 
with hers, we may then look forward with confidence to the time, as not 
far distant, when, with our vast commercial marine (more than two thirds 
of the British), we may, with proper economy in our disbursement, and 
by limiting the objects of our expenditures to those which properly be- 
long to this government under the Constitution, place a navy on the 
ocean, without increase of burden on the people, that will give complete 
protection to our coast and command the respect of the world. But if 
that cannot be done — if our expenses must necessarily greatly exceed in 
proportion that of the first maritime power in the world, it is well it should 
be known at once, that we may look to other means of defence, and give 
up what, in that case, would be a hopeless struggle. I do not believe that it 
will be found to be the case. On the contrary, I am impressed with the 
belief that our naval force ought not to cost more in proportion than the 
British. In some things they may have the advantage, but we will be 
found to have equally great in others. 

From these statements it may be fairly inferred that there is great room 
for economy, under every head of expenditure. I am by no means pre- 
pared to say what reduction may be eifected by it. It would require 
much more time and minute examination to determine with precision 
anything like the exact amount ; but it is certain that millions may be 
saved, simply by a judicious and strict system of economy, without im- 
pairing in any degree the efficiency of the government. But in order to 
form a more definite conception as to the amount of that reduction, I pro- 
pose to add to the aggregate expense of 1823 seventy-five per cent. — the 
estimated increase of the population of the United States since then, 
which will give the amount that ought to have been the estimated ex- 
penditures for this year, on the supposition that the expense of the gov- 
ernment ought not, in ordinary times, to increase faster than the popula- 
tion ; and which, deducted from the actual estimates of the year, will 
show, on that supposition, to what amount they ought to have been re- 
duced. But in making this supposition, I wish it to be understood I do 
not admit that the expenditures of the government ought to keep pace 
with our rapidly increasing population. There are many branches of the 
public service which ought not to be, and have not, in fact, been much 
increased with the increase of population, and are now, in point of ex- 
pansion, very nearly what they were in 1823. Others are more enlarged, 
but it is believed that there are but few whose growth have been greater, 
or as great, as that of our population. It would, in truth, not be difficult to 
show that an increase of revenue and expenditures, and, consequently, of 
patronage and influence, equal to our rapidly growing population, must 
almost necessarily end in making the government despotic. It is known 
that it takes a much less military force in proportion to subject a large 
country with a numerous population, than a small one with an inconsider- 
able one ; and in like manner, and for similar reasons, it takes much less 
patronage and influence in proportion to control the former than the lat- 
ter. So true is it, that I regard it as an axiom, that the purity and dura- 
tion of our free and popular institutions, looking to the vast extent of 
country and its great and growing population, depend on restricting its 
revenues and expenditures, and thereby its patronage and influence, to the 
smallest amount consistent with the proper discharge of the few great 
duties for which it was instituted. To a departure from it may be attrib- 
uted, in a great measure, the existing disorders. W ith these remarks, I 
shall now proceed to give the result of the proposed calculation. 

The actual expenditures of 1823, all included, except payments on ac- 
count of the public debt, amounted to $9,827,832. That sum multiplied 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 471 

bv 75 per cent., the estimated ratio of increase of population from 1823 
to 1840, gives $17,198,681, which, on the assumption that the expendi- 
tures should not increase more rapidly than the population, ought to be 
the extreme limits of the expenditures of this year. But the estimates 
for the year, deducting payment on account of tha debt, are, as has been 
stated, $25,997,258, being an excess of $8,498,577 beyond what the ex- 
penditures ought to be on the liberal scale assumed. The increase, in- 
stead of being at the rate of the population, is equal to 2/„\ to 1, com- 
pared with the expenditures of 1823, and 3^ nearly, compared with the 
ratio of the increase of population. Had the ratio of increase not ex- 
ceeded that of the population, the whole expenditure of the year, inclu- 
dincTthe sum of $7,000,000 for the debt, would have been but $24,198,681, 
inst°ead of $32,997,258. 

But as great as this reduction is, it by no means represents the saving 
that would be made on the data assumed. The expense of collecting the 
revenue (of which a statement has already been made as it relates to 
the customs), as well as several other items, less important, are not in- 
cluded in the expenditures, and must be added, to get the true amount 
that would be saved. The addition, at the lowest calculation, would be 
a million of dollars; which, added to the $8,498,577, would make the sum 
of $9,498,577, and would reduce what ought to be the estimates of the 
year, on the ground assumed, to $16,198,681. The saving is great; but, 
I feel confident, not greater than what, with a judicious and efficient sys- 
tem of administration, might be effected, and that not only without im- 
pairing, but actually increasing the efficiency of the government. To 
make so great a reduction, would take much time and labour ; but if those 
who have the power, and stand pledged, would begin the good work, 
much, very much, might be done during the present session. But if this 
bill, as it now stands, should become a law, I would despair for the pres- 
ent. I see in the amendment a deliberate and fixed determination to 
keep up the expenditures, regardless of pledges and consequences. 

Having now shown how greatly the public expenditures have increased 
since 1823, I next propose to make some remarks on the causes that have 
produced it. In the front rank I place the protective tariff. I selected 
the year 1823, as I stated in the early stages of my remarks, in part to 
illustrate the effects of that pernicious system in this connexion. It is 
curious to look over the columns of expenditures, under their various 
heads, in the table I hold in my hand, and note how suddenly they rose 
under every head, after each of the tariff acts of 1824 and 1828, until they 
reached the present point. [Here Mr. C. read from the table of the ex- 
penditures under each head, year by year, from 1823 to 1840, in illustra- 
tion of his remarks]. Nor is it wonderful that such should be ihe effect 
of the protective policy. How could it be otherwise 1 Duties were laid, 
not for revenue, but for protection. Money was not the object. It was 
but an incident, and the party in favour of the system (a majority in both 
houses during the whole period) cared not how it was wasted. During 
that wastefurperiod, I have heard members of Congress of high intelli- 
gence declare that it was better that the money should be burned or 
thrown into the ocean than not collected ; and they spoke in the true 
genius of that corrupting and oppressive system. In fact, after it was 
collected, there was a sort of necessity that it should be spent. Ihe col- 
lection was in bank-notes ; and of all absurdities, one of the greatest is, an 
accumulation of such an article in the public treasury, whether we regard 
the thing itself, or its effects on the community and the banks. W hea 
pushed to a great extent, it must prove ruinous to all ; and to such an ac- 
cumulation, in spite of the most wasteful extravagance m the expendi- 



472 • SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

tures, may be attributed, in a great degree, the overthrow of the banks, 
and the embarrassments of the government and country. But so blind 
were the banks, for the most part, to their fate, that they were among the 
foremost to urge on the course of policy destined to hasten so greatly 
their overthrow. All resistance on the part of the minority in Congress 
opposed to the system was in vain. If the money was saved from one 
objectionable object, it was sure to be applied to some other, and perhaps 
even more objectionable ; if the sluice of expenditures was stopped in one 
place, it was certain to burst through another. Under the conviction 
that the struggle was in vain so long as the cause remained, I ceased in 
a great measure resistance to appropriations, and turned my efforts against 
the cause — a treasury overflowing with bank-notes — to exhaust which was 
the only means left of staying the evil. It is not my intention to cast 
the blame on either party. The fault lay in the system — the policy of 
imposing duties when the money was not needed, and collecting it in a 
currency, which, to keep, would have been more wasteful and ruinous, if 
possible, than to spend, however extravagantly. It is due, in justice to the 
late administration, to say, that they had commenced, in good earnest, 
the work of reform, and that with so much success, as to have made a 
very considerable reduction in the expenditures, towards which no one 
exerted himself with more zeal or greater effect than the senator behind 
me (Mr. Woodbury), then at the head of the treasury department. It is 
to be deeply regretted that what was then so well begun has not been 
continued by those who have succeeded. 

It is admitted on all sides that we must equalize the revenue and ex- 
penditures. The scheme of borrowing to make up an increasing deficit 
must in the end, if continued, prove ruinous. Already is our credit 
greatly impaired. It is impossible to borrow at home, in the present state 
of things, at the usual rate of interest. The six per cent, stock authorized 
at the late session is now several per cent, below par ; and, if we would 
borrow in the home market, it would endanger the solvent banks. It is 
admitted that a loan of two millions in Boston has caused the present 
intense pressure there in the money market. Nor can the foreign market 
be relied on till our finances are put in a better condition. Who, in their 
present condition, would think of jeopardizing our credit by appearing in 
the European market with United States stocks'? It is certain that no 
negotiation could be effected there but at usurious interest, and on a con- 
siderable extension of the time for redemption ; the tendency of which 
would be to depress the state stocks, and lay the foundation of a perma- 
nent funded debt. There remains another objection, which should not be 
overlooked : the loan would be returned in merchandise, with the usual 
injurious and embarrassing effects of stimulating the consumption of the 
country, for the time, beyond what its exports would permanently sustain. 

Nor is the prospect much better for the additional issue of treasury- 
notes proposed by the bill as amended in the Senate. They are now be- 
low par, and this must still add to their depression ; perhaps to the same 
extent to which the six per cents, are now depressed. The reason is ob- 
vious. The only advantage which they have over stocks in raising a loan 
is, that they are receivable in the dues of the government, which gives 
them, to a certain extent, the character of currency ; but that advantage 
is not peculiar to them. As the law now stands, notes of solvent banks 
are also receivable in the public dues. They are, in fact, treasury-notes, 
as far as it depends on receivability ; as much so as if each one was en- 
dorsed to be received in the dues of the gov^ernment by an authorized 
ao-ent. Now, so long as the government receives bank-notes at par with 
their own, and the banks (as is now the case) refuse to receive them at par 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 473 

with bank-notes, treasury-notes will be depressed compared with bank-notes • 
for the plain reason that the latter can pay the debts both of the banks and the 
government, while the former can pay only the debts of the government. 

In such a state of things, only a very small amount of treasury-notes can be 
used for currency without depressing them below par ; and when that amount 
is much exceeded, they will sink rapidly to the depression of stock bearing the 
same rate of interest. Very different would be the fact if the sub-treasury had 
not been repealed. Under its operation, the government could at any time have 
issued what amount it pleased to meet a temporary deficit of the treasury, at a 
mere nominal rate of interest, or none at all. The provision that nothing but 
gold and silver, and the paper issued on the credit of the government, should 
be received in the public dues, would have kept them at par. But as things 
now are, it must be obvious that neither loans in the usual way, nor treasury- 
notes, can be relied on to make up the deficit, without ruinous consequences. 
And here let me inform the senators on the other side that they are labouring 
under a great mistake in supposing that we, who prefer treasury-notes to loans 
to meet the temporary wants of the treasury, are anxious to force the use of 
them on you. The fact is far otherwise. We deeply regret to see you re- 
duced to the necessity of using them. We believe them to be very useful and 
convenient, much cheaper, and more safe, than loans, to meet the occasional 
wants of the government, and see, with regret, a resort to them under circum- 
stances so well calculated to discredit them in the public estimation, and when 
they cannot be used but at the expense of the public creditors. 

We have, then, arrived at the point that we must increase the duties or cur- 
tail expenditures ; and the question is. Which shall we choose ? That question 
will be decided by the vote we are about to give. There is no mistake. Those 
who have changed this bill into a loan bill of $5,000,000 tell us, in language 
too intelligent to be mistaken, that they intend to fix the permanent expenses 
of the government at about $25,000,000 ; for it will take that sum, at least, to 
meet what they tell us is the lowest amount to which the expenditures can be 
reduced, and to discharge the interest and principal of the debt already con- 
tracted or authorized. Now, sir, it is clear that so large a sum cannot be de- 
rived from the present tariff', as high as it has been raised. I agree with the 
chairman that, with our present export trade, the heavy interest to be paid on 
debts abroad, and the large list of free articles, that it is not safe to estimate 
the consumption of the country of dutiable articles at more than $85,000,000, 
which, at 20 per cent, round, would give but $17,000,000 gross, and a nett 
revenue, according to the present expense of collection, of not more than 
$15,000,000 at the outside ; leaving $10,000,000 annually to be raised by ad- 
ditional duties on imports, or a corresponding reduction in the expenses of the 
government. Which shall we choose 1 That the reduction may be made, and 
the deficit met, aided by the repeal of the Distribution Bill, without impairhig 
the efficiency of the government, I trust I have satisfactorily shown ; not all at 
once, but enough and more, this year, to avoid this loan, and gradually, by a vig- 
orous system of economy, to arrest all farther loans, and to discharge those 
that have been contracted or authorized. Why not, then, adopt the alternative 
of curtailing expenses ? I put the question in all soberness to those who are 
in power and responsible. You stand pledged, solemnly pledged to reform — 
you told the people that the expenses of the government were extravagant ; that 
they could be reduced to a point lower than I have assigned ; and wliy not re- 
deem your pledge, when I have proved that there is such ample room to do so ? 
We, on this side, are anxious to co-operate with you, and to carry out with 
vigour the good work which had been commenced before you came into power. 
Why, instead of carrying on with still greater vigour what had been commenced, 
do you halt ? No : it is not strong enough. Why do you now go for increase, 
instead of reduction ? Why falsify all your solemn promises, and prove, now 

o 



474 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

that you are in power, that you are as zealous for debts, duties, and increase 
of expenditures, as you exhibited zeal for reform while you were seekino- 
power ? 

But one answer can be given — from deep solicitude for another protective 
tariff. Yes, that same pernicious system, which swelled the expenditures to 
their present vast amount, is the real impediment to their reduction. It is that 
which has made you forget all your promises, and which now seeks to keep up 
the expenditures as a pretext for imposing duties, not for revenue, but, in reality, 
for protection. It is that which is striving 1o force government to return to the 
old and disastrous policy which has brought such calamity on the country, and 
done so much to corrupt its morals and politics ; and which is now forcing it to 
resort to loans and treasury-notes, at the hazard of its credit, when it is so 
necessary, in the midst of the wrecks of that of so many of the states, that the 
credit of the Union should stand above suspicion. It is that which passed the 
Distribution Bill, and now resists its repeal, when it is clear that the revenue 
from the lands is indispensable to meet the demands on the government, and to 
preserve its credit. Put that corrupt and corrupting system out of the way, and 
every difficulty connected with our finances would vanish ; the Distribution 
Act would be repealed, the revenue from the public domain restored to the 
Union, and economy and retrenchment would save their millions. Every 
voice would be raised in their favour, and the expenditure would be speedily 
equalized with the revenue. Were this done, we would hear no more of an 
empty treasury — of loans, of treasury-notes and prostrated credit ; no more of 
additional duties. Instead of increase, we should hear the cheerful note of re- 
duction — repeal of taxes — striking shackles from commerce and navigation — 
and lightening the burden of labour. I hazard nothing in asserting that, wdth 
a thorough reform in the fiscal action of the government, and a repeal of the 
Distribution Act, that a revenue of thirteen millions from the customs would be 
sufficient — amply sufficient for carrying on the government efficiently. Such 
would be the happy effects of equalizing the revenue and expenditures by a 
judicious system of economy and retrenchment, aided by the restoration of the 
revenue from the lands. 

Let me now ask gentlemen if they have reflected on the consequences which 
must result from the other alternative, that of raising" the revenue to the standard 
of the expenditures. What has already been the effects of that policy ? What 
is the immediate cause of the present embarrassment ? What has emptied the 
treasury, prostrated the credit of the government, and imposed high additional 
taxes on the commerce and labour of the country ? What but the policy com- 
menced at the extra session, of keeping up the expenditures to the present high 
standard, and which, if we may judge by this measure, and the declaration of 
the chairman of the Committee on Finance, it is determined to adhere to? Can 
any one doubt that if there had been no change of policy — if that so earnestly 
pressed by my friend behind me, of reducing the expenditures, had been con- 
tinued, but that the existing embarrassments would have been avoided? On 
you, who have reversed the wise and judicious course then commenced, rests 
the responsibility. It is you who have emptied the treasury ; you who have 
destroyed the credit of the government, and caused the present embarrassments. 

But you are only at the beginning of your difliculties. Those that are to 
come, unless you change your course, are still more formidable. The power 
of borrowing, in every form, short of usurious and ruinous interest, is gone, and 
can you expect to raise from commerce alone the means of meeting the expen- 
ditures at the present high standard ? I pronounce it to be beyond your power 
to raise twenty-five millions annually from the customs. So large a sum can- 
not be extorted from commerce in the present state of things. A nett revenue 
to that amount would require a gross revenue, at the present extravagant rate 
of collection, of at least twenty-seven millions of dollars. Our present exports 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 475 

will not pay for an importation of more than $125,000,000, allowing for the or- 
dinary profits of trade. From this must be deducted !^ 10,000,000 for the inter- 
est of debt abroad, which would reduce the imports to $115,000,000. Deduct 
$10,000,000 more for free articles, immediately connected with the manufac- 
turing operations of the country, and it would reduce the dutiable articles con- 
sumed in the country annually to $105,000,000. In the free articles I do not 
include tea and coffee, which are now so. It would take an average duty of 
26 per cent, to raise $27,000,000 on $105,000,000. Can you, in the present 
state of things, raise your duties to that high standard ? 

I pass over the effects of such a duty in repressing the export trade, on 
■which the import depends. Between them there is the most intnnate relation. 
Each limits the amount of the other. In the long run, it is acknowledged that 
the imports cannot, on a fair valuation, exceed the exports. It is not less cer- 
tain that the same rule appUes to the exports, which, in the long run, cannot ex- 
ceed the imports. And hence, duties on imports as eflectually restrict and limit 
the amount of the exports as if directly imposed on the latter. To repress the 
one is to repress the other. But, setting aside all considerations of the kind, I 
directly meet the question, and say that you cannot extort from commerce the 
amount you propose. 

He who would reason from the past on this subject will be greatly deceived. 
High duties now will not give the revenue they once did. The smuggler for- 
bids. The standard of morals is greatly lowered. The paper system and the 
protective policy have worked a great and melancholy change in that respect. 
The country is filled with energetic and enterprising men, rendered desperate 
by being reduced from affluence to poverty through the vicissitudes of the times. 
They will give an impulse to smuggling unknown to the country heretofore. The 
profits of regular business, in the new state of things in which the country is 
placed, must be low and slow. Fortunes can no longer be made by a single 
bold stroke ; and the impatience and necessities of the large class to which 1 
have alluded, and whose debts will be sponged by the Bankrupt Act, will not 
submit to recovering their former condition by so slow a process. With high 
duties, smuggling, then, will open too tempting a field to restore their broken 
fortunes, not to be entered by many of the large class to which I refer, to which 
many will be added from the lowered standard of morals, who cannot plead the 
same necessity. If to this be added the great increased facility for smuggling, 
both on our Northern, and Eastern, and Southwestern frontiers, it will be in vain 
to expect to raise the sum proposed from commerce. Not only has the line of 
frontier along the lakes been greatly lengthened, but the facility of intercourse 
with them, both by canals and roads, have been increased in a still greater de- 
gree. How is smuggling to be prevented along so extended a frontier, with 
such unlimited facility for practising it ? Nor will the supply of smuggled goods 
be confined to the immediate neighbourhood of the frontier. They will pene- 
trate through the numerous roads and canals leading to the lakes, far iidand, and 
compete successfully with the regular trade in the heart of the country. Nor 
is it to be doubted but that the British authorities will connive at this illicit trade. 
Look at the immense interest which they have to turn the trade of our country, 
as far as possible, through the channel of the St. Lawrence. It will give to 
Great Britain the entire tonnage to whatever portion of our trade may be turned 
through that channel — a point so important to her naval supremacy, to which 
she is ever so attentive. Already great facility is afforded for turning the pro- 
vision trade, both for the home market and the supply of the West Indies, through 
it, and with much success. 

I was surprised to learn, since the commencement of the session, as I have 
no doubt most of those who hear me will be, that a place on the St. Lawrence, 
almost unknown, is already the fourth town in the Union, as to the number of 
vessels that enter and depart in the year. I refer to St. Vincent, at the outlet 



476 SPEECHES OP JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

of Lake Ontario. It is the depot for the British trade which descends the St. 
Lawrence from our side. To giv-e Ufe and vigour to a vast trade, which gives 
her the entire tonnage of the outward and inward voyage, is too important to 
be neglected, particularly as it would so powerfully counteract our high duties, 
and so greatly widen the field of consumption for her manufactures. Turning 
to the frontier at the other end of the Union, we shall find a great increase of 
facility for smuggling in that quarter ; but I abstain from enlarging on it for the 
present. 

Taking all these causes together, it cannot be doubted but that smugrslinor 
will commence at a much more lower point of duties than it ever has heretofore, 
and that all calculations of increase of revenue from increase of duties founded 
on the past will fail. It is the opinion of good judges that it would commence 
with duties as low as 12 per cent, on such articles as linen and silks ; but be that 
as it may, it may be safely predicted that the scheme of raising the standard of 
revenue to the present expenditures will fail. I pass over the violation of the 
compromise, which such a policy necessarily involves, its ruinous efl'ects on the 
great staples of the country, now suffering under the greatest depression, and that 
deep discontent which must follow in the quarter that produces them. I shall 
confine myself simply to the financial question. Regarded in that light, I tell gen- 
tlemen that the line of policy they propose will fail. They will have to aban- 
don it, or resort to internal taxes to supply the deficit from commerce. Yes, 
you must restore the revenue from the lands, economize and retrench, or be for- 
ced to resort to internal taxes in the end. Are you prepared for that ? I ask 
those who represent the great sections to the North and East of this, if they have 
reflected how that portion of the Union would be affected by internal taxes. I 
refer not to direct taxes, for that, according to the mode prescribed in the Con- 
stitution, can never be pushed to any oppressive extreme, but to excises. If 
you have not, it is time you should ; for in the way you are now going, you will 
soon have to learn experimentally how it will operate. 

There never has been a civilized country within my knowledge whose mon- 
eyed affairs have been worse managed than ours for the last dozen of years. 
In 1828 we raised the duties, on an average, to nearly fifty per cent, when the 
debt was on the eve of being discharged, and thereby flooded the country with 
a revenue, when discharged, which could not be absorbed by the most lavish 
expenditures. Hence the double affliction of an accumulating surplus of mill- 
ions on millions, and of the most wasteful expenditures at the same time. Then 
came the Compromise Act, which entirely exempted one half of the imports 
from duties, in order to escape the growing evil of such a surplus, and reduced 
the one tenth, every two years, on all the duties above twenty per cent., in or- 
der to get clear of the protective policy. Under their operation, aided by the 
Deposite Act, the surplus was absorbed, and the revenue gradually brought down 
to the proper level ; to meet the descending revenue, a reduction of expendi- 
tures was commenced, with the intention of equalizing the revenue and expen- 
ditures. Then a change of party took place, the one coming in professing a 
greater love for economy and retrenchment than the one going out ; but, instead 
of fulfilling their promises, the public expenditures have been increased by mill- 
ions — debts contracted — revenue from the lands sciuandered — and all this when 
the income was reduced to the least possible depression. Take all in all, can 
folly, can infatuation, go farther ? 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 477 

XXXIII. 

h 

SPEECH IN SUPPORT OF THE VETO POWER, FEB. 28, 1842. 

Mr. Calhoun said: The senator from Kentucky, in support of his amend- 
ment, maintained that the people of these states constitute a nation ; that the 
nation has a will of its own ; that the numerical majority of the whole was the 
appropriate organ of its voice ; and that whatever derogated from it, to that ex- 
tent departed from the genius of the government, and set up the will of the mi- 
nority against the majority. We have thus presented, at the very threshold of 
the discussion, a question of the deepest import, not only as it regards the sub- 
ject under consideration, but the nature and character of our government ; and 
that question is. Are these propositions of the senator true ?* If they be, then 
he admitted the argument against the veto would be conclusive ; not, however, 
for the reason assigned by him, that it would make the voice of a single func- 
tionary of the government (the President) equivalent to that of some six sen- 
ators and forty members of the other house ; but for the far more decisive 
reason, according to his theory, that the President is not chosen by the voice 
of the numerical majority, and does not, therefore, according to his principle, 
represent truly the will of the nation. 

It is a great mistake to suppose that he is elected simply on the principle of 
numbers. They constitute, it is true, the principal element in his election, but 
not the exclusive. Each state is, indeed, entitled to as many votes in his elec- 
tion as it is to representatives in the other house — that is, to its federal popu- 
lation ; but to these, two others are added, having no regard to numbers for 
their representation in the Senate, which greatly increases the relative influ- 
ence of the small states, compared to the large, in the presidential election. 
What effect this latter element may have on the numbers necessary to elect a 
president, may be made apparent by a very short and simple calculation. 

The population of the United States, in federal numbers, by the late census, 
is 15,908,376. Assuming that sixty-eight thousand, the number reported by 
the committee of the other house, will be fixed on for the ratio of representation 
there, it will give, according to the calculation of the committee, two hundred 
and twenty-four members to the other house. Add fifty-two, the number of the 
senators, and the electoral college will be found to consist of two hundred and 
seventy-six, of which one hundred and thirty-nine is a majority. If nineteen 
of the smaller states, excluding Maryland, be taken, beginning with Delaware 
and ending with Kentucky inclusive, they will be found to be entitled to one 
hundred and forty votes, one more than a majority, with a federal poi)ulation 
of only 7,327,869 ; while the seven other states, with a population of 8,680,507, 
would be entitled to but one hundred and thirty-six votes, three less than a ma- 
jority, with a population of almost a million and a half greater than the others. 
Of the one hundred and forty electoral votes of the smaller states, thirty-eight 
would be on account of the addition of two to each state, for their representa- 
tion in this body, while of the larger there would be but fourteen on that ac- 
coimt ; making a difference of twenty-four votes on that account, being two 
more than the entire electoral votes of Ohio, the third state in point of numbers 
in the Union. 

* Mr. Clay here interrupted Mr. Calhoun, and said that he meant a majority according to the 
forms of the Constitution. * i. *• j i.^ 

Mr Calhoun, in return, said he had taken down the words of the senator at the time, and wonw 
vouch for the correctness of his statement. The senator not only laid dowTi the propositions as 
stated, but he drew conclusions from them against the President's veto, which could only be sus- 
tained on the principle of the numerical majority. In fact, his course at the extra session, and the 
grounds assumed both by him and his coUeague, in this discussion, had their origin in the doctrmes 
embraced in that proposition. 



47S SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

The senator from Kentucky, with these facts, but acts in strict conformity to 
his theory of the government, in proposing the limitation he has on the veto 
power ; but as much cannot be said in favour fif the substitute he has offered. 
The argument is as conchisive against the one as the other, or any other modi- 
fication of the veto that could possibly be devised. It goes farther, and is con- 
clusive against the executive department itself, as elected ; for there can be no 
good reason offered why the will of the nation, if there be one, should not be 
as fully and perfectly represented in that department as in the legislative. 

But it does not stop there. It would be still more conclusive, if possible, 
against this branch of the government. In constituting the Senate, numbers 
are totally disregarded. The smallest state stands on a perfect equality with, 
the largest — Delaware, with her seventy-seven thousand, with New-York, with 
her two millions and a half. Here a majority of states control, without regard 
to population ; and fourteen of the smallest states, with a federal population of 
but 4.064,457, little less than a fourth of the whole, can, if they unite, overrule 
the twelve others, with a population of 11,844,919. Nay, more: they could 
virtually destroy the government, and put a veto on the whole system, by re- 
fusing to elect senators ; and yet this equality among states, without regard to 
numbers, including the branch where it prevails, would seem to be the favour- 
ite with the Constitution. It cannot be altered without the consent of every 
state; and this branch of the government, where it prevails, is the only one 
that participates in the powers of all the others. As a part of the legislative 
department, it has full participation with the other in all matters of legislation, 
except originating money bills ; while it participates with the executive in two of 
its highest functions, that of appointing to office and making treaties ; and in that 
of the judiciary, in being the high court before which all impeachments are tried. 

But we have not yet got to the end of the consequences. The argument 
would be as conclusive against the judiciary as against the Senate, or the ex- 
ecutive and his veto. The judges receive their appointments from the execu- 
tive and the Senate ; the one nominating, and the other consenting to and ad- 
vising the appointment; neither of which departments, as has been shown, is 
chosen by the numerical majority. In addition, they hold their office during 
good behaviour, and can only be turned out by impeachment ; and yet they 
have the power, in all cases in law and equity brought before them, in which 
an act of Congress is involved, to decide on its constitutionality — that is, in 
effect, to pronounce an absolute veto. 

If, then, the senator's theory be correct, its clear and certain result, if carried 
out in practice, would be to sweep away, not only the veto, but the executive, 
the Senate, and the judiciary, as now constituted ; and to leave nothing stand- 
ing in the midst of the ruins but the House of Representatives, where only, in 
the whole range of the government, numbers exclusively prevail. But, as deso- 
lating as would be its sweep in passing over the government, it would be far 
more destructive in its whirl over the Constitution. There it would not leave 
a fragment standing amid the ruin in its rear. 

In approaching this topic, let me premise (what all will readily admit), that 
if the voice of the people may be sought for anywhere with confidence, it may 
be in the Constitution, which is conceded by all to be the fundamental and para- 
movuit law of the land. If, then, the people of these states do really constitute 
a nation, as the senator supposes ; if the nation has a will of its own, and if the 
numerical majority of the whole is the only appropriate and true organ of that 
will, we may fairly expect to find that will, pronounced through the absolute 
majority, pervading ^ery part of that instrument, and stamping its authority on 
the whole. Is such the fact? The very reverse. Throughout the whole — 
from first to last — from beginning to end— in its formation, adoption, and amend- 
ment, there is not the slightest evidence, trace, or vestige of the existence of 
the facts on which the senator's theory rests ; neither of the nation, nor its will, 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 479 

nor of the numerical majority of the whole, as its organ, as I shall next proceed 
to show. 

The Convention which formed it was called by a portion of the states ; its 
members were all appointed by the states ; received their authority from their 
separate states ; voted by states in forming the Constitution ; agreed to it, when 
formed, by states ; transmitted it to Congress to be submitted to the states for 
their ratification ; it was ratified by the people of each state in convention, each 
ratifying by itself, for itself, and bound exclusively by its own ratification ; and 
by express provision it was not to go into operation unless nine out of the 
twelve states should ratify, and then to be binding only between the states rati- 
fying. It was thus put in the power of any four states, large or small, without 
regard to numbers, to defeat its adoption ; which might have been done by a 
very small proportion of the whole, as will appear by reference to the first cen- 
sus. That census was taken very shortly after the adoption of the Constitution, 
at which time the federal population of the then twelve states was 3,462,279 ; 
of which the four smallest, Delaware, Rhode Island, Georgia, and New- 
Hampshire, with a population of only 241,490 (something more than the four- 
teenth part of the whole), could have defeated the ratification. Such was the 
total disregard of population in the adoption and formation of the Constitution. 

It may, however, be said, it is true, that the Constitution is the work, of the 
states, and that there was no nation prior to its adoption ; but that its adoption 
fused the people of the states into one, so as to make a nation of what before 
constituted separate and independent sovereignties. Such an assertion would 
be directly in the teeth of the Constitution, which says that, when ratified, '• it 
should be binding" (not over the states ratifying, for that would imply that it 
was imposed by some higher authority ; nor between the individuals composing 
the states, for that would imply that they were all merged in one ; but) " be- 
tween the states ratifying the same ;" and thus, by the strongest implication, 
recoo-nising them as the parties to the instrument, and as maintaining their 
separate and independent existence as states after its adoption. But let that 
pass. I need it not to rebut the senator's theory — to test the truth of the asser- 
tion, that the Constitution has formed a nation of the people of these states. I 
go back to the grounds already taken : that if such be the fact — if they really 
form a nation since the adoption of the Constitution, and the nation has a will, 
and the numerical majority is its only proper organ, in that case the mode pre- 
scribed for the amendment of the Constitution would furnish abundant and con- 
clusive evidence of the fact. But here again, as in its formation and adoption, 
there is not the slightest trace or evidence that such is the fact ; on the con- 
trary, most conclusive to sustain the very opposite opinion. 

There are two modes in which amendments to the Constitution may be pro- 
posed. The one, such as that now proposed, by a resolution to be passed by 
two thirds of both houses ; and the other, by a call of a convention by Con- 
gress, to propose amendments, on the application of two thirds of the states, 
neither of which gives the least countenance to the theory of the senator. In 
both cases, the mode of ratification, which is the material point, is the same, 
and requires the concurring assent of three fourths of the states, regardless of 
population, to ratify an amendment. Let us now pause for a moment to trace 
the efl^ects of this provision. 

There are now twenty-six states, and the concurring assent, of course, of 
twenty states is sufficient to ratify an amendment. It then results that twenty 
of the smaller states, of which Kentucky would be the largest, are sufficient for 
that purpose, with a population, in federal numbers, of only 7,652,097, less by 
several hundred thousand than the numerical majority of the whole, against the 
united voice of the other six, with a population of 8,216,279, exceeding the 
former by more than half a million. And yet this minority, under the amend- 
ing power, may change, alter, modify, or destroy every part of the Constitution, 



480 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOTJN. 

except that which proAddes for an equality of representation of the states in the 
Senate ; while, as if in mockery and derision of the senator's theory, nineteen 
of the larger states, with a population, in federal numbers, of 14,526,073, can- 
not, even if united to a man, alter a letter in the Constitution, against the seven 
others, with a population of only 1,382,303; and this, too, under the existing 
Constitution, which is supposed to form the people of these states into a nation. 
Finally, Delaware, with a population of little more than 77,000, can put her 
\"eto on all the other states, on a proposition to destroy the equality of the states 
in the Senate. Can facts more clearly illustrate the total disregard of the nu- 
nierical majority, as well in the process of amending, as in that of forming and 
adopting the Constitution ? 

All this must appear anomalous, strange, and unaccountable, on the theory of 
the senator, but harmonious and easily explained on the opposite ; that ours is 
a union, not of individuals, united by what is called a social compact, for that 
would make it a nation ; nor of governments, for that would have formed a mere 
confederacy, like the one superseded by the present Constitution ; but a union 
of states, founded on a written, positive compact, forming a Federal Republic, 
with the same equality of rights among the states composing the union as 
among the citizens composing the states themselves. Instead of a nation we 
are, in reality, an assemblage of nations, or peoples (if the plural noun may be 
used where the language affords none), united in their sovereign character im- 
mediately and directly by their own act, but without losing their separate and 
independent existence. 

It results from all that has been stated, that either the theory of the senator 
is wrong, or that our political system is throughout a profound and radical error. 
If the latter be the case, then that complex system of ours, consisting of so many 
parts, but blended, as was supposed, into one harmonious and sublime whole, 
raising its front on high and challenging the admiration of the world, is but a 
misshapen and disproportionate structure, that ought to be demolished to the 
ground, with the single exception of the apartment allotted to the House of Rep- 
resentatives. Is the senator prepared to commence the work of demolition 1 
Does he believe that all other parts of this complex structure are irregular and 
deformed appendages ; and that if they were taken down, and the government 
erected exclusively on the will of the numercial majority, it would effect as well, 
or better, the great objects for which it was instituted: "to establish justice ; 
ensure domestic tranquillity ; provide for the common defence ; promote the 
general welfare ; and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our pos- 
terity ?" Will the senator — will any one — can any one — venture to assert that ? 
And if not, why not ? There is the question, on the proper solution of which 
hangs not only the explanation of the veto, but that of the real nature and char- 
acter of our complex, but beautiful and harmonious system of government. To 
give a full and systematic solution, it would be necessary to descend to the ele- 
ments of political science, and discuss principles little suited to a discussion in 
a deliberative assembly. I waive the attempt, and shall content myself with 
giving a much more matter-of-fact solution. 

It is sufficient, for that purpose, to point to the actual operation of the gov- 
ernment through all the stages of its existence, and the many and important 
measures which have agitated it from the beginning ; the success of which one 
portion of the people regarded as essential to their prosperity and happiness, 
while other portions have viewed them as destructive of both. What does this 
imply but a deep conflict of interests, real or supposed, between the different 
portions of the community, on subjects of the first magnitude — the currency, the 
finances, including taxation and disbursements ; the Bank, the protective tariff, 
distribution, and many others ; on all of which the most opposite and conflict- 
ing views have prevailed ? And what would be the effect of placing the pow- 
ers of the government under the exclusive control of the numercial majority — 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 481 

of 8,000,000 over 7,900,000 ; of six states over all the rest — but to give the 
dominant interest, or combination of intere^tij, an unlimited and despotic con- 
trol over all others ? What, but to vest it vvitii the power to administer the gov- 
ernment for its exclusive benefit, regardless of all others, and indifferent to their 
oppression and wretchedness ? And what, in a country of such vast extent and 
diversity of condition, institutions, industry, and productions, would that be but 
to subject the rest to the most grinding despotism and oppression ? But what is 
the remedy ? It would be but to increase the evil to transfer the power to a mi- 
nority, to abolish the House of Representatives, and place the control exclusive- 
ly in the hands of the Senate — in that of the four millions instead of the eight. 
If one must be sacrificed to the other, it is better that the few should be to the 
many, than the many to the few. 

What, then, is to be done, if neither the majority nor the minority, the greater 
nor less part, can be safely trusted with the exclusive control ? What but to 
vest the powers of the government in the whole — the entire people ; to make 
it in truth and reality the government of the people, instead of the government 
of a dominant over a subject part, be it the greater or less — of the whole peo- 
ple — self-government ; and if this should prove impossible in practice, then to 
make the nearest approach to it, by requiring the concurrence, in the action of 
the government, of the greatest possible number consistent with the great ends 
for which government was instituted — justice and security, within and without. 
But how is that to be effected ? Not, certainly, by considering the whole com- 
munity as one, and taking its sense as a whole by a single process, which, in- 
stead of giving the voice of all, can but give that of a part. There is but one 
way by which it can possibly be accomplished ; and that is by a judicious and 
wise division and organization of the government and community, with refer- 
ence to its different conflicting interests, and by taking the sense of each part 
separately, and the concurrence of all as the voice of the whole. Each may 
be imperfect of itself; but if the construction be good, and all the keys skilfully 
touched, there will be given out, in one blended and harmonious whole, the true 
and perfect voice of the people. 

But on what principle is such a division and organization to be made to effect 
this great object, without which it is impossible to preserve free and popular in- 
stitutions ? To this no general answer can be given. It is the work of the 
wise and experienced, having full and perfect knowledge of the country and 
the people in every particular for whom the government is intended. It must 
be made to fit ; and when it does, it will fit no other, and wUl be incapable of 
being imitated or borrowed. Without, then, attempting to do what cannot be 
done, I propose to point out how that which I have stated has been accomplish- 
ed in our system of government, and the agency the veto is intended to have in 
effecting it. 

I begin with the House of Representatives. There each state has a repre- 
sentation according to its federal numbers, and, when met, a majority of the 
whole number of members controls its proceedings ; thus giving to the numeri- 
cal majority the exclusive control throughout. The effect is to place its pro- 
ceedings in the power of eight nnllions of people over all the rest, and six of 
the largest states, if united, over the other twenty ; and the consequence, if the 
house was the exclusive organ of the voice of the people, would be the domi- 
nation of the stronger over the weaker interests of the community, and the es- 
tablishment of an intolerable and oppressive despotism. To find the remedy 
against what would be so great an evil, we must turn to this body. Here an 
entirely different process is adopted to take the sense of the community. Pop- 
ulation is entirely disregarded, and states, without reference to the number of 
people, are made the basis of representation ; the effect of which is to place the 
control here in a majority of the states, which, had they tlie exclusive power, 

Ppp 



482 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUIV. 

would exercise it as despotically and oppressively as v/ould the House of Rep- 
resentatives. 

Reo-arded, then, separately, neither truly represents the sense of the commu- 
nity, and each is imperfect of itself; but, when united, and the concurring voice 
of each is made necessary to enact laws, the one corrects the defects of the oth- 
er ; and, instead of the less popular derogating from the more popular, as is sup- 
posed by the senator, the two together give a more full and perfect utterance to 
the voice of the people than either could separately. Taken separately, six 
states might control the house, and a little upward of four millions might con- 
trol the Senate, by a combination of the fourteen smaller states ; but, by requi- 
ring the concurrent votes of the two, the six largest states must add eight others 
to have the control in both bodies. Suppose, for illustration, they should unite 
with the eight smallest, which would give the least number by which an act 
could pass both houses : it will be found, by adding the population, in federal 
numbers, of the six largest to the eight smallest states, that the least number by 
which an act can pass both houses, if the members should be true to those 
they represent, would be 9,788,570 against a minority of 6,119,797, instead of 
8,000,000 against 7,900,000, if the assent of the most popular branch alone were 
required. 

This more full and perfect expression of the voice of the people by the con- 
currence of the two, compared to either separately, is a great advance towards 
a full and perfect expression of their voice ; but great as it is, it falls far short, 
and the framers of the Constitution were, accordingly, not satisfied with it. To 
render it still more perfect, their next step was to require the assent of the Pres- 
ident before an act of Congress could become a law ; and, if he disapproved, 
to require two thirds of both houses to overrule his veto. We are thus brought 
to the point immediately under discussion, and which, on that account, claims 
a full and careful examination. 

One of the leading motives for vesting the President with this high power 
was, undoubtedly, to give him the means of protecting the portion of the powers 
allotted to him by the Constitution against the encroachment of Congress. To 
make a division of power effectual, a veto in one form or another is indipensa- 
ble. The right of each to judge for itself of the extent of the power allotted to 
its share, and to protect itself in its exercise, is what in reality is meant by a 
division of power. Without it, the allotment to each department would be a 
mere partition, and no division at all. Acting under this impression, the fra- 
mers of the Constitution have carefully provided that his approval shall be ne- 
cessary, not only to the acts of Congress, but to every resolution, vote, or order 
requiring the consent of the two houses, so as to render it impossible to elude 
it by any conceivable device. This of itself was an adequate motive for the 
provision ; and, were there no other, ought to be a sufficient reason for the re- 
jection of this resolution. Without it, the division of power between the legis- 
lative and executive departments would have been merely nominal. 

But it is not the only motive. There is another and deeper, to which the di- 
vision itself of the government into departments is subordinate — to enlarge the 
popular basis, by increasing the number of voices necessary to its action. As 
numerous as are the voices required to obtain the assent of the people through 
the Senate and the house to an act, it was not thought by the framers of the 
Constitution sufficient for the action of the government in all cases. Nine thou- 
sand eight hundred, as large as is the number, were regarded as still too few, 
and six thousand one hundred too many, to remove all motives for oppression ; 
the latter being not too few to be plundered, and the former not too large to di- 
vide the spoils of plunder among. Till the increase of numbers on one side, 
and the decrease on the other, reaches that point, there is no security for the 
weaker against the stronger, especially in so extensive a country as ours. Act- 
ing in the spirit of these remarks, the authors of the Constitution, although they 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 483 

deemed the concurrence of the Senate and the house as sufficient, with the ap- 
proval of the President, to the enactment of laws in ordinary cases ; yet, when 
he dissented, they deemed it a sufficient presumption against the measure to re- 
quire a still greater enlargement of the popular basis for its enactment. With 
this view, the assent of two thirds of both houses was required to overrule his 
veto — that is, eighteen states in the Senate, and a constituency of ten million 
six hundred thousand in the other house. 

But it may be said that nothing is gained towards enlarging the popular basis 
of the gov^ernment by the veto power, because the number necessary to elect a 
majority to the two houses, without which the act could not pass, would be suf- 
ficient to elect him. That is true. But he may have been elected by a differ- 
ent portion of the people, or, if not, great changes may take place during his 
four years, both in the Senate and the house, which may change the majority 
that brought him into power, and with it the measures and policy to be pursued. 
In either case, he might find it necessary to interpose his veto, to maintain his 
views of the Constitution, or the policy of the party of which he is at the head, 
and which elevated him to power. 

But a still stronger consideration for vesting him with the power may be found 
in the difference of the manner of his election, compared with that of the mem- 
bers of either house. The senators are elected by the vote of the legislatures 
of the respective states ; and the members of the house by the people, who, in 
almost all the states, elect by districts. In neither is there the least responsi- 
bility of the members of any one state to the liCgislature or people of any other 
state. They are, as far as their responsibility may be concerned, solely and 
exclusively under the influence of the states and people who respectively elect 
them. Not so the President. The votes of the whole are counted in his elec- 
tion, which makes him more or less responsible to every part — to those who 
voted against him, as well as those to whom he owes his election ; which he 
must feel sensibly. If he should be an aspirant for. a re-election, he will de- 
sire to gain the favourable opinion of states that opposed him, as well as to re- 
tain that of those which voted for him. Even if he should not be a candidate 
for re-election, the desire of having a favourite elected, or maintaining the as- 
cendency of his party, may have, to a considerable extent, the same influence 
over him. The effect, in either case, would be to make him look more to the 
interest of the whole — to soften sectional feelings and asperity — to be more of a 
patriot, than the partisan of any particular interest ; and, through the influence 
of these causes, to give a more general character to the politics of the country, 
and thereby render the collision between sectional interests less fierce than it 
would be if legislation depended solely on the members of the two houses, who 
owe no responsibility but to those who elected them. The same influence acts 
even on the aspirants for the presidency, and is followed to a very considerable 
extent by the same softening and generalizing effects. In the case of the Pres- 
ident, it may lead to the interposing of his veto against oppressive and danger- 
ous sectional measures, even when supported by those to whom he owes his 
election. But, be the cause of interposing his veto what it may, its effect, in 
all cases, is to require a greater body of constituency, through the legislative 
organs, to put the government in action against it — to require another key to be 
struck, and to bring out a more full and perfect response from the voice of the 
people. 

There is still another impediment, if not to the enactment of laws, to their 
execution, to be found in the judiciary department. I refer to the right of the 
courts, in all cases coming before them in law or equity, where an act of Con- 
gress comes in question, to decide on its unconstitutionahty ; which, if decided 
against the law in the Supreme Court, is, in effect, a permanent veto. But here 
a difference must be made between a decision against the constitutionality of 



484 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOtS". 

a law of Congress and that of states. The former acts as a restriction on the 
powers of this government, but the latter as an enlargement. 

Such are the various processes of taking the sense of the people through the 
divisions and organization of the different departments of the government ; all 
of which, acting through their appropriate organs, are intended to widen its basis, 
and render it more popular, instead of less, by increasing the number necessary 
to put it in action, and having for their object to prevent one portion of the com- 
munity from aggrandizing or enriching itself at the expense of the other, and to 
restrict the whole to the sphere intended by the framers of the Constitution. 
Has it effected these objects ? Has it prevented oppressioti and usurpation on 
the part of the government ? Has it accomplished the objects for which the 
government was ordained, as enumerated in the preamble of the Constitution ? 
Much, very much, certainly, has been done, but not all. IMany instances might 
be enumerated, in the history of the government, of the violation of the Consti- 
tution — of the assumption of powers not delegated to it — of the perversion of 
those delegated to uses never intended — and of their being wielded by the 
dominant interest, for the time, for its aggrandizement, at the expense of the 
rest of the community — instances that may be found in eveiy period of its ex- 
istence, from the earliest to the latest, beginning with the bank and bank con- 
nexion at its outset, and ending with the Distribution Act, at its late extraordi- 
nary session. How is this to be accounted for ? What is the cause ? 

The explanation and cause will be found in the fact that, as fully as the sense 
of the people is taken in the action of the government, it is not taken fully 
enough. For, after all that has been accomplished in that respect, there are 
but two organs through which the voice of the community acts directly on the 
government, and which, taken separately, or in combination, constitute the ele- 
ments of which it is composed : the one is the majority of the states regarded 
in their corporate character as bodies politic, which, in its simple form, consti- 
tutes the Senate ; and the other is the majority of the people of the states, of 
which, in its simple form, the House of Representatives is composed. These, 
combined in the proportions already stated, constitute the executive department ; 
and that department and the Senate appoint the judges who constitute the judi- 
ciary. But it is only in their simple form in the Senate and the other house 
that they have a steady and habitual control over the legislative acts of the 
government. The veto of the executive is rarely interposed — not more than 
about twenty times during the period of more than fifty years that the goveni- 
ment has existed. Their effects have been beneficially felt, but only casually, 
at long intervals, and without steady and habitual influence over the action of 
the government. The same remarks are substantially applicable to what, for 
the sake of brevity, may be called the veto of the judiciary ; the right of nega- 
tiving a law for the want of constitutionality, when it comes in question, in a 
case before the courts. 

The government, then, of the Union being under no other habitual and steady 
control but these two majorities, acting through this and the other house, is, in 
fact, placed substantially under the control of the portion of the community 
which the united majorities of the two houses represent for the time, and which 
may consist of but fourteen states, with a federal population of less than ten 
millions against a little more than six, as has been already explained. But, as 
large as is the former, and as small as is the latter, the one is not large enough, 
in proportion, to prevent it from plundering, under the forms of law, and the 
other small enough from being plundered ; and hence the many instances ol 
violation of the Constitution, of usurpation, of powers perverted and wielded for 
selfish purposes, which the history of the government affords. They furnish 
proof conclusive that the principle of plunder, so deeply implanted in all gov- 
ernments, has not been eradicated in ours by all the precaution taken by its 
framers against it. 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 485 

But in estimating the number of the constituency necessary to control the ma- 
jority in the two liouses of Congress at something less than ten miUiuns, I have 
estimated it aUogether too liigli, regarding the practical operation of the govern- 
ment. To form a correct conception of its practical operation in this respect, 
another element, which has in practice an important influence, must be taken 
into the estimate, and which I shall next proceed to explain. 

Of the two majorities, which, acting either separately or in combination, con- 
trol the government, the numerical majority is by far the most influential. It 
has the exclusive control in the House of Representatives, and preponderates 
more than Ave to one in the choice of the President, assuming that the ratio of 
representation will be fixed at sixty-eight thousand under the late census. It 
also greatly preponderates in appointment of the judges, the right of nominating 
having much greater influence in making appointments than that of advising 
and consenting. From these facts, it must be apparent that the leaning of the 
President will be to that element of power to which he mainly owes his eleva- 
tion, and on which he must principally rely to secure his re-election, or main- 
tain the ascendency of the party and its policy, the head of which he usually is. 
This leaning of his must have a powerful effect on the inclination and tendency 
of the whole government. In his hands are placed, substantially, all the hon- 
ours and emoluments of the government; and these, when greatly increased, as 
they are, and ever must be when the powers of the government are greatly 
stretched and increased, must give the President a corresponding influence over 
not only the members of both houses, but also public opinion, and, through 
that, a still more powerful indirect influence over them ; and thus they may be 
brought to sustain or oppose, through his influence, measures which otherwise 
they would have opposed or sustained, and the whole government be made to 
lean in the same direction with the executive. 

From these causes, the government, in all of its departments, gravitates steadi- 
ly towards the numerical majority, and has been moving slowly towards it from 
the beginning ; sometimes, indeed, retarded, or even stopped or thrown back, 
but, taking any considerable period of time, always advancing towards it. That 
it begins to make near approach to that fatal point, ample proof may be found 
in the oft-repeated declaration of the mover of this resolution, and of many of 
his supporters at the extraordinary session — that the late pesidential electiou 
decided all the great measures which he so ardently pressed through the Sen- 
ate. Yes, even here, in this chamber, in the Senate, which is composed of the 
opposing element, and on which the only effectual resistance to this fatal ten- 
dency exists that is to be found in the government, we are told that the popular 
will, as expressed in the presidential election, is to decide not oidy the elec- 
tion, but every measure which may be agitated in the canvass in order to influ- 
ence the result. When what was thus boldly insisted on comes to be an es- 
tablished principle of action, the end will be near. 

As the government approaches nearer and nearer to the one absolute and single 
power, the will of the greater number, its action will become more and more 
disturbed and irregular ; faction, corruption, and anarchy will more and more 
abound ; patriotism will daily decay, and affection and reverence for the gov- 
ernment grow weaker and weaker, until the flnal shock occurs, when the system 
will rush to ruin, and the sword take the place of law and Constitution. 

Let me not be misunderstood. I object not to that structure of the govern- 
ment which makes the numerical majority the predominant element : it is, per- 
haps, necessary that it should be so in all popular constitutional governments 
like ours, which excludes classes. It is necessarily the exponent of the strong- 
est interest, or combination of interests, in the community ; and it would seem 
to be necessary to give it the preponderance, in order to infuse into the govern- 
ment the necessary energy to accomplish the ends for which it was instituted. 
The great question is, How is due preponderance to be given to it, without sub- 



486 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUJf. 

jecting the whole, in time, to its unlimited sway ? Which brings up the ques- 
tion, Is there anywhere in our complex system of government, a guard, check, 
or contrivance, sufficiently strong to arrest so fearful a tendency of the govern- 
ment ? Or, to express it in more direct and intelligible language, Is there any- 
where in the system a more full and perfect expression of the voice of the peo- 
ple of the states calculated to counteract this tendency to the concentration of 
all the powers of the government in the will of the numerical majority, resulting 
from the partial and imperfect expression of their voice through its organs ? 

Yes, fortunately, doubly fortunately, there is ; not only a more full and per- 
fect, but a full and perfect expression to be found in the Constitution, acknowl- 
edged by all to be the fundamental and supreme law of the land. It is full 
and perfect, because it is the expression of the voice of each state, adopted by 
the separate assent of each, by itself, and for itself; and is the voice of all, by 
being that of each component part, united and blended into one harmonious 
whole. But it is not only full and perfect, but as just as it is full and perfect ; 
for, combining the sense of each, and therefore all, there is nothing left on 
which injustice, or oppression, or usurpation can operate. And, finally, it is as 
supreme as it is just ; because, comprehending the will of all, by uniting that 
of each of the parts, there is nothing within or above to control it. It is, in- 
deed, the vox populi iwx Dei — the creating voice that called the system into 
existence, and of which the government itself is but a creature, clothed with 
delegated powers to execute its high behests. 

We are thus brought to a question of the deepest import, and on which the 
fate of the system depends. How can this full, perfect, just, and supreme 
voice of the people, imbodied in the Constitution, be brought to bear habitually 
and steadily in counteracting the fatal tendency of the government to the abso- 
lute and despotic control of the numerical majority ? Or — if I may be permit- 
ted to use so bold an expression — How is this, the deity of our political system, 
to be successfully invoked, to interpose its all-powerful creating voice to save 
from perdition the creature of its will and the work of its hand ? If it cannot 
be done, ours, like all free governments preceding it, must go the way of nil 
flesh ; but if it can be, its duration may be from generation to generation, to the 
latest posterity. To this all-important question I will not attempt a reply at this 
time. It would lead me far beyond the limits properly belonging to this discus- 
sion. I descend from the digression nearer to the subject immediately at is- 
sue, in order to reply to an objection to the veto power taken by the senator 
from Virginia on this side the chamber (Mr. Archer). 

He rests his support of this resolution on the ground that the object intended 
to be effected by the veto has failed ; that the framers of the Constitution regarded 
the legislative department of the government as the one most to be dreaded ; and 
that their motive for vesting the executive with the veto was to check its en- 
croachments on the other departments ; but that the executive, and not the 
Legislature, had proved to be the most dangerous ; and that the veto had become 
either useless or mischievous, by being converted into a sword to attack, instead 
of a shield to defend, as was originally intended. 

I make no issue with the senator as to the correctness of his statement. I 
assume the facts to be as he supposes ; not because I agree with him, but sim- 
ply with the view of making my reply more brief. 

Assuming, then, that the executive department has proved to be the more 
formidable, and that it requires to be checked rather than to have the power of 
checking others, the first inquiry, on that assumption, should be into the cause 
of its increase of power, in order to ascertain the seat and the nature of the dan- 
ger ; and the next, whether the measure proposed — that of divesting it of the 
veto, or modifying it as proposed — would guard against the danger apprehended. 

1 begin with the first ; and in entering on it, assert with confidence, that if 
the executive has become formidable to the liberty or safety of the country, or 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 4S7 

Other departments of the government, the cause is not in the Constitution, but 
in the acts and omissions of Congress itself. 

According to my conception, the powers vested in the President by the Con- 
stitution are few and effectually guarded, and are not of themselves at all formi- 
dable. In order to have a just conception of the extent of his powers, it must 
be borne in mind that there are but two classes of power known to the Consti- 
tution ; and they are powers that are expressly granted, and those that are ne- 
cessary to carry the granted powers info execution. Now, by a positive pro- 
vision of the Constitution, all powers necessary to the execution of the granted 
powers are expressly delegated to Congress, be they powers granted to the 
legislative, executive, or judicial department ; and can only be exercised by the 
authority of Congress, and in the manner prescribed by law. This provision 
will be found in what is called the residuary clause, which declares that Con- 
gress shall have power " to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper 
to carry into execution the foregoing powers" (those granted to Congress), 
*' and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the 
United States, or in any department or officer thereof." A more comprehensive 
provision cannot be imagined. It carries with it all powers necessary and 
proper to the execution of the granted powers, be they lodged where they may, 
and vests the whole, in terms not less explicit, in Congress ; and here let me 
add, in passing, that the provision is as wise as it is comprehensive. It depos- 
ites the right of deciding what powers are necessary for the execution of the 
granted powers where, and where only, it can be lodged with safety — in the 
hands of the law-making power ; and forbids any department or officer of the 
government from exercising any power not expressly authorized by the Con- 
stitution or the laws, thus making ours emphatically a government of law and 
Constitution. 

Having now shown that the President is restricted by the Constitution to 
powers expressly granted to him, and that if any of his granted powers be such 
that they require other powers to execute them, he cannot exercise them with- 
out the authority of Congress, I shall now show that there is not one power 
vested in him that is any way dangerous, unless made so by the acts or per- 
mission of Congress. I shall take them in the order they stand in the Consti- 
tution. 

He is, in the first place, made commander-in-chief of the army and navy of 
the United States, and the militia when called into actual service. Large and 
expensive military and naval establishments, and numerous corps of militia, 
called into service, would, no doubt, increase very dangerously the power and 
patronage of the President ; but neither can take place but by the action of 
Congress. Not a soldier can be enlisted, a ship of war built, nor a militiaman 
called into service, without its authority ; and, very fortunately, our situation is 
such that there is no necessity, and probably will be none, why his power and 
patronage should be dangerously increased by either of those means. 

He is next vested with the power to make treaties and to appoint officers, 
with the advice and consent of the Senate ; and here, again, his power can only 
be made dangerous by the action of one or both houses of Congress. In the 
formation of treaties, two thirds of the Senate must concur ; and it is difficult 
to conceive of a treaty that could materially enlarge his powers, that would not 
require an act of Congress to carry it into effect. The appointing power may, 
indeed, dangerously increase his patronage, if officers be uselessly multiplied 
and too highly paid ; but if such should be the case, the fault would be in Con- 
gress, by whose authority exclusively they can be created or their compensa- 
tion regulated. 

But much is said in this connexion of the power of removal, justly accompa- 
nied by severe condemnation of the many and abusive instances of the use of 
the power, and the dangerous influence it gives the President ; in all of which 



4S8 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

I fully concur. It is, indeed, a corrupting and dangerous power, when officers 
are greatly multiplied and highly paid, and when it is perverted from its legiti- 
mate object to the advancement of personal or party purposes. But 1 find no 
such power in the list of powers granted to the executive, which is proof con- 
clusive that it belongs to the class necessarj^ and proper to execute some other 
power, if it exists at all, which none can doubt ; and, for reasons already as- 
signed, cannot be exercised without authority of law. If, then, it hag been 
abused, it must be because Congress has not done its duty in permitting it to 
be exercised by the President without the sanction of law authorizing its exer- 
cise, and guarding against the abuses to which it is so liable. 

The residue of the list are rather duties than rights — that of recommending 
to Congress such measures as he may deem expedient ; of convening both 
houses on extraordinary occasions ; of adjourning them when they cannot agree 
on the time ; of receiving ambassadors and other ministers ; of taking care that 
the laws be faithfully executed, and commissioning the officers of the United 
States. Of all these, there is but one which claims particular notice, in connex- 
ion with the point immediately under consideration ; and that is, his power as 
the administrator of the laws. But whatever power he may have in that capa- 
city depends on the action of Congress. If Congress should limit its legisla- 
tion to the few great subjects confided to it ; so frame its laws as to leave as 
little as possible to discretion, and take care to see that they are duly and faith- 
fully executed, the administrative powers of the President would be proportion- 
ally limited, and divested of all danger. But if, on the contrary, it should ex- 
tend its legislation in every direction ; draw within its action subjects never 
contemplated by the Constitution ; multiply its acts, create numerous offices, 
and increase the revenue and expenditures proportionally, and, at the same 
time, frame its laws vaguely and loosely, and withdraw, in a great measure, its 
supervising care over their execution, his power would indeed become truly 
formidable and alarming. Now I appeal to the senator and his friend, the au- 
thor of this resolution, whether the growth of executive power has not been the 
result of such a course on the part of Congress. I ask them whether his pow- 
er has not, in fact, increased or decreased just in proportion to the increase 
and decrease of the system of legislation, such as has been described ? What 
was the period of its maximujn increase, but the very period which they have 
so frequently and loudly denounced as the one most distinguished for the prev- 
alence of executive power and usurpation ? Much of that power certainly de- 
pended on the remarkable man then at the head of that department ; but much 
— far more — on the system of legislation which the author of this resolution 
had built up with so much zeal and labour, and which carried the powers of 
the government to a point beyond that to which it had ever before attained, 
drawing many and important powers into its vortex, of which the framers of the 
Constitution never dreamed. And here let me say to both of the senators, and 
the party of which they are prominent members, that they labour in vain to 
bring down executive power, while they support the system they so zealously 
advocate. The power they complain of is but its necessary fruit. Be assured 
that, as certain as Congress transcends its assigned limits, and usurps powers 
never conferred, or stretches those conferred beyond the proper limits, so sure- 
ly will the fruits of its usurpation pass into the hands of the executive. In 
seeking to become master, it but makes a master in the person of the President. 
It is only by confining itself to its allotted sphere, and a discreet use of its ac- 
knowledged powers, that it can retain that ascendency in the government which 
the Constitution intended to confer on it. 

Having now pointed out the cause of the great increase of the executive 
power on which the senator rested his objection to the veto power, and having 
satisfactorily shown, as I trust I have, that, if it has proved dangerous in fact, 
the fault is not in the Constitution, but in Congress, I would next ask hira, la 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 489 

what possible way coulJ the divesting the President of his veto, or modifying 
it as he proposes, limit his power 1 Is it not clear that, so far from the veto 
being the cause of the increase of his power, it would have acted as a limita- 
tion on it if it had been more freely and frequently used ? If the President had 
vetoed the original Bank— the connexion with the banking system— the tanfTs 
of 1824 and '^1828, and the numerous acts appropriating money for roads, 
canals, harbours, and a long list of other measures not less unconstitutional, 
would 'his power have been half as great as it now is ? He has grown great 
and powerful, not because he used his veto, but because he abslaincd from usmg 
it. In fact, it is difficult to imagine a case in which its application can tend to 
enlarge his power, except it be the case of an act intended to repeal a law 
calcutated to increase his power, or to restore the authority of one which, by an 
arbitrary construction of his power, he has set aside. 

Now let me add, in conclusion, that this is a question, in its bearings, of vital 
importance to that wonderful and sublime system of government which our 
patriotic ancestors established, not so much by their wisdom, wise and experi- 
enced as they were, as by the guidance of a kind Providence, who, in his di- 
vine dispensations, so disposed events as to lead to the establishment of a system 
of o-overnment wiser than those who framed it. The veto of itself, as important 
as tt is, sinks into nothing compared to the principle involved. It is but one, and 
that by no means the most considerable, of those many devices which 1 have at- 
tempted to explain, and which were intended to strengthen the popular basis 
of our government, and resist its tendency to fall under the control of the domi- 
nant interest, acting through the mere numerical majority. The introduction oi 
this resolution may be regarded as one of the many symptoms of that fatal ten- 
dency and of which we had such fearful indications in the bold attempt at the 
late extraordinary session, of forcing through a whole system of measures of the 
most threatening and alarming character, in the space of a few weeks, on the 
ground that they were all decided in the election of the late President ; thus 
attempting to substitute the will of a majority of the people, in the choice ot a 
chief magistrate, as the legislative authority of the Union, in lieu of the beauti- 
ful and profound system established by the Constitution. 



XXXIV. 

SPEECH ON MR. CLAY's RESOLUTIONS IN RELATION TO THE REVENUES 
AND EXPENDITURES OF THE GOVERNMENT, MARCH 16, 1842. 

Mr. Calhoun said : These resolutions are of a very mixed and contradictory 
character They contain much that I approve, and much that I condemn. 1 
approve of them, in the first place, because they recognise the Compromise Act, 
and profess to respect its provisions. I still more heartily approve of them be- 
cause they assert that no duty ought to be laid but for revenue, and no revenue 
raised but what may be necessary for the economical admmistration ot the gov- 
ernment, and, by consequence, abandon the protective pohcy. I very dcculecl- 
Iv approve of the prefe-rence which they give to the ad valorem over specific 
duties, and the effective argument of the senator (Mr. Clay) in support of that 
preference. And, finally, I approve of the principle that the government ought 
not to rely on loans or treasury-notes as a part of their ways and means in time 
of peace, except to meet a temporary deficit. , , x i ,\...r. ? 

Having approved of so much, it may be asked, For what do I condemn them ? 
I do it for this : that they do not propose to carry out in practice what "i^v FO- 
fess in principle ; that, while they profess to respect the Compromise Act, they 
violate it in every essential particular but one, the ad valorem principle, and 

Q Q Q 



490 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

even that, I fear, it is intended to set aside by the juggle of home vakiation. If 
there be any part of that act more sacred than another, it is that which provides 
that there shall be no duty imposed after the 30th of June next except for rev- 
enue, and no revenue raised but what may be necessary to the economical ad- 
ministration of the government. It was for that the act was passed, and with- 
out which it would not have existed. If that was not apparent on the face of 
the act itself, the causes which led to its adoption would clearly prove it. It 
is sufficient, in this connexion, to remind the Senate that the object of the act 
was to terminate the controversy between the State of South Carolina and this 
government, growing out of the tarilT of 1828. The object of the state, as far 
as it was individually concerned, was twofold — to put down the protective pol- 
icy, and to protect herself against high duties, even for revenue, when it could 
be avoided by due regard to economy. To secure the former, the provision 
was inserted that no duty should be laid but for revenue ; and the latter, that no 
revenue should be raised but what was necessary for the economical adminis- 
tration of the government. Without these provisions, I, as her representative 
on this floor, would never havei given my assent to the act ; and, if I had, the 
state would never have acquiesced in it. I speak with perfect confidence, for 
even with these important provisions, she reluctantly assented to the compromise. 

Besides these, there was another object, in which the whole Union was deep- 
ly concerned, which influenced her in the step she then took ; and that was to 
guard against the dangerous consequences of an accumulation of a large surplus 
revenue in the treasury after the payment of the public debt. While defending her- 
self, and the portion of the Union in which her lot is cast, against an unconstitu- 
tional and oppressive measure, she was not unmindful of her Federal duties and 
obligations, nor did she permit her fidelity to the Union and the government to be 
impaired in her resistance to oppression. She had the sagacity to see, long in 
advance, the corrupting and dangerous consequences of a large and permanent 
surplus, of which experience has since given such calamitous evidence ; and has 
the merit of taking the most intrepid stand against it, while others were unheed- 
ing, or indifi'erent to consequences. To guard against this danger, every article 
imported that did not come in conflict wUh the protective policy was made, by the 
Compromise Act, duty free to the 30th of June next, which, in the aggregate, 
equalled in value those on which the duties were retained ; that is, one half 
the duties were forthwith repealed ; but to prevent the possibility of abuse, and 
to guard in the most eftectual manner the two leading provisions of the act, it 
was expressly provided that, after that time, all articles of imports, except a 
small list contained in the 5th section, should be subject to duty, and that no 
duty should thereafter exceed 20 per cent, ad valorem. The intention of the 
former provision was to prevent the enlargement of the free list, and thereby 
raising the duties proportionally higher on the dutied articles ; and of the latter, 
that, under no pretext whatever, for protection or revenue, should duties be rais- 
ed above 20 per cent., which was regarded as the extreme limits to which they 
ought ever to be carried for revenue. These were the guards on which 1 re- 
lied to prevent a return to the protective policy, or the raising of the revenue 
beyond what the necessary and economical wants of the government might re- 
quire ; and which, if they should be respected, will prove all-sufiicient for the 
purpose intended. 

Having secured these essential points, as far as the state and the Union at 
large were concerned, the next object was so to reduce the duties on the pro- 
tected articles as to prevent any shock to the manufacturing interests. The 
state waged no war against them. Her opposition was to the unconstitutional 
and oppressive means by which it was sought to promote them at the expense 
of the other great interests of the community. She wished the manufacturers 
well ; and, in proposing to bring down the duties gradually, through a slow pro- 
cess of many years, to the revenue point, I but faithfully represented her feel- 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 491 

ings. My first proposition was to allow seven years, and to take one seventh 
annually ofl'; but, finally, I acquiesced in extending the time two years more, 
and to reduce the duties as provided for by the act. So far from being an op- 
ponent to manufacturing industry, there is not one within the reach of my voice 
who puts a higher estimate on those arts, mechanical and chemical, by which 
matter is subjected to the dominion of mind. I regard them as the very basis 
of civilization, and the principal means designed by Providence for the future 
progress and improvement of our race. They will be found in progress to re- 
act on the moral and political world, and thereby producing greater and more 
salutary changes in both than all other causes combined. 

Such are the leading objects of the Compromise Act. It is admitted, on all 
hands, that the provisions in favour of the manufacturing interests have been 
faithfully observed on our part. We have patiently waited the nine years of 
slow reduction, and resisted every attempt to make changes against the manu- 
facturing interest, even when they would have operated in our favour, and for 
which we have received the thanks of those who represented it on this floor. 
And now, when the time has arrived when it is our turn to enjoy its benefits, 
they who called on us to adhere to the act when the interest of the manufac- 
turers was at stake, and commended us for ouii fidelity to the compromise, turn 
round, when it suits their interest, and coolly and openly violate every provis- 
ion in our favour, with the single exception already noticed, as I shall next pro- 
ceed to show. 

For that purpose it will be necessary to go back to the extraordinary session, 
for then the violation commenced. Going, then, back, and passing over minor 
points, I charge upon the senator and his friends, in the first place, a palpable 
infraction of the compromise, in raising the duties without making the least ef- 
fort to reduce the expenditures of the government to what was necessary to its 
economical administration. The act is positive, that no more revenue should 
be raised than what such administration might require : a provision just as es- 
sential as that which requires that no duty should be imposed but for revenue. 
Acting, then, in the spirit of the act, the first step towards a revision of the du- 
ties should have been to ascertain what amount of revenue would be required 
for the economical administration of the government. Was that done ? No- 
thing like it ; but the very reverse. Not an effort was made to ascertain what 
the wants of the treasury required — not one to reduce the expenditures, although 
the senator and his party had come in on a solemn pledge to make a great re- 
duction. Instead of that, every effort was made to increase the expenditures 
and add to the loans, forgetful alike of the compromise and pledges to the peo- 
ple, and, at the same time, to reduce the revenue by giving away the income from 
the lands, with the intention of increasing the duties on the imports. 

The next charge I make is, a great enlargement of the list of free articles by 
the act increasing the duties, passed at the same session, in direct violation of 
the fifth section of the Compromise Act. Foreseeing that the protective system 
might again be renewed, and high duties imposed, simply by extending the list 
of free articles, and throwing the whole burden of supporting the government 
on the articles selected for protection, that section enumerates a short list of 
articles which should be duty free after the 30th of June next, and provided that 
all which were not enumerated should be subject to duties after that period, in 
order to guard against such abuses. In the face of this provision, the act al- 
luded to increased the list of free articles manifold, taking the amount stated by 
the senator, as contained in that list, to be correct. 

Such were the infractions of the act during that session ; and it is now pro- 
posed by these resolutions to give the finishing blow by rai-sing the duties, on 
an average, to 30 per centum on all articles not made free, in express violation 
of the main provision in the compromise, that no duty should be laid above 20 
per cent, after the 30th of June next. The senator admits this to be an infrac- 



492 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

tion, but pleads necessity. Now, sir, I admit, if there be indeed a necessity — 
if, after reducing the expenditures of the government to its just and economical 
w^iflts, and the list of free articles to that provided for in the act, and returning 
the revenue from the lancTs to the treasury, there should be a deficit which could 
not be met without going beyond the 20 per cent., a case would be made that 
might justify it. But I utterly deny, in the first place, that, if all had been done 
that ought to have been, there would be any such necessity ; and, in the next, 
the right to plead a necessity of his own creating. I go farther, and call on 
hiin to explain how he can, in fairness or honour, after what occurred at the ex- 
traordinary session, propose, as he has in these resolutions, to repeal the pro- 
vision in the Distribution Act which makes it void if the duties should be raised 
above 20 per cent. It is well known to all that it could not have passed with- 
out the insertion of that provision, and that on its passage depended that of the 
Bankrupt Bill. Now I ask him how, after having secured the passage of two 
such important measures, can he reconcile it with what is fair or honourable, to 
turn round and propose to repeal the very provision by which their passage was 
effected ? 

But the senator denies that the necessity is of his creating, and insists that, 
if the revenue from the land were restored, rigid economy enforced, and all the 
provisions of the compromise respected, there would not be sufficient income to 
meet the necessary and economical wants of the government. I take issue with 
him on the fact, and shall now proceed to show that, even on his own data, 
there would be ample revenue without raising the duties above 20 per cent. 

According to the estimates of the senator, the whole amount of appropriations, 
excluding public debt, required for the service of the year, permanent and cur- 
rent, under the various heads of civil list and miscellaneous, army and navy in 
all their branches, is twenty millions five hundred thousand dollars. To which 
he adds for other appropriations, not included in these, one million five hundred 
thousand dollars, which can mean nothing but contingent, unforeseen expendi- 
tures, and for the debt, two millions of dollars ; making, in the aggregate, twenty- 
four millions of dollars. To this he proposes to add two millions more annual- 
ly, as a reserved fund to meet contingencies ; to which I object, on the ground 
that the object is already provided for by the one million five hundred thousand dol- 
lars for appropriations not included in the twenty millions five hundred thousand. 
There can be no demand on the treasury but through appropriations, and there 
can be no meaning attached to contingent appropriations but such unforeseen ex- 
penditures as are not usually included under the various heads of civil list, mis- 
cellaneous, army, and nav)'. The senator has clearly attempted to make a dis- 
tinction that does not exist, and, in consequence, made a double provision for 
the same object. Of the two, I take the less sum, as I regard it ample as a 
permanent contingent fund, which will make his estimate for the year, thus cor- 
rected, to be twenty-four millions of dollars — a sum surely amply large. 

Let us now turn to the ways and means to meet this large demand on the 
treasury. The first item is the revenue from the land, which ought to yield, 
under proper management, an average of at least three millions five hundred 
thousand dollars for the next five years, and which would reduce the amount to 
be provided for from the imposts to twenty millions five hundred thousand dollars. 
From this there ought to be deducted at least five hundred thousand dollars from 
the saving that may be made in the collection of the customs, which the sen- 
ator estimates at one million six hundred thousand. I find, taking a series of 
years, under the tariff of 1828, with its exorbitant duties, and the consequent 
great increase of expenditures to guard against smuggling and frauds, that the 
collection of about an equal sum cost 4i per cent. Allowing the same rate un- 
der the more simple and moderate system of duties, according even to the 
scheme of the senator, and the cost of collection, instead of the sum proposed, 
would be about eight hundred and fifty thousand dollars, making a difference 



SPEECHES OP JOHN C. CALHOl'N, 493 

of seven hundred and fifty thousand ; but, for the facility of counting, and to be 
liberal, I allow but half a million for saving. That would reduce the sum tc 
be provided for by duties to twenty millions of dollars ; and the next question 
is, What rate of duty will be necessary to meet that amount ? 

Here, again, I take the estimate of the senator as the basis of my calcu- 
lation. He bases his estimates of the imports on the probable amount (»f the 
exports, adding fifteen per cent, to the former for the profits of freight and trade. 
On this basis he estimates the probable amoimt of imports at one hundred and 
nineteen millions of dollars, a sum probably too low, taking the average of the 
next five years, provided the duties shall be moderate, and no adverse unfore- 
seen cause should intervene. From this sum he deducted ten millions to meet 
the interest abroad, on account of the debts of the states : a sum, for the reason 
assigned by the senator from New-Hampshire behind me, too large, at least by 
three millions of dollars. Deduct seven millions on that account, and there 
"would be left one hundred and twelve millions. The senator next deducted 
eighteen millions for articles made free by the act of the extra session, not in- 
cluding coftee and tea, which he estimates at twelve millions. I cannot assent 
to the deduction to the extent stated, as it is clearly against the provisions of 
the Compromise Act, as beyond the permanent free list provided for by that act. 
What would be the amount within its limits I have not been able to ascertain ; 
but on the best data I have been able to obtain, I would not suppose that it 
would much, if any, exceed three millions five hundred thousand dollars, not in- 
cluding gold and silver. I exclude them because they are constantly flowing 
in and out, according to the demands of trade, the imports of one year becoming 
the exports of the next, and the reverse, except the small amount that may be 
permanently added to the circulation or be used in the country. The sum of 
three millions five hundred thousand dollars deducted from the hundred and 
twelve millions would leave, on the data assumed, a hundred and eight millions 
five hundred thousand as the probable annual amount of dutiable articles that 
would be imported for home consumption. Twenty per cent, on that sum 
would give twenty-one millions seven hundred thousand dollars, a sum ample to 
meet the amount estimated, and cover the necessary expenses of collection, and 
pay the bounties and premiums properly chargeable on the treasury. 

But, in making these calculations, I by no means wish to be understood as 
acquiescing in the estimates which the senator has made of what ought to be 
the expenditures of the government. I hold them much too high. With an 
efficient system of administration, actuated by a true spirit of economy, seven- 
teen millions would be ample to meet all expenses, without impairing the effi- 
ciency of the government, as I have shown on a former occasion ; to raise 
which, an average duty of twelve or fifteen per cent., instead of twenty, would, 
with the aid of the revenue from the lands, be abundantly sufficient. 

Having now shown that, while the senator professes to respect the compro- 
mise, he "has in fact violated, or proposes to violate, all the essential provisions 
of the act, and that his plea of necessity for the proposing to raise the duties 
above the twenty per cent, utterly fails him, it may be asked. How is this con- 
tradiction in his course to be explained ? Is he deluded, or does he intend to 
delude others 1 To suppose the latter would impeach his sincerity, which I 
do not intend to question. But how is delusion to be accounted for ? It re- 
sults from his position. 

He is a tariff man, decidedly opposed to free trade. We have his own au- 
thority for the assertion. According to his views, free trade is among the 
greatest curses that could befall the country, and a high protective tarifl" among 
the greatest blessings. AVhile he thus thinks and feels, circumstances, not ne- 
cessary to be explained, have placed him in such relation to the Compromise 
Act, thcit he is sincerely desirous of respecting its provisions ; but the misfor- 
tune is, that his respect for it is not compatible Avith his strong attachment to 



'^94 SPEECHES OP JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

bis long-cherished system of policy. There is no estimating the force of self 

delusion in a position so contradictory, of which the course of the senator!" 

this occasion furnishes a striking illustration Pnt^.t. t, ^^^^^^^ on 

does, it IS natural that he should desii. o :' "outl pr ^ "^ 

xve notions on one side and opposition to fr7e trld" on e other forlsht 

be wondered at that his respect for the Compromise Act shonM h.,' li 

far as they stand in the way of his favni.ritP lil ?, . *° >''^^^ ^« 

ded himself that the experLen ta^^e c wfs ^ ' iTf "rf^ '' ^' ^'' P^^^"^' 

.™e ,ha. ab„>,t one l.alf of .^:t:LZs7:^:Zt\:yT.:Z 1 le 'e'sf 
due and they the most tntportant, but a small reduction of dml;^ comnarativelv 
speaking, was made prior to the 1st of January last Ti Ithln "^ j , '^ 
most of the articles was at a hi»h protective me R„, lit j 1"-' ™ 
have had free trade, I equally dInyTarr r'el c.ion'thi Vastln'!:: 
has in any degree impaired the productive energies of the countrv „r r„'^ l 

four years owmg to the vast extent of loans contracted abroad by t^anv of h^ 

& s ■ Nort'al; rtriPfTr"^ '^"'""' ■" ■"=-•'-<'- of v^lt, i *; 

he t,. „f ^1 J ■ "^ *'' <='>"yi"g M-ade, because it is little aflected bv 

intttf r;r„pt;:d'aT.iS:r'^ '-""■''' - '"^ -"^^^ -^ "--^-^^ - --^p- 

In order to have a full and satisfactory view of the relative effects of increas 

"utte aZf t rf iTr °; °" ^^p"" "'"'• ' >"'- -rangedi:. .irrth; 

^eTnfea^r'Cn'nitti risers: fi?t°"'' '"^f "\"--"f-...res, for s... 
fessedlv for r,r„,r, 1 J J ' . , ' >"'"' ""'''"' '•>« '''■s' larift' laid pro- 

of e.Vkyearstcl'^he"^ ?"''";^ "ith 1840, divided into two equal perfods 
of thftw^pot:: ; ar /s ofTsllfa^d isof ■ ^tn'''^'"''") *° •'^™'' 

since the commencement of the reduction. I have extended the first ^o 1 Aq' 

Te:ZT^V^sl '^TTf'''^ ^"^^^^ ^" coffee!": tdtm'e'trerS 
considerableL^d ' T "^' "' ^ reference to the table will show, gave a 

considerable impulse to our export trade in 1831 and 1832, and a corresponding 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 495 

increase of tlie exports to the period of high protective duties, which fairly be- 
longs to that of reduction. Tlie great reduction took place in March, 1833, un- 
der the Compromise Act, and with that year, accordingly, I commence the pe- 
riod of reduction, to the effects of which the senator attributes such disastrous 
results to the industry of the country. With these remarks I shall now pro- 
ceed to compare the two periods, in order to ascertain how far facts will sus- 
tain or refute his bold declamatory assertions. 

The aggregate amount of the value of the exports, in the first series of years, 
from 1824 to 1833, the period when the protective policy was in its greatest 
vigour, was $469,198,564, making an average of $57,399,945 per annum, 
throughout the period ; while the aggregate amount of value in the last, the 
period of reduction under the compromise, was $768,352,365, giving an aver- 
age of $96,442,795, and making an aggregate gain, in the period of reduc- 
tion, over that of protection, of $299,174,791, and an average annual gain of 
$38,646,855, being rather more than 65 per cent, on the average of the former 
period : an increase without example in any former period of the history of our 
commerce. This vast increase has had a corresponding effect on our tonnage 
in the foreign and coasting trade, as will appear by reference to table B, which 
contains a statement of our tonnage for the two periods. The aggregate 
amount of the foreign tonnage at the close of the first period was, in the foreign, 
686,989, and the coasting, 752,456 tons, making the aggregate 1,439,450 tons, 
against the last, in the foreign trade, of 896,646, and the coasting, 1,230,999; 
making, in the aggregate, 2,180,763, and an increase during the period of re- 
duction of duties, over that of protection, of 741,303 tons; while, during the 
first, there was an actual falling off in the tonnage, as the table will show. 

But it will no doubt be objected, that this mighty impulse from reduction, 
which has so vastly increased our exports and tonnage, was confined to the 
great agricultural staples ; and that the eflects will be found to be the reverse 
on the manufacturing industry of the country. The very opposite is the fact ; 
so far from falling off, it is the very branch of our exports that has received the 
greatest impulse, as will be apparent by reference to table C, in which the ex- 
ports in value of domestic manufactures are arranged in tabular form, divided 
into the same periods. It will appear, by reference to it, that the whole value 
of the exports of domestic manufactures, during the period of high protective 
duties, was but $43,180,755. So far from increasing, there was an actual fall- 
ing off, comparing the last with the first year of the series, of $505,633. Now 
turn to the period of reduction of duties, and mark the contrast. Instead of 
fallino- off, the exports increased to $65,917,018 during the period ; and, com- 
paring the last year of the series with the last of that of high protective duties, 
the increase will be found to be $7,798,207, greater than the former year by 
nearly three millions of dollars. This vast increase of the exports of domestic 
manufactures, even beyond the other branches of exports, is attributable mainly 
to the fact that a large portion of the articles for which they were exchanged 
were made duty free during the period under the compromise, while the greater 
part of those for which the great agricultural staples were exchanged were still 
subject to high duties. 

But it has been said that this vast increase has resulted from the embarrassed 
state of the home market, which forced the manufacturers to go abroad to find 
purchasers, and that it is rather an evidence of their depression than their 
prosperity. To test the truth of this objection, I propose to select the manufac- 
ture of cotton, which furnishes the largest item in the exports of domestic manu- 
factures, and shall show conclusively that the increase of exports under the re- 
duction of duties, so far from being produced by the cause assigned, is but the 
natural result of the healthy and flourishing condition of that important branch 
of our industry. I shall go to its headquarters, Lowell and Boston, for my 
proof, as affording the best possible evidence of its actual condition throughout 



496 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

the manufacturing region. I shall begin at the former place, and, in the absence 
of all official documents, shall draw from a highly respectable source, the writer 
of the money articles in the New-York Herald, who appears to have drawn 
from some authentic source, if we may judge from the minuteness of his state- 
ment. 

According to his statement, the entire amount of cotton goods made at Low- 
ell, in 1839, was 58,263,400 yards ; and in 1840, 73,853,400 yards ; making an 
increase, in a single year, of 15,590,000 yards, more than 25 per cent, on the 
entire growth in that branch in that flourishing town, from its foundation to the 
beginning of the year 1840 ! But as great as that is, it is not equal, in propor- 
tion, to the quantity of the raw article consumed, which in the former year was 
19,258,600 pounds, and the latter 28,764,000 — increase 9,509,600— more than 
50 per cent, in one year, on the entire increase of the consumption, up to the 
commencement of the year! What makes it the more striking, is the fact that 
this great increase took place under a very great fall of price, averaging fully 
22 per cent. ; but, notwithstanding this great fall, the aggregate gain from the 
fall in the price of the raw material and extension of the operations exceeded 
that of 1839 by $195,922 ; affording conclusive proof that lovv^ prices and in- 
creased gain may be reconciled in manufacturing industry. 

But it may be said that the gain is not in proportion to the extension of the 
operation, and that, so far from indicating a prosperous condition, it is indicative 
of the reverse. To this I reply, that if the fact be as supposed — if the year 
1840 was really a bad instead of a good year for the manufacture of cotton in 
Massachusetts and the adjacent region — the proof will be found in the falling 
off of their operations the next year. But, so far from that being the case, I 
shall show, by conclusive evidence, that their increase in 1841 exceeded all 
preceding years, if we may judge from the quantity of the raw material requi- 
red, than which there can be nothing safer by which to judge. 

I hold in my hand a statement of the amount of cotton imported into Boston 
from 1835 to 1840 inclusive ; and from the 1st of January, 1841, to the 25th of 
May, of the same year, being rather less than five months, taken from the Bos- 
ton Atlas, which may be regarded as good authority on the subject. Now as- 
suming, as I safely may, that the cotton imported into Boston is almost exclu- 
sively for domestic use, and is consumed by that large portion of our cotton man- 
ufacturers which draw their supply from there, we will have in the quantity 
imported very nearly the quantity consumed ; and in that consumed the extent 
of the manufacturing operations in the entire circle which draws its supplies 
from Boston. Now, what says the statement? In 1835 there were imported, 
in round numbers, into Boston, 80,000 bales ; in 1836, 82,000 ; in 1837, 82,000 ; 
in 1838,96,000; in 1839, 94,000; in 1840, 136,000; and from the 1st of Jan- 
uary to the 26th of May, 1841, 93,000 ; and for the year, as estimated by the 
editor of the Atlas, 150,000 ; almost double the consumption, as compared to 
1835, in the short space of eight years, and increasing more and more rapidly 
with the reduction of duties, and the most rapidly just as the period of the final 
great reduction is about to take place. I rejoice at all this. I rejoice, because 
it is proof conclusive of the great prosperity, up to that period, of this important 
branch of our industry ; because it is proof of the beneficial and stimulating ef- 
fect of decreasing duties ; because I see in such results that the great staple 
interest of the South, and the great manufacturing interest of the North, may be 
reconciled, and that each will find, on fair trial, their mutual interest in low du- 
ties and a sound currency, as the only safe and solid protection. This great 
and striking result is not, be assured, accidental. It comes from fixed laws, 
which only require to be known and to be acted on to give unbounded prosper- 
ity to the country. But I had almost forgotten to ask, How can this vast in- 
crease of 1841, compared with that of 1840, be reconciled with the supposed 
unproductive condition of the manufacture of cotton in the latter year ? Have 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 497 

our New-England brethren forgotten their sagacity and prudence, and gone on 
rapidly extending their operations, in spite of a decaying business ? 

But I have not yet exhausted the proof of the great and beneficial effects re- 
sulting from the reduction of the duties. It has been alleged, as a conclusive 
objection against the reduction of duties, that it would inundate the country with 
imports of foreign production, the belief of which has spread great alarm among 
the manufacturing interest of the country. I admit that the injudicious and sud- 
den reduction at the beginning of this year, and which is to take place on the 
30th of June next, may, to a considerable extent, have the temporary effect ap- 
prehended. I was opposed to throwing so great a reduction on the termination 
of the series of years of reduction fixed by the compromise, and that for the 
reason that it would have that effect. Had the reduction been equally distribu- 
ted over the whole period, as I proposed, or had the offer I made at the extra- 
ordinary session been accepted, of bringing down the duties above 20 per cent, 
on the protected articles gradually, and raising those on the free in the same 
way, the evil would have been wholly avoided ; but other counsel prevailed. 
The mischief is now done, and must be endured. It is, however, some conso- 
lation to think it will be but temporary. Low duties and a sound currency will 
prove the most effective preventive to over-importation, and the alarm, in the 
end, will prove unfounded. That reduction of duties has not been followed by 
the evil apprehended, we have strong proof in the fact that it has not been the 
case under the regular and gradual reduction provided by the compromise, quite 
down to the last great reduction. In 1839, the importation of cotton goods, 
of all descriptions, amounted in value to $13,913,393, and in 1840 to but 
$6,594,484 ; making a reduction in one year, under the increasing reduction 
of duties, of $7,408,909 ; more than equal to the whole amount of the importa- 
tion of the year ; and yet, with all these decisive proofs of their great and grow- 
ing prosperity, the cotton and other manufacturing interests are pouring in pe- 
titions day after day by thousands, crying out for relief, and asking for high 
and oppressive duties on almost every article of consumption, for their benefit, 
at the expense of the rest of the community ; and that, too, when the great sta- 
ple exporting interest, if we are to believe the members representing these pe- 
titioners on this floor, is at the same time in the most depressed and embarrass- 
ed condition. 

But it is attempted to explain these striking proofs of prosperity, which 
cannot be denied, by stating that they occurred under high protective duties, 
as only four tenths of the duties above 20 per cent, on protected articles 
had been taken ofT prior to the 1st of .January last, and that what remained was 
ample for protection ; and that it is to that, not the reduction of the duties, that 
this great increase of the manufacture of cotton is to be attributed. In reply, I 
ask, if protection, and not reduction of duties, be in fact the cause, how is it to 
be explained that so little progress was made by the cotton manufactories du- 
ring the high protective duties of the tariffs of 1824 and 1828 ? And how, that 
the progress has been more and more rapid, just in proportion as the duties have 
been reduced under the compromise, as the vast increase of the importation of 
the raw material into the port of Boston clearly indicates ? These facts prove, 
beyond controversy, that the great increase in question did not depend on the 
protective policy, but the reverse, the reduction of duties, and may be fairly 
attributed to the effect which the repeal and the reduction of duties under that 
act have had in cheapening the cost of production at home, and enlarging the mar- 
ket for the product of our labour abroad, by removing so many and such oppressive 
burdens from our foreign exchanges. 

Having now shown the relative effects of protection and reduction of duties 
on the export trade generally, and on the tonnage, foreign and coasting, and the 
manufacture and consumption of cotton, I shall now proceed to trace their com- 
parative eflTects on the three great agricultural staples, cotton, rice, and tobacco,. 

R R R 



498 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

all of which are the product of that portion of the Union which the senator and 
his friends would persuade us has sull'ered so much from the reduction of the 
duties. I shall begin with 1820 and conclude with 1840, making twenty-one 
years, which I shall divide into three equal periods of seven years each ; the 
lirst to extend to 1826 inclusive, the second to 1833 inclusive, and the last to 
1841. The first will conclude with the period which fairly represents the ef- 
fects of the high duties under the act of 1816, with one or two supplemental acts 
passed at the close of the late war ; the second, that under the protective tarifl's 
of 1824 and 1828 ; and the last, that under the compromise or reduction of du- 
ties. I have commenced the periods of protection and reduction at a little later 
period than in making out the table of exports generally, because the agricultu- 
ral staples are sold and shipped in the fiscal year subsequent to their produc- 
tion, and are not materially affected by a change of duty till the succeeding 
year. It ha*s also the advantage of being divisible into three equal parts, nearly 
coinciding with those marked and dissimilar periods of legislation in reference 
to the duties on imports. The disturbing eflects of the late war on the com- 
merce of the coimtry had in a great measure ceased at the date of the com- 
mencement of the first period. With these explanatory remarks, I shall begin 
with cotton, the leading article, and shall draw my facts from official documents, 
imless otherwise stated. 

The table marked D contains a statement of the value of the exports of cotton 
for each year during this long period, divided, as already stated, into periods of 
seven years ; by reference to which it will be seen that the aggregate value of 
the exports for the first period of seven years, from 1819 to 1826 inclusive, was 
$170,765,993. That period was one of severe contraction of the currency, fol- 
lowing the great expansion in consequence of the universal suspension of all the 
banks south of New-England, from 1813 to 1817, and was marked by great 
commercial and pecuniary embarrassment. 

The aggregate exports in value for the next period of seven years, from the 
termination of the first to 1833 inclusive, was $201,302,247 (see same table) — 
a period throughout of high protective duties, without relaxation, excepting the 
last two years, when the duties on coffee, tea, and some other articles were 
greatly reduced, and which, as will be seen by referen'te to the table, had a 
very sensible efiect in increasing the exports of those years. The increase of 
the exports in the whole of this period, compared with the former, was but 
$31,536,254, about 1| per cent., being a rate per cent, compared to the increase 
of population of about y'j only. But even this inconsiderable increase, in a pe- 
riod marked by no extraordinary vicissitude or embarrassment in the commerce 
or currency of the country, over one of severe contraction and embarrassment, 
occurred principally during the last two years of the series, after the reduction 
of the duties already alluded to, and to which it may be fairly attributed. 

The aggregate increase for the last period of seven years, from 1833, the 
year of the compromise, to 1841, was $435,300,830 (see same table) — a period 
throughout of reduction, making an increase of $233,998,583 ; equal to about 115 
per cent, compared to the aggregate value of the period of high protective tariff; 
and four times greater than the average increase of our population for the same 
period, and this for a large portion of the time of unexampled derangement of 
the currency and pecuniary and commercial embarrassment. 

I shall now pass to the next most important of our great agricultural staples, 
tobacco, referring for a detailed view to table marked E, and for explanation as 
to each period, the remarks made in reference to cotton. 

The aggregate export in value of tobacco for the first period was $43,441,509 ; 
and of the second, $39,983,570 ; being an actual falling off under the high, in- 
creased protective duties of the acts of 1824 and 1828, compared to the lower, 
but still high duties of the former period, of $3,557,899, and that, too, in the 
absence of all adverse causes except the high, oppressive duties during the pe- 
riod. 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 499 

Turn now to the period of reduction, and witness the result, notwithstanding 
all its embarrassments. The aggregate export of tobacco during tliat period 
increased to $.57,809,098 — an increase, compared to the period of protection, 
of $17,945,528, equal to about 43 per cent, on the former, and nearly double 
compared to the increase of population. And yet, with this striking fact, taken 
from official documents, there are those residing in the tobacco region who, not 
content with this vast and rapid increase, would resort to retaliatory duties on 
silks, linens, wines, and the other articles made free of duty by the Compromise 
Act, in order to increase still more the tobacco trade ; that is, they would lay 
heavy duties on the very articles, the exception of which from duties has given 
it this mighty increase, in the hopeless struggle of compelling a change in the 
long-established system of finance by which tobacco has been subject to high 
duties in the old nations of Europe. If what is aimed at could be accomplish- 
ed, it would be well, though I doubt whether it would be to the advantage of 
our tobacco trade, even if it could be done ; but if it should fail, the loss would 
be certain and incalculable to the tobacco growers. The trade would be sacri- 
ficed in the attempt. The duty already imposed, at the extra session, of 20 
per cent., will do much to cripple the trade. 

I shall next proceed to the least considerable of the three staples, rice, refer- 
ring for detailed information to the table F ; and here we have the only unfa- 
vourable result which any of the items of exports I have examined give. The 
aggregate exports of rice, in value, during the first period, were $12,334,369 ; 
and in the second, $16,308,842, showing a gain of $3,974,573 ; and in the third, 
of $15,314,739, showing a falling oft" of $994,103 in the exports, probably 
caused by the greater consumption at home, in consequence of opening the in- 
terior to its use by means of railroads and canals, and the drawing ofl' of hands 
engaged in the culture of rice to be employed in that of cotton. 

By combining the vv^hole, it will appear that the aggregate gain on the three 
staples in the second period, that of high protective duties, compared with the 
first, that of lower, but still high duties and great commercial and pecuniary 
embarrassment, deducting the falling off" on tobacco, and adding the gain on 
rice, is only $31,953,828 in seven years, on an aggregate export, during the 
first period, of $226,538,201, less than 1| per cent, for the whole period, being 
an increase, compared to that of the population for the time, of about one six- 
teenth only; while the aggregate gain of the last period (that of reduction of 
duties) on the three staples combined, deducting the loss on rice, and adding 
the gain on tobacco, is, compared to the second, that of high protective duties, 
$250,950,958 in the seven years ; being an increase greater than the whole 
amount of the aggregate exports of the preceding period, and greater than the 
ratio of the increase of population for the time, by more than 3^ to one. 

Such is the mighty impulse which (I will not say free trade, for we are 
still far from it) a reduction of duties has given to the export trade of our great 
agricultural staples, from which the commerce and navigation of the country 
derive their main support. There can be no mistake. The facts are drawn 
from oflicial sources, and do not admit of any error which can materially v«ry the 
result. 

But I admit that there is great pecuniary embarrassment and distress through- 
out the whole staple region, notwithstanding this vast increase of the produc- 
tion and value of their great staples. The fact being admitted, the question is, 
What is the cause ? The senator and his friends attribute it to the reduction 
of the duties. I deny it. The official documents deny it ; for nothing is more 
certain than that the income of the staple states, taken as a whole, never has 
been so great ; no, nothing like it in proportion to its population, as it has been 
during the period since the adoption of the compromise. Be, then, the cause 
what It may, it is certain that it is not the reduction of duties ; and that, so far 
from that, it has taken place in spite of, and not in consequence of reduction. 



500 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

What, then, is it ? I will tell you : indebtedness — universal, deep indebtedness 
of states, corporations, and individuals, followed by a forced and sudden liqui- 
dation. That is the obvious and unquestionable cau&e. And what has caused 
that ? What but a vast and long-continued expansion of the currency, which 
raised prices beyond all former rates, and which, by its delusive effects, turned 
the whole community into a body of speculators, in the eager expectation of 
amassing sudden fortunes ? And what caused this great and disastrous expan- 
sion ? The banks, combined with the high and oppressive duties imposed by 
the tariff of 1828. It was that measure, which, by its necessary operation, 
turned exchanges in favour of this country, and^ by necessary consequence, as 
I have proved on a former occasion,* caused the great expansion which follow- 
ed the passage of that act, and which, by a series of causes, explained on the 
same occasion, continued to keep exchanges either in our favour, or about par, 
to the suspension in 1837. Another powerful cause for this expansion, result- 
ing from high duties and springing from the same act, was the vast sui-plus 
revenue which it accumulated in the treasury, or rather in the banks, as its de- 
positories, and which became, in fact, bank capital in its worst and most cor- 
rupting form, and did more to overthrow them, and cause the present embar- 
rassed state of the government and the country, than all other causes combined. 
It was the proximate cause of the then suspension ; and, in turn, of their present 
ruined condition, and that of the forced liquidation under which the coimtry is 
suffering. These causes, witli the bankrupt law and the return of stocks from 
abroad, followed by a drain of specie, have produced that universal and intense 
pecuniary embarrassment and distress of which we hear such complaint. They 
belong to the banking and tariff system, and not to the reduction of duties, 
which, so far from being the cause, has done much to mitigate the evil, by the 
vast addition it has made to the income of the countr}', as has been shown. 
But, in addition to these, the great staple region, especially the cotton region 
of the Southwest, have had great and peculiar dithculties of their own. The 
rapid extinction of the Indian title to a vast and fertile territory in that quarter, 
with a climate and soil more congenial to the growth of cotton than any of the 
Atlantic states, which, in combination with the expanded state of the currency, 
led to bold and reckless speculation, on a great scale, at the highest prices in 
land and negroes, and which have overwhelmed the Southwestern States with 
debt, and, notwithstanding the vast increase of their income, have left them in 
their present embarrassed condition. 

These, I repeat, are the great causes of the distress and embarrassments of 
the staple states, and, I may add, through them, of the Union. They come not 
from free trade, as the senator would have us believe, but from his own favour- 
ite system of banks and tariffs, to which he so earnestly invites the country 
again to return. His is the stimulating treatment. The suffering patient is 
trembling in every joint, and almost ready to sink from his late debaucheries ; 
his prescription is to return again to the bottle — to drink from the same de- 
ceitful bowl, instead of honestly prescribing total abstinence as the only effect- 
ual reAedy. 

But to return to the documents, which I have not exhausted. The senator 
asserted that the price of cotton has been lower during the period of reduction 
than under his old and cherished system of protection ; and here, again, I meet 
him on the fact. In order to test the truth of his assertion, I have formed a tab- 
ular statement of the quantity and price of cotton for each year, from 1819 to 
1841, divided, as in the case of the exports, into three parts, of seven year.9 
each, corresponding with the former. The table will be found in the appendix, 
marked G. The statement from 1819 to 1836 is taken from a laborious and 
carefully-compiled report of the senator from New-Hampshire (Mr. Woodbury), 
made while he was Secretary of the Treasury, and which contains a great deal 
* Speech on the Assumption of State Debts. 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 501 

of valuable information in relation to that important staple. Tlie price for the 
remaining portions of the period is from a monthly statement of the prices of 
cotton at New-Orleans, taking the average between the highest and lowest 
price each month, and the quantity from several sources, but principally from a 
carefully-drawn statement, apparently by one well informed, and published in 
the Southern Banner. 

By reference to the table, it will be seen that the aggregate quantity produced 
in the first part of the period, from 1819 to 1826 inclusive, was 1555 millions 
of pounds ; that the average price was 15i cents per pound, and the value 
$234,675,000; and that in the second, from 1826 to 1831, the quantity was 
2530 millions of pounds, the average price 10 cents, and the value $263,387,500 ; 
showing a falling oil' in the average price of rather more than one third, and an 
aggregate increase of value of only $28,712,500 in the whole seven years. 
Now note the difference under the influence of the reduction of the duties. 
The aggregate quantity increased to 3777 millions of pounds, the price in- 
creased to an average of I3i cents per pound, and the aggregate value to 
$496,516,500, making an increase for the seven years of $223,730,000. But 
as great and striking as this result is, there is reason to believe that it is below 
the reality. Having the average price for the respective periods, and the value 
of the exports for the same, it is easy to ascertain the quantity shipped to for- 
eign countries on those data, which, if deducted from the whole quantity pro- 
duced, will give what would be left for home consumption. By applying this 
calculation to the respective periods, it will be found that in the two former pe- 
riods a considerably greater amount is left for home consumption than what 
the home market is usually estimated to require during those periods, and in 
the last considerably less. That would indicate a corresponding error either 
in the price or the quantity, in favour of the first two, against the last period ; 
which may in part be accounted for from the fact that, in making up the esti- 
mate of the price prior to 1835, the Secretary of the Treasury took the aggregate 
value, including Sea Island as well as the short staple, and which, of course, 
would considerably increase the average price of the whole, at a period when 
the former bore a larger proportion to the whole than at present. The prices in 
the table, since 1835, are taken exclusively from the short staple. But, be the 
cause what it may, it is probable, on the data already stated, the value during 
the last period, that of reduction, ought to be raised not less than twenty mill- 
ions, or those of the preceding reduced that amount. 

And here I deem it proper to notice the triumphant air with which the sena- 
tor noticed the present low price of cotton, which he asserted to be lower than 
it has been since the late war. It is indeed low, very low — too much so to 
bear the burden of high protective duties ; but as low as it is, it is not lower 
than it was in 1831, under the operation of his favourite system, and to which 
he invites us to return. But the senator seems to forget that price is not the 
only element by which the prosperity of cotton, or any other product, is to be 
estimated. Quantity is fully as important as price itself in estimating the m- 
come of those engaged in the production. Now, sir, let us take into the calcu- 
lation both these elements, in estimating the income of the cotton planters from 
the crop of 1830, sold in 1831, and that of 1841, sold this year, estimated at 
the same price, say an average of 9 cents, or any other amount. The crop of 
1830 is put down at 350 millions of pounds, which, at 9 cents, would giro 
$31,500,000; and that of 1841 estimated at one million seven hundred thou- 
sand bales, say four hundred pounds to the bale, would give 680 milUons of 
pounds, which, at nine cents, would give $61,200,000 ; making a difference of 
$29,700,000 in favour of the latter, nearly double the former. It is this great 
increase in quantity, produced under the stimulus of low duties, which, if we 
were permitted to enjoy its advantages, would add so greatly to the prosperity 
of the cotton interest. 



502 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

Such are the facts, drav/n almost exclusively from official documents, and 
such the results, proving beyond all doubt the deadening effects of high pro- 
tective duties on the productive energy^ of the country, an^ the vivifying effects 
of a reduction from duties. Proof more conclusive of the one and the other 
cannot be offered ; but it would be vain to expect it to make the slighest im- 
pression on the party which now controls the government. The leading inter- 
ests — those which control all their actions — are banks, tariffs, stocks, paper, mo- 
nopolies, and, above all, that misletoe interest which lives on the government 
itself, and flourishes most when its exactions are the greatest, and its expendi- 
tures the most profuse. High duties are the life-blood of this powerful combina- 
tion ; and be the proof of its pernicious effects on the community at large ever 
so clear — as clear as the sun at noon, it would make no impression on them. 
It is to politics, and not to political economy, they look ; and they would readily 
sacrifice the manufactures themselves to save their party and its political ascen- 
dency. But I say to them, that it is in vain you resist light and reason. The 
freedom of trade has its foundation in the deep and durable foundation of truths 
and will vindicate itself. It draws its origin from on high. It emanates from 
the Divine will, and is designed in its dispensation to perform an important part 
in binding together in concord and peace the nations of the earth, and in ex- 
tending far and wide the blessings of civilization. In fulfilment of this high de- 
sign, severe penalties are annexed to a departure from its laws. But this is 
not the proper occasion to enter on these higher considerations. I hope an op- 
portunity will be afforded when the bill comes up for the revision of the duties 
for which these resolutions are, I suppose, intended to prepare the way. When 
it comes to be acted on, I intend to embrace the opportunity to trace the laws 
of which the facts and results, which I have stated from official sources, are but 
consequences — laws as fixed and immutable as those which govern the mate- 
rial world. 

As great and striking as these results are, it must be borne in mind that they 
are but the effects of the reduction of duties, and that, too, under the greatest 
embarrassment and disadvantages, growing out of the protective system, and not 
the full and mature fruit of free trade. What has as yet been experienced af- 
fords but a faint conception of the wide and general prosperity which would be 
diffused throughout the whole community by low duties, sound currency, and 
exemption from the debts and embarrassments of a false and pernicious system. 
If gentlemen could be persuaded to abstain from their prescriptions — leave off 
their nostrums — restore the revenue from the lands — economize and retrench 
expenditures — the youthful vigour of the patient would soon do the rest. Full 
and robust health would soon be restored, and a few years' experience under the 
benign effects of a truer and better system would in a short time obliterate the 
recollection of present suffering. 

Before I conclude, I feel called on to notice the frequent allusion made to 
South Carolina during the course of this discussion. Every one who has lis- 
tened to what has been said must have been struck with the bold assertions of 
the senator, and others who have taken the same side, in reference to her de- 
pression and difficulties. It has been solemnly asserted that no one could ven- 
ture to say that she has realized any of the anticipated advantages from reduc- 
tion of the duties. I propose to answer these bold and declamatory assertions, 
as I have others of like kind, by appealing to facts, resting on official docu- 
ments. For this purpose, I have selected the same period of twenty-one years, 
from 1819 to 1841, divided into the same divisions of seven years each, and 
have formed a table marked H, giving the exports from the state for each year, 
and the aggregate exports for each division. Reference to it will show that 
the aggregate exports in value from the state during the first period, from 1819 
to 1826 inclusive, was $55,545,572 ; and that from the next, terminating with 
1833, under the operation of the two high tariffs of 1824 and 1828, the aggre- 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 503 

gate exports decreased to $52,965,513, showing a falling ofl' of a million and 
a half, under high duties. Turning, then, to the period of reduction, the period 
depicted by gentlemen as so disastrous to the state, we shall find, instead of a 
decrease, the aggregate exports of the period swelled to $78,338,594, being an 
increase of $25,375,081, compared to the preceding period of high duties. The 
eftect on the imports is still more striking, both in the falling oft' during the pe- 
riod of high duties and recovering under that of reduction. 

But it has been attempted to explain this rapid increase of exports on the 
ground that a large portion are the products of Georgia, drawn to the port of 
Charleston by the railroad to Hamburg, opposite to Augusta. It is probable 
that there was a greater amount from Georgia during the last period, compared 
with the preceding, from that cause, but nothing like suthcient to account for 
the increase, as would be manifest by turning to the exports and imports of 
Georgia for the same period. I find, on examining them, that they have fol- 
lowed the same laws in the two periods, the exports remaining about stationary 
during the period of high duties, and the imports regularly falling off, and both 
immediately and regularly increasing throughout that of the reduction ; with 
this difference, that Georgia has increased in both even more rapidly than Car- 
olina, probably because of her increased population. But be that as it may, it 
clearly shows that the great increase of Carolina is not owing to the cause to 
which it is attempted to attribute it. 

But as great as the impulse is which has been given to her export trade, I 
do not deny that South Carolina, like all the other states, is suffering under 
great pecuniary and commercial embarrassments ; not, however, in consequence 
of reduction of duties, but in spite of it. Her suffering is from the same gen- 
eral causes already explained, with the addition of several peculiar to herself. 
Short crops from bad seasons for the last two years ; a destructive fire in the 
heart of her commercial capital, which destroyed a large portion of that city ; 
a heavy loss, estimated at about three millions of dollars, from the insolvency 
of the United States Bank of Pennsylvania ; a large expenditure on a railroad 
project, which has been found impracticable ; and the deranged state of the 
currency in the surrounding states, which has done much to embarrass her com- 
merce. But, in the midst of all difficulties, she stands erect, with a sound cur- 
rency and unimpeached credit, and as likely to ride out the storm as any other 
state.- Gentlemen greatly mistake if they suppose she is so ignorant and stupid 
as to confound the cause of her difficulties with what has done so much to aug- 
ment her means, and to enable her to bear up successfully under her difficulties. 
Having finished my remarks as far as they relate to these resolutions, I pro- 
pose to advert, in conclusion, to a topic which has been drawn into this discus- 
sion by almost every one who has spoken on the opposite side. It would seem 
that there has sprung up, all at once, among our manufacturing friends, a great 
solicitude about us of the South, and our great staple. They look on our ruin 
as certain, unless something should be done to prevent it, and are ready to shed 
tears at the distress about to overwhelm us. They see in Hindostan a great 
and successful rival, about to drive us entirely out of the cotton market of the 
world ; against which, according to their opinion, there is but one refuge, the 
home market, to be secured by high protective duties. To this panacea they 
resort for every disease that can afflict the body politic. But admit the danger : 
I ask. Of what service would the home market be to us if we lose the foreign ? 
We have already possession, substantially, of the home market. The whole 
amount of cotton goods imported for consumption in 1840 was but little more 
than six millions of dollars, about one eighth in value compared with that man- 
ufactured at home. Of the imported, by far the larger proportion arc fine and 
light articles, which would require but a small quantity of the raw material to 
mtmufacture them ; not more at the outside, I should suppose, than thirty thou- 
sand bales ; so that, if every yard of cotton goods consum.ed in the country was 



504 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

made at home, it would only make that addition to the quantity of cotlon al- 
ready consumed by our own manufactures. What, I ask, is to be done with 
the residue, which is live or six times greater, and now finds its market abroad ? 
Do you suppose that we are such simpletons as to assent to high duties on all 
we consume — to be highly taxed in all that we eat, drink, or wear, for such pal- 
try consideration ? But suppose we should be simple enough to be gulled by 
so shallow a device, what security have we, if the East India cotton should 
prove to be cheaper than ours, as you allege it will, that the duty which would 
be laid on it might not be repealed, just as you have repealed that on indigo, 
raw hides, and many other articles, which might be supplied from our own soil 1 
You must pardon me. I cannot take your word, after the ingenuity you have 
shown in construing away the Compromise Act. You must excuse me if I am 
a little suspicious and jealous after what I have witnessed. You must redeem 
the existing pledges before you ask me to accept of anoiher. 

But is the danger really so great as gentlemen represent 1 Are we in reali- 
ty about to find a successful rival in the cultivation of cotton 1 If such be the 
fact — if the cultivation of cotton is to be lost, we shall have at least the poor 
consolation that we will not be the only sufl'erer. It would work a revolution 
in all our industrial pursuits. What would become of our foreign and domestic 
commerce ? What of our tonnage and navigation 1 What of our finances 1 
What of the great internal exchanges of the country 1 I will not undertake to 
offer an opinion on the capacity of Hindostan to produce cotton. The reoion is 
large, and the soil and climate various. The population great, and wages low ; 
but I must be permitted to doubt the success of the experiment of driving us out 
of the market, though backed and patronised by English capital and energy. 
Nor am I alone in doubting. I have taken from a late English paper (The 
Manchester Guardian) an article which speaks with great confidence that the 
experiment has proved a failure. I will thank the secretary to read it : 

" Cultivation of Cotton in India. — Since the publication of the letter on 
this subject, addressed by the Bombay Chamber of Commerce to the Indian 
government, we have learned, through the medium of letters received by the 
last overland mail, that the efibrts of the American planters who went to the 
westerly side of India have so far entirely failed. Indeed, so far as we can 
learn, there has been very great neglect and mismanagement on almost every 
point connected with their operations. It would seem as if the directors of the 
East India Company had thought it was quite enough to send them to India, 
and that all farther care about them was quite unnecessary ; for, on their arri- 
val in that country, they found that no direction respecting them had been giv- 
en ; and they were absolutely losing their time for two or three months, until 
instructions could be received from the government. Then, instead of letting 
them survey the country, and choose the situation and soil which appeared best 
adapted for the culture of cotton, when instructions were received, they were 
taken at once to Broach, and there placed under the direction of a gentleman 
who felt no interest in the matter, but who took upon him to choose soil and 
situation for them. He allotted them what was considered very good cotton 
land — that is, land of a strong and tenacious quality, exceedingly well adapted 
for the growth of the native cotton, but which former experiments had shown 
to be very unfavourable to the American plant, which has a large tap root, and 
thrives as badly in the stiff black soil in which the native cotton is gi'own, as 
carrots would thrive in a stiff clay in this country. As a matter of course, their 
crop of upland cotton has failed, with the exception of a very small patch which 
they had planted on a piece of light sandy soil, which the tap roots of the cot- 
ton were able to penetrate, and on which the plants were exceedingly luxu- 
riant, and covered with large pods of cotton. From the strong black soil, it was 
not supposed that they would be able to pick a pound per acre of good cotton. So 
far, therefore, the cultivation of American cotton in Upper India has made no 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 505 

progress ; nor do we imagine that it is very likely to do so hereafter. From 
all we have read upon the subject of Indian cotton cultivation, it seems to us 
that the best chance of success is to be found in a careful and discriminating 
growth of native varieties, and a careful gathering and cleaning of the produce. 
This was one of the objects towards which the attention of the American plant- 
ers was to be directed, but hitherto we find very little has been done. At the 
date of the latest advices from Broach (the 24th of November), they were put- 
ting up a ginhouse for ginning native cotton ; but, owing to the great number 
of obstacles necessarily experienced in such a country as India, they made very 
slow^ progress with their work, and it was feared that the growing crop would 
be entirely over before their gins were ready. Up to the date mentioned, no 
satisfactory experiments had been made as to the capability of the native cotton 
to stand ginning. Some trials were about to be made with a hand-gin, which, 
one would suppose, ought to have been the first step taken, before incurring a 
large expense in erecting machinery, which may prove useless. On the whole, 
we fear the prospect of receiving any large supply of superior cotton from In- 
dia is not at present very flattering. In order to overcome the difticulties pre- 
sented by the habits of the people, and by other causes, great energy and per- 
severance on the part of the agents of the Indian government intrusted with 
the control of the experiments are absolutely necessary ; and those qualities can- 
not be expected from parties who do not feel a strong interest in their success. 
Hitherto, we believe, the government agents have lent but a cold and indifier- 
ent aid to the experiments ; and it is, therefore, to be feared that, unless the 
matter should be put into other hands, there does not seem to be much chance 
of any good result from experiments from which so much was expected." — Man- 
chester Guardia7i. 

In confirmation of the opinion of the writer of the article, that of intelligent 
individuals, well acquainted with the country, might be added, who speak with 
confidence that, taking price and quality into consideration, we have nothing se- 
rious to apprehend. We might, indeed, have something to fear during the con- 
tinuance of the Chinese war. That country is the principal market for the cot- 
ton of Hiiidostan, and while it remains closed, the cotton intended for its mar- 
ket may be thrown in such quantities on the European as may materially de- 
press the price. But the present relation between Great Britain and China can- 
not long continue. It can scarcely be doubted that the former will at last suc- 
ceed in opening the market of China to the commerce of the world to a much 
greater extent than it has ever been heretofore ; when, so far from competing 
with us, the cotton of Hindostan will not be sufficient to supply the demands 
of that great market. 

But I am not ignorant that we must rely for holding the cotton market on 
our superior skill, industry, and capacity for producing the article. Nearly, if 
not altogether, one half of the solid contents of the globe is capable of producing 
cotton ; and that, too, in the portion the most populous, and where labour is the 
cheapest. We may have rivals everywhere in a belt of 70 degrees at least, 
lying on each side of the equator, and extending around the globe. Not only 
the far East, but all Western Asia, quite to the 35th, or even the 40th degree 
of latitude, a large portion of Europe, almost all Africa, and a large portion of 
this continent, may be said to be a cotton-producing region. When the price 
of cotton rises high, a large portion of that immense region becomes our com- 
petitors in its production, which invariably results in a great fall of price, when 
a struogle follows for the market. In that struggle we have ever, heretofore, 
succeeded, and I have no fear, with fair play on the part of our own govern- 
ment, we will continue to be successful against the world. W e have the ele- 
ments of success within us. A favourable soil and climate, a plenty of cheap 
land, held in fee simple, without rent, tithes, or poor rates. But, above all, we 
Iiave a cheap and efficient body of labourers, the best fed, clothed, trained, and 

S s « 



506 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 



provided for of any in the whole cotton-gTowing region, for whose labour we 
have paid in advance. I say paid for in advance, /or our property in our slaves 
is but loages purchased in advance, including the support and supplies of the la- 
bourers, which is usually very liberal. With these advantages, we may bid de- 
fiance to Hindu or Egj'ptian labour, at its two or three cents a day. Ours be- 
ing already paid for, is, as far as the question of competition is concerned, still 
cheaper, to say nothing of its superior efficiency, its better and more skilful di- 
rection, under the immediate eye of intelligent proprietors, of cheap, unencum- 
bered land, favourable soil and climate, and greater facility and cheapness of 
transportation to the great markets of the world. But this is not all. We have 
another and great advantage. There is not a people on earth who can so well 
bear the curtailing of profits as the Southern planters, when out of debt. A 
plantation is a little community of itself, which, when hard pressed, can furnish 
within itself almost all of its supplies. Ours is a fine provision country, and, 
when needs be, can furnish most of its supplies of food and clothing from its 
own resources. In prosperous times, when the price of our staples is high, our 
labour is almost exclusively directed to their production ; and then we freely and 
liberally part with their proceeds in exchange for horses, mules, cattle, hogs, 
and provisions of all description from the West, and clothing and all the products 
of the arts with the North and East ; but when prices fall and pressure comes, 
we gradually retire on our own means, and draw our own supplies from within. 
With these great advantages, it is not wonderful that in all the great strug- 
gles that we have had for the cotton market (they have been many and great), 
we have ever come off successful. It is incident to that great staple article, 
cotton, the first in the whole circle of commerce, to be subject to extraordinary 
vibrations of price from the causes to which I have alluded. At one time prices 
are high and profits great, and at another low and the profits small. It can be 
permanently cultivated only by those who can best go through these great vi- 
brations. We are willing to hold it on that condition, and feel confident we 
can, with justice from this government. We dread not the competition of Hin- 
dostan ; but your unequal, unconstitutional, and oppressive legislation — that le- 
gislation which pushes the expenditures of the government to the most extrav- 
agant extent, and which places the burden of supporting the government almost 
exclusively on the exchanges of our products with the rest of the world. Every 
dollar of tax, imposed on our exchanges in the shape of duties, impairs to that 
extent our capacity to meet the severe competition to which we are exposed ; 
and nothing but a system of high protective duties, long continued, can prevent 
us from meeting it successfully. It is that which we have to fear. Let the 
planters avoid banks, keep out of debt, and have a sound currency and low du- 
ties, and they may bid defiance to competition, come from what quarter it may, 
and look forward with confidence to a prosperity greater than they have ever 
yet experienced. 

APPENDIX. 





TABLE A.- 


DOMESTIC EXPORTS 




Years. 


Domestic Exports. 






Years. 


Domestic Exports. 


1825 


$66,941,745 


1833 


$70,317,698 


1826 


53,055,710 






1834 


81,034,162 


1827 


58,921,691 






1835 


101,189,082 


1828 


50,669,669 






1836 


106,916,680 


1829 


55,700,193 






1837 


95,564,414 


1830 


59,462,029 






1838 


96,033,821 


1831 


61,277,057 






1839 


103,533,891 


1832 



63,137,470 






1840 


113,762,617 


$469,198,564 




$768,352,365 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN, 
TABLE B— AMERICAN TONNAGE. 



507 



Years 



Registered 
Tonnage. 



Enrolled 

and 
Licensed. 



1825 '700,787! 
1826737,978' 
1827:747,170; 
1828;812,619| 
18291650,142 
1830^576,475 
18311620,451 
1832;686,9S9| 



722,323 

796,212 
873,437 
928,772 
610,654' 
615,301 
647,394: 
752,459 



1.423,111 
1,534,190 

1,620,607 
1,741,391 
1,260,977 
1,191,776 
1,267,846 
1,439,450 



Reg-jstered 
Tonnage. 



Enrolled 
and 

Licensed. 



1833 
1834 
1835* 
1836' 

1837! 
1838! 
1839: 
1840 



750,026 
857,438 
885,821 
897,774 
8 10,447' 1 
822,59lll 
834,244^1 
899,7641 1 



856,122 
901,468 
939,118' 
984,328' 
,086,238' 
,173,047' 
,262,234' 
,280,9991 



1,606,149 
1,758,906 
1,824,9391 
1,892,2021 
1,896,685 
1,995,638 
2,096,4781 
2,180,7631 





TABLE 


C— MANUFACTURES. 




\ ears. 


Ainount in each vear. 






Years. 


Amjiint lu each year. 1 

$6,557,080 


1825 


$5,729,797 


1833 


1826 


5,495,130 






1834 


6,247,893 


1827 


5,536,651 






1835 


7,694,073 


1828 


5,548,354 






1836 


6,107,528 


1829 


5,412,320 






1837 


7,136.997 


1830 


5.320,980 






1838 


8,397,078 ! 


1831 


5,086,8S0 






1839 


10.927,529 


1832 


5,050,633 
$43,180,755 






1840 


12,848,840 






$65,917,018 







TABLE 


D.— EXPORTS. 






Years. 


Cotton. 


, Y'ears. 


Cottun. 


1 Years. 

~1834 


Cotton. 


1820 


22,308,667 


1827 


29,359,545 


49,448,402 


1821 


20,157,484 


1828 


22,487,229 


1835 


64,661,302 


1822 


24,035,058 


1829 


26,575,311 


1836 


71,284,925 


1823 


20,445,520 


1830 


29,674,883 


1837 


63,240,102 


1824 


21,947,401 


1831 


25,289,492 


1838 


61,556,811 


1825 


36,846,649 


1832 


31,724,682 


1839 


61,238,982 


1826 


25,025,214 


1833 


36,191,105 
.201,302,247 


1840 


63,870,307 


170,765,993 1 


4-35,300,831 



TABLE E.— EXPORTS. 



Y'ears. 


Tobacco. 


Years. 


'I'obacco. 


1 Years. 


T..ba.-.,,. 


1820 


7,968,600 


1827 


6,816,146 


1834 


6,595,305 


1821 


5,648,962 


1828 


5,840,707 


1835 


. 8,250,577 


1822 


6,222,838 


1829 


5,185,370 


1836 


10,058,640 


1823 


6,282,672 


1830 


5,833,112 


1837 


5,795,647 


1824 


4,855,568 


1831 


4,892,388 


1838 


7,392,029 


1825 


6,115,623 


1832 


5,999,769 


1839 


9,832,943 


1826 


5,347,208 


1833 


5,755,968 


1840 


9,883,957 
57,809,098 


43,441,469 


39,963,460 







TABLE 


F.— EXPORTS. 






Y'ears. 


Rice. 


1 Y'ears. 


Rice. 


Years. 


Rice. 


1820 


1,714,923 


1827 


2,343,908 


1834 


O 10O .TOO 


1821 


1,494,307 


1828 


2,620,696 


1835 


2,210,331 


1822 


1,563,482 


1829 


2,514,370 


1836 


2,548,750 


1823 


1,820,985 


1830 


1,986,824 


1837 


2,309.279 


1824 


1,882,982 


1831 


2,016,267 


1838 


1,721,819 


1825 


1,925,245 


1832 


2,152,361 


1839 


2,460,198 


1826 


1,917,445 

12,319,369 ! 


1833 


2,774,418 


1840 


1,942,076 
15,314,745 


16,4uS,844 1 



503 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 



TABLE G. 

Statement showitig the quantity, price, and value of the Cotton grown in the 
United States from 1819 to 1840. 



Year. 


lbs. millions. 


Price per lb. 

cents. 


Value. 


Increase. 


1820 


160 


17 


$27,200,000 




1821 


180 


16 


28,800,000 




1822 


210 


l^ 


34,650,000 




1823 


185 


11 


20,350,000 




1824 


215 


15 


32,250,000 




1825 


255 


21 


53,550,000 




1826 


350 


11 


38,500,000 




1555 


15| 


$234,675,000 


1827 


270 


91 


27,700,000 




1828 


325 


101 


40,625,000 




1829 


365 


10 


36,500,000 




1830 


350 


10 


35,000,000 




1831 


385 


n 


35,612,500 




1832 


390 


10 


39,000,000 




1833 


445 


11 


48,950,000 


$28,712,500 


2530 


10 


$263,387,500 


1834 


460 


13 


59,800,000 




1835 


416 


16^- 


68,640,000 




1836 


445 


15^ 


67,862,500 




1837 


485 


15i 


73,962,500 




1838 


525 


lOi 


53,812,500 




1839 


566 


14 


79,240,000 




1840 


880 


9^ 


83,600,000 


$223,730,000 


3777 


m 


$487,117,500 



The quantity of cotton received at the port of Boston from October, 
1839, to October, 1840, was: 

Receipts in 1835 80,709 bales. 

do. 1836 - 82,885 " 

do. 1837 ...... 82,664 " 

do. 1838 96,636 " 

do. 1839 94,350 " 

do. 1840 136,357 " 

Estimate for 1841 150,000 " 

Since January 1st, 1841, there was received to this, the 26lh of May, 
less than five months, 93,057 bales, and the quantity received this year 
will probably be 150,000 bales. — Boston Atlas. 

TABLE H.— DOMESTIC EXPORTS OF SOUTH CAROLINA FROM 1819 TO 1841. 



Years. 


Exports. 


Years. 


Exports. 


Years. 


Exports. 


1820 


8,690,539 


1827 


8,189,496 


1834 


11,119,565 


1821 


6,867,515 


1828 


6,508,570 


1835 


11,224,298 


1822 


7,136,366 


1829 


8,134,676 


1836 


13,482,757 


1823 


6,671,998 


1830 


7,580,821 


1837 


11,138,992 


1824 


7,833,713 


1831 


6,528,605 


1838 


11,017,391 


1825 


10,876,475 


1832 


7,685,833 


1839 


10,318,822 


1826 


7,468,966 


1833 


8,337,512 
52,965,513 


1840 


10,036,769 


55,545,572 


78,338.594 



Gain in last seven years, 25,373,081. 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 509 

XXXV. 

SPEECH ON THE LOAN BILL, APRIL 12, 1842. 

The question being put on the passage of the bill, and the yeas and 
nays having been ordered, 

Mr. Calhoun said, that it was not his object, in rising at this late stage 
of the question, to discuss the provisions of this bill. That had been 
done so fully and ably by those who had preceded in the debate on the 
same side, that he had nothing to add. But, in order to have a full and clear 
understanding of the bearing of this measure on the finances of the gov- 
ernment, we must look beyond the provisions of the bill. It was not a 
lone measure, unconnected with those which preceded it, or would suc- 
ceed it, but quite the reverse. It was a link in the sytem of policy com- 
menced at the special session, and which had hitherto been perseveringly 
followed up, and, if he was not greatly deceived, would be persisted in so 
lonf as those who now have the control held power. Already has the 
system contributed greatly to depress the credit of the government, and 
it is to be feared, if it be not arrested, that it will sink it far below its 
present level. What he proposed, in the remarks which he was about 
to offer, was to trace the consequences of the system in its bearings on 
the finances and credit of the government. 

That the credit of the government is greatly impaired of late, \\i\\ not 
be denied. It is but a short time since the very committee which re- 
ported this loan bill reported another for about the same amount, Avhich 
became a law. At that time, so high did the credit of the government 
stand, that it was expressly provided that not more than six per cent, in- 
terest should be allowed, and that the loan should be redeemable in three 
years. As short as was the period, it was confidently predicted that it 
would be taken at five per cent. ; and the Secretary of the Treasury 
commenced his negotiation for the loan with that expectation, and actu- 
ally obtained a considerable portion of it under six per cent. The bill 
passed late in July last ; and, in the period of nine short months, the very 
same committee reported this bill, which proposes to send the public 
credit into the market to be sold for what it will bring ; and that, too, for 
twenty years, a period nearly seven times longer than the term prescribed 
in the former bill. 

The conditions offered for a loan may fairly be regarded as indicating 
the value which the government stamps on its own credit ; and we may 
be assured that the keensighted race who have money to lend will rarely 
affix a higher value than what that stamp indicates. Judged by that stand- 
ard, the credit of the government has never before been as low; no, not in 
the' late war with England— a war with one of the greatest, if not the 
o-reatest power on earth— commenced with a remnant of an old debt of 
more than forty millions of dollars, and at the very beginning of which 
there was a universal suspension of payments by all the banks south of 
New-England. Even in that great struggle, under all its embarrassments, 
no secretary of the treasury or committee ever dared to put the credit of 
the government into market under such disadvantageous terms as is pro- 
posed in this bill. The longest period for the redemption of any loan 
contracted during the war, if his memory served him, was but twe ve 
years — a period not much exceeding half the time allowed by this 
bill. Such and so great has been the decay of the public credit i» the 
short space of a few months ! And here the question is presented, What 



510 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

has caused this unexampled and rapid decay of the credit of the govern- 
ment in a period of peace, when the resources of the country are more 
than doubled, and with a public debt comparatively so small 1. 

The chairman of the Finance Committee felt the force of this question ; 
and, if we are to believe him, the extraordinary ofi'er which the Secretary 
of the Treasury is authorized to make for this loan is to be explained, not 
on the ground that the credit of the government is impaired, but from the 
scarcity of money. He says that there is an extraordinary demand for 
money, and that a higher interest, in consequence, must be paid for 
its use ; and that the government, like individuals, can get it only by 
giving its market value. Unfortunately for him, the fact does not accord 
with his explanation. Interest is now lower in the general market of the 
world than when the former loan bill passed. The best index of that 
market is the rate of interest at which the Bank of England discounts. 
Judging by that, there has been a very great reduction of interest within 
the last few months — from five to four per cent. Even in our own country, 
where confidence is imperfect, interest is far from being high. It was but 
the other day stated, in a debate on this bill, that the stocks of the State of 
Maine and the city of Philadelphia, bearing six per cent, interest, are at 
par ; and that of his own state, in its own market, is, he is informed, some- 
thing above par. But the senator himself may be quoted against his own 
explanation. Forgetful of the ground that he had taken, he mentioned it 
as a remarkable fact, that exchange with England at this time is very 
low — several per cent, below par. From this he inferred that money was 
plenty — not, indeed, from increase of quantity, but from the diminution 
of business. Like everything else, its price (if he might use the expres- 
sion as applied to money) followed the great law of demand and supply ; 
and it might be lowered, as well by diminishing the demand as by increas- 
ing the supply ; and, in either case, a favourable state of the market would 
exist for the negotiation of loans on good terms, where the credit of the 
borrower was above suspicion. 

The senator from Rhode Island (Mr. Simmons), taking a mo're correct 
view of the fact, admitted that the difficulty of negotiating a loan on fa- 
vourable terms was the loss of credit ; but he attributed the loss of credit 
on the part of this government to the loss of credit by so many of the states 
of the Union. He said that there was a mutual sympathy between fhe 
credit of this government and that of the states, and that when the one 
was impaired it necessarily impaired the other. He (Mr. C.) did not ad- 
mit that there was any such dependance ; and, for proof, he referred to 
the fact that a few months since, when the former loan bill passed, the 
credit of this government stood high — never higher, although that of 
many of the states was then greatly depressed. But, while he denied the 
dependance, he readily admitted that there was so much connexion be- 
tween the two, that, when the credit of the states was greatly impaired, 
great prudence, much caution, and careful management were necessary 
to prevent that of this government from being depressed. It was the mo- 
ment when the money-lenders would view the conduct of this government 
with the keenest jealousy, and when any mismanagement of its finances 
would be sure to be followed with the worst effect on its credit ; but, with 
proper management, its credit would not be affected by the discredit of 
the states. 

If, then, neither the state of the money market, nor the discredit of so 
many of the states, can explain the necessity for the extraordinary terms 
to be offered for this loan, to what is it to be attributed 1 It was no time 
for vague or gentle language. He intended to express himself plainly and 
strongly, but without the least intention of ofTending. It is, then, to be 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. ,511 

attributed to the loss of credit on tlie part of tiie government — a rapid 
and great loss — and which, he feared, was still in progress. And to what 
is that to be attributed ( To your conduct, gentlemen. It is you who 
have impaired the public credit. You are the responsible party. You 
have destroyed the equilibrium between income and expenditure, on which 
the credit of governments, as well as individuals, must ultimately depend. 
You have reduced the income of the government below its expenditures: 
in the first place, by giving away a portion of the revenue from the pub- 
lic lands — a portion by far the most permanent and growing ; and, in the 
next, by greatly increasing its expenditures. To this you added a heavy loan 
of 1)12,000,000, making an annual charge for interest of upward of seven 
hundred thousand dollars. And, to cap the climax, you proposed, in the 
face of all this, to raise the permanent expenditures to nearly thirty mill- 
ions of dollars, without making any adequate provision to meet it. It 
was thus that the equilibrium between the income and expenditure of the 
government was destroyed ; and the want of means to meet its engage- 
ments followed as a matter of course. 

But what you did was not so fatal to the public credit, as bad as it was, 
as the circumstances under which you did it. What were they ? You 
did it when you knew that the credit of many states was deeply impaired, 
and threatened to be still more so. You knew that there was hazard that 
their discredit might react and cast suspicion on the credit of the Union, 
and impair that of this government, as well as that of the states which still 
preserved theirs, without great prudence and caution in the management 
of our finances. Nor were you ignorant that the financial condition of 
the government was in other respects highly critical. That you were 
fully apprized of the fact, I will prove from your own words. How often 
have you declared that there was a heavy deficit when you came into 
power ; that the revenue was rapidly declining under the Compromise 
Act; and that those who preceded you had neglected to make provision 
to meet the growing deficit ; and, finally, that there was great waste in 
the collection and disbursement of the revenue 1 You stated all this to 
prove that the blame lay not at your door. Admitting all you said, can 
you exempt yourselves from blame 1 Power was not forced on you. You 
sought it — eagerly sought it — and that by the most objectionable means. 
You got it under the promise of reform, and thus placed yourselves un- 
der the most solemn obligation to administer the finances with the utmost 
care and skill. And yet it was under these circumstances, and in the 
extremely critical condition, according to your own admission, of the 
finances of the government, that you reduced the income, increased the 
expenditures, added a large amount of debt, and proclaimed your inten- 
tion to raise the permanen't expenditures far above the then existing scale, 
without providing anything like adequate means to meet such increase. 
Can it, then, be a matter of surprise that such conduct should be followed 
by that rapid and deep decay of credit by which it has been sunk, in the 
short space of a few months (if we may judge by the terms of this bill), 
to a point of depression far below what it ever has been at any other pe- 
riod, in peace or w^ar 1 Be assured that the keen and vigilant class who 
have money to lend watch your course with ceaseless attention ; and that 
not a false step has been taken in the management of the finances,, nor an 
act been done that may indicate a want of due care or regard to the pub- 
lic faith on your part, that has not contributed to impair the credit of the 
government, especially at so critical a period as that through which we 
are now passing. i • i i. 

Having now shown that it is the course you have pursued which has 
prostrated the credit of the government, the question next presented is, 



512 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

What impelled you to pursue a course so disastrous to the public credit 1 
Why did you surrender the revenue from the land 1 Why so greatly in- 
crease the expenditures at the same time 1 Why propose to raise the 
permanent expenses to so high a standard 1 Were you ignorant of con- 
sequences 1 Did you not see that it would destroy the equilibrium be- 
tween income and expenditures! You cannot plead ignorance ; you did 
it with your eyes open. The loan bill of the special session proves that 
your measures had created a deficit ; and the declaration of your distin- 
guished leader, whose authority is so high with you, at the close of the 
extra session, that there would be a deficit in the revenue for this year of 
at least ten millions of dollars, conclusively shows that the deficit then 
created was known to be not of a temporary character. And here we 
have a still more important and searching question presented : What im- 
pelled you, at so critical a moment, when the credit of the government 
required the most careful and vigilant nursing, knowingly to destroy — 
not for the moment only, but for the future — the equilibrium between its in- 
come and its expenditures 1 To this there can be but one answer : it was 
your system of policy that impelled you — a system deliberately adopted 
at the special session, steadily pursued since, and, it is to be feared, will 
be pursued, regardless of consequences to government and country, as 
long as you can retain power. 

What that policy is, is not a matter of inference or conjecture. You 
have openly, boldly, and manfully avowed, that the great and leading ob- 
jects of your policy Avere bank and tariff — a National Bank and high pro- 
tective tariff; that without the one there never could be a sound curren- 
cy, nor prosperous industry without the other. Your great leader has, 
over and over again, proclaimed them to be the great objects of your pol- 
icy ; and the report of the minority of the committee on the exchequer 
in the other house, from the pen of a distinguished member of your party, 
openly asserts that the one is indispensable to the other, and that without 
both there can be no relief for the currency and industry of the country. 
There is, indeed, a mysterious connexion between them ; and he (Mr. C.) 
would admit that, without their joint action, there never could be such an 
inflation of the currency, and fictitious and delusive state of prosperity, as 
that through which we have recently passed. Their united action might, 
indeed, again restore a like state ; but it would be of short duration, and 
would be suddenly followed by disasters still greater than the present ; 
just as each succeeding debauch of the drunkard leaves him in a worse 
condition than that which preceded. 

In pursuing these, the acknowledged great and leading objects of your 
system of policy, to Avhich all others are subordinate, you commenced at 
the extra session with the bank ; justly believing that, once established, all 
others would follow as a matter course. The Bank Bill fell under the 
veto, and a new tack became necessary, in which its associated measure, 
a high tariff, became the primary object, in the hope (not badly founded), 
if it could be adopted and be made permanent, that it would, in the end, 
carry the bank as certainly as the bank would the tariff. Since then, your 
whole energy has beeii directed to establishing a high tariff. How was 
that to be done 1 

The Compromise Act stood in the way. Under its provisions a pro- 
tective tariff, by name, was out of the question. Your distinguished leader 
stood openly pledged against it, and the whole Southern wing of your 
party, with one or two exceptions (besides being pledged against it), repre- 
sented constituents who were utterly opposed to the system. In this di- 
lemma there was but one expedient left — to bring about such a condition 
of the treasury as would compel a resort to high duties for revenue, and 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUX. 513 

thereby accomplish indirectly what could not be effected directly. This 
is the key of your whole policy. It explains everything-. For this the 
revenue from the land was surrendered ; the expenses increased ; loans 
contracted ; a high and permanent rate of expenditures proposed ; the 
pledge to reform, to economize, and retrench, left unredeemed ; and, finally, 
the credit of the government prostrated at a moment so hazardous. That 
very prostration, this very bill, with all the enormity of its provisions, is 
part of the ways and means by which you hope to accomplish your cher- 
ished object. 

Gentlemen (said Mr. C, addressing the opposite side of the chamber), 
I must speak freely. The critical state of the public credit, and the dan- 
gerous condition of the government and country, demand it. There is 
one fatal principle pervading your policy, not now only, but at all times, 
which has wellnigh brought the government to destruction. You lay 
duties, not for revenue, but for protection. Revenue, with you, in laying 
duties, is a mere incident, which claims but little of your care or atten- 
tion. Your primary object is protection ; that is, so to impose the duties 
as to convert them into actual bounties to certain portions of the capital 
and industry of the country, without regard to their effect on the residue. 
It is the bounty, and not the revenue, that you regard ; and hence duties are 
imposed, either as to time, amount, and manner, with little or no regard 
to revenue. 

Of the truth of this, we have a remarkable illustration when you were 
last in power, under the younger Adams, in 1828, At that time the rev- 
enue — as was acknowledged on all sides — was ample to meet the expen- 
ditures of the government, including the payment of the public debt, 
which was then nearly discharged. A few millions only remained then 
to be paid off', when a large portion of the revenue — nearly one half — 
would no longer be required for the use of the government. On revenue 
principles, it was clearly the time, not for the increase, but the reduction of 
duties. And yet it was at that very period, when you, acting under (he false 
and dangerous system which guides you in all your acts, regardless of 
consequences, passed the tariff of 1828, which nearly doubled the duties, 
and so increased the revenue as suddenly to pay off' the public debt. 
Then followed the surplus revenue ; expansion of the currency ; the pet- 
bank system, and all the corrupting and disastrous consequences which 
have since caused such calamity. The Compromise Act put an end to the 
tariff of 1828. Then followed an opposite train of consequences : a grad- 
ually decreasing revenue, with the high rate of expenditures caused by 
the surplus revenue. Under its mischievous influence, the expenditures 
had nearly trebled in a few years, accompanied by a looseness and waste 
unknown before in the collection and disbursements of the government. 
It required but little sagacity to see that, if something decisive was not 
done to bring down the expenditures with the decrease of revenue, a crash 
must follow. I was not silent. I saw the danger, and proclaimed it; and 
those in power began to exert themselves with effect to meet it. At this 
critical period, you succeeded in obtaining power; but, as experience has 
proved, with no abatement in your attachment to the fatal policy which 
led to the disastrous act of 1828. 

You then committed, under the influence of that policy, the monstrous 
folly and injustice of raising the revenue, when it ought to have been re- 
duced ; of destroying the equilibrium between income and expenditures, 
by raisino; the latter far beyond the former ; and now, under the same per- 
nicious mfluence, you commit the reverse error, of sinking the income 
below the expenditures, by throwing away the revenue from the lands, 
and increasing expenditures, to be followed, I fear, by disasters still more 

T T T 



514 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

fatal. It is difficult to imagine an error calculated to cause greater mis- 
chief, in the present condition of things, than that of making revenue a 
subordinate consideration in the imposition of duties. The revenue is, 
emphatically, the state; and the imposition of burdens on the people to 
raise what may be necessary for the wants of the government is the act, 
above all others, which requires the highest caution and skill so to be per- 
formed as to extract the greatest amount of revenue with the least burden, 
and the greatest equality and justice among the members of the com- 
munity. But when the great and primary object is forgotten — when 
duties are imposed as to time, manner, and amount, without regard to 
revenue, or equality, or justice, the result must be such as we have wit- 
nessed — the treasury overflowing, and exhausted in rapid succession ; and 
distrust, jealousy, and discord pervading the whole community. Alter- 
nation of income and expenditures, as rapid as the government has ex- 
perienced under the influence of this radical and pernicious error, would 
prove ruinous in private life. Take, for illustration, an ordinary family 
of half a dozen sons and daughters, in independent but moderate circum- 
stances, having (say) an annual income of two thousand dollars, and living 
in decent frugality within their income. Few conditions of life would be 
more propitious to happiness than this. Now, suppose that their income 
should be suddenly raised to twenty thousand dollars annually, and con- 
tinue so for eisfht or nine years, till the habit of the family should become 
completely changed — a fine mansion to rise not far from their former 
snug residence, furnished with rich furniture, splendid carriages and 
horses to take the place of the plain gig and horse, and the sons and 
daughters to enter into all the fashionable and extravagant amusements 
and expenses of the higher circles. And then suppose the income of the 
family to be reduced suddenly to its former standard of two thousand dol- 
lars; and who does not see that it would require the greatest resolution 
and prudence on the part of its head to save the family from ruin — the 
most careful nursing of income, severest lopping off" of expenditures, and 
rigid economy in all things'? But if, instead of that, they should endeav- 
our to keep up or increase expenses and their style of living, and should 
ostentatiously give away a large portion of their reduced revenue, their 
discredit would be certain, and the ruin of the family inevitable. And 
such must be the fate of the government, if the folly of your course be 
persisted in. 

I feel, Mr. President, how vain it is to urge arguments against the fixed 
determination of a party resolved to carry through their favourite system 
of policy, however ruinous it may prove to both the government and the 
country. That its determination is fixed, has been evinced on so many 
and striking occasions, that I am forced to surrender the hope of over- 
coming it so long as the party can retain a majority in either house. It 
is true, there have been some signs, occasionally, of yielding as to the 
revenue from the lands. We have been told by a member on that side, 
in this discussion, that the policy of giving up the revenue from the land 
was a great mistake, and that it must be reversed ; and that the party- 
would be forced to do it, whether it wished or not. I have no such an- 
ticipation : not that I doubt but the pressure on the public treasury will 
be great, and the discredit of the government ruinous; but I see little 
hope that anything of the kind can force the party to relax. They have 
staked their all on the tariff' and the bank, and are resolved to play out 
the game to the last cent. When the question of repeal comes up, we 
shall find that the Distribution Act will be clung to, should credit perish 
and the treasury be bankrupt, because the policy of the party requires it. 
But we are told that the act will be repealed by its own provisions ; that 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 615 

the duties must be raised above 20 per cent., in order to meet the wants 
of the government j and that the fact of so raising them will, by one of its 
provisions, repeal the act. Such is, indeed, the provision ; and it is no 
less true that its insertion was necessary to secure the passage of the act, 
and its passage that of the Bankrupt Act. Such being the fact, honour 
and good faith forbid the repeal of the proviso. But will they be re- 
spected ] I would be happy to think so, but am incredulous, because the 
policy of the party stands in the way. Yes ; to restore the land fund 
would raise the income some three or four millions of dollars annually. 
That would reduce the necessity of raising the duties proportionally ; and 
that would be inconsistent with the policy of the party, to which every- 
thing must yield. 

The same cogent argument will prevent all serious efforts in favour of 
economy and retrenchment. We have been told by gentlemen that there 
was great waste, extravagance, and fraud in the public disbursements j 
and able committees have been appointed in both houses to detect abuses, 
and reduce the expenditures of the government. Well : I am one of those 
who believe that there are, and have been, great abuses in the disburse- 
ments ; who never doubted that the surplus revenue would lead, and has 
led, to frauds, waste, and extravagance ; but I have little hope of seeing 
them corrected, or of witnessing any considerable reduction in the ex- 
penses of the government, while you, gentlemen, shall retain power. I 
doubt not the committees will be vigilant in hunting out fraud and mal- 
administration: that is something. 1 wish every instance may be detect- 
ed and brought to light, fall the blame where it may. But as to any sub- 
stantial reform, either by economy or retrenchment, I expect none ; and 
that for the all-powerful reason — your system of policy forbids. So far 
from looking for either, I anticipate the very reverse from this bill. If 
the negotiation for the loan should be successful, it will but replenish the 
treasury, to be wasted in extravagant appropriations ; raising still higher 
the standard of expenditures, and creating new demands on the treasury, 
to be supplied by what is so desired by you — still higher duties. The re- 
sult must be, that the credit of the government„instead of improving, will 
be worse a year hence than at present. 

I (said Mr. C.) regard this bill, not only as the offspring of the fixed 
policy of gentlemen, but as intended as one of means of perpetuating 
it. The great length of time which the proposed loan would have to 
run, and the decisive vote against the amendment offered by the senator 
from Mississippi (Mr. Walker), to pledge the revenue from the lands to 
pay its interest and redeem the principal, leave but little doubt on that 
point. Thus regarding it, I cannot look forward without the apprehen- 
sion of the mostdisastrous results to the credit and finances of the gov- 
ernment. If persisted in, it must ultimately prostrate public credit, or 
force the government to an entire change of its system of finance. It 
will not only throw the entire burden of supporting the government on 
duties on imports, but will lead to an imposition of them the most unjust 
and unequal, and, at the same time, least favourable, in proportion to the 
burden imposed, to a productive revenue. The very spirit of the system, 
which leads to the imposition of the whole burden of supporting the gov- 
ernment on the imports, will as surely lead to such an imposition of the 
duties as may be regarded the most favourable io the protective policy, 
without regard either to revenue, or justice, or equality. 

Actino- in the spirit of the system, it is easy to see that those who have 
the control will lay the highest rate of duties on all articles which can be 
manufactured at home, with the view of excluding entirely foreign arti- 
cles of a similar description. That is the professed object of the system. 



516 ' SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

But the effect of such duties would be, to a vast extent, in the present 
state of things, to lop off almost entirely what might be a great and pro- 
ductive source of income under a moderate and judicious system of duties 
laid expressly for revenue. 

Under the influence of the same policy, there will, no doubt, be a large 
list of articles entirely exempt from duties. The chairman of the Com- 
mittee on Finance (if I did not mistake him) estimated the amount of the 
free articles under the tariff to be established, at thirty millions of dollars. 

[Mr. Evans said, "That is the amount now, as the law stands."] 

Yes (replied Mr. C.), and is intended to be the amount after it is modi- 
fied to suit the wishes of the party. It is no conjecture. 

I hold the proof in my hand — a bill reported to the other house by a 
member from Massachusetts (Mr. Saltonstall), chairman of the Committee 
on Manufactures, and a gentleman deep in the confidence of his party. 
It proposes a free list of at least thirty millions, and a system of duties 
not much, if any, less odious and oppressive than the tariff of 1828, This 
long and heavy list is made up of articles of a description not produced 
in the country, and which, for the most part, are consumed in the manu- 
facturing region, or for which manufactures are given in exchange abroad. 
If revenue was the principal object, the very principle on which they are 
to be excepted would make them the most legitimate objects of high 
duties. They are the very articles that could be taxed highest, without 
danger of being superseded by home articles of a similar description, and 
which, for the same reason, would throw the burden equally on the con- 
sumers. But revenue is not the object j and they must be exempted, be 
the inequality or the effect on the revenue and credit of the government 
what it may. If to the probable amount of free articles be added the 
amount required to meet the interest of the debt abroad — say seven 
millions; and if to that be added the verj^ great reduction which the high 
duties to be laid on the protected articles must make in their importa- 
tion, some conception may be formed of the narrow basis on which the 
revenue of the government must stand, if the system of policy of the 
party should be carried out in its spirit, as it is intended to be. The 
whole weight will press on what the advocates choose to call luxuries — 
such as linen, worsted stuffs, silks, spirits, wines ; most of which may 
come, indirectly, into competition with home-made articles, for which 
they may be substituted ; and all of which, or nearly so, are got in ex- 
change, not for manufactures, but the productions of our soil; and are, 
therefore, according to the genius of the system, legitimately objects of 
high taxation. 

Such, gentlemen, must be the system of imposts, if the influence which 
has heretofore controlled you should continue to do so ; which, I fear, 
hardly admits of a doubt. It is precisely the system proposed to be 
established by the bill of the other house. It may, indeed, be modified, 
to catch a few Southern votes ; but there is little hazard in saying that it 
is what is desired, and will be approached as near as may be practicable. 
It is on such a tariff that you propose to rely exclusively for revenue to 
maintain the public credit, and to support the government, at a rate of ex- 
penditures graduated by the highest scale ; and this you expect to do in 
the present depressed state of credit, crippled condition of commerce, and 
deranged state of the currency. I shall not stop to discuss the influence 
which these, and the many other causes that might be enumerated, must 
have in diminishing, far below all ordinary calculation, the income from 
such a tariff; the advanced growth of our manufactures in most of the 
important branches ; the effects of high duties on the articles for which 
our great agricultural staples are for the most part exchanged ; and the 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 517 

great extent of smuggling, which cannot but take place in the present 
condition of the country ; but I will venture to tell you that you will be 
utterly disappointed in your expectation of an adequate revenue from 
such a tariff. The income will fall far short, and the credit of the country 
will receive a shock from which it will be hard to recover it. The end 
will be, the abandonment of your system, or a resort to internal taxes ; 
when an entire change of our financial system will follow. 

Thus thinking, I cannot vote for this bill. I would rather meet the dif- 
ficulties at once, than to contribute by my vote to postpone the shock, by 
sustaining a system which I solemnly believe must lead to such danger- 
ous consequences. I would rather let the patient take his chance, than 
to countenance what I cannot but regard as the most dangerous quackery. 
But we are not reduced to the alternative of doing nothing or taking this 
bill. There are other, and safe and speedy measures of relief, if you would 
but agree to abandon your system of policy and adopt them. They are 
so obvious, that I cannot persuade myself that they have been overlooked ; 
and am forced to believe that they have not been adopted because your 
policy forbids it. If you could be persuaded to yield that, and substitute 
for this bill a provision to fund the outstanding treasury-notes in six per 
cent, stocks, payable in four, five, or six years; to surrender the public 
lands, and pledge them for the faithful redemption of that stock ; and pass 
a joint resolution refusing to receive the notes of banks that declined to 
receive your treasury-notes at par, the market would speedily be freed 
from that excess which depresses the credit of treasury-notes, and the 
residue would rise at once to par with specie. If the banks agreed to re- 
ceive them, their interest and that of the government would be combined 
to tjphoid their credit at par; and, if not,'the fact that they would be ex- 
clusively received with specie in the public dues would give a greatly in- 
creased demand for them, which would have the same effect. 

That done, follow up with a rigid system of economy and retrench- 
ment ; lop off all expenses not necessary for the defence of the country 
and the frugal administration of the government; put an end to waste, 
extravajrance, and fraud ; and, after you have made your appropriations, 
and revised the duties with an eye mainly to revenue and equality ot 
burden— if there should be an estimated deficit in the income, before the 
increased duties could be made available, it may be met by the use of 
your own credit directly, or the negotiation of a small loan, which cou d 
then be had on fair terms, and for a short period. It is by this simple 
process that you may relieve the afovernment from its present embarrass- 
ment, restore its credit, and raise what supplies may be necessary at home, 
without goino- abroad at present. I have (said Mr. C), on my part, in- 
superable objections to sending our credit abroad in the world at this 
time. It stands low at present ; and, as an American and Republican, 1 am 
too proud to have it exposed to the contumely of the rich and pouerlul 
bankers of Europe, to which it must necessarily be at such a period. 1 
would adopt any expedient, or make any reasonable sacrifice, to avoid 
such disgrace. Adopt the measures I have suggested, which, instead ot 
sacrifice, will afford relief on terms more favourable than the most san- 
ffuine can anticipate obtaining supplies from abroad, and it will be avoid- 
ed. I can imagine but one objection, and that the oft-repeated one— your 

system — forbids. , . , . 

Having now said what I intended in reference to this measure, let me 
add, in conclusion, that if I could be governed by party feelings and views 
at such a juncture as I conceive this to be in our affairs, instead of the 
solemn and earnest desire I feel to see the credit of the government re- 
stored, and the country extricated from its present difficulties, I would 



518 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOITN. 

rejoice to see the party opposed to me pursuing the course they do. I 
feel the most thorough conviction that, under their system, the credit of 
the government, instead of improving, will grow worse and worse ; and 
will end, if persisted in, not only in the overthrow, but in the dissolution 
of the party, and affixing permanent odium to their measures and policy, 
but, in the mean time, with no small hazard to the country and its institu- 
tions. 



XXXVI. 

SPEECH ON THE PASSAGE OF THE TARIFF BILL, AUGUST 5, 1842. 

Mr. President — The Tariff Bill of 1828 has, by common consent, been 
called the bill of abominations ; but, as bad as that was, this — all things consid- 
ered — is worse. It is, in the first place, worse, because it is more onerous ; 
not that the duties are on an average higher — for they are probably less by about 
10 per cent. This, it is estimated, will average about 36 per cent, ad valorem, 
on the aggregate of the imports ; and that averaged, according to the best esti- 
mate that 1 have been able to make, about 46. But this difference is more than 
made up by other considerations ; and, among them, that allowed long credit 
for the payment of the duties ; this requires them to be paid in cash, which 
will add to their burden not less than 4 or 5 per cent. Again : there has been 
a great falling off in prices on almost all articles, which increases, in the same 
proportion, the rate per cent, on the cost of all specific duties — probably not 
much less than 50 per cent. ; which, considering the number and the importance 
of the articles on which they are laid in this bill, will much more than make up 
the difference. To these may be added its arbitrary and oppressive provisions 
for valuing goods and collecting duties, with the fact that it goes into operation, 
without notice, immediately on its passage, which would fall heavily on the 
commercial interest ; and the undue weight it would impose on the less wealthy 
portions of the community, in consequence of the higher duties it lays on coarse 
articles of general consumption. 

It is, in the next place, worse, because, if it should become a law, it would 
become so under circumstances still more objectionable than did the tariff of 
1828. I shall not dwell on the fact that, if it should, it would entirely super- 
sede the Compromise Act, and violate pledges openly given here in this cham- 
ber, by its distinguished author, and the present Governor of Massachusetts, 
then a member of this body — that, if we of the South would adhere to the com- 
promise while it was operating favourably to the manufacturing interest, they 
would stand by it when it came to operate favourably to us. I pass, also, with- 
out dwelling on the fact that it proposes to repeal the provision in the act of 
distribution, which provides that the act shall cease to operate if the duties 
should be raised above 20 per cent. — a provision, without which, neither that r^or 
the Bankrupt Bill could have become a law, and which vi-as inserted under cir- 
cumstances that pledged the faith of the majority to abide by it. I dwell not on 
these double breaches of plighted faith, should this bill become a law ; not be- 
cause I regard them as slight objections ; on the contrary, they are of a serious 
character, and likely to exercise a very pernicious influence over our future le- 
gislation, by preventing amicable adjustments of questions that may hereafter 
threaten the peace of the country ; but because I have, on a former occasion, 
expressed my views fully in relation to them. I pass on to the objection that, 
if this bill should pass, it would against the clear light of experience. When 
that of 1828 passed, we had but little experience as to the eflects of the pro- 
tective policy. It is true that the act of 1824 had been in operation a few 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 519 

years, whicli may be regarded the first which avowed the policy that ever pass- 
ed ; but it had been in operation too short a time to shed much light on the 
subject. Since then, our experience has been greatly enlarged. We have had 
periods of considerable duration both of increase and reduction of duties, and 
their effects respectively on the industry and prosperity of the country, which 
enables us to compare, from authentic public documents, the result. It is most 
triumphantly in favour of reduction, though made under circumstances most ad- 
verse to it, and most favourable to increase. I have, on another occasion du- 
ring this session, shown, from the commercial tables and other authentic sources, 
that, during the eight years of high duties, the increase of our foreign commerce, 
and of our tonnage, both coastwise and foreign, was almost entirely arrested ; 
and that the exports of domestic manufactures actually fell off, although it was 
a period exempt from any general convulsion in trade or derangement of the cur- 
rency. On the same occasion, I also showed that the eight years of the reduc- 
tion of duties, which followed, were marked by an extraordmary impulse given 
to every branch of industry — agricultural, commercial, navigating, and manu- 
facturing. Our exports of domestic productions, and our tonnage, increased 
fully a third, and our manufactures still more ; and this, too, under the adverse 
circumstances of an inflated, unsteady currency, and the whole machinery of 
commerce deranged and broken. And yet, with this flood of light from authen- 
tic documents before us, what are we about to do ? To pass this bill, and to re- 
store the old, and, as was hoped, exploded system of restrictions and prohibi- 
tions, under the false guise of a revenue bill, as I shall next proceed to show. 
Yes, senators, we are told by the chairman of the Finance Committee, and 
others who advocate it, that this bill is intended for revenue, and that of 1828 
was for protection ; and it is ob that assumption they attempt to discriminate 
between the two, and hope to reconcile the people to this measure. It is, in- 
deed, true that the bill of 1828 was for protection. The treasury was then well 
replenished, and not an additional dollar was needed to meet the demands of 
the government ; and, what made it worse, the public debt was then reduced to 
a small amount ; and what remained was in a regular and rapid course of re- 
duction, which would in a few years entirely extinguish the whole, when more 
than half of the revenue would have become surplus. It was under these cir- 
cumstances that the bill of 182S, which so greatly increased the duties, was in- 
troduced, and became a law— an act of legislative folly and wickedness almost 
without example. Well has the community paid the penalty. Yes, much 
which it now suffers, and has suffered, and must sufler, are but its bitter fruits. 
It was that which so enormously increased the surplus revenue after the cxtm- 
auishment of the debt in 1832 ; and it was that surplus which mainly led to 
the vast expansion of the currency that followed, and from which have suc- 
ceeded so many disasters. It was that which wrecked the currency, overthrew 
the almost entire machinery of commerce, precipitated hundreds of thousands 
from afiluence to want, and which has done so much to tamt private and public 

morals. .,11 1 r I, 

But is this a revenue bill ? I deny it. We have, indeed, the word of the 
chairman for it. He tells us it is necessary to meet the expenditures of the 
government; of which, however, he gave us but little proof, except his word. 
But I must inform him that he must go a step farther before he can satisly me. 
He must not only show that it is necessary to meet the expenditures oi the gov- 
ernment, but also that those expenditures themselves are necessary. He must 
show that retrenchment and economy have done their full work ; that all use- 
less expenditures have been lopped off; that exact economy has been enforced 
in every branch, both in the collection and disbursement of the revenue ; and, 
above all, that none of the resources of the government have been thrown away 
or surrendered. Has he done all that ? Or has he showed that it has been 
even attempted? that either he or his party have made any systematic or se- 



520 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

rious effort to redeem the pledge, so often and solemnly given before the elec- 
tion, that the expenditures should be greatly reduced below what they then 
were, and be brought down to seventeen, sixteen, and even as low as thirteen 
millions of dollars annually ? Has not their course been directly the reverse 
since they came into power ? Have they not surrendered one of the two great 
sources of revenue — the public lands ; raised the expenditure from twenty-one 
or two millions, to twenty-seven annuaMy ; and increased the public debt from 
five and a half to more than twenty millions ? And has not all this been done 
under circumstances well calculated to excite suspicion that the real design was 
to create a necessity for duties, with the express view of affording protection 
to manufactures ? Have they not, indeed, told us, again and again, through 
their great head and organ, that the two great and indispensable measures to 
relieve the country from existing embarrassments were a protective tariff' and a 
National Bank ? and is it, then, uncharitable to assert that the expenditures, so 
far from being necessary to the just and economical wants of the government, 
have been raised to what they are, with the design of passing this bill in the 
only way it could be passed — under the guise of revenue ? 

But, if it were admitted that the amount it proposes to raise is necessary to 
meet the expenditures of the government, and that the expenditures themselves 
were necessary, the chairman must still go one step farther, to make good his 
assertion that this is a bill for revenue, and not for protection. He must show 
that the duties it proposes are laid on revenue, and not on protective principles. 

No two things, senators, are more different than duties for revenue and pro- 
tection. They are as opposite as light and darkness. The one is friendly, and 
the other hostile, to the importation of the article on which they may be im- 
posed. Revenue seeks not to exclude or diminish the amount imported ; on the 
contrary, if that should be the result, it neither designed nor desired it. While 
it takes, it patronises ; and patronises, that it may take more. It is the reverse, 
in every respect, with protection. It seeks, directly, exclusion or diminution. 
It is the desired result ; and, if it fails in that, it fails in its object. But, al- 
though so hostile in character, they are intimately blended in practice. Every 
duty imposed on an article manufactured in the country, if it be not raised to 
the point of prohibition, will give some revenue ;. and every one laid for rev- 
enue, be it ever so low, must afford some protection, as it is called. But, not- 
withstanding they are so blended in practice, plain and intelligible rules may 
be laid down, by which the one may be so distinguished from the other as 
never to be confounded. To make a duty a revenue, and not a protective duty, 
it is indispensable, in the first place, that it should be necessary to meet the ex- 
penditures of the government ; and, in the next, that the expenditures them- 
selves should be necessary for the support of the government, without the defi- 
cit being caused intentionally, to raise the duty, either by a surrender of other 
sources of revenue, or by neglect or waste. In neither case, as has been stated, 
would the duty be for revenue. It must, in addition, never be so high as to 
prohibit the importation of the article : that would be utterly incompatible with 
the object of revenue.. But there are other less obvious, though not less im- 
portant rules, by which they may be discriminated with equal certaint)^ 

On all articles on which duties can be imposed, there is a point in the rate 
of duties which may be called the maximum point of revenue — that is, a point 
at which the greatest amount of revenue would be raised. If it be elevated 
above that, the importation of the article would fall off" more rapidly than the 
duty would be raised ; and, if depressed below it, the reverse eff'ect would fol- 
low : that is, the duty would decrease more rapidly than the importation would 
increase. If the duty be raised above that point, it is manifest that all the in- 
termediate space between the maximum point and that to which it may be 
raised would be purely protective, and not at all for revenue. Another rule 
remains to be laid down, drawn from the facts just stated, still more important 



SPEECHES OP JOHN C. CALHOUN. 521 

than the preceding, as far as the point under consideration is involved. It re- 
sults, from the facts stated, that any given amount of duty, other than the maxi- 
mum, may be collected on any article, by tvi^o distinct rates of duty — the one 
above the maximum point, and the other below it. The lower is the revenue 
rate, and the higher the protective ; and all the intermediate is purely protec- 
tive, whatever it be called, and involves, to that extent, the principle of pro- 
hibition, as perfectly as if raised so high as to exclude importation totally. It 
follows that all duties not laid strictly for revenue are purely protective, 
whether called incidental or not ; and hence the distinction taken by the sen- 
ator from Arkansas immediately on my left (Air. Sevier) between incidental 
and accidental protection is not less true and philosophical than striking. The 
latter is the only protection compatible with the principles on which duties for 
revenue are laid. 

This bill, regarded as a revenue bill, cannot stand the test of any one of these 
rules. That it cannot as to the first two, has already been shown. That 
some of the duties amount to prohibition, has been admitted by the chairman. 
To those, he admits, a long list of others might be added. I have in my 
drawer an enumeration of many of them, furnished by an intelligent and ex- 
perienced merchant ; but I will not occupy the time of the Senate by reading 
the catalogue. That a large portion of the duties on the protected articles ex- 
ceed the maximum point of revenue, will not be denied ; and that there are 
few or none imposed on protected articles, on which an equal revenue might 
not be raised at a lower rate of duty, will be admitted. As, then, every fea- 
ture of this bill is stamped with protection, it is as much a bill for protection as 
that of 1828. Wherein, then, does it differ ? In this : that went openly, boldly, 
and manfully for protection.; and this assumes the guise of revenue. That car- 
ried the drawn dagger in its hand; and this conceals it in its bosom. That 
imposed the burden of protection — a burden admitted to be unjust, unequal, and 
oppressive, but it was the only burden ; but this superadds the weight of its 
false guise — a heavy debt, extravagant expenditures, the loss of public lands, 
and the prostration of public credit, with the intent of concealing its purpose. 
And this, too, may be added to the other objections, which makes it worse than 
its predecessor in abomination. 

I am, senators, now brought to the important question, Why should such a 
bill pass ? Who asks for it, and on what ground ? It comes ostensibly from 
the manufacturing interest. I say ostensibly ; for I shall show, in the sequel, 
that there are other and more powerful interests among its advocates and sup- 
porters. And on what grounds do they ask it ? It is on that of protection. 
Protection against what ? Against violence, oppression, or fraud 1 If so, gov- 
ernment is bound to afford it, if it comes within the sphere of its powers, cost 
what it may. It is the object for which government is instituted ; and it it fails 
in that, it fails in the highest point of duty. No : it is against neither violence, 
oppression, nor fraud. There is no complaint of being disturbed in property or 
pursuits, or of being defrauded out of the proceeds of industry. Against what, 
then, is protection asked ? It is against low prices. The manufacturers com- 
plain that they cannot afford to carry on their pursuits at prices as low as at 
present ; and that, unless they can get higher, they must give up manufactu- 
rint^. The evil, then, is low prices ; and what they ask ot government is to 
give them higher. But how do they ask it to be done ? Do tliey ask govern- 
ment to compel those who may want to purchase to give them higher ? Ao: 
that would be a hard task, and not a little odious ; difficult to be defended on 
the principles of equity, justice, or the Constitution, or to be enforced, if it could 
be Do they ask that a tax should be laid on the rest of the community, and 
the proceeds divided among them, to make up for low prices ■. or, m other 
words, do they ask for a bounty? No: that would be rather too open, op- 
pressive, and indefensible. How, then, do they ask it to be done ? by put- 



522 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

tino- down competition, by the imposition of taxes on the products of others, so 
as to give them the exclusion of the market, or at least a decided advantage 
over others ; and thereby enable them to sell at higher prices. Stripped of all 
disguise, this is their request ; and this they call protection. Protection, in- 
deed ! Call it tribute, levy, exaction, monopoly, plunder ; or, if these be too 
harsh, call it charity, assistance, aid — anything rather than protection, with 
which it has not a feature in common. 

Considered in this milder light, where, senators, will you find the power to 
give the assistance asked ? Or, if that can be found, how can you reconcile it 
to the principles of justice or equity to grant it? But suppose that to be over- 
come : I ask. Are you prepared to adopt as a principle that, whenever any 
branch of industry is suffering from depressed prices, it is your duty to call on 
all others to assist it ? Such is the broad principle that lies at the bottom of 
what is asked ; and what would it be, if carried out, but equalization of income ? 
And what that, but agrarianism as to income 1 And in what would that differ, 
in effect, from the agrarianism of property, which you, on the opposite side of 
the chamber, profess so much to detest 1 But, if you are not ready to carry 
out the principle in its full extent, are you prepared to restrict it to a single 
class — the manufacturers ? Will you give them the great and exclusive ad- 
vantage of having the right of demanding assistance from the rest of the com- 
munity whenever their profits are depressed below the point of remuneration 
by vicissitudes to which all others are exposed ? 

But suppose all these difficulties surmounted : there is one rule, where as- 
sistance is asked, which, on no principle of justice, equity, or reason, can be 
violated — and that is, to ascertain, from careful and cautious examination, 
whether, in fact, it be needed by the party asking ; and, if it be, whether the 
one of whom it is asked can afford to give it or not. Now I ask whether any 
such examination has been made. Has the Finance Committee, which report- 
ed this bill, or the Committee on Manufactures, to which the numerous peti- 
tions have been referred, or any member of the majority who support this bill, 
made an impartial or careful examination, in order to ascertain whether they 
who ask aid can carry on their manufactures without higher prices ? Or have 
they given themselves the least trouble to ascertain whether the other portions 
of the community could afford to give them higher 1 Will any one pretend that 
he has ? I can say, as to the interest with which I am individually connected, 
I have heard of no such inquiry ; and can add farther, from my own experi- 
ence (and fearlessly appeal to every planter in the chamber to confirm my state- 
ment), that the great cotton-growing interest cannot afford to give higher prices 
for its supplies. As much as the manufacturing interest is embarrassed, it is 
not more so than the cotton-growing interest ; and as moderate as may be the 
profit of the one, it cannot be more moderate than that of the other. I ask 
those who represent the other great agricultural staples — I ask the great pro- 
vision interest of the West, the navigating, the conmiercial, and, finally, the 
great mechanical and handicraft interests — if they have been asked whether 
they can afford to give higher prices for their supplies 1 And, if so, what was 
their answer ? 

If, then, no such examination has been made, what has been done ? Those 
who have asked for aid have been permitted to fix the amount according to 
their own cupidity ; and this bill has fixed the assessment on the other in- 
terests of the community, without consulting them, with all the provisions ne- 
cessary for extorting the amount in the promptest manner. Government is to 
descend from its high appointed duty, and become the agent of a portion of the 
community to extort, under the guise of protection, tribute from the rest of the 
community ; and thus defeat the end of its institution, by perverting powers, in- 
tended for the protection of all, into the means of oppressing one portion for the 
benefit of another. 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 523 

But tliere never yet has been devised a scheme of emptying the pockets of 
one portion of the commimity into those of the other, however unjust or op- 
pressive, for which plausible reasons could not be found ; and few have been 
so prolific of such as that under consideration. Among them, one of the most 
plausible is, that the competition which is asked to be excluded is that of 
foreigners. The competition is represented to be between home and foreitrn 
industry ; and he who opposes what is asked is held up as a friend to foreign, 
and the enemy to home industry, and is regarded as very little short of being a 
traitor to his country. I take issue on the fact. 1 deny that there is, or can be, 
any competition between home and foreign industry' but through the latter ; and 
assert that the real competition, in all cases, is, and must be, between one 
branch of home industry and another. To make good the position taken, I 
rely on a simple fact, which none will deny — that imports are received in ex- 
change for exports. From that it follows, if there be no export trade, there 
will be no import trade ; and that to cut off the exports, is to cut off the im- 
ports. It is, then, not the imports, but the exports Avhich are exchanged for 
them, and without which they would not be introduced at all, that causes, in 
reality, the competition. It matters not how low the wages of other countries 
may be, and how cheap their productions, if we have no exports, they cannot 
compete with ours. 

The real competition, then, is with that industry which produces the articles 
for export, and which purchases them and carries them abroad, and brings 
back the imported articles in exchange for them ; and the real complaint is, that 
those so employed can furnish the market cheaper than those can who manu- 
f9,cture articles similar with the imported ; and what, in truth, is asked is, that 
this cheaper process of supplying the market should be taxed, by imposing high 
duties on the importation of the articles received in exchange for those exported, 
in order to give the dearer a monopoly, so that it may sell its prodiicts for high- 
er prices. It is, in fact, a warfare on the part of the manufacturing industry, 
and those which are associated with it, against the export industry of the com- 
munity, and those associated with it. Now I ask, What is that export indus- 
try ? What is the amount produced ? by whom produced ? and the number of 
persons connected with it, compared with those who ask a monopoly against it ? 

The annual domestic exports of the country may be put down, even in the 
present embarrassed condition of the country, at $110,000,000, valued at our 
own ports. It is drawn from the forest, the ocean, and the soil, except about 
ten millions of domestic manufactures, and is the product of that vast mass of 
industry engaged in the various branches of the lumber business, the fisheries, 
in raising grain and stock, producing the great agricultural staples, rice, cotton, 
and tobacco ; in purchasing and shipping abroad these various products, and 
exchanging and bringing home, in return, the products of other countries, with 
all the associated industry necessary to keep this vast machinery in motion — 
the ship-builder, the sailor, and the himdreds of thousands of mechanics, inclu- 
ding manufacturers themselves, and others, who furnish the various necessary 
supplies for that purpose. It is difficult to estimate with precision the number 
employed, directly or indirectly, in keeping in motion this vast machinery, of 
which our great commercial cities, and numerous ships, which whiten the ocean, 
are but a small part. A careful examination of the returns of the statistics ac- 
companying the census would afford a probable estimate ; and on the faith of 
such examination, made by a friend, I feel myself warranted in saymg that it 
exceeds those employed in manufacturing, with the associated industry necessa- 
ry to furnish them Avith supplies, in the proportion at least of ten to one. It is 
probably much greater. 

Such is the export industry of the country ; such its amount ; such the sour- 
ces from which it is drawn ; such the variety and magnitude of its branches : 
and such the proportion in numbers which those who are employed in it, directly 



524 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

and indirectly, bears to those who are, in like manner, employed in manufac- 
turing industry. It is this vast and various amount of industry employed at 
home, and drawing from the forest, the water, and the soil, as it were by crea- 
tion, this immense surplus wealth, to be sent abroad, and exchanged for the pro- 
ductions of the rest of the globe, that is stigmatized as foreign industry ! And 
it is that, senators, which you are now called on to tax, by imposing the high 
duties proposed in this bill on the articles imported in exchange, in order to ex- 
clude them, in whole or part, for the supposed benefit of a very minor interest, 
which chooses to regard itself as exclusively entitled to your protection and fa- 
vour. Are you prepared to respond favourably to the call, by voting for this 
bill ? Waiving the high questions of justice and constitutional power, I propose 
to examine, in the next place, the mere question of expediency ; and, for that 
j)urpose, the operation of these high protective duties — tracing, first, their effects 
on the manufacturing interest intended be to benefited, and afterward on the ex- 
port interest, against which they are directed. 

And here let me say, before I enter on this part of my subject, that I am no 
enemy to the manufacturing interest. On the contrary, few regard them with 
greater favour, or place a higher estimate on their importance, than myself. 
According to my conception, the great advance made in the arts by mechanical 
and chemical inventions and discoveries, in the last three or four generations, 
lias done more for civilization, and the elevation of the human race, than all oth- 
er causes combined in the same period. With this impression, I behold with 
pleasure the progress of the arts in every department, and look to them mainly 
as the great means of bringing about a higher state of civilization, with all the 
accompanying blessings, physical, political, and moral. It is not to them, nor to 
the manufacturing interest, I object, but to what I believe to be the unjust, the 
unconstitutional, the mistaken and pernicious means of bettering their condition, 
by wdiat is called the protective system. 

In tracing what would be the efTects of the high protective duties proposed 
by the bill, I shall suppose all the grounds assumed by its advocates to be true ; 
that the low prices complained of are caused by the imports received in ex- 
change for exports ; that the imports have, to a great extent, taken possession 
of the market ; and that the imposition of high duties proposed on the imports 
would exclude them either wholly, or to a great extent ; and that the market, in 
consequence, would be relieved, and be followed by the rise of price desired. 
I assume all to be as stated, because it is the supposition most favourable to 
those who ask for high duties, and the one on which they rely to make out their 
case. It is my wish to treat the subject with the utmost fairness, having no 
other object in view but truth. 

According, then, to t\ie supposition, the first leading effect of these high pro- 
tective duties would be to exclude the imported articles, against which they are 
asked, either entirely, or to a great extent. If they should fail in that, it is ob- 
vious that they would fail in the immediate object desired, and that the whole 
would be an abortion. What, then, I ask, must be the necessary consequence 
of the exclusion of the articles against which the protective duties are propo- 
sed to be laid ? The answer is clear. The portion of the exports, which would 
have been exchanged for them, must then return in the unprotected and free ar- 
ticles ; and among the latter, specie, in order to purchase from the manufactu- 
rers at home the supplies which, but for the diUies, woidd have been purchased 
abroad. And what would be the efTect of that, but to turn the exchange, arti- 
ficially, in our favour, as against other countries, and in favour of the manufac- 
turing portion of the country, as against all others ? And what would that be 
but an artificial concentration of the specie of the country in the manufacturing 
region, accompanied by a corresponding expansion of the currency from that 
cause, and still more from the discounts of the banks 1 I next ask. What must 
be the effects of such expansion but that of raising prices there ? and what of 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 525 

that, but of increasing the expense of manufacturing, and that continuing till the 
increased expense shall raise the cost of producing so high as to be equal to 
that of the imported article, with the addition of the duty, when the importations 
will again commence, and an additional duty be demanded ? 

This inevitable result would be accelerated by two causes. The effect of 
the duty in preventing importation would cause a falling off of the demand abroad, 
and a consequent falling oft', temporarily, of price there. The extent would de- 
pend on the extent of the falling off compared with the general demand for the 
article ; and, of course, would be greater in some articles, and less in others. 
AH would be more or less affected ; but none to an extent so great as was in- 
sisted on by the chairman, and other advocates of the system, the other day, in 
the discussion of the duty on cotton bagging ; but still sufficient, in most cases, 
to be sensibly felt. I say temporarily, for the great laws which regulate and 
equalize prices would in time cause, in turn, a corresponding falling oft' in the 
production of the article proportional to the falling off of the demand. 

But another and more powerful cause would be put in operation at home, 
which would tend still more to shorten the periods between the demand for pro- 
tection. The stimulus caused by the expansion of the currency, and increased 
demand and prices consequent on the exclusion of the article from abroad, would 
tempt numerous adventurers to rush into the business, often without experience 
or capital ; and the increased production, in consequence, thrown into the mar- 
ket would greatly accelerate the period of renewed distress and embarrassment, 
and demand for additional protection. 

The history of the system fully illustrates the operation of these causes, and 
the truth of the conclusion drawn from them. Every protective tarift' that Con- 
gress has ever laid has disappointed the hopes of its advocates ; and has been 
followed, at short intervals, by a demand for higher duties, as I have shown on 
a former occasion.* The cry has been protection after protection ; one bottle 
after another, and each succeeding one more capacious than the preceding. 
Repetition but increases the demand, till the whole terminates in one universal 
explosion, such as that from which the country is now struggling to escape. 

Such are the effects of the system on the interest in favour of which these 
high protective duties are laid ; and I shall now proceed to trace them on the 
great export interest, against which they are laid. I start at the same point — 
the exclusion, in part or whole, of the importation of the articles against which 
they are laid — their very object, as I have stated, and which, if not eftected, the 
"whole must fail. The necessary' consequence of the falling off of the imports 
must be, uhimately, the falling off of the exports. They are mutually depend- 
ant on each other. It is admitted that the amount of the exports limits the im- 
ports ; and that, taking a series of years together, their value, fairly estimated, 
will be equal, or nearly so ; but it is no less certain that the imports limit, in 
like manner, the exports. If all imports be prohibited, all exports must cease ; 
and if a given amount of imports only be admitted, the exports must ftnally sink 
down to the same amount. For like reason, if such high duties be imposed 
that only a limited amount can be imported with profit (which is the case in 
question), the exports must, in like manner, sink down to the same amount. In 
this aspect, it is proper to trace the effect of another and powerful cause, inti- 
mately connected with that under consideration. 

This falling off of the imports would necessarily cause a falling off of the de- 
mand in the market abroad for our exports. The capacity of our customers 
there to buy from us depends, in a great measure, on their capacity of selling 
to us. To impair the one is to impair the other. The joint operation of the 
two causes would be highly adverse to the export industry of the country. If 
it should not cause an actual decrease of the exports, it would arrest, or greatly 

* Mr. Calhoun's Speech on the Assumption of the Debts of the States. 



526 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

retard, their increase, and with it, the commerce, the navigation, and their as- 
sociate interests ; which explains why those great branches of business were ar- 
rested in their growth under the protective tariffs of 1824i and 1838, and receiv- 
ed such a mighty impulse from the reduction of duties under the Compromise 
Act, as shown from the commercial tables, exhibited on a former occasion du- 
ring the present session.* 

But the loss would not be limited to the falling off of the quantity of the ex- 
ports. There would be a falling off of price as well as quantity. The effects 
of these high protective duties, by preventing imports, would be, to cause a 
drain of specie from abroad, as has been stated, to purchase at home the sup- 
plies which before had been obtained abroad. This, together with the di- 
minished capacity of our foreign customers to buy, as just explained, would 
tend to cause a fall in the price of the articles exported, which would be more 
or less considerable on each, according to circumstances. Both causes com- 
bined — the falling off of quantity and price — would proportionably diminish the 
means of those directly and indirectly engaged in the great export business of 
the country ; which would be followed by another and more powerful cause of 
their impoverishment — that they would have to give a higher price — more 
money, out of their diminished means, to purchase their supplies, whether im- 
ported or manufactured at home, than what they could have got them for 
abroad. Say that the effect would be to increase prices but 25 per cent. : 
then they would have to give one dollar and twenty-five cents, where other- 
wise one dollar would have been sufficient. The joint effects of the whole 
would be the diminution of means, and a contraction of the currency and fall 
of prices in the portion of the Union where the export interest is predominant, 
and an expansion of the currency and increase of price in that where the 
manufacturing interest is, as has been explained. The consequence would be, 
to compel the suffering interest to resort, in the first place, to economy and cur- 
tailment of expenses ; and, if the system be continued, to the abandonment of 
pursuits that no longer afford remunerating profits. 

I next propose to consider what must be the consequence of that result on 
the business and trade of the country. For that purpose, I propose to select a 
single article, as it will be much easier to trace the effects on a single article 
with precision and satisfaction, than it would be on so great a number and va- 
riety. I shall select cotton, because by far the most considerable in the list of 
domestic exports, and the one with which I am the best acquainted. 

When the cultivation of cotton is profitable, those engaged in it devote their 
attention almost exclusively to it, and rely on the proceeds of their crop to pur- 
chase almost every article of supply except bread ; and many even that, to a 
great extent. But when it ceases to be profitable, from high protective duties, 
or other causes, they curtail their expenses, and fall back on their own re- 
sources, with which they abound, to supply their wants. Household industry 
revives ; and strong, substantial, coarse clothing is manufactured from cotton 
and wool for their families and domestics. In addition to cotton, corn and 
other grains are cultivated in sufficient abundance, not only for bread, but for 
the rearing of stock of various descriptions — hogs, horses, mules, cattle, and 
sheep. The effect of all this is to diminish greatly the consumption of the 
manufactured articles, whether imported or made in other portions of the Union ; 
and still, in a greater degree, the purchase of meat, grain, and stock, followed 
by a great falling off in the trade between the cotton region of the South and 
the manufacturing region of the North on one side, and, on the other, the great 
provision and stock region of the West. But the effects do not end there. 
The West — the great and fertile valley of the Mississippi — draws its means 
of purchasing from the manufacturing region almost exclusively from the cot- 

* Mr. Calhoun's Speech on Mr. Clay's Resolutions . 



\ 

SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 527 

ton ; and the falling off of its trade with that region is followed by a corre- 
sponding falling off in that with the manufacturing. The end is, that thia 
scheme of compelling others to give higher prices than they can afl'ord termi- 
nates, as it regards this great branch of industry, in the impoverishment of cus- 
tomers, and loss of the trade of two great sections of the Union. It is thus, 
senators, that every act of folly or vice (through the principle of retributive jus- 
tice, so deeply seated by an all-wise Providence in the political and moral 
world) is sure at last to recoil on its authors. 

What is said of cotton is equally applicable to every other branch of indus- 
try connected directly or indirectly with the great export industry of the coun- 
try. This bill would affect them all alike ; cause them to sell less, get less, 
and give more for what they buy, and to fall back on their own resources for 
supplies ; or abandon their pursuits, to be followed, finally, by impoverishment 
and loss of custom to those with whom it originates. The whole tendency of 
the measure is to isolate country from country, state from state, neighbourhood 
from neighbourhood, and family from family, with diminished means and in- 
creasing poverty as the circle contracts. The consummation of the system, to 
use an illustration no less true than striking of a deceased friend,* " is Robin- 
son Crusoe in goatskin." 

Such would be the effects of the proposed high protective duties, both on the 
interest in favour of which, and that against which they are intended ; even on 
the supposition that the evil is such as the advocates of this bill suppose. But 
such is not the case. The present embarrassment of the manufacturing inter- 
est is not caused by the fact, as supposed, that the imported articles have taken 
possession of the market, almost to the exclusion of the domestic. It is far 
otherwise. Of the whole amount, in value, of the articles proposed to be pro- 
tected by this bill, the imported bear but a small proportion to the domestic. 
The chairman of the Committee on Manufactures (Mr. Simmons) estimates the 
former at $45,000,000, and the latter at $400,000,000 ; that is, about one to 
nine. This estimate is based on the census of 1840. It is probably less now 
than then, in consequence of the increase of the manufactures since, and the 
falling off of the imports. I venture nothing in saying that at no former period 
of our history has the disproportion been so great between them, or the com- 
petition so decidedly against the imported articles. If farther and even more 
decided proof be required, it will be found in the state of the exchange. It is 
now about 31 per cent, in favour of New-York, against Liverpool ; which is 
proof conclusive that our exports, after meeting our engagements abroad, are 
more than sufficient to supply the demands of the country for imported articles, 
even at the comparatively low rates of duty for the last year ; so much so, that 
it is more profitable to import money than goods. As proof of the fact, I see 
it stated that one of the banks of New-York has given orders to import a large 
amount of specie on speculation. It is in such a state of things, and not such 
as that supposed, that it is proposed to lay these high protective duties ; and 
the question is. How will they work under it ? 

That they will still more effectually exclude the imported articles, and still 
more strongly turn the exchange in our favour, and thereby give a local and 
artificial expansion to the currency in the manufacturing region, and a tem- 
porary stimulus to that branch of industry, is probable, but there is no hazard 
in saying that it would be fleeting, beyond what has been usual from the same 
cause, and would be succeeded more speedily, and to a greater extent, by the 
falling off of the home market, through the operation of causes already ex- 
plained. The resuU, in a few words, would be a greater and more sudden 
reaction, to be followed by a more sudden and more extensive loss of the 
home market ; so that, whatever might be gained by the exclusion of foreign 

* Hon. Warren R. Davis. 



528 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

articles, would be far outweighed by the loss of it. What else would follow, 
I will not attempt to anticipate. It would be the first time that a high protect- 
ive tariff has ever been adopted under similar circumstances ; and it would be 
difficult, without the aid of experience,- in a case so unprecedented, and on a 
subject so complicated, to trace consequences with anything like precision or 
certainty. 

The advocates of the protective, or, rather, the prohibitory system (for that is 
the more appropriate name), have been led into error, from not distinguishing 
between the situation of our country and that of England. That country has 
risen to great power and wealth, and they attribute it to her prohibitory policy, 
overlooking the great advantages of her position ; her greater freedom and 
security, compared to the rest of Europe ; and forgetting that other European 
countries, and Spain in particular, pushed the system even farther, with the 
very reverse effect. But, admitting that the greatness of England may, in part, 
be attributed to the system, still it would furnish no proof that its effects would 
be the same with us. Our situ«.tion is, in many respects, strikingly different 
from hers ; and, among others, in the important particular, as it affects the point 
under consideration, that she never had but few raw materials to export, and 
they of no great value : coal and salt now, and avooI formerly ; while cur coun- 
try has numerous such products, and of the greatest value in the general com- 
merce of the world. England had to create, by manufacturing, the products 
for her export trade ; but, with us, our soil and climate and forests are the great 
sources from which they are drawn. To extract them from these, to ship them 
abroad, and exchange them for the products of the rest of the world, forms the 
basis of our industry, as has been shown. In that is to be found the great 
counteracting cause, with us, to the system of prohibitory duties, the operation 
of which I have endeavoured rapidly to sketch. It has heretofore defeated, 
and will continue to defeat, the hopes of its advocates. In England, there 
neither was nor is any such counteracting cause ; and hence the comparative 
facility and safety with which it could be introduced and established there. 

But it was asked, What is to be done ? What course does true policy re- 
quire, to give the highest possible impulse to the industry and prosperity of the 
country, including manufactures and all ? I answer, the very reverse of that 
proposed by this bill. Instead of looking to the home market, and shaping all 
our policy to secure that, we must look to the foreign, and shape it to secure 
that. 

We have, senators, reached a remarkable point in the progress of civiliza- 
tion and the mechanical and chemical arts, and which will require a great 
change in the policy of civilized nations. Within the last three or four gen- 
erations, they have received an impulse far beyond all former example, and 
have now obtained a perfection before unknown. The result has been a won- 
derfully increased facility of producing all articles of supply depending on those 
arts ; that is, of those very articles which we call, in our financial language, 
protected articles ; and against the importation of which these high duties are 
for the most part intended. In consequence of this increased facility, it now 
requires but a small part, comparatively, of the labour and capital of a country 
to clothe its people, and supply itself with most of the products of the useful 
arts ; and hence, all civilized people, with little exception, are producing their 
own supply, and even overstocking their own market. It results that no peo- 
ple restricted to the home market can, in the present advanced state of the 
useful arts, rise to greatness and wealth by manufactures. For that purpose, 
they must compete successfully for the foreign market in the younger, less ad- 
vanced, and less civilized countries. This necessity for more enlarged and 
freer intercourse between the older, more advanced, and more civilized nations, 
and the younger, less advanced, and less civilized, at a time when the whole 
globe is laid open to our knowledge, and a rapidity and facility of intercourse 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 529 

cslablislied between all its parts heretofore unknown, is one of tlie mighty means 
ordained by Providence to spread population, light, civilization, and prosperity 
far and wide over its entire surface. 

The great problem, then, is. How is the foreign market to be commanded ? I 
answer, by the reverse means proposed in order to command the home market 
— low instead of high duties ; and a sound currency, fixed, stable, and as near- 
ly as possible on the level with the general currency of the world, instead of an 
inflated and fluctuating one. Nothing can be more hostile to the command of 
foreign trade than high prohibitory duties, even as it regards the exports of 
manufactures. The artificial expansion of the currency, and consequent rise 
of price and increased expense of production, which, as has been shown, must 
follow, would be of themselves fatal ; but to that must be added another cause 
not much less so. I refer to the general pressure of the prohibitory system on 
the export industry of the country, as already explained, and which would fall 
with as much severity on the export of manufactures as on that of cotton or 
any other manufactured article. The system operates with like efiect on ex- 
ports, Avhether of raw materials or manufactured articles in the last and highest 
state of finish. The reason is the same as to both. This begins to be understood 
in countries the most advanced in the arts, and whose exports consist almost 
exclusively of manufactured articles ; and especially England, the most so of 
any ; and hence they have already begun the process of reduction of duties, 
with the view of increasing their exports. In the recent adjustment of her tar- 
iff", England, with that avowed view, made great reduction in her import duties. 
But can Ave hope to compete successfully in the market of the world by means 
of a sound currency and low duties ? I answer, if we cannot, we may give up 
the contest as desperate ; and the sooner the better. It is idle, and worse than 
idle, to attempt to add to the growth of our manufactures by the prohibitory sys- 
tem. They have already reached, under its influence, their full, but stunted 
growth. To attempt to push them farther, must react and retard instead of ac- 
celerating their growth. The home market cannot consume our im.mense sur- 
plus productions of provisions, lumber, cotton, and tobacco ; nor find employ- 
ment in manufacturing, for home consumption, the vast amount of labour em- 
ployed in raising the surplus beyond the home consumption, and which can only 
find a market abroad. Take the single article of cotton. It takes, at the least 
calculation, 700,000 labourers to produce the crop — more than twice the num- 
ber, on a fair calculation, employed in all the branches of manufactures which 
can expect to be benefited by these high duties. Less than the sixth part would 
be ample to raise every pound of cotton necessary for the home market, if every 
yard of cotton cloth consumed at home were manufactured at home, and made 
from home-raised cotton. What, then, I ask, is to become of the five or six 
hundred thousand labourers now employed in raising the article for the foreign 
market? How can they find employment in manufacturing, when 91 parts in 
100 of all the protected articles consumed in the country are now made at home T 
And if not in manufacturing, how else can they be employed ? In raising pro- 
visions ? Those engaged in that already supply, and more than supply, the 
home market ; and how shall they find employment in that quarter ? How those 
employed in the culture of tobacco, and the lumber business, and foreign trade ? 
The alternative is inevitable — they must either persist, in spite of these high 
protective duties, with all the consequent loss and impoverishment which must 
follow them, in their present employment, or be forced into universal competi- 
tion in producing the protected articles for the home market, which is already 
nearly fully supplied by the small amount of labour engaged in their production. 
But why should we doubt our capacity to compete successfully, with a sound 
currency and low duties, in the general market of the world ? A superabun- 
dance of cheap provisions, and of the raw material, as far as cotton is concern- 
ed, gives us great advantage in the greatest and most important branch of man- 

X X X 



530 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

iifactures in modem times. To these may be added, a favourable situation for 
trade with all the world ; the most abundant and cheap supply of what may be 
called natural capital — water, coal, timber, and soil ; and a peculiar aptitude for 
mechanical and chemical improvements on the part of our citizens, combined 
with great energy, industry, and skill. There are but two drawbacks — high 
wa^es and high interest. In other respects, no country has superior advanta- 
ges for manufacturing. 

No one is more averse to the reduction of wages than I am, or entertains a 
greater respect for the labouring portion of the community. Nothing could in- 
duce me 10 adopt a course of policy that would impair their comfort or prosper- 
ity. But when we speak of wages, a distinction must be made between the 
real and artificial ; between that which enables a labourer to exchange the fruits 
of his industry for the greatest amount of food, clothing, and other necessaries 
or comforts, without regard to the nominal amount in money, and the mere nom- 
inal money amount, that is often the result of an inflated currency, which, in- 
stead of increasing wages in proportion to the price and the means of the la- 
bourer, is one of the most effective means of defrauding him of his just dues. 
But it is a great mistake to suppose that low prices and high wages, estimated 
in money, are irreconcilable. Wages are but the residuum after deducting the 
profit of capital, the expense of production, including the exactions of the gov- 
ernment in the shape of taxes, which must certainly fall on production, however 
laid. The less that is paid for the use of capital, for the expense of produc- 
tion, and the exactions of the government, the greater is the amount left for wa- 
ges ; and hence, by lessening these, prices may fall, and wages rise at the same 
time ; and that is the combination which gives to labour its greatest reward, and 
places the prosperity of a country on the most durable basis. It is not my 
habit to stop and illustrate by example ; but the importance of the point under 
consideration is such, that it would seem to justify it. 

For this purpose, I shall select a product of the soil, and take the article of 
wheat. Suppose twenty bushels of wheat to be produced on an acre of land in 
Virginia, worth ten dollars the acre, and twenty on an acre in England, worth 
one hundred dollars, and the wheat to be worth one dollar a bushel ; suppose, 
also, that the interest, or cost for the use of capital, to be the same in both 
-countries — say 6 per cent. — and the cost of cultivation and the exactions of the 
government the same : it is manifest, on the supposition, that wages could not 
commence in England till $6 (the interest on $100) was paid ; while in Vir- 
ginia it would commence after GO cents (the interest on $10) was paid. And 
hence, in England, setting the cost of cultivation and the exactions of the gov- 
ernment aside, but $14 would be left for wages, while $19 40 would be left in 
Virginia ; and hence, the product of labour in Virginia, out of this greater re- 
siduum, might sell at a lower price, and leave still a greater fund for the re- 
ward of wages. The reduction of the cost of cultivation, and of the exactions 
of the government, would have the same effect as paying less for the capital, 
and would have the effect of making a still greater difference in the fund to 
pay wages. Taking the aggregate of the whole, and comparing all the ele- 
ments that enter into the computation, I feel assured that, with a sound curren- 
cy and low duties — i. e,, Ught taxes exacted on the part of the government — 
the only element which is against us in the rate of interest, but that our advanta- 
ges in other respects would more than counterbalance it ; and that we have no- 
thing to fear in open competition with other countries in the general market of 
the world. We would have our full share with the most successful ; while, at 
the same time, the exuberance of the home market, relieved from oppressive 
burdens, would be vastly increased, and be more effectually and exclusively 
commanded by the productions of our own manufacturers, than it can possibly 
be by the unjust, unconstitutional, monopolizing, and oppressive scheme propo- 
sed by this bill. 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C, CALHOUN. 531 

I am not ignorant, senators, that it is the work of time and of great delicacy 
to pass from the artiticial condition in which the country has long been placed, 
in reference to its industry, by a mistaken and mischievous system of policy. 
Sudden transitions, even to better habits or better conditions, are hazardous, un- 
less slowly effected. With this impression, I have ever been averse to all sud- 
den steps, both as to the currency and the system of policy which is now the 
subject of our deliberation, bad as I believe them both to be ; and deep as my 
conviction is in favour of a sound currency and low duties, I am by no means 
disposed to reach, by a sudden transition, the points to which I firmly believe 
they may be reduced, consistently with the necessary wants of the government, 
by a proper management of our finances. 

But, as pernicious as the prohibitory or protective system may be on the in- 
dustrial pursuits of the country, it is still more so on its politics and morals. 
That they have greatly degenerated within the last fifteen or twenty years ; that 
there are less patriotism and purity, and more faction, selfishness, and corrup- 
tion ; that our public affairs are conducted with less dignity, decorum, and re- 
gard to economy, accountability, and public faith ; and, finally, that the taint has 
extended to private as well as public morals, is, unhappily, but too manifest to 
be denied. If all this be traced back, the ultimate cause of this deplorable 
change will be found to originate mainly in the fact, that the duties (or, to speak 
more plainly, the taxes on imports), from which now the whole revenue is de- 
rived, are so laid, that the most powerful portion of the community — not in num- 
bers, but influence — are not only exempted from the burden, but, in fact, ac- 
cording to their own conception, receive bounties from their operation. They 
crowd our tables with petitions, imploring Congress to impose taxes — high tax- 
es ; and rejoice at their imposition as the greatest blessing, and deplore their 
defeat as the greatest calamity ; while other portions regard them in the oppo- 
site light, as oppressive and grievous burdens. Now, senators, I appeal to 
you — to the candour and good sense even of the friends of this bill — whether 
these facts do not furnish proof conclusive that these high protective duties are 
regarded as bounties, and not taxes, by these petitioners, and those who support 
their course, and urge the passage of the bill ? Can stronger proof be ofibred ? 
Bounties may be implored, but it is not in human nature to pray for taxes, bur- 
den, and oppression, believing them to be such. I again appeal to you, and ask 
if the power of taxation can be perverted into an instrument in the hands of gov- 
ernment to enrich and aggrandize one portion of the community at the expense 
of the other, without causing all of the disastrous consequences, political and 
moral, which we all deplore ? Can anything be imagined more destructive of pa- 
triotism, and more productive of faction, selfishness, and violence ; or more hos- 
tile to all economy and accountability in the administration of the fiscal department 
of the government ? Can those who regard taxes as a fruitful source of gain, 
or as the means of averting ruin, regard extravagance, waste, neglect, or any 
other means by which the expenditures may be increased, and the tax on the 
imports raised, with the deep condemnation which their corrupting consequen- 
ces on the politics and morals of the community demand ? Let the history of 
the government since the introduction of the system, and its present wretched 
condition, respond. 

But it would be doing injustice to charge the evils which have flowed from 
the system, and the greater which still threaten, exclusively on the manufactu- 
ring interest. Although it ostensibly originates with it, yet, in fact, it is the 
least efficient, and the most divided, of all that combination of interests from 
which the system draws its support. Among them, the first and most powerful 
is that active, vigilant, and well-trained corps, which lives on government, or 
expects to live on it ; which prospers most when the revenue is the greatest, 
the treasury the fullest, and the expenditures the most profuse ; and, of course, 
is ever the firm and faithful support of whatever system shall extract most from 



532 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

the pockets of the rest of the commnnity, to be emptied into theirs. The next 
in order — v/hen the government is connected with the banks — when it receives 
their notes in its dues, and pays them away as cash, and uses them as its de- 
positories and fiscal agents — are the banking and other associated interests, 
stock-jobbers, brokers, and speculators ; and vrhich, like the other, profit the 
more in consequence of the connexion ; the higher the revenue, the greater its 
surplus and the expenditures of the government. It is less numerous, but still 
more active and powerful, in proportion, than the other. These form the basis "; 
and on these, political aspirants, who hope to rise to power and control through 
it, rear their party organization. It is they who infuse into it the vital princi- 
ple, and give life, and energy, and direction to the whole. This formidable com- 
bination, thus vivified and directed, rose to power in the late great political 
struggle, and is now in the ascendant ; and it is to its death-like efforts to main- 
tain and consolidate its power, that this and the late session owe their extra- 
ordinary proceedings. Its hope now is centred in this bill. In their estima- 
tion, without a protective tariff", all is lost ; and, with it, that which is now lost 
may be regained. 

I have now, senators, said what I intended. It may be asked. Why have I 
spoken at all ? It is not from the expectation of changing a single vote on the 
opposite side. That is hopeless. The indications during this discussion show, 
beyond doubt, a foregone determination on the part of its advocates to vote for 
the bill, without the slightest amendment, be its defects or errors ever so great. 
They have shut their eyes and closed their ears. The voice of an angel from 
heaven could not reach their understanding. Why, then, have I raised mine ? 
Because my hope is in truth. " Crushed to earth, it will rise again." It is 
rising, and I have added my voice to hasten its resuiTection. Great already 
is the change of opinion on this subject since 1828. Then the plantation states, 
as they were called, stood alone against this false and oppressive system. We 
had scarcely an ally beyond their limits, and we had to throw off" the crushing 
burden it imposed, as we best could, within the limits of the Constitution. Very 
difllerent is the case now. On whatever side the eye is turned, firm and faith- 
ful allies are to be seen. The great popular party is already rallied almost en 
masse around the banner which is leading the party to its final triumph. The 
few that still lag will soon be rallied under its ample folds. On that banner is 
inscribed, FREE TRADE; LOW DUTIES; NO DEBT; SEPARATION 
FROM BANKS ; ECONOMY; RETRENCHMENT, AND STRICT AD- 
HERENCE TO THE CONSTITUTION. Victory in such a case Avill be 
great and glorious ; and if its principles be faithfully and firmly adhered to, after 
it is achieved, much will it redound to the honour of those by whom it will have 
been won ; and long will it perpetuate the liberty and prosperity of the covmtry. 



XXXVII. 

SPEECH ON THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON, AUGUST, 1842. 

Mr. Calhoun said that his object in rising was not to advocate or oppose 
the treaty, but simply to state the reasons that would govern him in voting for 
its ratification. The question, according to his conception, was not whether it 
was all we could desire, or whether it was liable to this or that objection, but 
whether it was such a one that, under all the circumstances of the case, it 
would be most advisable to adopt or reject. Thus regarded, it was his inten- 
tion to state fairly the reasons in favour of and against its ratification, and to 
assign to each its proper weight, beginning with the portion relating to the 
Northeastern boundary, the settlement of which was the immediate and promi- 
nent object of the negotiation. 



SlPEECEIES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 533 

He was one of those who had not the slightest doubt that the boundary for 
%vhich the State of Maine contended was the true one, as estabhshed by the 
treaty of j)eace in 1783 ; and had accordingly so recorded his vote, after *a de- 
liberate investigation of the subject. But, although such was his opinion, he 
did not doubt, at the time, that the boundary could only be settled by a compro- 
mise line. We had admitted it to be doubtful at an early period during the 
administration of Washington, and more recently and explichly, by stipulating 
to submit it to the arbitration of a friendly power, by the treaty of Ghent. The 
doubt thus admitted on our part to exist had been greatly strengthened by the 
award of the King of Holland, who had been mutually selected as the arbiter 
under the treaty. So strong, indeed, was his (Mr. C.'s) impression that the 
dispute could otdy be settled by a compromise or conventional line, that he said 
to a friend in the then cabinet (when an appropriation was made a few years 
since for a special mission to be sent to England on the subject of the boundary, 
and his name, among others, was mentioned for the place), that the question 
could only be settled by compromise ; and for that purpose some distinguished 
citizen of the section ought to be selected ; and neither he, nor any other 
Southern man, ought to be thought of. With these previous impressions, he 
was prepared, when the negotiation opened, to expect, if it succeeded in adjust- 
ing the difficulty, it would be (as it has been) on a compromise line. Notwith- 
standing, when it was first announced that the line agreed on included a con- 
siderable portion of the territory lying to the west of the line awarded by the 
King of Holland, he was incredulous, and expressed himself strongly against 
it. His first impression was perhaps the more strongly against it, from the 
fact that he had lixed on the River St. John, from the mouth of Eel River, 
taking the St. Francis branch (the one selected by the King of Holland) as the 
natural and proper compromise boundary, including in our limits all the portion of 
the disputed territory lying north of Eel River, and west and south of the St. John, 
above its junction ; and all the other within that of Great Britain. On a little 
reflection, however, he resolved not to form his opinion of the merits or demer- 
its of the treaty on rumoiur or imperfect information, but to wait until the whole 
subject was brought before the Senate officially, and then to make it up on full 
knowledge of all the facts and circumstances, after deliberate and mature reflec- 
tion ; and that he had done with the utmost care and impartiality. What he 
now proposed was to give the result, with the reasons on which it rests, and 
which would govern his vote on the ratification. 

He still believed that the boundary which he had fixed in his own mind was 
the natural and proper one ; but, as that could not be obtained, the question for 
them to decide was. Are the objections to the boundary as actually agreed on, 
and the stipulations connected with it, such as ought to cause its rejection ? In 
deciding it, it must be borne in mind that, as far as this portion of the boundary 
is concerned, it is a question belonging much more to the State of Maine than 
to the Union. It is, in truth, but the boundary of that state ; and it makes a 
part of the boundary of the United States, only by being the exterior boundary 
of one of the states of our Federal Union. It is her sovereignty and soil that 
are in dispute, except the portion of the latter that still remains in Massachu- 
setts ; and it belongs, in the first place, to her, and to Massachusetts, as far as her 
right of soil is involved, to say what their rights and interests are, and \s hat is 
required to be done. The rest of the Union is bound to defend them in their 
just claim ; and to assent to what they may be willing to assent, in settling the 
claim in contest, if there should be nothing in it inconsistent with the interest, 
honour, or safety of the rest of the Union. It is so that the controversy has 
ever been regarded. It is well known President Jackson would readily have 
agreed to the award of the King of Holland, had not Maine objected ; and that, 
to overcome her objection, he was prepared to recommend to Congress to give 
her, in order to get her consent, one million of acres of the public domain, worth, 



534 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

at the minimum price, a million and a quarter of dollars. The case is now re- 
versed. Maine and Massachusetts have both assented to the stipulations of the 
treaty, as far as the question of the boundary aflects their peculiar interest, 
through commissioners vested with full powers to represent them : and the 
question for us to decide is, Shall we reject that to which they have assented ? 
Shall the government, after refusing to agree to the award of the King of Hol- 
land, because Maine objected, now reverse its course, and refuse to agree to 
that which she and Massachusetts have both assented ? There may, indeed, be 
reasons strong enough to authorize such a course ; but they must be such as 
will go to prove that we cannot give our assent consistently with the interests, 
the honour, or the safety of the Union. That has not been done ; and, he 
would add, if there be any such, he has not been able to detect them. 

It has, indeed, been said that the assent of Maine was coerced. She cer- 
tainly desired to obtain a more favourable boundary ; but when the alternative 
was presented of another reference to arbitration, she waived her objection, as 
far as she was individually concerned, rather than incur the risk, delay, uncer. 
tainty, and vexation of another submission of her claims to arbitration ; and left 
it to the Senate, the constituted authority appointed for the purpose, to decide 
on the general merits of the treaty as it relates to the whole Union. In so 
doing, she has, in his opinion, acted wisely and patriotically — wisely for her- 
self, and patriotically in reference to the rest of the Union. She has not got, 
indeed, all she desired ; and has even lost territory, if the treaty be compared 
to the award of the King of Holland ; but, as an olFset, that which she has lost 
is of little value, while that which she retains has been greatly increased in 
value by the stipulations contained in the treaty. The whole amount lost is 
about half a million of acres. It lies along the eastern slope of the highlands, 
skirting the St. Lawrence to the east, and is acknowledged to be of little value 
for soil, timber, or anything else — a steril region, in a severe, inhospitable chme. 
Against that loss, she has acquired the right to navigate the River St. John ; 
and that, not only to float down the timber on its banks, but all the productions 
of the extensive, well-timbered, and, taken as a whole, not steril portion of 
the state that lies on her side of the basin of that river and its tributaries. But 
that is not all. She also gains what is vastly more valuable — the right to ship 
them, on the same terms as colonial productions, to Great Britain and her colo- 
nial possessions. 

These great and important advantages will probably double the value of that 
extensive region, and make it one of the most populous and flourishing portions 
of the state. Estimated by a mere moneyed standard, these advantages are 
worth, he would suppose, all the rest of the territory claimed by Maine without 
them. If to this be added the sum of about $200,000 to be paid to her for the 
expense of defending her territory, and $300,000 to her and Massachusetts in 
equal moieties, in consequence of their assent to the boundary and the equiva- 
lents received, it must be apparent that Maine has not made a bad exchange in 
accepting the treaty, as compared with the award, as far as her separate inter- 
est is concerned. But be that as it may, she is the rightful judge of her own 
interests ; and her assent is a sufficient ground for our assent, provided that to 
which she has assented does not involve too great a sacrifice on the part of the 
rest of the Union, nor their honour or safety. So far from that, as far as the ' 
rest of the Union is concerned, the sacrifice is small and the gain great. They 
are under solemn constitutional obligations to defend Maine, as one of the mem- 
bers of the Union, against invasion, and to protect her territory, cost what it 
may, at every hazard. The power claiming what she contended to be hers, 
is one of the greatest, if not the greatest, on earth ; the dispute is of long stand- 
ing, and of a character difficult to be adjusted ; and, however clear the right of 
Maine may be regarded in the abstract, it has been made doubtful in conse- 
quence of admissions, for which the government of the Union is responsible. 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 535 

To terminate such a controversy, with the assent of the party immediately in- 
terested, by paying the small sum of half a million — of which a large part 
(say $200,000) is unquestionably due to Maine, and would have to be paid to 
her without the treaty — is indeed a small sacrifice — a fortunate deliverance. 
President Jackson was willing to allow her, as has been stated, more than twice 
as much for her assent to the award ; and in doing so, he showed his wisdom, 
whatever might have been thought of it at the time. Those, at least, who op- 
posed the treaty will not charge him with being willing to sacrifice the inter- 
est and honour of the Union in making the offer ; and yet the charge which 
they make against this portion of the treaty does, by implication, subject what 
he was ready to do to a similar one. 

But it is said that the territory which England would acquire beyond the 
boundary of the awarded line would greatly strengthen her frontier and weak- 
en ours, and would thereby endanger the safety of the country in that quarter. 
He did not profess to be deeply versed in military science, but, according to 
his conception, there was no foundation for the objection. It was, if he did not 
mistake, the very last point on our whole frontier, from the mouth of the St; 
Croix to the outlet of Lake Superior, on which an expedition would be organi- 
zed on either side to attack the possessions of the other. In a military point 
of view, our loss is as nothing in that quarter ; while in another, and a much more 
important quarter, our gain by the treaty is great, in the same point of view. 
He referred to that provision by which we acquire Rouse's Point, at the nor- 
thern extremity of Lake Champlain. It is among the most important military 
positions on the whole line of our Eastern and Northern frontier, Avhether it be 
regarded in reference to offensive or defensive operations. He well remem- 
bered the deep sensation caused among miUtary men in consequence of its loss ; 
and he would leave the question of loss or gain, in a military point of view 
(taking the two together), to their decision, without the least doubt what it 
would be. 

But if it should be thought by any one that these considerations, as conclu- 
sive as they seemed to be, were not sufficient to justify the ratification of this 
portion of the treaty, there were others, which appeared to him to be perfectly 
conclusive. He referred to the condition in which we would be left if the 
treaty should be rejected. He would ask, If, after having agreed at Ghent to 
refer the subject to arbitration, and after having refused to agree to the award 
made under that reference, by an arbitrator of our own selection, we should 
now reject this treaty, negotiated by our own Secretary of State, under our own 
eyes, and which had previously received the assent of the states immediately 
interested, whether there would be the slightest prospect that another equally 
favourable would ever be obtained ? On the contrary, would avc not stand in a 
far worse condition than ever in reference to our claim ? Would it not, indeed, 
be almost certain that we should lose the whole of the basin of the St. John, 
and Great Britain gain all for which she ever contended, strcnsthened as she 
would be by the disclosures made during this discussion ?* He was far from 

* The following extract from the speech of Mr. Rives, the chairman of the Committee on For- 
eign Relations, will showwhat the disclosures were : . f., 

It appears to the committee, therefore, in looking back to the public and solemn acts ol the gov- 
ernment and of successive administrations, that the time has passed, if it ever existed, when we 
could be justified in making the precise line of boundary claimed t)y us the subject of a sine qua 
non of negotiation, or of the vltimo ratw—o{ an assertion by force. Did a second arbitration, then, 
afford the prospect of a more satisfactory result ? This expedient seemed to be rqnallv rejected by 
all parties-by the United States, by Great Britain, and by the State of Maine. 11 such an alterna- 
tive should be contemplated by any one as preferable to the arrangement which had been made, it 
is fit to bear m mind the risk and uncertainly, as well as the inevitable delay and expense, inci.lent 
to that mode of decision. We have already seen, in the mstance of the arbitration by the King of 
the Netherlands, how much weight a tribunal of that sort is inclined to give to the argument of con- 
venience, and a supposed mtention on the part of the negotiators of the treaty of 1,83 against the 
literal and positive terms employed by the instrument in its description of limits. Is there no dan- 
ger in the event of another arbitration, that a farther research into the public archives of Europe 
might brmg to light some embarrassing (even though apocryphal) document, to throw a new shade 



536 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

asserting that the facts disclosed estabUshed the claim of Great Britain, or that 
the map exhibited is the one to which Franklin referred in his note to the Count 

of plausible doubt on the clearness of our title, in the view of a sovereign arbiter ? Such a docu- 
ment has already been communicated to the committee ; and I feel it (said Mr. R.) to be my duly to 
lay it before the Senate, that they may fully appreciate its bearings, and determine for themselves 
the weight and importance which belong to it. It is due to the learned and distinguished gentleman 
(Mr. Jared Sparks, of Boston) by whom the document referred to was discovered in the arcluves of 
France, while pursuing his laborious and intelligent researches connected with the history of our 
own country, that the account of it should be given in his own words, as contained m a communi- 
cation addressed by him to the department of state. I proceed, therefore, to read from that com- 
munication : 

" While pursuing my researches among the voluminous papers relating to the American Revolu- 
tion in the Archives des Affaires Etrangeres in Paris, I found in one of the bound volumes an ori- 
ginal letter from Dr. Franklin to Count de Vergennes, of which the following is an exact transcript •. 

" ' Passy, December 6, 1782. 
" ' Sir — I have the honour of returning herewith the map your excellency sent me yesterday. I 
have marked with a strong red line, according to your desire, the limits of the United States, as 
settled in the preliminaries between the British and American plenipotentiaries. 

" ' With great respect, I am, &c., 

" ' B. Franklin.' 

" This letter weis written six days after the preliminaries were signed ; and if we could procure 
the identical map mentioned by Franklin, it would seem to afford conclusive evidence as to the 
meaning affixed by the comniissioners to the language of the treaty on the subject of the boundaries. 
You may well suppose that I lost no time in making inquiry for the map, not doubting that it would 
conlirm all my previous opinions respecting the validity of our claim. In the geographical depart- 
ment of the Archives are sixty thousand maps and charts ; but so well arranged with catalogues 
and indexes, that any one of them may be easily found. After a little research in the American di- 
vision, with the aid of the keeper, I came upon a map of North America, by D'Anville, dated 1746, 
in size about eighteen inches square, on which was drawn a strong red line throughout the entire 
boundary of the United States, answering precisely to Franklin's description. The line is bold and 
distinct in every part, made with red ink, and apparently drawn with a hair-pencil, or a pen with a 
blunt point. There is no other colouring on any part of the map. 

" Imagine my surprise on discovering that this line runs wholly south of the St. John, and between 
the head waters of that river and those of the Penobscot and Kennebec. In short, it is exactly the 
line now contended for by Great Britain, except that it concedes more than is claimed. The north 
line, after departing from the source of the St. Croix, instead of proceeding to Mars Hill, stops far 
short of that point, and turns off to the west, so as to leave on the British side all the streams 
which flow into the St. John between the source of the St. Croix and Mars Hill. It is evident 
that the line, from the St. Croix to the Canadian highlaixl, is intended to exclude all the waters run- 
ning into the St. John. 

" There is no positive proof that this map is actually the one marked by Franklin ; yet, upon any 
other supposition, it would be difficult to explain the circumstances of its agreeing so perfectly with 
liis description, and of its being preserved in the place where it would naturally be deposited by 
Count de Vergennes. 1 also found another map in the Archives, on wluch the same boundary was 
traced in a dotted red line with a pen, apparently copied from the other. 

" I enclose herewith a map of Maine, on which I have drawn a strong black line, corresponding 
with the red one above mentioned." 

I am far from intimating (said Mr. R.) that the documents discovered by Mr. Sparks, curious and 
well worthy of consideration as they undoubtedly are, are of weight sufficient to shake the title of 
the United States, founded on the positive language of the treaty of peace. But they could not fail, 
in the event of another reference, to give increased confidence and emphasis to the pretensions of 
Great Britain, and to exert a corresponding influence upon the mind of the arbiter. It is worth 
while, in this connexion, to turn to what Lord Ashburton has said, in one of his communications to 
Mr. Webster, when explaining his views of the position of the highlands described in the treaty : 

'• My inspection of the maps, and my examination of the documents," says his lordship, " lead me 
to a very strong conviction that the highlands contemplated by the negotiators of the treaty were 
the only highlands then known to them — at the head of the Penobscot, Kennebec, and the uvcrs west 
of the St. Croix ; and that they did not precisely know hovs' the north line from the St. Croix would 
strike them ; and if it were not my wish to shorten this discussion, I believe a very good argument 
might be drawn from the words of the treaty in proof of this. In the negotiations with Mr. Living- 
ston, and afterward with Mr. M'Lane, this view seemed to prevail ; and, as you are aware, there 
were proposals to search for these highlands to the west, where alone, I believe, they will be found 
to answer perfectly the description of the treaty. If this question should, unfortunately, go to a farther 
reference, I should by no means despair of finding some confirmation of this I'iew of the case." 

It is for the Senate to consider (adiied Mr. R.) whether there would not be much risk of intro- 
ducing new complications and embarrassments in this controversy, by leaving it open for another 
litigated reference ; and if the British government — strongly prepossesseti, as its minister tells us it 
is, with the justice of its claims — would not find what it would naturally consider a persuasive 
*'■ confirmation of its view of the case" in documents such as those encountered by Mr. Sparks in 
his historical researches in the Archives of France. 

A map has been vauntmgly paraded here from Mr. Jefferson's collection, in the zeal of opposi- 
tion (without taking time to see what it was), to confront and invalidate the map found by Mr. 
Sparks in the foreign ofSce at Paris ; but, the moment it is examined, it is found to sustain, by the 
most precise and remarkable correspondence in every feature, the map communicated by Mv. Sparks. 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 537 

de Vergennes, the French minister ; but it cannot be doubted that the conform- 
ity of the hne deUneated on the map with the one described in his note 
would have the eilect of strengthening not a Httle the claims of Great Britain 
in her own estimation and that of the world. But the facts stated, and tlic map 
exhibited by the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations (Mr. Rives), 
are not the only or the strongest disclosures made during the discussion. The 
French map introduced by the senator from Missouri (Mr. Benton), from iMr. 
Jefferson's collection in the Congress library, in order to rebut the inference 
from the former, turned out to be still more so. That was made in the village 
of Passy, in the year after the treaty of peace was negotiated, where Franklin 
(who was one of the negotiators) resided, and was dedicated to him ; and that 
has the boundary line drawn in exact conformity to the other, and in the man- 
ner described in the note of Doctor Franklin — a line somewhat more adverse 
to us than that claimed by Great Britain. But, as striking as is this coincidence, 
he was far from regarding it as sufficient to establish the claim of Great Brit- 
ain. It would, however, be in vain to deny that it was a corroborating circum- 
stance, calculated to add no small weight to her claim. 

It would be still farther increased by the fact that France was our ally at the 
time, and, as such, must have been consulted, and kept constantly advised of 
all that occurred during the progress of the negotiation, including its final result. 
It would be idle to suppose that these disclosures would not weigh heavily 
against us in any future negotiation. They would, so much so — taken in con- 
nexion with the adverse award of the King of Holland, and this treaty, should 
it be rejected — as to render hopeless any future attempt to settle the question 
by negotiation or arbitration. No alternative would be left us but to yield to 
the full extent of the British claim, or to put Maine in possession by force, and 
that, too, with the opinion and sympathy of the world against us and our cause. 
In his opinion, we would be bound to attempt it, in justice to Maine, should we 
refuse to agree to what she has assented. So much for the boundary question, 
as far as Maine is concerned. 

Having now shown — satisfactorily, he hoped — that Maine has acted wisely 
for herself in assenting to the treaty, it remained to be considered whether we, 
the representatives of the Union on such questions, would not also do so in rat- 
ifying it, so far, at least, as the boundary question is involved. He would add 
nothing to what had already been said of the portion in which Maine was im- 
mediately interested. His remarks would be confined to the remaining portion 
of the boundary, extending from the northwestern corner of that state to the 
Rocky Mountains. 

Throughout this long-extended line every question has been settled to our 
satisfaction. Our right has been acknowledged to a territory of about one hun- 
dred thousand acres of land in New-Hampshire, which would have been lost by 
the award of the King of Holland. A long gore of about the same amount, ly- 
ing in Vermont and New- York, and which was lost under the treaty of Ghent, 
would be regained by this. It includes Rouse's Point. Sugar Island, lying in 
the water connexion between Lakes Huron and Superior, and heretofore in dis- 
pute, is acknowledged to be ours ; it is large, and valuable for soil and position. 
So, also, is Isle Royale, near the northern shore of Lake Superior, acknowledg- 

The senator who produced it could see nothing but the microscopic dotted line running off in a 
northeasterly direction ; but the moment other eyes were applied to it, there was found, m bold re- 
lief, a strong red Une, mdicating the linuts of the United States, according to the treaty of peace, 
and coinciding, muuitely and exactly, with the boundary traced on the map of Mr. Sparks. That 
this red line, and not the hardly visible dotted Ime, was intended to represent the hinits of the L nited 
States, according to the treaty of peace, is conclusively shown by the circumstance that the red line 
is drawn on the map all around the exterior boundary of the United States ; through the nuddle of 
the Northren Lakes, thence through the Long Lake and the Rainy Lake to the Lake ot the Woods ; 
and from the western extremity of the Lake of the Woods to the River Mississippi ; and along that 
river to the point where the boundary of the United States, acconling to the treaty of peace, leaves 
it ; and thence, by its easterly course to the mouth of the St. Mary's on the Atlantic. 

Y y Y 



53S SPEECHES OF JOHN C, CALHOUN. 

ed to be ours — a large island, and valuable for its fisheries. And also a large 
tract of country to the north and west of that lake, between Fond du Lac and 
the River St. Louis on one side, and Pigeon River on the other — containing four 
millions of acres. It is said to be steril, but cannot well be more so than that 
acquired by Great Britain lying west of the boundary awarded by the King of 
Holland. In addition, all the islands in the River St. Lawrence and the lakes, 
which were divided in running out the division line under previous treaties, are 
acquired by us under this ; and all the channels and passages are opened to the 
common uses of our citizens and the subjects of Great Britain. 

Such are the provisions of the treaty in reference to this long line of bounda- 
ry. Our gain — regarded in the most contracted point of view, as mere equiva- 
lents for the sum assumed to be paid by us to Maine and Massachusetts for their 
assent to the treaty — is vastly greater than what we have contracted to pay. 
Taking the whole boundary question together, and summing up the loss and 
gain of the whole, including what affects Maine and Massachusetts, and he could 
not doubt that, regarded merely as set-offs, our gain greatly exceeds our loss — 
vastly so, compared to what it would have been under the award of the King 
of Holland, including the equivalent which our government was willing to al- 
low Maine for her assent. But it would be, indeed, to take a very contracted 
view to regard it in that light. It would be to overlook the vast importance of 
permanently establishing, between two such powers, a line of boundary of sev- 
eral thousand miles, abounding in disputed points of much difficulty and long 
standino-. The treaty, he trusted, would do much to lay the foundation of a solid 
peace between the countries — a thing so much to be desired. 

It is certainly much to be regretted, after settling so large a portion of the 
boundary, that the part beyond the Rocky Mountains should remain unadjusted. 
Its settlement would have contributed much to strengthen the foundation of a 
durable peace. But would it be wise to reject the treaty because all has not 
been done that could be desired ? He placed a high value on our territory on 
the west of those mountains, and held our title to it to be clear ; but he would 
reo-ard it as an act of consummate folly to stake our claim on a trial of strength 
at°this time. The territory is now held by joint occupancy, under the treaty of 
Ghent, which either party may terminate by giving to the other six months' no- 
tice. If we were to attempt to assert our exclusive right of occupancy at pres- 
ent the certain loss of the territory must be the result ; for the plain reason that 
Great Britain could concentrate there a much larger force, naval and military, 
in a much shorter time, and at far less expense, than we could. That will not 
be denied ; but it will not always be the case. Our population is steadily — he 
mio-ht say rapidly — advancing across the Continent, to the borders of the Pa- 
ciffc Ocean. Judging from past experience, the tide of population will sweep 
across the Rocky Mountains, with resistless force, at no distant period, when 
what we claim will quietly fall into our hands, without expense or bloodshed. 
Time is acting for us. Wait patiently, and all we claim will be ours ; but if we 
attempt to seize it by force, it will be sure to elude our grasp. 

Having now stated his reasons for voting to ratify the articles in the treaty 
relating to the boundary, he would next proceed to assign those that would gov- 
ern his%ote on the two relating to the African slave-trade. And here he would 
premise, that there are several circumstances which caused no small repug- 
nance on his part to any stipulations whatever with Great Britain on the sub- 
ject of those articles ; and he would add, that he would have been gratified if 
they, and all other stipulations on the subject, could have been entirely omitted ; 
but he must, at the same time, say he did not see how it was possible to avoid 
entering into some arrangement on the subject. To understand our difficulty, 
it will be necessary to advert to the course heretofore taken by the governrnent 
in reference to the subject, and the circumstances under which the negotiations 
that resulted in this treaty commenced. 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 539 

Congress at an early day — as soon, in fact, as it could legislate on the sub- 
ject under the Constitution — passed laws enacting severe penalties against the 
African slave-trade. That was followed by the treaty of Ghent, which declared 
it to be irreconcilable with the principles of humanity and justice, and stipula- 
ted that both of the parties — the United States and Great liritain — should use 
their best endeavours to effect its abolition. Shortly after, an act of Congress 
was passed declaring it to be piracy ; and a resolution was adopted by Congress 
requesting the President to enter into arrangements with other powers for its 
suppression. Great Britain, actuated by the same feelings, succeeded in ma- 
king treaties with the European maritime powers for its suppression ; and, not 
long before the commencement of this negotiation, had entered into joint stipu- 
lations with the live great powers to back her on the question of search. She 
had thus acquired a general supervision of the trade along the African coast ; 
so that vessels carrying the flag of every other country, except ours, were sub- 
ject on that coast to the inspection of her cruisers, and to be captured, if sus- 
pected of being engaged in the slave-trade. In consequence, ours became al- 
most the only flag- used by those engaged in the trade, whether our own peo- 
ple or foreigners, although our laws inhibited the traffic under the severest 
penalties. In this state of things. Great Britain put forward the claim of the 
right of search as indispensable to suppress a trade prohibited by the laws of 
the civilized world, and to the execution of the laws and treaties of the nations 
associated with her by mutual engagements for its suppression. At this stage, 
a correspondence took place between our late minister at the Court of St. James 
and Lord Palmerston on the subject, in which the latter openly and boldly 
claimed the right of search, and which was promptly and decidedly repelled on 
our side. We had long since taken our stand against it, and had resisted its 
abuse, as a belligerant right, at the mouth of the cannon. Neither honour nor 
policy on our part could tolerate its exercise in time of peace, in any form — 
whether in that of search, as claimed by Lord Palmerston, or the less oll'ensive 
and unreasonable one of visitation, as proposed by his successor. Lord Aber- 
deen. And yet we were placed in such circumstances as to require that some- 
thing should be done. It was in such a state of things that the negotiation com- 
menced ; and commenced, in part, in reference to this subject, which was tend- 
ing rapidly to bring the two countries into collision. On our side, we were 
deeply committed against the traffic, both by legislation and treaty. The in- 
fluence and the efforts of the civilized world were directed against it ; and that, 
too, under our lead at the commencement; and with such success as to compel 
vessels engaged in it to take shelter, almost exclusively, under the fraudulent 
use of our flag. To permit such a state of things to continue could not but 
deeply impeach our honour, and turn the sympathy of the world against us. On 
the other side. Great Britain had acquired, by treaties, the right of supervision, 
including that of search and capturing, over the trade on the coast of Africa, 
with the view to its suppression, from all the maritime powers except ourselves. 
Thus situated, he must say that he saw no alternative for us but the one adopt- 
ed — to take the supervision of our own trade on that coast into our own hands, 
and to prevent, by our own cruisers, the fraudulent use of our flag. The only- 
question, in the actual state of things, as it appeared to him, was, whether it 
should be done by a formal or informal arrangement. He would have prefer- 
red the latter ; but the difference between them was not, in his opinion, such 
as would justify, on that account, the rejection of the treaty. They would, in 
substance, be the same, and have differed but little, probably, in the expense of 
execution. Either was better than the other alternatives— to do nothing ; to 
leave things in the dangerous state they stood, or to yield to the right of search- 
er visitation. 

It is objected that the arrangement entered into is virtually an acknowledg- 
ment of the right of search. He did not so regard it. On the contrary, he 



540 SPEECHES OP JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

considered it, under all the circumstances, as a surrender of that claim on the 
part of Great Britain : a conclusion which a review of the whole transaction, 
in his opinion, would justify. Lord Palmerston, in the first place, claimed the 
unqualified right of search, in which it is understood he was backed by the five 
great powers. Lord Aberdeen, with more wisdom and moderation, explained 
it to mean the right of visitation simply ; and, finally, the negotiation is closed 
without reference to either, simply with a stipulation between the parties to keep 
up for five years a squadron of not less than eighty guns on the coast of Africa, 
to enforce separately and respectively the laws and obligations of each of the 
countries for the suppression of the slave-trade. It is carefully worded, to make 
it mutual, but at the same time separate and independent ; each looking to the 
execution of its own laws and obligations, and carefully excluding the supervis- 
ion of either over the other, and thereby directly rebutting the object of search 
or visitation. 

The other article, in reference to the same subject, stipulates that the parties 
will unite in all becoming representation and remonstrance with any powers 
within whose dominions markets are permitted for imported African slaves. If 
he were to permit his feelings to govern him exclusively, he would object to 
this more strongly than any other provision in the treaty : not that he was oppo- 
sed to the object or the policy of closing the market to imported negroes ; on the 
contrary, he thought it both right and expedient in every view. Brazil and the 
Spanish colonies were the only markets, he believed, still remaining open, and 
to which this provision would apply. They were already abundantly supplied 
with slaves, and he had no doubt that sound policy on their part required that 
their markets should be finally and effectually closed. He would go farther, 
and say that it was our interest they should be. It would free us from the ne- 
cessity of keeping cruisers on the African coast to prevent the illegal and Iraud- 
ulent use of our flag, or for any other purpose but to protect our commerce in 
that quarter— a thing of itself much to be desired. We would have a still strong- 
er interest if we were governed by selfish considerations. We are rivals in the 
production of several articles, and more especially the greatest of all the agri- 
cultural staples— cotton. Next to our own country, Brazil possesses the great- 
est advantages for its production, and is already a large grower of the article ; 
towards the production of which the continuance of the market for imported 
slaves from Africa would contribute much. But he would not permit such con- 
siderations to influence him in voting on the treaty. He had no objection to see 
Brazil develop her resources to the full ; but he did believe that higher con- 
siderations, connected with her safety, and that of the Spanish colonies, made 
it their interest that their market should be closed against the traffic. 

But it may be asked. Why, with these impressions, should he have any ob- 
jection to this provision of the treaty ? It was because he was averse to inter- 
ferine with other powers when it could be avoided. It extends even to cases 
like the present, where there was a common interest in reference to the sub- 
ject of advice or remonstrance ; but it would be carrying his aversion to fastid- 
iousness, were he to permit it to overrule his vote in the adjustment of questions 
of such magnitude as are involved on the present occasion. 

But the treaty is opposed, not only for what it contains, but also for what it 
does not ; and, among other objections of the kind, because it has no provision 
in reference to the case of the Creole, and other similar ones. He admitted 
that it is an objection ; and that it was very desirable that the treaty should have 
guarded, by specific and efficient provisions, against the recurrence of such out- 
rages on the rights of our citizens, and indignity to our honour and independ- 
ence. If any one has a right to speak warmly on this subject, he was the in- 
dividual ; but he could not forget that the question for us to decide is, Shall we 
ratify or reject the treaty ? It is not whether all has been done which it was 
desirable should be done, but whether we shall confirm or reject what has ac- 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUX. 541 

tually been clone ; not whether we have gained all we could desire, but whether 
we shall retain what we have gained. To decide that as it ought to be, it is 
our duty to weigh, calmly and fairly, the reasons for and against the ratification, 
and to decide in favour of the side which preponderates. 

It does not follow that nothing has been done in relation to the cases under 
consideration because the treaty contains no provisions in reference to them. 
The fact is otherwise. Much, very much, has been done; in his opinion, lit- 
tle short, in its effect, of a positive stipulation by the treaty to guard against the 
recurrence of such cases hereafter. To understand how much has been done, 
and \vhat has been gained by us, it is necessary to have a correct conception 
of the state of the case in reference to them before the negotiation commenced, 
and since it terminated. 

These cases are not of recent origin. The first of the kind was that of the 
brig Comet, which was stranded on the false keys of the Bahamas, as far back 
as 1830, with slaves on board. She was taken into Nassau, New-Providence, 
by the wreckers, and the slaves liberated by the colonial authorities. The next 
was the Encomium, which occurred in 1834, and which, in all the material cir- 
cumstances, was every way similar to that of the Comet. The case of the En- 
terprise followed. It took place in 1835, and diiTered in no material circum- 
stance from the others, as was acknowledged by the British government, except 
that it occurred after the act of Parliament abolishing slavery in the colonies 
had gone into operation, and the others prior to that period. 

After a long correspondence of nearly ten years, the British government 
agreed to pay for the slaves on board of the first two, on the ground that they 
were liberated before the act abolishing slavery had gone into operation ; but 
refused to pay for those belonging to the Enterprise, because they were libera- 
ted after it had. To justify this distinction, Lord Palmerston had to assume 
the ground, virtually, that the law of nations was opposed to slavery — an as- 
sumption that placed the property of a third of the Union Avithout the pale of 
its protection. On that ground, he peremptorily refused compensation for the 
slaves on board the Enterprise. Our executive, under this refusal, accepted 
the compensation for those on board the Comet and Encomium, and closed the 
correspondence, without even bringing the subject before Congress. With 
such perfect indifTerence was the whole affair treated, that, during the long pe- 
riod the negotiation was pending, the subject was never once mentioned, as far 
as he recollected, in any executive message ; while those of far less m.agnitude 
— the debt of a few millions due from France, and this very boundary question 
— were constantly brought before Congress, and had nearly involved the coun- 
try in war with two of the leading powers of Europe. Those who are now so 
shocked that the boundary question should be settled, without a settlement also 
of this, stood by in silence, year after year, during this long period, not only 
without attempting to unite the settlement of this with that of the boundary, but 
without ever once naming or alluding to it as an item in the list of the dispute 
between the two powers. It was regarded as beneath notice. He rejoiced to 
witness the great change that has taken place in relation to it, and to find 
that those who were then silent and indificrcnt now exhibit so much zeal and 
vehemence about it. He took credh to himself for having contributed to bring 
this change about. It was he who revived our claim when it lay dead and 
buried among the archives of the state department— who called for the corre- 
spondence— 'who moved resolutions affirming the principles of the law of na- 
tions in reference to these cases, and repelling the presumptuous and insulting 
assumption on which it was denied by the British negotiator. Such was the 
force of truth, and so solid the foundation on which he rested our claun, that 
his resolutions received the unanimous vote of this body ; but he received no 
support— no, not a cheering word— from the quarter which now professes so 
much zeal on the subject. His utmost hope, at the time, was to keep alive our 



542 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

right till some propitious moment should arrive to assert it successfully. In 
the mean time, the case of the Creole occurred, which, as shocking and out- 
rageous as it is, was but the legitimate consequence of the principle maintained 
by Lord Palmerston, and on which he closed the correspondence in the case 
of the Enterprise. 

Such was the state of the facts when the negotiations commenced in refer- 
ence to these cases ; and it remains now to be shown in what state it has left 
them. In the first place, the broad principles of the law of nations, on which 
he placed our right in his resolutions, have been clearly stated and conclusively 
vindicated in the very able letter of the Secretary of State, which has strength- 
ened our cause not a little, as well from its intrinsic merit as the quarter from 
which it comes. In the next place, we have an explicit recognition of the 
principles for which we contend, in the answer of Lord Ashburton, who ex- 
pressly says that, " on the great general principles affecting this case" (the 
Creole), " they do not differ ;" and that is followed by " an engagement that in- 
structions shall be given to the governors of her majesty's colonies on the 
southern borders of the United States to execute their own laws with careful 
attention to the wishes of their government to maintain good neighbourhood ; 
and that there shall be no officious interference with American vessels driven 
by accident or violence into their ports. The laws and duties of hospitality 
shall be executed." This pledge was accepted by our executive, accompanied 
by the express declaration of the President, through the Secretary of State, 
that he places his reliance on those principles of public law which had been 
stated in the note of the Secretary of State. To all this it may be added, that 
strong assurances are given by the British negotiator of his belief that a final 
arrangement may be made of the subject by positive stipulations in London. 
Such is the state in which the negotiation has left the subject. 

Here, again, he would repeat, that such stipulations in the treaty itself would 
have been preferable. But who can deny, when he compares the state of the 
facts as they stood before and since the close of this negotiation, that we have 
gained — largely gained — in reference to this important subject? Is there 
no diff'erence, he would ask, between a stern and peremptory denial of our right 
on the broad and insulting ground assumed by Lord Palmerston, and its ex- 
plicit recognition by Lord Ashburton ? none in the pledge that instructions 
should be given to guard against the recurrence of such cases, and a positive 
denial that we had suffered wrong or insult, or had any right to complain ? 
none between a final closing of all negotiation, and a strong assurance of a 
final adjustment of the subject by satisfactory arrangement by treaty ? And 
would it be wise or prudent, on our part, to reject what has been gained, be- 
cause all has not been 1 As to himself, he must say that, at the time he moved 
his resolutions, he little hoped, in the short space of two years, to obtain what 
has already been gained ; and that he regarded the prospect of a final and satis- 
factory adjustment, at no distant day, of this subject, so vital in its principles to 
his constituents and the whole South, as far more probable than he then did 
this explicit recognition of the principles for which he contended. In the 
mean time, he felt assured the engagement given by the British negotiator 
would be fulfilled in good faith ; and that the hazard of collision between the 
countries, and the disturbance of their peace and friendship, has passed away, 
as far as it depends on this dangerous subject. But if in this he should, unfor- 
tunately, be mistaken, we should stand on much more solid ground in defence 
of our rights, in consequence of what has been gained ; as there would then 
be superadded broken faith to the violation of the laws of nations. 

Having now said what he intended on the more important points, he would 
pass over without dwelling on the provision of the treaty for delivering up to 
justice persons charged with certain crimes ; the aff"air of the Caroline ; and 
the correspondence in reference to impressment. The first is substantially 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 543 

the same as that contained in Jay's treaty on the same subject. On the next, 
he had nothing to add to what has already been said by others. As to the last, 
he did not doubt that the strong ground taken in the correspondence against tho 
impressment of seamen on board of our merchant vessels, in time of war, 
would have a good effect. It will contribute to convince Great Britain that the 
practice cannot be renewed, in the event of another European war, without a 
certain and immediate conflict between the two countries. 

I (said Mr. Calhoun) have now stated my opinion fully and impartially on 
the treaty, with the connected subjects. On reviewing the whole, and weigh- 
ing the reasons for and against its ratification, I cannot doubt that the former 
greatly preponderate. If we have not gained all that could be desired, we 
have gained much that is desirable ; and, if all has not been settled, much has 
been, and that not of little importance. It is not of little importance to have 
the Northeastern boundary settled, and that, too, with the consent of the states 
immediately interested ; a subject which has been in dispute almost from the 
origin of the government, and which had become more and more entangled, and 
adverse to our claim, on every attempt heretofore made to settle it. Nor is it 
of little importance to have the whole line of boundary between us and the 
British dominions, from the source of the St. Croix to the Rocky Mountains, 
settled — a line of more than three thousand miles, with many disputed points 
of long standing, the settlement of which had baffled all previous attempts. 
Nor is it of little importance to have adjusted the embarrassments relating to 
the African slave-trade, by adopting the least objectionable of the alternatives. 
Nor to have the principles of the law of nations for which we contended, in 
reference to the Creole and other cases of the kind, recognised by Great Brit- 
ain ; nor to have a solemn pledge against their recurrence, with a reasonable 
assurance of satisfactory stipulations by treaty. Nor is it of little importance 
to have, by the settlement of these inveterate and difficult questions, the relation 
of the two countries settled down in amity and peace — permanent amity and 
peace, as it may be hoped — in the place of that doubtful, unsettled condition, 
between peace and war, which has for so many years characterized it, and 
which is so hostile to the interests and prosperity of both countries. 

Peace (said Mr. C.) is the first of our wants, in the present condition of our 
country. We wanted peace, to reform our own government, and to relieve the 
country from its great embarrassments. Our government is deeply disordered ; 
its credit is impaired ; its debt increasing ; its expenditures extravagant and 
wasteful ; its disbursements without efficient accountability ; and its taxes (for 
duties are but taxes) enormous, unequal, and oppressive to the great producing 
classes of the countrj\ Peace, settled and undisturbed, is indispensable to a 
thorough reform, and such a reform to the duration of the government. But, so 
long as the relation between the two countries continues in a state of doubt be- 
twe°en peace and war, all attempts at such reform will prove abortive. The 
first step in any such, to be successful, must be to reduce the expenditures to 
the legitimate and economical wants of the government. "Without that, there 
can be nothing worthy of the name ; but in an unsettled state of the relations 
of the two countries, all attempts at reduction will be baffled by the cry of war, 
accompanied by insinuations against the patriotism of those who may be so 
hardy as to make them. Should the treaty be ratified, an end will be put to 
that, and no excuse or pretext be left to delay the great and indispensable work 
of reform. This may not be desirable to those who see, or fancy they see, 
benefits in high duties and wasteful expenditures ; but, by the great producing 
and tax-paying portions of tho community, it will be regarded as one ol the 
gi-eatest of"blessings. These are not the only reasons for wanting peace. We 
want it, to enable the people and the states to extricate themselves from their 
embarrassments. They are both borne down by heavy debts, contracted in a 
period of fallacious prosperity, from which there is no other honest and hon- 



544 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

curable extrication but the payment of what is due. To enable both states and 
individuals to pay their debts, they must be left in full possession of all their 
means, with as little exactions or restrictions on their industry as possible on 
the part of this government. To this, a settled state of peace, and an open 
and free commerce, are indispensable. With these, and the increasing habits 
of economy and industry now everyw^here pervading the country, the period 
of embarrassment will soon pass away, to be succeeded by one of permanent 
and healthy prosperity. 

Peace is, indeed, our policy. A kind Providence has cast our lot on a por- 
tion of the globe sufficiently vast to satisfy the most grasping ambition, and 
abounding in resources beyond all others, which only require to be fully de- 
veloped to make us the greatest and most prosperous people on earth. To the 
full development of the vast resources of our country we have political institu- 
tions most happily constituted. Indeed, it would be difficult to imagine a sys- 
tem more so than our Federal Republic — a system of State and General Gov- 
ernments, so blended as to constitute one sublime whole ; the latter having 
charge of the interests common to all, and the former those local and peculiar 
to each state. With a system so happily constituted, let a durable and firm 
peace be established, and this government be confined rigidly to the few great 
objects for which it was instituted ; leaving the states to contend in generous 
rivalry to develop, by the arts of peace, their respective resources ; and a 
scene of prosperity and happiness would follow heretofore unequalled on the 
globe. I trust (said Mr. C.) that this treaty may prove the first step towards 
such a peace. Once established with Great Britain, it would not be difficult, 
with moderation and prudence, to establish permanent peace with the rest of 
the world, when our most sanguine hopes of prosperity may be realized. 



XXXVIII. 

SPEECH ON THE OREGON BILL, JANUARY 24, 1843. 

Mr. Calhoun said it ought to be borne in mind, in the discussion of 
this measure, that there is a conflict between our claim and that of Gi-eat 
Britain to the Oregon territory; and that it extends to the whole terri- 
tory from the Rocky Mountains to the Pacific Ocean, and from the north- 
ern limits of Mexico, in latitude 42°, to the southern limits of the Rus- 
sian possessions, in latitude 54°. Nor ought it to be forgotten that the two 
governments have made frequent attempts to adjust their conflictino- 
claims, but, as yet, without success. The first of these was made in 
1818. It proved abortive ; but a convention was entered into which pro- 
vided that the territory should be left free and open to our citizens and 
the subjects of Great Britain for ten years ; the object of which was to 
prevent collision and preserve peace till their respective claims could be 
adjusted by negotiation. The next was made in 1824, when we offered 
to limit our claim to the territory by the 49th degree of latitude, which 
would have left to Great Britain all north of that latitude to the southern 
boundary of Russia. Her negotiator objected, and proposed the Colum- 
bia River as the boundary between the possessions of the two countries. 
It enters the ocean about the 46th degree of latitude. It follows that the 
portion of the territory really in dispute between the two countries is 
about three degrees of latitude — that is, about one fourth of the whole. 
The attempt to adjust boundaries again failed, and nothing was efl^ected. 
I learn from our negotiator (a distinguished citizen of Pennsylvania, now 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 545 

in this city), that the negotiation was conducted with much earnestness, 
and not a little feeling, on the part of the British negotiators. 

In 1827, just before the termination of the ten years, another attempt 
was made at an adjustment. The negotiation was conducted on our part 
by Mr. Gallatin. The whole subject was discussed fully, and with great 
ability and clearness on both sides, but, like the two preceding, failed to 
adjust the conflicting claims. The same offers were made respectively 
by the parties that were made in 1824, and again rejected. All that could 
be done was to renew the convention of 1818, but with the provision that 
each party might, at its pleasure, terminate the agreement by giving a 
year's notice. The object of the renewal was, as in 1818, to preserve 
peace for the time, by preventing either party from asserting its exclusive 
claim to the territory ; and that of the insertion of the provision to give 
either party the right of doing so whenever it might think proper, by giv- 
ing the stipulated notice. 

Nor ought it to be forgotten that, during the long interval from 1818 
to this tim-e, continued efforts have been made in this and the other house 
to induce Congress to assert, by some act, our exclusive right to the ter- 
ritory, and that they have all heretofore failed. It now remains to be seen 
whether this bill, which covers the whole territory, as well north as south 
of the -tOth, and provides for granting land, and commencing systemati- 
cally the work of colonization and settlement, shall share the fate of its 
predecessors. 

To determine whether it ought or ought not involves the decision of 
two preliminary questions. The first is, whether the time is now arrived 
when it would be expedient, on our part, to attempt to assert and maintain 
our exclusive claim to the territory, against the adverse claim of Great 
Britain ; and the other, if it has, whether the mode proposed in this bill 
is the proper one. 

In discussing them, I do not intend to consider the question of our right 
to the territory, nor its value, nor whether Great Britain is actuated by 
that keen, jealous, and hostile spirit towards us which has been attributed 
to her in this discussion. I shall, on the contrary, assume our title to be 
as valid as the warmest advocate of this bill asserts it to be ; the terri- 
tory to be, as to soil, climate, production, and commercial advantages, all 
that the ardent imagination of the author of the measure paints it to be ; 
and Great Britain to be as formidable and jealous as she has been repre- 
sented. I make no issue on either of these points. I controvert none of 
them. According to my view of the subject, it is not necessary. On the 
contrary, the clearer the title, the more valuable the territory ; and the 
more powerful and hostile the British government, the stronger will be 
the ground on which I rest my opposition to the bill. 

With these preliminary remarks, I repeat the question. Has the time ar- 
rived when it would be wise and prudent for us to attempt to assert and 
maintain our exclusive right to the territory against the adverse and con- 
flicting claim of Great Britain 1 I answer, No, it has not ; and that for 
the decisive reason, because the attempt, if made, must prove unsuccess- 
ful against the resistance of Great Britain. We could neither take nor 
hold it against her ; and that for a reason not less decisive — that she 
could in a much shorter time, and at far less expense, concentrate a far 
greater force than we could in the territory. 

We seem to forget, in the discussion of this subject, the great events 
which have occurred in the eastern portion of Asia during the last year, 
and which have so greatly extended the power of Great Britain in that 
quarter of the globe. She has there, in that period, terminated success- 
fully two wars j by one of which she has given increased quiet and sta- 

Z z z 



546 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

bility to her possessions in India ; and, by the other, has firmly planted her 
power on the eastern coast of China, where she will undoubtedly keep up, 
at least for a time, a strong military and naval force, for the purpose of 
intimidation and strengthening her newly-acquired possession. The point 
she occupies there, on the western shore of the Pacific, is almost directly 
opposite to the Oregon Territory, at the distance of about five thousand 
five hundred miles from the mouth of Columbia River, with a tranquil 
ocean between, which may be passed over in six weeks. In that short 
time she might place, at a moderate expense, a strong naval and military 
force at the mouth of that river, where a formidable body of men, as hardy 
and energetic as any on this continent, in the service of the Hudson Bay 
Company, and numerous tribes of Indians under its control, could be pre- 
pared to sustain and co-operate with it. Such is the facility with which 
she could concentrate a force there to maintain her claim to the territory 
against ours, should they be brought into collision by this bill. 

I now turn to examine our means of concentrating an opposing force 
by land and water, should it become necessary to maintain our claim. 
We have no military or naval position in the Pacific Ocean. Our fleet 
would have to sail from our own shores, and would have to cross the line 
and double Cape Horn in 56 degrees of south latitude, and, turning north, 
recross the line and ascend to latitude 46 north, in order to reach the 
mouth of Columbia River — a distance from New- York (over the straight- 
est and shortest line) of more than 13,000 miles, and which would require 
a run of more than 18,000 of actual sailing on the usual route. Instead 
of six weeks, the voyage would require six months. I speak on the au- 
thority of one of the most experienced officers attached to the navy de- 
partment. 

These facts are decisive. We could do nothing by water. As far as that 
element is concerned, we could not oppose to her a gun or a soldier in the 
territory. 

But, as great as are the impediments by water, they are, at present, not 
much less so by land. If we assume some central point in the State of Mis- 
souri as the place of rendezvous from which our military force would 
commence its march for the territory, the distance to the mouth of the 
Columbia River will be found to be about two thousand miles, of which 
much more than a thousand miles would be over an unsettled country, con- 
sisting of naked plains or mountainous regions, without provisions, ex- 
cept such game as the rifle might supply. On a greater portion of this 
long march the force would be liable to be attacked and harassed by nu- 
merous and warlike tribes of Indians, whose hostilities might be readily 
turned against us by the British traders. To march such a distance with- 
out opposition would take upward of 120 days, assuming the march to 
be at the usual rate for military forces. Should it be impeded by the 
hostilities of Indians, the time would be greatly prolonged. 

I now ask. How could any considerable force sustain itself in so lon-T a 
-march, through a region so destitute of supplies'? A small detachment 
might live on game, but that resource would be altogether inadequate to 
the support of an army. But, admitting an army could find sufficient 
supplies to sustain itself on its march to the territory, how could it sus- 
tain itself in an uncultivated territory, too remote to draw supplies from 
our settlements in its rear, and with the ocean in front closed against it 
by a hostile fleet '? And how could supplies be found to return if a re- 
treat should become necessary] In whatever view the subject maybe 
regarded, I hazard nothing in asserting that, such is the difficulty at present 
on our part of concentrating and maintaining a force in the territory, that 
a few! thousand regulars, advantageously fortified on the Columbia River, 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 547 

with a small naval force to support them, could, with the aid of the em- 
ployees of the Hudson Bay Company, and the co-operation of the Indians 
under its influence, bid defiance to any effort we could make to dislodge 
them. If all other difficulties could be surmounted, that of transporting 
a sufficient battering-train, with all of its appurtenances, to so great a dis^ 
tance, and over so many obstacles, would be insuperable. 

Having now made good my first position, that the attempt, at present, 
to assert and maintain our exclusive claim to the territory against the 
adverse claim of Great Britain, must prove unsuccessful if she resisted, 
it now remains to inquire whether she would resist. And here let me 
say, whatever might be the doubts of others, surely they who have in this 
discussion insisted so strongly on her power, her jealousy, and her deter- 
mination to hold the territory, cannot doubt that she would resist. If, 
indeed, provoking language can excite her to resistance, or if half which 
has been said of her hostile disposition be true, she not only would resist, 
but would gladly seize so favourable an occasion to do so, while w'e are 
comparatively so weak and she so strong in that quarter. However un- 
favourable the time might be for us, for her it would be the most propiti- 
ous. Her vast resources and military power in the East are liberated, 
and at her disposal, to be directed to assert and maintain her exclusive 
claim to the territory against ours, if she should determine to follow our 
example in case this bill should pass. Even I, who believe that the pres- 
ent ministry is disposed to peace ; that the recent mission to this coun- 
try originated in the spirit of peace ; and that Sir Robert Peel has exhib- 
ited great wisdom and moderation — moderation in the midst of splendid 
success, and therefore more to be trusted — do not doubt she would re- 
sist, if we should adopt this measure. We must not forget, as clear as 
we believe our title to be, that the right to the territory is in dispute be- 
tween the two countries, and that, as certain as we regard our right to 
be, she regards hers as not less so. It is a case of adverse conflictincr 
claims, and we may be assured, if we undertake to assert our exclusive 
right, she will oppose us by asserting hers ; and if the appeal should be to 
force, to decide between us at present, the result would be inevitable — 
the territory would be lost to us. Indeed, this is so incontestable that no 
one has ventured to deny it, and there is no hazard in asserting that no 
one will who understands the subject, and does not choose to have the 
soundness of his judgment questioned. 

But, it may be asked. What then^ Shall we abandon our claim to the 
territory 1 I answer. No. I am utterly opposed to that 5 but, as bad as 
that would be, it w^ould not be as much so as to adopt a rash and precip- 
itate measure, which, after great sacrifices, would finally end in its loss. 
But I am opposed to both. My object is to preserve, and not to lose the 
territory. I do not agree with my eloquent and able colleague that it is 
worthless. He has underrated it both as to soil and climate. It contains 
a vast deal of land, it is true, that is barren and worthless, but not a little 
that is highly productive. To that may be added its commercial advan- 
tages, which will, in time, prove to be great. We must not overlook the 
important events to which I have alluded as having recently occurred in 
the eastern portion of Asia. As great as they are, they are but the begin- 
ning of a series of a smilar character which must follow at no distant day. 
What has taken place in China will, in a few years, be followed in Japan 
and all the eastern portions of that continent. Their ports, like the Chi- 
nese, will be opened, and the whole of that large portion of Asia, contain- 
ing nearly half of the population and wealth of the globe, will be thrown 
open to the commerce of the world, and be placed within the pale of Eu- 
ropean and American intercourse and civilization. A vast market will be 



548 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

created, and a mighty impulse will be given to commerce. No small 
portion of the share that would fall to us with this populous and indus- 
trious portion of the globe is destined to pass through the ports of the 
Oregon Territory to the valley of the Mississippi, instead of taking the 
circuitous and long voyage round Cape Horn, or the still longer round 
the Cape of Good Hope. It is mainly because I place this high estimate 
on its prospective value that I am so solicitous to preserve it, and so ad- 
verse to this bill, or any other precipitate measure which might terminate 
in its loss. If I thought less of its value, or if I regarded our title less 
clear, my opposition would be less decided. 

Having now, I trust, satisfactorily shown that, if we should now attempt 
to assert and maintain our exclusive right to the territory against the ad- 
verse claim of Great Britain, she would resist ; and that, if shere sisted, 
our attempt would be unsuccessful, and the territory be lost, the question 
presents itself. How shall we preserve itl 

There is only one means by which it can be preserved, but that, fortu- 
nately, is the most powerful of all — time. Time is acting for us ; and if 
we shall have the wisdom to trust its operation, it will assert and main- 
tain our right with resistless force, without costing a cent of money or a 
drop of blood. There is often, in the affairs of government, more effi- 
ciency and wisdom in non-action than in action. All we want to effect 
our object in this case is " a wise and masterly inactivity." Our popula- 
tion is rolling towards the shores of the Pacific with an impetus greater 
than what we realize. It is one of those forward movements which leaves 
anticipation behind. In the period of thirty-two years which have elapsed 
since I took my seat in the other house, the Indian frontier has receded a 
thousand miles to the West. At that time our population was much less 
than half what it is now. I,t was then increasing at the rate of about a 
quarter of a million annually ; it is now not less than six hundred thou- 
sand, and still increasing at the rate of something more than three per 
cent, compound annually. At that rate, it will soon reach the yearly in- 
crease of a million. If to this be added that the region west of Arkansas 
and the State of Missouri, and south of the Missouri River, is occupied 
by half-civilized tribes, who have their lands secured to them by treaty 
(and whioh will prevent the spread of population in that direction), and 
that this great and increasing tide will we forced to take the comparative- 
ly narrow channel to the north of that river and south of our northern 
boundary, some conception may be formed of the strength with which the 
current will run in that direction, and how soon it will reach the eastern 
gorges of the Rocky Mountains. I say some conception, for I feel as- 
sured that the reality will outrun the anticipation. In illustration, I will 
repeat what I stated when I first addressed the Senate on this subject. As 
wise and experienced as was President Monroe — as much as he had wit- 
nessed of the growth of our country in his time, so inadequate was his 
conception of its rapidity, that near the close of his administration, in the 
year 1S2J<, he proposed to colonize the Indians of New-York, and those 
north of the Ohio River and east of the Mississippi, in what is now called 
the Wisconsin Territory, under the impression that it was a portion of 
our territory so remote that they would not be disturbed by our increas- 
ing population for a long time to come. It is now but eighteen years 
since ; and already, in that short period, it is a great and flourishing ter- 
ritory, ready to knock at our door for admission as one of the sovereign 
members of the Union. But what is still more striking — what is really 
wonderful and almost miraculous is, that another territory (Iowa), still 
farther west (beyond the Mississippi), has sprung up, as if by magic, and 
has already outstripped Wisconsin, and may knock for entrance before 



SPEECHES OP JOHN C. CALHOUX. 549 

she is prepared to do so. Such is the wonderful growth of a popula- 
tion which has attained the number ours has, and is still yearly increas- 
ing at the compound rate it is, and such the impetus with which it is 
forcing its way, resistlessly, westward. It will soon — far sooner than an- 
ticipated — reach the Rocky Mountains, and be ready to pour into the Ore- 
gon Territory, when it will come into our possession without resistance 
or struggle ; or, if there should be resistance, it would be feeble and inef- 
fectual. We should then be as much stronger there, comparatively, than 
Great Britain, as she is now stronger than we are ; and it would then be as 
idle in her to attempt to assert and maintain her exclusive claim to the 
territory against us, as it would now be in us to attempt it against her. Let 
us be wise and abide our time, and it will accomplish all that we desire 
with more certainty, and with infinitely less sacrifice than we can w^ith- 
out it. 

But if the time had already arrived for the successful assertion of our 
right against any resistance which might be made, it would not, in my 
opinion, be expedient in the present condition of the government. It is 
weak — never more so ; weak politically, and from the state of the finances. 
The former was so ably and eloquently described by my colleague, that I 
have nothing to add but a single remark on the extraordinary state of 
parties at present. There are now three parties in the Union ; of which 
one is in possession of the executive department, another of the legisla- 
tive, and the other, judging by the recent elections, of the country, which 
has so locked and impeded the operations of the government, that it is 
scarcely able to take measures necessary to its preservation. 

In turning from this imbecile political condition of the government, and 
casting my eyes on the state of its finances, I behold nothing but disorder 
and embarrassment ; credit prostrated ; a new debt contracted, already 
of considerable amount, and daily increasing ; expenditures exceeding in- ' 
come ; and the prospect, instead of brightening, growing still more 
gloomy. Already the debt falls not much short of thirty millions of dol- 
lars, to which will be added, from present appearances, by the end of the 
year (if the appropriations are not greatly curtailed and the revenue im- 
proved), not less, probably, than ten millions, when the interest would be 
upward of two millions of dollars annually — a sum more than equal to the 
nett revenue from the public lands. The only remaining revenue is derived 
from the foreign commerce of the country, and on that such heavy duties 
are imposed that it is sinking under the burden. The imports of the last 
quarter, it is estimated, will be less than nine millions of dollars — a fall- 
ing off of about two thirds, compared with what it ought to be, according 
to the estimate made at the last session by those who imposed the burden. 
But as great as it is, the falling off will, I understand, be still greater, from 
present indications, during the present quarter ; and yet, in the face of 
all this, we are appropriating money as profusely, and projecting schemes 
of expenditure as thoughtlessly, as if the treasury were full to overflowing. 
So great is the indifference, that even the prostrated condition of the 
treasury attracts no attention. It is scarcely mentioned or alluded to. 
No one seems to care anything about it. Not an inquiry is made how 
the means of supplying the acknowledged deficit to meet the current de- 
mands on the'treasury, or to cover the extraordinary expenditures which 
will be incurred by this measure, should it be adopted, are to be raised. I 
would ask its advocates. Do you propose to borrow the funds necessary 
for its execution 1 Our credit is already greatly impaired, and our debt 
rapidly increasing; and are you willing still farther to impair the one and 
add to the increase of the other \ Do you propose to raise them by in- 
creasing the duties ] Can you hope to derive additional revenue from 



550 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

such increase, when the duties are already so high as not oniy to paralyze 
the commerce, agriculture, and industry of the country, but to diminish, 
to an alarming extent, the revenue from the imports 1 Are you prepared 
to lay a duty on tea and coffee, and other free articles'? If so, speak out, 
and tell your constituents plainly that such is your intention ; that money 
must be had ; and that no other source of revenue is left which can be 
relied on but a tax on them. It must come to that ; and, before we incur 
the expense, it is but fair that our constituents should know the conse- 
quence. 

But we are told the expense will be small — not exceeding one or two 
hundred thousand dollars. Let us not be deceived. What this bill ap- 
propriates is but the entering-wedge. Let it pass, and no one can tell 
what it will cost. It will depend on circumstances. Under the most 
favourable, on the supposition that there will be no resistance on the part 
of Great Britain, it would amount to millions; but if she should resist, 
and we should make it a question of force, I hazard nothing in saying it 
would subject the country to heavier expenditures, and expose it to 
greater danger, than any measure which has ever received the sanction 
of Congress. 

Many and great are the acts of folly which we have committed in the 
management of our finances in the last fourteen or fifteen years. We 
doubled our revenue when our expenditures were on the eve of being re- 
duced one half by the discharge of the public debt. We reversed that 
act of folly, and doubled our expenditures when the revenue was in the 
course of reduction under the Compromise Act. When the joint efibcts 
of the operation of the two had exhausted the treasury, and left the gov- 
ernment without adequate means to meet current demands, by an aptitude 
in folly unexampled, we selected that as the fit moment to divest the 
government of the revenue from the public domain, and to place the en- 
tire burden of supporting it on the commerce of the country. And then, 
as if to consummate the whole, we passed an act at the close of the last 
session which bids fair to cripple effectually this our only remaining 
source of revenue. And now what are we doing ? Profiting by the dis- 
astrous consequences of past mismanagement \ Quite the reverse : com- 
mitting, if possible, greater and more dangerous acts of folly than ever. 
When the government and the country are lying prostrate by this long 
series of errors and mismanagement j when the public credit is deeply 
impaired; when the people and the states are overwhelmed by debt, and 
need all their resources to extricate themselves from their embarrass- 
ments, that is the moment we select to bring forward a measure which, 
on the most favourable supposition, if adopted, cannot fail to subject the 
government to very heavy expenditures, even should events take the most 
favourable turn ; and may — no, that is not strong enough — would, prob- 
ably, subject it to greater than it ever has heretofore been. Where would 
the government find resources to meet them '? Not in its credit, for that 
would be extinct. Not in the impost, for that is already overburdened. 
Not in internal taxes, the indebted condition of the states forbids that. 
More than half the states of the Union are in debt ; many deeply, and 
several even beyond their means of payment. They require every cent 
of the surplus means of their citizens, which can be reached by taxes, to 
meet their own debts. Under such a state of things, this government 
could not impose internal taxes, to any considerable amount, without 
bankrupting the indebted states or crushing their citizens. What would 
follow should the government be compelled, in consequence of this meas- 
ure, to resort to such taxes, I shall not undertake to trace. Suffice it to 
say, that all preceding disasters, as great as they are, which followed the 
preceding acts of folly, would be as nothing compared to the overwhelm 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 551 

ing calamities which would follow this. Our system might sink under 
the shock. 

If, senators, you would hearken to the voice of one who has some ex- 
perience, and no other desire but to see the country free and prosperous, I 
would say, Direct your eyes to the finances. There, at present, the dan- 
ger lies. Restore, without delay, the equilibrium between revenue and 
expenditures, which has done so much to destroy our credit and derange 
the whole fabric of the government. If that should not be done, the gov- 
ernment and country will be involved, ere long, in overwhelming difficul- 
ties. Cherish the revenue from the lands and the imports. They are our 
legitimate sources of revenue. When the period arrives — come when it 
may — that this government will be compelled to resort to internal taxes 
for its support in time of peace, it will mark one of the most difficult and 
dangerous stages through which it is destined to pass. If it should be a 
period like the present — when the states are deeply in debt, and need all 
their internal resources to meet their own engagements — it may prove 
fatal ; and yet it would seem as if systematic efforts are, and have been 
making for some time, to bring it about at this critical and dangerous pe- 
riod. To this all our financial measures tend — the giving away the pub- 
lic lands ; the crushing of the customs by high protective, and, in many 
instances, prohibitory duties ; the adoption of hazardous and expensive 
measures of policy, like the present ; and the creation of a public debt, 
without an effort to reduce the expenditures. How it is all to end time 
only can disclose. 

But if our finances were in ever so flourishing a state ; if the political 
condition of the country were as strong as it could be made by an admin- 
istration standing at the head of a powerful dominant party ; and if our 
population had reached the point where we could successfully assert and 
maintain our claim against the adverse claim of Great Britain, there 
would still remain a decisive objection to this bill. The mode in which 
it proposes to do it is indefensible. If we are displeased with the exist- 
ing arrangement, which leaves the territory free and open to the citizens 
and subjects of the two countries ; if we are of opinion it operates prac- 
tically to our disadvantage, or that the time has arrived v.hen Ave ought 
to assert and carry into effect our claim of exclusive sovereignty over the 




to this express and plain provision^ Why should it undertake to assert 
our exclusive ownership to the whole territory, in direct violation of the 
treaty % Why should it, with what we all believe to be a good title on 
our part, involve the country in a controversy about the violation of the 
treaty, in which a large portion (if not a majority) of the body believe 
that we would be in the wrong, when the treaty itself might so easily, and 
in so short a time, be terminated by our own act, and the charge of its 
violation be avoided 1 Can any satisfactory reason be given to these 
questions I I ask the author of the measure, and its warm advocates, for 
an answer. None has been given yet, and none, I venture to assert, will 
be attempted. I can imagine but one answer that can be given — that 
there are those who will vote for the bill that would not vote to give no- 
tice, under the delusive hope that we may assert our exclusive ownership, 
and take possession, without violating the treaty or endangering the peace 
of the country. Their aim is, to have all the benefit of the treaty, without 
beino- subject to its restrictions ; an aim in direct conflict with the only 
object of the treaty— to prevent conflict between the two countries, by 
keepino- the question of ownership or sovereignty in abeyance till the 
questio'n of boundary can be settled. That such is the object appears 



552 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 

to be admitted by all except the senator from New-Hampshire (Mr. Wood- 
bury), whose argument, I must say, with all deference for him, was on 
that point very unsatisfactory. The other advocates of the bill, accord- 
ingly, admit that a grant of lands to emigrants settling in the territory, to 
take effect immediately, would be a violation of the treaty ; but contend 
that a promise to grant hereafter would not be. The distinction is, no 
doubt, satisfactory to those who make it ; but how can they rationally ex- 
pect it will be satisfactory to the British government, when so large a 
portion of the Senate believe that there is no distinction between a grant 
and a promise to grant lands, as it relates to the treaty, and hold one to be 
as much a violation of it as the other \ We may be assured that the British 
government will look to the intention of the bill, and, in doing so, will see 
that its object is to assert our exclusive claim of sovereignty over the en- 
tire territory against their adverse claim, and will shape their course ac- 
cordingly. Oar nice distinction between actual grants and the promise 
to grant will not be noticed. They will see in it the subversion of the 
object for which the treaty v/as formed, and take their measures to coun- 
teract it. The result will be that, instead of gaining the advantage aimed 
at, we shall not only lose the advantages of the treaty, but be involved in 
the serious charge of having violated its provisions. 

I am not, however, of opinion that Great Britain would declare war 
against us. If I mistake not, she is under the direction, at this time, of 
those who are too sagacious and prudent to take that course. She would 
probably consider the treaty at an end, and take possession adverse to us, 
if not of the whole territory, at least to the Columbia River. She would, 
at the same time, take care to command that river by a strong fortifica- 
tion, manned by a respectable garrison, and leave it to us to decide 
whether we shall acquiesce, or negotiate, or attempt to dislodge her. 
To acquiesce, under such circumstances, would be a virtual surrender of 
the territory; to negotiate with adverse and forcible possession against 
us would be almost as hopeless ; and to dislodge her at present would, 
as has been shown, be impracticable. 

Such, in my opinion, would be the probable result, should this bill be 
passed. It would place us, in every respect, in a situation far less eligible 
than at present. The occupation of British subjects in the territory, as 
things now stand, is by permission, under positive treaty stipulation, and 
cannot ripen into a title, as it was supposed it would by the senator from 
Illinois (Mr. M'Roberts). 

But if their occupancy was adverse (as it would be should this measure 
be adopted), and Great Britain should resist, then his argument would be 
sound, and have great force. In that case, the necessity of takino- some 
decisive step on our part to secure our rights would be imperious. De- 
lay would then, indeed, be dangerous. But as it is, no length of time 
can confer a title against us; and it is that, considering what advantacre 
Great Britain has over us at present, either to take or hold possession, 
which ought to give to the treaty great value ia our estimation. It is a 
wise maxim to let well enough alone. We can do little at present to bet- 
ter our condition. Even the occupation and improvement by British sub- 
jects, against which so much has been said, will in the end, if we act 
wisely, be no disadvantage. Neither can give any claim against us, when 
the time comes to assert our rights, if we abide faithfully by the treaty. 
They are but preparing the country for our reception ; and should their 
improvements and cultivation be extended, it would only enable us to take 
possession with more ease if it should ever become necessarjr to assert 
our claims by force, which I do not think probable, if we shall have the 
wisdom to avoid hasty and precipitate action, and leave the question to 
the certain operation of time. 



SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUN. 553 

In conclusion, I might appeal to the authority of all preceding admin- 
istrations, from 1818 to the present time, in support of the views I have 
taken. On what other supposition can it be explained that the adminis- 
tration of Mr. Monroe should assent to the treaty of that year, which left 
the territory open and free to the citizens and subjects of the two coun- 
tries for the period of ten years 1 Or that Mr. Adams should revive it, 
with the provision that either might terminate it by giving one year's no- 
tice 1 Or, still more emphatically, how can it be explained that, with this 
right of terminating the treaty, the administration of General Jackson, 
and that of his successor, should, for the period of twelve years, acquiesce 
in it, but on the conviction that it was the best arrangement which could 
be made, and that any change or movement on our part would but render 
our situation worse, instead of better, in relation to the territory 1 It can- 
not be said that the present is a more favourable period to assert our ex- 
clusive right than during either of the preceding administrations. The re- 
verse is the fact. It is, in every view, far less favourable than either, 
and especially than that of General Jackson, when the treasury was over- 
flowing, and the head of the administration possessed greater influence 
and power than any other chief magistrate that ever presided over the 
country. Thai, if ever, was the time to assert our exclusive o^\'nership ; 
particularly as those who are so earnestly pressing it on the government 
were then in power, and would have been responsible for its execution. 
How is it to be explained that they were then so passive and are now so 
urgent for the passage of this bill ] 

Entertaining these views, I hope that the motion of the senator from 
Virginia (Mr. Archer) will prevail, and the bill be referred to the Com- 
mittee on Foreign Relations. The subject is one of great importance 
and delicacy, and ought to be carefully examined by the appropriate or- 
gan of the body. Should it be referred, I trust the committee will report 
amendments to strike out all the provisions of the bill which, by any 
reasonable interpretation, might be regarded to be in conflict with the 
stipulations of the treaty between the two countries, or which might in- 
cur any considerable expense in the present exhausted condition of the 
treasury. As at present advised, I am not indisposed to the provision, if 
properly guarded, which proposes to extend our jurisdiction over our 
citizens in the territory. It ought not, however, to be carried farther 
than the provisions of the act of Parliament of 1821. I am opposed to 
holding out temptation to our citizens to emigrate to a region where we 
cannot at present protect them ; but if there be any who may choose to 
emigrate, I would be far from opposing them, and am unwilling that they 
should lose, by emigration, personally the benefit of our jurisdiction and 
laws. 

I have now said what I intended in reference to this bill, and shall con- 
clude by noticing some remarks which fell from the senator from Mis- 
souri (Mr. Linn) who introduced it. When he first addressed the Senate, 
in reply to my former remarks, he spoke a good deal about opposition 
and injustice to the West, and referred to some of the acts of the govern- 
ment at an early date, which he supposed partook of that character. I 
do not suppose that he intended it, but his remarks were calculated to 
make the impression (taken in connexion with the time and subject) that ^ 
he regarded the opposition to the passage of this bill as originating in ' 
unfriendly feelings to the West. But if he so regards it, and if he intended 
to apply his remarks to me, I would appeal to my acts to repel the unjust 

imputation. . -ir r- lu 

[Here Mr. Linn disclaimed any intention of attributing to Mr. Lalhoun 
hostile or unkind feelings to the West.] 

iA 



554 SPEECHES OF JOHN C. CALHOUiV. 

;Mr. Calhoun : I am happy to hear the disclaimer of the senator. I felt 
assured he could not have intended to do me so much injustice as to at- 
tribute to me the slightest hostility to the West. No one knows better 
than he does that my opposition to the bill originates in public consid- 
erations, free from all local feelings, and that my general views of policy 
have ever been friendly, and even liberal, towards the West; but as there 
are others not so familiar with my course in reference to that great and 
growing section, I deem it proper to avail myself of the opportunity brielly 
to allude to it, in order to repel any improper imputation which may be 
attempted to be attributed to me, from any quarter, on account of my 
course on the present occasion. 

I go back to the time when I was at the head of the war department. 
At that early period I turned my attention particularly to the interest of 
the West. I saw that it required increased security to its long line of 
frontier, and greater facility for carrying on intercourse with the Indian 
tribes in that quarter, and to enable it to develop its resources, especially 
that of its fur-trade. To give the required security, I ordered a much larger 
portion of the army to that frontier ; and to afford facility and protection 
for carrying on the fur-trade, the military posts were moved much hitrher 
up the -Mississippi and Missouri Rivers. Under the increased security 
and facility which these measures afforded, the fur-trade received a great 
impulse. It extended across the continent, in a short time, to the Pacific, 
and north and south to the British and the Mexican frontiers ; yielding 
in a few years, as stated by the senator from Missouri (Mr. Linn), half a 
million of dollars annually. But I stopped not there. I saw that indi- 
vidual enterprise on our part, however great, could not successfully com- 
pete with the powerful incorporated Canadian and Hudson Bay Compa- 
nies, and that additional measures were necessary to secure, permanently, 
our fur-trade. For that purpose, I proposed to establish a post still higher 
tip the Missouri, at the mouth of the Yellow Stone River, and to give 
such unity and etiiciency to our intercourse and trade with the Indian 
tribes, between our western frontier and the Pacific Ocean, as would en- 
able our citizens engaged in the fur-trade to compete successfully with 
the British traders. Had the measures proposed been adopted, we would 
not have to listen to the complaint, so frequently uttered in this discus- 
sion, of the loss of that trade. 

But that is not all. I might appeal to a measure more recent, and still 
more strongly illustrative of the liberal feelings which have ever influ- 
enced me whenever the interest of the West was concerned. I refer to 
the bill relating to the portion of public domain lying within the new 
states, which I introduced some time since. It is true, indeed, that I 
looked to the interest of the whole Union in introducing that measure, 
but it is not the less so that it would, if it should become a law, more 
especially benefit the West. In doing that, I exposed myself, in my own 
section, to the imputation of seeking the friendship of the West — as I do, 
on this occasion, to that of hostility towards that great and growing sec- 
tion. As the hazard of the former could not deter me from doing my 
duty then, so that of the latter cannot from doing my duty now. The 
same sense of duty which on that occasion impelled me to support a 
measure in which the West was peculiarly interested, at the hazard of 
incurring the displeasure of my own section, because I believed it calcu- 
lated to promote the interest of the whole, impels me on this occasion to 
oppose this measure, at the hazard of displeasing the West, because I be- 
lieve, in so doing, I not only promote the interest of the Union generally, 
but that of the West especially. 

THE E.VD. 



HARPER & BROTHERS, NEW-YORK. 



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This volume is designed to be a complete defining and 
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England and America. When printed by itself, this work 
makes a volume of nearly three hundred page*, 8vo. 

Of the numerous recommendations of the original work 

and the abridgment, the foDowing only can be here given_ 

From officers of Yale arui MiddUbury CoUeges, and of the 

Andover Theological Institution. 

" Tne merits of Dr. Webster's American Dictionary of the 
English language are very extensively acknowledged. W'e 
regi'd It as a great improvement on all the works which 
have preceded it : the definitums have a character of dis- 
crimination, copiousness, perspicuity, and accuracy, not 
found, we believe, in any other dictionary of the English 
JangTiage." 
From R^.Dr. Wayland, President of Brotvn Vniversify. 

'• It gives me pleasure to state, that I have made use of 
your quarto or octavo dictionary, ever since the time of their 
publication ; and that for copiousness, for exactitude rf 
definiticai, and adaptedness to the present state of litera- 
ture and science, they seem to me to be the most valuable 
worki of the kind that I have ever seen in our language." 

From Dr. Chapin. President of Colmnina CoUege. D- C. 

" I am prepared, after protracted and careful exajninaton. 
to saythat, in my judgment., the dictionary of Noah We bsttr 
pciKenes unnviJed merit." 

From Hon. Judge Story. 

" 1 have had occ-asion to use and examine Dr. Webster's 
quarto dictionary, and the abridgment of it by Mr. Worces- 
ter. Each of them appears to me to be executed with great 
caxe, learning, and-ability." 



I n as it ii in 

the kind in 

.>oe !■ obnMU 



From JjT. Fisk and other officers of the Wesleya* Uttiterriiy, 
Middletoicn, Ct. 

" We have seen and examined your Ajnencan Dictionary, 
and we think it unnvaled by any work erf the kind in the 
English language." 

From the Medical Farulty of Yale CoUege, and otf-er iistim 
guuhed phyncians. 

" The subscribers having examined Dr. Webster's quart* 
and octavo dictionaries, take pleas'ire in eipreMinr unrap 
probation of these worts. The defnitionr ;•.>• :'.-j»t import- 
ant jiart of such works, as to prartir^. -•- fnU 
and correct, and the vocabulary is by h ■ ^sive 
that has been published ; indeed, it is ^ - • -o be 
a substitute for all other dictionaries of i:.«- xir.j.-ige.'' 
From the Rev. T. H. GaOaudet, late Principal of the AMer- 
icon Deaf and Dumlj Asylum. 

" I have no hesitation m saying, that Dr. Webster's Eag- 
lish Dictionary is decidedly the best with which I am ac- 
quainted." 

Similar recommendations have been given by mcire than 
a hundred members of Congress, and by ranoos conven- 
tions of literary men and teachers. 

FOREIGN TESTIMONIALS. 

From the Cambridge /• 

" When this work is as wet . 
America, it -wi'.l supersede eve-. 
the same department of letters. 
aT\H indisputable." 

From the Dublin Lif 

"Dr. Webster's kno-jr 
extensive, and his resear 
meaning of words, not * 
numerous. T^e .::-'•; 
terms IS a very vi. ^ •. 
The notation ado;v . ... 
of the vowels, is m-J'-b s::T-.p>r Tia. 
Sheridan, and fbliowed by Walker." 

From the Ezir'ar.'- 

"Theveteraa Webster's wort -■^^tf 

as far as we can Jtidge, :t seem*. • irtnz- 

able character it has long maj: ■ '•- ^"^^ 

view is corroborated bv •."-.--.• ■ . . ntjc, 

who does not hesitate' t^ •- ™j** 

useful dictionary of the £-;■-- --•? - " '-'^ 

•een." 

From the Svn. 

"Itisirr- "■ ■• ■ -- -' - .- 

enng tha- '. -tn- 

vations a.-' '.ermi 

are/nflwii:. . -- -'. .---...--^- 

From the Aherieen Chremcle. 

" We be? to call the attention of our readers to tbe nrpab- 
licatjon of this work, the supreme excellence of which :s»o 
obvious, that it is unnectsaary for na to enlaise on lU 
ments." 

Extended critupLts on the work. rOT£.Tmiag tbeee TJewg, 
have appeared in the Westrnmster P.eview, and th* 8cae»- 
ti£c Journal of Profe^ar Jameson of Edinbargh. 



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Price of the 158 Volumes $70 30. 



'i 



outhis question of ba. k monevr or r,. ''''''='''^' 

.money. J.et him start ivsthi^ff^ or <Jovernment 

..letters to eIpgI ivoneX^.hT.^^^ ""^ '"^"^l '^'^ 

^, deloma est^^Bink paper musf be 'n?;'- "^''^/'^'i-" 

l^^^o^'^e^^T.-f.^^-"---^ «1n^^^^^^^^ 

to ascertain he terms unon \vhS?"f'" ^^ "ecess.^ry 
Government .^ t^' "^"!^ "H'Ch the note^ of the 

rSio"^^:?-^""^ -^->' - a'cl'afon'Su^ra^o^ 

ot^^ ^ '°^^.A^;l;^r\^r^-'P'!'--P-ssion 

are a better sabstitutefaTgo"a'a,dsifv^r%?'" ^'^^'^^ 
;.aper i have heard yet pro^po<ed "^ """' "'^" ""^ 

paper money canMot be reh/d?n" 'T'^'"^^ <^"'^*'e 
circulatlug medium LnUormm Siru S'^r- '''' 
of prosperity, when confMpnPB i^ ,• u ^i' ''mes 

mere U!u„ n.Je S r,u.w .f"'.'""': «na ,vl,e„ 

reaction takes Dlarp <inH t^L. ■ *"'^'^'J"- then a 
tlra^v the cred is fhev h«vi ""^ .immediately with- 
curuil their is ues and nnH?'"''"- '^'"^ suddenly 
■■ma ruinous con?racton of h^n," ""^.^P^cted 
dium. Which is leit by ho „?hnii cUculaimg me- 
banLs by this means fave them ok°?'™"h "J- '^'^«^ 
chievous conseonences f f ,^1 ^''•^' *^"*^ ^'^^ '^^'s- 
cupiduy are ^ZTu^.toTn^Uc'^.^-^'''''^^ or 

' ^t!^'i^s^^^ ^rsu^L^ft1^'";«,---gein .S20. 
Legislature whether a Vation^l v - ''"^'}^^ of the 
.he credit of tt^e Gover S- anS''!; ^°""^'^^ O'^ 
mi«ht not be devised whic^wouid'' "d'^Jn".'^^'- 

from The SuSanVv- ""^ '^^ Peeled to resuit 

Ja: '■'r^e'SerT/^ho'r'vf ''• Dallas, who 

and manuaii/ a mper medium n?'?''"^,''' '"'"^'J- 
j not be questioned " '^^«'^'"'" of exchange iviil 

Let h:m then loot tnn at l~•^^^. . 

;-.hn «^.,,, of " epre.A?iVv„ ^RJ'.'^" ^ ^P-^ch in 

lu wh:ch he £a>^r'ino state .i^'^^f^ary 26, ISU. 

medium i^ ODDos^ri trCtL ■ ot our circulat'nz 

Constiiution'^'^The r^we^'^'a^''!''"^^ "^ ">« ^'-'deral 

that L.^rument h.^^e^^tl ;^-f" 'o Congress by 

currency of tiie L-nited Stn-,.,"' reguiate the 

that rn)vver. thouKhph-en^^V RO'nt of fact, 

liioir hands. It i.s cse oi"' ,' LV'"^'"'^'*^' '* "ot in 

/ lurni.h these ex t rai s nn^ '^'"f '".^titutio-.e." 

of any Liemocrat tolerably Jin' ^"^ '^^ '"formation 

h story of his county, b^t £ .,'„"f 'J' Vi^ P""''*^"^' 

viio inny be saved by rea, incr 'm"' "^ ^^"^ ^^^u z, 

himself ridiculous ni-l^n h5, "''"^ ^'""'^ making 

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